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WESTERN WORLD

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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS EDITOR IN CHIEF

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PLATO

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The Dialogues of PLATO

TRANSLATED BY BENJAMIN JOWETT

The Seventh Letter

TRANSLATED BY J. HARWARD

u s c



WILLIAM BENTON *Publisher*

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CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO GENEVA SYDNEY TOKYO

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

PLATO c. 428 B.C.-c. 348 B.C.

PLATO, son of Ariston and Perictione, was born in 428 or 427 B.C. His family was, on both sides, one of the most distinguished of Athens. Ariston is said to have traced his descent through Codrus to the god Poseidon on the mother's side, the family which was related to Solon, goes back to Dropides, archon of the year 644 B.C. His mother apparently married as her second husband her uncle Pyrilampes, a prominent supporter of Pericles, and Plato was probably chiefly brought up in his house.

Plato's early life coincided with the disastrous years of the Peloponnesian War, the shattering of the Athenian Empire, and the fierce civil strife of oligarchs and democrats in the year of anarchy 404-403 B.C. He was too young to have learned anything by experience of the imperial democracy of Pericles, or of the full tide of the sophistic movement. He must have known Socrates from boyhood for his relatives, Critias and Charmides, were old friends of the philosopher. Aristotle also ascribes to him an early familiarity with the Heraclelean Cratylus. But Plato himself tells us in *The Seventh Letter* that his early ambitions were political. Following the establishment of the Thirty in 404, in which his relatives were leaders, Plato was invited to share in their doings as something to which he had a claim. He held back until their policy was revealed and then was repelled by their violence, particularly by their attempt to implicate Socrates in an illegal execution. He hoped for better things from the restored democracy until the condemnation of Socrates convinced him that he could no more collaborate with the democrats than with the oligarchs. Concluding that "public affairs at Athens were not carried on in accordance with the manners and practices of our fathers, nor was there any ready method by which I could make new friends," Plato abandoned his intention of dedicating himself to politics.

After the execution of Socrates in 399 B.C., Plato went on a series of travels. It would seem that he then discovered his vocation to philosophy as he reflected on the life and teaching of

Socrates. Hermodorus, an immediate disciple, is the authority for the statement that Plato and other Socratic men took temporary refuge at Megara with the philosopher Euclides, who is said to have taught the doctrines of Socrates and of Parmenides. The Alexandrian *Lives* represent the next few years as spent in extensive travels in Greece, Egypt, and Italy. Plato's own statement is only that he visited Italy and Sicily at the age of forty, was disgusted by the gross sensuality of life there, but found a kindred spirit in Dion, brother-in-law of Dionysius I of Syracuse, who was to involve him again in politics twenty years later.

On his return to Athens about 38, Plato founded the Academy. He had presumably already completed some of his dialogues, in particular those celebrating the memory of Socrates. For the rest of his life he presided over the Academy, making it the intellectual center of Greek life. Its only rival was the school of Isocrates. From the allusions of Aristotle it appears that Plato lectured without manuscript, and "problems" were propounded for solution by the joint researches of the students. In addition to philosophy, particular attention was given to science and law. The most important mathematical work of the fourth century was done by friends or pupils of Plato. Theatetus, the founder of solid geometry, was a member of the Academy, and Eudoxus of Cnidus is said to have removed his school from Cyzicus to Athens for the purpose of cooperation with Plato. The Academy was frequently called upon by various cities and colonies to furnish advisers on legislative matters. Plutarch records that among others, Plato sent Aristonymus to the Arcadians, Phormion to Elis, Menodemus to Pyrrhæa.

In 36, when Plato was in his sixtieth year and renowned as the head of the Academy, he was invited to intervene in the politics of Syracuse. Dionysius II had just assumed power, and Plato's friend Dion urged the philosopher to come and undertake the education of the young king and to strengthen him against the encroachment of Carthage in Sicily. Plato's reluctance to make such an attempt was overcome

only by his friendship for Dion and a feeling of shame lest I might someday appear to myself wholly and solely a mere man of words. Plato started Dionysius on a program of philosophical education but in a few months found himself involved in the intrigues of the court against Dion and when Dion was finally forced into virtual banishment Plato returned to Athens. Dionysius who prided himself on his philosophical accomplishments kept in correspondence with Plato and prevailed upon him to visit Syracuse again in 361. Plato renewed his attempt to persuade Dionysius not to enslave Sicily nor any other State to despots

but to put it under the rule of laws. But he again found that the tyrant refused to act righteously and allowed no opportunity for a rule in which philosophy and power really met together. It was only after considerable personal danger that Plato reached Athens. He

never again attempted direct intervention in political affairs although several members of the Academy joined Dion's expedition against Syracuse in 357 which resulted in the overthrow of the tyranny.

The Sicilian voyages are considered to mark a distinct break in Plato's literary activity. The work of his last years is now usually held to consist of a group of seven dialogues: *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*. The Academy was presumably well organized by that time and made fewer administrative demands upon Plato. But we know from Aristotle who became a student there in 367 that Plato still continued to lecture and to take a leading part in the research problems. Legislation seems to have been given particular concern and the *Laws* is said to have been in the process of publication when Plato died in 348 or 347 B.C.

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THE SEVENTH LETTER, 800

CHARMIDES, or Temperance

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE. SOCRATES, who is the FATHER OF CHARMIDES. CHARMIDON.
CURTUS. SEEN. *The Poet says of Themistocles that he was near the Porch of the King Archon.*



[153] I started even now. I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a good while away I thought that I should like to go and look at my old haunts. So I went into the palace of Themistocles, which is over against the temple at the porch of the King Archon. And there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew but not all. My visit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me enter than they saluted me from afar on all sides and Charmidon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?—(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away of which the news had only just reached Athens.)

To see, I replied, that, here I am.

There was a report, he said, that the empire now was very sore, and that many of our acquaintances had fallen.

That I minded, he said, was not far from the truth.

Is now, he said, that you were present?

I was.

Then sit down, and tell us the whole story which as yet we have only heard imperfectly.

I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Curtus the son of Calaeschrus, and when I had related him and the rest of the company I told them the news from the army and answered their several enquiries.

Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make enquiries about matters at home—about the present state of philosophy and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or

beauty or both. Curtus, glancing at the door [154] turned my attention to some youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another followed by a crowd. Of these, because Socrates, he said, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty as it is thought to be, of the day and he is likely to be not far off himself.

Who is he, I said, and who is his father?

Charmides, he replied, is his name: he is my cousin, and the son of my uncle Clinon. I rather think that you know him too, although he was not grown up at the time of your departure.

Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a young man.

You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.

Now you know my friend, that I cannot measure anything and of the beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk for almost all your persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at his beauty and stature: all the world seemed to be enamoured of him: amazement and confusion reigned when he entered and a troop of lovers followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected in this way was not surprising but I observed that there was the same feeling among

the boys all of them down to the very least child turned and looked at him as if he had been a statue

Chaerephon called me and said What do you think of him Socrates? Has he not a beautiful face?

Most beautiful I said

But you would think nothing of his face he replied if you could see his naked form he is absolutely perfect

And to this they all agreed

By Heracles I said there never was such a paragon if he has only one other slight addition

What is that? said Critias

If he has a noble soul and being of your house Critias he may be expected to have this

He is as fair and good within as he is without replied Critias

Then before we see his body should we not ask him to show us his soul naked and undisguised? he is just of an age at which he will like to talk

[155] That he will said Critias and I can tell you that he is a philosopher already and also a considerable poet not in his own opinion only but in that of others

That my dear Critias I replied is a distinction which has long been in your family and is inherited by you from Solon But why do you not call him and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is there could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you who are his guardian and cousin

Very well he said then I will call him and turning to the attendant he said Call Charmides and tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday Then again addressing me he added He has been complaining lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning now why should you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?

Why not I said but will he come?

He will be sure to come, he replied

He came as he was bidden and sat down between Critias and me Great amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his neighbour in order to make a place for him next to themselves until at the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over sideways Now I my friend was beginning to feel awkward my former bold belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished And when Critias told

him that I was the person who had the cure he looked at me in such an indescribable manner and was just going to ask a question And at that moment all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and O rare! I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment and took the flame Then I could no longer contain myself I thought how well Cydias understood the nature of love when in speaking of a fair youth he warns some one not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild beast appetite But I controlled myself and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache I answered but with an effort that I did know

And what is it? he said

I replied that it was a kind of leaf which required to be accompanied by a charm and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure he would be made whole but that without the charm the leaf would be of no avail

[156] Then I will write out the charm from your dictation he said

With my consent? I said or without my consent?

With your consent Socrates he said laughing

Very good I said and are you quite sure that you know my name?

I ought to know you he replied for there is a great deal said about you among my companions and I remember when I was a child seeing you in company with my cousin Critias

I am glad to find that you remember me I said for I shall now be more at home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm about which I felt a difficulty before For the charm will do more Charmides than only cure the headache I dare say that you have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes that they cannot cure his eyes by themselves but that if his eyes are to be cured his head must be treated and then again they say that to think of curing the head alone and not the rest of the body also is the height of folly And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together Did you ever observe that this is what they say?

Yes he said

And they are right and you would agree with them?

Yes he said certainly I should

His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain confidence and the vital heat returned. Such Charmides I said is the nature of the charm which I learned when serving with the army from one of the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis who are said to be so skilful that they can even give immortality. This Thracian told me that in these notions of theirs which I was just now mentioning the Greek physicians are quite right as far as they go but Zamolxis, he added our king who is also a god says further that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head or the head without the body so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul and this he said is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole which ought to be studied also for the part can never be well unless the whole is well. For all good and evil whether in the body or in human nature originates, as he declared in the soul and overflows from thence as if from the head into the eyes [157]. And therefore if the head and body are to be well you must begin by curing the soul that is the first thing. And the cure my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words and by them temperance is implanted in the soul and where temperance is there health is speedily imparted not only to the head but to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same time added a special direction. Let no one, he said, persuade you to cure the head until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the charm. For this he said is the great error of our day in the treatment of the human body that physicians separate the soul from the body. And he added with emphasis at the same time making me swear to his words. Let no one, however rich or noble or fair persuade you to give him the cure, without the charm. Now I have a worn and I must keep my oath and therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your soul as the stranger directed I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Critias when he heard this said. The headache will be an unexpected gain to my young relation if the pain in his head compels him to improve himself and I can tell you Socrates, that Charmides is not only pre-eminent in beauty among his equals, but also in that qual-

ity which is given by the charm and thus as you say is temperance?

Yes I said.

Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings and for his age is superior to none in any quality.

Yes I said Charmides and indeed I think that you ought to excel others in all good qualities for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who could easily point out two Athenian houses whose union would be likely to produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of Dropidas whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrics of Anacreon Solon and many other poets as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune [158] and your mother's house is equally distinguished for your maternal uncle Pylampes is reputed never to have found his equal in Persia at the court of the great king or on the continent of Asia in all the places to which he went as ambassador for stature and beauty that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors you ought to be first in all things and sweet son of Cleon your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty you add temperance and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to be then dear Charmides blessed art thou in being the son of thy mother. And here lies the point for if as he declares you have this gift of temperance already and are temperate enough in that case you have no need of any charms whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once but if you have not yet acquired this quality I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. Please therefore to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying—have you or have you not this quality of temperance?

Charmides blushed and the blush he gilded his beauty for modesty is becoming in youth he then said very ingenuously that he really could not at once answer either yes or no to the question which I had asked. For said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate that would be a strange thing for me to say of myself and also I should give the lie to Critias, and many others who think as he tells you that I am temperate but on the other hand if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself which would be ill manners and therefore I do not know how to answer you.

I said to him That is a natural reply Charmides and I think that you and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine therefore if you please I will share the enquiry with you but I will not press you if you would rather not

There is nothing which I should like better he said and as far as I am concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best

[159] I think I said that I had better begin by asking you a question for if temperance abides in you you must have an opinion about her she must give some intimation of her nature and qualities which may enable you to form a notion of her Is not that true?

Yes he said that I think is true

You know your native language I said and therefore you must be able to tell what you feel about this

Certainly he said

In order then that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not tell me I said what in your opinion is Temperance?

At first he hesitated and was very unwilling to answer then he said that he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for example as walking in the streets and talking or anything else of that nature In a word he said I should answer that in my opinion temperance is quietness

Are you right Charmides? I said No doubt some would affirm that the quiet are the temperate but let us see whether these words have any meaning and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the noble and good?

Yes

But which is best when you are at the writing master's to write the same letters quickly or quietly?

Quickly

And to read quickly or slowly?

Quickly again

And in playing the lyre or wrestling quickness or sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness?

Yes

And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratiun?

Certainly

And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally quickness and agility are

good slowness and inactivity and quietness are bad?

That is evident

Then I said in all bodily actions not quietness but the greatest agility and quickness is noblest and best?

Yes certainly

And is temperance a good?

Yes

Then in reference to the body not quietness but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance if temperance is a good?

True he said

And which I said is better—facility in learning or difficulty in learning?

Facility

Yes I said and facility in learning is learning quickly and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

True

And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically rather than quietly and slowly?

Yes

And which is better to call to mind and to remember quickly and readily or quietly and slowly?

The former

[160] And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul and not a quietness?

True

And is it not best to understand what is said whether at the writing master's or the music master's or anywhere else not as quietly as possible but as quickly as possible?

Yes

And in the searchings or deliberations of the soul not the quietest as I imagine and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers is thought worthy of praise but he who does so most easily and quickly?

Quite true he said

And in all that concerns either body or soul swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?

Clearly they are

Then temperance is not quietness nor is the temperate life quiet—certainly not upon this view for the life which is temperate is supposed to be the good And of two things one is true—either never or very seldom do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and energetic ones or supposing that of the nobler actions there are as many quiet as quick and vehement still even if we grant this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more

than acting quickly and energetically either in walk or talking or in anything else nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet seeing that temperance is admitted by us to be a good and noble thing and the quick have been shown to be as good as the quiet.

I think, he said, Socrates that you are right.

Then once more Charmides I said fix your attention on and look within consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself and the nature of that which has the effect. Think over all this, and like a brave youth tell me—What is temperance?

After a moment's pause in which he made a really manly effort to think, he said, My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man a hamed or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

Very good, I said, and did you not admit just now that temperance is noble?

Yes, certainly, he said.

And the temperate are also good?

Yes.

And can that be good which does not make men good?

Certainly not.

And you would infer that temperance is not only noble but also good?

[161] That is my opinion.

Well I said but surely you would agree with Homer when he says

If deity is not good for a man?

Yes, he said, I agree.

Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?

Clearly.

But temperance whose presence makes men only good and not bad is always good?

That appears to me to be as you say.

And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty—if temperance is a good and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?

All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true but I should like to know what you think about another definition of temperance which I just now remember to have heard from some one who said, "That temperance is doing our own business." Was he right, he affirmed that?

You must remember! I said, this is what Cratylus or some philosopher has told you.

Some one else, then, said Cratylus for certain, I have not.

But it has matter said Charmides from whom I heard this?

No matter at all, I replied, for the point is

not who said the words but whether they are true or not.

There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied.

To be sure, I said, yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover their truth or falsehood for they are a kind of riddle.

What makes you think so? he said.

Because I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?

I should rather think that he was doing some thing.

And does the scribe write or read or teach you boys to write or read your own names only or did you write your enemies' names as well as your own and your friends?

As much one as the other.

And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?

Certainly not.

And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?

But they are the same as doing.

And the healing art, my friend, and building and weaving and doing anything whatever which is done by art—these all clearly come under the head of doing?

Certainly.

And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat and make his own shoes and his own flask and strigil and other implements [162] on this principle of every one doing and performing his own and abstaining from what is not his own?

I think not, he said.

But, I said, a temperate state will be a well ordered state.

Of course, he replied.

Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business, not at least in this way or doing things of this sort?

Clearly not.

Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning for I do not think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you Charmides?

Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.

Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, thinking that no one

would know the meaning of the words doing his own business

I dare say he replied

And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?

Indeed I cannot and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this phrase did not understand what he was saying Whereupon he laughed slyly and looked at Critias

Critias had long been showing uneasiness for he felt that he had a reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company He had however hitherto managed to restrain himself but now he could no longer forbear and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I entertained at the time that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias And Charmides who did not want to answer himself but to make Critias answer tried to stir him up He went on pointing out that he had been refuted at which Critias grew angry and appeared as I thought inclined to quarrel with him just as a poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them so he looked hard at him and said—

Do you imagine Charmides that the author of this definition of temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words because you do not understand them?

Why at his age I said most excellent Critias he can hardly be expected to understand but you who are older and have studied may well be assumed to know the meaning of them and therefore if you agree with him and accept his definition of temperance I would much rather argue with you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition

I entirely agree said Critias and accept the definition

Very good I said and now let me repeat my question—Do you admit as I was just now saying that all craftsmen make or do something?

I do

[163] And do they make or do their own business only or that of others also?

They make or do that of others also

And are they temperate seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?

Why not? he said

No objection on my part I said but there may be a difficulty on his who proposes as a definition of temperance doing one's own business and then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others should not be temperate

Nay said he did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said those who make not those who do

What! I asked do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?

No more he replied than making or working are the same thus much I have learned from Hesiod who says that work is no disgrace Now do you imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were describing he would have said that there was no disgrace in them—for example in the manufacture of shoes or in selling pickles or sitting for hire in a house of ill fame? That Socrates is not to be supposed but I conceive him to have distinguished making from doing and work and while admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a disgrace when the employment was not honourable to have thought that work was never any disgrace at all For things nobly and usefully made he called works and such makings he called workings and doings and he must be supposed to have called such things only man's proper business and what is hurtful not his business and in that sense Hesiod and any other wise man may be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work

O Critias I said no sooner had you opened your mouth than I pretty well knew that you would call that which is proper to a man and that which is his own good and that the makings of the good you would call doings for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions which Prodicus draws about names Now I have no objection to your giving names any signification which you please if you will only tell me what you mean by them Please then to begin again and be a little plainer Do you mean that this doing or making or whatever is the word which you would use of good actions is temperance?

I do he said

Then not he who does evil but he who does good is temperate?

Yes he said and you friend would agree

No matter whether I should or not just now not what I think but what you are saying is the point at issue

Well he answered I mean to say that he who does evil and not good is not temperate and that he is temperate who does good and not evil for temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions

[164] And you may be very likely right in

what you are saying but I am curious to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own temperance?

I do not think so he said

And yet were you not saying just now that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another's work, as well as in doing their own?

I was he replied but what is your drift?

I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?

I think that he may

And he who does so does his duty?

Yes

And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?

Yes he acts wisely

But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited and when not to be benefited by the work which he is doing?

I suppose not

Then, I said he may sometimes do good or harm and not know what he is himself doing and yet, in doing good, as you say he has done temperately or wisely Was not that your statement?

Yes

Then as would seem in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?

But that, Socrates, he said is impossible and therefore if this is, as you imply the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I will withdraw them rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise who does not know himself and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in error I or self knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription know thyself at Delphi. That word if I am not mistaken is put there as a sort of salvation which the god addresses to those who enter the temple as much as to say that the ordinary salvation of Hades is not right, and that the exhortation Be temperate! would be a far better way of saving one another The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was as I believe that the god speaks to those who enter his temple, not as men speak but, when a worshipper enters, the first word which he hears is Be

temperate! This however like a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle for know thyself and Be temperate! are the same as I maintain and as the letters imply and yet they may be easily misunderstood [165] and succeeding sages who added "Never too much or Give a pledge and evil is nigh at hand" would appear to have so misunderstood them for they imagined that know thyself was a piece of advice which the god gave and not his salutation of the worshippers at their first coming in and they dedicated their own inscription under the idea that they too would give equally useful pieces of advice Shall I tell you Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right but at any rate, no clear result was attained) and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to prove if you deny that temperance is self knowledge

Yes, I said, Critias but you come to me as though I professed to know about the questions which I ask, and as though I could if I only would agree with you Whereas the fact is that I enquire with you into the truth of that which is advanced from time to time just because I do not know and when I have enquired I will say whether I agree with you or not. Please then to allow me time to reflect.

Reflect, he said

I am reflecting I replied, and discover that temperance or wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything must be a science, and a science of something

Yes, he said the science of itself

Is not medicine I said the science of health?

True

And suppose I said that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of medicine, which is this science of health I should answer that medicine is of very great use in producing health which as you will admit, is an excellent effect.

Granted

And if you were to ask me what is the result or effect of architecture which is the science of building I should say houses, and so of other arts which all have their different results. Now I want you Critias to answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which according to you is the science of itself Admitting this view I ask of you what good work worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself effect?

Answer me

That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry Socrates he said for wisdom is not like

the other sciences any more than they are like one another but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me he said what result is there of computation or geometry in the same sense as a house is the result of building or a garment of weaving [166] or any other work of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot

That is true I said but still each of these sciences has a subject which is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true?

Yes he said

And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?

They are not

The art of weighing again has to do with lighter and heavier but the art of weighing is one thing and the heavy and the light another. Do you admit that?

Yes

Now I want to know what is that which is not wisdom and of which wisdom is the science?

You are just falling into the old error. Socrates he said. You come asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences and then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike but they are not for all the other sciences are of something else and not of themselves. Wisdom alone is a science of other sciences and of itself. And of this as I believe you are very well aware and that you are only doing what you denied that you were doing just now trying to refute me instead of pursuing the argument.

And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are a good common to all mankind?

Yes certainly, Socrates he said

Then I said be cheerful sweet sir and give your opinion in answer to the question which I asked never minding whether Critias or Socrates is the person refuted attend only to the argument and see what will come of the refutation

I think that you are right he replied and I will do as you say

Tell me then I said what you mean to affirm about wisdom

I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself as well as of the other sciences

But the science of science I said will also be the science of the absence of science

Very true he said

[167] Then the wise or temperate man and he only will know himself and be able to examine what he knows or does not know and to see what others know and think that they know and do really know and what they do not know and fancy that they know when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. And this is wisdom and temperance and self knowledge—for a man to know what he knows and what he does not know. That is your meaning?

Yes he said

Now then I said making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus the Saviour let us begin again and ask in the first place whether it is or is not possible for a person to know that he knows and does not know what he knows and does not know and in the second place whether if perfectly possible such knowledge is of any use

That is what we have to consider he said

And here Critias I said I hope that you will find a way out of a difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty?

By all means he replied

Does not what you have been saying if true amount to this that there must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other sciences and that the same is also the science of the absence of science?

Yes

But consider how monstrous this proposition is my friend in any parallel case the impossibility will be transparent to you

How is that? and in what cases do you mean?

In such cases as this. Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not like ordinary vision but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision and of the defect of them which in seeing sees no colour but only itself and other sorts of vision. Do you think that there is such a kind of vision?

Certainly not

Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no

sound at all but only itself and other sorts of hearing or the defects of them?

There is not

Or take all the senses can you imagine that there is any sense of itself and of other senses but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of the senses?

I think not

Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure but of itself and of all other desires?

Certainly not

Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good but only for itself and all other wishes?

I should answer No

Or could you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty but of itself and of other loves?

I should not

[168] Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears but has no object of fear?

I never did he said

Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?

Certainly not

But surely we are assuming a science of this kind which having no subject matter is a science of itself and of the other sciences?

Yes that is what is affirmed

But how strange is this if it be indeed true we must not however as yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science let us rather consider the matter

You are quite right

Well then that science of which we are speaking is a science of something and is of a nature to be a science of something?

Yes

Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else?

Yes

Which is less if the other is conceived to be greater?

To be sure

And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself and greater than other great things but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater then that thing would have the property of being greater and also less than itself?

That, Socrates he said is the inevitable inference

Or if there be a double which is double of

itself and of other doubles these will be halves for the double is relative to the half?

That is true

And that which is greater than itself will also be less and that which is heavier will also be lighter and that which is older will also be younger and the same of other things that which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object I mean to say for example that hearing is as we say of sound or voice Is that true?

Yes

Then if hearing hears itself it must hear a voice for there is no other way of hearing

Certainly

And sight also my excellent friend if it sees itself must see a colour for sight cannot see that which has no colour

No

Do you remark Cebes, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible and in other cases hardly credible—inadmissible for example in the case of magnitudes numbers and the like?

Very true

But in the case of hearing and sight or in the power of self motion and the power of heat to burn this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some [169] but perhaps not by others And some great man my friend is wanted who will satisfactorily determine for us whether there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self or some things only and not others and whether in this class of self related things if there be such a class that science which is called wisdom or temperance is included I altogether distrust my own power of determining these matters I am not certain whether there is such a science of science at all and even if there be I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance until I can also see whether such a science would or would not do us any good for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a good And therefore O son of Callaeschrus as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science and also of the absence of science I will request you to show in the first place as I was saying before the possibility and in the second place the advantage of such a science and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance

Critias heard me say this and saw that I was in a difficulty and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of

yawning from him so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at issue and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed I said to him: Well then Critias if you like let us assume that there is this science of science whether the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting the existence of it will you tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not know which as we were saying is self knowledge or wisdom so we were saying?

Yes Socrates he said and that I think is certainly true for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge which he has in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift and he who has beauty will be beautiful and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self knowing will know himself.

I do not doubt I said that a man will know himself when he possesses that which has self knowledge but what necessity is there that, having this he should know what he knows and what he does not know?

[170] Because Socrates they are the same.

Very likely I said but I remain as stupid as ever for still I fail to comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of self.

What do you mean? he said.

This is what I mean I replied I will admit that there is a science of science — can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge?

No just that.

But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?

Certainly not.

The one is medicine and the other is politics whereas that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.

Very true.

And if a man knows only and has only knowledge of knowledge and has no further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself or other men.

True.

Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? Say that he knows health — not wisdom or temperance but the art of medicine has taught it to him, — and he has learned harmony from the art of music and building from the art of building — neither from wisdom or temperance and the same of other things.

That is evident.

How will wisdom regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science ever teach him that he knows health or that he knows building?

It is impossible.

Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows but not what he knows?

True.

Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know but only the knowledge that we know or do not know?

That is the inference.

Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows he will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind but wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is?

Plainly not.

Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the true physician nor between any other true and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way. If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false how will he proceed? He will not talk to him about medicine and that as we were saying is the only thing which the physician understands.

True.

And on the other hand the physician knows nothing of science for this has been assumed to be the province of wisdom.

True.

[171] And further since medicine is science we must infer that he does not know anything of medicine.

Exactly.

Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge but when he wants to discover the nature of this he will ask: What is the subject matter? For the several sciences are distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the nature of their subjects. Is not that true?

Quite true.

And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject matter of health and disease?

Yes.

And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?

True.

And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?

He will.

He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right in relation to health and disease?

He will.

But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge of medicine?

He cannot.

No one at all, it would seem except the physician can have this knowledge and therefore not the wise man—he would have to be a physician as well as a wise man.

Very true.

Then, assuredly wisdom or temperance if only a science of science and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all like any other art, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom and no one else.

That is evident, he said.

But then what profit, Critias, I said is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which require, if this is wisdom? If indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew and did not know and that he knew the one and did not know the other and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know but we should have found out those who knew and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom and everything else of

which wisdom was the lord would have been well ordered for truth guiding and error having been eliminated [173] in all their doings, men would have done well and would have been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom—to know what is known and what is unknown to us?

Very true he said.

And now you perceive, I said that no such science is to be found anywhere.

I perceive he said.

May we assume then I said that wisdom viewed in this new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage—that he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns and that everything will be clearer to him because, in addition to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows himself whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed to have a feeble and weaker insight? Are not these my friend the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?

That is very likely he said.

That is very likely I said and very likely too, we have been enquiring to no purpose as I am led to infer because I observe that if this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us if you please, assume the possibility of this science of sciences and further admit and allow as was originally suggested that wisdom is the knowledge of what we know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further consideration I am doubtful Critias whether wisdom, such as this would do us much good. For we were wrong I think in supposing as we were saying just now that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state would be a great benefit.

How so? he said.

Why I said, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which mankind could obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who were better acquainted with them.

Were we not right in making that admission?

I think not.

How very strange Socrates!

By the dog of Egypt I said there I agree with you and I was thinking as much just now

when I said that strange consequences would follow and that I was afraid we were on the wrong track for however ready we may be to admit that this is wisdom [173] I certainly cannot make out what good this sort of thing does to us

What do you mean? he said I wish that you could make me understand what you mean

I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense I replied and yet if a man has any feeling of what is due to himself he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined

I like that he said

Hear then I said my own dream whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate I cannot tell The dream is this Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining and that she has absolute sway over us then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not or any physician or general or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant will deceive or elude us our health will be improved our safety at sea and also in battle will be assured our coats and shoes and all other instruments and implements will be skilfully made because the workmen will be good and true Aye and if you please you may suppose that prophecy which is the knowledge of the future will be under the control of wisdom and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets in their place as the revealers of the future Now I quite agree that mankind thus provided would live and act according to knowledge for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy my dear Critias—this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine

Yet I think he replied that if you discard knowledge you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else

But of what is this knowledge? I said Just answer me that small question Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?

God forbid

Or of working in brass?

Certainly not

Or in wool or wood or anything of that sort?

No I do not

Then I said we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to knowledge is happy for these live according to knowledge and yet they are not allowed by you to be

happy but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge [174] such for example as the prophet who as I was saying knows the future Is it of him you are speaking or of some one else?

Yes I mean him but there are others as well

Yes I said some one who knows the past and present as well as the future and is ignorant of nothing Let us suppose that there is such a person and if there is you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men

Certainly he is

Yet I should like to know one thing more which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy?

Not all equally he replied

But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past present or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?

Nonsense about the game of draughts

Or of computation?

No

Or of health?

That is nearer the truth he said

And that knowledge which is nearest of all I said is the knowledge of what?

The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil

Monster! I said you have been carrying me round in a circle and all this time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly and be happy not even if knowledge include all the sciences but one science only that of good and evil For let me ask you Critias whether if you take away this medicine will not equally give health and shoemaking equally produce shoes and the art of the weaver clothes?—whether the art of the pilot will not equally save our lives at sea and the art of the general in war?

Quite so

And yet my dear Critias none of these things will be well or beneficially done if the science of the good be wanting

True

But that science is not wisdom or temperance but a science of human advantage not a science of other sciences or of ignorance but of good and evil and if this be of use then wisdom or temperance will not be of use

And why he replied will not wisdom be of use? For however much we assume that wis-

dom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under her control and in this way will benefit us.

And will wisdom give health? I said, is not this rather the effect of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,—do they not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?

That is obvious.

Then wisdom will not be the producer of health.

Certainly not.

The art of health is different.

Yes, different.

[15] Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend, for that again we have just now been attributing to another art.

Very true.

How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?

That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.

You see then Critias that I was not far wrong, in fearing that I could have no sound notion about wisdom. I was quite right in deprecating myself for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything, at an enquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be fairly granted: for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument said No, and protested against us; and we admitted further that this science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied by the argument) because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge of what he knew, and did not know also we nobly disregarded, and never even considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at all for our assumption was, that he knows that which he does not know, than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still unable to discover the truth, but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of its way to prove the nullity of that which we asserted only by a sort of supposition and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wisdom, which result, as far as I am con-

cerned, is not so much to be lamented, I said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry—that you, having such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit or good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit, from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad enquirer for wisdom or temperance. I believe to be really a great good and happy are you, Charmides, if you certainly possess it. Wherefore examine yourself [16] and see whether you have this gift and can do without the charm, for if you can I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason out anything, and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are the happier you will be.

Charmides said, I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance, for how can I know whether I have a thing of which even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to discover the nature?—(not that I believe you.) And further I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily until you say that I have had enough.

Very good, Charmides, said Critias, if you do this I shall have a proof of your temperance that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, and never desert him at all.

You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides, if you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you.

And I do command you, he said.

Then I will do as you say and begin this very day.

You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?

We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.

And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?

Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders us, and therefore you had better consider well.

But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is employed and you when you are determined on an thing, and in the mood of violence are irresistible.

Do not you resist me then, he said.

I will not resist you, I replied.

LYSIS, or Friendship

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE *Socrates who is the narrator* MENEXENUS HIPPOTHALES
LYSIS CTESIPPUS *Scene A newly erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens*



[203] I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum intending to take the outer road which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate of the city which is by the fountain of Panops I fell in with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus and Ctesippus the Paeanian and a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales seeing me approach asked whence I came and whither I was going.

I am going I replied from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.

Then come straight to us he said, and put in here you may as well.

Who are you I said and where am I to come?

He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. And there he said is the building at which we all meet and a goodly company we are.

And what is this building I asked and what sort of entertainment have you?

[204] The building he replied is a newly erected Palaestra and the entertainment is generally conversation to which you are welcome.

Thank you I said and is there any teacher there?

Yes he said your old friend and admirer Miecus.

Indeed I replied he is a very eminent professor.

Are you disposed he said to go with me and see them?

Yes I said but I should like to know first what is expected of me and who is the favourite among you?

Some persons have one favourite Socrates and some another he said.

And who is yours? I asked tell me that Hippothales.

At this he blushed and I said to him O Hippothales thou son of Hieronymus! do not say that you are or that you are not, in love the confession is too late for I see that you are not only in love but are already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am the Gods have given me the power of understanding affections of this kind.

Whereupon he blushed more and more.

Ctesippus said I like to see you blushing Hippothales and hesitating to tell Socrates the name when if he were with you but for a very short time you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else. Indeed Socrates he has literally deafened us and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis and if he is a little intoxicated there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough but nothing at all in comparison with his verse and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions it is really too bad and worse still is his manner of singing them to his love he has a voice which is truly appalling and we cannot help hearing him and now having a question put to him by you behold he is blushing.

Who is Lysis? I said I suppose that he must be young for the name does not recall any one to me.

Why he said his father being a very well known man he retains his patronymic and is

not as yet commonly called by his own name but, although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.

But tell me whose son he is, I said.

He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone.

Ah, Hippothales, I said what a noble and really perfect love you have found! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the company and then I shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say [205] about his love, either to the youth himself or to others.

Nay, Socrates, he said you surely do not attach any importance to what he is saying.

Do you mean, I said that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?

No but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.

He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad.

Hippothales I said if you have ever made any verses or songs in honour of your favourite, I do not want to hear them but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one.

Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said for if, as he avers, the sound of my words is all ringing in his ears, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them.

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus I know only too well and very ridiculous the tale is for all that he is a lover and very devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their victory at the Pythian games and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four horses and six horses—these are the tales which he composes and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a connexion of the family setting forth how in virtue of this relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of Lysis this ancestor was himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme. And there are the sort of old wiles tales which he sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him.

When I heard this, I said O ridiculous Hip-

pothales! how can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?

But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself Socrates.

You think not? I said.

Nay but what do you think? he replied.

Most assuredly I said, those songs are all in your own honour for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour of you who have conquered and won such a love but if he slips away from you the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings [206] and therefore the wise lover does not praise his beloved until he has won him because he is afraid of accidents. There is also another danger the fair when any one praises or magnifies them are filled with the spirit of pride and vain glory. Do you not agree with me?

Yes, he said.

And the more vain glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?

I believe you.

What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?

He would be a bad hunter undoubtedly.

Yet and if instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with words and songs, that would show a great want of wit do you not agree?

Yes.

And now reflect Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.

Assuredly not he said such a poet would be a fool. And this is the reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?

That is not easy to determine I said but if you will bring your love to me, and will let me talk with him I may perhaps be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused.

There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied if you will only go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra and sit down and talk, I believe that he will come of his own accord for

he is fond of listening Socrates And as this is the festival of the Hermaea the young men and boys are all together and there is no separation between them He will be sure to come but if he does not Ctesippus with whom he is familiar and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend shall call him

That will be the way I said Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the Palaestra and the rest followed

Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing and this part of the festival was nearly at an end They were all in their white array and games at dice were going on among them Most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves but some were in a corner of the Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice which they took out of little wicker baskets There was also a circle of lookers-on among them was Lysis He was standing with the other boys and youths, [207] having a crown upon his head like a fair vision and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty We left them and went over to the opposite side of the room where finding a quiet place we sat down and then we began to talk This attracted Lysis who was constantly turning round to look at us—he was evidently wanting to come to us For a time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone but first of all his friend Menexenus leaving his play, entered the Palaestra from the court and when he saw Ctesippus and myself was going to take a seat by us and then Lysis seeing him followed and sat down by his side and the other boys joined I should observe that Hippothales when he saw the crowd got behind them where he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis lest he should anger him and there he stood and listened

I turned to Menexenus and said Son of Demophon which of you two youths is the elder?

That is a matter of dispute between us he said

And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute?

Yes certainly

And another disputed point is which is the fairer?

The two boys laughed

I shall not ask which is the richer of the two I said for you are friends are you not?

Certainly they replied

And friends have all things in common so that one of you can be no richer than the other if you say truly that you are friends

They assented I was about to ask which was the juster of the two and which was the wiser of the two but at this moment Menexenus was called away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic master wanted him I supposed that he had to offer sacrifice So he went away and I asked Lysis some more questions I dare say Lysis I said that your father and mother love you very much

Certainly he said

And they would wish you to be perfectly happy

Yes

But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave and who cannot do what he likes?

I should think not indeed he said

And if your father and mother love you and desire that you should be happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your happiness

Certainly he replied

And do they then permit you to do what you like and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire?

Yes indeed Socrates there are a great many things which they hinder me from doing

What do you mean? I said Do they want you to be happy and yet hinder you from doing what you like? [208] For example if you want to mount one of your father's chariots and take the reins at a race they will not allow you to do so—they will prevent you?

Certainly he said they will not allow me to do so

Whom then will they allow?

There is a charioteer whom my father pays for driving

And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes with the horses? and do they pay him for this?

They do

But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you like—they will permit that?

Permit me! indeed they will not

Then I said may no one use the whip to the mules?

Yes he said the muleteer

And is he a slave or a free man?

A slave he said

And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him to do what he likes when they prohibit you? Answer me now Are you your

own master or do they not even allow that?

Nay he said of course they do not allow it

Then you have a master?

Yes, my tutor there he is

And is he a slave?

To be sure he is our slave, he replied

Surely I said this is a strange thing that a free man should be governed by a slave And what does he do with you?

He takes me ■ my teachers

You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?

Of course they do

Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and masters on you But at any rate when you go home to your mother she will let you have your own way and will not interfere with your happiness her wool or the price of cloth which she is weaving are at your disposal I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden spoons or her comb or any other of her spinning implements

Nay Socrates, he replied laughing not only does she hinder me, but I should be beaten if I were to touch one of them

Well I said, this is amazing And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?

No indeed, he replied

But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy and doing as you like?—keeping you all day long in subject on to another and in a word, doing nothing which you desire [209] so that you have no good as would appear out of their great possessions, which are under the control of any body rather than of you and have none of your own fair person which is tended and taken care of by another while you Lysis are master of nobody and can do nothing?

Why he said Socrates the reason is that I am not of age.

I doubt whether that is the real reason I said for I should imagine that your father Democritus, and your mother do permit you to do many things already and do not wait until you are of age for example, if they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them

Very true

And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which you please or to take up the lyre and tune the notes and play with the flutes, or strike with the plectrum exactly as you please and neither father nor mother would interfere with you.

That is true he said

Then what can be the reason Lysis I said why they allow you to do the one and not the other?

I suppose, he said because I understand the one and not the other

Yes, my dear youth I said the reason is not any deficiency of years but a deficiency of knowledge and whenever your father thinks that you are wiser than he ■ he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to you

I think so

Aye, I said and about your neighbour too does not the same rule hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself or will he commit them to you?

I think that he will commit them to me

Will not the Athenian people too entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?

Yes

And oh! let me put another case, I said There is the great king and he has an eldest son who is the Prince of Asia—suppose that you and I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his son ■ will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup and putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?

To us, clearly

And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?

Of course

Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes will he allow him or will he not allow him to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge of medicine

[210] He will not allow him

Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine he will allow us to do what we like with him—even to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ashes upon them because he supposes that we know what is best?

That ■ true

And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?

That is very true, Socrates, he replied

Then now my dear Lysis, I said you perceive that in things which we know every one will trust us—Hellenes and barbarians, men

and women—and we may do as we please about them and no one will like to interfere with us we shall be free and masters of others and these things will be really ours for we shall be benefited by them But in things of which we have no understanding no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they will hinder us as far as they can and not only strangers but father and mother and the friend if there be one who is dearer still will also hinder us and we shall be subject to others and these things will not be ours for we shall not be benefited by them Do you agree?

He assented

And shall we be friends to others and will any others love us in as far as we are useless to them?

Certainly not

Neither can your father or mother love you nor can anybody love anybody else in so far as they are useless to them?

No

And therefore my boy if you are wise all men will be your friends and kindred for you will be useful and good but if you are not wise neither father nor mother nor kindred nor any one else will be your friends And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge can you have any conceit of knowledge?

That is impossible he replied

And you Lysis if you require a teacher have not yet attained to wisdom

True

And therefore you are not conceited having nothing of which to be conceited

Indeed Socrates I think not

When I heard him say this I turned to Hippothales and was very nearly making a blunder for I was going to say to him That is the way Hippothales in which you should talk to your beloved humbling and lowering him and not as you do puffing him up and spoiling him But I saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said and I remembered that although he was in the neighbourhood [211] he did not want to be seen by Lysis so upon second thoughts I refrained

In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis and Lysis in a childish and affectionate manner whispered privately in my ear so that Menexenus should not hear Do Socrates tell Menexenus what you have been telling me

Suppose that you tell him yourself Lysis I replied for I am sure that you were attending

Certainly, he replied

Try then to remember the words and be as exact as you can in repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything ask me again the next time that you see me

I will be sure to do so Socrates but go on telling him something new and let me hear as long as I am allowed to stay

I certainly cannot refuse I said since you ask me but then as you know Menexenus is very pugnacious and therefore you must come to the rescue if he attempts to upset me

Yes indeed he said he is very pugnacious and that is the reason why I want you to argue with him

That I may make a fool of myself?

No indeed he said but I want you to put him down

That is no easy matter I replied for he is a terrible fellow—a pupil of Ctesippus And there is Ctesippus himself do you see him?

Never mind Socrates, you shall argue with him

Well I suppose that I must I replied

Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret and keeping the feast to ourselves

I shall be happy I said to let you have a share Here is Lysis who does not understand something that I was saying and wants me to ask Menexenus who as he thinks is likely to know

And why do you not ask him? he said

Very well I said I will and do you Menexenus answer But first I must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing All people have their fancies some desire horses and others dogs and some are fond of gold and others of honour Now I have no violent desire of any of these things but I have a passion for friends and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world I would even go further and say the best horse or dog Yea by the dog of Egypt I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius [212] or even to Darius himself I am such a lover of friends as that And when I see you and Lysis at your early age so easily possessed of this treasure and so soon he of you and you of him I am amazed and delighted seeing that I myself although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acquisition that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired But I want to ask you a question about this for you have experience tell me then when one loves another ■ the lover or the

beloved the friend or may either be the friend?
 Either may I should think be the friend of
 either

Do you mean I said that if only one of them
 loves the other they are mutual friends?

Yes, he said that is my meaning

But what if the lover is not loved in return?
 which is a very possible case

Yes
 Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy
 which sometimes is entertained by lovers re-
 specting their beloved. Nothing can exceed their
 love and yet they imagine either that they are
 not loved in return or that they are hated. Is
 not that true?

Yes, he said quite true

In that case, the one loves and the other is
 loved?

Yes
 Then which is the friend of which? Is the
 lover the friend of the beloved whether he be
 loved in return or hated or is the beloved the
 friend or is there no friendship at all on either
 side unless they both love one another?

There would seem to be none in all

Then this notion is not in accordance with
 our previous one. We were saying that both
 were friends, if one only loved but now un-
 less they both love neither is a friend

That appears to be true

Then nothing which does not love in return
 is beloved by a lover?

I think not.

Then they are not lovers of horses, whom
 the horses do not love in return nor lovers of
 quails, nor of dogs nor of vine nor of gym-
 nastic exercises who have no return of love
 nor of wisdom unless wisdom loves them
 in return. Or shall we say that they do love
 them although they are not beloved by them
 and that the poet was wrong who sings—

*Happy is man to whom his children are dear
 dear to his grandfather and dogs of chase
 dear to the squire of another land?*

I do not think that he was wrong

You think that he is right?

Yes

Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what
 is beloved whether loving or hating may be
 dear to the lover of it for example very young
 children, too young to love or even hating the
 father or mother when they are punished by
 them [213] are never dearer to them than at
 the time when they are being hated by them

I think that what you say is true
 And if so not the lover but the beloved is
 the friend or dear one?

Yes

And the hated one, and not the hater is the
 enemy?

Clearly

Then many men are loved by their enemies
 and hated by their friends and are the friends
 of their enemies, and the enemies of their
 friends. Yet how absurd my dear friend or
 indeed impossible is this paradox of a man be-
 ing an enemy to his friend or a friend to his
 enemy

I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say

But if this cannot be the lover will be the
 friend of that which is loved?

True

And the hater will be the enemy of that
 which is hated?

Certainly

Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the
 preceding instance, that a man may be the friend
 of one who is not his friend or who may be his
 enemy when he loves that which does not love
 him or which even hates him. And he may be
 the enemy of one who is not his enemy and
 even his friend for example when he hates
 that which does not hate him or which even
 loves him

That appears to be true.

But if the lover is not a friend nor the be-
 loved a friend nor both together what are we
 to say? Whom are we to call friends in one an-
 other? Do any remain?

Indeed Socrates, I cannot find any

But, O Menexenus! I said may we not have
 been altogether wrong in our conclusions?

I am sure that we have been wrong. Socrates
 said Lysis. And he blushed as he spoke, the
 words seeming to come from his lips involun-
 tarily because his whole mind was taken up
 with the argument there was no mistaking his
 attentive look while he was listening

I was pleased at the interest which was shown
 by Lysis, and I wanted to give Menexenus a
 rest, so I turned to him and said I think, Lysis
 that what you say is true and that, if we had
 been right, we should never have gone so far
 wrong let us proceed no further in this direc-
 tion (for the road seems to be getting trouble-
 some) but take the other path into which we
 turned and see what the poets have to say
 [214] for they are to us in a manner the fathers
 and authors of wisdom and they speak of friends

in no light or trivial manner but God himself as they say makes them and draws them to one another and thus they express if I am not mistaken in the following words —

God is ever drawing like towards like and making them acquainted

I dare say that you have heard those words

Yes he said I have

And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about nature and the universe

Very true he replied

And are they right in saying this?

They may be

Perhaps I said about half or possibly altogether right if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us For the more a bad man has to do with a bad man and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him the more he will be likely to hate him for he injures him and injurer and injured cannot be friends Is not that true?

Yes he said

Then one half of the saying is untrue if the wicked are like one another?

That is true

But the real meaning of the saying as I imagine is that the good are like one another and friends to one another and that the bad as is often said of them are never at unity with one another or with themselves for they are passionate and restless and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing Do you not agree?

Yes I do

Then my friend those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate if I rightly apprehend them that the good only is the friend of the good and of him only but that the evil never attains to any real friendship either with good or evil Do you agree?

He nodded assent

Then now we know how to answer the question Who are friends? for the argument declares That the good are friends

Yes he said that is true

Yes I replied and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer By heaven and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will Assuming that like inasmuch as he is like is the friend of like and useful to him—or rather let me try another way of putting the matter Can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to

himself or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? [215] And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?

They cannot

And can he who is not loved be a friend?

Certainly not

But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?

True

But then again will not the good in so far as he is good be sufficient for himself? Certainly he will And he who is sufficient wants nothing—that is implied in the word sufficient

Of course not

And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

He will not

Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

He cannot

And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?

Clearly not

What place then is there for friendship if when absent good men have no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for themselves) and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?

They cannot

And friends they cannot be unless they value one another?

Very true

But see now Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this—are we not indeed entirely wrong?

How so? he replied

Have I not heard some one say as I just now recollect that the like is the greatest enemy of the like the good of the good?—Yes and he quoted the authority of Hesiod who says

*Potter quarrels with potter bard with bard
Beggar with beggar*

and of all other things he affirmed in like manner That of necessity the most like are most full of envy strife and hatred of one another and the most unlike of friendship For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich and the weak requires the aid of the strong and the sick man of the physician and every one who is ignorant has to love and court him who knows And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language that the idea of

friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full the full the void, and so of all other things for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from like {16} And I thought that who said this was a charming man, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

I should say at first hearing that he is right, said Menexenus

Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

Exactly

Yes, Menexenus but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the all wise eristics be down upon us in triumph and ask, fairly enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate and what answer shall we make to them—must we not admit that they speak the truth

We must.

They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

Neither be replied

Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad

I do not see how that is possible.

And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be friends.

They must.

Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends

I suppose not.

And yet there is a further consideration may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?

How do you mean? he said.

Why really I said, the truth is that I do not know but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that the beautiful is the friend as the old proverb says Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, a pretty thing, and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that

Yes.

Thus I say I am a sort of notion that what is

neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined to think so I assume that there are three principles—the good the bad and that which is neither good nor bad. You would agree—would you not?

I agree

And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, nor the good of the evil—these alternatives are excluded by the previous argument and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.

True

But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying

True

And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil.

Clearly not.

Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil

{17} That may be assumed to be certain.

And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid but is well enough and the healthy man has no love for the physician, because he is in health

He has none

But the sick loves him, because he is sick?

Certainly

And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?

Yes.

But the human body regarded as a body is neither good nor evil?

True.

And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine

Yes.

Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil

So we may infer

And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil—if itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good for as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.

in no light or trivial manner but God himself as they say, makes them and draws them to one another and this they express if I am not mistaken in the following words —

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*Potter quarrels with potter bad with bad
Beggars with beggars*

and of all other things he affirmed in like manner That of necessity the most like are most full of envy strife and hatred of one another and the most unlike of friendship I or the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich and the weak requires the aid of the strong and the sick man of the physician and every one who is ignorant has to love and court him who knows And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that the idea of

And is health a friend, or not a friend?

A friend.

And disease is an enemy?

Yes.

Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and the evil, and for the sake of the good and the friend?

Clearly.

Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?

That is to be inferred.

Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of the friend, and the like of the like which has been declared by us to be an impossibility but, in order that this new statement may not deceive us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain. Medicate, as we were saying, is a friend or dear to us for the sake of health?

Yes.

And health is also dear?

Certainly.

And if dear then dear for the sake of something?

Yes.

And surely this object must also be dear as is understood in our previous admissions?

Yes.

And that something dear involves something else dear?

Yes.

But then, proceeding in this way shall we not arrive at some first principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred to any other for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are dear and, having there arrived we shall stop?

True.

My fear is that all these other things, which we say are dear for the sake of another are illusions and deceptions only but where that first principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put the matter thus. Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures) would not the father who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sake of his son? I mean for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine.

He would.

And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Certainly.

But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them equally with his son? Is not this rather the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means which are provided for the sake of an object, [20] but to the object for the sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth for there is a further object, whatever it may be which we value most of all, and for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. Am I not right?

Yes, certainly.

And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate.

That, he said, appears to be true.

And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.

True.

Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?

I think so.

And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in this way. Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, and that evil went far away and in no way affected soul or body nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say are neither good nor evil in themselves—would the good be of any use, or other than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the evil and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease but if there had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good—to be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in the good for its own sake.

I suppose not.

Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For they are called dear because of another dear or friend. But

Impossible

Further I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them and there are some which are not assimilated take for example the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another substance

Very good

In such a case is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment?

What do you mean? he said

This is what I mean Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead would they be really white or would they only appear to be white?

They would only appear to be white he replied

And yet whiteness would be present in them? True

But that would not make them at all the more white notwithstanding the presence of white in them—they would not be white any more than black?

No

But when old age infuses whiteness into them then they become assimilated and are white by the presence of white

Certainly

Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of an other substance or must the presence be after a peculiar sort?

The latter he said

Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil but not as yet evil and that has happened before now?

Yes

And when anything is in the presence of evil not being as yet evil the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing [218] but the presence of evil which makes a thing evil takes away the desire and friendship of the good for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the evil?

None

And therefore we say that those who are already wise whether Gods or men are no longer lovers of wisdom nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are ignorant to the extent of being evil for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant but are not yet hardened in their ignorance or void of understanding and do not as yet find that they know what they do not know and therefore those who are the lov-

ers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good for as we have already seen neither is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like of like You remember that?

Yes they both said

And so Lysis and Menexenus we have discovered the nature of friendship—there can be no doubt of it Friendship is the love which by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good either in the soul or in the body or anywhere

They both agreed and entirely assented and for a moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey But then a most unaccountable suspicion came across me and I felt that the conclusion was untrue I was pained and said Alas! Lysis and Menexenus I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only

Why do you say so? said Menexenus

I am afraid I said that the argument about friendship is false arguments like men are often pretenders

How do you mean? he asked

Well I said look at the matter in this way a friend is the friend of some one is he not?

Certainly he is

And has he a motive and object in being a friend or has he no motive and object?

He has a motive and object

And is the object which makes him a friend dear to him or neither dear nor hateful to him?

I do not quite follow you he said

I do not wonder at that I said But perhaps if I put the matter in another way you will be able to follow me and my own meaning will be clearer to myself The sick man as I was just now saying is the friend of the physician—is he not?

Yes

And he is the friend of the physician because of disease and for the sake of health?

Yes

And disease is an evil?

Certainly

And what of health? I said Is that good or evil or neither?

[219] Good he replied

And we were saying I believe that the body being neither good nor evil because of disease that is to say because of evil is the friend of medicine and medicine is good and medicine has entered into this friendship for the sake of health and health is a good

True

They agreed to the latter alternative

Then my boys we have again fallen into the old discarded error for the unjust will be the friend of the unjust and the bad of the bad as well as the good of the good

That appears to be the result

But again if we say that the congenial is the same as the good in that case the good and he only will be the friend of the good

True

But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember has been already refuted by ourselves

We remember

Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can only like the wise men who argue in courts sum up the arguments—If neither the beloved nor the lover nor the like, nor the unlike nor the good nor the congenial nor any other of whom we spoke—for there were such a number of them that I cannot remember all—if none of these are

friends I know not what remains to be said

[223] Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers and bade them go home as it was getting late At first we and the bystanders drove them off but afterwards as they would not mind and only went on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry and kept calling the boys—they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermæa which made them difficult to manage—we fairly gave way and broke up the company

I said however a few words to the boys at parting O Menexenus and Lysis how ridiculous that you two boys and I an old boy who would fain be one of you should imagine ourselves to be friends—this is what the bystanders will go away and say—and as yet we have not been able to discover what is a friend!

with the true friend or dear the case is quite the reverse for that is proved to be dear because of the hated and if the hated were away it would be no longer dear

Very true he replied at any rate not if our present view holds good

But oh! will you tell me, I said whether if evil were to perish we should hunger any more or thirst any more or have any similar desire? [221] Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other desires—that they will remain but will not be evil because evil has perished? Or rather shall I say that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous for who knows? This we do know that in our present condition hunger may injure us and may also benefit us—Is not that true?

Yes

And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us and sometimes neither one nor the other?

To be sure

But is there any reason why because evil perishes that which is not evil should perish with it?

None

Then even if evil perishes the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?

Clearly they will

And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?

He must

Then even if evil perishes there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?

Yes

But not if evil is the cause of friendship for in that case nothing will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed

True

And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?

Very true

But now our view is changed and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship?

I suppose so

May not the truth be rather as we were saying just now that desire is the cause of friendship, for that which desires is dear to that

which is desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing?

Likely enough

But surely I said he who desires desires that of which he is in want?

Yes

And that of which he is in want is dear to him?

True

And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?

Certainly

Then love and desire and friendship would appear to be of the natural or congenial. Such Lysis and Menexenus is the inference

They assented

Then if you are friends you must have natures which are congenial to one another?

Certainly they both said

And I say my boys that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or affected him [222] if he had not been in some way congenial to him either in his soul or in his character or in his manners or in his form

Yes yes said Menexenus But Lysis was silent

Then I said the conclusion is that what is of a congenial nature must be loved

It follows he said

Then the lover who is true and no counterfeiter must of necessity be loved by his love

Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this and Hippothales changed into all manner of colours with delight

Here intending to revise the argument I said Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like? For if that is possible then I think Lysis and Menexenus there may be some sense in our argument about friendship But if the congenial is only the like how will you get rid of the other argument of the uselessness of like to like in as far as they are like for to say that what is useless is dear would be absurd? Suppose then that we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the like—in the intoxication of argument that may perhaps be allowed

Very true

And shall we further say that the good is congenial and the evil uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the evil and the good to the good and that which is neither good nor evil to that which is neither good nor evil?

Ac As far as I am concerned Lysimachus and Melesias I applaud your purpose and I will gladly assist you and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad.

La Certainly Nicias and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias and which is applicable, not only to them but to us, and to every one who is occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too apt to be negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after.

Lys Why Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?

La Certainly Lysimachus.

Ac That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches for quite lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,—Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age.

Lys Those who have reached my time of life Socrates and Nicias and Laches fall out of acquaintance with the young because they are generally detained at home by old age but you, O son of Sophroniscus, should I let your fellow demesmen have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father for I and he were always companions and friends and to the hour of his death there never was a difference between us and now it comes back to me at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home [181] and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

Son Certainly father this is he.

Lys I am delighted to hear Socrates, that you maintain the name of your father who was a most excellent man and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed.

La Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining not only his father's, but

also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium and I can tell you that if others had only been like him the honour of our country would have been upheld and the great defeat would never have occurred.

Lys That is very high praise which is accorded to you Socrates by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame and I hope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought to have visited us long ago and made yourself at home with us but now from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out do as I say—come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may continue your friend as I was your father's. I shall expect you to do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your duty. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak—the art of fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?

Soc I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in this matter and also in every way will comply with your wishes but as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear first what my elders have to say and to learn of them and if I have anything to add then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias that one or other of you begin.

Nic I have no objection Socrates and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure their bodily health. [182] No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise and thus, and the art of riding are of all arts most befitting to a freeman for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are the athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use and will be of the greatest whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a single person or perhaps of several and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further this

LACHES, or Courage

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE *LYSIMACHUS son of Aristides MELESIAS,
son of Thucydides THEIR SONS NICIAS, LACHES SOCRATES*



[178] *Lys* You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour Nicias and Laches but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him I think that we may as well confess what this was for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you The reason was that we were intending to ask your advice Some laugh at the very notion of advising others and when they are asked will not say what they think They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them and answer according to his and not according to their own opinion But as we know that you are good judges and will say exactly what you think we have taken you into our counsels The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows Melesias and I have two sons that is his son and he is named Thucydides after his grandfather [179] and this is mine who is also called after his grandfather Aristides Now we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths and not to let them run about as they like which is too often the way with the young when they are no longer children but to begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them And knowing you to have sons of your own we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training and improvement and if perchance you have not attended to them we may remind you that you ought to have done so and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty I will tell you Nicias and Laches even at the risk of being tedious how we came to think of this Melesias and I live together and our sons

live with us and now as I was saying at first we are going to confess to you Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace—in the management of the allies and in the administration of the city but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show The truth is that we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth while they were occupied with the concerns of others and we urge all this upon the lads pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves but that if they take pains they may perhaps become worthy of the names which they bear They on their part promise to comply with our wishes and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them Some one commended to us the art of fighting in armour which he thought an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen and told us to go and see him And we determined that we would go and get you to accompany us and we were intending at the same time if you did not object to take counsel with you about the education of our sons That is the matter which we wanted to talk over with you [180] and we hope that you will give us your opinion about this art of fighting in armour and about any other studies or pursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn Please to say whether you agree to our proposal

endness of this art but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter.

LYS. I am going to ask this favour of you Socrates, as is the more necessary because the two counsellors disagree, and some one is in a matter still needed who will decide between them. Had they a need, no art would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.

SOC. What, Lymachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?

LYS. Why yes, Socrates, what else am I to do?

SOC. And would you do so too, if I was? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skilful master?

LYS. The latter Socrates, as would surely be reasonable.

SOC. His opinion would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

LYS. Certainly.

SOC. And for this reason, as I imagine,—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

LYS. To be sure.

[155] SOC. Must we not then first of all ask whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? Let there be, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the rest. If there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and Lymachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches and even this nation, not well or ill depends the better order of their father's house.

LYS. This is true.

SOC. Great care, then, is required in this matter?

LYS. Certainly.

SOC. Come, as I was just now saying that we were considering, or wanting to consider who was the best trainer. Should we not select him who knows and has practised the art, and had the best teachers?

LYS. I think that we should.

SOC. But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?

LYS. I do not understand.

SOC. Let me try to make my meaning plainer

then. I do not think that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is or is not skilful in the art, and has or has not had a teacher of the art.

LYS. Why Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?

SOC. Yes, Nicias, but there is also a prior question, which I may illustrate in this way. When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

LYS. About the eyes.

SOC. And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and a what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?

LYS. True.

SOC. And in a word, when he considers any thing for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

LYS. Certainly.

SOC. And when you call in an adviser you should see whether he too is skilful in the art, the instrument of the end which you have in view?

LYS. Most true.

SOC. And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of you, is?

LYS. Yes.

SOC. And we are enquiring Which of us is skilful or successful in the training of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

LYS. Well but, Socrates, did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have in some things?

SOC. Yes, Laches, I have observed that but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, [156] unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works.

LYS. That is true.

SOC. And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lymachus and I myself, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any and prove them to be in the first place men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have been really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher but that he has works of his own to show then he should point out to them what

sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons for every man who has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army which is the sequel of the lesson and when he has learned this and his ambition is once fired he will go on to learn the complete art of the general There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable and valuable to a man and this lesson may be the beginning of them Let me add a further advantage which is by no means a slight one—that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self possessed in the field And I will not disdain to mention what by some may be thought to be a small matter—he will make a better appearance at the right time that is to say at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies My opinion then Lysimachus is as I say that the youths should be instructed in this art and for the reasons which I have given But Laches may take a different view and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say

La I should not like to maintain Nicias that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned for all knowledge appears to be a good and if as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm this use of arms is really a species of knowledge then it ought to be learned, but if not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only or if it be knowledge but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it? /183/ I say this because I think that if it had been really valuable the Lacedaemonians whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war would have discovered this one And even if they had not still these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters and that a master of the art who was honoured among them would be sure to make his fortune among other nations just as a tragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring states but rushes hither straight and exhibits at Athens and this is natural Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory which they do not touch with the point of their foot but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans and

particularly to those who would themselves acquire knowledge that they are by no means first rate in the arts of war Further Lysimachus I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service and have taken their measure which I can give you at once for none of these masters of fence have ever been distinguished in war—there has been a sort of fatality about them while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised the art they appear to be a most unfortunate exception For example this very Stesilaus whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers I have seen at another time making in sober truth an involuntary exhibition of himself which was a far better spectacle He was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel and was armed with a weapon half spear half scythe the singularity of this weapon was worthy of the singularity of the man To make a long story short I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe spear He was fighting and the scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship and stuck fast and he tugged but was unable to get his weapon free The two ships were passing, one another He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on /184/ he let the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle The people in the transport clapped their hands and laughed at his ridiculous figure and when some one threw a stone which fell on the deck at his feet and he quitted his hold of the scythe spear the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air suspended from the transport Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art as Nicias asserts but I tell you my experience and as I said at first whether this be an art of which the advantage is so slight or not an art at all but only an imposition in either case such an acquirement is not worth having For my opinion is that if the professor of this art be a coward he will be likely to become rash and his character will be only more notorious or if he be brave and fail ever so little other men will be on the watch and he will be greatly traduced for there is a jealousy of such pretenders and unless a man be pre eminent in valour he cannot help being ridiculous if he says that he has this sort of skill Such is my judgment Lysimachus of the de

inhableness of this art but, as I said at first ask Socrates and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion on the matter

Lys I am going to ask this favour of you Socrates as is the more necessary because the two councillors disagree and some one is in a manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed no arbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree

Soc What, Lysimachus are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?

Lys Why yes Socrates what else am I to do?

Soc And would you do so too Melesas? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son would you follow the advice of the majority of us or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skilful master?

Mei The latter Socrates as would surely be reasonable

Soc His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

Mei Certainly

Soc And for this reason as I understand—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

Mei To be sure

[185] *Soc* Must we not then first of all ask whether there is any one of us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If there is let us take his advice, though he be only one and not mind the rest if there is not let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your richest and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house

Mei That is true

Soc Great care, then, is required in this matter

Mei Certainly

Soc Suppose, as I was just now saying that we were consulting, or waiting to consult—who was the best adviser? Should we not select him who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?

Mei I think that we should

Soc But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we wish to find the masters?

Mei I do not understand

Soc Let me try to make my meaning plainer

then I do not think that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting when we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has not had a teacher of the art

Nic Why Socrates is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?

Soc Yes Nicias but there is also a prior question which I may illustrate in this way. When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

Nic About the eyes

Soc And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?

Nic True

Soc And in a word when he considers anything for the sake of another thing he thinks of the end and not of the means?

Nic Certainly

Soc And when you call in an adviser you should see whether he too is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?

Nic Most true

Soc And at present we have in view some knowledge of which the end is the soul of youth?

Nic Yes

Soc And we are enquiring Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

La Well but, Socrates did you never observe that some persons who have had no teachers are more skilful than those who have, in some things?

Soc Yes Laches I have observed that but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, [186] unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works

La That is true

Soc And therefore Laches and Nicias as Lysimachus and Melesas in their anxiety to improve the minds of the sons have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any and prove them to be in the first place men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have been really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher but that he has works of his own to show then he should point out to them what

sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons for every man who has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army which is the sequel of the lesson and when he has learned this and his ambition is once fired he will go on to learn the complete art of the general There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable and valuable to a man and this lesson may be the beginning of them Let me add a further advantage which is by no means a slight one—that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self possessed in the field And I will not disdain to mention what by some may be thought to be a small matter—he will make a better appearance at the right time that is to say at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies My opinion then Lysimachus is as I say that the youths should be instructed in this art and for the reasons which I have given But Laches may take a different view and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say

La I should not like to maintain Nicias that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned for all knowledge appears to be a good and if as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm this use of arms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned but if not and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only or if it be knowledge but not of a valuable sort then what is the use of learning it? (183) I say this because I think that if it had been really valuable the Lacedaemonians whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war would have discovered this one And even if they had not still these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters and that a master of the art who was honoured among them would be sure to make his fortune among other nations just as a tragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring states but rushes hither straight and exhibits at Athens and this is natural Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory which they do not touch with the point of their foot but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans and

particularly to those who would themselves acquire knowledge that they are by no means first rate in the arts of war Further Lysimachus I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service and have taken their measure which I can give you at once for none of these masters of fence have ever been distinguished in war—there has been a sort of fatality about them while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised the art they appear to be a most unfortunate exception For example this very Stesilaus whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers I have seen at another time making in sober truth an involuntary exhibition of himself which was a far better spectacle He was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel and was armed with a weapon half spear half scythe the singularity of this weapon was worthy of the singularity of the man To make a long story short I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe spear He was fighting and the scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship and stuck fast and he tugged but was unable to get his weapon free The two ships were passing one another He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on (184) he let the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle The people in the transport clapped their hands and laughed at his ridiculous figure and when some one threw a stone which fell on the deck at his feet and he quitted his hold of the scythe spear the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air suspended from the transport Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art as Nicias asserts but I tell you my experience and as I said at first whether this be an art of which the advantage is so slight or not an art at all but only an imposition in either case such an acquirement is not worth having For my opinion is that if the professor of this art be a coward he will be likely to be come rash and his character will be only more notorious or if he be brave and fail ever so little other men will be on the watch and he will be greatly traduced for there is a jealousy of such pretenders and unless a man be pre eminent in valour he cannot help being ridiculous if he says that he has this sort of skill Such is my judgment Lysimachus of the de

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unpleasant indeed I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves and therefore I say that for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner but you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.

La I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue or of any sort of wisdom who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one I deem to be the true musician attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged not in the Ionian or in the Phrygian mode nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me and the better he speaks the more I hate him and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to [189] him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him for I too agree with Solon that I would fain grow old learning many things. But I must be allowed to add of the good only. Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil but that the teacher is younger or not yet in repute—any thing of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I beg you notice that you may teach and confuse me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger and gave a proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ges.

Soc I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.

Lys But this is our proper business and yours as well as ours for I reckon you as one of us. I leave then to take my place and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know for the sake of the youths and talk and consult with them for I am old, and my memory is bad and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by yourselves and I will listen and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.

Soc Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us. Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training and whom have we made better? But the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing and were able to make the addition then clearly we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean [190] Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift and also were able to impart sight to the eyes then, clearly we should know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

La That is true, Socrates.

Soc And are not our two friends, Laches at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

La Very true.

Soc Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant?

La I do not think that we can, Socrates.

Soc Then Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?

La Yes

Soc And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

La Certainly

Soc I would not have us begin my friend with enquiring about the whole of virtue for that may be more than we can accomplish let us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part the enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us

La Let us do as you say Socrates

Soc Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?

La Yes certainly

Soc Then Laches suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits Tell me if you can what is courage

La Indeed Socrates I see no difficulty in answering he is a man of courage who does not run away but remains at his post and fights against the enemy there can be no mistake about that

Soc Very good Laches and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask but another

[191] *La* What do you mean Socrates?

Soc I will endeavour to explain you would call a man courageous who remains at his post and fights with the enemy?

La Certainly I should

Soc And so should I but what would you say of another man who fights flying instead of remaining?

La How flying?

Soc Why as the Scythians are said to fight flying as well as pursuing and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas that they knew how to pursue and fly quickly hither and thither and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself as having a knowledge of fear or flight and calls him an author of fear or flight

La Yes Socrates and there Homer is right for he was speaking of chariots as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry who have that way of fighting but the heavy armed Greek fights as I say remaining in his rank

Soc And yet Laches you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea who, when they

came upon the light shields of the Persians are said not to have been willing to stand and fight and to have fled but when the ranks of the Persians were broken they turned upon them like cavalry and won the battle of Plataea

La That is true

Soc That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly and that this was the reason of your answering badly For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy armed soldiers but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier and not only who are courageous in war but who are courageous in perils by sea and who in disease or in poverty or again in politics are courageous and not only who are courageous against pain or fear but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy There is this sort of courage—is there not Laches?

La Certainly Socrates

Soc And all these are courageous but some have courage in pleasures and some in pains some in desires and some in fears and some are cowards under the same conditions as I should imagine

La Very true

Soc Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general And I will begin with courage and once more ask What is that common quality which is the same in all these cases and which is called courage? Do you now understand what I mean?

La Not over well

[192] *Soc* I mean this As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness and which is found in running in playing the lyre in speaking in learning and in many other similar actions or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms legs mouth voice mind—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?

La Quite true

Soc And suppose I were to be asked by some one What is that common quality Socrates which in all these uses of the word you call quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time—whether in running speaking or in any other sort of action

La You would be quite correct

Soc And now Laches do you try and tell me in like manner What is that common quality which is called courage and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied

both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?

La I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.

Soc But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason. I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

La Most noble, certainly.

Soc And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

La Very noble.

Soc But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

La True.

Soc And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

La I ought not to say that, Socrates.

Soc Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for it is not noble but courage is noble?

La You are right.

Soc Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

La True.

Soc But as to the epithet "wise,"—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance in spending his money wisely knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

La Assuredly not.

Soc Or for example, if a man is a physician and his son, or some patient of his has inflammation of the lungs and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses—is that courage?

[193] *La* No that is not courage at all any more than the last.

Soc Again take the case of one who endures in war and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him—and suppose that he has also advantages of position—would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?

La I should say that the latter Socrates, was the braver.

Soc But, surely this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

La That is true.

Soc Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures having the knowledge of horsemanship is not so courageous as he who endures, having no such knowledge?

La So I should say.

Soc And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

La True.

Soc And he who descends into a well and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action having no knowledge of diving or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?

La Why Socrates, what else can a man say?

Soc Nothing, if that be what he thinks.

La But that is what I do think.

Soc And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things having the skill to do them.

La That is true.

Soc But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us.

La Quite true.

Soc Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

La True.

Soc And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dishonour is courage.

La Very true.

Soc And are we right in saying so?

La Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

Soc Then according to your statement, you and I Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

La That is most true.

Soc And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

La Quite the reverse.

Soc Suppose, however that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.

[194] *La* To what extent and what principle do you mean?

Soc The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in the enquiry and then courage will not laugh at our faintheartedness in searching for courage which after all may very likely be endurance.

La I am ready to go on, Socrates, and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said, and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage, but somehow or other she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

Soc But my dear friend should not the good sportsman follow the track and not be lazy?

La Certainly he should.

Soc And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

La I should like that.

Soc Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp you see our extremity and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

Nic I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way, for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

Soc What is it, Nicias?

Nic I have often heard you say that Every man is good in that in which he is wise and bad in that in which he is unwise.

Soc That is certainly true, Nicias.

Nic And therefore if the brave man is good he is also wise.

Soc Do you hear him, Laches?

La Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

Soc I think that I understand him, and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

La What can he possibly mean, Socrates?

Soc That is a question which you must ask of himself.

La Yes.

Soc Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom, for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

Nic Certainly not.

Soc Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

Nic No.

Soc But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

La I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates, and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

[195] *Nic* I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war or in anything.

La How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

Soc Why do you say so, Laches?

La Why, surely courage is one thing and wisdom another.

Soc That is just what Nicias denies.

La Yes, that is what he denies, but he is so silly.

Soc Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

Nic Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates, but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

La Very true, Nicias, and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question. Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

Nic Not at all.

La No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous, a whit the more for that.

Soc What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying something of importance.

Nic Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.

Soc How so?

Nic Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease, he can tell the sick man no more than this: Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

La Yes, certainly so, in my opinion.

Nic And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?

La Certainly not.

Nic And do you suppose that the physician

or any other artist knows this, or any one in deed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous.

Soc Do you understand his meaning Laches?

La Yes, I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet, Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

Nic What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

La Indeed I do who but he?

Nic Much rather I should say he of whom I speak for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass whether death or disease, or loss of property or victory or defeat in war [196] or in any sort of contest but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.

La I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer nor a physician, nor in any other character unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honesty; to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so doing but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?

Soc I quite agree with you Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him if not, we will in truth hum.

La Do you Socrates if you like ask him I think that I have asked enough.

Soc I do not see why I should not and my question will do for both of us.

La Very good.

Soc Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument. Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

Nic I do.

Soc And not every man has this knowledge the physician and the soothsayer have it not and they will not be courageous unless they acquiesce in—that is what you were saying?

Nic I was.

Soc Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.

Nic I think not.

Soc Clearly not Nicias not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And thus I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion or a leopard or perhaps a boar or any other animal has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion and a stag and a bull and a monkey have equally little pretensions to courage.

[197] La Capital Socrates by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.

Nic Why Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, to my way of thinking between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men many women many children many animals. And you, and men in general call by the term courageous actions which I call rash—my courageous actions are wise actions.

La Behold Socrates, how admirably as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

Nic Not so Laches, but do not be alarmed for I am quite willing to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that

you are courageous and therefore wise

La I could answer that but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian

Soc Do not answer him Laches I rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived He has got all this from my friend Damon and Damon is always with Prodicus who of all the Sophists is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort

La Yes Socrates and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her

Soc Yes my sweet friend but a great statesman is likely to have a great intelligence And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination

La Then examine for yourself Socrates

Soc That is what I am going to do my dear friend Do not however suppose I shall let you out of the partnership for I shall expect you to apply your mind and join with me in the consideration of the question

La I will if you think that I ought

[198] *Soc* Yes I do but I must beg of you Nicias to begin again You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue

Nic Very true

Soc And you yourself said that it was a part and there were many other parts all of which taken together are called virtue

Nic Certainly

Soc Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice temperance and the like are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage Would you not say the same?

Nic Certainly

Soc Well then so far we are agreed And now let us proceed a step and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another Let me then tell you my own opinion and if I am wrong you shall set me right in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear and fear is not of the present nor of the past but is of future and expected evil Do you not agree to that Laches?

La Yes Socrates entirely

Soc That is my view Nicias the terrible things as I should say are the evils which are future and the hopeful are the good or not

evil things which are future Do you or do you not agree with me?

Nic I agree

Soc And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

Nic Precisely

Soc And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as to a third point

Nic What is that?

Soc I will tell you He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past another of the present a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future but that of all three there is one science only for example there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times present past and future and one science of husbandry in like manner which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times As to the art of the general you yourselves will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war [199] and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general and not the general under the soothsayer Am I not correct in saying so Laches?

La Quite correct

Soc And do you Nicias also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things whether future present or past?

Nic Yes indeed Socrates that is my opinion

Soc And courage my friend is as you say a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?

Nic Yes

Soc And the fearful and the hopeful are admitted to be future goods and future evils?

Nic True

Soc And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?

Nic That is true

Soc Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful for they are future only courage like the other sciences is concerned not only with good and evil of the future but of the present and past and of any time?

Nic That as I suppose is true

Soc Then the answer which you have given Nicias includes only a third part of courage, but our question extended to the whole nature of courage and according to your view that is according to your present view courage is

not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

Nic I agree, Socrates.

Soc But then my dear friend if a man knew all good and evil and how they are, and have been and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural, and he would provide the good as he would know how to deal both with gods or men.

Nic I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

Soc But then *Nic* as courage according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?

Nic It would seem so.

Soc But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

Nic Yes, that was what we were saying.

Soc And that is in contradiction with our present view?

Nic That appears to be the case.

Soc Then *Nicias*, we have not discovered what courage is.

Nic We have not.

[200] *La* And yet friend *Nicias* I imagined that you would have made the discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.

Nic I perceive, *Laches*, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know that I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been discussing, and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself I will freely impart my

satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.

La You are a philosopher *Nicias*, of that I am aware, nevertheless I would recommend *Lysimachus* and *Melesias* not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children, but, as I said at first, they should ask *Socrates* and not let him off, if my own sons were old enough I would have asked him myself.

Nic To that I quite agree, if *Socrates* is willing to take them under his charge I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of *Niceratus*. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, *Lysimachus*.

Lys He ought, *Nicias*, for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, *Socrates*—will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?

Soc Indeed *Lysimachus* I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which *Nicias* and *Laches* have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty, but as we are all in the same perplexity why should one of us be preferred to another? [201] I certainly think that no one should and under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age I would quote to them the authority of *Homer* who says that

Modesty is not good for elderly men.

Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of the youths our own education.

Lys I like your proposal, *Socrates*, and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour of you. Come to my house to-morrow at dawn and we will advise about these matters. For the present let us make an end of the conversation.

Soc I will come to you to-morrow. *Lysimachus*, as you propose, God willing.

PROTAGORAS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE *SOCRATES* who is the narrator of the Dialogue to his
Companion *HIPPOCRATES* *ALCIBIADES* *CRITIAS* *PROTAGORAS* *Hippias*
Prodicus *Sophists* *CALLIAS* a wealthy Athenian *Scene* *The House of Callias*



[309] *Com* Where do you come from *Soc* rates? And yet I need hardly ask the question for I know that you have been in chase of the fair *Alcibiades*. I saw him the day before yester day and he had got a beard like a man—and he is a man as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming.

Soc What of his beard? Are you not of *Homer's* opinion who says

Youth is most charming when the beard first appears?

And that is now the charm of *Alcibiades*.

Com Well and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him and was he gracious to you?

Soc Yes I thought that he was very gracious and especially to-day for I have just come from him and he has been helping me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him and several times I quite forgot that he was present.

Com What is the meaning of this? Has any thing happened between you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he is certainly not in this city of Athens.

Soc Yes much fairer.

Com What do you mean—a citizen or a foreigner?

Soc A foreigner.

Com Of what country?

Soc Of *Abdera*.

Com And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of *Cleinias*?

Soc And is not the wiser always the fairer sweet friend?

Com But have you really met, *Socrates* with some wise one?

Soc Say rather with the wisest of all living men if you are willing to accord that title to *Protagoras*.

Com What! Is *Protagoras* in Athens?

Soc Yes he has been here two days.

Com And do you just come from an interview with him?

[310] *Soc* Yes and I have heard and said many things.

Com Then if you have no engagement suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed and my attendant here shall give up his place to you.

Soc To be sure and I shall be grateful to you for listening.

Com Thank you too for telling us.

Soc That is thank you twice over. Listen then—

Last night or rather very early this morning *Hippocrates* the son of *Apollodorus* and the brother of *Phaon* gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door some one opened to him and he came rushing in and bawled out *Socrates* are you awake or asleep?

I knew his voice and said *Hippocrates* is that you? and do you bring any news?

Good news he said nothing but good.

Delightful I said but what is the news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?

He drew nearer to me and said Protagoras is come

Yes, I replied he came two days ago have you only just heard of his arrival?

Yes, by the gods, he said but not until yesterday evening

At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said Yesterday quite late in the evening on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus as I meant to ha told you, if some other matter had not come in the way — on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.

I who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?

He replied, laughing Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.

But, surely I said, if you give him money and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.

Would heaven he replied, that this were the case! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now in order that you may speak to him on my behalf for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him [311] (when he visited Athens before I was but a child) and all men praise him Socrates he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home He lodges, as I hear with Callias the son of Hipponicus let us start.

I replied Not yet, my good friend the hour is too early But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until daybreak when the day breaks, then we will go For Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be sure to find him never fear

Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If for example, you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the

Asclepiad and were about to give him your money and some one had said to you you are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates tell me, what is he that you give him money? how would you have answered?

I should say he replied that I gave money to him as a physician

And what will he make of you?

A physician, he said.

And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and were intending to give them money and some one had asked you What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this money? — how would you have answered?

I should have answered, that they were statues.

And what will they make of you?

A statuey of course.

Well now I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad but if not then we are to spend the money of your friends as well Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money — how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor and that Homer is a poet but what appellation is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?

They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.

Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Certainly

But suppose a person were to ask this further question And how about yourself? [312] What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?

He answered with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn so that I could see him) Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

By the gods I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?

Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.

But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian or musician or trainer not with the view of mak-

ing any of them a profession but only as a part of education and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them?

Just so he said and that in my opinion is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.

I said I wonder whether you know what you are doing?

And what am I doing?

You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is and if not then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to which you commit your self be good or evil.

I certainly think that I do know he replied.

Then tell me what do you imagine that he is?

I take him to be one who knows wise things he replied as his name implies.

And might you not I said affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also. Do not they too know wise things? But suppose a person were to ask us In what are the painters wise? We should answer In what relates to the making of likenesses and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask What is the wisdom of the Sophist and what is the manufacture over which he presides?—how should we answer him?

How should we answer him Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?

Yes I replied that is very likely true but not enough for in the answer a further question is involved. Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?

Yes.

Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?

Yes that may be assumed.

And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?

Indeed he said I cannot tell.

[313] Then I proceeded to say Well but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one who might do good or harm to it would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question which you hold to be of far

more value than the body and upon the good or evil of which depends the well being of your all—about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening as you say, you hear of him and in the morning you go to him never deliberating or taking the opinion of anyone as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not—you have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination although as you admit you do not know him and have never spoken with him and you call him a Sophist but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this he replied No other inference Socrates can be drawn from your words.

I proceeded Is not a Sophist Hippocrates one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.

And what Socrates is the food of the soul?

Surely I said knowledge is the food of the soul and we must take care my friend that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body for they praise indiscriminately all their goods without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful neither do their customers know with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge and make the round of the cities and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them praise them all alike though I should not wonder O my friend if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul and their customers equally ignorant unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If therefore you have understanding of what is good and evil you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one [314] but if not then O my friend pause and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer and carry them away in other vessels and before you receive them into the body as food you

may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken and what not and how much and when and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel when you have paid for them; you must receive them into the soul and go your way either greatly harmed or greatly benefited and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders for we are still young—too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go as we were intending and hear Protagoras and when we have heard what he has to say we may take counsel of others for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias but there is Hippias of Elis and if I am not mistaken Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.

To this we agreed and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house and there we stopped in order to conclude a discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along and we stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper who was a eunuch and who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door and he opened and saw us he grumbled. They are Sophists—he is not at home and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked and he answered without opening. Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellow? But, my friend, I said you need not be alarmed for we are not Sophists and we are not come to see Callias but we want to see Protagoras and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty the man as persuaded to open the door.

When we entered we found Protagoras talking a walk in the cloister and next to him on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus and Pylarchus the son of Pericles who by the mother's side is his half brother and Charmides, the son of Glaucon [315]. On the other side of him were Xanthippus the other son of Pericles, Philipides, the son of Philomachus also Antimoerus of Mendes, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous and intend to make sophistry a profession. A train of listeners followed him the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like

Orpheus attracting them by his voice and they following. I should mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements; they never got into his way at all but when he and those who were with him turned back then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side he was always in front and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.

After him as Homer says I lifted up my eyes and saw Hippias the Elcan sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the Myrtilusian and Andron the son of Androton and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions and he, excellent Phaedrus was determining their several questions to them and discoursing of them.

Also my eyes beheld Tantalus for Prodicus the Ceian was at Athens he had been lodged in a room which in the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse but as the house was full Callias had cleared this out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed wrapped up in sheepskins and bed-clothes, of which there seemed to be a great heap and there was sitting by him on the couches near Pausanias of the deme of Ceraeiris and with Pausanias was a youth quite young who is certainly remarkable for his good looks and if I am not mistaken is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon and my suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth and also there were the two Ademantuses, one the son of Cepis and the other of Leucolophides and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying for he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man [316] but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible.

No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful as you say and I believe you and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

On entering we stopped a little in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said Protagoras my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.

CL. R. F. M. c. 2, 600

Do you wish he said to speak with me alone or in the presence of the company?

Whichever you please I said you shall determine when you have heard the purpose of our visit

And what is your purpose? he said

I must explain I said that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian he is the son of Apollodorus and of a great and prosperous house and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age I believe that he aspires to political eminence and thus he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him And now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or in the presence of the company

Thank you Socrates for your consideration of me For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their kinsmen or any other acquaintances old or young and live with him under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation ought to be very cautious great jealousies are aroused by his proceedings and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies Now the art of the Sophist is as I believe of great antiquity but in ancient times those who practised it fearing this odium veiled and disguised themselves under various names some under that of poets as Homer Hesiod and Simonides some of hierophants and prophets as Orpheus and Musaeus and some as I observe even under the name of gymnastic masters like Iccus of Tarentum or the more recently celebrated Herodicus now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara who is a first rate Sophist Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician but was really an eminent Sophist also Pythocleides the Cean and there were many others and all of them as I was saying adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur But that is not my way [317] for I do not believe that they effected their purpose which was to deceive the government who were not blinded by them and as to the people they have no understanding and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them Now to run away and to be caught in running away is the very height of folly and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind for they regard him who runs away as a rogue in addition to any other objections which they have to him, and therefore I take an entirely opposite

course and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind such an open acknowledgement appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other precautions and therefore I hope, as I may say by the favour of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist And I have been now many years in the profession—for all my years when added up are many there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you if you want to speak with me in the presence of the company

As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias and would gladly show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said But why should we not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?

Very good he said

Suppose said Callias that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss—This was agreed upon and great delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk we ourselves took the chairs and benches and arranged them by Hippias where the other benches had been already placed Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed and brought in him and his companions

When we were all seated Protagoras said Now that the company are assembled Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just now speaking [318]

I replied I will begin again at the same point Protagoras and tell you once more the purport of my visit this is my friend Hippocrates who is desirous of making your acquaintance he would like to know what will happen to him if he associates with you I have no more to say

Protagoras answered Young man if you associate with me on the very first day you will return home a better man than you came and better on the second day than on the first and better every day than you were on the day before

When I heard this I said Protagoras I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this even at your age and with all your wisdom if any one were to teach you what you did not know before you would become better no doubt but please to answer in a different way—I will explain how by an example Let me suppose that Hippocrates instead of desiring your acquaintance wished to become acquainted with the

young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as he has come to you, and had heard him say as he has heard you say that every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him, and then suppose that he were to ask him, In what shall I become better and in what shall I grow?—Zeuxippus would answer in praise. And suppose that he went to Othagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him, In what shall I become better day by day? he would reply in eulogy. Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner—in what, Protagoras, will he be better and about what?

When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied You ask questions fairly and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the habit of insuiling their pupils who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy and geometry and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this) but if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private as well as public: he will learn to order his own house in the best manner and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the affairs of the state.

[319] Do I understand you, I said, and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?

That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.

Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an indestructible people, and indeed they are esteemed to be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly and the many have decided to building, the builders are summoned

as advisers when the question is one of ship-building, then the shipwrights and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good looking and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and scoff at him, until either he is clamoured down and returns of himself or if he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about professors of the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger, rich and poor, high and low—any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher and yet giving advice, evidently because they are under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of individuals: the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others [320] as for example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers, but they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away and placed him in the house of Anaxagoras to be educated, but before six months had elapsed, Anaxagoras sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver and am disposed to think that there must be something in what you say because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?

That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to

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Zeus. I should like them all to have a share for cases cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further make a law by my order that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death for he is a plague of the state."

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations and when any one else interferences, then, as you say they object, if he be not of the favoured few. Which, as I reply is very natural. But when they meet to deliberate about political virtue, [32] which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof which is that. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him but when honesty is in question or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.

I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously but to be a thing which may be taught and which comes to a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature or chance they do not try to punish or to prevent

them from being what they are they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance whereas if a man is wanting in those good qualities which are attained by study and exercise and teaching and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him—of these evil qualities one is impiety [33] another injustice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another and reprimand him,—clearly because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason that he has done wrong—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil doers and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far Socrates I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the argument. Please to consider. Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question I con-

you as younger men in an apologue or myth or shall I argue out the question?

To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.

Well then he said I think that the myth will be more interesting.

Once upon a time there were gods only and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior of the earth and when they were about to bring them into the light of day they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus Let me distribute and do you inspect. This was agreed and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness while he equipped the weaker with swiftness some he armed and others he left unarmed and devised for the latter some other means of preservation making some large and having their size as a protection and others small whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground [321] this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one or another he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist the summer heat so that they might have a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food—herb of the soil to some to others fruits of trees and to others roots and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones while those who were their prey were very prolific and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did Epimetheus who not being very wise forget that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give—and when he came to man who was still unprovided he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity Prometheus came to inspect the distribution and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished but that man alone was naked and shoeless and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching when man in his turn

was to go forth into the light of day and Prometheus not knowing how he could devise his salvation stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene and gave them to man. (They could neither have been acquired nor used without fire) and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life but political wisdom he had not for that was in the keeping of Zeus and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven where Zeus dwelt who moreover had terrible sentinels but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus in which they used to practise their favourite arts and carried off Hephaestus' art of working by fire and also the art of Athene and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.

[322] Now man having a share of the divine attributes was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods because he alone was of their kindred and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate speech and names and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided mankind at first lived dispersed and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts for they were utterly weak in comparison of them and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals food they had but not as yet the art of government of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self preservation gathered them into cities but when they were gathered together having no art of government they evil intreated one another and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated and so he sent Hermes to them bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men—Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed that is to say to a favoured few only one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men or shall I give them to all? To all said

freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another—and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws—suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing: do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their souls grow up to be disordered or undisciplined according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing. In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue—with the *savages*, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenæan festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his *Chorus*, you would be only too glad to meet with *Eurybates* and *Pharmonides*, and you would sorrowfully seek to resist the rascality of this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability: and you say, Where are the teachers? [3-5] You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there would not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans the same art which their fathers learned or their fathers? He and his fellow workmen have to bid them to the best of their ability—but who will carry them further in their art? And you would certainly find a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them, but there would be no difficulty in finding, a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else: if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be,

and also all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good: and I give my pupils their money as worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment—When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion: and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polydorus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, *Paralus* and *Xanthippus*, but are nothing in comparison with their father: and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of *Paralus* and *Xanthippus* themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.

Protagoras ended, and in my ear

To charm, gleit his voice that I thut e
Th u hit him and e k and stood fir d
to h ar

At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at *Hippocrates*, I said to him, O son of *Apollo-dorus*, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither: I would not have missed the speech of *Protagoras* for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good: but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that *Protagoras* will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult *Pericles* or any of our great speakers [3-9] about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse: but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask: and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go on giving on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them: whereas our friend *Protagoras* can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly: and when he asks he will

tained the only solution of your difficulty there is no other. For if there be any such quality and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter [325] or the smith or the potter but justice and temperance and holiness and in a word manly virtue—if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown up man or woman must be taught and punished until by punishment he becomes better and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable—if what I am saying be true good men have their sons taught other things and not this do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private and public and notwithstanding they have their sons taught lesser matters ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death but greater things of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them—aye and confiscation as well as death and in a word may be the ruin of families—those things I say they are supposed not to teach them—not to take the utmost care that they should learn. How improbable is this Socrates!

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to understand what is being said to him he can not say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust this is honourable that is dishonourable this is holy that is unholy do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys well and good if not he is straightened by threats and blows like a piece of bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written as before he understood only what was spoken [326] they put into his hands the works of great poets which he reads sitting on a bench at school in these are contained many admonitions and many tales and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men which he is

required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then again the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief and when they have taught him the use of the lyre they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets who are the lyric poets and these they set to music and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious and rhythmical and so more fitted for speech and action for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich their children begin to go to school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters the state again compels them to learn the laws and live after the pattern which they furnish and not after their own fancies and just as in learning to write, the writing master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time these are given to the young man in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying and he who transgresses them is to be corrected or in other words called to account which is a term used not only in your country but also in many others seeing that justice calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public why Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder for the opposite would be far more surprising.

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is nothing very wonderful in this for as I have been saying the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession [327] If so—and nothing can be truer—then I will further ask you to imagine as an illustration some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute players as far as each had the capacity and everybody was

freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws—suppose I say that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute playing do you imagine Socrates, that the sons of good flute players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute players and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one and all flute players would be good enough in comparison of those who are ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education or courts of justice or laws or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue—with the savages, for example whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenæan festival If you were living among men such as the man haters in his Chorus you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of this part of the world And you Socrates are discontented and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue each one according to his ability and you say Where are the teachers? [328] You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found Or you might ask Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow workmen have taught them to the best of their ability—but who will carry them further in the arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty Socrates in finding a teacher of them but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant And this is true of virtue or of anything else if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue or so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be,

and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good and I give my pupils their money's worth and even more as they themselves confess And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment—When a man has been my pupil if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught and that this is the opinion of the Athenians And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polydeitus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father and this is true of the sons of many other artists As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them

Protagoras ended and in my ear

*S ch m ng t ft h s voice th t the while
Th gh t h m still speak ng t ll stood fixed
to h*

At length when the truth dawned upon me that he had really finished not without difficulty I began to collect myself and looking at Hippocrates I said to him O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good but I know better now Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain as he has already explained so much If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers [339] about these matters he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse but then when one has a question to ask of any of them like books they can neither answer nor ask and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly and when he asks he will

want and hear the answer and this is a very rare gift Now I Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question which if you will only answer I shall be quite satisfied You were saying that virtue can be taught—that I will take upon your authority and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men and several times while you were speaking justice, and temperance and holiness and all these qualities were described by you as if together they made up virtue Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind

There is no difficulty Socrates in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one

And are they parts I said in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes and ears are the parts of a face or are they like the parts of gold which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?

I should say that they differed Socrates in the first way they are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole face

And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Of if a man has one part must he also have all the others?

By no means he said for many a man is brave and not just or just and not wise

You would not deny then that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

[330] Most undoubtedly they are he answered and wisdom is the noblest of the parts

And they are all different from one another? I said

Yes

And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face—the eye for example, is not like the ear and has not the same functions and the other parts are none of them like one another either in their functions or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile would imply

Yes Socrates you are right in supposing that they differ

Then I said no other part of virtue is like knowledge or like justice or like courage or

like temperance or like holiness?

No he answered

Well then I said suppose that you and I enquire into their natures And first you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing would you not? That is my opinion would it not be yours also?

Mine also he said

And suppose that some one were to ask us saying O Protagoras and you Socrates what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just or unjust?—and I were to answer just would you vote with me or against me?

With you he said

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me that justice is of the nature of the just would not you?

Yes he said

And suppose that he went on to say Well now is there also such a thing as holiness?—we should answer Yes if I am not mistaken?

Yes he said

Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing—should we not say so?

He assented

And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy or of the nature of the unholy? I should be angry at his putting such a question and should say Peace man nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?

Certainly he said

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another [331] I should reply You certainly heard that said but not as you imagine by me for I only asked the question Protagoras gave the answer And suppose that he turned to you and said "Is this true Protagoras?" and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another and is this your position?—how would you answer him?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said Socrates

Well then Protagoras we will assume this and now supposing that he proceeded to say further Then holiness is not of the nature of justice nor justice of the nature of holiness but of the nature of unholiness and holiness is of the nature of the not just and therefore of the unjust and the unjust is the unholy" how shall

we answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy and that holiness is just and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on our behalf and whether you would agree with me.

He replied. I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please and let us assume, if you will, that justice is holy and that holiness is just.

Pardon me, I replied. I do not want this "if you wish" or "if you will" sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no "if."

Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing: white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common, even the parts of the face which, as we were saying, before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar and one of them is like another of them. And you may perceive that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular however slight, unlike.

And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?

Certainly not, any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.

[332] Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?

I do.

And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?

That is true, he said.

And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?

Yes, he said.

And temperance makes them temperate?

Certainly.

And they who do not act rightly act foolishly and in acting thus are not temperate?

I agree, he said.

Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?

He assented.

And foolish actions are done by folly and temperate actions by temperance?

He agreed.

And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?

He assented.

And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly and that which is done with slowness, slowly?

He assented again.

And that which is done in the same manner is done by the same and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?

He agreed.

Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?

Yes.

To which the only opposite is the ugly?

There is no other.

And is there anything good?

There is.

To which the only opposite is the evil?

There is no other.

And there is the acute in sound?

True.

To which the only opposite is the grave?

There is no other, he said, but that.

Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more.

He assented.

Then now I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that every thing has one opposite and not more than one?

We did so.

And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?

Yes.

And that which was done foolishly as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?

Yes.

And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?

He agreed.

And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?

Yes.

wait and hear the answer and this is a very rare gift Now I Protagoras want to ask of you a little question which if you will only answer I shall be quite satisfied You were saying that virtue can be taught—that I will take upon your authority and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men and several times while you were speaking justice and temperance and holiness and all these qualities were described by you as if together they made up virtue Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind

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what he is talking about. As then if I had been deaf and you were going on to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice so now having such a bad memory I will ask you to cut your answers shorter if you would take me with you

What do you mean? he said how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?

Certainly not, I said.

But short enough?

Yes, I said

Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?

I have heard I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, [335] if you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.

Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired as you want me to do I should have been no better than another and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere

I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help and considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation so I said Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer for you are a master of wisdom but I cannot manage these long speeches I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place) I will depart although I should have liked to have heard you

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He said We cannot let you go Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our discussions I must therefore beg you to

remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.

Now I had got up and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired and do now heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I could But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himeria [336] when in his prime or with some one of the long or day course runners To such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same of my own legs but they refuse to comply And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly and he can run slowly And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point as he did at first if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing and making an oration is quite another in my humble opinion.

But you see, Socrates said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way just as you claim to speak in yours

Here Alcibiades interposed and said That, Callias, is not a true statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech—in thus he yields the palm to Protagoras but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory) And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras that is my view and every man ought to say what he thinks.

When Alcibiades had done speaking some one—Crates I believe—went on to say O Prodicus and Hippas, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side But we should not be partisans either of

And one thing is done by temperance and quite another thing by folly?

Yes

And in opposite ways?

Certainly

And therefore by opposites—then folly is the opposite of temperance?

Clearly

And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?

He assented

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Yes

[333] Then Protagoras which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance and that both of them are parts of virtue and that they are not only distinct but dissimilar both in themselves and in their functions like the parts of a face Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony they do not accord or agree for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one and yet folly which is one has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

He assented but with great reluctance

Then temperance and wisdom are the same as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same And now Protagoras I said we must finish the enquiry and not faint Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

I should be ashamed Socrates he said to acknowledge this which nevertheless many may be found to assert

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied

I would rather he said that you should argue with the many first if you will

Whichever you please if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not My object is to test the validity of the argument and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing as he said that the argument was not encouraging at length he consented to answer

Now then I said begin at the beginning and answer me You think that some men

are temperate and yet unjust?

Yes he said let that be admitted

And temperance is good sense?

Yes

And good sense is good counsel in doing in justice?

Granted

If they succeed, I said or if they do not succeed?

If they succeed

And you would admit the existence of goods?

Yes

And is the good that which is expedient for man?

Yes indeed he said and there are some things which may be inexpedient and yet I call them good

I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war Seeing this I minded my business and gently said—

[334] When you say Protagoras that things inexpedient are good do you mean inexpedient for man only or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?

Certainly not the last he replied for I know of many things—meats drinks medicines and ten thousand other things which are inexpedient for man and some which are expedient and some which are neither expedient nor in expedient for man but only for horses and some for oxen only and some for dogs and some for no animals but only for trees and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches as for example manure which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches or I may instance olive oil which is mischievous to all plants and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit) that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man is a very great evil to his inward parts and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food except in very small quantities just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces

When he had given this answer the company cheered him And I said Protagoras I have a wretched memory and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember

Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian

*Hardly e the o e ha d c n a man be ome truly
good built i squ re n hands and i et and
m nd no k u thout a ft w*

Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the
who e?

There is no need, I said for I am perfectly
well acquainted with the ode—I have made a
careful study of it.

Very well, he said And do you think that
the ode is a good composition and true?

Yes, I said both good and true

But if there is a contradiction can the com-
position be good or true?

No, not in that case I replied

And is there not a contradiction? he asked
Reflect.

Well my friend I have reflected

And does not the poet proceed to say I do
not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the
utterance of a wise man Hardly can a man be
good Now you will observe that this is said
by the same poet.

I know it.

And do you think, he said, that the two say-
ings are consistent?

Yes, I said I think so (at the same time I
could not help fearing that there might be
something in what he said) And you think
otherwise?

Why he said how can he be consistent in
both? First of all presuming as his own thought,
Hardly can a man become truly good and
then a little further on in the poem forgetting
and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree
with him, when he says, Hardly can a man be
good, which is the very same thing And yet
when he blames him he says the same with
himself he blames himself so that he must be
wrong either in his first or his second assertion

Many of the audience cheered and applauded
this And I felt at first giddy and faint as if I
had received a blow from the hand of an expert
boxer when I heard his words and the sound of
the cheerin and to confess the truth, I wanted
to get me to think hat the meaning of the
poet really as So I turned to Prodicus and
called him Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a
countryman of yours and you ought to come to
his aid [330] I must appeal to you, like the
river Scamander in Homer who when he
was conquered by Achilles, summons the Simois to
aid him saying

*B ther d or let us both tog ther stay the fo e of
the hero*

And I summon you for I am afraid that Pro-
tagoras will make an end of Simonides Now is
the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the ap-
plication of your philosophy of synonyms
which enables you to distinguish will and
"wish" and make other charming distinctions
like those which you drew just now And I
should like to know whether you would agree
with me for I am of opinion that there is no
contradiction in the words of Simonides And
first of all I wish that you would say whether
in your opinion Prodicus being is the same
as becoming

Not the same, certainly replied Prodicus

Did not Simonides first set forth as his own
view that Hardly can a man become truly
good?

Quite right, said Prodicus

And then he blames Pittacus not as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says
himself but for saying something different
from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides
says, that hardly can a man become good
but hardly can a man be good and our friend
Prodicus would maintain that being Protagoras,
is not the same as becoming and if they
are not the same, then Simonides is not incon-
sistent with himself I dare say that Prodicus
and many others would say as Hesiod says,

*On the one ha d ha dly can a m n become good
For the gods have m de virtue the re i d i to l
But n the other ha d whe y u ha e climbed the
h ght
Then t retain t true ho e ver difficult the acqui-
sition is easy*

Prodicus heard and approved but Protagoras
said Your correction Socrates involves a
greater error than is contained in the sentence
which you are correcting

Alas! I said Protagoras then I am a sorry
physician and do but aggravate a disorder
which I am seeking to cure.

Such is the fact he said

How so? I asked

The poet, he replied could never have made
such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in
the opinion of all men is the hardest of all
things, can be easily retained

Well I said and how fortunate are we in
having Prodicus among us at the right mo-
ment for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which,
as I imagine, is more than human and of very
ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides
or even older [341] Learned as you are in
many things, you appear to know nothing of

Socrates or of Protagoras let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion

[337] Prodicus added That Critias seems to me to be well said for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers remembering however that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them but to the wiser a higher meed should be given and a lower to the less wise And I as well as Critias would beg you Protagoras and Socrates to grant our request which is that you will argue with one another and not wrangle for friends argue with friends out of goodwill but only adversaries and enemies wrangle And then our meeting will be delightful for in this way you who are the speakers will be most likely to win esteem and not praise only among us who are your audience for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers souls but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight Thus spoke Prodicus and many of the company applauded his words

Hippias the sage spoke next He said All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens by nature and not by law for by nature like is akin to like whereas law is the tyrant of mankind and often compels us to do many things which are against nature How great would be the disgrace then if we who know the nature of things and are the wisest of the Hellenes and as such are met together in this city which is the metropolis of wisdom and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind I do pray and advise you Protagoras and you Socrates to agree upon a compromise Let us be your peacemakers And do not you Socrates aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse if Protagoras objects [338] but loosen and let go the reins of speech that your words may be grander and more becoming to you Neither do you Protagoras go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into

an ocean of words but let there be a mean observed by both of you Do as I say And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper length

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval Callias said that he would not let me off and they begged me to choose an arbiter But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly for if the person chosen was inferior then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better or if he was equal neither would that be well for he who is our equal will do as we do and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say Let us have a better then—to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras And if you choose another who is not really better and whom you only say is better to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him not that as far as I am concerned any reflection is of much consequence to me Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire If Protagoras is not disposed to answer let him ask and I will answer and I will endeavour to show at the same time how as I maintain he ought to answer and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask let him in like manner answer me and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him you and I will unite in entreating him as you entreated me not to spoil the discussion And this will require no special arbiter—all of you shall be arbiters

This was generally approved and Protagoras though very much against his will was obliged to agree that he would ask questions and when he had put a sufficient number of them that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies He began to put his questions as follows—

I am of opinion Socrates he said that skill in poetry is the principal part of education [339] and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct and what are not and how they are to be distinguished and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry we will speak as before of virtue but in reference to a passage of a poet Now Simonides says to

philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics: they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions [33] Such were Thales of Miletus and Pittacus of Mitylene and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon and Cleobulus the Lacedaemonian, and Myson the Chian, and seventh in the catalogue of wise men as the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this character: consisting of short memorable sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi as the first fruits of their wisdom the far famed inscriptions, which are in all men's mouths—know thyself and nothing too much.

Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise. *Hard is it to be good.* And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying then as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying.

Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if in the very first words of the poem wanting to say only that to become good is hard he inserted *μὲν* "on the one hand [on the one hand] to become good is hard [there would be no reason for the introduction of *μὲν* unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus's saying *Hard is it to be good*" and he, in refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, not joining truly with good, but with hard. *Not that the hard thing is to be truly good as though the *εἶ* were some truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (this could be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides) but you must suppose him to make a traction (the word truly construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking, and Simonides answering him). O my friends, says Pittacus, hard is it to be good, and Simonides answers, [34] In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken: the diffi-*

culty is not to be good but on the one hand to become good: four square in hands and feet and mind without a flaw—that is hard truly. This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of *μὲν* on the one hand, and for the position at the end of the clause of the word "truly" and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem which is a charming piece of workmanship and very finished but such minutiae would be tedious. I should like however to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good as you, Pittacus, affirm is not possible, and is not granted to man. God only has this blessing but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him. Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel?—not the private individual for he is always overpowered and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown and only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him who at some time or other has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician for the good may become bad as another poet witnesses.

The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad

But the bad does not become bad: he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying *Hard is it to be good.* Now there is a difficulty in becoming good and yet this is possible but to be good is an impossibility—

For he who does well still gets down and he who does ill is still bad

But what sort of doing is good in letters? [345] and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the sick. But he who does ill is the bad.

this but I know for I am a disciple of Ius And now if I am not mistaken you do not understand the word hard (*χαλεπὸν*) in the sense which Simonides intended and I must correct you as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word awful (*δεινός*) as a term of praise If I say that Protagoras or any one else is an awfully wise man he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good awful and then he explains to me that the term awful is always taken in a bad sense and that no one speaks of being awfully healthy or wealthy or awful peace but of awful disease, awful war awful poverty meaning by the term awful evil And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Ceanes when they spoke of hard meant evil or something which you do not understand Let us ask Prodicus for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides What did he mean, Prodicus by the term hard?

Evil said Prodicus

And therefore I said Prodicus he blames Pittacus for saying Hard is the good just as if that were equivalent to saying Evil is the good

Yes he said that was certainly his meaning and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms which in a Lesbian who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural

Do you hear Protagoras I asked what our friend Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for him?

You are entirely mistaken Prodicus said Protagoras and I know very well that Simonides in using the word hard meant what all of us mean not evil but that which is not easy—that which takes a great deal of trouble of this I am positive

I said I also incline to believe Protagoras that this was the meaning of Simonides of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware but he thought that he would make fun and try if you could maintain your thesis for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context in which he says that God only has this gift Now he can not surely mean to say that to be good is evil when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other For if this be his meaning Prodicus would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen And I should like to tell you [342] I said what I imagine to be the real

meaning of Simonides in this poem if you will test what in your way of speaking would be called my skill in poetry or if you would rather, I will be the listener

To this proposal Protagoras replied As you please—and Hippias Prodicus and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed

Then now I said I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this poem of Simonides There is a very ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas and there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the world This however is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny and they pretend to be ignorant just because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule the world by wisdom like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking and not by valour of arms considering that if the reason of their superiority were disclosed all men would be practising their wisdom And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them and have the caestus bound on their arms and are always in training and wear short cloaks for they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their country and they hold a philosophical *séance* unknown to strangers and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities—in this they are like the Cretans—in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying terse and full of meaning with unerring aim and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands And many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of

about the highest matters."—And thus, I said Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.

Hippias said I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of the poem but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me.

Say Hippias, said Alcibiades not now but at some other time. At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer or that if he would rather answer than that Socrates should ask.

I said I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse—who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another while they are drinking with the sound of their own voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity raise the price of flute girls in the market, hating for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute girls, nor dancing girls, nor harp-girls and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner even though they are very liberal in their positions. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you can not interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying, people who cure them declaring some that the poet has one meaning and others that he has another and the point which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another and put one another to the proof in conversation. {348} And these are the models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer or if you would rather do you answer and give me

the opportunity of resuming and completing our unfinished argument.

I made these and some similar observations but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Therapon Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said—Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed that we may know his intention and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.

I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.

So I said Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that

When two go together a third sees before the other

for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought but if a man

Sees a third, when he is alone

he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?—who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are thus, and yet have not the power of making others good—whereas you are not only good yourself but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself that although other Sophists conceal their profession you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return {349} How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first and also to have your help in considering them.

Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician and in the second place a good physician for he may become a bad one also but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that sort and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated by time or toil or disease or other accident (the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge) but the bad man will never become bad for he is always bad and if he were to become bad he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously good but that he may become good and may also become bad and again that

They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love

All this relates to Pittacus as is further proved by the sequel. For he adds

Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in searching after the impossible hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad bosomed earth if I find him I will send you word

(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem)

But him who does no evil voluntarily I praise and love—not even the gods war against necessity

All this has a similar drift for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man as I believe will allow that any human being errs voluntarily or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily the word voluntarily applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a good man might often compel himself [346] to love and praise another and to be the friend and approver of another and that there might be an involuntary love such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother or country or the like. Now bad men when their parents or country have any defects look on them with malignant joy and

find fault with them and expose and denounce them to others under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of neglect and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased but the good man dissembles his feelings and constrains himself to praise them and if they have wronged him and he is angry he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides as is probable considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like much against his will and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is censorious.

For I am satisfied [he says] when a man is neither bad nor very stupid and when he knows justice (which is the health of states) and is of sound mind I will find no fault with him for I am not given to finding fault and there are innumerable fools

(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault)

All things are good with which evil is unmingled

In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them as you might say. All things are white which have no black in them for that would be ridiculous but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state. He says

I do not hope to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the broad bosomed earth (if I find him I will send you word) in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately good and does no evil is good enough for me who love and approve every one

(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word *εὐαίρειν* [approve] because he is addressing Pittacus—

Who love and approve every one voluntarily who does no evil

and that the stop should be put after voluntarily) but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you Pittacus I would never have blamed [347] if you had spoken what was moderately good and true but I do blame you because putting on the appearance of truth you are speaking falsely

they are not the same and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art and also like ability by madness and rage but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul

I said You would admit, Protagoras that some men live well and others ill?

He assented.

And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

He does not

But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he be not in that case have lived well?

He will

Then to live pleasantly is a good and to live unpleasantly an evil?

Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.

And do you Protagoras, like the rest of the world call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort and in as far as they are painful they are bad

I do not know Socrates he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil Having regard not only to my present answer but also to the whole of my life I shall be safer if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good and that there are some painful things which are good and some which are not good and that there are some which are neither good nor evil

And you would call pleasant I said the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

Certainly he said

Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself

According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, I thus reflect about this he said and if the reflection is to the point and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree but if not, then we will argue

And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said or shall I begin?

You ought to take the lead he said for you are the author of the discussion

[352] May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the

health or some other bodily quality of another—he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers and then he says Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view—that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras and reveal your opinion about knowledge that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength or of rule, or of command their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about any how Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man if he only knows the difference of good and evil to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

I agree with you Socrates, said Protagoras and not only so, but I above all other men am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things

Good, I said and true But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning

Yes, Socrates, he replied and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error

Suppose, then that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection which they call “being overcome by pleasure” [353] and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best When we say to them Friends you are mistaken and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called being overcome by pleasure, pray what is it, and by what name would you describe it?

But why Socrates should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many who just say anything that happens to occur to them?

I believe, I said that they may be of use in

If I am not mistaken the question was this Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function no one of them being like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing but that each of them had a separate object and that all these objects were parts of virtue not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another and have each of them a distinct function I should like to know whether this is still your opinion or if not I will ask you to define your meaning and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me

I answer, Socrates he said that all these qualities are parts of virtue and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the fifth of them which is courage is very different from the other four as I prove in this way You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous unholy intemperate ignorant who are nevertheless remarkable for their courage

Stop I said I should like to think about that When you speak of brave men do you mean the confident or another sort of nature?

Yes he said I mean the impetuous ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach

In the next place you would affirm virtue to be a good thing of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher

Yes, he said I should say the best of all things if I am in my right mind

And is it partly good and partly bad I said or wholly good?

Wholly good and in the highest degree

[350] Tell me then who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?

I should say the divers

And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?

Yes that is the reason

And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled horseman or the unskilled?

The skilled

And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?

The peltasts And that is true of all other

things he said if that is your point those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge and they are more confident after they have learned than before

And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant I said of these things and yet confident about them?

Yes he said, I have seen such persons far too confident

And are not these confident persons also courageous?

In that case he replied courage would be a base thing for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen

Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?

Yes he said to that statement I adhere.

And those I said who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous but mad and in that case the wisest are also the most confident and being the most confident are also the bravest and upon that view again wisdom will be courage

Nay Socrates he replied you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident but I was never asked whether the confident are the courageous if you had asked me I should have answered Not all of them and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge and more courageous than others who have no knowledge and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom You might begin by asking whether the strong are able and I should say Yes and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle and more able after than before they had learned and I should assent And when I had admitted this you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength whereas in that case I should not have admitted any more than in the other that the able are strong although I have admitted that the strong are able [351] For there is a difference between ability and strength the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that

PROTAGORAS

good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names—first good and evil and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply.

By pleasure for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer then, we shall only say that he is overcome. By what? he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply indeed we shall say but our questioner will rejoice with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, "That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply. Because it was not worthy for if it had been worthy then he who, as we say was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. But how? he will reply can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another either as greater and smaller or more and fewer? Thus we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome—what do you mean? he will say but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?" Admitted. And now substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say not as before that a man does what is evil knowingly but that he does what is painful knowingly and because he is overcome by pleasure [356] which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller and more and fewer and differ in degree? For if any one says

Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain—To that I should reply. And do they differ in any thing but in pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a child weigher put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures as a pleasure, you of course take the more

and greater or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.

He agreed with me.

Well then I shall say if you agree so far be so good as to answer me a question. Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same holds of thickness and number also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near and lesser when at a distance. They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the greater and in not doing or in avoiding the less. What would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would faint teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?

Yes, he said the art of measurement.

Suppose, again the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other [357] and whether near or at a distance. What would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number when the question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not?

Protagoras himself thought that they would. Well then, my friends I say to them seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter must not this measuring be a con-

helping us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our agreement that I should show the way in which, as I think, our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow, but if not, never mind.

You are quite right, he said, and I would have you proceed as you have begun.

Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question: What account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant and they knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: In what way do you say that they are evil—in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of what ever nature?—Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like?

I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you do.

And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain—they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures—there again they would agree?

[354] We both of us thought that they would.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view and say: Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises and military service and the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?—they would assent to me?

He agreed.

And do you call them good because they

occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain, or because afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power over others and wealth?—they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?

He assented.

Are these things good for any other reason, except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?—they would acknowledge that they were not?

I think so, said Protagoras.

And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?

He assented.

Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good, and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If however you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.

I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains, then if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.

True, said Protagoras.

Suppose again I said that the world says to me: Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject? Excuse me, friends, I should reply, but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression, overcome by pleasure, and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other [355] than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences.—If what you say is true, then the argument is absurd, which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure, or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is

parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them each of them had a separate function. To this, however I am not referring but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each other but that the fifth which was courage, differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous which proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember Protagoras, that this was your answer.)

He assented.

Well then I said: tell us against what are the courageous ready to go—against the same dangers as the cowards?

No, he answered.

Then against something different?

Yes, he said.

Then do cowards go where there is safety and the courageous where there is danger?

Yes, Socrates, so men say.

Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the courageous are ready to go—against dangers, believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?

No, said he, the former case has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.

That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers since the want of self-control which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.

He assented.

And yet the courageous man and the coward do go to meet that about which they are confident so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.

And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous goes the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.

And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said.

Honourable, he replied.

And is honourable then already admitted by

us to be good for all honourable actions we have admitted to be good.

That is true and to that opinion I shall always adhere.

[360] True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war which is a good and honourable thing?

The cowards, he replied.

And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?

It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied.

And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler and pleasanter and better?

The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.

But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better and pleasanter and nobler?

That must be admitted.

And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?

True, he replied.

And if not base then honourable?

He admitted this.

And if honourable, then good?

Yes.

But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman on the contrary are base?

He assented.

And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?

True, he said.

Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?

I should say cowardice, he replied.

And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?

Assuredly, he said.

And because of that ignorance they are cowards?

He assented.

And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?

He again assented.

Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?

He nodded assent.

But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?

Yes.

Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?

To that again he nodded assent.

And the ignorance of them is cowardice?

To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.

sideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

This is undeniably true

And this as possessing measure must undeniably also be an art and science?

They will agree he said

The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration but the existence of such a science furnishes a demonstra-

ive answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras At the time when you asked the question if you remember both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge and that knowledge in whatever existing must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge and we refused to allow this and you rejoined O Protagoras and Socrates what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this?—tell us what you call such a state—if we had immediately and at the time answered Ignorance you would have laughed at us But now in laughing at us you will be laughing at yourselves for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains that is in their choice of good and evil from defect of knowledge and you admitted further that they err not only from defect of knowledge in general but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance This therefore is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure—ignorance and that the greatest And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance but you who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught neither go yourselves nor send your children to the Sophists who are the teachers of these things—you take care of your money and give them none and the result is that you are the worse off both in public and private life—Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general And now I should like to ask you [358] Hippias and you Prodicus as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours) whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true

Then you agree I said that the pleasant is the good and the painful evil And here I

would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names whether he is disposed to say pleasurable delightful joyful However by whatever name he prefers to call them I will ask you most excellent Prodicus to answer in my sense of the words

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others

Then my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? The honourable work is also useful and good?

This was admitted

Then I said if the pleasant is the good nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable when he might do the better And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom

They all assented

And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

To this also they unanimously assented

Then I said no man voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks to be evil To prefer evil to good is not in human nature and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils no one will choose the greater when he may have the less

All of us agreed to every word of this

Well I said there is a certain thing called fear or terror and here Prodicus I should particularly like to know whether you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil

Protagoras and Hippias agreed but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror

Never mind Prodicus I said but let me ask whether if our former assertions are true a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been already made that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be evil?

[359] *That also was universally admitted*

Then I said these Hippias and Prodicus are our premisses and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at first I do not mean in what he said quite at first for his first statement as you may remember was that whereas there were five

EUTHYDEMUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES, *who is the narrator* CRITO CLEINIAS
EUTHYDEMUS DIONYSODORUS CYSEPPUS. Scene The Lyceum



[271] CRITO Who was the person Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who was he?

SOCRATES There were two, Crito: which of them do you mean?

CRITO The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right hand side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has wonderfully grown: he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he is much forwarder and very good looking: the other is thin and looks younger than he is.

SOCRATES He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus and on my left hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the conversation.

CRITO Neither of them are known to me, Socrates: they are a new importation of Sophists as I should imagine. Of what country are they and what is their line of wisdom?

SOCRATES As to their origin I believe that they are natives of this part of the island and have migrated from Chios to Thurium: they were driven out of Thurium, and have been living for many years past in these regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful—consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was before: they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in the use of their bodies, are in addition in every sort

of warfare [272] for they are capital at fighting in armour and will teach this art to any one who pays them: and also they are most skilful in legal warfare: they will plead themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their wisdom: but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them: and now no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands: for they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one.

CRITO But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear that.

SOCRATES Certainly not, Crito: as I will prove to you: for I have the consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I esteem quite, as I may say in old age, last year or the year before: they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music master, for when the boys who go to him see me going with them they laugh at me and call him grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience similar treatment: the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive me: and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to

And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous in courage and in opposed to the ignorance of these things?

At this point he would no longer nod assent but was silent

And why I said do you neither assent nor dissent Protagoras?

Finish the argument by yourself he said

I only want to ask one more question I said I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?

You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer Socrates and therefore I will gratify you and say that this appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument

My only object I said in continuing the discussion has been the desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue for if this were clear [361] I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also become clear The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular For if the argument had a human voice that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying Protagoras and Socrates you are strange beings there are you Socrates who were saying that virtue cannot be taught contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge including justice and temperance and courage—which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught for if virtue were other than knowledge as Protagoras attempted to prove then clearly virtue cannot be taught but if virtue is

entirely knowledge as you are seeking to show then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught Protagoras on the other hand who started by saying that it might be taught is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught Now I Protagoras perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas have a great desire that they should be cleared up And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is and whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument as he forgot us in the story I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these questions in Promethean care of my own life And if you have no objection as I said at first I should like to have your help in the enquiry

Protagoras replied Socrates I am not of a base nature and I am the last man in the world to be envious I cannot but applaud your energy and your conduct of an argument As I have often said I admire you above all men whom I know and far above all men of your age and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy Let us come back to the subject at some future time at present we had better turn to something else

By all means I said if that is your wish for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias So the conversation ended and we went our way

taught at all or that you are not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him who is of the latter temper of mind that virtue can be taught and that you are the men from whom he will best learn it?

Certainly Socrates said Dionysodorus our art will do both.

And you and your brother Dionysodorus I said of all men who are now living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study of virtue?

[275] Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.

Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will confer a great favour on me and on every one present for the fact is I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His name is Cleinias and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old Alcibiades cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is most happily timed and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection.

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used and Euthydemus in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied There can be no object on Socrates if the young man is only willing to answer questions.

He is quite accustomed to do so I replied for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him and therefore he is quite at home in answering.

What followed Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the task of rehearsing in finite wisdom and therefore like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now Euthydemus if I remember rightly began nearly as follows O Cleinias are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?

The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help and I knowing that he was distressed said Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions.

Whichever he answers said Dionysodorus leaning forward so as to catch my ear his face beaming with laughter I prophesy that he will be refuted Socrates.

While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer and therefore I had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed [276] and he answered that those who learned were the wise.

Euthydemus proceeded There are some whom you would call teachers are there not?

The boy assented.

And they are the teachers of those who learn—the grammar master and the lyre master used to teach you and other boys and you were the learners?

Yes.

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

No he said.

And were you wise then?

No indeed he said.

But if you were not wise you were unlearned?

Certainly.

You then learning what you did not know were unlearned when you were learning?

The youth nodded assent.

Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

At these words the followers of Euthydemus of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director laughed and cheered. Then before the youth had time to recover his breath Dionysodorus cleverly took him in hand and said Yes Cleinias and when the grammar master dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation?

The wise replied Cleinias.

Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.

Then once more the admirers of the two heroes in an ecstasy at their wisdom gave vent to another peal of laughter while the rest of us were silent and amazed. Euthydemus observing this, determined to persevere with the youth and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question which might be compared to the double turn of an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn learn what they know or what they do not know?

Connus and I hope that you will make one and perhaps we had better take your sons as a bait they will want to have them as pupils and for the sake of them will be willing to receive us

Cri I see no objection, Socrates if you like but first I wish that you would give me a description of their wisdom that I may know beforehand what we are going to learn

Soc In less than no time you shall hear for I cannot say that I did not attend—I paid great attention to them and I remember and will endeavour to repeat the whole story Providentially, I was sitting alone in the dressing room of the Lyceum where you saw me and was about to depart when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign [273] so I sat down again and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus came in and several others with them whom I believe to be their disciples and they walked about in the covered court they had not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered who as you truly say is very much improved he was followed by a host of lovers one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian a well bred youth but also having the wildness of youth Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting alone and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me as you describe and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus when they saw him at first stopped and talked with one another now and then glancing at us for I particularly watched them and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth and the other by me on the left hand the rest anywhere I saluted the brothers whom I had not seen for a long time and then I said to Cleinias Here are two wise men Euthydemus and Dionysodorus Cleinias wise not in a small but in a large way of wisdom for they know all about war—all that a good general ought to know about the array and command of an army and the whole art of fighting in armour and they know about law too and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured

They heard me say this but only despised me. I observed that they looked at one another and both of them laughed and then Euthydemus said Those Socrates are matters which we no longer pursue seriously to us they are secondary occupations

Indeed I said if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary what must the principal one be tell me I beseech you what that noble study is?

The teaching of virtue Socrates he replied is our principal occupation and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man

My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought as I was saying just now that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in armour and I used to say as much of you for I remember that you professed this when you were here before But now if you really have the other knowledge O for give me I address you as I would superior beings and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions [274] But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so vast that a feeling of incredulity steals over me

You may take our word Socrates for the fact

Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom or what will you do?

That is why we have come hither Socrates and our purpose is not only to exhibit but also to teach any one who likes to learn

But I can promise you I said that every unvirtuous person will want to learn I shall be the first and there is the youth Cleinias and Ctesippus and here are several others I said pointing to the lovers of Cleinias who were beginning to gather round us Now Ctesippus was sitting at some distance from Cleinias and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking with me he was prevented from seeing Cleinias who was between us and so partly because he wanted to look at his love and also because he was interested he jumped up and stood opposite to us and all the other admirers of Cleinias as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus followed his example And these were the persons whom I showed to Euthydemus telling him that they were all eager to learn to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom Then I said O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the favour to exhibit There may be some trouble in giving the whole exhibition but tell me one thing—can you make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn of you or of him also who is not convinced either because he imagines that virtue is a thing which cannot be

rus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear: and if I do this in a very marvellous and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture on improvising before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom, and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now O son of Aniochus let me put a question to you. Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man, for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

[279] There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy?—that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No sovereign sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered: for every one will say that wealth is a good.

Certainly he said.

And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

He agreed.

Can there be any doubt that good birth and power and honours in one's own land, are goods?

He assented.

And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, justice, courage? do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

They are goods, said Cleinias.

Very well, I said, and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the good or not?

Among the goods.

And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.

Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

What is that? he asked. Fortune, Cleinias, I replied, which all even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

True, he said.

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly O son of Aniochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing stock of ourselves to the strangers.

Why do you say so?

Why, because we have already spoken of good fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

What do you mean?

I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same thing twice over.

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied, Surely wisdom is good fortune, even a child may know that.

The simple minded youth was amazed, and observing his surprise, I said to him, Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute players are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute?

He assented.

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?

Certainly.

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?

None, certainly.

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

With a wise one.

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

A wise one.

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

He assented.

[280] Then wisdom always makes men fortunate, for by wisdom no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer.

We continued at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

Again Dionysodorus whispered to me That Socrates is just another of the same sort

Good heavens, I said and your last question was so good!

Like all our other questions Socrates, he replied—inevitable

I see the reason I said why you are in such reputation among your disciples

Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn what they do not know and he put him through a series of questions the same as before

[277] Do you not know letters?

He assented

All letters?

Yes

But when the teacher dictates to you does he not dictate letters?

To this also he assented

Then if you know all letters he dictates that which you know?

This again was admitted by him

Then said the other you do not learn that which he dictates but he only who does not know letters learns?

Nay said Cleinias but I do learn

Then said he you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?

He admitted that

Then he said you were wrong in your answer

The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the argument like a ball which he caught and had another throw at the youth Cleinias he said Euthydemus is deceiving you For tell me now is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?

Cleinias assented

And knowing is having knowledge at the time?

He agreed

And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?

He admitted that

And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?

Those who have not

And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?

He nodded assent

Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire and not of those who have?

He agreed

Then Cleinias he said those who do not know learn and not those who know

Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall but I knew that he was in deep water and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly You must not be surprised Cleinias at the singularity of their mode of speech this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries and this answers to the enthronement which, if you have ever been initiated is, as you will know accompanied by dancing and sport and now they are just prancing and dancing about you and will next proceed to initiate you, imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual which as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms The two foreign gentlemen perceiving that you did not know wanted to explain to you that the word to learn has two meanings, [278] and is used first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge the latter is generally called knowing rather than learning but the word learning is also used and you did not see, as they explained to you that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men of those who know and of those who do not know There was a similar trick in the second question when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser he would only be able to play with men tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit down and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play But in what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how) for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy but I suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now Euthydemus and Dionysodo-

rus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear: and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you. Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

[2/9] There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy?—that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And thus, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered for every one will say that wealth is a good.

Certainly he said.

And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

He agreed.

Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power and honour in one's own land, are goods?

He assented.

And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, justice, courage do you not eagerly and indeed think, Cleinias, that it shall be no more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

These goods, said Cleinias.

Every man, I said, and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the goods or not?

Among the goods.

And now I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.

Upon recollect on I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

What is that? he asked.

Fortune, Cleinias, I replied, which all even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

True, he said.

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly O son of Axiochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing stock of ourselves to the strangers.

Why do you say so?

Why because we have already spoken of good fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

What do you mean?

I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good fortune, which has a place in the list already and saying the same thing twice over.

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With a wise one.

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

A wise one.

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

He assented.

[30] Then wisdom always makes men fortunate for by wisdom no man would err and therefore he must act rightly and succeed or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer.

We continued at last, somehow or other to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember I said our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

He assented

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things if they profited us not or if they profited us?

If they profited us he said

And would they profit us if we only had them and did not use them? For example if we had a great deal of food and did not eat or a great deal of drink and did not drink should we be profited?

Certainly not he said

Or would an artisan who had all the implements necessary for his work and did not use them be any the better for the possession of them? For example would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood if he never worked?

Certainly not he said

And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking and did not use them would he be happy because he possessed them?

No indeed Socrates

Then I said a man who would be happy must not only have the good things but he must also use them there is no advantage in merely having them?

True

Well Cleinias but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things is that sufficient to confer happiness?

Yes in my opinion

And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

He must use them rightly

That is quite true I said And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non use for the one is an evil and the other is neither a good nor an evil [281] You admit that?

He assented

Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?

Nothing else, he said

And surely in the manufacture of vessels knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

He agreed

And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and health and beauty is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them and regulates our practice about them?

He assented

Then in every possession and every use of a thing knowledge is that which gives a man not

only good fortune but success?

He again assented

And tell me I said, O tell me what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off having and doing many things without wisdom or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

Certainly he said

And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man?

A poor man

A weak man or a strong man?

A weak man

A noble man or a mean man?

A mean man

And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?

Yes

And an indolent man less than an active man?

He assented

And a slow man less than a quick and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?

All this was mutually allowed by us

Then I said Cleinias the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge under the guidance of ignorance they are greater evils than their opposites inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence they are greater goods but in themselves they are nothing?

That he replied is obvious

What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result—that other things are indifferent and that wisdom is the only good and ignorance the only evil?

He assented

[282] Let us consider a further point I said Seeing that all men desire happiness and happiness as has been shown is gained by a use and a right use of the things of life and the right use of them and good fortune in the use of them is given by knowledge—the inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can?

Yes, he said

And then a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than money from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor whether citizen or stranger—the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, to not to all dishonourable Cleinias nor to any one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree? I said

Yes, he said I quite agree, and think that you are right.

Yes, I said Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously for this is a point which has still to be considered and is not yet agreed upon by you and me—

But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said

Best of men I said I am delighted to hear you say so and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom and you individually will try to love her?

Certainly Socrates, he said I will do my best

I was pleased at hearing this and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit of the sort of exhortations which I would have you give and I hope that one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style or at least take up the enquiry where I left off and proceed to show the youth whether he should have all knowledge or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy and what that is. For as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart

[23.] Thus I spoke Crito and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the question and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong for the man Crito began a remarkable discourse well worth

hearing and wonderfully persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue

Tell me he said Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to be come wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?

I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with the youth and that this made them jest and play and being under this impression I was the more decided in saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said

Reflect, Socrates you may have to deny your words

I have reflected I said and I shall never deny my words

Well said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?

Undoubtedly

And he is not wise as yet?

At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is

You wish him he said to become wise and not to be ignorant?

That we do

You wish him to be what he is not and no longer to be what he is?

I was thrown into consternation at this

Taking advantage of my consternation he added You wish him no longer to be what he is which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or to perish!

When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and said Stranger of Thurii—if politeness would allow me I should say A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?

Euthydemus replied And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?

Yes said Ctesippus I should be mad to say anything else.

[24.] And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?

You tell the thing of which you speak

And he who tells tells that thing which he tells and no other?

Yes, said Ctesippus

And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?

Certainly

And he who says that thing says that which is?

Yes

And he who says that which is, says the truth And therefore Dionysodorus if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie

Yes Euthydemus said Ctesippus but in saying this he says what is not

Euthydemus answered And that which is not is not?

True

And that which is not is nowhere?

Nowhere

And can any one do anything about that which has no existence or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?

I think not said Ctesippus

Well but do rhetoricians when they speak in the assembly do nothing?

Nay he said they do something

And doing is making?

Yes

And speaking is doing and making?

He agreed

Then no one says that which is not for in saying what is not he would be doing something and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what is not And therefore upon your own showing no one says what is false but if Dionysodorus says anything he says what is true and what is

Yes Euthydemus said Ctesippus but he speaks of things in a certain way and manner and not as they really are

Why Ctesippus said Dionysodorus do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are?

Yes he said—all gentlemen and truth speaking persons

And are not good things good and evil things evil?

He assented

And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?

Yes

Then the good speak evil of evil things if they speak of them as they are?

Yes indeed he said and they speak evil of evil men And if I may give you a piece of advice you had better take care that they do not speak evil of you since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil

And do they speak great things of the great renowned Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?

To be sure they do said Ctesippus and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician

You are abusive Ctesippus said Dionysodo-

rus you are abusive!

Indeed I am not Dionysodorus he replied for I love you and am giving you friendly advice and if I could would persuade you not like a boor to say in my presence that I desire my beloved [-85] whom I value above all men to perish

I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another so I made a joke with him and said O Ctesippus I think that we must allow the strangers to use language in their own way and not quarrel with them about words, but be thankful for what they give us If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones—whether this is a discovery of their own or whether they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into a good one—if they know this (and they do know this—at any rate they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art)—let them in their phraseology destroy the youth and make him wise and all of us with him But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them then *fiat experimentum in corpore senis* I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus he may put me into the pot like Medea the Colchian kill me boil me, if he will only make me good

Ctesippus said And I Socrates am ready to commit myself to the strangers they may skin me alive if they please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already) if only my skin is made at last not like that of Marsyas into a leathern bottle but into a piece of virtue And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him when really I am not angry at all I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking improperly to me and you must not confound abuse and contradiction O illustrious Dionysodorus for they are quite different things

Contradiction! said Dionysodorus why there never was such a thing

Certainly there is he replied there can be no question of that Do you Dionysodorus maintain that there is not?

You will never prove to me he said that you have heard any one contradicting any one else

Indeed said Ctesippus then now you may hear me contradicting Dionysodorus

Are you prepared to make that good?

Certainly he said

Well, have not all things words expressive of them?

Yes.

Of their existence or of their non-existence?
Of their existence.

[286] Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember that no man could affirm a negative, for no one could affirm that which is not.

And what does that signify? said Ctesippus you and I may contradict all the same for that.

But can we contradict one another said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?

He assented.

Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?

He granted that proposition also.

But when I describe something and you describe another thing or I say something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?

Here Ctesippus was silent and I in my astonishment said What do you mean Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood a man must either say what is true or say nothing Is not that your position?

He assented.

But if he cannot speak falsely may he not think falsely?

No he cannot, he said.

Then there is no such thing as false opinion?

No he said.

Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing a mistake of fact?

Certainly he said.

And that is impossible?

Impossible, he replied.

Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?

Refute me, he said.

But how can I refute you if as you say to tell a falsehood is impossible?

Very true, said Euthydemus.

Neither did I tell you just now to refute me said Dionysodorus for how can I tell you to do that which is not?

O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question [287] if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting—that is what you mean?

Yes, he replied.

And now I said I will ask my stupid question If there is no such thing as error in deed word, or thought, then what in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn?

And are you such an old fool Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at first—and if I had said anything last year I suppose that you would bring that up too—but are non-plussed at the words which I have just uttered?

Why I said, they are not easy to answer for they are the words of wise men and indeed I know not what to make of this word non-plussed," which you used last what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

No he replied, they mean what you say And now answer.

What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.

Answer said he.

And is that fair?

Yes, quite fair he said.

Upon what principle? I said I can only suppose that you are a very wise man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answer—and now you will not open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.

You prate, he said, in stead of answering. But if, my good sir you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

I suppose that I must obey for you are master. Put the question.

Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

They are alive.

And do you know of any word which is alive?

I cannot say that I do.

Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?

Why because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet perhaps I was right after all in saying that words have a sense—what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error even you will not refute me and all your wisdom will be non-plussed but if I did fall into error then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error—and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago [288] I am inclined to think however Dionysodorus and Euthydemus that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely to advance even your skill in the subtleties of logic which is really amazing has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself now any more than of old.

Ctesippus said Men of Chios Thuri or however and whatever you call yourselves I wonder at you for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

Fearing that there would be high words I again endeavoured to soothe Ctesippus and said to him To you Ctesippus I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias—that you do not understand the ways of these philosophers from abroad. They are not serious but like the Egyptian wizard Proteus they take different forms and deceive us by their enchantments and let us like Menelaus refuse to let them go until they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their full beauty will appear let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I pray to behold them it might be a guide to them. I will go on therefore where I left off as well as I can in the hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity and that when they see me deeply serious and interested they also may be serious. You Cleinias I said shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?

Yes he replied.

And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?

Yes he said.

And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute truth—A knowledge which will do us good?

Certainly he said.

And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where

most gold was hidden in the earth?

Perhaps we should he said.

But have we not already proved I said that we should be none the better off even if with out trouble and digging all the gold which there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold [289] the knowledge would be of no value to us unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said.

I quite remember he said.

Nor would any other knowledge whether of money making or of medicine or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing and not to use it when made be of any good to us. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality neither would there be any use in that if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances?

To all this he agreed.

Then my dear boy I said the knowledge which we want is one that uses itself well as makes?

True he said.

And our desire is not to be skilful lyre makers or artists of that sort—far otherwise for with them the art which makes is one and the art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same they are divided for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And clearly we do not want the art of the flute maker this is only another of the same sort?

He assented.

But suppose I said that we were to learn the art of making speeches—would that be the art which would make us happy?

I should say no rejoined Cleinias.

And why should you say so? I asked.

I see he replied that there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they make just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres and also some who are of themselves unable to compose speeches but are able to use the speeches which the others make for them and this proves that the art of making speeches is not the same as the art of using them.

Yes I said and I take your words to be a

insufficient proof that the art of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered in that direction for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great art of enchantment [90] and hardly if at all, inferior to it, and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of theirs acts upon deities and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying of them. Do you agree with me?

Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right.

Whether then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?

I do not see my way, he said.

But I think that I do, I replied.

And what is your notion? asked Cleinias.

I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which the possession is most likely to make a man happy.

I do not think so, he said.

Why not? I said.

The art of the general is surely an art of using mankind.

What of that, I said.

Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing, and when the net is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it, but they hand it over to the cook, and the geometers and astronomers and calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in them)—they I say not being able to use but only to catch their prey, hand over their art in entirety to the dialectician to be applied by him, if they have any sense in them.

Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?

Certainly, he said, just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use them himself, or as the quail-take transfers the quails to the keeper of them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.

Crito And do you mean, Socrates, that the younger said all this?

Soc. Are you incredulous, Crito?

Crito Indeed I am, for if he did say so then in my opinion he needs neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor.

Soc. Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real answerer.

[291] Crito Ctesippus! nonsense.

Soc. All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say my good Crito, that they may have been spoken by some superior person, that I heard them I am certain.

Crito Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior. I should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

Soc. Find? my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure, we were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever.

Crito How did that happen, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you, the kingly art was identified by us with the political.

Crito Well, and what came of that?

Soc. To this royal or political art all the arts including the art of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking—the art which is the source of good government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and utilizing them.

Crito And were you not right, Socrates?

Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed, for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority do anything for us? To be sure, was the answer. And could not you, Crito, say the same?

Crito Yes I should.

Soc. And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say—it produces health?

Crito I should.

Soc. And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over

the subject arts—what does that do? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth? [292]

Cri Yes

Soc And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?

Cri Indeed I am not, Socrates

Soc No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.

Cri Certainly

Soc And surely it ought to do us some good?

Cri Certainly, Socrates

Soc And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge of some kind is the only good.

Cri Yes, that was what you were saying.

Soc All the other results of politics and they are many, as for example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in themselves, but the political science ought to make us wise and impart knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good and make us happy.

Cri Yes, that was the conclusion at which you had arrived according to your report of the conversation.

Soc And does the kingly art make men wise and good?

Cri Why not, Socrates?

Soc What, all men and in every respect? and teach them all the arts—carpentering and cobbling and the rest of them?

Cri I think not, Socrates

Soc But then what is this knowledge and what are we to do with it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil and gives no knowledge but the knowledge of itself, what then can it be and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?

Cri By all means

Soc And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good and that these others will make others again without ever determining in what they are to be good, for we have put aside the results of politics as they are called. This is the old, old song over again and we are just as far as ever, if not farther from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

Cri Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

Soc Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on

the point of shipwreck, [293] I lifted up my voice and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument. They were our Castor and Pollux. I said, and they should be serious and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

Cri And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?

Soc Yes, indeed, he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect. Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?

Indeed I am.

Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

Then tell me, he said, do you know any thing?

Yes, I said, I know many things, but not any thing of much importance.

That will do, he said. And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

Certainly not.

And did you not say that you knew some thing?

I did.

If you know, you are knowing.

Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.

That makes no difference—and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?

Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not know.

And if you do not know, you are not knowing.

Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.

Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing, and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things.

A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be, and therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking—May I

assume this to be your ingenious notion?

Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said.

Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?

Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. What do you mean? I said, do you know nothing?

Nay, he replied, we do know something. [294] Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?

Yes, all things, he said, and that is as true of you as of us.

O indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And do all other men know all things or nothing?

Certainly, he replied, they cannot know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.

Then what is the inference? I said.

They know all things, he replied, if they know one thing.

O hear, said Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest: hardly have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering, and leather cutting?

Certainly, he said.

And do you know stitching?

Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.

And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?

Certainly, did you think we should say no to that?

By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me some proof, which would enable me to know whether you speak truly.

What proof shall I give you? he said.

Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.

Will you not take our word that we know all things?

Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing: and then we shall know that you are speaking the truth, if you tell us the number and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they refused, and they would only say in answer: each of his ques-

tions, that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all restraint: no question in fact was too bad for him: he would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and they like wild boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.

Certainly, he replied.

And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he got to such a height of skill as that?

He can do anything, he said.

And did you always know this?

Always, he said.

When you were children, and at your birth?

[295] They both said that they did.

This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, Socrates.

Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men.

But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar marvels.

Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me.

Answer then, he said.

Ask, I said, and I will answer.

Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?

Something, I said.

And do you know with what you know, or with something else?

With what I know, and I suppose that you mean with my soul?

Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one?

Well, I said, but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid: when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, and not to ask again.

Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said.

Yes, I replied.

Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.

Yes, I said, but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will that please you—it I answer what is not to the point?

That will please me very well, but will not please you equally well, as I imagine.

I certainly will not answer unless I understand you I said

You will not answer he said according to your view of the meaning because you will be prating and are an ancient

Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions when he wanted to catch me in his springes of words And I remembered that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him and then he neglected me because he thought that I was stupid and as I was intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil I reflected that I had better let him have his way as he might think me a blockhead and refuse to take me So I said You are a far better dialectician than myself Euthydemus for I have never made a profession of the art and therefore do as you say ask your questions once more and I will answer

Answer then he said again whether you know what you know with something or with nothing

Yes I said I know with my soul

[296] The man will answer more than the question for I did not ask you he said with what you know but whether you know with something

Again I replied Through ignorance I have answered too much but I hope that you will forgive me And now I will answer simply that I always know what I know with something

And is that something he rejoined always the same or sometimes one thing and sometimes another thing?

Always I replied when I know I know with this

Will you not cease adding to your answers?

My fear is that this word always may get us into trouble

You perhaps but certainly not us And now answer Do you always know with this?

Always since I am required to withdraw the words when I know

You always know with this or always knowing do you know some things with this and some things with something else or do you know all things with this?

All that I know I replied I know with this

There again Socrates he said the addition is superfluous

Well then I said I will take away the words that I know

Nay, take nothing away I desire no favours of you but let me ask Would you be able to know all things if you did not know all things?

Quite impossible.

And now he said you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that you know all things

I suppose that is true I said if my qualification implied in the words that I know is not allowed to stand and so I do know all things.

And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know whether you make the addition of when you know them or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all things that is to say when you were a child, and at your birth and when you were growing up and before you were born and before the heaven and earth existed you knew all things, if you always know them and I swear that you shall always continue to know all things if I am of the mind to make you

But I hope that you will be of that mind reverend Euthydemus I said if you are really speaking the truth and yet I a little doubt your power to make good your words unless you have the help of your brother Dionysodorus then you may do it Tell me now both of you for although in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things when I am told so by men of your prodigious wisdom—how can I say that I know such things Euthydemus as that the good are unjust come do I know that or not?

Certainly you know that

What do I know?

That the good are not unjust

[297] Quite true I said and that I have always known but the question is where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Nowhere said Dionysodorus

Then I said I do not know this

You are ruining the argument said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus he will be proved not to know and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time

Dionysodorus blushed

I turned to the other and said What do you think Euthydemus? Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?

What replied Dionysodorus in a moment am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Thereupon I said Please not to interrupt my good friend or prevent Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust such a lesson you might at least allow me to learn

You are running away Socrates said Dionysodorus and refusing to answer

No wonder I said for I am not a match for

one of you, and a *fortiori* I must run away from two I am no Heracles and even Heracles could not fight against the Hydra, who was a she. So, but, and had the wit to shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off especially when he saw a second monster or a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his mouth and bawling. When the monster was growing troublesome, he called Iolaus, his nephew to his help, who ably succoured him but if my Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles [the statu-ary] were to come, he would only make a bad business worse.

And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours?

I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will insist on asking—that I pretty well know—out of envy in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.

Then answer me, he said.

Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles and his father was not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of Heracles.

And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?

Yes, I said, he is my half-brother the son of my mother but not of my father.

Then he is and is not your brother.

Not by the same father my good man, I said, for Chaereclermus was his father and mine was Sophroniscus.

And was Sophroniscus a father and Chaereclermus also?

Yes, I said the former was my father and the latter his.

[93] Then, he said Chaereclermus is not a father.

He is not my father I said.

But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?

I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that you may prove me to be one.

Are you not other than a stone?

I am.

And being other than a stone, you are not a stone and being other than gold you are not gold.

Very true.

And so Chaereclermus, he said, being other

than a father is not a father?

I suppose that he is not a father I replied.

For if said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaereclermus is a father then Sophroniscus, being other than a father is not a father and you, Socrates, are without a father.

Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?

A surely not, said Euthydemus.

Then he is the same?

He is the same.

I cannot say that I like the connection but is he only my father Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?

Of all other men, he replied Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father?

Certainly I did so imagine, said Ctesippus.

And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?

They are not "*in part mavericks*" Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the father of all.

But he is, he replied.

What, of men only said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals?

Of all, he said.

And your mother too, is the mother of all?

Yes, our mother too.

Yes and your mother has a progeny of sea urchins then?

Yes and yours, he said.

And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?

And yours too.

And your papa is a dog?

And so is yours, he said.

If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog.

Yes, a vulpin of a one, said Ctesippus.

And he has puppies?

Yes, and they are very like himself.

And the dog is the father of them.

Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come to other.

And is he not yours?

To be sure he is.

Then he is a father and he is yours, ergo, he is your father and the puppies are your brothers.

Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word. You beat this dog.

Ctesippus said laughing Indeed I do and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him [299] Then you beat your father he said

I should have far more reason to beat yours said Ctesippus what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of yours

But neither he nor you, Ctesippus have any need of much good

And have you no need Euthydemus? he said

Neither I nor any other man for tell me now Ctesippus if you think it good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it or to go to war armed rather than unarmed

Good I say And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your charming puzzles

That he replied you will discover if you answer since you admit medicine to be good for a man to drink when wanted must it not be good for him to drink as much as possible when he takes his medicine a cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?

Ctesippus said Quite so Euthydemus that is to say if he who drinks is as big as the statue of Delphi

And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?

Very true said Ctesippus and do you think Euthydemus that he ought to have one shield only and one spear?

I do

And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you and your companion fight in armour I thought that you would have known better Here Euthydemus held his peace but Dionysodorus returned to the previous answer of Ctesippus and said —

Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing?

Yes said Ctesippus and the more the better And to have money everywhere and always is a good?

Certainly a great good he said And you admit gold to be a good? Certainly he replied

And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always and as much as possible in himself and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly and a talent in his pate and a stater of gold in either eye?

Yes Euthydemus said Ctesippus and the Scythians reckon those who have gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father) and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls gilt and see the inside of them and hold their own head in their hands

[300] And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision or that which has not? said Euthydemus

That which has the quality of vision clearly And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said

Yes I do

Then do you see our garments?

Yes

Then our garments have the quality of vision

They can see to any extent said Ctesippus What can they see?

Nothing but you my sweet man may perhaps imagine that they do not see and certainly Euthydemus you do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep and that if it be possible to speak and say nothing—you are doing so

And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus

Impossible said Ctesippus

Or a speaking of the silent?

That is still more impossible he said

But when you speak of stones wood iron bars do you not speak of the silent?

Not when I pass a smithy for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched so that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken please however to tell me how you can be silent when speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present)

When you are silent, said Euthydemus is there not a silence of all things?

Yes he said

But if speaking things are included in all things then the speaking are silent

What said Ctesippus then all things are not silent?

Certainly not said Euthydemus

Then my good friend do they all speak?

³ Note the ambiguity of $\delta \rho \alpha \mu$ 'things visible and able to see' $\sigma \tau \omega \alpha \lambda \epsilon \gamma$ 'the speaking of the silent' the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* iv 166 12-14.

Yes those which speak.

Nor said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?

Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing. I am sure that you will be "non-passed" at that answer.

Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter: he said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma all is over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the referee must have picked up this answer from them, for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things?

Why Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?

Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.

[301] Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?

Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was richly served for having opened my mouth at all. I said however: They are not the same as beautiful, beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them.

And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?

God forbid, I replied.

But how, he said, by reason of one thing be present with another, and one thing be another?

Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning, to mistake their skill, on which my heart was set.

Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?

That, he said, is as I please.

And do you please?

Yes, he said.

And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other: for surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will hardly say the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you must have accidentally missed the last question: for in general you and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

What, said he, is the business of a good work-

man? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

The smith's.

And whose the making of pots?

The potter's.

And who has to grill and skin and mince and boil and roast?

The cook, I said.

And if a man does his business he does right, is it?

Certainly.

And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin: you have admitted that?

Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me.

Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the potter he would do their business.

Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom: can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.

What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?

Yes, I do, subject to your correction: for you are the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.

Is not that which you would deem your own he said, that which you have in your own power and which you are able to use as you would desire, [302] for example, an ox or a sheep—would you not think that which you could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased to be your own and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to be in your own power?

Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the questions, which I was impatient to hear): yes, such things, and such things only are mine.

Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?

Yes, I said.

You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming?

I agree.

Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who gives a des-

Ctesippus said laughing *Indeed I do and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him* [299] *Then you beat your father* he said

I should have far more reason to beat yours said Ctesippus *what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of yours*

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* Note the ambiguity of $\delta \alpha \lambda \delta \rho \alpha$ things visible and able to see $\sigma \tau \omega \alpha \lambda \epsilon \gamma$ the speaking of the silent the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech cannot be perfectly rendered in English Compare Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* iv 166 12 14.

Yes those which speak.

Nay said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?

Neither and both said Dionysodorus quickly interposing I am sure that you will be non-plussed at that answer.

Here Ctesippus as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter he said That brother of yours, Euthydemus has got into a dilemma all is over with him This delighted Cleinias whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said at such solemn and beautiful things?

Why Socrates said Dionysodorus did you ever see a beautiful thing?

Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many

[301] Were they other than the beautiful or the same as the beautiful?

Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all I said however They are not the same as absolute beauty but they have beauty present with each of them.

And are you an ox because an ox is present with you or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?

God forbid I replied.

But how he said by reason of one thing being present with another will one thing be another?

Is that your difficulty? I said For I was be-
 coming to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

Of course he replied I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?

That he said, is as I please.

And do you please?

Yes, he said.

And you will admit that the same is the same and the other other for surely the other is not the same I should imagine that even a child will hardly deny the other to be other But I think Dionysodorus, that you must have intentionally missed the last question for in general you and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

What said he, is the business of a good work-

man? tell me in the first place, whose business is hammering?

The smith's

And whose the making of pots?

The potter's

And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?

The cook I said

And if a man does his business he does rightly?

Certainly

And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin you have admitted that?

Yes I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me.

Then if some one were to kill mince, boil roast the cook he would do his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the potter he would do their business.

Poseidon I said this in the crown of wisdom can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

And would you be able, Socrates to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

Certainly I said if you will allow me

What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?

Yes I do, subject to your correction for you are the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top of all my wisdom.

Is not that which you would deem your own he said that which you have in your own power and which you are able to use as you would desire [302] for example an ox or a sheep—would you not think that which you could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased to be your own and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to be in your own power?

Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the questions, which I was impatient to hear) yes, such things and such things only are mine.

Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?

Yes I said

You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming?

I agree.

Then after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great he said Tell me Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here anticipating the final move like a person caught in a net, who gives a des-

perate twist that he may get away I said No Dionysodorus I have not

What a miserable man you must be then he said you are not an Athenian at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples or any other mark of gentility

Nay Dionysodorus I said do not be rough good words if you please in the way of religion I have altars and temples domestic and ancestral and all that other Athenians have

And have not other Athenians he said an ancestral Zeus?

That name, I said is not to be found among the Ionians whether colonists or citizens of Athens an ancestral Apollo there is who is the father of Ion and a family Zeus and a Zeus guardian of the phratry and an Athene guardian of the phratry But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us

No matter said Dionysodorus for you admit that you have Apollo Zeus and Athene

Certainly I said

And they are your gods he said

Yes I said my lords and ancestors

At any rate they are yours he said did you not admit that?

I did I said what is going to happen to me?

And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have life are animals and have not these gods life?

They have life I said

Then are they not animals?

They are animals I said

And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice as you pleased?

I did admit that Luthydemus and I have no way of escape

[303] Well then said he if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them as you would with other animals?

At this I was quite struck dumb Crito and lay prostrate Ctesippus came to the rescue

Bravo Heracles brave words said he

Bravo Heracles or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus

Poseidon said Ctesippus what awful distinctions I will have no more of them the pair are invincible

Then my dear Crito there was universal applause of the speakers and their words and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered for hitherto their partisans only had cheered at each successive hit, but now the

whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to sympathize in their joy To such a pitch was I affected myself that I made a speech in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom I was their devoted servant and fell to praising and admiring of them What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much indeed to admire in your words Euthydemus and Dionysodorus but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion—whether of the many or of the grave and reverend seigniors—you regard only those who are like yourselves And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you and who would approve of such arguments the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them I must further express my approval of your kind and public spirited denial of all differences whether of good and evil white or black or any other the result of which is that as you say every mouth is sewn up not excepting your own which graciously follows the example of others and thus all ground of offence is taken away But what appears to me to be more than all is that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time [304] Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of acquiring the exhibition would be best of all if the discussion were confined to your two selves but if there must be an audience let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee—you should be careful of this—and if you are wise you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves For only what is rare is valuable and water which as Pindar says is the best of all things is also the cheapest And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils

Such was the discussion Crito and after a few more words had passed between us we went away I hope that you will come to them with me since they say that they are able to

teach any one who will give them money no age or want of capacity is an impediment And I must repeat one thing which they said for your especial benefit,—that the learning of their art did not at all interfere with the business of money making

Cri Truly Socrates though I am curious and ready to learn yet I fear that I am not like minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who as you were saying would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions—he was a professor of legal oratory—who came away from you while I was walking up and down Crito said he to me, are you giving no attent on to these wise men? No indeed I said to him I could not get within hearing of them—there was such a crowd You would have heard something worth hearing if you had What was that? I said You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing “And what did you think of them? I said What did I think of them? He said—theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool and making much ado about nothing That was the expression which he used Surely I said philosophy is a charming thing {305} Charming! he said what simplicity! philosophy is nought and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of your friend—his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say and fasten upon every word And these, as I was telling you are supposed to be the most eminent professors of the time But the truth is, Crito that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous Now concern of the pursuit, Socrates hither come in from him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men there, I confess that, in my opinion he was in the right

Soc O Crito they are marvellous men but what was I going to say? First of all let me know—What manner of man was he who came up to you and censured philosophy was he a orator who himself practises in the courts or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches in which they do battle?

Cri He was certainly not an orator and I

doubt whether he had ever been into court but they say that he knows the business and is a clever man and composes wonderful speeches

Soc Now I understand Crito he is one of an amphibious class whom I was on the point of mentioning—one of those whom Prodicus describes as on the border ground between philosophers and statesmen—they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the wisest nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom for that they are themselves really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, when they get hold of them in conversation This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural for they have a certain amount of philosophy and a certain amount of political wisdom there is reason in what they say for they argue that they have just enough of both and so they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom

Cri What do you say of them Socrates? There is certainly something specious in that notion of theirs

Soc Yes, Crito there is more speciousness than truth they cannot be made to understand the nature of intermediates {306} For all persons or things which are intermediate between two other things and participate in both of them—if one of these two things is good and the other evil are better than the one and worse than the other but if they are in a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end they fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends Only in the case when the two component elements which do not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either Now if philosophy and political action are both good but tend to different ends and they participate in both and are in a mean between them then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either or if the one be good and the other evil they are better than the one and worse than the other only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be any truth in what they say I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil but the truth is, that these philosopher politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the attainment of the respective ends and are really third although they would

perate twist that he may get away I said No Dionysodorus I have not

What a miserable man you must be then he said you are not an Athenian at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples or any other mark of gentility

Nay Dionysodorus I said do not be rough good words if you please in the way of religion I have altars and temples domestic and ancestral and all that other Athenians have

And have not other Athenians he said an ancestral Zeus?

That name, I said is not to be found among the Ionians whether colonists or citizens of Athens an ancestral Apollo there is who is the father of Ion and a family Zeus and a Zeus guardian of the phratry and an Athene guardian of the phratry But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us

No matter said Dionysodorus for you admit that you have Apollo Zeus and Athene

Certainly I said

And they are your gods he said

Yes I said my lords and ancestors

At any rate they are yours he said did you not admit that?

I did I said what is going to happen to me?

And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have life are animals and have not these gods life?

They have life I said

Then are they not animals?

They are animals I said

And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice as you pleased?

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Poseidon said Ctesippus what awful distinctions I will have no more of them the pair are invincible

Then my dear Crito there was universal applause of the speakers and their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered for hitherto their partisans only had cheered at each successive hit, but now the

whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to sympathize in their joy To such a pitch was I affected myself that I made a speech in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom I was their devoted servant and fell to praising and admiring of them What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much indeed to admire in your words Euthydemus and Dionysodorus but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion—whether of the many or of the grave and reverend seigniors—you regard only those who are like yourselves And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you and who would approve of such arguments the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them I must further express my approval of your kind and public spirited denial of all differences whether of good and evil white or black or any other the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up not excepting your own which graciously follows the example of others and thus all ground of offence is taken away But what appears to me to be more than all is that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time [304] Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of acquiring the exhibition would be best of all if the discussion were confined to your two selves but if there must be an audience let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee—you should be careful of this—and if you are wise you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves For only what is rare is valuable and water which as Pin-dar says is the best of all things is also the cheapest And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils

Such was the discussion Crito and after a few more words had passed between us we went away I hope that you will come to them with me since they say that they are able to

teach any one who will give them money no
 or want of capacity is an impediment. And
 I must meet one *Cratylus* which they said, for
 your especial benefit,—that the learning of their
 art did not at all interfere with the business of
 money-making.

CR. Truly, Socrates, though I am curious
 and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not fit to
 be mixed with Euthydemus, but one of the other
 sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be
 moved by such arguments than use them in
 instruction of others. And though I may appear
 ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think
 that you may as well hear what was said to me
 by a man of very considerable pretensions—he
 was a professor of legal oratory—who came
 away from you while I was walking up and
 down. "Cratylus," said he to me, "are you giving
 no attention to these wise men?" "No, indeed,"
 I said to him. "I could not get within hearing
 of them—there was such a crowd. You would
 have heard something, worth hearing if you
 had. What was that?" I said, "You would
 have heard the greatest masters of the art of
 rhetoric disowning." "And what did you think
 of them?" I said. "What did I think of them?"
 he said—"There was the sort of discourse
 which anybody might hear from men who
 were paying the fool, and making much ado
 about nothing. That was the expression which
 he used." "Surely," I said, "philosophy is a
 charming thing." [303] "Charming," he said,
 "what implies? philosophy is noble, and I
 think that if you had been present you would
 have been ashamed of our friend—his con-
 duct was so very strange in placing himself at
 the mercy of men who care not what they say
 and listen upon every word. And these, as I
 was telling you, are supposed to be the most
 eminent professors of their time. But the truth
 is, Cratylus, that the study itself and the men them-
 selves are utterly mean and ridiculous. Now
 censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming
 from him or from others, appears to me to
 be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of
 holding a public discussion with such men,
 there, I confess that, in my opinion, he was in
 the right.

SOR. O Cratylus they are marvellous men, but
 what was I going to say. First of all let me
 know—What manner of man was he who
 came up to you and censured philosophy? was
 he an orator who himself practices in the courts,
 or an instructor of orators, who makes the
 speeches with which they do battle?

CR. He was certainly not an orator and I

doubt whether he had ever been into court; but
 they say that he knows the business, and is a
 clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.

SOR. Now I understand, Cratylus—he is one of
 an amphibious class, whom I was on the point
 of mentioning,—one of those whom Prodicus
 describes as on the border ground between phi-
 losophers and statesmen—they think that they
 are the wisest of all men, and that they are gen-
 erally esteemed the wisest—nothing but the ri-
 valry of the philosophers stands in their way,
 and they are of the opinion that if they can
 prove the philosophers to be good for nothing,
 no one will dispute their title to the palm of
 wisdom, for that they are themselves really the
 wisest, although they are apt to be misled by
 Euthydemus and his friends, when they get
 bored of them in conversation. Thus opinion
 which they entertain of their own wisdom is
 very natural, for they have a certain amount of
 philosophy and a certain amount of political
 wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for
 they argue that they have just enough of both,
 and so they keep out of the way of all risks and
 conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.

CR. What do you say of them, Socrates?
 There is certainly something specious in that
 notion of theirs.

SOR. Yes, Cratylus, there is more speciousness
 than truth; they cannot be made to understand
 the nature of intermediates. [306] For all per-
 sons or things, which are intermediate between
 two other things, and partake in both—
 them—if one of these two things is good and
 the other evil, are better than the one and worse
 than the other; but if they are in a mean be-
 tween two good things, which do not tend to
 the same end, they fall short of either of their
 component elements in the attainment of their
 ends. Only in the case when the two com-
 ponent elements which do not tend to the same
 end are evil is the participant better than either.
 Now if philosophy and political action are
 both good, but tend to different ends, and they
 partake in both, and are in a mean between
 them, then they are really nonsense, for they
 are worse than either or if the one be good and
 the other evil, they are better than the one and
 worse than the other—only on the supposition
 that they are both evil could there be any truth
 in what they say. I do not think that they will
 admit that their two pursuits are either wholly
 or partly evil; but the truth is, that these phi-
 losopher-politicians do aim at both fall short
 of both in the attainment of their respective
 ends, and are really third, although they could

like to stand first. There is no need however to be angry at this ambition of theirs—which may be forgiven for every man ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really are.

Cri I have often told you Socrates that I am in a constant difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the younger one who is only a child but the other Critobulus is getting on and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking when I hear you talk that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties about our children—in the first place about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them and then about heaping up money for them—and yet taking no care about their education. But then again when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others I am amazed. To me if I am to confess the truth, [307] they all seem to be such outrageous beings so that I do not know how I can advise

the youth to study philosophy.

Soc Dear Crito do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing and the good are few and beyond all price for example are not gymnastic and rhetoric and money making and the art of the general noble arts?

Cri Certainly they are in my judgment.

Soc Well and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?

Cri Yes indeed that is very true.

Soc And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?

Cri That would not be reasonable Socrates.

Soc Do you then be reasonable Crito and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her and not your sons only but if she be what I believe that she is then follow her and serve her you and your house as the saying is and be of good cheer.

CRATYLUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES, HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS



[383] *Hermogenes* Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?

Cratylus I like you please.

Her I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has been arguing about names: he says that they are natural and not conventional—not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use—but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers: "Yes." And Socrates? "Yes." Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he replies:—If all the world were to call you *Hermogenes*, that would not be your name." And when I am anxious to have a further explanation, he is ironical and mysterious, [384] and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter: if he would only tell and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means—or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear

Socrates Son of Hippocleus, there is an ancient saying, that hard is the knowledge of the good. And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such mat-

ters. I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really *Hermogenes*, I suspect that he is only making fun of you—he means to say that you are no true son of *Hermes*, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

Her I have often talked over this matter both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement: any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old—we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly imposed name is as good as the old—for there is no name given to anything by nature: all is convention and habit of the users—such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.

[385] *Soc* I dare say that you are right, *Hermogenes*: let us see—your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it?

Her That is my notion.

Soc Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

Her Yes.

Soc Well, now let me take an instance—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually and

rightly called a man by the rest of the world and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world—that is your meaning?

Her He would according to my view

Soc But how about truth then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

Her Certainly

Soc And there are true and false propositions?

Her To be sure

Soc And a true proposition says that which is and a false proposition says that which is not?

Her Yes what other answer is possible?

Soc Then in a proposition there is a true and a false?

Her Certainly

Soc But is a proposition true as a whole only and are the parts untrue?

Her No the parts are true as well as the whole

Soc Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones or every part?

Her I should say that every part is true

Soc Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?

Her No that is the smallest

Soc Then the name is a part of the true proposition?

Her Yes

Soc Yes, and a true part as you say

Her Yes

Soc And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?

Her Yes

Soc Then if propositions may be true and false names may be true and false?

Her So we must infer

Soc And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name?

Her Yes

Soc And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them?

Her Yes Socrates I can conceive no correctness of names other than this you give one name and I another and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another

Soc But would you say Hermogenes that the things differ as the names differ? [386]

and are they relative to individuals as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things and that things are to me as they appear to me and that they are to you as they appear to you Do you agree with him or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?

Her There have been times Socrates when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras not that I agree with him at all

Soc What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?

Her No indeed but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men and a good many of them

Soc Well and have you ever found any very good ones?

Her Not many

Soc Still you have found them?

Her Yes

Soc And would you hold that the very good were the very wise and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?

Her It would

Soc But if Protagoras is right and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?

Her Impossible

Soc And if on the other hand wisdom and folly are really distinguishable you will allow I think that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct For if what appears to each man is true to him one man cannot in reality be wiser than another

Her He cannot

Soc Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always for neither on his view can there be some good and other bad if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all

Her There cannot

Soc But if neither is right and things are not relative to individuals and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence they are not in relation to us or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy but they are independent and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature

Her I think Socrates that you have said the truth

Soc Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?

Her Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.

[387] *Soc* Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument but we cut with the proper instrument only and according to the natural process of cutting, and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.

Her I should say that the natural way is the right way.

Soc Again, in burning, not every way is the right way but the right way is the natural way and the right instrument the natural instrument.

Her True.

Soc And this holds good of all actions?

Her Yes.

Soc And speech is a kind of action?

Her True.

Soc And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.

Her I quite agree with you.

Soc And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak.

Her That is true.

Soc And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?

Her True.

Soc And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?

Her Precisely.

Soc Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure—in this and no other way shall we name with success?

Her I agree.

Soc But again that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?

Her Yes.

Soc And that which has to be woven or

pierced has to be woven or pierced with some thing?

Her Certainly.

Soc And that which has to be named has to be named with something?

Her True.

Soc What is that with which we pierce?

Her An awl.

[388] *Soc* And with which we weave?

Her A shuttle.

Soc And with which we name?

Her A name.

Soc Very good then a name is an instrument?

Her Certainly.

Soc Suppose that I ask "What sort of instrument is a shuttle?" and you answer "A weaving instrument."

Her Well.

Soc And I ask again "What do we do when we weave?"—The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.

Her Very true.

Soc And may not a similar description be given of an awl and of instruments in general?

Her To be sure.

Soc And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument what do we do when we name?

Her I cannot say.

Soc Do we not give information to one another and distinguish things according to their natures?

Her Certainly we do.

Soc Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.

Her Yes.

Soc And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?

Her Assuredly.

Soc Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher?

Her Yes.

Soc And when the weaver uses the shuttle whose work will he be using well?

Her That of the carpenter.

Soc And is every man a carpenter or the skilled only?

Her Only the skilled.

Soc And when the piercer uses the awl whose work will he be using well?

Her That of the smith.

Soc And is every man a smith or only the skilled?

Her The skilled only

Soc And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?

Her There again I am puzzled

Soc Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?

Her Indeed I cannot

Soc Does not the law seem to you to give us them?

Her Yes I suppose so

Soc Then the teacher when he gives us a name uses the work of the legislator?

Her I agree

Soc And is every man a legislator or the skilled only?

Her The skilled only

Soc Then Hermogenes not every man is able to give a name but only a maker of names [389] and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest

Her True

Soc And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?

Her Certainly

Soc And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making will he make another looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?

Her To the latter I should imagine

Soc Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?

Her I think so

Soc And whatever shuttles are wanted for the manufacture of garments thin or thick of flaxen woollen or other material ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case

Her Yes

Soc And the same holds of other instruments when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work he must express this natural form and not others which he fancies in the material whatever it may be which he employs for example he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses?

Her Certainly

Soc And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses?

Her True

Soc For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs and this is true of instruments in general

Her Yes

Soc Then as to names ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural names of each thing into sounds and syllables and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same but the material may vary and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made whether in Hellas or in a foreign country [390]—there is no difference

Her Very true

Soc And the legislator whether he be Hellenic or barbarian is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables this or that country makes no matter

Her Quite true

Soc But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes or the weaver who is to use them?

Her I should say he who is to use them, Socrates

Soc And who uses the work of the lyre maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?

Her Certainly

Soc And who is he?

Her The player of the lyre

Soc And who will direct the shipwright?

Her The pilot

Soc And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work and will know whether the work is well done in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man?

Her Yes

Soc And this is he who knows how to ask questions?

Her Yes

Soc And how to answer them?

Her Yes

Soc And him who knows how to ask and

answer you would call a dialectician?

Her Yes that would be his name.

Soc Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder and the pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.

Her True.

Soc And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?

Her That is true.

Soc Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy or the work of light or chance persons and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms in letters and syllables.

Her I cannot answer you, Socrates but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment, [391] and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness of names.

Soc My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but you have forgotten) that I knew nothing and proposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter a step has been gained for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.

Her Very good.

Soc And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, if you care to know is the next question.

Her Certainly I care to know.

Soc Then reflect.

Her How shall I reflect?

Soc The true way is to have the assistance of those who know and you must pay them well both in money and in thanks: these are the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has—rather dearly—bought the reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.

Her But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst epudiating Protagoras and his *Truth* I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm!

Truth was the title of the book of Protagoras cf. *Theaetetus* 16

Soc Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

Her And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?

Soc He often speaks of them notably and nobly in the places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names—do you not think so?

Her Why of course they call them rightly if they call them at all. But to what are you referring?

Soc Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?

Whom the Gods call Xanthus and men call Scamander

[392] *Her* I remember

Soc Well and about this river—to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says,

The Gods call Chalcas and men Cymon

to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcas is than the name Cymonius—do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batiera and Myrina? And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance you will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer

Her I do.

Soc Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector's son—Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Her I do not know

Soc How would you answer if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?

Her I should say the wise, of course

Soc And are the men or the women of a city taken as a class, the wiser?

Her I should say the men

Soc And Homer as you know says that the

Il ad vi. 402.

Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city) but if the men called him Astyanax the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women

Her That may be inferred

Soc And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?

Her To be sure

Soc Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?

Her Clearly

Soc And what is the reason of this? Let us consider—does he not himself suggest a very good reason when he says

For he alone defended their city and long u alls?

This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving as Homer observes

Her I see

Soc Why Hermogenes I do not as yet see myself and do you?

Her No indeed not I

[393] *Soc* But tell me friend did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?

Her What of that?

Soc The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax—both are Hellenic and a king ($\alpha\sigma\alpha\kappa\varsigma$) and a holder ($\epsilon\kappa\tau\alpha\rho$) have nearly the same meaning and are both descriptive of a king for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king he rules and owns and holds it But perhaps you may think that I am talking nonsense and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names

Her I assure you that I think otherwise and I believe you to be on the right track

Soc There is reason I think in calling the lion's whelp a lion and the foal of a horse a horse I am speaking only of the ordinary course of nature when an animal produces after his kind and not of extraordinary births—if contrary to nature a horse have a calf then I should not call that a foal but a calf nor do I call any inhuman birth a man but only a natural birth And the same may be said of trees and other things Do you agree with me?

Her Yes I agree

Soc Very good But you had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king And whether the syllables

of the name are the same or not the same, makes no difference provided the meaning is retained nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it

Her What do you mean?

Soc A very simple matter I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with the exception of the four ϵ ι \omicron ω the names of the rest whether vowels or consonants are made up of other letters which we add to them but so long as we introduce the meaning and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct Take, for example the letter *beta*—the addition of η τ α , gives no offence and does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names

Her I believe you are right

Soc And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the son of a king [394] the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire and similarly the offspring of every kind in the regular course of nature is like the parent and therefore has the same name Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person and he may not recognize them although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell although to the physician who regards the power of them they are the same and he is not put out by the addition and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two or indeed by the change of all the letters for this need not interfere with the meaning As was just now said the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike which is the τ and yet they have the same meaning And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the meaning is the same And there are many other names which just mean "king" Again there are several names for a general as for example Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior) and others which denote a physician as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesumbrotus (curer of mortals) and there are many others which might be cited differing in their syllables and letters but having the same meaning Would you not say so?

Her Yes.

So The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?

Her Yes.

So And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are produced? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before us—of a horse, foal, and a calf.

Her Quite true.

So Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?

Her Certainly.

So He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesticus (remindful of God) or any of these names, if names are correctly given, he should have an opposite name.

Her Certainly Socrates.

So Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes the man of the mountains who appears to be rightly called whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the severity and fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero's nature.

[395] Her That is very likely Socrates.

So And his father's name is also according to nature.

Her Clearly.

So Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them, and his continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think that Aeneas is rightly called for his murder of Chryseiddes and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his reputation—the name is a law altered and disguised so as not to be suitable to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as a swarthy, stubborn, or as a person the fearless, or as a person the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct on every point of view. And I think that Peops is also named appropriately for as the name implies, he is rightly called Elops who sees what is near only (αὐτὸν πρὸς).

Her How so?

So Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil

which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages he saw only what was at hand and immediate,—or in other words, *relates* (near) in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.

Her And what are the traditions?

So Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life—last of all came the utter ruin of his country, and after his death he had the woe suspended (relates us) over his head in the world below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him *relates* (the most weighed down by misfortune) disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus and into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmitted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father [396] has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena (Ζηνα) and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia (Δια) the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life (Ζηνα διὰ πάντων τῶν ζῴων). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity) and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact for this is the meaning of his father's name *huper* quasi *huper* (ὑπερ, to sweep) not in the sense of a youth, but signifying *υἱὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ* to be the pure and guarded mind (sc. *πρὸς τὸ νοεῖν*). He, as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (*αὐρὸς* *πρὸς τὸ νοεῖν*) from looking upwards, which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusively of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,—then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not lead good to the end.

Her You seem to me Socrates to be quite like a prophet newly inspired and to be uttering oracles

Soc Yes Hermogenes and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn he talked and I listened and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names—that will be the way but to-morrow if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away and make a purification of him if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this [397] sort

Her With all my heart for I am very curious to hear the rest of the enquiry about names

Soc Then let us proceed and where would you have us begin now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily but have a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names as we were saying they may have no business or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune) or Sosias (the Saviour) or Theophilus (the beloved of God) and others But I think that we had better leave these for there will be more chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences—there ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named and perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving them names

Her I think so Socrates

Soc Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods and show that they are rightly named Gods?

Her Yes that will be well

Soc My notion would be something of this sort—I suspect that the sun moon earth stars and heaven which are still the Gods of many barbarians were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running from their running nature they were called Gods or runners (*θεοί* *θεοίρας*) and when men became acquainted with the other Gods they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think that likely?

Her I think it very likely indeed

Soc What shall follow the Gods?

Her Must not demons and heroes and men come next?

Soc Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? Tell me if my view is right

Her Let me hear

Soc You know how Hesiod uses the word?

Her I do not

Soc Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?

Her Yes I do

Soc He says of them—

But now that fate has closed over this race

They are holy demons upon the earth

Beneficent avengers of ill guardians of mortal men

[398] *Her* What is the inference?

Soc What is the inference! Why I suppose that he means by the golden men, not men literally made of gold but good and noble and I am convinced of this because he further says that we are the iron race

Her That is true

Soc And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden race?

Her Very likely

Soc And are not the good wise?

Her Yes they are wise

Soc And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them demons because they were *δαίμονες* (knowing or wise) and in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead and becomes a demon which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (*δαίμωνιος*) both in life and death and is rightly called a demon

Her Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you but what is the meaning of the word hero? (*ἥρως* in the old writing, *ἥρως*)

Soc I think that there is no difficulty in explaining for the name is not much altered and signifies that they were born of love

Her What do you mean?

Soc Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?

Her What then?

Soc All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman or of a mortal man for a Goddess think of the word in the

old Attic, and you will see better that the name heroes is only a slight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang either this is the meaning or if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians and disjecticians, and able to put the question (πρωτῶ) for *πρωτῶ* is equivalent to *ἀγαθῶ*. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why man are called ἀνθρώπων?—that is more difficult.

Her No, I cannot and I would not try even if I could, because I think that you are the more likely to succeed.

[399] Soc That is to say you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.

Her Of course.

Soc Your faith is not vain for at this very moment a new and ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful before tomorrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now attend to me and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word *ἀνθρώπος* in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the *iota*s and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being omitted and the acute takes the place of the grave.

Her That is true.

Soc The name *ἄνθρωπος*, which is as once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter which is the *alpha*, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.

Her What do you mean?

Soc I mean to say that the word "man" implies that other animals neither examine, or consider or look up at what they see, but that man not only sees (*ὄρω*) but considers and looks up at that which he sees and hence he alone of all animals is rightly called ἀνθρώπων, meaning ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶν.

Her May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?

Soc Certainly.

Her I will take that which appears to me to flow next in order. You know the distinction of soul and body?

Soc Of course.

Her Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.

Soc You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word ψυχή (soul) and then of the word σῶμα (body)?

Her Yes.

Soc If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that those who first use the name ψυχή meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival (ἐψυχῶ) and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called *psyche*. But please stay a moment I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, [400] for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another?

Her Let me hear.

Soc What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?

Her Just that.

Soc And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things?

Her Yes I do.

Soc Then you may well call that power *ψυχή* which carries and holds nature (ἐψυχῶ, αἰετα) and this may be refined away into ψυχή.

Her Certainly and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than the other.

Soc It is so but I cannot help laughing if I am to suppose that this is the true meaning of the name.

Her But what shall we say of the next word?

Soc You mean σῶμα (the body)

Her Yes.

Soc That may be variously interpreted and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (σῆμα) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to (σῆμα) the body, probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated kept safe (σῶμα, σωτηρία) as the name σῶμα implies, until the penalty is paid according to this view not even a letter of the word need be changed.

Her I think Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods,

like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them

Soc Yes indeed Hermogenes and there is one excellent principle which as men of sense we must acknowledge—that of the Gods we know nothing either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves whatever they may be, are true And this is the best of all principles and the next best is to say as in prayers that we will call them by any sort of kind of names or patronymics which they like [401] because we do not know of any other That also I think is a very good custom and one which I should much wish to observe Let us then if you please in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them we do not presume that we are able to do so but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names—in this there can be small blame

Her I think Socrates that you are quite right and I would like to do as you say

Soc Shall we begin, then with Hestia according to custom?

Her Yes that will be very proper

Soc What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

Her That is another and certainly a most difficult question

Soc My dear Hermogenes the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons they were philosophers and had a good deal to say

Her Well and what of them?

Soc They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names Even in foreign names if you analyze them a meaning is still discernible For example that which we term *οἶα* is by some called *εἶα*, and by others again *ωἶα* Now that the essence of things should be called *εἶα* which is akin to the first of these (*οἶα = εἶα*) is rational enough And there is reason in the Athenians calling that *εἶα* which participates in *οἶα* For in ancient times we too seem to have said *εἶα* for *οἶα* and this you may note to have been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to *εἶα* which was natural enough if they meant that *εἶα* was the essence of things Those again who read *ωἶα* seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heraclitus that all things flow and nothing stands with them the pushing principle (*ωθον*) is the cause and ruling power of all things and is

therefore rightly called *εἶα* Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense

Her Why Socrates?

Soc My good friend I have discovered a hint of wisdom

Her Of what nature?

[402] *Soc* Well rather ridiculous and yet plausible

Her How plausible?

Soc I fancy to myself Heraclitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke

Her How do you mean?

Soc Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest he compares them to the stream of a river and says that you cannot go into the same water twice

Her That is true

Soc Well then how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods agreed pretty much in the doctrine of Heraclitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer and as I believe, Hesiod also tells of

Ocean the origin of Gods and mother Tethys

And again Orpheus says that

The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry and he espoused his sister Tethys who was his mother's daughter

You see that this is a remarkable coincidence and all in the direction of Heraclitus

Her I think that there is something in what you say Socrates but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys

Soc Well that is almost self-explained being only the name of a spring a little disguised for that which is strained and filtered (*διὰ τρυβίου ὕδω μύον*) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two words

Her The idea is ingenious Socrates

Soc To be sure But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken

Her Yes

Soc Then let us next take his two brothers

CRATYLUS

Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.

Her By all means.

Soc Poseidon is *πρωτόγονος*, the chain of the fact, the original inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his wills, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon. The *ε* was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so, but the name may have been originally written with a double *λ* and not with an *ο* (*403*) meaning that the God knew many things (*πολλὰ εἶδεν*). And perhaps also because the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (*σάω*) and then *π* and *δ* have been added. Pluto gives wealth (*πλοῦτος*) and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (*αἰθερ*) and so they are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead.

Her And what is the true derivation?

Soc In part of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond.

Her Why, how is that?

Soc I will tell you my own opinion, but first, I should like to ask you which chain votes any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him more to the same spot,—desire or necessity?

Her Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

Soc And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

Her Assuredly they would.

Soc And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer and not by necessity?

Her That is clear.

Soc And there are many desires?

Her Yes.

Soc And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest.

Her Yes.

Soc And is any desire stronger than the longing that you will be made better by associating with another?

(C. *ἡρεσθε* in 356, 35)

Her Certainly not.

Soc And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is visiting to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world, and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there, wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in that (*404*) for in their liberated state he can band them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far famed chains.

Her There is a deal of truth in what you say.

Soc Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (*αἰθερ*)—far otherwise, but from his knowledge (*εἰδω*) of all noble things.

Her Very good, and what do we say of Demeter and Herè, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

Soc Demeter is *ἡ δέσποινη μήτηρ*, who gives food like a mother. Herè is the lovely one (*ἡρα*)—for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (*αἶρ*) putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Herè several times over. People dread the name of Pherephanta as they dread the name of Apollo—and with as little reason, the fear if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into Pherephone, and they are terrified at this, whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (*σοφῆ*) for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (*φερόμενα*) that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepapha (*Φερεφάφα*) or some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (*τὸν φερόμενον φέρει μέρη*) herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with

her because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now a-days because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name Apollo which as I was saying is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?

Her To be sure I have and what you say is true.

Soc But the name in my opinion is really most expressive of the power of the God.

Her How so?

Soc I will endeavour to explain for I do not believe that any single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes [405] of the God embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them—music and prophecy and medicine and archery.

Her That must be a strange name and I should like to hear the explanation.

Soc Say rather an harmonious name as be seems the God of Harmony. In the first place the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

Her Very true.

Soc And is not Apollo the purifier and the washer and the absolver from all impurities?

Her Very true.

Soc Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions as being the physician who orders them he may be rightly called *Απολουν* (purifier) or in respect of his powers of divination and his truth and sincerity which is the same as truth he may be most fitly called *Απλος* from *απλος* (sincere) as in the Thessalian dialect for all the Thessalians call him *Α-λος* also he is *αι Βαλλων* (always shooting) because he is a master archer who never misses or again the name may refer to his musical attributes and then as in *ακολουθος* and *ακοιτις* and in many other words the *α* is supposed to mean together so the meaning of the name Apollo will be moving together whether in the poles of heaven as they are called or in the harmony of song which is termed concord because he moves all together by an harmonious power as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together both among Gods and among men. And as in the words *ακολουθος* and *ακοιτις* the *α* is substituted for an *ο* so the

name *Απολλων* is equivalent to *ομοπολων* only the second *λ* is added in order to avoid the ill omened sound of destruction (*απολων*). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name [406] which as I was saying just now has reference in all the powers of the God who is the single one, the everdaring, the purifier, the mover together (*α-λοις αι Βαλλων απολοιωι ομοπολων*). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (*μυσθαι*) and Leto is called by this name because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing (*εβελημων*) to grant our requests or her name may be Letho as she is often called by strangers—they seem to imply by it her amiability and her smooth and easy going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy (*αρτεμης*) well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (*αρετη*) and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (*την αρετον μισησασα*). He who gave the Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

Her What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Soc Son of Hipponicus you ask a solemn question there is a serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names. The serious explanation is not to be had from me but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one for the Gods too love a joke. *Διονυσος* is simply *διδουσι οινον* (giver of wine) *Διδοινυσος* as he might be called in fun—and *οινος* is properly *οιουσ* because wine makes those who drink think (*οιεσθαι*) that they have a mind (*νοον*) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite born of the foam (*αφρος*) may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.

Her Still there remains Athene whom you Socrates as an Athenian will surely not forget there are also Hephaestus and Ares.

Soc I am not likely to forget them.

Her No indeed.

Soc There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.

Her What other appellation?

Soc We call her Pallas.

Her To be sure.

Soc And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth [407] or by the use of the hands we

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writers and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words *crattos* and *ros* appear to be the same,— that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (εἰς αὐτὸν γινέσθαι) this is broken up into two words, *crattos* from *cr* and *att*, and *r* ε from *ros*, just as the original name of *Zeno* was divided into *Z* and *eno* and the whole proposition means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words *ros* and *crattos* being thus formed out of a single proposition.

Her Indeed Socrates, you make surprising progress.

Soc I am run away with.

Her Very true.

Soc But am not yet at my utmost speed.

[411] *Her* I should like very much to know in the next place, how you would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?

Soc That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (*φρόνησις*) and understanding (*σοφία*) and judgment (*γνώμη*) and knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and all those other charming words, as you call them?

Her Surely we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.

Soc By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion on which came into my head only this moment. I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who in their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving in all directions and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condensation, they suppose to be a reality of nature they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.

Her How is that, Socrates?

Soc Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just cited the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated.

Her No, indeed, I never thought of it.

Soc Take the first of those which you mentioned clearly that is a name indicative of motion.

Her What was the name?

Soc *Φρόνησις* (wisdom) which may signify *φρασις* is *πο* *φρονσις* (perception of motion and flux) or perhaps *φρασις* *φρονσις* (the blessing of motion) but is at any rate connected with *φ* *πρόβασις* (motion) *γνώμη* (judgment) again certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (*φρονσις*) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider or if you would rather here is *φρονσις*, the very word just now mentioned, which is *φρονσις* (the desire of the new) the word *φρονσις* implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express his longing of the soul, for the original name was *φρονσις*, and not *φρονσις* but *φ* took the place of a double *ε*. The word *σωτηρις* is the salvation (*σωτηρις*) of that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) which we were just now considering [412] *Ἐπιστήμη* (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (*επιστήμη*) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them wherefor the word should rather be read as *ἐπιστήμη*, inserting or *ἐπιστήμη* (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion the word is derived from *ἐπιστήμη* (to go along with) and, like *ἐπιστήμη* (to know) implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of things. *Σοφία* (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion often use the word *ἔρως* (he rushed) and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named *ἔρως* (Rush) for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (*ἔρως*) of motion is expressed by *σοφία*, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (*γαδ*) is the name which is given to the admirable (*γαδ*) in nature for although all things move, still there are degrees of motion some are swifter some slower but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called *γαδ* *δικαιοσύνη* (justice) is clearly *δικαιο* *συνσις* (understanding of the just) but the actual word *δικαιο* is more difficult men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree.

For those who suppose all things to be in

Her You will oblige me

Soc How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first—the sun?

Her Very good

Soc The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form [409] for the Dorians call him *αλιος* and this name is given to him because when he rises he gathers (*αλιζει*) men together or because he is always rolling in his course (*αι ειλειν εν*) about the earth or from *αιολειν* of which the meaning is the same as *ποικιλλειν* (to variegate), because he varie gates the productions of the earth

Her But what is *σεληνη* (the moon)?

Soc That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras

Her How so?

Soc The word seems to forestall his recent discovery that the moon receives her light from the sun

Her Why do you say so?

Soc The two words *σελας* (brightness) and *φως* (light) have much the same meaning?

Her Yes

Soc This light about the moon is always new (*ιεν*) and always old (*ενον*) if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always adds new light and there is the old light of the previous month

Her Very true

Soc The moon is not unfrequently called *σελαιαια*

Her True

Soc And as she has a light which is always old and always new (*ειον ιενον αι*) she may very properly have the name *σελαισεισασαια* and this when hammered into shape becomes *σελαιαια*

Her A real dithyrambic sort of name that Socrates. But what do you say of the month and the stars?

Soc *Μεις* (month) is called from *μεινσθαι* (to lessen) because suffering diminution the name of *αστρα* (stars) seems to be derived from *αστραπη* which is an improvement on *αναστροφωπη* signifying the upsetting of the eyes (*αναστρεφειν οπα*)

Her What do you say of *πυρ* (fire) and *ιδωρ* (water)?

Soc I am at a loss how to explain *πρ* either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please however to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort

Her What is it?

Soc I will tell you but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the word *πρ*?

Her Indeed I cannot

Soc Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of this and several other words?—My belief is that they are of foreign origin. For the Hellenes especially those who were under the dominion of the barbarians often borrowed from them

Her What is the inference?

Soc Why you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language and not according to the language from which the words are derived is rather likely to be at fault

Her Yes certainly

[410] *Soc* Well then consider whether this *πρ* is not foreign for the word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue and the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed just as they have *υδωρ* (water) and *κνιες* (dogs) and many other words

Her That is true

Soc Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of *πυρ* and *ιδωρ*. *Αηρ* (air) Hermogenes may be explained as the element which raises (*αιρει*) things from the earth or as ever flowing (*αιρει*) or because the flux of the air is wind and the poets call the winds air blasts (*α ηραι*) he who uses the term may mean so to speak air flux (*αηρορροιν*) in the sense of wind flux (*πνευματορροιν*) and because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word air (*αηρ* = *αηρης* *πρω*) *Αιθηρ* (aether) I should interpret as *αειθερ* this may be correctly said because this element is always running in a flux about the air (*αιθει περι τον αερα ρειω*). The meaning of the word *γη* (earth) comes out better when in the form of *γα* α, for the earth may be truly called mother (*γαια*, *γεννητειρα*) as in the language of Homer (Od. ix 118 xiii 160) *γεγαασι* means *μητρηνσθαι*

Her Good

Soc What shall we take next?

Her There are *ωραι* (the seasons) and the two names of the year *εν αυτος* and *ετος*

Soc The *ωραι* should be spelt in the old Attic way if you desire to know the probable truth about them they are rightly called the *ωραι* because they divide (*οριζουσιν*) the summers and

tions are often such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is the word $\sigma\phi\gamma\epsilon\sigma\phi\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ which ought properly to be $\phi\gamma\epsilon\phi\gamma\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ and there are other examples.

Her That is quite true Socrates.

Soc And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to any object.

Her True.

Soc Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator like yourself should observe the laws of moderation and probability.

Her Such is my desire.

Soc And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian [415] or you will unnerve me of my strength. When you have allowed me to add $\mu\eta\chi\alpha\rho\eta$ (constraint) to $\pi\eta$ (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive $\mu\eta\chi\alpha\rho\eta$ to be a sign of great accomplishment— μ *en* for $\mu\eta$ or has the mean in of greatness, and these ϵ $\mu\eta\kappa$ ϵ and α make up the word $\mu\eta\chi\alpha\rho\eta$. But, as I was saying being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words $\pi\eta$ (virtue) and α (ice) $\nu\pi\epsilon\rho\eta$ I do not as yet understand, but α is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded for all things being in a flux ($\iota\sigma\tau\omega\varsigma$) α is $\alpha\iota\alpha$ *en* (going badly) and this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of α *en*, or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of $\alpha\iota\omega\varsigma$ *en* α may be further illustrated by the use of $\delta\upsilon\lambda\omega$ (cowardice) which ought to have come after $\delta\pi\epsilon\alpha$, but was forgotten, and as I fear is not the only word which has been passed over. $\delta\upsilon\lambda\omega$ signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain ($\delta\upsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$) for $\lambda\alpha\upsilon$ means strength and therefore $\delta\upsilon\lambda\omega$ expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul and π μ (difficulty) is an *en* of the same nature (from *en* not, and π $\rho\epsilon\iota\upsilon\theta\omicron\iota$ to go) like anything else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word $\alpha\iota\omega\varsigma$ appears to mean $\alpha\iota\omega\varsigma$ *en* α , or going badly or limping and halting of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with ice. And if α is the name of this sort of thing $\nu\pi\epsilon\rho\eta$ will be the opposite of τ , signifying in the first place ease of motion then the stream of the good soul is unimpeded and has therefore the attribute of *en* flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called $\pi\eta$ or more correctly $\alpha\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\eta$ (ever flowing) and

liad vi. 65.

may perhaps have had another form, $\alpha\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\eta$ (eligible) indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into $\pi\eta$ I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine but I think that if the previous word α was right, then $\alpha\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\eta$ is also right.

[416] Her But what is the meaning of $\kappa\alpha\kappa$ which has played so great a part in your previous discourse?

Soc That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.

Her What device?

Soc The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.

Her Very likely you are right but suppose that we leave these words and endeavour to see the rationale of α and $\alpha\chi\alpha\rho\alpha$.

Soc The meaning of $\alpha\chi\alpha\rho\alpha$ is evident being only α $\sigma\chi$ ϵ $\rho\alpha\iota\varsigma$ (always preventing from flowing) and this is in accordance with our former derivations. For the name giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name $\alpha\chi\alpha\rho\alpha$ to that which hindered the flux ($\alpha\upsilon$ $\sigma\chi\epsilon\sigma\tau\omega$) and this is now beaten together into $\alpha\chi\alpha\rho\alpha$.

Her But what do you say of $\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\varsigma$?

Soc That is more obscure yet the form is only due to the quantity and has been changed by altering α into ϵ .

Her What do you mean?

Soc This name appears to denote mind.

Her How so?

Soc Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?

Her Certainly.

Soc And must not this be the mind of Gods or of men or of both?

Her Yes.

Soc Is not mind that which called ($\alpha\lambda$ *en*) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful ($\alpha\lambda$)?

Her That is evident.

Soc And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?

Her Certainly.

Soc Physic does the work of a physician and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?

Her Exactly.

Soc And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?

Her Of course.

motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes through all this and is the instrument of creation in all and is the subtlest and swiftest element for if it were not the subtlest and a power which none can keep out and also the swiftest passing by other things as if they were standing still it could not penetrate through the moving universe And this element which superintends all things and pieces (*διαίον*) all is rightly called *δίκαιον* the letter *κ* is only added for the sake of euphony Thus far as I was saying there is a general agreement about the nature of justice [413] but I, Hermogenes being an enthusiastic disciple have been told in a mystery that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world now a cause is that because of which anything is created and some one comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause and I begin after hearing what he has said to interrogate him gently

Well my excellent friend say I but if all this be true I still want to know what is justice Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions and am leaping over the barriers and have been already sufficiently answered and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after another and at length they quarrel For one of them says that justice is the sun and that he only is the piercing (*διαίοντα*) and burning (*καίοντα*) element which is the guardian of nature And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion I am answered by the satirical remark

What is there no justice in the world when the sun is down? And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion he says Fire in the abstract but this is not very intelligible Another says No not fire in the abstract but the abstraction of heat in the fire Another man professes to laugh at all this and says as Anaxagoras says that justice is mind for mind as they say has absolute power and mixes with nothing and orders all things and passes through all things At last, my friend I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to learn But still I am of opinion that the name which has led me into this digression was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned

Her I think Socrates that you are not improving now you must have heard this from some one else

Soc And not the rest?

Her Hardly

Soc Well then let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest What remains after justice? I do not think that we have as yet discussed courage (*ἀνδρεία*)—injustice (*ἀδικία*) which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle (*διαίοντος*) need not be considered Well then the name of *ἀνδρεία* seems to imply a battle—this battle is in the world of existence and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (*ἐναντία ροή*) if you extract the *δ* from *ἀνδρεία* the name at once signifies the thing and you may clearly understand that *ἀνδρεία* is not the stream opposed to every stream but only to that which is contrary to justice [414] for otherwise courage would not have been praised The words *ἀρρεν* (male) and *ανήρ* (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (*ἡ ἀνω ροή*) *Γυνή* (woman) I suspect to be the same word as *γυνή* (birth) *θηλυ* (female) appears to be partly derived from *θηλη* (the teat), because the teat is like rain and makes things flourish (*τεθηνεῖναι*)

Her That is surely probable

Soc Yes and the very word *θάλλειν* (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of youth which is swift and sudden ever And this is expressed by the legislator in the name which is a compound of *θεῖν* (running) and *αλλίσθαι* (leaping) Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance which have still to be explained

Her True

Soc There is the meaning of the word *τέχνη* (art) for example

Her Very true

Soc That may be identified with *ἐχέον* and expresses the possession of mind you have only to take away the *τ* and insert two *ο*s one between the *χ* and *ι* and another between the *ν* and *η*

Her That is a very shabby etymology

Soc Yes my dear friend but then you know that the original names have been long ago burned and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways and time too may have had a share in the change Take, for example the word *κατοπτρον* why is the letter *ρ* inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape And the addi-

Her Such is my view

Soc And do you know that the ancients said $\delta\iota\omega\gamma\omicron$ and not $\zeta\gamma$?

Her They did so

Soc And $\zeta\gamma$ (= yoke) has no meaning—it ought to be $\delta\iota\omega\gamma\omicron$ which word expresses the binding of two together (δ = $\nu\alpha\gamma\alpha\gamma\gamma$) for the purpose of drawing—this has been changed into $\zeta\gamma$ and there are many other examples of similar changes

Her There are

Soc Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word $\delta\epsilon\upsilon$ (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other appellations of good for $\delta\epsilon\omicron$ is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain ($\delta\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\mu\omicron$) or hinderer of motion, and therefore $\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ brother of $\beta\lambda\alpha\beta\omicron\rho\omicron$

Her Yes, Socrates that is quite plain

Soc Not if you restore the ancient form which is more likely to be the correct one, ($\zeta\gamma\iota\gamma$) and read $\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ instead of $\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ if you convert the ϵ into an α after the old fashion this word will then agree with other words meaning good for $\delta\epsilon\omicron$ not $\delta\epsilon$ signifies the good, and is a term of praise and the author of names has not contradicted himself but in all these various appellations, $\delta\epsilon$ (obligatory) $\alpha\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron$ (advantageous) $\lambda\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\lambda\omicron\tau$ (profitable) $\rho\delta\alpha\lambda\epsilon$ (gaudful) $\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron$ (= good) $\sigma\iota\mu\phi\epsilon\rho\omicron$ (expedient) $\epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\upsilon$ (plentiful) the same conception is implied of the ordering or ad persading principle which is praised and the restraining and binding principle which is censured And this is further illustrated by the word $\zeta\eta\mu\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma$ (hurtful) in which if the ζ is only changed into δ as in the ancient language, becomes $\delta\mu\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma$ and this name as you will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (δ = $\nu\epsilon\iota\omega$)

Her What do you say of $\rho\delta\omicron\eta$ (pleasure) $\lambda\iota\pi\eta$ (pain) $\pi\upsilon\theta\mu\omicron$ (desire) and the like, Socrates

Soc I do not think Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them— $\rho\delta\omicron\eta$ is $\eta\eta\sigma$ the act on which tends to advantage and this original form may be supposed to have been $\rho\omicron\eta$ but this has been altered by the insertion of the δ $\lambda\iota\pi\eta$ appears to be derived from the elaxai (λ) which the body feels when it so on (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (α and $\nu\epsilon\iota\omega$) $\alpha\lambda\gamma\theta\delta\omicron$ (distress) if I may not mistake, is a foreign word which is derived from $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\omicron\varsigma$ (evil) $\omega\delta\eta$ (sorrow) is called from the putting on ($\omicron\upsilon$) so row = $\chi\theta\eta\delta\omicron$ (exaction) the much too labours, as any one may see $\chi\theta\eta\delta\omicron$

(joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul ($\chi\epsilon\omega$) $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$ (delight) is so called from the pleasure $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\alpha$ ($\mu\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon$) through the soul which may be likened to a breath ($\pi\iota\sigma\eta$) and is properly $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\pi\omicron\upsilon$ but has been altered by time into $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\psi\omicron\sigma\tau\eta$ (cheerfulness) and $\pi\theta\mu\omicron$ explain themselves the former which ought to be $\alpha\phi\epsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\eta$ and has been changed into $\alpha\phi\psi\omicron\sigma\tau\eta$ is named as every one may see from the soul moving ($\psi\epsilon\pi\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$) in harmony with nature $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\iota\mu\omicron$ is really $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon\theta\iota\mu\omicron$ $\sigma\alpha\delta\tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon$ the power which enters into the soul $\theta\mu\omicron\varsigma$ (passion) is called from the rushing ($\theta\upsilon\omega$) and boiling of the soul $\mu\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma$ (desire) denotes the stream ($\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) which most draws the soul $\delta\iota\alpha\tau\epsilon\sigma\upsilon\tau\eta\epsilon$ $\rho\omicron\eta$ —because flowing with desire ($\mu\epsilon\upsilon$) and expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to (α) them, and is termed $\mu\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma$ from possessing this power $\pi\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ (longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place ($\nu\omicron\iota$) this is the reason why the name $\pi\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ is applied to things absent, as $\mu\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma$ is to things present $\mu\iota\alpha$ (love) is so called because flowing in ($\sigma\pi\alpha\upsilon$) from without the stream is not inherent but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called $\sigma\pi\omicron\varsigma$ (influx) in the old time when they used σ for ω , and is called $\mu\iota\alpha$, no that ω is substituted for But why do you not give me another word?

Her What do you think of $\delta\omicron\zeta\alpha$ (opinion) and that class of words?

Soc $\delta\omicron\zeta\alpha$ is either derived from $\delta\iota\omega\varsigma$ (pursuit) and expresses the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow ($\delta\omicron\zeta\omicron$) the latter is more likely and is confirmed by $\alpha\eta\theta\eta\varsigma$ (thinking) which is only $\omega\varsigma$ (moving) and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of each thing—just as $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta$ (counsel) has to do with shooting ($\beta\lambda\eta$) and $\beta\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon\iota$ (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating—all these words seem to follow $\delta\omicron\zeta\alpha$, and all involve the idea of shooting just as $\beta\lambda\epsilon\omega$, absence of counsel on the other hand is a mishap or missing or mistaking of the mark or aim or proposal or object

Her You are quickening your pace now Socrates

Soc Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God not however until I have explained $\omega\upsilon\omega\eta$ (necessity) which ought to come next, and $\sigma\omicron\upsilon$ (the unitary) $\epsilon\upsilon$ is certainly the yielding ($\epsilon\upsilon$) and unresisting—the no-

Soc And that principle we affirm to be mind?

Her Very true

Soc Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?

Her That is evident

Soc What more names remain to us?

Her There are the words which are connected with αγαθον and καλοι such as σιμπεροι and λυσιτελουν, εφελιμον, κερδαλεον and their opposites [417]

Soc The meaning of σιμπερον (expedient) I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples—for it is a sister word to επιστημη meaning just the motion (φορα) of the soul accompanying the world and things which are done upon this principle are called σιμφορα or σιμπεροντα because they are carried round with the world

Her That is probable

Soc Again χερδαλεον (gainful) is called from χερσος (gain) but you must alter the δ into ν if you want to get at the meaning for this word also signifies good but in another way he who gave the name intended to express the power of admixture (κεραυνιμειον) and universal penetration in the good in forming the word however he inserted a δ instead of an ν and so made κερδος

Her Well but what is λυσιτελουν (profitable)?

Soc I suppose Hermogenes that people do not mean by the profitable the gainful or that which pays (λειει) the retailer but they use the word in the sense of swift You regard the profitable (λυσιτελουν) as that which being the swiftest thing in existence allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion but always if there begins to be any end lets things go again (λειει) and makes motion immortal and unceasing and in this point of view as appears to me the good is happily denominated λυσιτελουν—being that which looses (λειει) the end (τελος) of motion Ωφελιμον (the advantageous) is derived from οφελειν, meaning that which creates and increases this latter is a common Homeric word and has a foreign character

Her And what do you say of their opposites?

Soc Of such as mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak

Her Which are they?

Soc The words αξιμφορον (inexpedient) αωφελεις (unprofitable) αλυσιτελες (unadvantageous) ακερδες (ungainful)

Her True

Soc I would rather take the words βλαβερον (harmful), ζημιαδες (hurtful)

Her Good

Soc The word βλαβερον is that which is said to hinder or harm (βλαπτει) the stream (ρουν) βλαπτον is βουλομειοι απτειν (seeking to hold or bind) for απτειν is the same as δει and δειν is always a term of censure βουλομειοι απτειν ρουν (wanting to bind the stream) would properly be βουλαπτερονι and this as I imagine is improved into βλαβερον

Her You bring out curious results Socrates, in the use of names and when I hear the word βουλαπτερονι I cannot help imagining that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene

[418] *Soc* That is the fault of the makers of the name Hermogenes not mine

Her Very true but what is the derivation of ζημιαδες?

Soc What is the meaning of ζημιαδες?—let me remark Hermogenes how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by putting in and pulling out letters even a very slight permutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense I may instance the word δεοι which occurs to me at the moment and reminds me of what I was going to say to you that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of δεοι and also of ζημιαδες which in the old language is clearly indicated

Her What do you mean?

Soc I will try to explain You are aware that our forefathers loved the sounds ε and δ especially the women who are most conservative of the ancient language but now they change ε into η or ε, and δ into ζ this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound

Her How do you mean?

Soc For example in very ancient times they called the day either ιμερα or εμερα, which is called by us μερα

Her That is true

Soc Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name? of which the reason is that men long for (φιμικοναι) and love the light which comes after the darkness and is therefore called μερα, from μερος desire

Her Clearly

Soc But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning although there are some who imagine the day to be called μερα because it makes things gentle (μερα)

Soc But the secondary as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary

Her That is evident.

Soc Very good but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown which they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question. Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another should we not, like the deaf and dumb make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?

Her There would be no choice, Socrates.

[423] Soc We should imitate the nature of the thing, the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwariness heaviness and downwardness could be expressed by letting them drop to the ground if we were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and the gestures as like as we could to them

Her I do not see that we could do anything else.

Soc We could not for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express anything

Her Very true

Soc And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we want to express.

Her It must be so, I think.

Soc Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?

Her I think so

Soc Nay my friend I am disposed to think that we have not reached the truth as yet.

Her Why not?

Soc Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate.

Her Quite true.

Soc Then could I have been right in what I was saying?

Her In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

Soc In the first place, I should reply not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal nor again an imitation of what music imitates these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows. All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour?

Her Certainly

Soc But the art of naming appears not to be

concerned with imitations of this kind the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?

Her True.

Soc Again, is there not an essence of each thing just as there is a colour or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?

Her I should think so

Soc Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing, in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?

[424] Her Quite so

Soc The musician and the painter were the first names which you gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?

Her I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer or name-giver of whom we are in search.

Soc If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider the names *ποι* (stream) *εἶμι* (to go) or *οἶ* (recreation) about which you were asking, and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not.

Her Very good

Soc But are these the only primary names, or are there others?

Her There must be others

Soc So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and letters ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary and then of compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?

Her Yes.

Soc Must we not begin in the same way with letters first separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes, into classes, according to the received distinctions of the learned also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet mutes and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of things we shall give their names, and see whether as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred and hence we shall see their natures, and see too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters and when we have well considered all this, we shall know

tion implied in yielding and not opposing yielding as I was just now saying to that motion which is in accordance with our will but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will implies error and ignorance the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable and rugged and overgrown and impedes motion—and this is the derivation of the word *αἰγაკιον* (necessary) *αἶν* *αἰγῆ* *ἰοι* going through a ravine But while my strength lasts let us persevere and I hope that you will persevere with your questions

Her Well then let me ask about the great and noblest such as *ἀληθεια* (truth) and *ψευδος* (falsehood) and *ον* (being) [421] not forgetting to enquire why the word *ονομα* (name) which is the theme of our discussion has this name of *ονομα*

Soc You know the word *μαιοσθαι* (to seek)?

Her Yes—meaning the same as *ζητειν* (to enquire)

Soc The word *ονομα* seems to be a compressed sentence signifying *οι οι ζητημα* (being for which there is a search) as is still more obvious in *ονομαστον* (notable) which states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a seeking (*ον οἱ μασμα*) *ἀληθεια* is also an agglomeration of *θεια* *αλη* (divine wandering) implying the divine motion of existence *ψευδος* (falsehood) is the opposite of motion here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction which he compares to sleep (*ειδειν*) but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of *ψ* *ον* and *ουσια* are *ἰοι* with an *ι* broken off this agrees with the true principle for being (*ον*) is also moving (*ἰον*) and the same may be said of not being which is like *ἰοι* *ε* called not going (*οικ* *οι* or *οικ* *ον* = *ουκ* *ἰοι*)

Her You have hammered away at them manfully but suppose that some one were to say to you what is the word *οι* and what are *ρεοι* and *δολν*?—show me their fitness

Soc You mean to say how should I answer him?

Her Yes

Soc One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already suggested

Her What way?

Soc To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin and thus is very likely the right answer and something of this kind may be true of them but also the original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages names have been so twisted in all man-

ner of ways that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue

Her Very likely

Soc Yes very likely But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch For we should remember that if a person go on analysing names into words and enquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed and keeps on always repeating this process he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair

Her Very true

[422] *Soc* And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and sentences for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? The word *αγαθον* (good) for example is as we were saying a compound of *αγαστος* (admirable) and *θοος* (swift) And probably *θοος* is made up of other elements and these again of others But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element which need not be resolved any further

Her I believe you to be in the right

Soc And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements must not their truth or law be examined according to some new method?

Her Very likely

Soc Quite so Hermogenes all that has preceded would lead to this conclusion And if as I think the conclusion is true then I shall again say to you come and help me that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary names

Her Let me hear and I will do my best to assist you

Soc I think that you will acknowledge with me that one principle is applicable to all names primary as well as secondary—when they are regarded simply as names there is no difference in them

Her Certainly not

Soc All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of things

Her Of course

Soc And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the secondary names is implied in their being names

Her Surely

therefore used in order to express motion, just as by the letter ι he expresses the subtle elements which pass through all things. [4-7] This is why he uses the letter ϵ as imitative of motion, $\alpha\upsilon\alpha$. And there is another class of letters, ϕ , ψ , σ and τ of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath: these are used in the imitation of such notions as $\psi\epsilon\iota\sigma\mu\epsilon$ (shivering) ϵ or (seething) $\sigma\upsilon\alpha\alpha$ (to be shaken) $\sigma\upsilon\sigma\mu\epsilon$ (shock) and are always introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is ϕ $\omega\upsilon\delta\epsilon\tau$ (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of δ and τ was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement of λ in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in $\lambda\epsilon\upsilon$ (level) and in the word $\lambda\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$ (to slip) itself, $\lambda\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$ (slight) in the word $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omega\delta\epsilon\tau$ (gluey) and the like: the heavier sound of γ detained the slipping tongue, and the unon of the τ gave the notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in $\gamma\lambda\upsilon\kappa\upsilon\sigma$, $\gamma\lambda\epsilon\upsilon$, $\gamma\lambda\omega\delta\epsilon\tau$. The he observed to be a notion of inwardness: hence he introduced the sound in $\theta\omicron$ and $\sigma\tau\epsilon\alpha$ as being assigned to the expression of size, and η of length, because they are great letters: \omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of mixed up in the word $\gamma\omicron\upsilon\gamma$ $\lambda\epsilon$ (round). Thus did the legislator reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compound other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names: but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

Her. But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me: he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.

Cr. Well, but surely Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment, at any rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.

[48] Her. No indeed, but, Socrates says,

and I agree with him, "to add little to little" is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you can add anything at all however small to our knowledge, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.

Soc. I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out: and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprised to find that you have found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers: and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your disciples.

Cr. You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more probable: and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the *Prayers* says to Ajax—

Illustration of the son of Telamon to do of the people
 I am near to the spoken in all things, as much to my mind.

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle and to give answer much to my mind: whether you are inspired by Euthyphrus, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

Soc. Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom: I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself: What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with you—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to "look fore and aft," in the words of the aforesaid Homer: and now let me see where are we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing—has this proposition been sufficiently proven?

Cr. Yes, Socrates, what you say as I am disposed to think is quite true.

Soc. Names, then, are given in order to instruct?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. And naming is an art, and has artificers?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. And who are they?

[49] Cr. The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

how to apply them to what they resemble—whether one letter is used to denote one thing or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them just as in painting the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only or any other colour and sometimes mixes up several colours as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind—he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them and so too we shall apply letters to the expression of objects either single letters when required or several letters and so we shall form syllables as they are called [425] and from syllables make nouns and verbs and thus at last from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language large and fair and whole and as the painter made a figure even so shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician or by some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves but I was carried away—meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject and we must see whether the primary and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not for if they are not the composition of them my dear Hermogenes will be a sorry piece of work and in the wrong direction.

Her That Socrates I can quite believe.

Soc Well but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way? for I am certain that I should not.

Her Much less am I likely to be able.

Soc Shall we leave them then? or shall we seek to discover if we can something about them according to the measure of our ability saying by way of preface as I said before of the Gods that of the truth about them we know nothing and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present enquiry let us say to ourselves before we proceed that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow but under the circumstances as men say we must do as well as we can. What do you think?

Her I very much approve.

Soc That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables and so find expression may appear ridiculous Hermogenes but it cannot be avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this we must have recourse to divine help like the tragic poets who in any per-

plexity have their Gods waiting in the air and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion by saying that the Gods gave the first names and therefore they are right. This will be the best contrivance or perhaps that other notion may be even better still of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we are [426] or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them which is the same sort of excuse as the last for all these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?

Her Certainly Socrates.

Soc My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have.

Her Fear not I will do my best.

Soc In the first place the letter ρ appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion ($\kappaίνησις$). But I have not yet explained the meaning of this latter word which is just $\iotaεῖσις$ (going) for the letter η was not in use among the ancients who only employed ϵ and the root is $\kappaινειν$ which is a foreign form the same as $\epsilonἶναι$. And the old word $\kappaίνησις$ will be correctly given as $\iotaεῖσις$ in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root $\kappaινειν$ and allowing for the change of the η and the insertion of the ϵ we have $\kappaίνησις$ which should have been $\kappaινησις$ or $\iotaεῖσις$ and $\sigmaτασις$ is the negative of $\iotaεῖσις$ (or $\iotaεῖσις$) and has been improved into $\sigmaτασις$. Now the letter ρ as I was saying appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the expression of motion and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose for example in the actual words $\ρην$ and $\ρην$ he represents motion by ρ also in the words $\tauρεμειν$ (trembling) $\τροχων$ (rugged) and again in words such as $\κρουειν$ (strike) $\θρασειν$ (crush) $\epsilonρκεειν$ (bruise) $\θρασειν$ (break) $\κρησειν$ (crumble) $\phiειν$ (whirl) of all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter ρ because as I imagine he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter which he

Soc. Why what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, "This is your picture," showing him his own likeness, or perceiving the likeness of a woman, and when I say show I mean bring before the sense of sight.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And may I not go to him again, and say "This is your name"—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. I say I may say to him— "This is your name" [431] and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself when I say "This is a man" or of a female of the human species, when I say "This is a woman," as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?

C. As I would have agreed with you, Socrates, and therefore I say: Granted.

Soc. That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say Cratylus?

C. As I agree and think that what you say is very true.

Soc. And further primary nouns may be compared to pictures and to pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all—some may be wanting or there may be too many or too much of them—may there not?

Crat. Very true.

Soc. And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

C. As, Yes.

Soc. In like manner he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one: whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.

C. That is true.

Soc. Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?

C. As, Yes.

Soc. And this artist of names is called the legislator?

C. As, Yes.

Soc. Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad: it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?

C. Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different: for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters α or β [432] or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter the name which is written is not only written wrongly but not written at all: and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

Soc. But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

Crat. How so?

Soc. I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all: for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus: and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness, and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form: would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?

C. As I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

Soc. Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names, and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?

Crat. Yes, I see.

Soc. But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the real things.

C. As, Quite true.

Soc. Then fear not, but have the courage to

Soc And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain what I mean of painters some are better and some worse?

Crat Yes

Soc The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures better and the worse execute them worse and of builders also the better sort build fairer houses and the worse build them worse

Crat True

Soc And among legislators there are some who do their work better and some worse?

Crat No there I do not agree with you

Soc Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?

Crat No indeed

Soc Or that one name is better than another?

Crat Certainly not

Soc Then all names are rightly imposed?

Crat Yes if they are names at all

Soc Well what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes which was mentioned before—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him shall we say that this is a wrong name or not his name at all?

Crat I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all but only appears to be his and is really the name of somebody else who has the nature which corresponds to it

Soc And if a man were to call him Hermogenes would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes if he is not

Crat What do you mean?

Soc Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your meaning I should answer that there have been plenty of liars in all ages

Crat Why Socrates how can a man say that which is not?—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?

Soc Your argument friend is too subtle for a man of my age But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

Crat Neither spoken nor said

Soc Nor uttered nor addressed? For example If a person saluting you in a foreign country were to take your hand and say Hail Athenian stranger Hermogenes son of Sincron—these words whether spoken said uttered or addressed would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes or perhaps to nobody at all?

Crat In my opinion Socrates the speaker would only be talking nonsense

Soc Well but that will be quite enough for me if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false [430] or partly true and partly false—which is all that I want to know

Crat I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no purpose and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot

Soc But let us see Cratylus whether we can not find a meeting point for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?

Crat I should

Soc And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?

Crat Certainly

Soc And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things but in another way?

Crat Yes

Soc I believe you may be right but I do not rightly understand you Please to say then whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they are the imitation

Crat They are

Soc First look at the matter thus you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man and of the woman to the woman and so on?

Crat Certainly

Soc And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman and of the woman to the man?

Crat Very true

Soc And are both modes of assigning them right or only the first?

Crat Only the first

Soc That is to say the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?

Crat That is my view

Soc Now then as I am desirous that we be ing friends should have a good understanding about the argument let me state my view to you the first mode of assignment whether applied to figures or to names I call right and when applied to names only true as well as right and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike I call wrong and in the case of names false as well as wrong

Crat That may be true Socrates in the case of pictures they may be wrongly assigned but not in the case of names—they must be always right

Soc In as far as they are like or in as far as they are unlike?

Crat In as far as they are like

Soc Are they altogether alike?

Crat Yes for the purpose of expressing motion.

Soc And what do you say of the insertion of the λ? for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness

Crat Why perhaps the letter λ is wrongly inserted Socrates, and should be altered into ρ, as you were saying to *Hermogenes* and in my opinion rightly when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion

Soc Good But still the word is intelligible to both of us when I say *σκληρός* (hard) you know that I mean

Crat Yes my dear friend and the explanation of that is custom

Soc And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I understand and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound [435] this is that you are saying?

Crat Yes

Soc And if when I speak you know my meaning there is an indication given by me to you?

Crat Yes

Soc This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from like, for example in the λ of *σκληρός*. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself and the correctness of a name turns out to be conventional since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much still you must say that the signification of words given by custom and not by likeness for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we have agreed thus far Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent) the custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts for suppose we take the instance of number how can you ever imagine my good friend that you will find names resembling every individual number unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of name? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance as *Hermogenes* says, is a shabby thing which has
See *ib.* c. 4, 464

to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness for I believe that if we could always or almost always use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate this would be the most perfect state of language as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you what is the force of names and what is the use of them?

Crat The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine is to inform the simple truth is that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them

Soc I suppose you mean to say Cratylus that as the name is so also is the thing and that he who knows the one will also know the other because they are similar and all similars fall under the same art or science and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things

Crat That is precisely what I mean

Soc But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which according to you is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?

[436] Crat I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of information about them there can be no other

Soc But do you believe that in the discovery of them he who discovers the names discovers also the things or is this only the method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery?

Crat I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of the same nature as instruction

Soc Well but do you not see, Cratylus that he who follows names in the search after things and analyses their meaning is in great danger of being deceived?

Crat How so?

Soc Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified—did he not?

Crat True

Soc And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?

Crat But, Socrates am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known or else as I was saying his names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not misused the truth and the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter

admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same with the thing but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named and described so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained and this as you will remember [433] was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the letters

Crat Yes I remember

Soc Good and when the general character is preserved even if some of the proper letters are wanting still the thing is signified—well if all the letters are given not well when only a few of them are given I think that we had better admit this lest we be punished like travellers in Ægina who wander about the street late at night and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too late or if not you must find out some new notion of correctness of names and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables for if you say both you will be inconsistent with yourself

Crat I quite acknowledge Socrates what you say to be very reasonable

Soc Then as we are agreed thus far let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters

Crat Yes

Soc And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

Crat Yes

Soc Enough then of names which are rightly given And in names which are incorrectly given the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters or there would be no likeness but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word you would admit that?

Crat There would be no use Socrates in my quarrelling with you since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all

Soc Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

Crat Yes I do

Soc But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive and some derived?

Crat Yes I do

Soc Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others who say that names are conventional and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them and that convention is the only principle and whether you abide by our present convention or make a new and opposite one according to which you call small great and great small—that they would say makes no difference if you are only agreed Which of these two notions do you prefer?

[434] *Crat* Representation by likeness *Soc* rates is infinitely better than representation by any chance sign

Soc Very good but if the name is to be like the thing the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things Returning to the image of the picture I would ask How could any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated and out of which the picture is composed?

Crat Impossible

Soc No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation And the original elements are letters?

Crat Yes

Soc Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds Do you agree with me that the letter ρ is expressive of rapidity motion and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so?

Crat I should say that you were right

Soc And that λ was expressive of smoothness and softness and the like?

Crat There again you were right

Soc And yet as you are aware that which is called by us $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\sigma\eta\varsigma$ is by the Eretrians called $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\sigma\eta\rho$

Crat Very true

Soc But are the letters ρ and σ equivalents and is there the same significance to them in the termination ρ , which there is to us in σ or is there no significance to one of us?

Crat Nay surely there is a significance to both of us

others of motion? Were we mistaken?

Crat. But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.

Soc. And which, then, did he make, my good friend those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.

Crat. No not in that way Socrates.

Soc. But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that they are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right: and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.

Crat. I agree.

Soc. But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?

Crat. Clearly.

Soc. But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way through their affinities, when they are akin to each other and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them must signify something other and different from them.

Crat. What you are saying is, I think, true.

[439] *Soc.* Well, but reflect have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the things themselves—which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed?

Crat. I should say that we must learn of the truth.

Soc. How real existence is to be studied or discovered, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No they must be studied and investigated in themselves.

Crat. Clearly Socrates.

Soc. There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. I myself do not deny that the errors of names did really give them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your opinion. Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good or any other absolute existence?

Crat. Certainly Socrates, I think so.

Soc. Then let us seek the true beauty not asking whether a face is fair or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away and is first this and then that must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?

Crat. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the same and if they are always the same and in the same state, and never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved.

Crat. Certainly they cannot.

[440] *Soc.* Nor yet can they be known by any one for at the moment that the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no state.

Crat. True.

Soc. Nor can we reasonably say Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view there will be no one to know and nothing to be known but if that which knows and that which is known exist ever and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist,

have a common character and purpose?

Soc But that friend Cratylus is no answer. For if he did begin in error he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself there would be nothing strange in this any more than in geometrical diagrams which have often a slight and in visible flaw in the first part of the process and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles—are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion. Were we not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?

Crat Yes, that is assuredly their meaning and the true meaning.

[437] *Soc* Let us revert to *ἐπιστήμη* (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this word is seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present and not reject the *ε* (cf. 412 A) but make an insertion of an *ι* instead of an *ε* (not *πιστήμη* but *επιστήμη*). Take another example *βεβαιον* (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position and not of motion. Again the word *ἵστορία* (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (*ἵσταται*) of the stream and the word *πιστον* (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion then again *μνήμη* (memory) as any one may see expresses rest in the soul and not motion. Moreover words such as *ἀμαρτία* and *σῆμα* which have a bad sense viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as *σπίσις* and *ἐπιστήμη* and other words which have a good sense (cf. *ομαρτεῖ σπίζειν ἐπισταί τμπερεσθαι*) and much the same may be said of *ἀμαθία* and *ἀκολασία*, for *ἀμαθία* may be explained as *ἡ ἀμαθὴ ἰοίτος πορεία* and *ἀκολασία* as *ἡ ἀκολοῖσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι*. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst sense will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates not that things are in motion or progress but that they are at rest which is the opposite of motion.

Crat Yes Socrates but observe the greater number express motion.

Soc What of that Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?

Crat No that is not reasonable.

Soc Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to another about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?

Crat Quite true.

Soc Tell me then did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names know or not know the things which they named?

Crat They must have known Socrates.

[438] *Soc* Why yes friend Cratylus they could hardly have been ignorant.

Crat I should say not.

Soc Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying if you remember that he who gave names must have known the things which he named are you still of that opinion?

Crat I am.

Soc And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?

Crat I should.

Soc But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? For if we are correct in our view the only way of learning and discovering things is either to discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.

Crat I think that there is a good deal in what you say Socrates.

Soc But if things are only to be known through names how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge or were legislators before there were names at all and therefore before they could have known them?

Crat I believe Socrates the true account of the matter to be that a power more than human gave things their first names and that the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.

Soc Then how came the giver of the names if he was an inspired being or God to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and

PHAEDRUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE. SOCRATES PHAEDRUS. Scene Under a
plane-tree by the banks of the Ilissus



[21-] *Socrates.* My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?

Phaedrus. I come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been sitting with him the whole morning, and our common friend Acumenus tells me that it is much more refreshing to walk in the open air than to be shut up in a cloister.

Soc. There he is right. Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?

Phaedr. Yes, he was staying with Epicrates, here at the house of Morychus, that house which is near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

Soc. And how did he entertain you? Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?

Phaedr. You shall hear if you can spare time to accompany me.

Soc. And should I not deem the conversation of you and Lysias a thing of his/her import, as I may say in the words of Pindar, "than any business?"

Phaedr. Will you go on?

Soc. And will you go on with the narration?

Phaedr. My tale, Socrates, since of your sort, for so I was the theme which occupied us—love after a fashion. Lysias has been writing about a fair youth who was being tempted, but not by a lover, and thus at the point he ingeniously proved that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover.

Soc. O that is noble of him! I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one—then he would meet the case of me and of many

a man, his words would be quite refreshing and he would be a public benefactor. For my part, I do so long to hear his speech, that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Hierodicus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company.

Phaedr. What do you mean, my good Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do justice to an elaborate work, [22-] which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing? Indeed, I cannot. I would give a great deal if I could.

Soc. I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that the speech of Lysias was repeated to him, not once only, but again and again—he insisted on hearing it many times over, and Lysias was very willing to gratify him. At last, when nothing else would do, he got hold of the book, and looked at what he most wanted to see,—this occupied him during the whole morning,—and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, by the way, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long, and he went to a place outside the wall that he might practise his lesson. There he is a certain lover of discourse who had a singular weakness—he saw and rejoiced now thought he, I shall have a partner in my revels. And he invited him to come and walk with him. But when the lover of discourse begged that he would repeat the tale, he gave himself airs and said, "No I cannot," as if he were indisposed, although, if the hearer had refused,

then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality: he will not believe that all things leak like a pot or imaginethat the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true Cratylus but is also very likely to be untrue and therefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well

and like a man and do not easily accept such a doctrine for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

Crat I will do as you say though I can assure you Socrates that I have been considering the matter already and the result of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus.

Soc Then another day my friend when you come back you shall give me a lesson but at present go into the country as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.

Crat Very good Socrates I hope, however that you will continue to think about these things yourself.

PHAEDRUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE. SOCRATES PHAEDRUS Scene Under a plane tree by the banks of the Ilissus

[227] *Socrates* My dear Phaedrus whence come you, and whither are you going?

Phaedrus I come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall for I have been sitting within the whole morning and our common friend Anaximenes tells me that it is much more refreshing to walk in the open air than to be shut up in a cloister.

Soc There he is right. Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?

Phaedr Yes, he was staying with Epicrates, here at the house of Morchus; that house which is near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

Soc And how did he entertain you? Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?

Phaedr You shall hear if you can spare time to accompany me.

Soc And should I not deem the conversation of you and Lysias a thing of higher import, as I may say in the words of Prodicus than any business?

Phaedr Will you go on?

Soc And will you go on with the narration?

Phaedr My tale, Socrates, is one of your sort, for love was the theme which occupied us—love after a fashion. Lysias has been sitting about a young youth who was being tempted, but not by a lover and this was the point he ingeniously proved that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover.

Soc O that is noble of him! I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one—then he would meet the case of me and of many

a man his words would be quite refreshing and he would be a public benefactor. For my part, I do so long to hear his speech, that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Herodotus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company.

Phaedr What do you mean my good Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do justice to an elaborate work, [228] which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot. I would give a great deal if I could.

Soc I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself and I am very sure that the speech of Lysias was repeated to him not once only but again and again—he insisted on hearing it many times over and Lysias was very willing to gratify him. At last, when nothing else would do, he got hold of the book and looked at what he most wanted to see,—this occupied him during the whole morning—and then when he was tired with sitting he went out to take a walk, not until by the dog. I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long and he went to a place outside the wall that he might practise his lesson. There he saw a certain lover of discourse who had a singular weakness—he saw and rejoiced now thought he, "I shall have a partner in my revels." And he invited him to come and walk with him. But when the lover of discourse begged that he would repeat the tale, he gave himself airs and said, "No I cannot, as if he were indisposed although, if the hearer had refused

he would sooner or later have been compelled by him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore Phaedrus bid him do at once what he will soon do whether bidden or not.

Phaedr. I see that you will not let me off until I speak in some fashion or other. Verily therefore my best plan is to speak as I best can.

Soc. A very true remark, that of yours.

Phaedr. I will do as I say, but believe me, Socrates, I did not learn the very words—O no, nevertheless I have a general notion of what he said, and will give you a summary of the points in which the lover differed from the non-lover. Let me begin at the beginning.

Soc. Yes, my sweet one, but you must first of all show what you have in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised at my expense if you have Lysias himself here.

Phaedr. Enough, I see that I have no hope of practising my art upon you. But if I am to read, where would you please to sit? [229]

Soc. Let us turn aside and go by the Ilissus, we will sit down at some quiet spot.

Phaedr. I am fortunate in not having my sandals, and as you never have any, I think that we may go along the brook and cool our feet in the water; this will be the easiest way, and at midday and in the summer is far from being unpleasant.

Soc. Lead on, and look out for a place in which we can sit down.

Phaedr. Do you see the tallest plane tree in the distance?

Soc. Yes.

Phaedr. There are shade and gentle breezes and grass on which we may either sit or lie down.

Soc. Move forward.

Phaedr. I should like to know, Socrates, whether the place is not somewhere here at which Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus?

Soc. Such is the tradition.

Phaedr. And is this the exact spot? The little stream is delightfully clear and bright, I can fancy that there might be maidens playing near.

Soc. I believe that the spot is not exactly here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, where you cross to the temple of Artemis, and there is, I think, some sort of an altar of Boreas at the place.

Phaedr. I have never noticed it, but I be-

seech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?

Soc. The wise are doubtful, and I should not be singular if like them I too doubted. I might have a rational explanation, that Orithyia was playing with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighbouring rocks, and this being the manner of her death, she was said to have been carried away by Boreas. There is a discrepancy, however, about the locality, according to another version of the story she was taken from Areopagus, and not from this place. Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them: much labour and ingenuity will be required of him, and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate Hippocentaurs and chimeras, dire Gorgons and winged steeds, flow in apace and numberless other inconceivable and portentous natures. And if he is sceptical about them and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up a great deal of time. Now I have no leisure for such enquiries: shall I tell you why? I must first know myself as the Delphian inscription says [230] to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I bid farewell to all this: the common opinion is enough for me. For as I was saying, I want to know not about this, but about myself: am I a monster, more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a divinest and lowlier destiny? But let me ask you, friend, have we not reached the plane tree to which you were conducting us?

Phaedr. Yes, this is the tree.

Soc. By Hère, a fair resting place, full of summer sounds and scents. Here is this lofty and spreading plane tree, and the agnus castus high and clustering in the fullest blossom, and the greatest fragrance, and the stream which flows beneath the plane tree is deliciously cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments and images, this must be a spot sacred to Acheulous and the Nymphs. How delightful is the breeze—so very sweet, and there is a sound in the air shrill and summerlike which makes answer to the chorus of the cicadae. But the greatest charm of all is the grass, like a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable guide.

Phaedr. What an incomprehensible being

you are Socrates when you are in the country as you say you really are like some stranger who is led about by a guide. Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the gates.

Soc. Very true, my good friend, and I hope that you will excuse me when you hear the reason which is that I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees of the country. Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell with which to draw me out of the city into the country like a hungry cow before whom a bough or a bunch of fruit is waved. For only hold up before me in like manner a book, and you may lead me all round Attica and over the wide world. And now having arrived I intend to lie down and do you choose any posture in which you can read best. Begin.

Phaedr. Listen. You know how matters stand with me and how as I conceive, [231] this affair may be arranged for the advantage of both of us. And I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown when their passion ceases but to the non-lovers who are free and not under any compulsion no time of repentance ever comes for they confer their benefits according to the measure of their ability in the way which is most conducive to their own interest. Then again, lovers consider how by reason of their love they have neglected their own concerns and rendered service to others and when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles which they have endured they think that they have long gone made to the beloved a very ample return. But the non-lover has no such tormenting recollections he has never neglected his affairs or quarrelled with his relations he has no troubles to add up or excuse to himself and being well rid of all these evils why should he not freely do what will gratify the beloved?

If you say that the lover is more to be esteemed because his love is thought to be greater for he is willing to say and do what is hateful to other men in order to please his beloved—that if true is only a proof that he will prefer any future loss to his present, and will injure his old love at the pleasure of the new. And how in a matter of such infinite importance, can a man be right in trusting himself to one who is afflicted with a malady which no experienced person would attempt to cure for the patient himself admits that he is not in his

right mind and acknowledges that he is wrong in his mind but says that he is unable to control himself? And if he came to his right mind would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? Once more there are many more non-lovers than lovers and if you choose the best of the lovers, you will not have many to choose from but if from the non-lovers, the choice will be larger and you will be far more likely to find among them a person who is worthy of your friendship. If public opinion be your dread and you would avoid reproach in all probability the lover who is always thinking that other men are as envious of him as he is of [232] them will boast to some one of his successes, and make a show of them openly in the pride of his heart—he wants others to know that his labour has not been lost but the non-lover is more his own master and is desirous of solid good and not of the opinion of mankind. Again the lover may be generally noted or seen following the beloved (this is his regular occupation) and whenever they are observed to exchange two words they are supposed to meet about some affair of love either past or in contemplation but when non-lovers meet, no one asks the reason why because people know that talking to another is natural whether friendship or mere pleasure be the motive.

Once more, if you fear the fickleness of friendship consider that in any other case a quarrel might be a mutual calamity but now when you have given up what is most precious to you you will be the greater loser and therefore, you will have more reason in being afraid of the lover for his vexations are many and he is always fancying that every one is leagued against him. Wherefore also he debar himself from society he will not have you intimate with the wealthy lest they should exceed him in wealth or with men of education lest they should be his superiors in understanding and he is equally afraid of anybody's influence who has any other advantage over himself. If he can persuade you to break with them you are left without a friend in the world or if out of a regard to your own interest you have more sense than to comply with his desire, you will have to quarrel with him. But those who are non-lovers, and whose success in love is the reward of their merit, will not be jealous of the companions of their beloved and will rather hate those who refuse to be his associates thinking that their favour is slighted by the latter and benefited by the former for more love than

hatred may be expected to come to him out of his friendship with others. Many lovers too have loved the person of a youth before they knew his character or his longings, so that when their passion has passed away there is no knowing whether they will continue to be his friends, [233] whereas in the case of non-lovers who were always friends the friendship is not lessened by the favours granted but the recollection of these remains with them and is an earnest of good things to come.

Further I say that you are likely to be improved by me whereas the lover will spoil you. For they praise your words and actions in a wrong way partly because they are afraid of offending you and also their judgment is weakened by passion. Such are the feats which love exhibits: he makes things painful to the disappointed which give no pain to others; he compels the successful lover to praise what ought not to give him pleasure and therefore the beloved is to be pitied rather than envied. But if you listen to me in the first place I in my intercourse with you shall not merely regard present enjoyment but also future advantage being not mastered by love but my own master nor for small causes taking violent dislikes but even when the cause is great slowly laying up little wrath—unintentional of fences I shall forgive and intentional ones I shall try to prevent and these are the marks of a friendship which will last.

Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend? reflect—if this were true we should set small value on sons or fathers or mothers nor should we ever have loyal friends for our love of them arises not from passion but from other associations. Further if we ought to shower favours on those who are the most eager suitors—on that principle we ought all ways to do good not to the most virtuous but to the most needy for they are the persons who will be most relieved and will therefore be the most grateful and when you make a feast you should invite not your friend but the beggar and the empty soul for they will love you and attend you and come about your doors and will be the best pleased and the most grateful and will invoke many a blessing on your head. Yet surely you ought not to be granting favours to those who besiege you with prayer but to those who are best able to reward you nor to the lover only but to those who are worthy of love nor to those who will enjoy the bloom of your youth [234] but to those who will share their possessions with you in age nor to those

who, having succeeded will glory in their success to others, but to those who will be modest and tell no tales nor to those who care about you for a moment only but to those who will continue your friends through life nor to those who when their passion is over will pick a quarrel with you but rather to those who, when the charm of youth has left you will show their own virtue. Remember what I have said and consider yet this further point: friends admonish the lover under the idea that his way of life is bad but no one of his kindred ever yet censured the non-lover or thought that he was ill advised about his own interests.

Perhaps you will ask me whether I propose that you should indulge every non-lover. To which I reply that not even the lover would advise you to indulge all lovers for the indiscriminate favour is less esteemed by the rational recipient and less easily hidden by him who would escape the censure of the world. Now love ought to be for the advantage of both parties and for the injury of neither.

I believe that I have said enough but if there is anything more which you desire or which in your opinion needs to be supplied ask and I will answer.

Now Socrates what do you think? Is not the discourse excellent more especially in the matter of the language?

Soc. Yes quite admirable the effect on me was ravishing. And this I owe to you. Phaedrus for I observed you while reading to be in an ecstasy and thinking that you are more experienced in these matters than I am I followed your example and like you my divine darling I became inspired with a phrenzy.

Phaedr. Indeed you are pleased to be merry.

Soc. Do you mean that I am not in earnest?

Phaedr. Now don't talk in that way Socrates but let me have your real opinion. I adjure you by Zeus the god of friendship to tell me whether you think that any Hellene could have said more or spoken better on the same subject.

Soc. Well but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author or only the clearness and roundness and finish and tour-nure of the language? As to the first I willingly submit to your better judgment [235] for I am not worthy to form an opinion having only attended to the rhetorical manner and I was doubting whether this could have been defended even by Lysias himself. I thought though I speak under correction that he repeated himself two or three times either from want of

words or from want of pains and also, he appeared to me ostentatiously to exult in showing how well he could say the same thing in two or three ways

Phaedr Nonsense Socrates what you call reputation was the especial merit of the speech for he omitted no topic of which the subject rightly allowed and I do not think that any one could have spoken better or more exhaustively

Soc There I cannot go along with you Ancient sages, men and women, who have spoken and written of these things would rise up in judgment against me, it out of complaisance I assented to you.

Phaedr Who are they and where did you hear anything better than this?

Soc I am sure that I must have heard but at this moment I do not remember from whom perhaps from Sappho the fair or Anacreon the wise or possibly from a prose writer Why do I say so? Why because I perceive that my bosom is full and that I could make another speech as good as that of Lysias, and different. Now I am certain that this is not an invention of my own, who am well aware that I know nothing and therefore I can only infer that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher from the waters of another though I have actually forgotten in my stupidity who was my informant

Phaedr That is grand—but never mind where you heard the discourse or from whom let that be a mystery not to be divulged even at my earnest desire Only as you say promise to make another and better oration equal in length and entirely new on the same subject and I like the nine Muses, will promise to set up a golden image at Delphi not only of myself, but of you and as large as life

Soc You are a dear golden ass if you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that I can make a speech from which all his arguments are to be excluded The worst of authors will say something which is to the point Who for example, [236] could speak on this subject of yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover? These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said?) and must be allowed and excused the only merit is in the arrangement of them for there can be none in the invention but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality

Phaedr I admit that there is reason in what

you say and I too will be reasonable, and will allow you to start with the premiss that the lover is more disordered in his wits than the non-lover if in what remains you make a longer and better speech than Lysias, and use other arguments, then I say again that a statue you shall have of beaten gold and take your place by the colossal offerings of the Cypselids at Olympia

Soc How profoundly in earnest is the lover because to tease him I lay a finger upon his love! And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?

Phaedr There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak as you best can "Do not let us exchange *tu quoque* as in a farce or compel me to say to you as you said to me, "I know Socrates as well as I know myself and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs. Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed yourself of the speech for here are we all alone, and I am stronger remember and younger than you—Wherefore perpend, and do not compel me to use violence

Soc But, my sweet Phaedrus, how ridiculous it would be of me to compete with Lysias in an extempore speech! He is a master in his art and I am an untalented man

Phaedr You see how matters stand and therefore let there be no more pretences for indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.

Soc Then don't say it.

Phaedr Yes, but I will and my word shall be an oath I say or rather swear—but what god will be witness of my oath?—By this plane tree I swear that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of this very plane tree I will never tell you another never let you have word of another!

Soc Will not I am conquered the poor lover of discourse has no more to say

Phaedr Then why are you still at your tricks?

Soc I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved

Phaedr Proceed

[237] *Soc* Shall I tell you what I will do?

Phaedr What?

Soc I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say

Phaedr Only go on and you may do any thing else which you please

Soc Come O ye Muses melodious as ye are called whether you have received this name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians are a musical race help O help me in the tale which my good friend here desires me to rehearse in order that his friend whom he always deemed wise may seem to him to be wiser than ever

Once upon a time there was a fair boy or more properly speaking a youth he was very fair and had a great many lovers and there was one special cunning one who had persuaded the youth that he did not love him but he really loved him all the same and one day when he was paying his addresses to him he used this very argument—that he ought to accept the non lover rather than the lover, his words were as follows —

All good counsel begins in the same way a man should know what he is advising about or his counsel will all come to nought But people imagine that they know about the nature of things when they don't know about them and not having come to an understanding at first because they think that they know they end as might be expected in contradicting one another and themselves Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we condemn in others but as our question is whether the lover or non lover is to be preferred let us first of all agree in defining the nature and power of love and then keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage

Every one sees that love is a desire and we know also that non lovers desire the beautiful and good Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will one is the natural desire of pleasure the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war and sometimes the one sometimes the other conquers When opinion by the help of reason leads us to the best the conquering principle is called temperance [238] but when desire which is devoid of reason rules in us and drags us to pleasure that power of misrule is called excess Now excess has many names and many members and many forms, and any of these forms when very marked gives a name neither honourable nor creditable to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating for example which

gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires is called gluttony and he who is possessed by it is called a glutton the tyrannical desire of drink which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink has a name which is only too obvious and there can be as little doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called—it will be the name of that which happens to be dominant And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty and especially of personal beauty by the desires which are her own kindred—that supreme desire I say which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced from this very force receiving a name is called love (*ερωμενικὴ εἶδος*)

And now, dear Phaedrus I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself inspired?

Phaedr Yes So rates you seem to have a very unusual flow of words

Soc Listen to me then in silence for surely the place is holy so that you must not wonder if as I proceed I appear to be in a divine fury for already I am getting into dithyrambics

Phaedr Nothing can be truer

Soc The responsibility rests with you But hear what follows and perhaps the fit may be averted all is in their hands above I will go on talking to my youth Listen

Thus my friend we have declared and defined the nature of the subject keeping the definition in view let us now enquire what advantage or disadvantage is likely to ensue from the lover or the non lover to him who accepts their advances

He who is the victim of his passions and the slave of pleasure will of course desire to make his beloved as agreeable to himself as possible. Now to him who has a mind diseased anything is agreeable which is not opposed to him but that which is equal or superior is hateful to him and therefore the lover will not brook any superiority or equality on the part of his beloved [239] he is always employed in reducing him to inferiority And the ignorant is the inferior of the wise the coward of the brave, the slow of speech of the speaker the dull of the clever These and not these only are the mental defects of the beloved—defects which when implanted by nature are necessarily a de-

light to the lover and when not implanted, he must contrive to implant them in him, if he would not be deprived of his fleeting joy. And therefore he cannot help being jealous, and will debar his beloved from the advantages of society which would make a man of him, and especially from that society which would have given him wisdom, and thereby he cannot fail to do him great harm. That is to say in his excess of fear lest he should come to be despised in his eyes he will be compelled to banish from him divine philosophy and there is no greater injury which he can inflict upon him than this. He will contrive that his beloved shall be wholly ignorant, and in everything shall look to him he is to be the delight of the lover's heart, and a curse to himself. Truly a lover is a profitable guardian and associate for him in all that relates to his mind.

Let us next see how his master whose law of life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the body of his servant. Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? One brought up in shady bowers and not in the bright sun, a stranger to manly exercises and the sweat of toil, accustomed only to a soft and luxurious diet, instead of the hues of health having the colours of paint and ornament, and the rest of a price—such a life as any one can imagine and which I need not detail at length. But I may sum up all that I have to say in a word, and pass on. Such a person in war or in any of the great crises of life, will be the anxiety of his friends and also of his lover and certainly not the terror of his enemies which nobody can deny.

And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the matter of his property. This is the next point to be considered. The lover will be the first to see what, indeed, will be sufficiently evident to all men, that he desires above all things to deprive his beloved of his dearest and best and holiest possessions, [2,0] father mother hundred, friends, of all whom he thinks may be hinderers or reprovers of their most sweet converse. He will even cast a jealous eye upon his gold and all other property because these make him a less easy prey and when caught less manageable. Hence he is of necessity displeased at his possession of them and rejoices at their loss and he would like him to be wifeless, childless, homeless, as well and the lover the better for the lover he is all this, the longer he will enjoy him.

There are some sort of animals, such as flat terers, who are dangerous and much to be feared enough, and yet nature has mingled a temporary pleasure and grace in their composition. You may say that a courtesan is hurtful, and disagreeable of such creatures and their practices, and yet for the time they are very pleasant. But the lover is not only hurtful to his lover he is also an extremely disagreeable companion. The old proverb says that "birds of a feather flock together." I suppose that equality of years inclines them to the same pleasures, and similarity begets friendship yet you may have more than enough of each of this and very constraints is always said to be grievous. Now the lover is not only unlike his beloved, but he forces himself upon him. For he is old and his love is young, and neither day nor night will he leave him if he can help necessary and the sting of desire drive him on, and allure him with the pleasure which he receives from seeing hearing touching perceiving him in every way. And therefore he is delighted to fasten upon him and to minister to him. But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time? Must he not feel the extremity of disgust when he looks at an old shrivelled face and the remainder to match, which even in a description is disagreeable, and quite detestable when he is forced into daily contact with his lover. Moreover he is jealously watched and guarded against everything and everybody and has to bear mispraised and exaggerated praises of himself, and censures equally inappropriate, which are intolerable when the man is sober and, besides being intolerable, are published all over the world in all their indecency and want of modesty when he is drunk.

And not only while his love consumes him much evil and unpleasant, but when his love ceases he becomes a pernicious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths and prayers and promises, [2,1] and yet could hardly prevail upon him to tolerate the tedium of his company when from motives of interest. The hour of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master instead of love and infatuation, wisdom and temperance are his bosom's lords but the beloved has not discovered the change which has taken place in him, when he asks for a return and recalls to his recollection former sayings and doings. He believes himself to be speaking to the same person, and the other not having the courage to confess the truth, and not knowing how to fulfil the oaths and promises which he made when

under the dominion of folly and having now grown wise and temperate does not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. And so he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter the oyster shell has fallen with the other side uppermost—he changes pursuit into flight while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non lover and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless morose envious disagreeable being hurtful to his estate hurtful to his bodily health and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind than which there neither is nor ever will be any thing more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this fair youth and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you.

As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves

But I told you so I am speaking in verse and therefore I had better make an end enough.

Phaedr I thought that you were only half way and were going to make a similar speech about all the advantages of accepting the non lover. Why do you not proceed?

Soc Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics when only uttering a censure on the lover? And if I am to add the praises of the non lover what will become of me? Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non lover has all the advantages in which the lover is accused of being deficient. And now I will say no more there has been enough of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate [242] I will cross the river and make the best of my way home lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you.

Phaedr Not yet Socrates not until the heat of the day has passed do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the midday sun standing still as people say in the meridian. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said and then return in the cool.

Soc Your love of discourse *Phaedrus* is superhuman simply marvellous and I do not believe that there is any one of your contemporaries

who has either made or in one way or another has compelled others to make an equal number of speeches. I would except *Simmius* the Theban but all the rest are far behind you. And now I do verily believe that you have been the cause of another.

Phaedr That is good news. But what do you mean?

Soc I mean to say that as I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me—that sign which always forbids but never bids me to do anything which I am going to do and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner though not a very good one but I have enough religion for my own use, as you might say of a bad writer—his writing is good enough for him and I am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort of misgiving and like *Ibycus* I was troubled. I feared that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against the gods. Now I recognize my error.

Phaedr What error?

Soc That was a dreadful speech which you brought with you and you made me utter one as bad.

Phaedr How so?

Soc It was foolish I say—to a certain extent impious can anything be more dreadful?

Phaedr Nothing if the speech was really such as you describe.

Soc Well and is not *Eros* the son of *Aphrodite* and a god?

Phaedr So men say.

Soc But that was not acknowledged by *Lyias* in his speech nor by you in that other speech which you by a charm drew from my lips. For if love be as he surely is a divinity he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both the speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing [243] having no truth or honesty in them nevertheless they pretended to be something hoping to succeed in deceiving the mankind of earth and gain celebrity among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised not by *Homer* for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind but by *Stesichorus* who was a philosopher and knew the reason why and therefore when he lost his eyes for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely *Helen* he at

¹ In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.

once purged himself And the purgation was a recantation which began thus,—

False is that word of mine—the truth is that thou dost not embark in it for ever go to the walls of Troy

and when he had completed his poem which is called the recantation immediately his sight returned to him Now I will be wiser than either Stesichorus or Homer in that I am going to make my recantation for reviling love before I suffer and this I will attempt, not as before elated and ashamed, but with forehead bold and bare

Phædr. Nothing could be more agreeable to me than to hear you say so

Soc. Only think, my good Phædrus, what an utter want of delicacy was shown in the two discourses I mean in my own and in that which you recited out of the book Would not any one who was himself of a noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like his own when we tell of the petty causes of lovers jealousies and of their excited animosities, and of the injuries which they do to the beloved have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown —he could certainly never have admitted the justice of our censure?

Phædr. I dare say not Socrates

Soc. Therefore because I blush at the thought of this person and also because I am afraid of Lo e himself I desire to wash the brine out of my ears with water from the spring and I would counsel Lysias not to delay but to write another discourse which shall prove that *ceteris paribus* the lover ought to be accepted rather than the non-lover

Phædr. Be assured that he shall You shall speak the praises of the lover and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme.

Soc. You will be true to your nature in that and therefore I believe you

Phædr. Speak, and fear not

Soc. But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen no v lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non-lover before he knows what he is doing?

Phædr. He is close at hand, and always at your service

Soc. Know then fair youth that the former discourse was the word of Phædrus, /244/ the son of V in Man who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius) And this which I

am about to utter is the recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus) who comes from the town of Desire (Himera) and is to the following effect I told a lie when I said that the beloved ought to accept the non-lover when he might have the lover because the one is sane, and the other mad It might be so if madness were simply an evil but there is also a madness which is a divine gift, and the source of the chiefest blessings granted to men For prophecy is a madness and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas both in public and private life, but when in their senses few or none And I might also tell you how the Sibyl and other inspired persons have given to many an one many an intimation of the future which has saved them from falling But it would be tedious to speak of what every one knows

There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors of names who would never have connected prophecy (*μαντιη*) which foretells the future and is the noblest of arts with madness (*μανια*) or called them both by the same name, if they had deemed madness to be a disgrace or dishonour—they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was a noble thing for the two words *μαντικη* and *μανια* are really the same, and the letter *τ* is only a modern and tasteless insertion And this is confirmed by the name which was given by them to the rational investigation of futurity whether made by the help of birds or of other signs—this for as much as it is an art which supplies from the reasoning faculty mind (*λογη*) and information (*ωροπισια*) to human thought (*αγορη*) they originally termed it *λογιστικη* but the word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega (*ω ωροτικη* and *ω ωρικη*) and in proportion as prophecy (*μαντικη*) is more perfect and august than augury both in name and fact in the same proportion *μαντικη* is a madness superior to a sane mind (*σωφρονικη*) for the one is only of human but the other of divine origin Again, where plagues and mischievous woes have bred in certain families owing to some ancient blood guiltiness there madness has entered with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances found a way of deliverance for those who are in need and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind is by the use of purifications and mys-

series made whole and except from evil future as well as present and has a release from the calamity which was afflicting him [245] The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the Muses which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul and there inspiring frenzy awakens lyrical and all other numbers with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity But he who having no touch of the Muses madness in his soul comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he I say and his poetry are not admitted the sane man disappears and is no where when he enters into rivalry with the madman

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung from inspired madness And therefore let no one frighten or fluster us by saying that the temperate friend is to be chosen rather than the inspired but let him further show that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved if he can do so we will allow him to carry off the palm And we on our part will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven's blessings and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive and the witling disbelieve But first of all let us view the affections and actions of the soul divine and human and try to ascertain the truth about them The beginning of our proof is as follows—

The soul through all her being is immortal for that which is ever in motion is immortal but that which moves another and is moved by another in ceasing to move ceases also to live Only the self moving never leaving self never ceases to move and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides Now the beginning is unbegotten for that which is begotten has a beginning but the beginning is begotten of nothing for if it were begotten of something then the begotten would not come from a beginning But if unbegotten it must also be indestructible for if beginning were destroyed there could be no beginning out of anything nor anything out of a beginning and all things must have a beginning And therefore the self moving is the beginning of motion and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still and never again have motion or birth But if the self moving is proved to be immortal he who affirms that self motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion For the body which is

moved from without is soulless but that which is moved from within has a soul for such is the nature of the soul But if this be true must not the soul be the self moving and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? [246] Enough of the soul's immortality

Of the nature of the soul though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse let me speak briefly and in a figure And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent but those of other races are mixed the human charioteer drives his in a pair and one of them is noble and of noble breed and the other is noble and of ignoble breed and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature The soul in her torility has the care of inanimate being everywhere and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing—when perfect and fully winged she soars upward and orders the whole world whereas the imperfect soul losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there finding a home she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self moved but is really moved by her power and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be although fancy not having seen nor surely known the nature of God may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time Let that however be as God wills and be spoken of acceptably to him And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her wings!

The wing is the corporeal element which is most akin to the divine and which by nature tends to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region which is the habitation of the gods The divine is beauty wisdom goodness and the like and by these the wing of the soul is nourished and grows apace but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good wastes and falls away Zeus the mighty lord holding the reins of a winged chariot leads the way in heaven ordering all and taking care of all and there follows him the array of gods and demigods [247] marshalled in eleven bands Hestia alone abides at home in the house of heaven of the rest they who are reckoned among the

princely twelve march in their appointed order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro along which the blessed gods are passing every one doing his own work. he may follow who will and can, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to banquet and festal then they move up the steep to the top of the vault of heaven. The chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the reins glide rapidly but the others labour for the vicious steed goes heavily weighing down the charioteer to the earth when his steed has not been thoroughly trained—and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go forth and stand upon the outside of heaven and the revolution of the spheres carries them round and they behold the things beyond. But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever dreamed or ever will sing worthily? It is such as I will describe for I must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme. There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned the colourless formless intangible essence visible only to mind the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality and once more gazing upon truth is replenished and made glad until the motion of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute not in the form of generation or of relation which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute and beholding the other true existences in like manner and feasting upon them, he passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home and the celestial charioteer putting up his horses to the tall gates in ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

[248] Such is the life of the gods but of other souls that which follows God best and is likeliest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world and is carried round in the revolution troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being while an other only rises and falls, and sees and again fail to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and they all follow but not being strong enough they are carried round below the surface plunging treading none

another each striving to be first and there is confusion and perspiration and the extremity of effort and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers and all of them after a fruitless toil not having attained to the mysteries of true being go away and feed upon opinion. The reason why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that pasturage is found there which is suited to the highest part of the soul and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this. And there is a law of Destiny that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with a god is preserved from harm until the next period and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow and fails to behold the truth and through some ill hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her wings fall from her and she drops to the ground then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass not into any other animal but only into man and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher or artist or some musical and loving nature that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician or economist, or trader the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils or a physician the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant to the sixth the character of a poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue to the ninth that of a tyrant—all these are states of probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul of each one can return to the place from whence she came [249] for she cannot grow her wings in less only the soul of a philosopher guileless and true or the soul of a lover who is not devoid of philosophy may acquire wings in the third of the recurring periods of a thousand years he is distinguished from the ordinary good man who gains wings in three thousand years—and they who choose this life three times in succession have wings given them and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life and after the judgment they go some of them to the houses of correction which are under the

earth and are punished others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason—this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God—when regard less of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings and this is just for he is always according to the measure of his abilities clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine the vulgar deem him mad and rebuke him they do not see that he is inspired.

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness which is imputed to him who when he sees the beauty of earth is transported with the recollection of the true beauty he would like to fly away but he cannot he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest in him who has or shares in it and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For as has been already said every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world [250] they may have seen them for a short time only or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot and having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them and they when they behold here any image of that other world are rapt

in amazement but they are ignorant of what this rapture means because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them they are seen through a glass dimly and there are few who going to the images behold in them the realities and these only with dim-culty. There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness—we philosophers following in the train of Zeus others in company with other gods and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed celebrated by us in our state of innocence before we had any experience of evils to come when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy which we beheld shining in pure light pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about now that we are imprisoned in the body like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

But of beauty I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms and coming to earth we find her here too shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the most piercing of our bodily senses though not by that is wisdom seen her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her and the other ideas if they had visible counterparts would be equally lovely. But this is the privilege of beauty that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable in sight. Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other he looks only at her earthly namesake and instead of being awed at the sight of her he is given over to pleasure and like a brutish beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget [251] he consorts with wantonness and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a god-like face or form which is the expression of divine beauty and at first a shudder runs through him and again the old awe steals over him then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright mad man he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god then while he gazes on him

there is a sort of reaction and the shudder passes into an unusual heat and perspiration for as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms. And as he warms, the parts out of which the wing grew and which had been hitherto closed and rigid, and had prevented the wing from shooting forth are melted and as nourishment streams upon him the lower end of the wings begins to swell and grow from the root upwards and the growth extends under the whole soul—for once the whole was winged.

During this process the whole soul is all in a state of ebullition and effervescence,—which may be compared to the irritation and uneasiness in the gums at the time of cutting teeth—bubbles up and has a feeling of uneasiness and tickling but then in like manner the soul in beginning to grow wings the beauty of the beloved meets her eye and she receives the sensible warm motion of particles which flow towards her therefore called emotion ($\mu\text{πορ}$) and is refreshed and warmed by them and then she ceases from her pain with joy. But when she is parted from her beloved and her moisture fails, then the orifices of the passage out of which the wing shoots dry up and close and intercept the germ of the wing which being shut up with the emotion throbbing as with the pulsations of an artery pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained and at the recollection of beauty is again delighted. And from both of them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness of her condition and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one whether in her desire she runs. And when she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of beauty her constraint is loosened and she is refreshed, and has no more pangs and pains and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, [252] and is the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems above all he has forgotten mother and brethren and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property the rules and proprieties of life, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to leap like a servant, where ever he is allowed, as near as he can to his desired one who is the object of his worship and the physician who can alone assuage the greatness of his pain. And thus

state, my dear imaginary youth to whom I am talking is by men called love, and among the gods has a name at which you, in your simplicity may be inclined to mock there are two lines in the apocryphal writings of Homer in which the name occurs. One of them is rather outrageous and not altogether metrical. They are as follows

*Mortals call him fluttering love
But the immortals call him winged one
Because the growing of wings is a necessity to him*

You may believe this, but not unless you like. At any rate the loves of lovers and their causes are such as I have described.

Now the lover who is taken may be the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god and can endure a heavier burden but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And he who follows in the train of any other god while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts, honours and imitates him as far as he is able and after the manner of his god he behaves in his intercourse with his beloved and with the rest of the world during the first period of his earthly existence. Every one chooses his love from the ranks of beauty according to his character and this he makes his god and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship. The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him and therefore they seek out some one of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience of such a disposition hitherto they learn of any one who can teach them and themselves follow in the same way. And they have the less difficulty in finding the nature of their own god in themselves, [253] because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him and receive from him their character and disposition so far as man can participate in God. The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved wherefore they love him all the more and if like the Bacchic Nymphs they draw inspiration from Zeus, they pour out their own fountain upon him, wanting to make him as like as possible to their own god. But those who are the followers of Heracles seek a royal love, and when they have

found him they do just the same with him and in like manner the followers of Apollo and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be made like him whom they serve and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god and persuade their love to do the same and educate him into the manner and nature of the god as far as they each can for no feelings of envy or jealousy are entertained by them towards their beloved but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honour Thus fair and blissful to the beloved is the desire of the inspired lover and the imitation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love if he be captured by the lover and their purpose is effected Now the beloved is taken captive in the following manner —

As I said at the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three—two horses and a charioteer and one of the horses was good and the other bad the division may remain but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists and to that I will proceed The right hand horse is upright and cleanly made he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose his colour is white and his eyes dark he is a lover of honour and modesty and temperance and the follower of true glory he needs no touch of the whip but is guided by word and admonition only The other is a crooked lumbering animal put together anyhow he has a short thick neck he is flat faced and of a dark colour with grey eyes and blood red complexion the mate of insolence and pride shag eared and deaf hardly yielding to whip and spur Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love and has his whole soul warmed through sense and is full of the prickings and ticklings of desire [254] the obedient steed then as always under the government of shame refrains from leaping on the beloved but the other heedless of the pricks and of the blows of the whip plunges and runs away giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer whom he forces to approach the beloved and to remember the joys of love They at first indignantly oppose him and will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds but at last when he persists in plaguing them they yield and agree to do as he bids them

And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true

beauty whom he beholds in company with Modesty like an image placed upon a holy pedestal He sees her but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches the one willing and unresisting the unruly one very unwilling and when they have gone by a little the one is overcome with shame and wonder and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration the other when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath is full of wrath and reproaches which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow steed for want of courage and manhood declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion Again they refuse and again he urges them on and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time When the appointed hour comes they make as if they had forgotten and he reminds them fighting and neighing and dragging them on until at length he on the same thoughts in tent forces them to draw near again And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail and takes the bit in his teeth and pulls shamelessly Then the charioteer is worse off than ever he falls back like a racer at the barrier and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way he is tamed and humbled and follows the will of the charioteer and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear And from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear

[255] And so the beloved who like a god has received every true and loyal service from his lover not in pretence but in reality being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer if in former days he has blushed to own his passion and turned away his lover because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced now as years advance at the appointed age and time is led to receive him into communion For fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good And the beloved when he has received him into communion and intimacy is quite

amazed at the good will of the lover he recognises that the inspired friend is worth all other friends or kinsmen: they have nothing of friendship in them worthy to be compared with his. And when his feeling continues and he is nearer to him and embraces him, in gymnastic exercises and at other times of meeting, then the fountain of that stream, which Zeus when he was in love with Ganymede named Desire, overflows upon the lover and some enters into his soul, and some when he is filled flows out again, and as a breeze or an echo rebounds from the smooth rocks and returns whence it came, so does the stream of beauty passing through the eyes which are the windows of the soul, come back to the beautiful one there arriving and quickening the passages of the wings, wafting them and inviting them to grow and fill: the soul of the beloved also with love. And in she loves, but he knows not what he does not understand and cannot explain his own state, he appears to have caught the infection of blindness from another: the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself but he is not aware of this. When he is with the lover both cease from their pain, but when he is away then he longs as he is longed for and has love's image, love for love (Anaxagoras) lodged in his breast, which he calls and desires to be not love but friendship only and his desire is as the desire of the other but weaker: he wants to see him, touch him, kiss, embrace him, and probably not long afterwards his desire is accomplished. When they meet, the wanton seed of the lover has a word to say to the charmer (256) he would like to have a little pleasure in return for many pains, but the wanton seed of the beloved is not a word, for he is burning with passion which he understands not—he throws his arms round the lover and embraces him as his dearest friend and, when they are side by side, he is not in a state in which he can refuse the lover anything, if he ask him although his eloquence and the charmer's oration humiliate him with the arguments of shame and reason.

After this their happiness depends upon their self-control: it is the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life here in happiness and harmony—masters of themselves and orderly—controlling the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements of the soul and when the end comes, they are happy and winged for flight, he is conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories nor can human

discipline or discipline in purgation confer any greater blessing on man than this. If, on the other hand, they leave philosophy and lead the lower life of ambition, then probably after wine or in some other careless hour the two wanton animals take the two souls when off their guard and bring them together and they accomplish that desire of their hearts which to the many is bliss and thus having, once enjoyed they continue to enjoy yet rarely because they have not the approval of the whole soul. They too are dear but not so dear to one another as the others, either at the time of their love or afterwards. They consider that they have given and taken from each other the most sacred pledges, and they may not break them and fall into enmity. At last they pass out of the body unvinced, but eager to soar and thus obtain no mean reward of love and madness. For those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always happy companions in their pilgrimage, and when the time comes at which they receive their wings they have the same pilgrimage because of their love.

Thus great are the heavenly blessings which the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, my youth. Whereas the attachment of the non-lover which is alloyed with a worldly prudence and has worldly and enviously ways of doing out benefits, will breed in your soul those vulgar qualities which the populace applaud will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine thousand (257) years, and leave you a fool in the world below.

And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation, as well and as fairly as I could: more especially in the matter of the poetical figures which I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus would have them. And now forgive the past and accept the present, and be gracious and merciful to me, and do not in thine anger deprive me of sight, or take from me the art of love which thou hast given me but grant that I may be yet more esteemed in the eyes of the fair. And if Phaedrus or I myself said anything rude in our first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more of his poetry: bid him study philosophy like his brother Polemarchus and then his love for Phaedrus will no longer halt between two opinions, but will dedicate himself wholly to love and to philosophical discourses.

Phaedr. I join in the prayer Socrates, and say
See 34.

also having to do with all matters great as well as small good and bad alike and is in all equally right and equally to be esteemed—that is what you have heard?

Phaedr Nay, not exactly that I should say rather that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in lawsuits and to speaking in public assemblies—not extended farther

Soc Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes?

Phaedr No more than of Nestor and Odysseus unless Gorgias is your Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus

Soc Perhaps that is my meaning But let us leave them And do you tell me instead what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court—are they not contending?

Phaedr Exactly so

Soc About the just and unjust—that is the matter in dispute?

Phaedr Yes

Soc And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time if he is so inclined to be unjust?

Phaedr Exactly

Soc And when he speaks in the assembly he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time and at another time the reverse of good?

Phaedr That is true

Soc Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking by which he makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike one and many at rest and in motion?

Phaedr Very true

Soc The art of disputation then is not confined to the courts and the assembly but is one and the same in every use of language this is the art if there be such an art which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others?

Phaedr How do you mean?

Soc Let me put the matter thus When will there be more chance of deception—when the difference is large or small?

[262] *Phaedr* When the difference is small

Soc And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?

Phaedr Of course

Soc He then who would deceive others, and not be deceived must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?

Phaedr He must

Soc And if he is ignorant of the true nature of any subject how can he detect the greater or less degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant?

Phaedr He cannot

Soc And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?

Phaedr Yes that is the way

Soc Then he who would be a master of the art must understand the real nature of every thing or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances or how to avoid it?

Phaedr He will not

Soc He then who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?

Phaedr That may be expected

Soc Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art according to our notion of them in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand and in my own speech?

Phaedr Nothing could be better and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and wanting in illustrations

Soc Yes and the two speeches happen to afford a very good example of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose steal away the hearts of his hearers This piece of good fortune I attribute to the local deities and perhaps the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art of my own

Phaedr Granted if you will only please to get on

Soc Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias speech

Phaedr You know how matters stand with me and how as I conceive they might be arranged for our common interest and I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover For lovers repent—

[263] *Soc* Enough—Now shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words?

Phaedr Yes

Soc Every one is aware that about some

things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ

Phædr I think that I understand you but will you explain yourself?

Soc When any one speaks of iron and silver is not the same thing present in the minds of all?

Phædr Certainly

Soc But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?

Phædr Precisely

Soc Then in some things we agree, but not in others?

Phædr That is true.

Soc In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

Phædr Clearly in the uncertain class.

Soc Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err as of that in which they do not err?

Phædr He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle

Soc Yes and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the cases to which they are to be referred.

Phædr Certainly

Soc Now to which class does logic belong—to the debatable or to the undisputed class?

Phædr To the debatable, clearly for if not, do you think that I would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good?

Soc Capital But will you tell me whether I defined love as the beginning of my speech? for having been in an ecstasy I cannot well remember

Phædr Yes, indeed that you did, and so mistake

Soc Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Acheilus and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lycaeus the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken and Lycaeus at the commencement of his lover's speech did insist on our supposing love to be kinethood or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again

Phædr If you please but you will not find what you want.

Soc Read, that I may have his exact words.

Phædr "You know how matters stand with me, and how as I conceive, [461] they might be arranged for our common interest and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over"

Soc Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought for he has begun at the end and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended Am I not right, sweet Phædrus?

Phædr Yes, indeed, Socrates he does begin at the end

Soc Then as to the other topics—are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition?

Phædr You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition.

Soc At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet there should be a middle, beginning and end, adapted to one another and to the whole?

Phædr Certainly

Soc Can this be said of the discourse of Lycaeus? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian

Phædr What is there remarkable in the epitaph

Soc It is as follows—

I am a maiden of beauty and lie on the tomb of Midas

So long as water flows and hills are green

So long as her mother's spot by his side is marked
I shall be loved more sweetly by that Midas than by the
lover

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

Phædr You are making fun of that oration of ours

Soc Well, I will say no more about your friend's speech lest I should give offence to you, although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought

also having to do with all matters great as well as small good and bad alike and is in all equally right and equally to be esteemed—that is what you have heard?

Phaedr Nry not exactly that I should say rather that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in lawsuits and to speaking in public assemblies—not extended farther

Soc Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes?

Phaedr No more than of Nestor and Odysseus unless Gorgias is your Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus

Soc Perhaps that is my meaning But let us leave them And do you tell me instead what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court—are they not contending?

Phaedr Exactly so

Soc About the just and unjust—that is the matter in dispute?

Phaedr Yes

Soc And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just at another time if he is so inclined to be unjust?

Phaedr Exactly

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Soc Every one is aware that about some

tion the illustrious Parian, Evemus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the memory. But shall I "to dumb forgetfulness consign" Timas and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this: he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.

Phaedr. Well done, Prodicus!

Soc. Then there is Hippias the Elean stranger who probably agrees with him.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And there is also Polus, who has treasures of diallogology and gnomology and ekphrasy and who teaches in them the names of which Lycinus made him a present: they were to give a polish.

Phaedr. Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?

Soc. Yes, rules of correct diction and many other fine precepts for the "sorrows of a poor old man, or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant: he can put a whole company of people into a passion and out of one again by his mighty magic, and is first rate at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny on any grounds or none. All of them agree in asserting that a speech should end in a recapitulation, though they do not all agree to use the same word.

Phaedr. You mean that there should be a summing up of the arguments in order to remind the hearers of them.

Soc. I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?

Phaedr. Not much, nothing very important.

[268] *Soc.* Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really important question into the light of day: which is? What power has this art of rhetoric, and when?

Phaedr. A very great power in public meetings.

Soc. It has. But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians? To me there seem to be a great many holes in their web.

Phaedr. Give an example.

Soc. I will. Suppose a person to come to your

friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him: "I know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing: and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians by imparting this knowledge to others."—What do you suppose that they would say?

Phaedr. They would be sure to ask him whether he knew "to whom" he would give his medicines, and "when," and how much.

Soc. And suppose that he were to reply: "No, I know nothing of all that. I expect the patient who consults me to be able to do these things for himself."

Phaedr. They would say in reply that he is a madman or a pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on a prescription or two, although he has no real understanding of the art of medicine.

Soc. And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or Euripides and say that he knows how to make a very long speech about a small matter and a short speech about a great matter and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech, or any other kind of speech, and in teaching this fancies that he is teaching the art of tragedy—?

Phaedr. They too would surely laugh at him if he fancies that tragedy is anything but the arranging of these elements in a manner which will be suitable to one another and to the whole.

Soc. But I do not suppose that they would be rude or abusive to him. Would they not treat him as a musician would a man who thinks that he is a harmonist because he knows how to pitch the highest and the lowest notes, happening to meet such an one he would not say to him savagely: "Fool, you are mad!" But like a musician in a gentle and harmonious tone of voice, he would answer: "My good friend, he who would be a harmonist must certainly know this, and yet he may understand nothing of harmony if he has not got beyond your stage of knowledge, for you only know the preliminaries of harmony and not harmony itself."

Phaedr. Very true.

[269] *Soc.* And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would-be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would-be physician?

Phaedr. Quite true.

Soc. And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Peri-

rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech [265] which as I think is also suggestive to students of rhetoric.

Phaedr. In what way?

Soc. The two speeches as you may remember were unlike: the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted.

Phaedr. And right manfully.

Soc. You should rather say madly: and madness was the argument of them: for as I said, love is a madness.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And of madness there were two kinds: one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds: prophetic, imitative, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them: the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain.

Phaedr. I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.

Soc. Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise.

Phaedr. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one.

Phaedr. What are they?

Soc. First the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea, as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse: the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.

Phaedr. What is the other principle, Socrates?

Soc. The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is not breaking any part as a bad carver might. [266] Just as our two dis-

courses alike assumed first of all a single form of unreason, and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name—after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love, which he justly reviled, and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.

Phaedr. Most true.

Soc. I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization: they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see a One and Many in nature, him I follow and walk in his foot steps as if he were a god. And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians, but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise? Skillful speakers they are and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and win big gifts to them.

Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men, but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call and rightly in my opinion dialecticians. Still we are in the dark about rhetoric.

Soc. What do you mean? The remains of it, if there be anything remaining, which can be brought under rules of art, must be a fine thing, and at any rate is not to be despised by you and me. But how much is left?

Phaedr. There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?

Soc. Yes, thank you for reminding me.—There is the exordium, showing how the speech should begin, if I remember rightly, that is what you mean—the niceties of the art?

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Then follows the statement of facts and upon that witnesses, thirdly proofs, fourthly probabilities are to come, the great Byzantine word-maker also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.

Phaedr. You mean the excellent Theodorus.

[267] *Soc.* Yes, and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I ought also to men-

Phædr Exactly

Soc He will explain secondly the mode in which the acts or is acted upon

Phædr True.

Soc Thirdly having classified men and speeches and their kinds and assertions, and judged them to one another he will tell the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not

Phædr You have hit upon a very good way

Soc Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in speaking or writing. But the masters of the present day at whose feet you have sat, craftily conceal the nature of the soul which they know quite well. Nor until they adopt our method of reading and writing can we doubt that they rise by rules of art?

Phædr What is our method?

Soc I cannot give you the exact details but I should like to tell you generally as far as it in my power how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art

Phædr Let me hear

Soc Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes.—Such and such persons, he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way, and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, [22] and sees the person about whom he is speaking in the abstract actually before him and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion—*he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, seasonal effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned—when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of these powers*

whether in speaking or teaching or writing them and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says "I don't believe you" has the better of him. Well the teacher will say, is this, Phædrus and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric or am I to look for another?

Phædr He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another and yet the creation of such an art is not easy

Soc Very true and therefore let us consider this matter in every light and see whether we cannot find a shorter and easier road there is no use in taking a long rough round about way if there be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try and remember whether you have heard from Lyssias or any one else any thing which might be of service to us

Phædr If trying would avail then I might but at the moment I can think of nothing

Soc Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me

Phædr Certainly

Soc May not the wolf, as the proverb says, claim a hearing?

Phædr Do you say what can be said for him

Soc He will argue that there is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round, until you arrive at first principles for as I said at first, when the question is of justice and good or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has no need of rhetoric for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth but only about conviction and this is based on probability to which he who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts, if they are improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defence, and that always in speaking the orator should keep probability in view and say good bye to the truth [23] And the observance of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art

Phædr That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say Socrates. I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon this matter already with them this point is all important

Soc I dare say that you are familiar with Timon. Does he not derive probability to be that which the many think?

cles heard of these wonderful arts brachylogies and eikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavouring to draw into the light of day what would they say? Instead of losing temper and applying uncomplimentary epithets as you and I have been doing to the authors of such an imaginary art their superior wisdom would rather censure us as well as them. Have a little patience Phaedrus and Socrates they would say you should not be in such a passion with those who from some want of dialectical skill are unable to define the nature of rhetoric and consequently suppose that they have found the art in the preliminary conditions of it and when these have been taught by them to others fancy that the whole art of rhetoric has been taught by them but as to using the several instruments of the art effectively or making the composition a whole—an application of it such as this is they regard as an easy thing which their disciples may make for themselves.

Phaedr I quite admit Socrates that the art of rhetoric which these men teach and of which they write is such as you describe—there I agree with you. But I still want to know where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be acquired.

Soc The perfection which is required of the finished orator is or rather must be like the perfection of anything else partly given by nature but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge and practice you will be a distinguished speaker if you fall short in either of these you will be to that extent defective. But the art as far as there is an art of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias or Thrasymachus.

Phaedr In what direction then?

Soc I conceive Pericles to have been the most accomplished of rhetoricians.

Phaedr What of that?

Soc All the great arts require discussion and high speculation about the truths of nature [270] hence come loftiness of thought and completeness of execution. And this as I conceive was the quality which in addition to his natural gifts Pericles acquired from his intercourse with Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy and attained the knowledge of Mind and the negative of Mind which were favourite themes of Anaxagoras and applied what suited his purpose to the art of speaking.

Phaedr Explain.

Soc Rhetoric is like medicine.

Phaedr How so?

Soc Why because medicine has to define the nature of the body and rhetoric of the soul—if we would proceed not empirically but scientifically in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food in the other to implant the conviction or virtue which you desire by the right application of words and training.

Phaedr There Socrates I suspect that you are right.

Soc And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?

Phaedr Hippocrates the Asclepiad says that the nature even of the body can only be understood as a whole.

Soc Yes friend and he was right—still we ought not to be content with the name of Hippocrates but to examine and see whether his argument agrees with his conception of nature.

Phaedr I agree.

Soc Then consider what truth as well as Hippocrates says about this or about any other nature. Ought we not to consider first whether that which we wish to learn and to teach is a simple or multiform thing and if simple then to enquire what power it has of acting or being acted upon in relation to other things and if multiform then to number the forms and see first in the case of one of them and then in the case of all of them what is that power of acting or being acted upon which makes each and all of them to be what they are?

Phaedr You may very likely be right, Socrates.

Soc The method which proceeds without analysis is like the groping of a blind man. Yet surely he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison with the blind or deaf. The rhetorician who teaches his pupil to speak scientifically will particularly set forth the nature of that being to which he addresses his speech and this I conceive to be the soul.

Phaedr Certainly.

[271] *Soc* His whole effort is directed to the soul for in that he seeks to produce conviction.

Phaedr Yes.

Soc Then clearly Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest will give an exact description of the nature of the soul which will enable us to see whether she be single and same or like the body multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul.

Cf. Charmides 156

and they will not use their memories they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The poetic which you have discovered is an aid not to memory but to reminiscence, and you give your disc, is not truth, but only the semblance of truth they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing, they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing, they will be treasure company but in the show of wisdom without the reality.

Phaedr Yes Socrates, you can easily in Egypt, or of any other country.

Soc There is a tradition in the temple of Dodona that once first gave prophetic utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity to some pharaohs by deemed that if they heard the truth even from "cows or rocks," it was enough for them whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes.

Phaedr I acknowledged the justice of your rebuke and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.

Soc He would be a very simple person and quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who should leave in writing or recite in writing, any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain or who deemed that writing, as at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters?

Phaedr That is most true.

Soc I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus that writing is unfortunately like painting for the creations of the painter have the tint of life and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are dumb about anything more among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them and they cannot protect or defend themselves.

Phaedr That again is most true.

Soc Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, {26} and having far greater power—a son of the same family but lawfully begotten.

Phaedr Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?

Soc I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner which can defend itself and knows when to speak and when to be silent.

Phaedr You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?

Soc Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question? Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in some seriousness plant them during the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? at least he would do so if at all, only for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practices husbandry and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection?

Phaedr Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest he will do the other as you say only in play.

Soc And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding than the husbandman, about his own seeds?

Phaedr Certainly not.

Soc Then he will not seriously incline to write his thoughts "in water with pen and ink," sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to others?

Phaedr No, that is not likely.

Soc No that is not likely—in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement he will write them down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like this will be the pasture in which his days are spent.

Phaedr A pasture, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pasture of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily about justice and the like.

Soc True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them.

Phaedr Certainly he does

Soc I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort — He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other he is brought into court and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one the other should prove that they were alone and should argue thus How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him? The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system Am I not right *Phaedrus*?

Phaedr Certainly

Soc Bless me what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman in whatever name or country he rejoices has discovered Shall we say a word to him or not?

Phaedr What shall we say to him?

Soc Let us tell him that before he appeared you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him but if not we are satisfied with our own view that unless a man estimates the various characters of his hearers and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas he will never be a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of human power And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble which a good man ought to undergo not for the sake of speaking and acting before men but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him lies [274] for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves that a man of sense should not try to please his fellow servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters and therefore if the way is long and circuitous marvel not at this for where the end is great there we may take the longer road but not for lesser ends such as yours Truly the argument may say Tisias that if you do not mind going so far rhetoric has a fair beginning here

Phaedr I think Socrates that this is admirable if only practicable

Soc But even to fail in an honourable object is honourable

Phaedr True

Soc Enough appears to have been said by you of a true and false art of speaking

Phaedr Certainly

Soc But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing

Phaedr Yes

Soc Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?

Phaedr No indeed Do you?

Soc I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know although if we had found the truth ourselves do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men?

Phaedr Your question needs no answer but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard

Soc At the Egyptian city of Naukratis there was a famous old god whose name was Theuth the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice but his great discovery was the use of letters Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes and the god himself is called by them Ammon To him came Theuth and showed his inventions desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them he enumerated them and Thamus enquired about their several uses and praised some of them and censured others as he approved or disapproved of them It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts But when they came to letters This said Theuth will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit Thamus replied O most ingenious Theuth the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or injury of his own inventions to the users of them [275] And in this instance you who are the father of letters from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners souls be

cause they will not use their memories they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The spectacles which you have discovered in an aid not to memory but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth they will be hearers of many things and will be a learned nation; they will pretend to be omniscient and in general know nothing—they will be unwise every day to the ruin of wisdom without the truth.

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily make slaves of Egypt, or of any other country.

Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oak first gave prophetic utterances. The men and women in that sanctuary were phoebic; it seemed that if they heard a truth even in the darkness, it was enough for them whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but 'tis the maker is and from what country the talismen.

Phaedr. I cannot tell, it is justice of your rebuke, and I think was the Theban right in his view about letters.

Soc. He would be a very smart person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus of Ammon, who would let a man write, or recite in writing, any art under the idea that the written word would be a final guide or certain, or who seemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters?

Phaedr. That is most true.

Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is a most wretchedly like painting for the citizens of the nation have the semblance of knowledge and yet if you ask them a question they possess a so-called science. And the same may be said of poetry. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know something and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unanswerable answer. And when they have been once written down they are dumb of about as these among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply to whom not and, if they are mistreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them, and they cannot protect or defend themselves.

Phaedr. That again is most true.

Soc. Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, [26] and having far greater power—a son of the same family but lawfully begotten

Phaedr. Whom do you mean, and what is his or gin?

Soc. I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner which can defend itself and knows when to speak and when to be silent.

Phaedr. You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?

Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question? Would a husbandman who is a man of sense, use the seeds which he sows and which he wishes to bear fruit and in every serious circumstance plant them during the heat of summer in some garden or house, that he may see them when he sees them in the ways of the world, or in the city at least he would do so, if only for the sake of amusement and pleasure. But when he is in earnest he sows in the soil and sows wisely and carefully and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection?

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest he will do the other as you say only in play.

Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and true, he has any understanding, than the husbandman about his own seeds?

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to "write" his thoughts in a letter with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth away from to others.

Phaedr. No, that is not likely.

Soc. No, that is not likely—in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement. He will write them down as memorials to be consulted in the old troubles of old age, by himself or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth and when others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like this will be the pasture in which his days are spent.

Phaedr. A pasture, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pasture of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse manfully about justice and the like.

Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a common soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them,

Phaedr Certainly he does

Soc I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort — He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other he is brought into court and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one the other should prove that they were alone and should argue thus How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him? The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system Am I not right *Phaedrus*?

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Phaedr Your question needs no answer but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard

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Phædr Certainly

Soc Now go and tell this to your companion

Phædr But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten

Soc Who is he?

[219] *Phædr* Isocrates the fair —What message will you send to him and how shall we describe him?

Soc Isocrates is still young Phædrus but I am willing to hazard a prophecy concerning him.

Phædr What would you prophesy?

Soc I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias and that his character is cast in a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvellously improve as he grows older and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric but that there is in him a divine inspiration which will lead him to things higher still. For

he has an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message of the gods dwelling in this place and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates who is my delight and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours.

Phædr I will and now as the heat is abated let us depart.

Soc Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?

Phædr By all means.

Soc Beloved I am and all ye other gods who haunt this place give me beauty in the inward soul and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry. —Anything more? The prayer I think is enough for me.

Phædr Ask the same for me for friends should have all things in common.

Soc Let us go.

[277] and are not unfruitful but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness

Phaedr Far nobler certainly

Soc And now, Phaedrus having agreed up on the premises we decide about the conclusion

Phaedr About what conclusion?

Soc About Lysias whom we censured and his art of writing and his discourses and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them—these are the questions which we sought to determine and they brought us to this point And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite

Phaedr Yes I think with you but I wish that you would repeat what was said

Soc Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature and the complex and composite to the more complex nature—until he has accomplished all this he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art either for the purpose of teaching or persuading—such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument

Phaedr Yes that was our view certainly

Soc Secondly as to the censure which was passed on the speaking or writing of discourses and how they might be rightly or wrongly censured—did not our previous argument show—?

Phaedr Show what?

Soc That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be whether private man or statesman proposes laws and so becomes the author of a political treatise fancying that there is any great certainty and clearness in his performance the fact of his so writing is only a disgrace to him whatever men may say For not to know the nature of justice and injustice and good and evil and not to be able to distinguish the dream from the reality cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him even though he have the applause of the whole world

Phaedr Certainly

Soc But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written is of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, [278] they are only recited in order to be believed and not with any view to criticism or instruction and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we know and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul which is the true way of writing is there clearness and perfection and seriousness and that such principles are a man's own and his legitimate offspring—being in the first place the word which he finds in his own bosom secondly the brethren and descendants and relations of his others—and who cares for them and no others—this is the right sort of man and you and I *Phaedrus* would pray that we may become like him

Phaedr That is most assuredly my desire and prayer

Soc And now the play is played out and of rhetoric enough Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches—to Homer and other writers of poems whether set to music or not and to Solon and others who have composed writings in the form of political discourses which they would term laws—to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth and they can defend or prove them when they are put to the test by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them then they are to be called not only poets orators legislators but are worthy of a higher name befitting the serious pursuit of their life

Phaedr What name would you assign to them?

Soc Wise I may not call them for that is a great name which belongs to God alone—lovers of wisdom or philosophers in their modest and befitting title

Phaedr Very suitable

Soc And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions which he has been long putting and piecing adding some and taking away some may be justly called poet or speechmaker or law maker

Soc. But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only and not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad skilful and unskilful and of the gods conversing with one another and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?

Ion Very true Socrates

Soc. And do not the other poets sing of the same?

Ion Yes, Socrates but not in the same way as Homer

Soc. What, in a worse way?

Ion Yes, in a far worse

Soc. And Homer in a better way?

Ion He is incomparably better

Soc. And yet surely my dear friend Ion in a discussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking and one speaks better than the rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good speaker?

Ion Yes

Soc. And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?

Ion The same

Soc. And he will be the arithmetician?

Ion Yes

Soc. Well and in discussions about the wholeness of food, when many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him who recognizes the worse or the same?

Ion Clearly the same

Soc. And who is he, and what is his name?

Ion The physician

Soc. And speaking generally in all discussions in which the subject is the same and many men are speaking, will not he who knows the good know the bad speaker also? [532] For if he does not know the bad, neither will he know the good when the same topic is being discussed

Ion True

Soc. Is not the same person skilful in both?

Ion Yes

Soc. And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same way but the one speaks well and the other not so well?

Ion Yes and I am right in saying so

Soc. And if you knew the good speaker you would also know the inferior speakers who be inferior?

Ion That is true

Soc. Then my dear friend can I be mistaken in saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself acknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those who speak of the same things and that almost all poets do speak of the same things?

Ion Why then Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep and have absolutely no ideas of the least value, when any one speaks of any other poet but when Homer is mentioned I wake up at once and am all attention and have plenty to say?

Soc. The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail to see that you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets for poetry is a whole

Ion Yes

Soc. And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?

Ion Yes, indeed Socrates I very much wish that you would for I love to hear you wise men talk

Soc. O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so but you rhapsodes and actors and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For consider what a very commonplace and trivial thing it is this which I have said—a thing which any man might say that when a man has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let us consider this matter is not the art of painting a whole?

Ion Yes

Soc. And there are and have been many painters good and bad?

Ion Yes

Soc. And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but incapable of criticizing other painters [533] and when the work of any other painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the painter might be and about him only woke up

ION

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES, ION



[530] *Socrates* WELCOME, ION. Are you from your native city of Ephesus?

Ion No, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival of Asclepius.

Soc And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?

Ion O yes, and of all sorts of musical performers.

Soc And were you one of the competitors—and did you succeed?

Ion I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.

Soc Well done, and I hope that you will do the same for us at the Panathenaea.

Ion And I will, please heaven.

Soc I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, ION, for you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can, as a part of your art. Then again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets, and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them, and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote—a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be envied.

Ion Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art, and I believe myself able to speak about Homer better than any man, and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucón, nor any one else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.

Soc I am glad to hear you say so, ION. I see that you will not refuse to acquaint me with them.

Ion Certainly, Socrates, and you really ought to hear how exquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown.

Soc I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments of him at some other time [531]. But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only?

Ion To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough.

Soc Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?

Ion Yes, in my opinion there are a good many.

Soc And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?

Ion I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.

Soc But what about matters in which they do not agree?—for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have some thing to say—

Ion Very true.

Soc Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when they disagree?

Ion A prophet.

Soc And if you were a prophet, would you be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?

Ion Clearly.

Ion There again you are right

Soc Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion Precisely

Soc I wish you would frankly tell me Ion what I am going to ask of you. When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the door recognized by the suitors and cast in his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam—are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are speaking whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or where ever may be the scene of the poem?

Ion That proof strikes home to me Socrates. For I must frankly confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.

Soc Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival when he is dressed in holiday attire and has golden crowns upon his head of which nobody has robbed him, appears steeped in panic stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him—is he in his right mind or is he not?

Ion No indeed Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not in his right mind.

Soc And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most spectators?

Ion Only too well for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity wonder sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking, and I am obliged to give my every best attention to them for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment arrives.

Soc Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which as I am saying receive the power of the original magnet from one another? Thehapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links (536) and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these the Gods pass the souls of men in any direction which He pleases, and makes one man haughty and another lowly. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers and masters and undermasters of choruses, who are suspended as it from the stone at the side of the rings which hang down

from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse from whom he is suspended and by whom he is said to be possessed. Such is nearly the same thing, for he is taken hold of and from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one and are possessed by Homer and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep and know not what to say but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say but by divine inspiration and by possession just as the Corybantian revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed and have plenty of dances and words for that but take no heed of any other and you Ion when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say and have nothing to say of others. You ask Why is this? The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration.

Ion That is good, Socrates, and yet I doubt whether you will ever be eloquent enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure you would never think this to be the case.

Soc I should like very much to hear you but not until you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you speak well?—not surely about every part.

Ion There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well of that I can assure you.

Soc Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?

Ion And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?

Soc Why does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? For example, [537] about dining, if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them.

Ion I remember and will repeat them.

Soc Tell me then what Nestor says to Antiochus, his son here he bids him be careful of the turn at the horse race in honour of Patroclus.

Ion He says

But I will repeat the passage which he says to the Isthmian athletes during the night when they sleep and such as these: I do when I wear such good leather shoes I am careful

and was attentive and had plenty to say?

Ion No indeed I have never known such a person

Soc Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture who was skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion or of Epeius the son of Panopeus or of Theodorus the Samian or of any individual sculptor but when the works of sculptors in general were produced was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?

Ion No indeed no more than the other

Soc And if I am not mistaken you never met with any one among flute players or harp-players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyris or Orpheus or Phemius the rhapsode of Ithaca but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of Ephesus and had no notion of his merits or defects?

Ion I cannot deny what you say Socrates Nevertheless I am conscious in my own self and the world agrees with me in thinking that I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other man But I do not speak equally well about others—tell me the reason of this

Soc I perceive Ion and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be the reason of this The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art but as I was just saying an inspiration there is a divinity moving you like that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea This stone not only attracts iron rings but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended who take the inspiration For all good poets epic as well as lyric compose their beautiful poems not by art but because they are inspired and possessed And as the Corymbantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind [534] so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the in-

fluence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind And the soul of the lyric poet does the same as they themselves say for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses they like the bees winging their way from flower to flower And this is true For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses and the mind is no longer in him when he has not attained to this state he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles

Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men but like yourself when speaking about Homer they do not speak of them by any rules of art they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them and that only and when inspired one of them will make dithyrambs another hymns of praise another choral strains another epic or iambic verses—and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse for not by art does the poet sing but by power divine Had he learned by rules of art he would have known how to speak not of one theme only but of all and therefore God takes away the minds of poets and uses them as his ministers as he also uses diviners and holy prophets in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness but that God himself is the speaker and that through them he is conversing with us And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean which is in every one's mouth one of the finest poems ever written simply an invention of the Muses as he himself says For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human or the work of man but divine and the work of God and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of [535] songs? Am I not right Ion?

Ion Yes indeed Socrates I feel that you are for your words touch my soul and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us

Soc And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?

it is as if he carried him on the breast by the neck and he in turn let his full foot fall on him to the ground in the midst of the multitude and the eagle that cry was borne from the wings of the wind

These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine.

Ion And you are quite right, Socrates in saying so

Soc Yes, Ion and you are right also. And as I have selected from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.

Ion All passages I should say, Socrates.

Soc Not all, Ion, surely. Hasn't he you already for often what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.

[540] Ion Why what am I forgetting?

Soc Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?

Ion Yes, I remember.

Soc And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?

Ion Yes.

Soc Then upon your own showing, the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?

Ion I should exclude certain things, Socrates.

Soc You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them which of them will he know?

Ion He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say and what a ruler and what a subject.

Soc Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?

Ion No, the pilot will know best.

Soc O, will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?

Ion He will not.

Soc But he will know what a slave ought to say?

Ion Yes.

Soc Suppose the slave to be a cowherd, the

rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows?

Ion No, he will not.

Soc But he will know what a spinning woman ought to say about the working of wool?

Ion No.

Soc At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?

Ion Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be sure to know.

Soc Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?

Ion I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.

Soc Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsody, and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre, and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you by the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre—what would you answer?

Ion I should reply by my skill as a horseman.

Soc And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman?

Ion Yes.

Soc And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode?

Ion To me there appears to be no difference between them.

[541] Soc What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?

Ion Yes, one and the same.

Soc Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion Certainly, Socrates.

Soc And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?

Ion No, I do not say that.

Soc But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general.

Ion Certainly.

Soc And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?

Ion For the best, Socrates.

Soc And are you the best general, Ion?

Ion To be sure, Socrates, and Homer was my master.

so that the nave of the well wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity and avoid catching the stone

Soc Enough Now *Ion* will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion The charioteer clearly

Soc And will the reason be that this is his art or will there be any other reason?

Ion No that will be the reason

Soc And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a certain work for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine?

Ion Certainly not

Soc Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?

Ion Certainly not

Soc And this is true of all the arts—that which we know with one art we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior question You admit that there are differences of arts?

Ion Yes

Soc You would argue as I should that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another they are different?

Ion Yes

Soc Yes surely for if the subject of knowledge were the same there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different—if they both gave the same knowledge For example I know that here are five fingers and you know the same And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic you would acknowledge that we did?

Ion Yes

[538] *Soc* Tell me then what I was intending to ask you—whether this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge and different arts other subjects of knowledge?

Ion That is my opinion *Socrates*

Soc Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?

Ion Very true

Soc Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were reciting from Homer you or the charioteer?

Ion The charioteer

Soc Why yes because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer

Ion Yes

Soc And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion Yes

Soc And if a different knowledge then a knowledge of different matters?

Ion True

Soc You know the passage in which *Hecamede* the concubine of *Nestor* is described as giving to the wounded *Machaon* a posset, as he says

And with Pramnian wine and she grated cheese of goat's milk with a grater of bronze and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish to drink

Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion The art of medicine

Soc And when *Homer* says

And she descended into the deep like a leaven plummet which set in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields rushes along carrying death among the venomous fishes—

will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?

Ion Clearly *Socrates* the art of the fisherman

Soc Come now suppose that you were to say to me Since you *Socrates* are able to assign different passages in *Homer* to their corresponding arts I wish that you would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you For there are many such passages particularly in the *Odyssey* as for example the passage in which *Theoclymenus* the prophet of the house of *Melampus* says to the suitors—

[539] *Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night and the voice of lamentation bursts forth and your cheeks are wet with tears And the vestibule is full and the court is full of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus and the sun has perished out of heaven and an evil mist is spread abroad*

And there are many such passages in the *Iliad* also as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart where he says—

As they were eager to pass the ditch there came to them an omen a soaring eagle holding back the people on the left bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons still living and panting nor had he yet reigned the strife for he bent back and smote

SYMPOSIUM

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE APOLLODORUS who repeats to his companion the dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus and had already once narrated to Glaucon
PHAEDRUS PALSAMAS ERXIMACHUS ARISTOPHANES AGATHON SOCRATES ALCEBIADES
A TROOP OF FENCIBLES. Scene The House of Agathon



[172] CONCERNING the things about which you ask, to be informed I believe that I am not ill prepared with an answer. For the day before yesterday I was coming from my own home at Phalerum to the city, and one of my acquaintances who had caught a sight of me from behind calling out playfully in the distance said, Apollodorus O thou Phalerian man halt! So I did as I was bidden, and then he said I was looking for you, Apollodorus, only just now that I might ask you about the speeches in praise of love which were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades, and others at Agathon's supper. Phoenix, the son of Philop, told another person who told me of them, his narrative was very interesting, but he said that you knew, and I wish that you would give me an account of them. Which of you, should be the reporter of the words for us to end? And first tell me he said were you present at this meeting?

Your informant, Glaucon I said, must have been very indistinct indeed if you imagine that the occasion was recent, or that I could have been one of the party.

Why, says he replied, I thought so.

Impossible, I said. Are you ignorant that for many years Agathon has not resided at Athens, and that three have elapsed since I became acquainted with Socrates, and have made it my daily business to know all that he says and does [173] There is as a time when I was running

Probably a play fellows, & a bald headed.

ning about the world, fancying myself to be well employed, but I was really a most wretched being, no better than you are now. I thought that I ought to do anything, rather than be a philosopher.

Well, he said, jesting apart, tell me when the meeting occurred.

In our boyhood, I replied, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy on the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory.

Then it must have been a long while ago, he said, and who told you—did Socrates?

No indeed, I replied, but the same person who told Phoenix—he was a little fellow, who never wore any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum. He had been at Agathon's feast, and I think that in those days there was no one who was a more devoted admirer of Socrates. Moreover I have asked Socrates about the truth of some parts of his narrative, and he confirmed them. Then said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again, is not the road to Athens just made for conversation? And so we walked and talked of the discourses on love, and therefore as I said at first I am not ill prepared to comply with your request, and will have another rehearsal of them if you like. For to speak or to hear others speak of philosophy always gives me the greatest pleasure, to say nothing of the profit. But when I hear an other strain, especially that of you rich men and traders, such conversation displeases me.

Soc But then Ion what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown and do not want a general?

Ion Why Socrates the reason is that my countrymen the Ephesians are the servants and soldiers of Athens and do not need a general and you and Sparta are not likely to have me for you think that you have enough generals of your own

Soc My good Ion did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion Who may he be?

Soc One who though a foreigner has often been chosen their general by the Athenians and there ■ Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices although aliens after they had shown their merit And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general and honour him if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians and Ephesus is no mean city? But indeed Ion if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you

are able to praise Homer you do not deal fairly with me and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer and promises that you would exhibit them you are only a deceiver and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master will not even after my repeated entreaties explain to me the nature of it You have literally as many forms as Proteus and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning and like Proteus become all manner of people at once and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general [542] in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore And if you have art then as I was saying in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer you are not dealing fairly with me But if as I believe you have no art but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence then I acquit you of dishonesty and shall only say that you are inspired Which do you prefer to be thought dishonest or inspired?

Ion There ■ a great difference Socrates between the two alternatives and inspiration is by far the nobler

Soc Then Ion I shall assume the nobler alternative and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration and not art

there is no one to give you orders hitherto I have never left you in yourself. But on this occasion imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and the company are your guests: treat us well, and then we shall commend you." After this, supper was served but still no Socrates, and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected, and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him; that I may touch you," he said, and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession: for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought."

How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was desired, that that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller into the emptier man, as water runs through a hole out of a fuller cup into an emptier one: if that were so how greatly should I value the privilege of reclining at your side! For you would have filled me full with a stream of wisdom plenteous and fair: whereas my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream. But yours is bright and full of promise, and was manifested forth in all the splendour of youth the day before yesterday in the presence of more than thirty thousand Melænes.

You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you and I will have to determine who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge: but at present you are better occupied with supper.

[1-6] Socrates took his place on the couch and supped with the rest, and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said: And now my friends, how can we drink without injury to ourselves? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover, and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drink be made easy?

I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all means, avoid hard drinking: for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drunk in drink.

I think that you are right, said Eryximachus,

the son of Acumenus: but I should still like to hear one other person speak. Is Agathon able to drink hard?

I am not equal to it, said Agathon.

Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are fortunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink or to abstain, and will not mind, whichever we do.) Well, as none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad practice, which I never follow if I can help, and certainly do not recommend to another: least of all to any one who will feel the effects of yesterday's carouse.

I always do what you advise, and especially what you prescribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same.

It was agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day, but that they were all to drink only so much as they pleased.

Then said Eryximachus, as you are all agreed that drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion, I move in the next place, that the flute-girl who has just made her appearance, be told to go away and play to herself or to the likes, in the women who are within. To-day let us have conversation instead: and, [177] if you will allow me, I will tell you what sort of conversation. This proposal having been accepted, Eryximachus proceeded as follows:—

I will begin, he said, after the manner of Melanippe in Euripides,

Not in this word

which I am about to speak, but that of Phaedrus. For often he says to me in an indignant tone:— "What a strange thing it is, Eryximachus, that, whereas other gods have poems and hymns made in their honour, the great and glorious god Love, has no encomiast among all the poets who are so many. There are the worthy sophists too—the excellent Prodicus for example, who have decanted in prose on the virtues of Heracles and other heroes, and what is still more extraordinary, I have met with a philosophical work in which the utility of salt has been made the theme of an eloquent discourse, and many other like things have had a like honour bestowed upon them. And only to think that there should have been an eger

and I pity you who are my companions because you think that you are doing something when in reality you are doing nothing. And I dare say that you pity me in return whom you regard as an unhappy creature and very probably you are right. But I certainly know of you what you only think of me—there is the difference.

Companion I see Apollodorus that you are just the same—always speaking evil of yourself and of others and I do believe that you pity all mankind with the exception of Socrates your self first of all true in this to your old name which however deserved I know not how you acquired, of Apollodorus the madman for you are always raging against yourself and every body but Socrates.

Apollodorus Yes friend and the reason why I am said to be mad and out of my wits is just because I have these notions of myself and you no other evidence is required.

Com No more of that Apollodorus but let me renew my request that you would repeat the conversation.

Apoll Well the tale of love was on this wise—But perhaps I had better begin at the beginning [174] and endeavour to give you the exact words of Aristodemus.

He said that he met Socrates fresh from the bath and sandalled and as the sight of the sandals was unusual he asked him whither he was going that he had been converted into such a beau—

To a banquet at Agathon he replied whose invitation to his sacrifice of victory I refused yesterday fearing a crowd but promising that I would come to-day instead and so I have put on my finery because he is such a fine man. What say you to going with me unasked?

I will do as you bid me I replied.

Follow then he said and let us demolish the proverb.

To the feasts of inferior men the good unbidden go
instead of which our proverb will run—

To the feasts of the good the good unbidden go

and this alteration may be supported by the authority of Homer himself who not only demolishes but literally outrages the proverb. For after picturing Agamemnon as the most valiant of men he makes Menelaus who is but a faint hearted warrior come unbidden to the banquet of Agamemnon who is feasting and offering sacrifices not the better to the worse but the worse to the better.

I rather fear Socrates said Aristodemus lest this may still be my case and that like Menelaus in Homer I shall be the inferior person, who

To the feasts of the wise unbidden goes

But I shall say that I was bidden of you and then you will have to make an excuse.

Two going together

he replied in Homeric fashion one or other of them may invent an excuse by the way.

This was the style of their conversation as they went along Socrates dropped behind in a fit of abstraction and desired Aristodemus who was waiting to go on before him. When he reached the house of Agathon he found the doors wide open and a comical thing happened. A servant coming out met him and led him at once into the banquet hall in which the guests were reclining for the banquet was about to begin. Welcome Aristodemus said Agathon as soon as he appeared—you are just in time to sup with us if you come on any other matter put it off and make one of us as I was looking for you yesterday and meant to have asked you if I could have found you. But what have you done with Socrates?

I turned round but Socrates was nowhere to be seen and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before and that I came by his invitation to the supper.

You were quite right in coming said Agathon but where is he himself?

[175] He was behind me just now as I entered he said and I cannot think what has become of him.

Go and look for him boy said Agathon and bring him in and do you Aristodemus meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.

The servant then assisted him to wash and he lay down and presently another servant came in and reported that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighbouring house. There he is fixed said he and when I call to him he will not stir.

How strange said Agathon then you must call him again and keep calling him.

Let him alone said my informant he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason I believe that he will soon appear do not therefore disturb him.

Well if you think so I will leave him said Agathon. And then turning to the servants, he added Let us have supper without waiting for him. Serve up whatever you please, for

to e But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper they sent empty a 23 and presented to him an apparition only of her whom he sought, but herself they could not give up, because he showed no spirit: he was only a harp-player and did not dare like Alceus to die for love but was contriving how he might enter Hades alive or so: or they afterwards caused him to suffer death at the hands of women as the punishment of his cowardliness. Very different as the reward of the true love of Achilles towards his lover Patroclus—his lover and not his love (the notion that Patroclus was the beloved one is a foolish error into which Aeschylus has fallen, for Achilles was surely the fairer of the two, fairer also than all the other heroes and as Homer informs us, he was still beardless and younger far) [180] And greatly as the gods honour the virtue of love still the return of love on the part of the beloved to the lover is more admired and valued and rewarded by them for the lover is more divine because he is inspired by God. Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by his mother that he might avoid death and return home and live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. Nevertheless he gave his life to rescue his friend and dared to die not only in his defence, but after he was dead. Wherefore the gods honoured him: he enabled Alceus, and sent him to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirming that Love is the eldest and noblest and mightiest of the gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue in life and of happiness after death.

This, or something like this, as the speech of Phaedrus and some other speeches followed which Aristodemus did not remember the next which he repeated was that of Pausanias. Phaedrus, he said the argument has not been set before me. I think, quite in the right form—we should not be called upon to praise Love in such an indiscriminate manner. If there were only one Love then what you said would be well enough but since there are more Loves than one, you should have begun by determining which of them was to be the theme of our praises. I will amend this defect and first of all I will tell you which Love is deserving of praise, and then try to hymn the praise-worthy one in a manner worthy of him. For we all know that Love is inseparable from Aphrodite and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves.

And am I not right in asserting that there

are two goddesses? The elder one, having no mother who is called the heavenly Aphrodite—she is the daughter of Uranus the younger who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione—her we call common and the Love who is her fellow worker is rightly named common as the other love is called heavenly. All the gods ought to have praise given to them, but not without distinction of their natures and therefore I must try to distinguish the characters of the two Loves. No actions vary according to the manner of their performance [181] Take for example that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil but they turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them and if well done they are good and when wrongly done they are evil and in like manner not every love but only that which has a noble purpose is noble and worthy of praise. The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common and has no discrimination being such as the meaner sort of men feel and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul—the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly and therefore does good and evil quite indiscriminately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger than the other and she was born of the union of the male and female, and partakes of both.

But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part—she is from the male only this is that love which is of youths, and the goddess being elder there is nothing of youthfulness in her. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature any one may recognise the pure enthusiasts in the very character of their attachments. For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is beginning to be eloped much about the time at which their beards begin to grow. And in choosing young men to be their companions they mean to be faithful to them and pass their whole life in company with them not to take them in their inexperience and deceive them, and play the fool with them or run away from one to another of them. But the love of young boys should be forbidden by law because their future is uncertain they may turn out good or bad, either in body or soul and much noble enthusiasm may be thrown away upon them.

interest created about them and yet that to this day no one has ever dared worthily to hymn Love's praises! So entirely has this great deity been neglected. Now in this Phaedrus seems to me to be quite right and therefore I want to offer him a contribution also. I think that at the present moment we who are here assembled cannot do better than honour the god Love. If you agree with me there will be no lack of conversation for I mean to propose that each of us in turn going from left to right shall make a speech in honour of Love. Let him give us the best which he can and Phaedrus because he is sitting first on the left hand and because he is the father of the thought shall begin.

No one will vote against you Eryximachus said Socrates. How can I oppose your motion who profess to understand nothing but matters of love nor I presume will Agathon and Pausanias and there can be no doubt of Aristophanes whose whole concern is with Dionysus and Aphrodite nor will any one disagree of those whom I see around me. The proposal as I am aware may seem rather hard upon us whose place is last but we shall be contented if we hear some good speeches first. Let Phaedrus begin the praise of Love and good luck to him. All the company expressed their assent [178] and desired him to do as Socrates bade him.

Aristodemus did not recollect all that was said nor do I recollect all that he related to me but I will tell you what I thought most worthy of remembrance and what the chief speakers said.

Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty god and wonderful among gods and men but especially wonderful in his birth. For he is the eldest of the gods which is in honour to him and a proof of his claim to this honour is that of his parents there is no memorial neither poet nor prose writer has ever affirmed that he had any. As Hesiod says

*First Chaos came and then broad bosomed Earth
The everlasting seat of all that is
And Love*

In other words after Chaos the Earth and Love these two came into being. Also Parmenides sings of Generation

First in the train of gods he fashioned Love

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the witnesses who acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the gods. And not only is he the eldest he is also the source of the great

est benefits to us. For I know not any greater blessing to a young man who is beginning life than a virtuous lover or to the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would nobly live—that principle, I say neither kindred nor honour nor wealth nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I speaking? Of the sense of honour and dishonour without which neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work. And I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonourable act or submitting through cowardice when any dishonour is done to him by another will be more pained at being detected by his beloved than at being seen by his father or by his companions or by any one else. The beloved too when he is found in any disgraceful situation has the same feeling about his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves they would be the very best governors of their own city abstaining from all dishonour and emulating one another in honour [179] and when fighting at each other's side although a mere handful they would overcome the world. For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? The veriest coward would become an inspired hero equal to the bravest at such a time. Love would inspire him. That courage which as Homer says the god breathes into the souls of some heroes, Love of his own nature infuses into the lover.

Love will make men dare to die for their beloved—love alone and women as well as men. Of this Alcestis the daughter of Pelias is a monument to all Hellas for she was willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband when no one else would although he had a father and mother but the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs that she made them seem to be strangers in blood as their own son and in name only related to him and so noble did this action of hers appear to the gods as well as to men that among the many who have done virtuously she is one of the very few to whom in admiration of her noble action they have granted the privilege of returning alive to earth such exceeding honour is paid by the gods to the devotion and virtue of

ing both the lover and beloved in contests and trials, until they show to which of the two classes they respectively belong. And this is the reason why in the first place, a hasty attachment is held to be dishonourable, because time is the true test of this as of most other things; and secondly there is a dishonour in being overcome by the love of money or of wealth, or of political power, whether a man is seduced into surrender by the loss of them or having experienced the benefits of money and political corruption, is unable to rise above the seductions of them. For none of these things are of a permanent or lasting nature: not to mention that no generous friendship ever sprang from them. There remains, then, only one way of honourable attachment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way of virtue: for as we admitted that any service which the lover does to him is not to be accounted flattery or a dishonour to himself, so the beloved has one way only of voluntary service which is not dishonourable, and this is virtuous service.

For we have a custom, and according to our custom any one who does service to another under the idea that he will be improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular of virtue—such a voluntary service, I say, is not to be regarded as a dishonour and is not open to the charge of flattery. And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in one, and then the beloved may honourably indulge the lover. For when the lover and beloved come together having each of them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he can to his gracious loving one, and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good, the one capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire them with a view to education and wisdom: when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and then only, may the beloved yield with honour to the lover. Now when love is of this distinguished sort—there any disgrace in being deceived but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, [185] and disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor is disgraced all the same: for he has done his best to show that he would give himself up to any one who “uses base” for the sake of money: but this is not honourable. And on the

same principle he who gives himself to a lover because he is a good man, and in the hope that he will be improved by his company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his affection turn out to be a villain and to have no virtue: and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error: for he has proved that for his part he will do anything for any body with a view to virtue and improvement than which there can be nothing nobler. Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly and of great price in individuals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves are the offspring of the other who is the common goddess. To you, I hail, I offer this my contribution in praise of love, which is as good as I could make extempore.

Pausanias came to a pause—this is the balanced way in which I have been taught by the wise to speak: and Aristodemus said that the turn of Aristophanes was next, but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough and was obliged to change turns with Eryximachus the physician, who was reclining on the couch below him. Eryximachus, he said, you ought either to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my turn until I have left off.

I will do both, said Eryximachus. I will speak in your turn and do you speak in mine and while I am speaking let me recommend you to hold your breath and if after you have done so for some time the hiccough is no better, then gargle with a little water: and if it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze: and if you sneeze once or twice, even the most violent hiccough is sure to go. I will do as you prescribe, said Aristophanes, and now get on.

Eryximachus spoke as follows. Seeing that Pausanias made a fair beginning [186] and but a lame ending, I must endeavour to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distinguished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me that the double love is not merely an affection of the soul of man towards the fair or towards anything, but is to be found in the bodies of all animals and in productions of the earth, and I may say in all that is such is the conclusion which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, whence I learn how great and wonderful and universal is the duty of love, whose empire extends over all

in this matter the good are a law to themselves and the coarser sort of lovers ought to be restrained by force as we restrain or attempt to restrain them from fixing their affections on women of free birth [182] These are the persons who bring a reproach on love and some have been led to deny the lawfulness of such attachments because they see the impropriety and evil of them for surely nothing that is decorously and lawfully done can justly be censured

Now here and in Lacedaemon the rules about love are perplexing but in most cities they are simple and easily intelligible in Elis and Boeotia and in countries having no gifts of eloquence they are very straightforward the law is simply in favour of these connexions and no one whether young or old has anything to say to their discredit the reason being as I suppose that they are men of few words in those parts and therefore the lovers do not like the trouble of pleading their suit In Ionia and other places and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians the custom is held to be dishonourable loves of youths share the evil repute in which philosophy and gymnastics are held because they are inimical to tyranny for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them which love above all other motives is likely to inspire as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power And therefore the ill repute into which these attachments have fallen is to be ascribed to the evil condition or those who make them to be ill reputed that is to say to the self seeking of the governors and the cowardice of the governed on the other hand the indiscriminate honour which is given to them in some countries is attributable to the laziness of those who hold this opinion of them In our own country a far better principle prevails but as I was saying the explanation of it is rather perplexing For observe that open loves are held to be more honourable than secret ones and that the love of the noblest and highest even if their persons are less beautiful than others is especially honourable

Consider too how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the lover neither is he supposed to be doing anything dishonourable but if he succeeds he is praised and if he fail he is blamed And in the pursuit

of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many strange things which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any motive of interest [183] or wish for office or power He may pray and entreat, and supplicate and swear and lie on a mat at the door and endure a slavery worse than that of an slave—in any other case friends and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish him and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery the actions of a lover have a grace which ennoble them and custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that there is no loss of character in them and what is strangest of all he only may swear and forswear himself (so men say) and the gods will forgive his transgression for there is no such thing as a lover's oath Such is the entire liberty which gods and men have allowed the lover according to the custom which prevails in our part of the world From this point of view a man fairly argues that in Athens to love and to be loved is held to be a very nonhonourable thing But when parents forbid their sons to talk with their lovers and place them under a tutor's care, who is appointed to see to these things and their companions and equals cast in their teeth anything of the sort which they may observe, and their elders refuse to silence the reprovers and do not rebuke them—any one who reflects on all this will on the contrary think that we hold these practices to be most disgraceful But as I was saying at first the truth as I imagine is that whether such practices are honourable or whether they are dishonourable is not a simple question they are honourable to him who follows them honourably dishonourable to him who follows them dishonourably There is dishonour in yielding to the evil or in an evil manner but there is honour in yielding to the good or in an honourable manner

Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul inasmuch as he is not even stable because he loves a thing which is in itself unstable and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over he takes wing and flies away in spite of all his words and promises whereas the love of the noble disposition is life long for it becomes one with the everlasting The custom of our country would have both of them proven well and truly [184] and would have us yield to the one sort of lover and avoid the other and therefore encourages some to pursue, and others to fly test

is the peacemaker of gods and men working by a knowledge of the religious and irreligious tendencies which exist in human souls. Such is the great and mighty or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And the love more especially which is concerned with the good and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power and is the source of all our happiness and harmony and makes us friends with the gods who are above us and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation for I perceive that you are rid of the hiccuph [189] Yes said Aristophanes, the hiccuph is gone not however until I applied the sweetening and I wonder whether the harmony of the body has a lot of such uses and ticklings for I no sooner applied the sweetening than I was cured.

Eryx machus said: Be ye friend Aristophanes, although you are going to speak, you are making fun of me and I shall have to watch and see whether I cannot have a laugh at your expense when you might speak in peace.

You are quite right said Aristophanes laughing. I will unsay my words but do you please not to watch me, as I fear that in the speech which I am about to make instead of others laughing with me which is to the manner born of our muse and would be all the better I shall only be laughed at by them.

Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape Aristophanes? Well perhaps if you are very careful and bear in mind that you will be called to account, I may be induced to let you off.

Aristophanes professed to open another line of discourse he had much to praise Love in and then say unlike that either of Pausanias or Eryxmachus. Man kind he said judging by their ingenuity of it, it came to a point that all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars and offered solemn sacrifice in his honour but this is not done and most certainly ought to be done. Since of all the gods he is the best friend of men the helper and the healer of their ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race I will try to describe his power to you, and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am teaching you. In the first place let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to

it for the original human nature was not like the present but different. The sexes were not two as they are now but originally three in number there was man woman and the union of the two having a name corresponding to this double nature which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word Androgynous is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place the primeval man was round his back and sides forming a circle and he had four hands and four feet one head with two faces, looking opposite ways [190] set on a round neck and precisely alike also four ears to pry members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also revolve over and over at a great pace turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all like tumblers going over and over with their legs in the air this was when he wanted to run fast. Now the sexes were three and such as I have described them because the sun moon, and earth are three and the man was originally the child of the sun the woman of the earth and the man-woman of the moon which is made up of sun and earth and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength and the thoughts of their hearts were great and they made an attack upon the gods of them was told the tale of Orys and Ephialtes who as Homer says dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them but, on the other hand the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained.

At last after a good deal of reflection Zeus discovered a way. He said Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and improve their manners men shall continue to exist but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg. He spoke and cut men in two like a sorb-apple which is halved for picking or as you might divide an egg with a hair and as he cut them one after another he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the

things divine as well as human And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art There are in the human body these two kinds of love which are confessedly different and unlike and being unlike they have loves and desires which are unlike and the desire of the healthy is one and the desire of the diseased is another and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable and bad men dishonourable—so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged but discouraged And this is what the physician has to do and in this the art of medicine consists for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body and how to satisfy them or not and the best physician is he who is able to separate fair love from foul or to convert one into the other and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love whichever is required and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them loving friends is a skilful practitioner Now the most hostile are the most opposite such as hot and cold bitter and sweet moist and dry and the like And my ancestor Asclepius knowing how to implant friendship and accord in these elements was the creator of our art as our friends the poets here tell us and I believe them and not only medicine in every branch but the arts of gymnastic and husbandry are under his dominion

[187] Any one who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation of opposites and I suppose that this must have been the meaning of Heraclitus although his words are not accurate for he says that The One is united by disunion like the harmony of the bow and the lyre Now there is an absurdity in saying that harmony is discord or is composed of elements which are still in a state of discord But what he probably meant was that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once but are now reconciled by the art of music for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed there could be no harmony—clearly not For harmony is a symphony and symphony is an agreement but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be you cannot harmonize that which disagrees In like manner rhythm is compounded of elements short and long once differing and now in accord which accordance as in the former instance medicine so in all

these other cases music implants making love and unison to grow up among them and thus music too is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm Again in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double But when you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition of songs or in the correct performance of airs or metres composed already which latter is called education then the difficulty begins and the good artist is needed Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love—the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse and of the duty of accepting the temperate and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate and of preserving their love and again of the vulgar Polyhymnia who must be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed but may not generate licentiousness just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease Whence I infer that in music in medicine in all other things human as well as divine both loves ought to be noted as far as may be [188] for they are both present

The course of the seasons is also full of both these principles and when as I was saying the elements of hot and cold moist and dry attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony they bring to men animals and plants health and plenty and do them no harm whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year is very destructive and injurious being the source of pestilence and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants for hoar frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy Further more all sacrifices and the whole province of divination which is the art of communion between gods and men—these I say are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions a man honours the other love whether in his feelings towards gods or parents towards the living or the dead Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them and divination

were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-reliefs like the profile figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on monuments, and that we shall be like tallies.

Wherefore let us exhort all men to pity that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good of which Love is to us the lord and minister and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who oppose him. For if we are friends of the God and at peace with him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion in what I am saying to Pausanias and Agathon, who as I suspect, are both of the manly nature, and belong to the class which I have been describing. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished and each one returning to his primal nature had his original true love then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best is the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Wherefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit, we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, for he promises that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. Thus, Eryximachus, is my discourse of love, which, although different to yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn each, or rather either for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.

Indeed, I am not going to attack you, said Eryximachus, for I thought your speech charming, and did I not know that Agathon and Socrates are masters to the art of love, I should be really afraid that they would do me nothing to say after the world of things which have been said already. But, for all that, I am not without hopes.

[194] Socrates said You played your part well, Eryximachus but if you were as I am now or rather as I shall be when Agathon has spoken, you would, indeed, be in a great strait.

Cl. Aristot., P. 117, c. 11, 2, 1261 24 30.

You want to cast a spell over me Socrates, said Agathon, in the hope that I may be concerned at the expectation as I am among the audience that I shall speak well.

I should be strangely forgetful Agathon, replied Socrates, of the courage and magnanimity which you showed when your own compositions were about to be exhibited and you came upon the stage with the actors and faced the vast theatre altogether undismayed, if I thought that your nerves could be flustered at a small party of friends.

Do you think Socrates, said Agathon, that my head is so full of the theatre as not to know how much more formidable to a man of sense a few good judges are than many fools?

Nay replied Socrates, I should be very wrong in attributing to you, Agathon this or any other want of reticence. And I am quite aware that if you happen to meet with any whom you thought wise, you would care for their opinion much more than for that of the many. But then we, having been a part of the foolish many in the theatre cannot be regarded as the select wise though I know that if you chanced to be in the presence not of one of ourselves, but of some really wise man, you would be ashamed of disgracing yourself before him—would you not?

Yes, said Agathon.

But before the many you would not be ashamed if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence?

Here Phaedrus interrupted them saying, Do not answer him, my dear Agathon for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and from every one. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.

Very good Phaedrus, said Agathon I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak—

The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them [195] But I would rather praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he

man might contemplate the section of himself he would thus learn a lesson of humility Apollo was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. So he gave a turn to the face and pulled the skin from the sides all over that which in our language is called the belly like the purses which draw in and he made one mouth at the centre which he fastened in a knot (the same which is called the navel) [191] he also moulded the breast and took out most of the wrinkles much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last he left a few, however in the region of the belly and navel as a memorial of the primeval state. After the division the two parts of man each desiring his other half came together and throwing their arms about one another entwined in mutual embraces longing to grow into one they were on the point of dying from hunger and self neglect because they did not like to do anything apart and when one of the halves died and the other survived the survivor sought an other mate man or woman as we call them — being the sections of entire men or women — and clung to that. They were being destroyed when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan he turned the parts of generation round to the front for this had not been always their position and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground but in one another and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed and the race might continue or if man came to man they might be satisfied and rest and go their ways to the business of life so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us reuniting our original nature making one of two and healing the state of man.

Each of us when separated having one side only like a flat fish is but the indenture of a man and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lovers of women adulterers are generally of this breed and also adulterous women who lust after men the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men but have female attachments the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male and while they are young being slices of the original man [192] they hang about men and embrace them and they are themselves the best of boys and youths because they have the most manly nature. Some

indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true for they do not act thus from any want of shame but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up become our statesmen and these only which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saying. When they reach manhood they are lovers of youth and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children — if at all they do so only in obedience to the law but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them meets with his other half the actual half of himself whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy and will not be out of the other's sight as I may say even for a moment these are the people who pass their whole lives together yet they could not explain what they desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus with his instruments to come to the pair who are lying side by side and to say to them: What do you people want of one another? they would be unable to explain. And suppose further that when he saw their perplexity he said: Do you desire to be wholly one always day and night to be in one another's company? for it is this what you desire. I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together so that being two you shall become one and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two — I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire and whether you are satisfied to attain this? — there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting into one another this becoming one instead of two was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole [193] and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time I say when we were one but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us as the Arcadians

were dispersed into villages by the Lacedæmonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-relievo like the profile figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on monuments, and that we shall be like tallies.

Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good of which Love is to us the lord and minister: and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who oppose him. For if we are friends of the God and at peace with him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must be. Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion in what I am saying to Pausanias and Agathon, who as I suspect, are both of the manly nature, and belong to the class which I have been describing. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished and each one returning to his primal nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best in the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union, and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Wherefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, for he promises that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. Thus, Eryximachus, in my discourse of love, which, although different in yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn each, or rather either for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.

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CE. ARISTOTELIS, *Philosophy*, 126-2430.

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Here Phaedrus interrupted them saying: Do not answer him my dear Agathon for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and from every one. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.

Very good Phaedrus, said Agathon I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak—

The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them [195] But I would rather praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts: this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he

is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best? And he is the fairest for in the first place he is the youngest and of his youth he is himself the witness fleeing out of the way of age who is swift enough swifter truly than most of us like—Love hates him and will not come near him but youth and love live and move together—like to like as the proverb says Many things were said by Phaedrus about Love in which I agree with him but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Kronos—not so I maintain him to be the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever The ancient doings among the gods of which Hesiod and Parmenides spoke if the tradition of them be true were done of Necessity and not of Love had Love been in those days there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods or other violence but peace and sweetness as there is now in heaven since the rule of Love began

Love is young and also tender he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness as Homer says of Ate that she is a goddess and tender

*Her feet are tender for she sets her steps
Not on the ground but on the heads of men*

herein is an excellent proof of her tenderness—that she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love for he walks not upon the earth nor yet upon the skulls of men which are not so very soft but in the hearts and souls of both gods and men which are of all things the softest in them he walks and dwells and makes his home Not in every soul without exception for where there is hardness he departs where there is softness there he dwells and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places how can he be other than the softest of all things? [196] Of a truth he is the tenderest as well as the youngest and also he is of flexible form for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things or wind his way into and out of every soul of man undiscovered And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love ungrace and love are always at war with one another The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties whether of body or soul or aught else but in the place of flowers and scents there he sits and abides Concerning the beauty of the

god I have said enough and yet there remains much more which I might say Of his virtue I have now to speak his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man for he suffers not by force if he suffers force comes not near him neither when he acts does he act by force For all men in all things serve him of their own free will and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say is justice And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires and no pleasure ever masters Love he is their master and they are his servants and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed As to courage even the God of War is no match for him he is the captive and Love is the lord for love, the love of Aphrodite masters him as the tale runs and the master is stronger than the servant And if he conquers the bravest of all others, he must be himself the bravest.

Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken but I have yet to speak of his wisdom and according to the measure of my ability I must try to do my best In the first place he is a poet (and here like Eryximachus I magnify my art) and he is also the source of poetry in others which he could not be if he were not himself a poet And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet even though he had no music in him before this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts for no one can give to another that which he has not himself or teach that of which he has no knowledge Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom [197] born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the light of fame?—he whom Love touches not walks in darkness The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo under the guidance of love and desire so that he too is a disciple of Love Also the melody of the Muses the metalurgy of Hephaestus the weaving of Athena the empire of Zeus over gods and men are all due to Love who was the inventor of them And so Love set in order the empire of the gods—the love of beauty as is evident for with deformity Love has no concern In the days of old as I began by saying dreadful deeds were done among the gods for they were ruled by Necessity but now since the birth of Love and from the Love of the beautiful has sprung

every good in heaven and earth Therefore Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things And there comes into my mind a line of poetry in which he is said to be the god who

*Gives peace on earth and calm to the stormy deep
Who stills the winds and bids the sufferer sleep*

This is he who empties men of disaffection and fills them with affection—he makes them to meet together at banquets such as these in sacrifices feasts, dances, he is our lord—he sends courtesy and sends away discourtesy who gives kindness ever and never gives unkindness the friend of the good the wonder of the wise the amazement of the gods desired by those who have no part in him and precious to those who have the better part in him parent of delicacy luxury desire fondness, softness, grace regardful of the good regardless of the evil in every word work with fear—saviour pilot comrade helper glory of gods and men leader best and brightest in whose footsteps let every man follow steadily singing in his honour and joining in that sweet strain with which love charms the souls of gods and men Such is the power of Phaedrus half playful yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which according to my ability I dedicate to the god

[198] When Agathon had done speaking Aristodemus said that there as a general cheer the young men stood up to have spoken in a manner worthy of his self and of the god And Socrates looking at Eryximachus said Tell me son of Acumenus as the poet reasons in my fears? and as I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration and that I should be in a strait?

The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon repudiated Eryximachus, appealed to me to be true but not the other part—that you will be in a strait

Why my dear friend said Socrates must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words—who could listen to them without amazement? When I reflected on the immortalable life only of my own powers I was ready to run away for shame if the child was a possibility of escape For I as reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking me the Gorgonian or Gorgonian head of the great master

of rhetoric which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone as Homer says and strike me dumb And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love and saying that I too was a master of the art when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true and that this being presupposed out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and set them forth in the best manner And I felt quite proud thinking that I knew the nature of true praise and should speak well Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to Love every species of greatness and glory whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood—that was no matter for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should really praise Love but only that you should appear to praise him And so you attribute to Love every imaginable form of praise which can be ascribed anywhere and you say that he is all this and the cause of all that [199] making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not for you can not impose upon those who know him And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn I must beg to be absolved from the promise which I made in ignorance and which (as Euripides would say) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind Farewell then to such a strain for I do not praise in that way no indeed I cannot But if you like to hear the truth about love I am ready to speak in my own manner though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you Say then Phaedrus whether you would like to hear the truth about love spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time Will that be agreeable to you?

Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the company bid him speak in any manner which he thought best. Then he added let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions in order that I may take his admissions as the premisses of my discourse.

I grant the permission said Phaedrus put your questions. Socrates then proceeded as follows—

In the magnificent oration which you have just uttered I think that you were right my dear Agathon, in proposing to speak of the

nature of Love first and afterwards of his works—that is a way of beginning which I very much approve And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature may I ask you further Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? And here I must explain myself I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother—that would be ridiculous but to answer as you would if I asked is a father a father of something? to which you would find no difficulty in replying of a son or daughter and the answer would be right

Very true said Agathon

And you would say the same of a mother?

He assented

Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?

Certainly he replied

That is of a brother or sister?

Yes he said

And now said Socrates I will ask about Love—Is Love of something or of nothing?

[200] Of something surely he replied

Keep in mind what this is and tell me what I want to know—whether Love desires that of which love is

Yes surely

And does he possess or does he not possess that which he loves and desires?

Probably not I should say

Nay replied Socrates I would have you consider whether necessarily is not rather the word The inference that he who desires something is in want of something and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing is in my judgment Agathon absolutely and necessarily true What do you think?

I agree with you said Agathon

Very good Would he who is great desire to be great or he who is strong desire to be strong?

That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions

True For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?

Very true

And yet added Socrates if a man being strong desired to be strong or being swift desired to be swift or being healthy desired to be healthy in that case he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception For the possessors of these

qualities Agathon must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time whether they choose or not and who can desire that which he has? Therefore when a person says I am well and wish to be well or I am rich and wish to be rich and I desire simply to have what I have—to him we shall reply You my friend having wealth and health and strength want to have the continuance of them for at this moment whether you choose or no you have them And when you say I desire that which I have and nothing else is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future? He must agree with us—must he not?

He must replied Agathon

Then said Socrates he desires that what he has at present may be preserved to him in the future which is equivalent to saying that he desires something which is non-existent to him, and which as yet he has not got

Very true he said

Then he and every one who desires desires that which he has not already and which is future and not present and which he has not, and is not and of which he is in want—these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?

Very true he said

Then now said Socrates let us recapitulate the argument First is not love of something and of something too which is wanting to a man?

[201] Yes he replied

Remember further what you said in your speech or if you do not remember I will remind you you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods for that of deformed things there is no love—did you not say something of that kind?

Yes said Agathon

Yes my friend and the remark was a just one And if this is true Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?

He assented

And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?

True he said

Then Love wants and has not beauty?

Certainly he replied

And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?

Certainly not

Then would you still say that love is beautiful?

Agathon replied "I fear that I did not understand what I was saying."

You made a very good speech, Agathon, replied Socrates, but there is yet one small question which I could faintly ask—Is not the good also the beautiful?

Yes.

Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?

I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon—Let us assume that what you say is true.

Say rather beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth for Socrates is easily refuted.

And now, taking my leave of you, I will rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantinea, a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me. I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can. As you, Agathon, suggested I must speak first of the being, and nature of Love, and then of his works. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love is as a mighty god and likewise fair, and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, Love was neither fair nor good. What do you mean, Diotima, I said, is Love then evil and foul?

Hush, he cried, must that be foul which is not fair? [-02] Certainly, I said. And is that which is not wise, ignorant? do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance? And what may that be, I said.

Right opinion, she replied, which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth) but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom. Quite true, I replied. Do not then insist, she said, that what is not fair is of necessity foul or what is not good evil or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil for he is in a mean between them. Well, I said, Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god. By

those who know or by those who do not know? By all. And how, Socrates, she said with a smile, can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all? And who are they? I said.

You and I are two of them, she replied. How can that be? I said. It is quite intelligible, she replied, for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair—of course you would—could you dare to say that any god was not? Certainly not, I replied. And you mean by the happy those who are the possessors of things good or fair? Yes. And you admitted that Love because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want? Yes, I did.

But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair? Impossible. Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.

What then is Love? I asked. Is he mortal? No. What then? As in the former instance he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two. What is he, Diotima? He is a great spirit (*daimon*) and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal. And what, I said, is his power? He interprets, she replied, between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation find their way. For God mingles not with man, but through Love all the intercourse and converse of god with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual and other wisdom such as that of arts and handicrafts is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love. And who, I said, was his father and who his mother? The tale, she said, will take time nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty who is the son of Metis or Discretion was one of the guests. When the feast was over Penia or Poverty as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days) went into the garden of Zeus and fell

into a heavy sleep and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances plotted to have a child by him and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love who partly be cause he is naturally a lover of the beautiful and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful and also because he was born on her birthday is her follower and attendant And as his parentage is so also are his fortunes In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair as the many imagine him and he is rough and squalid and has no shoes nor a house to dwell in on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven in the streets or at the doors of houses taking his rest and like his mother he is always in distress Like his father too whom he also partly resembles he is always plotting against the fair and good he is bold enterprising strong a mighty hunter always weaving some intrigue or other keen in the pursuit of wisdom fertile in resources a philosopher at all times terrible as an enchanter sorcerer sophist He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty and dead at another moment and again alive by reason of his father's nature But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out and so he is never in want and never in wealth and further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge The truth of the matter is this No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom for he is wise already nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom [204] For herein is the evil of ignorance that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself he has no desire for that of which he feels no want But who then Diotima I said are the lovers of wisdom if they are neither the wise nor the foolish? A child may answer that question she replied they are those who are in a mean between the two Love is one of them For wisdom is a most beautiful thing and Love is of the beautiful and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant And of this too his birth is the cause for his father is wealthy and wise and his mother poor and foolish Such my dear Socrates is the nature of the spirit Love The error in your conception of him was very natural and as I imagine from what you say has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved which made you think that love was all beautiful For

the beloved is the truly beautiful and delicate and perfect and blessed but the principle of love is of another nature and is such as I have described

I said O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well but assuming Love to be such as you say what is the use of him to men That Socrates she replied I will attempt to unfold of his nature and birth I have already spoken and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful But some one will say Of the beautiful in what Socrates and Diotima?—or rather let me put the question more clearly and ask When a man loves the beautiful what does he desire I answered her That the beautiful may be his Still she said the answer suggests a further question What is given by the possession of beauty? To what you have asked I replied I have no answer ready

Then she said let me put the word good in the place of the beautiful and repeat the question once more If he who loves loves the good what is it then that he loves? The possession of the good I said And what does he gain who possesses the good? Happiness I replied there is less difficulty in answering that question [205] Yes she said the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness the answer is already final "You are right I said And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good or only some men?—what say you? All men I replied the desire is common to all Why then she rejoined, are not all men Socrates, said to love but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things I myself wonder I said why this is There is nothing to wonder at she replied the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole but the other parts have other names

Give an illustration I said She answered me as follows There is poetry which as you know is complex and manifold All creation or passage of non being into being is poetry or making and the processes of all art are creative and the masters of arts are all poets or makers Very true Still she said you know that they are not called poets but have other names only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest and is concerned with music and metre is termed poetry and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets "Very true I said

And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money making or gymnastics or philosophy are not called lovers—the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only—they alone are said to love, or to be lovers."

I dare say I replied, "that you are right."

Yes, she added, and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away if they are evil for they love not what is their own, unless perchance there be some one who calls what belongs to him the good, [206] and what belongs to another the evil. For there is nothing such men love but the good. Is there anything? Certainly I should say that there is nothing. Then, she said, the simple truth is, that men love the good. "Yes, I said. "To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?"

Yes, that must be added. And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good: "That must be added too. "Then love, she said, may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good? "That is most true."

"Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further?" she said, what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? and what is the object which they have in view?

Answer me. Nay Diotima, I replied, if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to learn from you about this very matter. Well, she said, I will teach you. The object which they have in view is birth in beauty whether of body or soul. I do not understand you. I said the oracle requires an explanation. I will make my meaning clearer she replied.

I mean to say that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation—procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity and thus procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always inhar-

monious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty then, is the deity or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore when approaching beauty the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit at the sight of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the reason why when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only."

What then? "The love of generation and of birth in beauty." "Yes, I said. Yes, indeed," she replied. But why of generation? "Because to the mortal creature, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality," she replied and if as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good [207] Wherefore love is of immortality."

All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember her once saying to me, "What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds, as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union whereto is added the care of offspring on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young. Man may be supposed to act thus from reason but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?" Again I replied that I did not know. She said to me And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this? But I have told you already Diotima, that my ignorance is the reason why I come to you for I am conscious that I want a teacher tell me then the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love." Marvel not," she said, "if you believe that love is of the immortal as we have several times acknowledged for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old."

Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity a man is called the same and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age and in which every animal is said to have life and identity he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation—hair, flesh bones blood and the whole body are always changing Which is true not only of the body but also of the soul whose habits tempers opinions desires pleasures pains fears, never remain the same in any one of us but are always coming and going and equally true of knowledge and what is still more surprising to us mortals [208] not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay so that in respect of them we are never the same but each of them individually experiences a like change For what is implied in the word recollection but the departure of knowledge which is ever being forgotten and is renewed and preserved by recollection and appears to be the same although in reality new according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved not absolutely the same but by substitution the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind—unlike the divine which is always the same and not another? And in this way Socrates the mortal body or mortal anything partakes of immortality but the immortal in another way Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality

I was astonished at her words and said Is this really true O thou wise Diotima? And she answered with all the authority of an accomplished sophist Of that Socrates you may be assured—think only of the ambition of men and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame They are ready to run all risks greater far than they would have run for their children and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil and even to die for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus or Achilles to avenge Patroclus or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues which still survives among us would be immortal? Nay she said I am persuaded that all men do all things and the better they are the more they do them in hope of the glorious

fame of immortal virtue for they desire to be immortal

Those who are pregnant in the body only betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love the offspring as they hope will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future But souls which are pregnant—for there certainly are men who are [209] more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body above all when he finds a fair and noble and well nurtured soul he embraces the two in one person and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man and he tries to educate him and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal Who when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours not only of Lacedaemon but of Hellas as one may say? There is Solon too who is the revered father of Athenian laws and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians who have given to the world many noble works and have been the parents of virtue of every kind and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs which

were never raised in honour of any one for the sake of his mortal children.

"These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, (210) may enter to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead. I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you fail if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms, and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only—out of that he should create fair thoughts, and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another, and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish could he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms. In the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle, and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom, until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed, please to give me your very best attention.

He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive the nature of wondrous beauty (and this, (211) Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils)—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one

time or in one relation or at one place fair at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place, but beauty absolute, separate, simple and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. Thus, my dear Socrates, said the stranger of Mantinea, "is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute, a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths whose presence now entrances you, and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and varieties of human life—rather looking and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? (212) Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality) and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?

Such, Phaedrus—and I speak not only to you, but to all of you—were the words of Diotima, and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a helper better

than love And therefore also I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him and walk in his ways and exhort others to do the same and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever

The words which I have spoken you Phaedrus may call an encomium of love or any thing else which you please

When Socrates had done speaking the company applauded and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house as of revellers and the sound of a flute girl was heard Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders If they are friends of ours he said invite them in but if not say that the drinking is over A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court he was in a great state of intoxication and kept roaring and shouting Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon and at length supported by the flute girl and some of his attendants he found his way to them Hail friends he said appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets his head flowing with ribands Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? Or shall I crown Agathon which was my intention in coming and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday and therefore I am here to day carrying on my head these ribands that taking them from my own head I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men as I may be allowed to call him Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I know very well that I am speaking the truth [213] although you may laugh But first tell me if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke? Will you drink with me or not?

The company were vociferous in begging that he would take his place among them and Agathon specially invited him Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him and as he was being led intending to crown Agathon he took the ribands from his own head and held them in front of his eyes he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates who made way for him and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates

Cf. 105

* *Supra* 212 Will you have a very drunken man? etc.

and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him Take off his sandals said Agathon and let him make a third on the same couch

By all means but who makes the third partner in our revels? said Alcibiades turning round and starting up as he caught sight of Socrates By Heracles he said what is this? here is Socrates always lying in wait for me, and always as his way is coming out at all sorts of unsuspected places and now what have you to say for yourself and why are you lying here where I perceive that you have contrived to find a place not by a joker or lover of jokes like Aristophanes, but by the fairest of the company?

Socrates turned to Agathon and said I must ask you to protect me Agathon for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other fair one or so much as to look at them If I do he goes wild with envy and jealousy and not only abuses me but can hardly keep his hands off me and at this moment he may do me some harm Please to see to this and either reconcile me to him or if he attempts violence protect me as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts

There can never be reconciliation between you and me said Alcibiades but for the present I will defer your chastisement And I must be you Agathon to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot—I would not have him complain of me for crowning you and neglecting him who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind and this not only once as you were the day before yesterday but always Whereupon taking some of the ribands he crowned Socrates and again reclined

Then he said You seem my friends to be sober which is a thing not to be endured you must drink—for that was the agreement under which I was admitted—and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk Let us have a large goblet Agathon or rather he said addressing the attendant bring me that wine-cooler The wine-cooler which had caught his eye was a vessel holding more than two quarts—thus he filled and emptied [214] and bade the attendant fill it again for Socrates Observe my friends said Alcibiades that this ingenious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk Socrates

drink the cup which the attendant filled for him.

Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? Are we to have neither conversation nor singing, over our cups but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?

Alcibiades replied: Had I worthy son of a most wise and worthy sire!

The same to you, said Eryximachus but what shall we do?

That I leave to you, said Alcibiades.

Let us play a masked dance to the

shall preside and we will obey. What do you want?

Well, said Eryximachus, before you appeared we had passed a resolution that each one of us in turn should make a speech in praise of love, and as good a one as he could: the turn was passed round from left to right and as all of us have spoken, and you have not spoken but have well drunken, you ought to speak and then impose upon Socrates any task which you please, and be on his right hand neighbour and so on.

That is good, Eryximachus said Alcibiades and yet the comparison of a drunken man's speech with those of sober men is hardly fair and I should like to know, sweet friend, whether you really believe that Socrates was just now saying for I can assure you that the very reverse is the fact and that if I praise any one but himself in his presence, whether God or man, he will hardly keep his hands off me.

I or shame, said Socrates.

Hold your tongue, said Alcibiades, for by Poseidon, there is no one else whom I will praise when you are of the company.

Well then, said Eryximachus, if you like praise, Socrates.

What do you think, Eryximachus? said Alcibiades, shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all?

What are you about, said Socrates, are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? Is that the meaning of your praise?

I am going to speak the truth if you will permit me.

I not only permit, but exhort you to speak the truth.

Then I will begin at once, said Alcibiades, and if I say anything which is not true, you may interrupt me if you will and say that is a lie, though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into my mind for the

fluent and orderly enumeration of all your singularities is not a task which is easy to a man in my condition.

[25] And now, my boys, I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him to be a caricature, and just as I speak not to make fun of him but only for the truth's sake. I say that he is exactly like the busts of Silenus, which are set up in the statues' shops, holding pipes and flutes in their mouths and they are made to open in the middle and have images of gods inside them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr: you yourself will not deny Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example you are a bully as I can prove by witnesses, if you will not confess. And are you not a flute player? That you are and a performer far more wonderful than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the powers of his breath and the players of his music do so still for the melodies of Olympus are derived from Marsyas who taught them and these whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute girl have a power which no others have: they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are divine. But you produce the same effect with your words only and do not require the flute: that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker even a very good one he produces absolutely no effect upon us, or not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second hand and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I could have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corymbant reeller and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well but I never had any similar feeling my soul as not stirred by them nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading [216] (this, Socrates, you will admit) and I am conscious that if I did not shut my

ears against him and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others, —he would transfix me and I should grow old sitting at his feet For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do neglecting the wants of my own soul and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him And he ■ the only person who ever made me ashamed which you might think not to be in my nature and there is no one else who does the same For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me And therefore I run away and fly from him and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him Many a time have I wished that he were dead and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad if he were to die so that I am at my wit's end

And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute playing of this satyr Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is and how marvellous his power For let me tell you none of you know him but I will reveal him to you having begun I must go on See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things—such is the appearance which he puts on Is he not like a Silenus in this? To be sure he is his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus but O my companions in drink when he is opened what temperance there is residing within! know you that beauty and wealth and honour at which the many wonder are of no account with him and are utterly despised by him he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them mankind are nothing to him all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them But when I opened him and looked within at his serious purpose I saw in him divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a [217] moment whatever Socrates commanded they may have escaped the observation of others but I saw them Now I fancied that he was seriously enamoured of my beauty and I thought that I should therefore have a grand opportunity of hearing him tell what he knew for I had a wonderful opinion of the attractions of my youth In the prosecution of this design when I next went to him I sent away the attendant who usually accompanied me (I will confess

the whole truth and beg you to listen and if I speak falsely do you Socrates expose the falsehood) Well he and I were alone together and I thought that when there was nobody with us I should hear him speak the language which lovers use to their loves when they are by themselves and I was delighted Nothing of the sort he conversed as usual and spent the day with me and then went away Afterwards I challenged him to the palaestra and he wrestled and closed with me several times when there was no one present I fancied that I might succeed in this manner Not a bit I made no way with him Lastly as I had failed hitherto I thought that I must take strong measures and attack him boldly and as I had begun not give him up but see how matters stood between him and me So I invited him to sup with me just as if he were a fair youth and I a designing lover He was not easily persuaded to come he did however after a while accept the invitation, and when he came the first time he wanted to go away at once as soon as supper was over and I had not the face to detain him The second time still in pursuance of my design after we had supped, I went on conversing far into the night, and when he wanted to go away I pretended that the hour was late and that he had much better remain So he lay down on the couch next to me the same on which he had supped and there was no one but ourselves sleeping in the apartment All this may be told without shame to any one But what follows I could hardly tell you if I were sober Yet as the proverb says

In vino veritas whether with boys or with out them and therefore I must speak Nor again should I be justified in concealing the lofty actions of Socrates when I come to praise him Moreover I have felt the serpent's sting and he who has suffered as they say is willing to tell his fellow sufferers only as they alone will be likely to understand him [218] and will not be extreme in judging of the sayings or doings which have been wrung from his agony I or I have been bitten by a more than viper's tooth I have known in my soul or in my heart or in some other part that worst of pangs more violent in ingenuous youth than any serpent's tooth the pang of philosophy which will make a man say or do anything And you whom I see around me Phaedrus and Agathon and Eryximachus and Pausanias and Aristodemus and Aristophanes all of you and I need not say Socrates himself have had experience of the same madness and passion in

your language after wisdom. Therefore listen and excuse my doings then and my sayings now. But let the attendants and other profane and unmannered persons close up the doors of their ears.

When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said "Socrates, are you asleep?" No, he said. Do you know what I am meditating?" "What are you meditating," he said. "I think," I replied, "that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favour and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in which I believe that you can help me better than any one else. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what I use men would say if I were to refuse a favour to such as you, than of what the world, who are mostly fools, would say of me if I granted it. To these words he replied in the ironical manner which is so characteristic of him—

"Mithrades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind nobly higher than any which I see in you. And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty you will have greatly the advantage of me: you will gain true beauty in return for appearance—like Diomedes (219) sold in exchange for brass. But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow crucial when the bodily eye fails, and it will be a long time before you get old." *Hearing this, I said*

"I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me." "That is good," he said. "At some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters. Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that the words which I had uttered like arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of year was winter and there I lay during the whole night hailing this wonderful monster in my arms.

This again, Socrates, will not be denied by you. And yet, notwithstanding all he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and disdainful of my beauty—which really as I fancied, had some attractions—hear O judges for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates—nothing more happened, but in the morning when I awoke (let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses) I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother.

What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and manliness. I never imagined that I could have met with a man such as he in wisdom and endurance. And therefore I could not be angry with him or renounce his company any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel much less he by money and my only chance of captivating him by my personal attractions had failed. So I was at my wit's end: no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another. All this happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea: there we messed together and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue. His endurance was simply marvellous when, (220) being cut off from our supplies, we were compelled to go without food—on such occasions which often happen in time of war he was superior not only to me but to everybody there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment though not willing to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that,—wonderful to relate! no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk and his powers, if I am not mistaken will be tested before long. His fortitude in enduring cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region is really tremendous, and everybody else either remained indoors, or if they went out had on an amazing quantity of clothes, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces. In the midst of this, Socrates with his bare feet on the ice and in his ordinary dress marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.

I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another which is worth hearing. *Of the dog's grand sufferings in the end of a man*

while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve: he would not give it up but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought and at noon attention was drawn to him and the rumour ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last in the evening after supper some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun and went his way.¹ I will also tell, if you please—and indeed I am bound to tell—of his courage in battle for who but he saved my life? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valour for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms and he ought to have received the prize of valour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank and I told them so (this again Socrates will not impeach or deny) but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very remarkable [221]—in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium where he served among the heavy armed—I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Pountaea for I was myself on horseback and therefore comparatively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating for the troops were in flight and I met them and told them not to be discouraged and promised to remain with them and there you might see him, Aristophanes as you describe just as he is in the streets of Athens: stalking like a pelican and rolling his eyes calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends and making very intelligible to anybody even from a distance that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance and in this way he and his companion escaped—for this is the sort of man who is never touched in war: those only are pursued who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the marvels which I might narrate in praise of Socrates: most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in another man but his

absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles and the same may be said of other famous men but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness however remote either among men who now are or who ever have been—other than that which I have already suggested of Silenus and the satyrs and they represent in a figure not only himself but his words. I or although I forgot to mention this to you before his words are like the images of Silenus which open they are ridiculous when you first hear them: he clothes himself in language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr—for his talk is of pack asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers and he always repeating the same things in the same words, so that any ignorant or inexperienced person might feel disposed to laugh at him [222] but he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them and also the most divine abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest comprehension or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honourable man.

This friends is my praise of Socrates. I have added my blame of him for his ill treatment of me and he has ill treated not only me but Charmides the son of Glaucon and Euthydemus the son of Diocles and many others in the same way—beginning as their lover he has ended by making them pay their addresses to him. Wherefore I say to you Agathon: Be not deceived by him: learn from me and take warning and do not be a fool and learn by experience as the proverb says.

When Alcibiades had finished there was a laugh at his outspokenness for he seemed to be still in love with Socrates. You are sober Alcibiades said Socrates or you would never have gone so far about to hide the purpose of your satyr's praises for all this long story is only an ingenious circumlocution of which the point comes in by the way at the end: you want to get up a quarrel between me and Agathon and your notion is that I ought to love you and nobody else and that you and you only ought to love Agathon. But the plot of this Satyr or Silenic drama has been detected and you must not allow him Agathon to set us at variance.

I believe you are right said Agathon and I

Cf *Gorgias* 490 491 517

¹ Cf *supra* 175

² Aristophanes *Clouds* 362.

as supposed to think that his intention in praising himself between you and me is as only to draw us but he shall gain nothing by that effort for I will go and lie on the couch next to you.

Yes, yes, replied Socrates, by all means come here and lie on the couch below me.

Yes, said Alcibiades, how I am fooled by this man; he is determined to get the better of me at every turn. I do beseech you, allow Agathon to lie between us.

Certainly not, said Socrates, as you praised me, and I in turn ought to praise my neighbor on the right; he will be out of order in praising me again when he ought rather to be praised by me, and I must entreat you to consent to this, and not be jealous, for I have a great desire to praise the youth [23].

Hurried cried Agathon, I will rise instantly that I may be praised by Socrates.

The usual way said Alcibiades is that Socrates is, no one else has any chance in the fair and now how readily has he introduced a specious reason for attracting Agathon to himself.

Agathon arose in order that he might take his place on the couch by Socrates. When suddenly a band of revellers entered, and spoiled the order of the banquet. Some one who was

going out having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made themselves at home. Great confusion ensued, and every one was compelled to drink large quantities of wine. Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus and others went away—he himself fell asleep, and as the nights were long took a good rest. He was awakened towards daybreak by a crowing of cocks, and when he awoke, the others were either asleep or had gone away; there remained only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon, who were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed round and Socrates was discoursing to them. Aristodemus was only half awake, and he did not hear the beginning of the discourse the chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they were constrained to assent, being drowsy and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped out then, when the day was already dawning Agathon Socrates having laid them to sleep, rose to depart. Aristodemus, as his manner was, followed him. At the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day as usual. In the evening he retired to rest at his own home.

MENO

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE MENO, SOCRATES A SLAVE OF MENO, ANYTES

[70] *Meno* CAN you tell me Socrates whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice or if neither by teaching nor practice then whether it comes to man by nature or in what other way?

Socrates O Meno there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding but now if I am not mistaken they are equally famous for their wisdom especially at Larisa which is the native city of your friend Aristippus And this is Gorgias doing for when he came there the flower of the Aleuadae among them your admirer Aristippus and the other chiefs of the Thessalians fell in love with his wisdom And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style which becomes those who know and is the style in which he himself answers all comers and any Hellene who likes may ask him any thing How different is our lot my dear Meno [71] Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired he would laugh in your face and say Stranger you have far too good an opinion of me if you think that I can answer your question For I literally do not know what virtue is and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not And I myself Meno living as I do in this region of poverty am as poor as the rest of the world and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue and when I do not know the quid of anything how can I know the quale? How if I knew nothing at all of

Meno could I tell if he was fair or the opposite of fair rich and noble or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?

Men No Indeed But are you in earnest, Socrates in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?

Soc Not only that my dear boy but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did in my judgment

Men Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

Soc Yes I have

Men And did you not think that he knew?

Soc I have not a good memory Meno and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time And I dare say that he did know and that you know what he said please therefore to remind me of what he said or if you would rather tell me your own view for I suspect that you and he think much alike

Men Very true

Soc Then as he is not here never mind him, and do you tell me By the gods Meno be generous and tell me what you say that virtue is for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge although I have been just saying that I have never found any body who had

Men There will be no difficulty Socrates in answering your question Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to administer the state and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself A woman's virtue if you wish to

know about that, may also be easily described her duty is to order her house and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free [72] has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them: for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.

Soc. How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees and I reply, But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them, or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

Men. I should answer that bees do not differ from one another as bees.

Soc. And if I went on to say, That is what I desire to know, Meno, tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike—would you be able to answer?

Men. I should.

Soc. And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues: and on this he who would answer the question, What is virtue? would do well to have his eye fixed. Do you understand?

Men. I am beginning to understand, but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish.

Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health and size and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?

Men. I should say that health is the same both in man and woman.

Soc. And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her, which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?

Men. I think not.

[73] Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same? Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1, 3, 160, 328. Cf. The *Republic* 146.

the same, whether in a child or in a grown up person, in a woman or in a man?

Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others.

Soc. But why? Were you not saying, that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?

Men. I did say so.

Soc. And can either house or state or any thing be well ordered without temperance and without justice?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?

Men. True.

Soc. And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust?

Men. They cannot.

Soc. They must be temperate and just?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then all men are good in the same way and by participation in the same virtues?

Men. Such is the inference.

Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?

Men. They would not.

Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.

Men. Will you have one definition of them all?

Soc. That is what I am seeking.

Men. If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master, and would he who governed be any longer a slave?

Men. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. No, indeed, there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend, according to you, virtue is the power of governing, but do you not add, justly and not unjustly?

Men. Yes, Socrates, I agree, there for justice is virtue.

Soc. Would you say, virtue, Meno, or "a virtue"?

Men What do you mean?

Soc I mean as I might say about anything that a round, for example is a figure and not simply figure and I should adopt this mode of speaking because there are other figures

Men Quite right and that is just what I am saying about virtue—that there are other virtues as well as justice

[74] *Soc* What are they? tell me the names of them as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me

Men Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues and there are many others

Soc Yes Meno and again we are in the same case in searching after one virtue we have found many though not in the same way as before but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all

Men Why Socrates even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things

Soc No wonder but I will try to get nearer if I can for you know that all things have a common notion Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before Meno he would say what is figure? And if you answered roundness he would reply to you in my way of speaking by asking whether you would say that roundness is figure or a figure and you would answer a figure

Men Certainly

Soc And for this reason—that there are other figures?

Men Yes

Soc And if he proceeded to ask What other figures are there? you would have told him

Men I should

Soc And if he similarly asked what colour is and you answered whiteness and the questioner rejoined Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply A colour because there are other colours as well

Men I should

Soc And if he had said Tell me what they are?—you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness

Men Yes

Soc And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way he would say Ever and anon we are landed in particulars but this is not what I want tell me then since you call them by a common name and say that they are all figures even when opposed to one an

other what is that common nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight as well as round and is no more one than the other—that would be your mode of speaking?

Men Yes

Soc And in speaking thus you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight or the straight any more straight than round?

Men Certainly not

Soc You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight or the straight than the round?

Men Very true

Soc To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour you were to reply Man I do not understand what you want [75] or know what you are saying he would look rather astonished and say Do you not understand that I am looking for the simile in multis? And then he might put the question in another form Meno he might say what is that simile in multis which you call figure and which includes not only round and straight figures but all? Could you not answer that question Meno? I wish that you would try the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue

Men I would rather that you should answer Socrates

Soc Shall I indulge you?

Men By all means

Soc And then you will tell me about virtue?

Men I will

Soc Then I must do my best for there is a prize to be won

Men Certainly

Soc Well I will try and explain to you what figure is What do you say to this answer — Figure is the only thing which always follows colour Will you be satisfied with it as I am sure that I should be if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?

Men But Socrates it is such a simple answer

Soc Why simple?

Men Because according to you figure is that which always follows colour

(*Soc* Cranted)

Men But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him?

Soc I should have told him the truth And if

he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer and if I am wrong your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein, that is to say, I should not only speak the truth but I should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And thus is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end or termination, or extremity?—all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them, but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult.

MEN. Yes, I should, and I believe that I understand your meaning.

SOC. And you could speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry?

MEN. Yes.

SOC. Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends, or more concisely the limit of solid.

MEN. And now, Socrates, what is colour?

SOC. You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer when you will not take the trouble of remembering what Socrates' definition of virtue is.

MEN. When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.

SOC. A man who is blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a creature and have still many lovers.

MEN. Why do you think so?

SOC. Why because you always speak in unpolite terms like all beauties, when they are in their prime you are tyrannical and also as I suppose, you have found out that I have a weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer.

MEN. Please do.

SOC. Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Corgias, which is familiar to you?

MEN. I should like nothing better.

SOC. Do not be and you need Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?

MEN. Certainly.

SOC. And pass us into luck and through which the effluence passes?

MEN. Exactly.

SOC. And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?

MEN. True.

SOC. And there is such a thing as sight?

MEN. Yes.

SOC. And now as Pindar says, read my meaning—"colour is an effluence of form commensurate with sight and palpable to sense."

MEN. That Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.

SOC. Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing, and your mind will have discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena.

MEN. Quite true.

SOC. The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.

MEN. Yes.

SOC. And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better, and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you could only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday to go away before the mysteries.

MEN. But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. [77]

SOC. Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best, but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good, and now in your turn you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal, and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces. I have given you the pattern.

MEN. Well then, Socrates, virtue as I take it, is when he who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself, so the poet says, and I say too—

It is the desire of the good, the whole of the power follows it, good.

SOC. And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?

MEN. Certainly.

SOC. Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

MEN. I think not.

SOC. There are some who desire it?

MEN. Yes.

Men What do you mean?

Soc I mean as I might say about anything that a round for example is a figure and not simply figure, and I should adopt this mode of speaking because there are other figures

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Men But Socrates it is such a simple answer

Soc Why simple?

Men Because according to you figure is that which always follows colour

(*Soc* Granted)

Men But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him?

Soc I should have told him the truth and if

power of attaining good justly or with justice and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

MEN. Yes.

SOC. Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue. For justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.

MEN. What of that?

SOC. What of that? Why did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue. As though you had told me, and I must already know the whole of virtue and this too when frattered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question. What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue. What else is its meaning, of say me, that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again if I can find any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?

MEN. No I do not say that he can.

SOC. Do you remember how in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?

MEN. Yes, Socrates, and we were quite right in doing so.

SOC. But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of it, or anything at all in that fashion. We should only have to ask over again the old question. What is virtue? Am I not right?

MEN. I believe that you are.

SOC. Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?

MEN. O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting your self and making others doubt. (Soc) And now you are casting your spells on me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am in my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you, and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of

speeches about virtue before now and to many persons—and very good ones they were as I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast in prison as a madman.

SOC. You are a rogue, Meno, and had almost caught me.

MEN. What do you mean Socrates?

SOC. I can tell why you made a simile about me.

MEN. Why?

SOC. In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty things made about them—as well they may—but I shall not return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not others are, for I perplex others, not because I am clear but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.

MEN. And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?

SOC. I know Meno what you mean but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know for if he knows, he has no need to enquire and if not, he cannot for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.

[Sic] MEN. Well Socrates, and is not the argument sound?

SOC. I think not.

MEN. Why not?

SOC. I will tell you why. I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that—

MEN. What did they say?

SOC. They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.

MEN. What was it? and who were they?

SOC. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics L. 1. 71. 25-31

Soc Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

Men Both I think.

Soc And do you really imagine Meno that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

Men Certainly I do.

Soc And desire \equiv of possession?

Men Yes of possession.

Soc And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them or does he know that they will do him harm?

Men There are some who think that the evils will do them good and others who know that they will do them harm.

Soc And in your opinion do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?

Men Certainly not.

Soc Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be good they really desire goods?

Men Yes in that case.

Soc Well and do those who as you say desire evils and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them know that they will be hurt by them?

Men They must know it.

[78] *Soc* And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

Men How can it be otherwise?

Soc But are not the miserable all fated?

Men Yes indeed.

Soc And does any one desire to be miserable and ill fated?

Men I should say not Socrates.

Soc But if there is no one who desires to be miserable there \equiv no one Meno who desires evil for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?

Men That appears to be the truth Socrates and I admit that nobody desires evil.

Soc And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?

Men Yes I did say so.

Soc But if this be affirmed then the desire of good \equiv common to all and one man is no better than another in that respect?

Men True.

Soc And if one man is not better than an

other in desiring good he must be better in the power of attaining it?

Men Exactly.

Soc Then according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?

Men I entirely approve Socrates of the manner in which you now view this matter.

Soc Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view for very likely you may be right — You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?

Men Yes.

Soc And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver and having office and honour in the state—those are what you would call goods?

Men Yes I should include all those.

Soc Then according to Meno who \equiv the hereditary friend of the great king virtue is the power of getting silver and gold and would you add that they must be gained piously justly or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition even if unjust and dishonest equally to be deemed virtue?

Men Not virtue Socrates but vice.

Soc Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue as would appear must accompany the acquisition and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Men Why how can there be virtue without these?

Soc And the non acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another or in other words the want of them may be equally virtue?

Men True.

Soc Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non acquisition and want of them but whatever \equiv accompanied by justice or honesty \equiv virtue [79] and whatever is devoid of justice \equiv vice.

Men It cannot be otherwise in my judgment.

Soc And were we not saying just now that justice temperance and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

Men Yes.

Soc And so Meno this is the way in which you mock me.

Men Why do you say that Socrates?

Soc Why because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer and you have forgotten already and tell me that virtue is the

MENO

from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong but of a figure equal every way and twice the size of this—that is to say of eight feet and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from a double line?

Boy Yes.

Soc But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?

Boy Certainly

Soc And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?

Boy Yes.

Soc Let us describe such a figure Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet?

Boy Yes.

Soc And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?

Boy True.

Soc And is not that four times four?

Boy Certainly

Soc And four times is not double?

Boy No indeed

Soc But how much?

Boy Four times as much

Soc Therefore the double line, boy has given a space not twice, but four times as much

Boy True.

Soc Four times four are sixteen—are they not?

Boy Yes.

Soc What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet—do you see?

Boy Yes

Soc And the space of four feet is made from this half line?

Boy Yes

Soc Good and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?

Boy Certainly

Soc Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one

Boy Yes I think so

Soc Very good I like to hear you say what you think And now tell me is not this a line of two feet and that of four?

Boy Yes.

Soc Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of

two feet and less than the other of four feet?

Boy It ought

Soc Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.

Boy Three feet.

Soc Then if we add a half to this line of two that will be the line of three Here are two and there is one and on the other side, here are two also and there is one and that makes the figure of which you speak?

Boy Yes.

Soc But if there are three feet thus say and three feet that way the whole space will be three times three feet?

Boy That is evident.

Soc And how much are three times three feet?

Boy Nine

Soc And how much is the double of four?

Boy Eight.

Soc Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?

Boy No

[84] Soc But from what line?—tell me exactly and if you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line

Boy Indeed Socrates, I do not know

Soc Do you see Meno what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now what is the side of a figure of eight feet but then he thought that he knew and answered confidently as if he knew and had no difficulty now he has a difficulty and neither knows nor fancies that he knows

Meno True.

Soc Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?

Meno I think that he is

Soc If we have made him doubt and given him the torpedo's shock, have we done him any harm?

Meno I think not.

Soc We have certainly as would seem assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side

Meno True

Soc But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know and had desired to know?

give a reason of their profession there have been poets also who spoke of these things by inspiration like Pindar and many others who were inspired And they say—mark now and see whether their words are true—they say that the soul of man is immortal and at one time has an end which is termed dying and at another time is born again but is never destroyed And the moral is that a man ought to live all ways in perfect holiness For in the ninth year *Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages* The soul then as being immortal and having been born again many times and having seen all things that exist whether in this world or in the world below has knowledge of them all and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue and about everything for as all nature is akin and the soul has learned all things there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning out of a single recollection all the rest if a man is strenuous and does not faint for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry for it will make us idle and is sweet only to the sluggard but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive In that confiding I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue

Men Yes Socrates but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?

Soc I told you Meno just now that you were a rogue and now you ask whether I can teach you when I am saying that there is no teaching [82] but only recollection and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a contradiction

Men Indeed Socrates I protest that I had no such intention I only asked the question from habit but if you can prove to me that what you say is true I wish that you would

Soc It will be no easy matter but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants that I may demonstrate on him

Men Certainly Come hither boy

Soc He is Greek and speaks Greek does he not?

Men Yes indeed he was born in the house

Soc Attend now to the questions which I ask him and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers

Men I will

Soc Tell me boy do you know that a figure like this is a square?

Boy I do

Soc And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?

Boy Certainly

Soc And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?

Boy Yes

Soc A square may be of any size?

Boy Certainly

Soc And if one side of the figure be of two feet and the other side be of two feet how much will the whole be? Let me explain if in one direction the space was of two feet and in the other direction of one foot the whole would be of two feet taken once?

Boy Yes

Soc But since this side is also of two feet there are twice two feet?

Boy There are

Soc Then the square is of twice two feet?

Boy Yes

Soc And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me

Boy Four Socrates

Soc And might there not be another square twice as large as this and having like this the lines equal?

Boy Yes

Soc And of how many feet will that be?

Boy Of eight feet

Soc And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square this is two feet—what will that be?

Boy Clearly Socrates it will be double

Soc Do you observe Meno that I am not teaching the boy anything but only asking him questions and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet does he not?

Men Yes

Soc And does he really know?

Men Certainly not

Soc He only guesses that because the square is double the line is double

Men True

Soc Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order (*To the Boy*) [83] Tell me, boy do you assert that a double space comes

Soc Which must have been the time when he was not a man?

Men Yes

Soc And if there have been always true thoughts in him both at the time when he was and was not a man which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge for he always either was or was not a man?

Men Oh surely

Soc And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer and try to recollect what you do not know or rather what you do not remember.

Men I feel, somehow that I like what you are saying.

Soc And I Meno like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know—that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.

Men There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.

Soc Then as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?

Men By all means Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question. What then in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature or as coming to men in some other way?

Soc Had I the command of you as well as of myself Meno I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained what it is. But as you think only of controlling me who am younger, and never of controlling yourself—such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and all with the question: Whether virtue is given by instruction or in any other way? to be argued upon hypothesis? [S.] As the geometer can when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle,

will reply: I cannot tell you as yet but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion. If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it, the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught under a hypothesis as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in that case will it be taught or not? or as we were just now saying remembered? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught?

Men I agree.

Soc Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?

Men Certainly.

Soc Then now we have made a quick end of this question if virtue is of such a nature it will be taught and if not not?

Men Certainly.

Soc The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?

Men Yes that appears to be the question which comes next in order.

Soc Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.

Men Certainly.

Soc Now if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good but if knowledge embraces all good then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?

Men True.

Soc And virtue makes us good?

Men Yes.

Soc And if we are good, then we are profitable for all good things are profitable?

Men Yes.

Soc Then virtue is profitable?

Men That is the only inference.

Soc Then no let us see what are the things which he especially profits us: Health and strength and beauty and wealth—these and the like of these. We call profitable?

Men True.

[88] Soc And yet these things may also

Men I think not Socrates

Soc Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?

Men I think so

Soc Mark now the farther development I shall only ask him and not teach him and he shall share the enquiry with me and do you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him instead of eliciting his opinion Tell me boy is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?

Boy Yes

Soc And now I add another square equal to the former one?

Boy Yes

Soc And a third which is equal to either of them?

Boy Yes

Soc Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?

Boy Very good

Soc Here then there are four equal spaces?

Boy Yes

Soc And how many times larger is this space than this other?

Boy Four times

Soc But it ought to have been twice only as you will remember

Boy True

Soc And does not this line reaching from corner to corner bisect each of these spaces?

[85]

Boy Yes

Soc And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?

Boy There are

Soc Look and see how much this space

is

Boy I do not understand

Soc Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?

Boy Yes

Soc And how many spaces are there in this section?

Boy Four

Soc And how many in this?

Boy Two

Soc And four is how many times two?

Boy Twice

Soc And this space is of how many feet?

Boy Of eight feet

Soc And from what line do you get this figure?

Boy From this

Soc That is from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?

Boy Yes

Soc And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal And if this is the proper name, then you Meno's slave are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?

Boy Certainly Socrates

Soc What do you say of him Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?

Men Yes they were all his own

Soc And yet as we were just now saying he did not know?

Men True

Soc But still he had in him those notions of his—had he not?

Men Yes

Soc Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know?

Men He has

Soc And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him as in a dream but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms he would know as well as any one at last?

Men I dare say

Soc Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself if he is only asked questions?

Men Yes

Soc And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?

Men True

Soc And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?

Men Yes

Soc But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life unless he has been taught geometry for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge Now has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him if as you say he was born and bred in your house

Men And I am certain that no one ever did teach him

Soc And yet he has the knowledge?

Men The fact Socrates is undeniable

Soc But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life then he must have had and learned it at some other time? [86]

Men Clearly he must

we fortunately have sitting by us Anytus [90] the very person of whom we should make enquiry. Him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father Anthemion, who acquired his wealth not by accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as Polycrates) but by his own skill and industry and who is a well-conditioned modest man not insolent or overbearing or annoying; moreover this son of his has received a good education as the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue and who they are. Please Anytus to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question. Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus. If we wanted Meno to be a good physician to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Any Certainly

Soc Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler should we not send him to the cobblers?

Any Yes

Soc And so forth?

Any Yes

Soc Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand payment for teaching the art and profess to teach it to any one who will come and learn? And if these were our reasons should we not be right in sending him?

Any Yes

Soc And might not the same be said of flute playing and of the other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute player refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money and be plaguing other persons to give him instruction who are not professed teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire—would not such conduct be the height of folly?

Any Yes by Zeus and of ignorant too

[91] Soc Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me about my friend Meno. He has been telling me Anytus that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the house,

and honour their parents and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction to any one who likes at a fixed price?

Any Whom do you mean Socrates?

Soc You surely know do you not Anytus that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?

Any By Heracles, Socrates forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influences to those who have to do with them.

Soc What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? Indeed I cannot believe you for I know of a single man Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Phidias who created such noble works, or any ten other statuary. How could that be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes who made the shoes or clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected and would very soon have starved whereas during more than forty years Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas and sending his disciples from him worse than he received them and he was never found out. For if I am not mistaken he was about seventy years old at his death forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession and during all that time he had a good reputation which to this day he retains and not only Protagoras but many others are well spoken of some who lived before him and others who are still living [92] No when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?

Any Out of their minds! No Socrates the young men who gave their money to them were out of their minds and their relations and

sometimes do us harm would you not think so?

Men Yes

Soc And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

Men Certainly

Soc Next let us consider the goods of the soul they are temperance justice courage quickness of apprehension memory magnanimity and the like?

Men Surely

Soc And such of these as are not knowledge but of another sort are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful as for example courage wanting prudence which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

Men True

Soc And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable but when done without sense they are hurtful?

Men Very true

Soc And in general all that the soul attempts or endures when under the guidance of wisdom ends in happiness but when she is under the guidance of folly in the opposite?

Men That appears to be true

Soc If then virtue is a quality of the soul and is admitted to be profitable it must be wisdom or prudence since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly and therefore if virtue is profitable virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?

Men I quite agree

Soc And the other goods such as wealth and the like of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil do not they also become profitable or hurtful accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?

Men True

Soc And the wise soul guides them rightly and the foolish soul wrongly

Men Yes

Soc And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, [89] if they are to be good and

so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue as we say is profitable?

Men Certainly

Soc And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?

Men I think that what you are saying *Soc* rates is very true

Soc But if this is true then the good are not by nature good?

Men I think not

Soc If they had been there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men and on their showing we should have adopted them and when we had got them we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold in order that no one might tamper with them and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state?

Men Yes *Socrates* that would have been the right way

Soc But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?

Men There appears to be no other alternative *Socrates* On the supposition that virtue is knowledge there can be no doubt that virtue is taught

Soc Yes indeed but what if the supposition is erroneous?

Men I certainly thought just now that we were right

Soc Yes *Meno* but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now but always

Men Well and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?

Soc I will try and tell you why *Meno* I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge for consider now and say whether virtue and not only virtue but anything that is taught must not have teachers and disciples?

Men Surely

Soc And conversely may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?

Men True but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

Soc I have certainly often enquired whether there were any and taken great pains to find them and have never succeeded and many have assisted me in the search and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know Here at the moment when he wanted

an illustration of the nature of true opinions while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause and thus fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge and, in the second place, they are true. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

MEN. What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.

SOC. I too speak rather in ignorance. I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I pretend to know but this is most certainly one of them.

MEN. Yes, Socrates, and you are quite right in saying so.

SOC. And am I not also right in saying that true opinion teaches the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

MEN. There again, Socrates, I think you are right.

SOC. Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action. But is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

MEN. True.

SOC. And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful.

MEN. Yes.

SOC. Setting then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him—I do not imagine either of them to be given by nature.

MEN. Not I.

SOC. Then if they are not given by nature neither are the good by nature good.

MEN. Certainly not.

SOC. And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching.

MEN. Yes.

SOC. If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge] then, as we thought, it was taught, is it not?

MEN. Yes.

SOC. And if it was taught it was wisdom?

MEN. Certainly.

SOC. And if there were teachers, it might be taught, and if there were no teachers, not?

MEN. True.

SOC. But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?

MEN. Yes.

SOC. Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?

MEN. Certainly.

SOC. And yet we admitted that it was a good?

MEN. Yes.

[99] SOC. And the right guide is useful and good?

MEN. Certainly.

SOC. And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these are the guides of man for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.

MEN. I think so too.

SOC. But if virtue is not taught, neither is it knowledge.

MEN. Clearly not.

SOC. Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.

MEN. I think not.

SOC. And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom I just spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

MEN. That is probably true, Socrates.

SOC. But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what intuition is in religion for we poets and also prophets say many things truly but they know not what they say.

MEN. So I believe.

SOC. And may we not, Meno, truly call those men "divine" who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?

MEN. Certainly.

SOC. Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen also, and all may be said to be divine and illumined, or inspired and possessed of God, in which communion they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.

MEN. Yes.

SOC. And the women too, Meno, call good

Soc And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed not only not to be teachers of others but to be ignorant themselves and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is there any thing about which even the acknowledged gentlemen are sometimes saying that this thing can be taught and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?

Men I should say certainly not

Soc But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers clearly there can be no other teachers?

Men No

Soc And if there are no teachers neither are there disciples?

Men Agreed

Soc And we have admitted that a thing can not be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

Men We have

Soc And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

Men There are not

Soc And if there are no teachers neither are there scholars?

Men That I think is true

Soc Then virtue cannot be taught?

Men Not if we are right in our view But I cannot believe Socrates that there are no good men And if there are how did they come into existence?

Soc I am afraid Meno that you and I are not good for much and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us This I say because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*)—and indeed if this be denied there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all

Men How do you mean Socrates?

Soc I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable [97] Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so

Men Yes

Soc And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action—there we were also right?

Men Yes

Soc But when we said that a man cannot be

a good guide unless he have knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) in this we were wrong

Men What do you mean by the word right?

Soc I will explain If a man knew the way to Larisa or anywhere else and went in the place and led others thither would he not be a right and good guide?

Men Certainly

Soc And a person who had a right opinion about the way but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also might he not?

Men Certainly

Soc And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth as he who knows the truth?

Men Exactly

Soc Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action whereas there is also right opinion

Men True

Soc Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

Men The difference Socrates is only that he who has knowledge will always be right but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right and sometimes not

Soc What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion so long as he has right opinion?

Men I admit the cogency of your argument and therefore Socrates I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ

Soc And shall I explain this wonder to you?

Men Do tell me

Soc You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Men What have they to do with the question?

Soc Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away

Men Well what of that?

Soc I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty for they will walk off like runaway slaves but when fastened they are of great value for they are really beautiful works of art [98] Now this is

Cf *Euthyphro* 11

even this Meletus but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety which you said that you knew so well, and of murder and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety again—is it not always the opposite of piety and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?

Euth. To be sure, Socrates.

Soc. And what is piety and what is impiety?

Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing—that is to say prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother or whoever he may be—that makes no difference and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others—of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods? (6)—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly deoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.

Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety—that I can not away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them oppose of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say *confessor* as I do, that I know nothing about them. Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.

Euth. Yes, Socrates and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

Soc. And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another and had dire quarrels, battles, and th like, as the poets say and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them and notably the robe of Athene which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

Euth. Yes, Socrates and, as I was saying, I

can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.

Soc. I dare say and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer which you have not as yet given, my friend, in the question, What is piety? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.

Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

Euth. There are.

Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?

Euth. I remember.

Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.

Euth. I will tell you, if you like.

Soc. I should very much like.

Euth. Piety then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

[7] *Soc.* Very good Euthyphro you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.

Euth. Of course.

Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?

Euth. It was.

Soc. And well said?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so it was certainly said.

Soc. And further Euthyphro the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?

Euth. Yes, that was also said.

Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I my good friend differ about a number of differences of this sort make us enemies

Soc I dare say not for you are reserved in your behaviour and seldom impart your wisdom But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody and would even pay for a listener and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative Now if as I was saying they would only laugh at me as you say that they laugh at you the time might pass gaily enough in the court but perhaps they may be in earnest and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict

Euth I dare say that the affair will end in nothing Socrates and that you will win your cause and I think that I shall win my own

Soc And what is your suit Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the defendant?

Euth I am the pursuer

Soc Of whom?

[4] *Euth* You will think me mad when I tell you

Soc Why has the fugitive wings?

Euth Nay he is not very volatile at his time of life

Soc Who is he?

Euth My father

Soc Your father! my good man?

Euth Yes

Soc And of what is he accused?

Euth Of murder Socrates

Soc By the powers Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth A man must be an extraordinary man and have made great strides in wisdom before he could have seen his way to bring such an action

Euth Indeed Socrates he must

Soc I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives—clearly he was for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him

Euth I am amused Socrates at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation for surely the pollution is the same in either case if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain If justly then your duty is to let the matter alone but if unjustly then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table proceed against him Now the man who is dead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our do-

mestic servants and slew him My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him for he regarded him as a murderer and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did die Now this was just what happened For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him that before the messenger returned from the diviner he was dead And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father Which shows Socrates how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety

Soc Good heavens Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact that supposing the circumstances to be as you state them you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?

Euth The best of Euthyphro and that which distinguishes him Socrates [5] from other men is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it?

Soc Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions and now as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion I have become your disciple You Meletus as I shall say to him acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian and sound in his opinions and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me and not have me into court but if you disapprove you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher and who will be the ruin not of the young but of the old that is to say of myself whom he instructs and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on and will not shift the indictment from me to you I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court

Euth Yes indeed Socrates and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than in me

Soc And I my dear friend knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple For I observe that no one appears to notice you—not

men this Meletus but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety which you said that you knew so well and of murder and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety again—is it not always the opposite of piety and also the same with itself having as impiety one notion which includes whatever is impious?

Euth. To be sure, Socrates.

Soc. And what is piety and what is impiety?

Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing—that is to say prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder sacrilege or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother or whoever he may be—that makes no difference and not to prosecute them as impiety. And please to consider Socrates what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words—a proof which I have already given to others—of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods? [6]—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned and when I am concerned.

Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety—that I can not away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But as you who are well informed about them approve of them I cannot do better than assent to your opinion or wisdom. What else can I say confessing as I do that I know nothing about them? Tell me for the love of Zeus whether you really believe that they are true.

Euth. Yes Socrates and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

Soc. And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another and had dire quarrels battles, and the like, as the poets say and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them and notably the robe of Athens which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

Euth. Yes, Socrates and as I was saying I

can tell you if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.

Soc. I dare say and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer which you have not as yet given my friend to the question. What is piety? When asked you only replied Doing as you do charging your father with murder.

Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.

Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

Euth. There are.

Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious and the pious pious?

Euth. I remember.

Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious such another impious.

Euth. I will tell you, if you like.

Soc. I should very much like.

Euth. Piety then, is that which is dear to the gods and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

[7] *Soc.* Very good Euthyphro you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I can not as yet tell although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.

Euth. Of course.

Soc. Come then and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?

Euth. It was.

Soc. And well said?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so it was certainly said.

Soc. And further Euthyphro the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?

Euth. Yes, that was also said.

Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I my good friend differ about a number do differences of this sort make us enemies

and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic and put an end to them by a sum?

Euth True

Soc Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?

Euth Very true

Soc And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?

Euth To be sure

Soc But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust good and evil honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences you and I and all of us quarrel when we do quarrel?

Euth Yes Socrates the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe

Soc And the quarrels of the gods noble Euthyphro when they occur are of a like nature?

Euth Certainly they are

Soc They have differences of opinion as you say, about good and evil just and unjust honourable and dishonourable there would have been no quarrels among them if there had been no such differences—would there now?

Euth You are quite right

Soc Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good and hate the opposite of them?

Euth Very true

Soc But as you say people regard the same things some as just and others as unjust—about these they dispute and so there arise wars and fightings among them [8]

Euth Very true

Soc Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods and are both hateful and dear to them?

Euth True

Soc And upon this view the same things Euthyphro will be pious and also impious?

Euth So I should suppose

Soc Then, my friend I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious but

now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

Euth But I believe Socrates that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer there would be no difference of opinion about that.

Soc Well but speaking of men Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil doer ought to be let off?

Euth I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing especially in courts of law they commit all sorts of crimes and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.

Soc But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro and yet say that they ought not to be punished?

Euth No they do not

Soc Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished but they deny their guilt do they not?

Euth Yes

Soc Then they do not argue that the evil doer should not be punished but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is and what he did and when?

Euth True

Soc And the gods are in the same case if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?

Euth That is true Socrates in the main

Soc But they join issue about the particulars—gods and men alike and if they dispute at all they dispute about some act which is called in question and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others is be unjust. Is not that true?

Euth Quite true

[9] *Soc* Well then my dear friend Euthyphro do tell me for my better instruction and information what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder and is put in chains by the master of the dead man and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn

from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods bosomily agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.

Euth. It will be a difficult task, but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.

Soc. I understand you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.

Euth. Yes indeed, Socrates, at least if they will listen to me.

Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking. I said to myself, Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the pious as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety, for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately denoted by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them. And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy, and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?

Euth. Why not, Socrates?

Soc. Why not certainly, as far as I am concerned. Euthyphro, the idea is no reason why not. It is worth this discussion will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me, as you promised, in a matter for you to consider.

Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?

Euth. We should enquire, and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy

[10] or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

Euth. I do not understand your meaning.

Socrates

Soc. I will endeavour to explain. We speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?

Euth. I think that I understand.

Soc. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Well, and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, that is the reason.

Soc. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?

Euth. True.

Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible but conversely visible because it is seen, nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible, and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And the same holds as in the previous instances: the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. And what do you say of piety? Euthyphro, is not piety according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, that is the reason.

Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Then that which is dear to the gods,

Euthyphro is not holy nor is that which is holy loved of God as you affirm but they are two different things

Euth How do you mean Socrates?

Soc I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy not to be holy because it is loved

Euth Yes

Soc But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them not loved by them because it is dear to them

Euth True

Soc But friend Euthyphro if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God and is loved because it is holy then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being [11] dear to God but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him But now you see that the reverse is the case and that they are quite different from one another For one (*θεοφιλες*) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved and the other (*σιος*) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved Thus you appear to me Euthyphro when I ask you what is the essence of holiness to offer an attribute only and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by all the gods But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness And therefore if you please I will ask you not to hide your treasure but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel) and what is impiety?

Euth I really do not know Socrates how to express what I mean For somehow or other our arguments on whatever ground we rest them seem to turn round and walk away from us

Soc Your words Euthyphro are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus and if I were the sayer or propounder of them you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his But now since these notions are your own you must find some other gibe for they certainly as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move

Euth Nay Socrates I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion not I certainly but you make them move or go round for they would never have stirred as far as I am concerned

Soc Then I must be a greater than Daedalus

for whereas he only made his own inventions to move I move those of other people as well And the beauty of it is that I would rather not For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus to be able to detain them and keep them fixed But enough of this As I perceive that you are lazy I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety and I hope that you will not grudge your labour Tell me then,—Is not that which is pious necessarily just?

Euth Yes

Soc And is then all which is just pious? or is that which is pious all just [12] but that which is just only in part and not all pious?

Euth I do not understand you Socrates

Soc And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am as you are younger But as I was saying revered friend the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy Please to exert yourself for there is no real difficulty in understanding me What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean The poet (Stasinus) sings—

*Of Zeus the author and creator of all these things
You will not tell for where there is fear there is
also reverence*

Now I disagree with this poet Shall I tell you in what respect?

Euth By all means

Soc I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease and the like evils but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear

Euth Very true

Soc But where reverence is there is fear for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action fears and is afraid of an ill reputation

Euth No doubt

Soc Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence and we should say where there is reverence there is also fear But there is not always reverence where there is fear for fear is a more extended notion and reverence is a part of fear just as the odd is a part of number and number is a more extended notion than the odd I suppose that you follow me now?

Euth Quite well

Soc That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious or the pious always the just and whether there may not be justice

where there is not piety for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part Do you dissent?

Euth No I think that you are quite right

Soc Then if piety is a part of justice I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases for instance if you had asked me what is an even number and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying a number which represents a figure having two equal sides Do you not agree?

Euth Yes, I quite agree

Soc In like manner I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me in justice or indict me for impiety as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness and their opposites

Euth Piety or holiness Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods as there is the other part of justice which attends to men

[13] *Soc* That is good Euthyphro yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of attention? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things For instance horses are said to require attention and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship Is it not so?

Euth Certainly

Soc I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

Euth Yes

Soc Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs but only the huntsman?

Euth True

Soc And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?

Euth Yes

Soc As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?

Euth Very true

Soc In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be you meaning Euthyphro?

Euth Yes

Soc And is not attention always directed good to the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved are they not?

Euth True

Soc As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?

Euth Certainly not for their hurt

Soc But for their good?

Euth Of course

Soc And does piety or holiness which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?

Euth No no that was certainly not what I meant

Soc And I Euthyphro never supposed that you did I asked you the question about the nature of the attention because I thought that you did not

Euth You do me justice Socrates that is not the sort of attention which I mean

Soc Good but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?

Euth It is such Socrates, as servants show to their masters

Soc I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods

Euth Exactly

Soc Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service having in view the attainment of some object—would you not say of health?

Euth I should

Soc Again there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?

Euth Yes Socrates with a view to the building of a ship

Soc As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a view to the building of a house?

Euth Yes

Soc And now tell me my good friend about the art which ministers to the gods what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if as you say you are of all men knowing the one who is best instructed in religion

Euth An I I speak the truth Socrates

Soc Tell me then oh tell me—what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?

Euth Many and fair Socrates are the works which they do

[14] *Soc* Why my friend, and so are those of a general But the chief of them is easily told Would you not say that story of war is the chief of them?

Euth Certainly

Soc Many and fair too, are the works of the husbandman if I am not mistaken but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?

Euth Exactly

Soc And of the many and fair things done by the gods which is the chief or principal one?

Euth I have told you already Socrates that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states just as the impious, which is displeasing to the gods is their ruin and destruction.

Soc I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked Euthyphro if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not else why when we reached the point did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer whither he leads I must follow and can only ask again what is the pious and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?

Euth Yes I do

Soc And sacrificing is giving to the gods and prayer is asking of the gods?

Euth Yes Socrates

Soc Upon this view then piety is a science of asking and giving?

Euth You understand me capitally Socrates

Soc Yes my friend the reason is that I am a votary of your science and give my mind to it and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?

Euth Yes, I do

Soc Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?

Euth Certainly

Soc And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want.

Euth Very true Socrates

Soc Then piety Euthyphro is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?

Euth That is an expression which you may use if you like

Soc But I have no particular liking for any thing but the truth. I wish however that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us [15] for there is no good thing which they do not give but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.

Euth And do you imagine Socrates that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?

Soc But if not Euthyphro what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?

Euth What else but tributes of honour and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?

Soc Piety then is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?

Euth I should say that nothing could be dearer.

Soc Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?

Euth Certainly

Soc And when you say this can you wonder at your words not standing firm but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle and he is yourself for the argument, as you will perceive comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?

Euth I quite remember

Soc And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?

Euth True

Soc Then either we were wrong in our former assertion or if we were right then we are wrong now.

Euth One of the two must be true.

Soc Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as I may. I entreat you not to scorn me but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For if any man knows you are he and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety I am confident

that you would never on behalf of a scoundrel have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.

Eth. Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry and must go now.

Soc. Alas! my companion and will you leave me in despair. I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. [16] I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.

APOLOGY



[17] How you O Athenians have been affected by my accusers I cannot tell but I know that they almost made me forget who I was—so persuasively did they speak and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth But of the many falsehoods told by them there was one which quite amazed me—I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence To say this when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker did indeed appear to me most shameless—unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth for if such is their meaning I admit that I am eloquent But in how different a way from theirs! Well as I was saying they have scarcely spoken the truth at all but from me you shall hear the whole truth not however delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases No by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment for I am confident in the justice of my cause at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you O men of Athens in the character of a juvenile orator—let no one expect it of me And I must beg of you to grant me a favour —If I defend myself in my accustomed manner and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the agora at the tables of the money-changers or anywhere else I would ask you not to be surprised and not to interrupt me on this account For I am more than seventy years of age and appearing now for the first time in a court of law I am quite a stranger to the language of the place and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger [18] whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue and after the fashion of his country —Am I making an unfair request of you?

Never mind the manner which may or may not be good but think only of the truth of my words and give heed to that let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly

And first I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers and then I will go on to the later ones For of old I have had many accusers who have accused me falsely to you during many years and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous too in their own way But far more dangerous are the others who began when you were children and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods tell me of one Socrates a wise man who speculated about the heaven above and searched into the earth beneath and made the worse appear the better cause The disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom I dread for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the gods And they are many and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days when you were more impressible than you are now—in childhood or it may have been in youth—and the cause when heard went by default for there was none to answer And hardest of all I do not know and cannot tell the names of my accusers unless in the chance case of a Comic poet All who from envy and malice have persuaded you—some of them having first convinced themselves—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with for I cannot have them up here and cross-examine them and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence and argue when there is no one who answers I will ask you then to assume with me as I was saying that my opponents are of two kinds one recent, the other ancient and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first for these accusations you heard long

before the others and much oftener

[19] Well then, I must make my defence and endeavor to clear a way in a short time a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed if to succeed be for my good and yours or I rely to avail me in my cause? The task is not an easy one. I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving the event with God in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.

I will begin at the beginning and ask what is the accusation which has given rise to the slander of me and in fact has encouraged Meletus to prefer this charge against me. Well what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors and I will sum up their words in an affidavit. Socrates is an evil-doer and a criminal person who searches into things under the earth and in heaven and he makes the worse appear the better cause and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others. Such is the nature of the accusation. It is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Anisophanes, who has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks in a circle and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any one who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus could bring so grave a charge against me. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this and to them I appeal. Speak then you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such matters. You hear the answer. And from what they say of this part of the charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.

As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher and take money. This accusation has no more truth in it than the other. Although if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an honour to him. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippasus of Elis who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own teachers by whom they might be taught for nothing [20] and come to them whom they not only pay but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them.

Anisophanes, *Clouds* 55 ff.

There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens of whom I have heard and I came to hear of him in this way.—I came across a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons I asked him "Callias?" I said "if your two sons were fools or calves there would be no difficulty in finding some one to put over them: we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence but as they are human beings whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political virtue?" You must have thought about the matter for you have sons is there any one? There is," he said. "Who is he?" said I and of what country? and what does he charge? Evenus the Parian he replied he is the man and his charge is five minae. Happy is Evenus I said to myself if he really has this wisdom and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and contented but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

I dare say Athenians that some one among you will reply "Yes Socrates but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you there must have been some odd, strange which you have been doing?" All these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men tell us then what is the cause of them for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you. Now I regard this as a fair challenge and I will endeavour to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom I reply wisdom such as may perhaps be attributed by many for as far as I am inclined to believe that I am wise whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have not myself and he who says that I have, speaks falsely and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens I must beg you not to interrupt me even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the odd which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit that witness shall be the God of Delphi—he

will tell you about my wisdom if I have any and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon—he was early a friend of mine and also a friend of yours [21] for he shared in the recent exile of the people and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon as you know was very impetuous in all his doings and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying—I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether any one was wiser than I was and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer I said to myself: What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie that would be against his nature. After long consideration I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him: Here is a man who is wiser than I am but you said that I was the wisest. Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom and observed him—his name I need not mention—he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows. When I began to talk with him I could not help thinking that he was not really wise although he was thought wise by many and still wiser by himself and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise but was not really wise and the consequence was that he hated me and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him saying to myself as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good I am better off than he is—for he knows nothing and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular then I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him and of many others besides him.

Then I went to one man after another being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked

and I lamented and feared this. But necessity was laid upon me—the word of God I thought ought to be considered first. And I said to myself: Go I must to all who appear to know [22] and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you Athenians by the dog I swear—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this. I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the Herculean labours, as I may call them which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets tragic dithyrambic and all sorts. And there I said to myself: you will be instantly detected now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry but by a sort of genius and inspiration: they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all as I may say and I was sure that they knew many fine things and here I was not mistaken for they did know many things of which I was ignorant and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets—because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance or like them in both and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.

This inquisition has led to my having many

enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind [23] and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise: and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing: he is not speaking of Socrates: he is only using my name by way of illustration: as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world obedient to the god and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one whether citizen or stranger who appears to be wise: and if he is not wise, then in indication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise: and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own: but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is another thing—young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to hear the pretenders examined: and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others: there are plenty of persons as they quickly discover who think that they know something: but really know little or nothing: and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say, is a villainous misleader of youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know and cannot tell: but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth and having no gods: and making the worse appear the better cause: for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected.—which is the truth: and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with this loud and intricate calumny. And this is the reason why my three accusers Meletus and Anytus and Lycon have set upon me. Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians [24] Lycon on behalf of the rhetorician: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And thus O men of Athens is

the truth and the whole truth: I have concealed nothing: I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me: and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—Hence has arisen the prejudice against me: and this is the reason of it, as you will find out either in this or in any future enquiry.

I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers: I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I must try to make a defence.—Let their affidavit be read: it contains something of this kind. It says that Socrates is a doer of evil who corrupts the youth and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own. Such is the charge: and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil and corrupt the youth: but I say O men of Athens that Meletus is a doer of evil: in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.

Come hither Meletus: and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?

Yes, I do.

Tell the judges, then, who is their improver for you must know as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is.—Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful and a very considerable proof of what I was saying that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

The laws.

But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is, who in the first place, knows the laws.

The judges, Socrates: who are present in court.

What, do you mean to say Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

Certainly they are.

What, all of them or some only and not others?

All of them.

By the goddess Hertha that is good never! There are plenty of improvers, [25] then. And

what do you say of the audience—do they improve them?

Yes they do

And the senators?

Yes the senators improve them

But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—or do they too improve them?

They improve them

Then every Athenian improves and elevates them all with the exception of myself and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

That is what I stoutly affirm

I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question. How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good or at least not many—the trainer of horses that is to say does them good and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true Meletus of horses or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only and all the rest of the world were their improvers. But you Meletus have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me

And now Meletus I will ask you another question—by Zeus I will. Which is better to live among bad citizens or among good ones? Answer friend I say the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good and the bad do them evil?

Certainly

And is there any one who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer my good friend the law requires you to answer—does any one like to be injured?

Certainly not

And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Intentionally I say

But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good and evil do them evil. Now is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life and am I at my age in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me I am very likely to

be harmed by him and yet I corrupt him and intentionally too—so you say although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you [26]. But either I do not corrupt them or I corrupt them unintentionally and on either view of the case you lie. If my offense is unintentional the law has no countenance of unintentional offences you ought to have taken me privately and warned and admonished me for if I had been better advised I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court which is a place not of instruction but of punishment

It will be very clear to you Athenians, as I was saying that Meletus has no care at all, great or small about the matter. But still I should like to know. Meletus in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young I suppose you mean as I infer from your indictment that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth as you say

Yes that I say emphatically

Then by the gods Meletus of whom we are speaking tell me and the court in somewhat plainer terms what you mean for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods and am not an entire atheist—this you do not lay to my charge—but only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different gods. Or do you mean that I am an atheist simply and a teacher of atheism?

I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist

What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other men?

I assure you judges that he does not for he says that the sun is stone and the moon earth

Friend Meletus you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras and you have but a bad opinion of the judges if you fancy them illiterate to such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian which are full of them. And so forsooth the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates when there are not unfre

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quently exhibitions of them at the theatre (price of admission one drachma at the most) and they might pay the money and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary news. And so Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

Nobody will believe you Meletus and I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help thinking men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere antagonism and youthful bravado (27). Has he not compounded a riddle thinking to try me? He said to himself—I shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this is not like a person who is in earnest.

I should like you O men of Athens to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency and do you Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience of my request that they could not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner.

Did ever man Meletus believe in the existence of human beings and not of human beings? I wish men of Athens that he would answer and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship and not in horses? or in flute playing and not in flute players? No myself. I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question. Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies and not in spirits or demigods?

He cannot.

How likely I am to have extracted that answer by the assistance of the court? But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine spiritual agencies (28). How could I do more for that? at any rate I believe in spiritual agencies—so you say and swear in the affidavit and yet I believe in divine beings how can I help believing in spirits or demigods—must I not? To be sure I must and the answer I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not the gods or the sons of gods?

Certainly they are.

But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you the demigods or spirits are gods and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods that is if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons—what human being will ever believe that there are no gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well affirm the existence of mules and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense Meletus could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and superhuman things and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and heroes (28).

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus any elaborate defence is unnecessary but I know only too well how many are the calamities which I have incurred and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed—not Meletus nor yet Anytus but the envy and detraction of the world which has been the death of many good men and will probably be the death of many more there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Some one will say And are you not ashamed Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer. There you are mistaken a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas upon your view the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much and the son of Thetis above all who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace and when he was so eager to slay Hector his goddess mother said to him that if he avenged his companion Patroclus and let Hector he would die himself—Fate, he said in these or the like words, waits for you next after Hector he receiving this warning utterly despised danger and death and instead of fearing them feared rather to live in dishonour and not to avenge his friend. Let me declare forthwith he replies and be avenged of my enemy rather than abide here by the beaked ships a laughing stock and a burden of the

earth Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger he should not think of death or of any thing but of disgrace And this, O men of Athens is a true saying

Strange indeed would be my conduct O men of Athens if I who when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium remained where they placed me like any other man facing death—if now when as I conceive and imagine God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men I were to desert my post through fear of death, [29] or any other fear that would indeed be strange and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death fancying that I was wise when I was not wise For the fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom and not real wisdom being a pretence of knowing the unknown and no one knows whether death which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort the ignorance which is the conceit that man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from men in general and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are—that whereas I know but little of the world below I do not suppose that I know but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better whether God or man is evil and dishonourable and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil And therefore if you let me go now and are not convinced by Anytus who said that since I had been prosecuted I must be put to death (or if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted at all) and that if I escape now your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words—if you say to me Socrates this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let off but upon one condition that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die—if this was the condition on which you let me go I should reply Men of Athens I honour and love you but I shall obey God rather than you and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy exhorting any one whom I meet and say

ing to him after my manner You my friend, —a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens—are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honour and reputation and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul which you never regard or heed at all? And if the person with whom I am arguing says Yes but I do care then I do not leave him or let him go at once but I proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him and if I think that he has no virtue in him but only says that he has I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less [30] And I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet young and old citizen and alien but especially to the citizens inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God and I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God For I do nothing but go about persuading you all old and young alike not to take thought for your persons or your properties but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul I tell you that virtue is not given by money but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man public as well as private This is my teaching and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth I am a mischievous person But if any one says that this is not my teaching he is speaking an untruth Wherefore O men of Athens I say to you do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not but whichever you do understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times

Men of Athens do not interrupt but hear me there was an understanding between us that you should hear me to the end I have something more to say at which you may be inclined to cry out but I believe that to hear me will be good for you and therefore I beg that you will not cry out I would have you know that if you kill such an one as I am you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me Nothing will injure me not Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself I do not deny that Anytus may perhaps kill him, or drive him into exile or deprive him of civil rights and he may imagine and others may imagine that he is inflicting a great injury upon him but there I do not agree For the evil of doing as he is doing—the evil of unjustly taking away the life of another—is greater far

And now Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me who if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech am a sort of gadfly given to the state by God and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life [31] I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep) and you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives unless God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to you by God the proof of my mission is this — if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years and have been doing yours coming to you individually like a father or elder brother exhorting you to regard virtue such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid there would have been some sense in my doing so, but now as you will perceive notwithstanding the impudence of my prosecutors dates to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one of that they have no wiles. And I have a sufficient witness in the truth of what I say — my poverty.

Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busy myself with the concern of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and address the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me speak at undriven times and in different places of an oracle or something which comes to me, and is the divinity which Miletus laid rules in the indictment. This sign which is a kind of voice first began to come to me when I was a child it always forbids but never commands me to do anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from being a politician. And rightly as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth for the truth is, that no man who

goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state, [32] will save his life. He who will fight for the right if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station and not a public one.

I can give you convincing evidence of what I say not words only but what you value far more — actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my own life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death and that as I should have refused to yield I must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts not very interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held O men of Athens, was that of senator the tribe Antiochia, which is my tribe had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae and you proposed to try them in a body contrary to law as you all thought afterwards but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality and I gave my vote against you and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you called and shouted I made up my mind that I would run the risk having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power they sent for me and four others into the rotunda and bade us bring Leon the Salamian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes and then I showed not in word only but in deed that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression I cared not a straw for death, and that my great and only care was fear. I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words.

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always maintained the right and had made justice, as I ought the first thing? No indeed men

of Athens neither I nor any other man [33] But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples. But if any one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission whether he be young or old he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who pay but any one whether he be rich or poor may ask and answer me and listen to my words and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one neither result can be justly imputed to me for I never taught or professed to teach him anything. And if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard let me tell you that he is lying.

But I shall be asked Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told you already, Athenians the whole truth about this matter they like to hear the cross examination of the pretenders to wisdom there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross examining other men has been imposed upon me by God and has been signified to me by oracles visions and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever intimated to any one. This is true O Athenians or if not true would be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth those of them who are now grown up and become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge or if they do not like to come themselves some of their relatives fathers brothers or other kinsmen should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself and there is Critobulus his son whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Spheerium who is the father of Aeschines—he is present and also there is Antiphon of Cephissus who is the father of Epigenes and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theodotides and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead and therefore he at any rate will not seek to stop him) and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus who had a brother Theages and Adeimantus the son of Ariston [34] whose brother Plato is present and Acantodorus who is the brother of Apollodorus whom I also see. I might mention a great many others some of

whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech and let him still produce them if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him say if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay Athenians the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter of the injurer of their kindred as Meletus and Anytus call me not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why indeed except for the sake of truth and justice and because they know that I am speaking the truth and that Meletus is a liar.

Well Athenians this and the like of this is all the defence which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at me when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar or even a less serious occasion prayed and entreated the judges with many tears and how he produced his children in court which was a moving spectacle, to enter with a host of relations and friends where as I who am probably in danger of my life will do none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind and he may be set against me and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now if there be such a person among you—mind I do not say that there is—to him I may fairly reply. My friend, I am a man and like other men a creature of flesh and blood and not of wood or stone as Homer says and I have a family yes, and sons, O Athenians three in number one almost a man and two others who are still young and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any self assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question of which I will not now speak. But having regard to public opinion I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself and to you and to the whole state. One who has reached my years and who has a name for wisdom ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men [35]. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage and any other virtue demean themselves in this way how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation when they have been condemned behaving in the strangest manner they seemed

to fancy that they were going to suffer some thing dreadful if they died and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live and I think that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who have a reputation and if they are done, you ought not to permit them. You ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous, than him who holds his peace.

But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment and he has sworn that he will judge according to the law, and not according to his own good pleasure and we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow yourself to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonourable and unjust and wrong especially now when I am being tried for perjury on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so—far otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.

Secondly, *ὁμολογῶντος*

There are many reasons why I am not grieved. O men of Athens, at the vote of condemnation [36] I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger but now had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say I think, that I have escaped Meletus. I may say more so, if I call out the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that he could not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmæ.

And so he proposes death as the penalty

And what shall I propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my due? What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life but has been careless of what the many care for—wealth and family interests and military offices, and speaking in the assembly and magistracies and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to be a politician and live, I did not go

here I could do no good to you or to myself but where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to the interests of the state and that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one? Doubtless some good thing. O men of Athens, if he has his reward and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor and who desires leisure that he may instruct you. There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the Prytæum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough and he only gives you the appearance of happiness and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty fairly I should say that maintenance in the Prytæum is the just return [37]

Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one, although I cannot convince you—the time has been too short if there were a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided in one day then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders and as I am convinced that I never wronged another I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil why should I propose a penalty which could certainly be an evil? Shall I say unprievable? And why should I live in prison, and

of Athens neither I nor any other man [33] But I have been always the same in all my actions public as well as private and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples. But if any one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission whether he be young or old he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who pay but any one whether he be rich or poor may ask and answer me and listen to my words and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one neither result can be justly imputed to me for I never taught or professed to teach him anything. And if any one says that he has ever learned or heard any thing from me in private which all the world has not heard let me tell you that he is lying.

But I shall be asked Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told you already Athenians the whole truth about this matter they like to hear the cross examination of the pretenders to wisdom there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross examining other men has been imposed upon me by God and has been signified to me by oracles visions and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever intimated to any one. This is true O Athenians or if not true would be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth those of them who are now grown up and become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge or if they do not like to come themselves some of their relatives fathers brothers or other kinsmen should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself and there is Critobulus his son whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus who is the father of Aeschines—he is present and also there is Antiphon of Cephissus who is the father of Epi genes and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theodotides and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead and therefore he at any rate will not seek to stop him) and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus who had a brother Theages and Adeimantus the son of Ariston [34] whose brother Plato is present and Acontodorus who is the brother of Apollodorus whom I also see. I might mention a great many others some of

whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him say if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter of the injurer of their kindred as Meletus and Anytus call me not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why indeed except for the sake of truth and justice and because they know that I am speaking the truth and that Meletus is a liar.

Well Athenians this and the like of this is all the defence which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is offended at me when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar or even a less serious occasion prayed and entreated the judges with many tears and how he produced his children in court which was a moving spectacle together with a host of relations and friends while as I who am probably in danger of my life will do none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind and he may be set against me and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now if there be such a person among you—mind I do not say that there is—to him I may fairly reply. My friend I am a man and like other men a creature of flesh and blood and not of wood or stone as Homer says and I have a family yes and sons, O Athenians three in number one almost a man and two others who are still young and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any self assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question of which I will not now speak. But having regard to public opinion I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself and to you and to the whole state. One who has reached my years and who has a name for wisdom ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men [35]. And it those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage and any other virtue demean themselves in this way how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation when they have been condemned behaving in the strangest manner they seemed

accusers of you than there are now accusers whom hitherto I have restrained and as they are younger they will be more inconsiderate with you and you will be more offended at them. If you think that by killing men you can prevent some one from censuring your evil deeds you are mistaken that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honourable the easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have condemned me.

Friends, who would have acquitted me I would like also to talk with you about the thing which has come to pass. The magistrates are busy and before I go to the place at which I must die stay then a little, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time. [40] You are my friends and I should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. O my judges—for you I may truly call judges—I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles. If I was going to make a slip or error in any matter and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning or when I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking at anything which I was going to say and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech but now in nothing I either did or did not do the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what has happened to me is a good and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. For the most obvious sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.

Let us reflect in another way and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good for one of two things—either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or as men say there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed

even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below [41] he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrim age will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay if this be true let me die again and again. Myself too shall have a wonderful interest in these meetings and conversing with Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon and any other ancient hero who has suffered death through an unjust judgment and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge as in this world, so also in the next and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too? What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions assuredly not. For besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal if what is said is true.

Wherefore, O judges be of good cheer about death and know of a certainty that no evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble wherefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also I am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers they have done me no harm, although

be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection I should have to lie in prison for money I have none and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix) I must indeed be blinded by the love of life if I am so irrational as to expect that when you who are my own citizens cannot endure my discourses and words and have found them so grievous and odious that you will have no more of them others are likely to endure me. No indeed men of Athens that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age wandering from city to city ever changing my place of exile and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that wherever I go there as here the young men will flock to me and if I drive them away their elders will drive me out at their request and if I let them come their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

Some one will say Yes Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue and then you may go into a foreign city and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God and therefore that I can not hold my tongue [38] you will not believe that I am serious and if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others is the greatest good of man and that the unexamined life is not worth living you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true although a thing of which is hard for me to persuade you. Also I have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay and not have been much the worse. But I have none and therefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well perhaps I could afford a mina and therefore I propose that penalty. Plato Crito Critobulus and Apollodorus my friends here bid me say thirty minae and they will be the sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty for which sum they will be ample security to you.

Not much time will be gained O Athenians in return for the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city who will say that you killed Socrates a wise man for they will

call me wise even although I am not wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years as you may perceive and not far from death. I am speaking now not to all of you but only to those who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to them. You think that I was convicted because I had no words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal—I mean if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to do weeping and wailing and lamenting and saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which as I maintain are unworthy of me. I thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common or mean when in danger nor do I now repent of the style of my defence. I would rather die having spoken after my manner than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of escaping death [39]. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms and fall on his knees before his pursuers he may escape death and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death if a man is willing to save and do anything. The difficulty my friends is not to avoid death but to avoid unrighteousness for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly and the slower runner has overtaken me and my accusers are keen and quick and the faster runner who is unrighteousness has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death,—they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong and I must abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated—and I think that they are well.

And now O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you for I am about to die and in the hour of death men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers that immediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose far otherwise. For I say that there will be more ac-

CRITO

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES CRITO Scene The Prison of Socrates



[43] *Socrates* Why have you come at this hour *Crito*? it must be quite early?

C Yes certainly

Soc What is the exact time?

Cr The dawn is breaking

Soc I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.

Cr He knows me, because I often come, *Socrates* moreover I have done him a kindness

Soc And are you only just risen?

C No I came some time ago

Soc Then why did you sit and say nothing instead of at once awakening me?

C I should not have liked myself *Socrates*, to be in such great trouble and unrest as you are—indeed I should not I have been watching with amazement your peaceful slumbers and for that reason I did not awake you because I wished to minimize the pain I have always thought you to be of a happy disposition but never did I see anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity

Soc Why *Crito* when a man has reached my age he ought not to be repining at the approach of death

C And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining

Soc That is true But you have not told me when you come at this early hour

C I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful not, as I believe, to yourself but to all of us who are your friends and saddest of all to me

Soc What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die?

C No the ship has not actually arrived

but she will probably be here to-day as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they left her there and therefore to-morrow *Socrates* will be the last day of your life

Soc Very well *Crito* if such is the will of God I am willing but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day

[44] *Cr* Why do you think so?

Soc I will tell you I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship

Cr Yes that is what the authorities say

Soc But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow this I infer from a vision which I had last night or rather only just now when you fortunately allowed me to sleep

Cr And what was the nature of the vision?

Soc There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said O *Socrates*,

Thet d day h c to ferul Phth sh tthou go

Cr What a singular dream, *Socrates*!

Soc There can be no doubt about the meaning *Crito* I think.

Cr Yes the meaning is only too clear But, oh! my beloved *Socrates*, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced but there is another evil people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money but that I did not care No can there be a worse disgrace than this—that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape and that you refused

they did not mean to do me any good and for this I may gently blame them

Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them and I would have you trouble them as I have troubled you if they seem to care about riches or anything more than about virtue or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing—then

reprove them as I have reprovèd you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing [42] And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands

The hour of departure has arrived and we go our ways—I to die and you to live. Which is better God only knows

condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be false for the sake of talking—mere childish nonsense? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito—whether under my present circumstances the argument appears to be in any way different or not and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument I have as I believe is maintained by many persons of authority as to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow—at least, [47] there is no human probability of this—and therefore you are disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only are to be valued and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?

Cr Certainly

Soc The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

Cr Yes

Soc And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil?

C Certainly

Soc And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—his physician or trainer whoever he may be?

Cr Of one man only

Soc And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only and not of the many?

Cr Clearly so

Soc And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?

C True

Soc And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?

C Certainly he will

Soc And what will that be whether tending in and what affecting, in the disobedient person?

C Clearly affecting the body that is what is destroyed by the evil

Soc Very good and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them, or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice—there is such a principle?

Cr Certainly there is, Socrates

Soc Take a parallel instance—if acting under the advice of those who have no understanding we destroy that which is improved by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has been destroyed is—the body?

Cr Yes

Soc Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?

Cr Certainly not

Soc And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we suppose that principle [48] whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?

Cr Certainly not

Soc More honourable than the body?

Cr Far more

Soc Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us, but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable—"Well," some one will say, "but the many can kill us."

Cr Yes, Socrates, that will clearly be the answer

Soc And it is true, but still I find with surprise that the old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition—that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?

Cr Yes, that also remains unshaken

Soc And a good life is equivalent to a just and honourable one—that holds also?

Cr Yes, it does

Soc From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the

Soc But why my dear *Crito* should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men and they are the only persons who are worth considering will think of these things truly as they occurred

Cr But you see *Socrates* that the opinion of the many must be regarded for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest evil to any one who has lost their good opinion

Soc I only wish it were so *Crito* and that the many could do the greatest evil for then they would also be able to do the greatest good—and what a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do neither for they cannot make a man either wise or foolish and what ever they do is the result of chance

Cr Well I will not dispute with you but please to tell me *Socrates* whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends are you not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away and lose either the whole or a great part of our property or that even a worse evil may happen to us? [45] Now if you fear on our account be at ease for in order to save you we ought surely to run this or even a greater risk be persuaded then and do as I say

Soc Yes *Crito* that is one fear which you mention but by no means the only one

Cr Fear not—there are persons who are willing to get you out of prison at no great cost and as for the informers they are far from being exorbitant in their demands—a little money will satisfy them. My means which are certainly ample are at your service and if you have a scruple about spending all mine here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs and one of them *Simmius* the Theban has brought a large sum of money for this very purpose and *Cebes* and many others are prepared to spend their money in helping you to escape. I say therefore do not hesitate on our account and do not say as you did in the court that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself anywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may go and not in Athens only there are friends of mine in Thessaly if you like to go to them who will value and protect you and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified *Socrates* in betraying your own life when you might be saved in acting thus you are playing into the hands of your enemies who are hurrying on

Cf Apology 37

your destruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your own children for you might bring them up and educate them instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be choosing the easier part not the better and manlier which would have been more becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions like yourself. And indeed I am ashamed not only of you but of us who are your friends when I reflect that the whole business will be attributed entirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been managed differently and this last act or crowning folly will seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice who might have saved you [46] if we had been good for anything and you might have saved yourself for there was no difficulty at all. See now *Socrates* how sad and discreditable are the consequences both to us and you. Make up your mind then or rather have your mind already made up for the time of deliberation is over and there is only one thing to be done which must be done this very night, and if we delay at all will be no longer practicable or possible. I beseech you therefore *Socrates*, be persuaded by me and do as I say

Soc Dear *Crito* your zeal is invaluable if a right one but if wrong the greater the zeal the greater the danger and therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best and now that this chance has befallen me I cannot repudiate my own words the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour and unless we can at once find other and better principles I am certain not to agree with you no not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations deaths frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. What will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men?—we were saying that some of them are to be regarded and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was

Cf Apology 30

one, and especially a rhetorician will have a good deal to say on behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He will argue that this law should not be set aside and shall we reply 'Yes' but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence. Suppose I say that?

Cr Very good Socrates

Soc And what that our agreement with you? the law would answer or were you to abide by the sentence of the state? And if I were to express my astonishment at their words, the law would probably add "Answer Socrates, instead of opening your eyes—you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us—What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begetting you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage? None I should reply. Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education of children in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic? Right, I should reply. Well then since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or your master if you had one because you have been struck or reviled by him, or received something evil at his hands?—you would not say this? [51] And because we think right to destroy you do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed and gently and reverently entreated when angry even more than a father and either to be persuaded or if not persuaded to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be en-

dured in silence and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank but whether in battle or in a court of law or in any other place he must do what his city and his country order him or he must change their view of what is just and if he may do no violence to his father or mother much less may he do violence to his country. What answer shall we make to this Crito? Do the laws speak truly or do they not?

Cr I think that they do

Soc Then the laws will say "Consider Socrates, if we are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For having brought you into the world and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give we further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him that if he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city and made our acquaintance he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any one who does not like us and the city and who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city may go where he likes retaining his property. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state and still remains has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents secondly because we are the authors of his education thirdly because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands [52] and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust and we do not rudely impose them but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us—that is what we offer and he does neither

"These are the sort of accusations to which as we were saying you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions you above all other Athenians. Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. There is clear proof" they will say Socrates that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city which as you never leave you may be supposed to love. For you never

Cf. *Phaedrus* 230.

Athenians and if I am clearly right in escaping then I will make the attempt but if not I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention of money and loss of character and the duty of educating one's children are I fear only the doctrines of the multitude who would be as ready to restore people to life if they were able as they are to put them to death—and with as little reason. But now since the argument has thus far prevailed the only question which remains to be considered is whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks or whether in reality we shall not do rightly and if the latter then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

Cr I think that you are right Socrates how then shall we proceed?

Soc Let us consider the matter together and do you either refute me if you can and I will be convinced or else cease my dear friend from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians for I highly value your attempts to persuade me to do so but I may not be persuaded against my own better judgment [49] And now please to consider my first position and try how you can best answer me.

Cr I will.

Soc Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong or that in one way we ought and in another we ought not to do wrong or is doing wrong always evil and dishonourable as I was just now saying and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made with in a few days to be thrown away? And have we at our age been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or in spite of the opinion of the many and in spite of consequences whether better or worse shall we insist on the truth of what was then said that injustice is always an evil and dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?

Cr Yes.

Soc Then we must do no wrong?

Cr Certainly not.

Soc Nor when injured injure in return as the many imagine for we must injure no one at all?

Cr Clearly not.

Soc Again Crito may we do evil?

Cf. Republic I. 335

Cr Surely not Socrates.

Soc And what of doing evil in return for evil which is the morality of the many—is that just or not?

Cr Not just.

Soc For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr Very true.

Soc Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider Crito whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held and never will be held by any considerable number of persons and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me then whether you agree with and assent to my first principle that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I have ever thought and continue to think but if you are of another opinion let me hear what you have to say. If however you remain of the same mind as formerly I will proceed to the next step.

Cr You may proceed for I have not changed my mind.

Soc Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in the form of a question—Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Cr He ought to do what he thinks right.

Soc But if this is true what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians [50] do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just—what do you say?

Cr I cannot tell Socrates for I do not know.

Soc Then consider the matter in this way—Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like) and the laws and the government come and interrogate me. Tell us Socrates, they say what are you about? are you not going by an act of yours to overturn us—the laws and the whole state as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown in which the decisions of law have no power but are set aside and trampled upon by individuals? What will be our answer Crito to these and the like words? Any

one, and especially a rhetorician will have a good deal to say on behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He will argue that this law should not be set aside and shall we reply Yes but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence. Suppose I say that?

Cr Very good, Socrates.

Soc And was that our agreement with you? the law would answer or were you to abide by the sentence of the state? And if I were to express my astonishment at their words, the law would probably add Answer Socrates, instead of opening your eyes—you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us—What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempt to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and beget you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage? None I should reply. Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education of children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic? Right, I should reply. Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us, nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or redden or do any other evil to your father or your master if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by him, or received a blow there it is at his hands?—you would not say that? [S] And because we think right to destroy you do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and held dear and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also we be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father and either to be persuaded, or if not persuaded, to be obeyed. And when we are punished by her whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be en-

dured in silence and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right, neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank but whether in battle or in a court of law or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him or he must change their view of what is just and if he may do no violence to his father or mother much less may he do violence to his country? What answer shall we make to this Crito? Do the laws speak truly or do they not?

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Soc Then the laws will say Consider Socrates if we are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For having brought you into the world and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him that if he does not like us then he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city and made our acquaintance he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any one who does not like us and the city and who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city may go where he likes, retaining his property. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state and still remains has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents secondly because we are the authors of his education thirdly because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands [S] and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust and we do not rudely impose them but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us—that is what we offer and he does neither.

These are the sort of accusations to which as we were saying you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions you above all other Athenians. Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. There is clear proof, they will say Socrates that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city which as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never

went out of the city either to see the games except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our state: we were your special favourites and you acquiesced in our government of you: and here in this city you begat your children which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover you might in the course of the trial if you had liked have fixed the penalty at banishment: the state which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile: and that you were not unwilling to die. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments and pay no respect to us the laws of whom you are the destroyer: and are doing what only a miserable slave would do: running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed and not in word only? Is that true or not? How shall we answer Crito? Must we not assent?

Cr. We cannot help it, Socrates.

Soc. Then will they not say: You Socrates are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure: not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception: but after you have had seventy years to think of them: during which time you were at liberty to leave the city if we were not to your mind: or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice: and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete: both which states are often praised by you for their good government [53] or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you above all other Athenians seemed to be so fond of the state: or in other words of us her laws (and who would care about a state which has no laws?) that you never stirred out of her: the halt the blind the maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so Socrates: if you will take our advice do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

For just consider: if you transgress and err in this sort of way: what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived

of citizenship, or will lose their property is tolerably certain: and you yourself if you fly to one of the neighbouring cities as for example Thebes or Megara: both of which are well governed: will come to them as an enemy. Socrates: and their government will be against you: and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws: and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the young: and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Crito's friends in Thessaly: where there is great disorder and licence: they will be charmed to hear the tale of your escape from prison: set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is of runaways: but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you were not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper: but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things: you will live: but how?—as the flatterer of all men and the servant of all men: and doing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly: having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue? [54] Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children—you want to bring them up and educate them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is this the benefit which you will confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive although absent from them: for your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them: and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will not take care of them? Nay: but if they who call themselves friends are good for anything: they will—to be sure they will.

Listen then Socrates to us who have

brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil, a victim not of the laws but of men. But if you go forth retuning evil for evil and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say yourself, your friends, your country and us, we shall be angry with you while you

live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy, for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen then to us and not to Crito.

This dear Crito is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that any thing more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak if you have anything to say.

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to follow whither he leads.

PHAEDO

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE PHAEDO *who is the narrator of the Dialogue to Echecrates of*
Phlius SOCRATES APOLLODORUS, SIMMIAS CEBES CRITO ATTENDANT OF THE PRISON
Scene The Prison of Socrates Place of the Narration Phlius

[57] *Echecrates* WERE you yourself *Phaedo* in the prison with Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?

Phaedo Yes *Echecrates* I was

Ech I should so like to hear about his death What did he say in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison but no one knew anything more for no *Phliasian* ever goes to Athens now and it is a long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither so that we had no clear account

[58] *Phaed* Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?

Ech Yes some one told us about the trial and we could not understand why having been condemned he should have been put to death not at the time but long afterwards What was the reason of this?

Phaed An accident *Echecrates* the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was tried

Ech What is this ship?

Phaed It is the ship in which according to Athenian tradition Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths and was the saviour of them and of himself And they are said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to Delos Now this custom still continues and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship is a holy season during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions

and when the vessel is detained by contrary winds the time spent in going and returning is very considerable As I was saying the ship was crowned on the day before the trial and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned

Ech What was the manner of his death *Phaedo*? What was said or done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present—so that he had no friends near him when he died?

Phaed No there were several of them with him

Ech If you have nothing to do I wish that you would tell me what passed as exactly as you can

Phaed I have nothing at all to do and will try to gratify your wish To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him

Ech You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you and I hope that you will be as exact as you can

Phaed I had a singular feeling at being in his company For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend and therefore I did not pity him *Echecrates* he died so fearlessly and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious that to me he appeared blessed I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call [59] and that he would be happy if any man ever was when he arrived there and

therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy is as the theme of which we speak). I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of pain for I reflected that he was soon to die and this painful feeling was shared by us all. We were laughing and weeping, by turns, expressing the exorable Apollodorus—you know the sort of man.

Ech. Yes.

Phaed. He was quite beside himself and I and all of us were greatly moved.

Ech. Who were present?

Phaed. Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Anaxenes likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paenias, Menexenus, and some others. Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.

Ech. Were there any strangers?

Phaed. Yes, there were *Simias* the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedonides Euboean and Teetion, who came from Megara.

Ech. And was Arius there, and Cleombrotus?

Phaed. No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Ech. Any one else?

Phaed. I think that these were nearly all.

Ech. Well, and what did you talk about?

Phaed. I will begin at the beginning, and end as to repeat the entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which is not far from the prison. There we used to wait talking with one another until the opening of the doors (for they are not opened very early) then we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we quitted the prison in the evening, that the sacred ship had come from Delos and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our arrival the jailer who answered the door instead of admitting us, came out and told us to stay until he called us. For the Eleven, he said, are no longer with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day. He soon returned and said that we might come in. [60] On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and *Xanthippe*, whom you know sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a

cry and said, as women will. O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you." Socrates turned to Crito and said "Crito, let some one take her home." Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away crying out and bearing herself. And when she was gone Socrates, sitting up on the couch bent and rubbed his leg saying as he was rubbing. How singular is the thing, called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other: their bodies are two but they are joined by a single head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how when he could not, he fastened their heads together and thus is the reason why when one comes the other follows as I know by my own experience now. When after the pain in my leg, which was caused by the chain, pleasure appears to succeed.

Upon this Cebes said I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Euenus the poet—I will be sure to ask it again and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him—he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.

Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth—that I had no idea of writing him or his poems to do so, as I knew would be no easy task. But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams—that I should compose music. The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another but always saying the same or nearly the same words. Cultivate and make music, said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy which has been the pursuit of my life, [61] and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing in the same way that the competitor in a race is bid-

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Ech You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you and I hope that you will be as exact as you can

Phaed I had a singular feeling at being in his company For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend and therefore I did not pity him *Echecrates* he died so fearlessly and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious that to me he appeared blessed I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call [59] and that he would be happy, if any man ever was when he arrived there and

therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we were) I was pained, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of pain for I remembered that he was soon to die, and this double feeling, as shared by us all, we were laughing and weeping by turns, expecting the entrance of Apollonius—you know the son of man?

Ech Yes.

Phaed He was quite beside himself and I and all of us were greatly moved.

Ech Who were present?

Phaed Of many Athenians there were, besides Apollonius, Critobulus and his father Critus, Hermogenes, Epistates, Aeschines, Antiphanes, the famous Ctesippus of the deme of Paenium, Laches, and some others. Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.

Ech Were there any strangers?

Phaed Yes, there were Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedon—Euthydemus and Terpsion, who came from Megara.

Ech And was Anaxippus there, and Cleombrotus?

Phaed No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Ech Say our cue.

Phaed I think that these were nearly all.

Ech Well, and what did you talk about?

Phaed I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling early in the morning in the court in which the trial took place, and which is not far from the prison. There we used to wait, some with one another until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early) then we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our arrival the porter who answered the door instead of admitting us, came out and told us to stay until he called us. For the Eleven, he said, "are now with Socrates they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day." He soon returned and said that we might come in. [Go.] On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, who as you know runs by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a

cry and said, as women will "O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you." Socrates turned to Criton and said "Criton, let some one take her home." Some of Criton's people accordingly led her away crying, out and beating herself. And then she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent and rubbed his leg saying as he was rubbing "How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other for their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife and how when he could not, he fastened their heads together and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows as I know by my own experience now. I am still the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain, pleasure appears to succeed.

Upon this Cebes said I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Euenus the poet—he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him—he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verses, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.

Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth—that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems to do so, as I knew would be no easy task. But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams "that I should compose music. The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another but always saying the same or nearly the same words. Cultivate and make music," said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy which has been the pursuit of my life, (61) and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing in the same way that the competitor in a race is bid-

den by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word and being under sentence of death and the festival giving me a respite I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple and in obedience to the dream to compose a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival and then considering that a poet if he is really to be a poet should not only put together words but should invent stories and that I have no invention I took some fables of Aesop which I had ready at hand and which I knew—they were the first I came upon—and turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus Cebes and bid him be of good cheer say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man and not tarry and that to-day I am likely to be going for the Athenians say that I must.

Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent companion of his I should say that as far as I know him he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.

Why said Socrates—is not Evenus a philosopher?

I think that he is said Simmias.

Then he or any man who has the spirit of philosophy will be willing to die but he will not take his own life for that is held to be unlawful.

Here he changed his position and put his legs off the couch on to the ground and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.

Why do you say enquired Cebes that a man ought not to take his own life but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?

Socrates replied: And have you Cebes and Simmias who are the disciples of Philolaus never heard him speak of this?

Yes but his language was obscure Socrates.

My words, too are only an echo but there is no reason why I should not repeat what I have heard and indeed as I am going to another place it is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?

Then tell me Socrates why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have certainly heard Philolaus about whom you were just now asking affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes and there are others who say the same although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.

[6.] Do not lose heart replied Socrates and the day may come when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception and why when a man is better dead he is not permitted to be his own benefactor but must wait for the hand of another.

Very true said Cebes laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian.

I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying but there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away: this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians and that we men are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree?

Yes I quite agree said Cebes.

And if one of your own possessions an ox or an ass for example took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?

Certainly replied Cebes.

Then if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait and not take his own life until God summons him as he is now summoning me.

Yes Socrates said Cebes there seems to be truth in what you say. And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions with the willingness to die which you were just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers is not reasonable for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so—he may argue that he had better run away from his master not considering that his duty is to remain to the end and not to run away from the good and that there would be no sense in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this Socrates is the reverse of what was just now said for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.

[6.] The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he turning to us,

is a man who is always enquiring and is not so easily convinced by the first thing which he hears.

And certainly a *Ides* *Summus*, the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly at once and lightly leave a master who is better than himself? And I rather imagine that *Cebes* is referring to you: he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.

Yes, replied *Socrates*: there is reason in what you say. And so you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?

We should like you to do so, said *Summus*.

Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, *Summus* and *Cebes*, that I ought to be grieved at death if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods: who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters) and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed better than the wise whom I leave behind: and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old some far better thing for the good than for the evil.

But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, *Socrates*? said *Summus*. Will you not impart them to us?—for they are a benefit in which we too are entitled to share. More than if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against your self.

I will do my best, replied *Socrates*. But you must first let me hear what *Crito* wants: he has long been wishing to say something to me.

Only this, *Socrates*, replied *Crito*: the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much: talking he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison: persons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.

Then said *Socrates*, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary: that shall

I know quite well what you would say, replied *Crito*: but I was obliged to satisfy him.

Never mind him, he said.

And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be

of good cheer when he is about to die: and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the [64] other world. And how this may be *Summus* and *Cebes*, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men: they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying: and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing, and desiring?

Summus said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me laugh, *Socrates*: for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death: and that they have found them out to be desiring of the death which they desire.

And they are right, *Summus*, in thinking so: with the exception of the words they have found them out: for they have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death. But enough of them—let us discuss the matter among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied *Summus*.

Is it not the separation of soul and body? And so to be dead is the completion of this: when the soul exists in herself and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul: what is this but death?

Just so, he replied.

There is another question which will probably throw light on our present enquiry: if you and I can agree about it—Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered *Summus*.

And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body: for example the acquisition of costly raiment or sandals or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like as far as he can to get away

den by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word and being under sentence of death and the festival giving me a respite I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple and in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival and then considering that a poet if he is really to be a poet should not only put together words but should invent stories and that I have no invention I took some fables of Aesop which I had ready at hand and which I knew—they were the first I came upon—and turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus Cebes and bid him be of good cheer say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man and not tarry and that to-day I am likely to be going for the Athenians say that I must.

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if while in company with the body the soul can not have pure knowledge, on of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all or if at all [67] after death. For then and not till then the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communication with the body and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth. For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another and thinking. You would agree would you not?

Undoubtedly Socrates

But, O my friend if this be true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go when I have come to the end of my journey I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing and not I only but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.

Certainly replied Simmias

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body as I am saying before the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all desires out of the body the dwelling in her own place alone as in another life so also in this as far as she can—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true he said

And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?

To be sure he said

And the true philosophers, and they only ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

That is true

And I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death and yet pine when it comes upon them.

Clearly

And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible.

Look at the matter thus—if they have been in every way the enemies of the body and are wanting to be alone with the soul when this desire of theirs is granted how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—and at the [68] same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will. O my friend if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there and there only he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true he would be very absurd as I was saying if he were afraid of death.

He would indeed replied Simmias

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power or both?

Quite so he replied

And is not courage Simmias a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?

Certainly

There is temperance again which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions and in the sense of superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body and can pass their lives in philosophy?

Most surely

For the courage and temperance of other men if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.

How so?

Well he said you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

Very true he said

And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

That is quite true

Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear and because they are afraid and yet that man should be courageous from fear and because he is a coward is surely a strange thing.

from the body and to turn to the soul

Quite true

In matters of this sort philosophers above all other men may be observed in every sort of way to dissect the soul from the communion [65] of the body

Very true

Whereas Simmias the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure life is not worth having and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead

That is also true

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body if invited to share in the enquiry a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not as the poets are always telling us inaccurate witnesses? and yet if even they are inaccurate and indistinct what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly he replied

Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived

True

Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought if at all?

Yes

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure—when she takes leave of the body and has as little as possible to do with it when she has no bodily sense or desire but is aspiring after true being?

Certainly

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true

Well but there is another thing Simmias Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak not of these alone but of absolute greatness and health and strength and of the essence or true nature of everything Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs?

or rather is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

Certainly

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very [66] truth of each he who has got rid as far as he can of eyes and ears and so to speak of the whole body these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge—who if not he is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?

What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates replied Simmias

And when real philosophers consider all these things will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? Have we not found they will say a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being it fills us full of loves and lusts and fears, and fancies of all kinds and endless foolery and in fact as men say takes away from us the power of thinking at all Whence come wars and fightings and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy and last and worst of all even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire and of which we say that we are lovers not while we live but after death for

posites which are generated out of opposites
And I want to show that in all opposites there
is of necessity a similar alternation. I mean to
say for example, that anything which becomes
greater or must become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been
once greater and then have become less. [71]

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the
stronger and the slower from the swifter.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better and the
more just is from the more unjust.

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we
convinced that all of them are generated out
of opposites?

Yes.

And in this universal opposition of all things,
are there not also two intermediate processes
which are ever going on, from one to the other
opposite, and back again where there is a great
excess and a less there is also an intermediate process
of increase and diminution, and that which
grows is said to wax, and that which decays to
wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as
dissolution and composition, cooling and heating
which equally involve a passage into and out
of one another. And this necessarily holds of
all opposites, even though not always expressed
in words—they are really generated out of one
another and there is a passing or process from
one to the other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as
sleep is the opposite of waking?

True, he said.

And what is it?

Death, he answered.

And these, if they are opposites, are gener-
ated the one from the other and have their
two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Now said Socrates, I will analyze one of the
two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned
to you, and also its intermediate processes, and
you shall analyze the other to me. One of them
I term sleep, the other waking. The state of
sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out
of sleeping, waking is generated, and out of
waking, sleeping; and the process of generation
in the one case falls asleep and in the other
wakes up. Do you agree?

I entirely agree.

Then, suppose that you analyze life and
death to me in the same manner. Is not death
opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from the living?

The dead.

And what from the dead?

I can only say in answer—the living.

Then the living, whether things or persons
Cebes, are generated from the dead?

That is clear, he replied.

Then the inference is that our souls exist in
the world below?

That is true.

And one of the two processes or generations
is visible—for surely the act of dying is visible?
Surely, he said.

What then is to be the result? Shall we ex-
clude the opposite process? and shall we sup-
pose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we
not rather assign to death some corresponding
process of generation?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Return to life.

And return to life, if there be such a thing, is
the birth of the dead into the world of the liv-
ing? [72]

Quite true.

Then here is a new way by which we arrive
at the conclusion that the living come from the
dead, just as the dead come from the living; and
this, it turns out, affords a most certain proof that the
souls of the dead exist in some place out of
which they come again.

Yes Socrates, he said, the conclusion seems
to flow necessarily out of our previous admis-
sions.

And that these admissions were not unfair
Cebes, he said, may be shown. I think, as fol-
lows. If generation were in a straight line
only and there were no compensation or circle
in nature, no turn or return of elements into
their opposites, then you know that all things
would at last have the same form and pass into
the same state, and there would be no more
generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

A simple thing enough, which I will illus-
trate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know
that if there were no alternation of sleeping and
waking, the state of the sleeping Endymion
would in the end have no meaning because

Very true

And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing and in their desire to keep them they abstain from some pleasures because they are overcome by others and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance [69] to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that in a sense they are made temperate through intemperance.

Such appears to be the case.

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain and of the greater for the less as if they were coins is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom and only in exchange for this and in company with this is anything truly bought or sold whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another is a shadow of virtue only nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things and temperance and justice and courage and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For many as they say in the mysteries are the thyrsus bearers but few are the mystics—meaning as I interpret the words the true philosophers. In the number of whom during my whole life I have been seeking according to my ability to find a place—whether I have sought in a right way or not and whether I have succeeded or not I shall truly know in a little while if God will when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right Simmias and Cebes in not grieving or repining at parting

from you and my masters in this world for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.

Cebes answered I agree, Socrates in the greater part of what you say [70]. But in what concerns the soul men are apt to be incredulous they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her release from the body issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you were speaking there would be good reason to hope. Socrates that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists and has any force or intelligence.

True Cebes said Socrates and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?

I am sure said Cebes that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

I reckon said Socrates that no one who heard me now not even if he were one of my old enemies the Comic poets could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern. If you please then we will proceed with the enquiry.

Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world and returning hither are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead but if this is not so then other arguments will have to be adduced.

Very true replied Cebes.

Then let us consider the whole question not in relation to man only but in relation to animals generally and to plants, and to every thing of which there is generation and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil just and unjust—and there are innumerable other op-

S. Y. so, yes, replied Simmas, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.
And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?

To be sure he said
And whence did we obtain our knowledge?
Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal and at another time unequal?

That is certain.
But are real equals ever equal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
Impossible, Socrates.

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
I should say clearly not, Socrates.
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality you conceived and attained that idea?

Very true, he said
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.

But that makes no difference whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?

Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
And must we not allow that when I or any one looking at any object, observes that the thing, which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of and cannot be, that it is inferior? but is inferior he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, though smaller, was inferior.

Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?
Precisely.

Then we must have knowledge of equality previous to the time when we first saw the material equals, (15) and reflected that all these material equals strive to attain absolute equal-

ity but fall short of it?
Very true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

Yes, Socrates: as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?

Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

No other inference can be drawn from the previous arguments.

And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?

Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?
Yes.

That is to say before we were born, I suppose?

True.
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less but all other ideas for we are not speaking only of equality but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?

We may.
But if after having acquired we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting Simmas, just the losing of knowledge?

Quite true, Socrates.
But if this knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process

all other things would be asleep too and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only and no division of substances then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner my dear Cebes if all things which partook of life were to die and after they were dead remained in the form of death and did not come to life again all would at last die and nothing would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things and they too die must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? ¹

There is no escape. Socrates said Cebes and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.

Yes he said Cebes it is and must be so in my opinion and we have not been deluded in making these admissions but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again and that the living spring from the dead and that the souls of the dead are in existence and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

Cebes added Your favourite doctrine Socrates that knowledge is simply recollection if true also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place [73] before existing in the form of man here then is an other proof of the soul's immortality.

But tell me Cebes said Simmias interposing what arguments are urged in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment that I remember them.

One excellent proof said Cebes is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way he will give a true answer of himself but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.

But if said Socrates you are still incredulous Simmias I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way—I mean if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?

Incredulous I am not said Simmias but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection and from what Cebes has said I am beginning to recollect.

But cf *Republic* x 611

Cf *Meno* 83 ff

lect and be convinced but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.

This is what I would say he replied—We should agree if I am not mistaken that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

Very true.

And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask. Whether a person who having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything knows not only that but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance—The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

True.

And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre or a garment or any thing else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they from knowing the lyre form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes and there are endless examples of the same thing.

Endless indeed replied Simmias.

And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention.

Very true he said.

Well and may you not also from seeing the picture of a house or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias you may be led to remember Cebes.

True.

Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

[74] Quite so.

And in all these cases the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?

It may be.

And when the recollection is derived from like things then another consideration is sure to arise which is—whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?

Very true he said.

And shall we proceed a step further and affirm that there is such a thing as equality not of one piece of wood or stone with another but that over and above this there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?

living is born of the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again?—Surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further. Like children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body the wind may really blow her away and scatter her especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm.

Cebes answered with a smile. Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hob oblin him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.

Socrates said. Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the fear.

[7, 8] And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?

Hellas, he replied is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few seek for him among them all far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money for there is no better way of spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too for you will not find others better able to make the search.

The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now if you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.

By all means, replied Socrates what else should I please?

Very good.
Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered and about which we fear? and what again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to these questions.

Very true, he said.

Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved but that which is uncompounded and that only must be, if anything is indissoluble.

Yes I should imagine so, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to

be the same and unchanging whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.

I agree, he said.

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of equality beauty or anything else—are these essences, I say liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms not admitting of variation at all or in any way or at any time?

They must be always the same Socrates replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be called equal or beautiful—are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same either with themselves or with one another?

The latter replied Cebes they are always in a state of change.

[79] And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well then added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

And, further is not one part of us body another part soul?

To be sure.

And to which class is the body more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not by man, Socrates.

And what we mean by seen and “not seen is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?

Yes, to the eye of man.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not seen.

Unseen then?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like to the unseen and the body to the seen?

which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

Very true

[76] So much is clear—that when we perceive something either by the help of sight or hearing or some other sense from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence as I was saying one of two alternatives follows—either we had this knowledge at birth and continued to know through life or after birth those who are said to learn only remember and learning is simply recollection.

Yes that is quite true Socrates

And which alternative Simmias do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?

I cannot decide at the moment

At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?

Certainly he will

But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?

Would that they could Socrates but I rather fear that to-morrow at this time there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought to be given.

Then you are not of opinion Simmias that all men know these things?

Certainly not

They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?

Certainly

But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born as men?

Certainly not

And therefore previously?

Yes

Then Simmias our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man and must have had intelligence.

Unless indeed you suppose Socrates that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth for this is the only time which remains.

Yes my friend but if so when do we lose them? for they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them or if not at what other time?

No Socrates I perceive that I was uncon-

sciously talking nonsense

Then may we not say Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating there is an absolute beauty and goodness and an absolute essence of all things and if to this which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations and with this compare them finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then our souls must have had a prior existence but if not there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born as that our souls existed before we were born and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Yes Socrates I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before [77] birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty goodness and the other notions of which you were just now speaking have a most real and absolute existence and I am satisfied with the proof.

Well but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too

I think said Simmias that Cebes is satisfied although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this may be the extinction of her. For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?

Very true Simmias said Cebes about half of what was required has been proven to wit, that our souls existed before we were born—that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting and has to be supplied when that is given the demonstration will be complete.

But that proof Simmias and Cebes has been already given said Socrates if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything

corruption and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and its desires and pleasures of the body until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of his lusts,—the soul I mean accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible and can be attained only by philosophy—do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?

Impossible, he replied.

She is held fast by the corporeal such the continual association and constant care of the body have wrought into her nature.

Very true.

And this corporeal element my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, near which as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible.

That is very likely, Socrates.

Yes, that is very likely, Cebes, and these must be the souls, not of the good but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life, and they continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be supposed to find the prisons in the same natures which they have had in their former lives.

What natures do you mean, Socrates?

What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony and intemperance, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of ordering them, [82] would pass into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think?

Compare Milton, *Comus* 463 ff.

But where lust

By w^h has looks loo^s g^o r^e d^o soul talk

But most by l^ud d^u l^u h^u act f^or

L^et f^em^er^es th^e w^ord p^ort

T^he s^ud g^o w^o l^ost d^y c^on^ou^on

Imbodie^d n^o m^ubr^us s^till h^u q^uiet l^es

T^he d^e n^e p^op^ort^y f^or th^e f^ost b^eg

Such are those th^u d^o g^lo^omy sh^ud^o d^o m^p

O^u s^uc^un^u n^o h^u d^u s^unt d^e sepulch^ures

L^e c^on^og^u and n^u g^oby w^o m^use g^oaze

As lo^ug^u l^eu^s the b^ody sh^ud^u l^e d^o

And l^e d^o w^oll by c^ou^oal e^ust^uasy

To d^e g^ou^oer^u and d^e g^ou^o d^e s^ut

I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable.

And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny and violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites—whether else, can we suppose them to go?

Yes, said Cebes, with such natures, beyond question.

And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?

There is not, he said.

Some are happy or than others, and the happiest both in themselves and in the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind.

Why are they the happiest?

Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into the form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from them.

Very likely.

No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason. Summius and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshy lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them—not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general, nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.

No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.

No indeed, he replied, and therefore they who have any care of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind, and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whether she leads they turn and follow.

What do you mean, Socrates?

I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body—until philosophy received her, she could only view real ex-

Cf. *Rep. Hic* x. 6 g.

That follows necessarily Socrates

And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception that is to say when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable and wanders and is confused the world spins round her and she is like a drunkard when she touches change?

Very true

But when returning into herself she reflects then she passes into the other world the region of purity and eternity and immortality and unchangeableness which are her kindred and with them she ever lives when she is by herself and is not let or hindered then she ceases from her erring ways and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

That is well and truly said Socrates he replied

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin as far as may be inferred from this argument as well as from the preceding one?

I think Socrates that in the opinion of every one who follows the argument the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the most stupid person will not deny that

And the body is more like the changing?

Yes

Yet once more consider the matter in another light When the soul and the body are united [80] then nature orders the soul to rule and govern and the body to obey and serve Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?

True

And which does the soul resemble?

The soul resembles the divine and the body the mortal—there can be no doubt of that Socrates

Then reflect Cebes of all which has been said is not this the conclusion?—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and unchangeable and that the body is in the very likeness of the human and mortal and unintellectual and multiform and

dissoluble and changeable Can this my dear Cebes be denied?

It cannot

But if it be true then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Certainly

And do you further observe that after a man is dead the body or visible part of him which is lying in the visible world and is called a corpse and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated is not dissolved or decomposed at once but may remain for some time nay even for a long time if the constitution be sound at the time of death and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed as the manner is in Egypt may remain almost entire through infinite ages and even in decay there are still some portions such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible—Do you agree?

Yes

And is it likely that the soul which is invisible in passing to the place of the true Hades which like her is invisible and pure and noble and on her way to the good and wise God whither if God will my soul is also soon to go—that the soul I repeat if this be her nature and origin will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body as the many say? That can never be my dear Simmias and Cebes The truth rather is that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body which she is ever avoiding herself gathered into herself—and making such abstraction her perpetual study—which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy [81] and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the study of death?

Certainly—

That soul I say herself invisible departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational thither arriving she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men their fears and wild passions and all other human ills and for ever dwells as they say of the initiated in company with the gods Is not this true Cebes?

Yes said Cebes beyond a doubt

But the soul which has been polluted and is impure at the time of her departure and is the
Cf *Apology* 40

their life long do then sing more lustily than ever rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god [85] whose ministers they are. But men because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry or in pain not even the nightingale nor the swallow nor yet the hoopoe which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow. Although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo they have the gift of prophecy and anticipate the good things of another world wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than ever they did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God and the fellow servant of the swans and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow

Very good Socrates said Simmias then I will tell you my difficulty and Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself (and I dare say that you have the same feeling) how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things either he should discover or be taught the truth about them or if this be impossible I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates to be not sufficient.

Socrates answered I dare say my friend that you may be right, but I should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient.

In this respect, replied Simmias—Suppose a person to use the same argument about har-

mony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible [86] incorporeal perfect, divine existing in the lyre which is harmonized but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material composite earthly and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings then he who takes this view would argue as you do and on the same analogy that the harmony survives and has not perished—you cannot imagine, he would say that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished—perished before the mortal. The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that. The thought, Socrates must have occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold wet and dry then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. But if so whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury then the soul though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time until they are either decayed or burnt. And if any one maintains that the soul being the harmony of the elements of the body is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?

Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was and said with a smile. Simmias has reason on his side and why does not some one of you who is better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps before we answer him we had better also hear what Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both spoken we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say or if not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell me then Cebes, he said what was the difficulty which troubled you?

Cebes said I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it was, and open to the same objections which were urged before [87] for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously and if I may say so quite sufficiently proven but the existence of

istence through the bars of a prison not in and through herself she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her own captivity [83] This was her original state and then as I was saying and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware philosophy seeing how terrible was her confinement of which she was to herself the cause received and gently comforted her and sought to release her pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deception and persuading her to retire from them and abstain from all but the necessary use of them and be gathered up and collected into herself bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence and to mistrust what ever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation for such things are visible and tangible but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears as far as she is able reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires he suffers from them not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for example the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but an evil greater far which is the greatest and worst of all evils and one of which he never thinks

What is it Socrates? said Cebes

The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then plainest and truest but this is not so they are really the things of sight

Very true

And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?

How so?

Why because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body until she becomes like the body and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below but is always infected by the body, and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple

Most true Socrates answered Cebes

And this Cebes is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave and not for the reason which the world gives. [84] Certainly not

Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thralldom of pleasures and pains doing a work only to be undone again weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web But she will calm passion and follow reason and dwell in the contemplation of her beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion) and thence deriving nourishment Thus she seeks to live while she lives and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that which is like her and to be freed from human ills Never fear Simmias and Cebes that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing

When Socrates had done speaking for a considerable time there was silence he himself appeared to be meditating as most of us were on what had been said only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument and whether there was anything wanting? For said he there are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly Should you be considering some other matter I say no more but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you think and let us have anything better which you can suggest and if you think that I can be of any use allow me to help you

Simmias said I must confess Socrates that doubts did arise in our minds and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which we wanted to have answered but which neither of us liked to ask fearing that our importunity might be troublesome at such a time

Socrates replied with a smile O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune if I cannot even persuade you that I am no worse off now than at any other time in my life Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they when they perceive that they must die having sung all

Ech What followed?

Phaed You shall hear for I was close to him in his right hand, seated on a sort of stool and on a couch which was a good deal higher. He stroked my head and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of playing with my hair and then he said To-morrow *Phaedo* I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.

Yes, *Socrates* I suppose that they will I replied.

Not so if you will take my advice.

What shall I do with them? I said.

To-day he replied and not to-morrow if this argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again you and I will both shave our locks and if I were you and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against *Simmias* and *Cebes* I would myself take an oath like the *Argives* not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.

Yes I said but *Heracles* himself is said not to be a match for two.

Summon me then he said and I will be your *Iolaus* until the sun goes down.

I summon you rather I rejoined not as *Heracles* summoning *Iolaus* but as *Iolaus* might summon *Heracles*.

That will do as well he said But first let us take care that we avoid a danger.

Of what nature? I said.

Lest we become misologists he replied no worse thing can happen to a man than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of ideas and both spring from the same cause which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperienced—you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish and then another and another and when this has happened several times to a man especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his when most trusted and familiar friends and he has often quarrelled with them he at last hates all men and believes that no one has any good in him at all. You must have observed this trait of character?

I have.

And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of human nature if experience would have taught him the true state of the case, [90] that

few are the good and few the evil and that the great majority are in the interval between them.

What do you mean? I said.

I mean he replied as you might say of the very large and very small—that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man and this applies generally to all extremes whether of great and small or swift and slow or fair and foul or black and white and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?

Yes I said I have.

And do you not imagine he said that if there were a competition in evil the worst would be found to be very few?

Yes that is very likely I said.

Yes that is very likely he replied although in this respect arguments are unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended but the point of comparison was that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false whether really false or not and then another and another he has no longer any faith left and great disputers as you know come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments or indeed of all things which like the currents in the *Euphrates* are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.

That is quite true I said.

Yes, *Phaedo* he replied and how melancholy if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge—that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit because he is annoyed should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them and lose truth and the knowledge of real ties.

Yes indeed I said that is very melancholy.

Let us then in the first place he said be careful of allowing or of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness in ourselves and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain health of mind—you and all other men having regard to the whole

the soul after death is still in my judgment unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body. Well then says the argument to me why do you remain unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to consider whether the objection which like Simmias I will express in a figure is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver who dies and after his death somebody says—He is not dead he must be alive—see there is the coat which he himself wove and wore and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous whether a man lasts longer or the coat which is in use and wear and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man who is the more lasting because the less lasting remains. But that Simmias as I would beg you to remark is a mistake any one can see that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is that the weaver aforesaid having woven and worn many such coats outlived several of them and was outlived by the last but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies especially if a man live many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste. But of course whenever the soul perishes she must have on her last garment and this will survive her and then at length when the soul is dead the body will show its native weakness and quickly decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death [88] For granting even more than you affirm to be possible and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth but also that the souls of some exist and will continue to exist after death and will be born and die again and that there is a natural strength

in the soul which will hold out and be born many times—nevertheless we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us for no one of us can have had any experience of it and if so then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited the soul also may utterly perish.

All of us as we afterwards remarked to one another had an unpleasant feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced before now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty not only into the previous argument, but into any future one either we were incapable of forming a judgment or there were no grounds of belief.

Ech. There I feel with you—by heaven I do. Phaedo and when you were speaking I was beginning to ask myself the same question. What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me and when mentioned came back to me at once as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, I implore you how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as you can.

Phaed. Often Echecrates I have wondered at Socrates but never more than on that occasion [89] That he should be able to answer was nothing but what astonished me was first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument and the readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army urging them to accompany him and return to the field of argument.

that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded

Certainly not.

Or do or suffer anything, other than they do or suffer?

He agreed.

Then a harmony does not, properly speak in, lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony but only follows them.

He assented.

For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to its parts.

That would be impossible, he replied.

And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?

I do not understand you, he said.

I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony and more completely a harmony when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible, and less of a harmony and less completely a harmony when less truly and fully harmonized.

True.

But does the soul admit of degrees or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely a soul than another?

Not in the least.

Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have wisdom, grace and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul, and this is said truly.

Yes, truly.

But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—and they say that there is another harmony and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her.

I cannot tell, replied Simmias, but I suppose that something of the sort would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony.

And we have already admitted that no soul is more soul than another which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony or more or less completely a harmony.

Quite true.

And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?

True.

And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony but only an equal harmony?

Yes, an equal harmony.

Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another is not more or less harmonized?

Exactly.

And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?

She has not.

And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another if vice be discord and virtue harmony?

Not at all more.

[94] Or speaking more correctly Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony will never have any vice because a harmony being absolutely a harmony has no part in the inharmonical.

No.

And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?

How can she have, if the previous argument holds?

Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?

I agree with you, Socrates, he said.

And can all this be true, think you? he said, for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?

It cannot be true.

Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?

Indeed I do not.

And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.

Very true.

But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed she can only follow she cannot lead them.

It must be so, he replied.

And yet do we not now discover the soul

of your future life and I myself in the prospect of death [91] For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher like the vulgar I am only a partisan Now the partisan when he is engaged in a dispute cares nothing about the rights of the question but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this—that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true I am rather seeking to convince myself to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me And do but see how much I gain by the argument For if what I say is true then I do well to be persuaded of the truth but if there be nothing after death still during the short time that remains I shall not distress my friends with lamentations and my ignorance will not last but will die with me and therefore no harm will be done This is the state of mind Simmias and Cebes in which I approach the argument And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates agree with me if I seem to you to be speaking the truth or if not withstand me might and main that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm and like the bee leave my sting in you before I die

And now let us proceed he said And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying Simmias if I remember rightly has fears and misgivings whether the soul although a fairer and diviner thing than the body being as she is in the form of harmony may not perish first On the other hand Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body but he said that no one could know whether the soul after having worn out many bodies might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her and that this is death which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on Are not these Simmias and Cebes the points which we have to consider?

They both agreed to this statement of them He proceeded And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument or of a part only?

Of a part only they replied

And what did you think he said of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection and hence inferred that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else [9-] before she was

enclosed in the body?

Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken Simmias agreed and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently

But rejoined Socrates you will have to think differently my Theban friend if you still maintain that harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose it

Never Socrates

But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul as you suppose but first the lyre and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord and then harmony is made last of all and perishes first And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?

Not at all replied Simmias

And yet he said there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which harmony is the theme?

There ought replied Simmias

But there is no harmony he said in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony Which of them will you retain?

I think he replied that I have a much stronger faith Socrates in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me than in the latter which has not been demonstrated at all but rests only on probable and plausible grounds and is therefore believed by the many I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors and unless great caution is observed in the use of them they are apt to be deceptive—in geometry and in other things too But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence Having as I am convinced rightly accepted this conclusion and on sufficient grounds I must as I suppose cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony

Let me put the matter Simmias he said, in another point of view [93] Do you imagine

was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself and also to others to know very well. I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths — such a fact as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking, for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion?

Yes, said Cebes, I think so.

Well, but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well, and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head, or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse, and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is the double of one.

And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.

I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of any of them by hearing I should for I cannot satisfy myself that [97] when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units added together make two, by reason of the addition I cannot understand how, when separated from the other each of them was one and not two, and now when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two. Neither can I understand how the dissolution of one is the way to make two, for then a different cause would produce the same effect — as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. I am any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed, or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method and can never admit of other.

Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted with the notion which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself, If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place, and I argued that if

any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of any thing, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the cause, since the same science comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round, and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best, and show that this was best, and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would further explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause. [98] And I thought that I could then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings, and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being, as they are, except that this was best, and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each, and what was good for all. These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

What expectations I had formed, and how grievously, as I said, disappointed! As I proceeded I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air and ether and water and other eccentricities, I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit there because my body is made up of bones and muscles, and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or enironment of flesh and skin, which contains them, and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and

to be doing the exact opposite—leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic then again more gently now threatening now admonishing the desires passions fears as if talking to a thing which is not her self as Homer in the *Odyssey* represents Odysseus doing in the words

*He eat his breast and thus reproached his heart
Endure my heart far worse hast thou endured!*

Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body and not rather of a nature which should lead and master them—herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?

Yes Socrates I quite think so

Then my friend we can never be right in saying that the soul is a harmony [95] for we should contradict the divine Homer and contradict ourselves

True he said

Thus much said Socrates of Harmonia your Theban goddess who has graciously yielded to us but what shall I say Cebes to her husband Cadmus and how shall I make peace with him?

I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him said Cebes I am sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could never have expected For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours and not impossibly the other whom you call Cadmus may share a similar fate

Nay my good friend said Socrates let us not boast lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak That however may be left in the hands of those above while I draw near in Homeric fashion and try the mettle of your words Here lies the point—You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life unless he can prove this and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul and of her existence prior

to our becoming men does not necessarily imply her immortality Admitting the soul to be long lived and to have known and done much in a former state still she is not on that account immortal and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution and may at last after the toils of life are over end in that which is called death And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times does not as you say make any difference in the fears of individuals For any man who is not devoid of sense must fear if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality This or something like this I suspect to be your notion Cebes and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may if you wish add or subtract any thing

But said Cebes as far as I see at present I have nothing to add or subtract I mean what you say that I mean

Socrates paused awhile and seemed to be absorbed in reflection At length he said You are raising a tremendous question Cebes involving the whole nature of generation and corruption [96] about which if you like I will give you my own experience and if any thing which I say is likely to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it

I should very much like said Cebes, to hear what you have to say

Then I will tell you said Socrates When I was young Cebes I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature to know the causes of things and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these—Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think or the air or the fire? or perhaps nothing of the kind—but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity And then I went on to examine the corruption of them and then to the things of heaven and earth and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries as I will satisfactorily prove to you For

all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another and to this I cleave, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me?

I do.
And that by greatness only great things become great and greater and by smallness things less become less?

True.
Then if a person were to remark that A is larger by a head than B [101] and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by and by reason of greatness, and the less is less only by and by reason of smallness and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?

Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.
In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by and by reason of, two but would say by and by reason of number or you would say that two cub is exceeded on cub by a half but by magnitude—for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.

Very true he said.
Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would gladly acknowledge that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently as far as you know the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say I will let me be puzzled of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them. I am inexperienced as I am and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow. I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and

when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher until you found a resting place in the best of the hypothesis but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Erasmians—at least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all for they have the wit to be self-pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. [102] But you, if you are a philosopher will certainly do as I say.

What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once.

Ech Yes, Phaedo and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates' reasoning.

Phaed Certainly Echocrates and such was the feeling of the whole company at the time.

Ech Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company and are now listening to your recital. But what fado is?

Phaed After all this had been admired, and they had agreed that ideas exist, and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly said—

This is your way of speaking, and yet when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?

Yes, I do.
But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?

True.
And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?

That is true.
And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.

this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture—that is what he would say and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound and air, and hearing and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort forgetting to mention the true cause which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence [99] for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Bocotia—by the dog they would if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said indeed that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them and that this is the way in which mind acts and not from the choice of the best is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition which the many feeling about in the dark are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven another gives the air as a support to the earth which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds and instead of finding any superior strength in it they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good—of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself or to learn of any one else the nature of the best I will exhibit to you if you like what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.

I should very much like to hear he replied. Socrates proceeded. I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water or in some similar medium. So in my

own case I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence [100] I dare say that the simile is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existence through the medium of thought, sees them only through a glass darkly any more than he who considers them in action and operation. However this was the method which I adopted. I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this whether relating to the cause or to anything else and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly as I do not think that you as yet understand me.

No indeed replied Cebes not very well.

There is nothing new, he said in what I am about to tell you but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions. I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness and the like grant me this and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes said. You may proceed at once with the proof for I grant you this.

Well he said then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step for I cannot help thinking if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such that it can be beautiful only in so far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and I should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?

Yes he said I agree.

He proceeded. I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour or form or any such thing is a source of beauty I leave all that which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly and perhaps foolishly hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained for as to the manner I am uncertain but I stoutly contend that by beauty

all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give either to myself or to another and to that I cling in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown and that to myself or to any one who asks the question I may safely reply That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me? I do.

And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater and by smallness the less become less?

True.

Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B [101] and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and could stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by and by reason of greatness and the less is less only by and by reason of smallness and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same as both and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference would you not?

Indeed I should said Cebes laughing.

In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by and by reason of two but would say by and by reason of number or you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half but by magnitude—for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.

Very true he said.

I should you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one is the cause of two? And you would judiciously assert that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence and consequently as far as you know the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this is the way to make two and the participation in one the way to make one. You would say I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them inexperienced as I am and ready to tart as the proverb says, at my own shadow. I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him or answer him until you had seen whether the consequences which he would agree with one another or not, and

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Yes I do.

But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates as the words may seem to imply because he is Simmias but by reason of the size which he has just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias any more than he is Socrates as Socrates but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?

True.

And if Phaedo exceeds him in size this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias who is comparatively smaller?

That is true.

And therefore Simmias is said to be great and is also said to be small because he is in a mean between them exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He added laughing I am speaking like a book but I believe that what I am saying is true.

Simmias assented

I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded instead of this one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite which is the less or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness be changed by that even as I having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias remain just as I was and am the same small person And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small in like manner the smallness in us can not be or become great nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite [103] but either passes away or perishes in the change

That replied Cebes is quite my notion

Hereupon one of the company though I do not exactly remember which of them said In heaven's name is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater and that opposites were simply generated from opposites but now this principle seems to be utterly denied

Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened I like your courage he said in reminding us of this But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete and now of the essential opposite which as is affirmed neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself then my friend we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them and these essential opposites will never as we maintain admit of generation into or out of one another At the same time turning to Cebes he said Are you at all disconcerted Cebes at our friend's objection?

No I do not feel so said Cebes and yet I cannot deny that I am often disturbed by objections

Then we are agreed after all said Socrates that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?

To that we are quite agreed he replied

Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view and

see whether you agree with me—There is a thing which you term heat and another thing which you term cold?

Certainly

But are they the same as fire and snow?

Most assuredly not

Heat is a thing different from fire and cold is not the same with snow?

Yes

And yet you will surely admit that when snow as was before said is under the influence of heat they will not remain snow and heat, but at the advance of the heat the snow will either retire or perish?

Very true he replied

And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish and when the fire is under the influence of the cold they will not remain as before fire and cold

That is true he said

And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in an eternal connection but anything else which not being the idea exists only in the form of the idea may also lay claim to it I will try to make this clearer by an example—The odd number is always called by the name of odd?

Very true

But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things which have their own name [104] and yet are called odd, because although not the same as oddness they are never without oddness?—that is what I mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd And there are many other examples would you not say for example that three may be called by its proper name and also be called odd which is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of three but also of five and of every alternate number—each of them without being oddness is odd and in the same way two and four and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even without being evenness Do you agree?

Of course

Then now mark the point at which I am aiming—not only do essential opposites exclude one another but also concrete things, which although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites these I say likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw For example Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an

even number while remaining three?

Very true, said Cebes.

And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?

It is not.

Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another but also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites.

Very true, he said.

Suppose, he said, that we endeavour if possible, to determine what these are.

By all means.

Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?

What do you mean?

I mean, as I was just now saying and as I am sure that you know that those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in number but must also be odd.

Quite true.

And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?

No.

And this impress was given by the odd principle?

Yes.

And to the odd is opposed the even?

True.

Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?

No.

Then three has no part in the even?

No one.

Then the triad or number three is uneven?

Very true.

To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed and yet do not admit opposites—as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side [105]

or as two does not receive the odd or fire the cold—if in these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the

odd. The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3/2, nor any fraction in which there is a half nor again in which there is a third admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole. You will agree?

Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.

And now he said, let us begin again and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it, let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks you "what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot," you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer) but fire, a far superior answer which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you why a body is diseased," you will not say from disease, but from fever and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them and so of things in general as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.

Yes, he said, I quite understand you.

Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?

The soul, he replied.

And is this always the case?

Yes he said of course.

Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?

Yes certainly.

And is there any opposite to life?

There is he said.

And what is that?

Death.

Then the soul as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.

Impossible replied Cebes.

And now he said what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?

The odd.

And that principle which repels the musical or the just?

The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.

And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?

The immortal he said.

And does the soul admit of death?

No

Then the soul is immortal?

Yes he said

And may we say that this has been proven?

Yes abundantly proven Socrates he replied
[106] Supposing that the odd were imperishable must not three be imperishable?

Of course

And if that which is cold were imperishable when the warm principle came attacking the snow must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?

True he said

Again if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished but would have gone away unaffected?

Certainly he said

And the same may be said of the immortal if the immortal is also imperishable the soul when attacked by death cannot perish for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death or ever be dead any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even or fire or the heat in the fire of the cold. Yet a person may say But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd? Now to him who makes this objection we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable for this has not been acknowledged but if this had been acknowledged there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing

Very true

And the same may be said of the immortal if the immortal is also imperishable then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal but it not some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given

No other proof is needed he said for if the immortal being eternal is liable to perish then nothing is imperishable

Yes replied Socrates and yet all men will agree that God and the essential form of life and the immortal in general will never perish

Yes all men he said—that is true and what more gods if I am not mistaken as well as men

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible must not the soul if she is immortal be also imperishable?

Most certainly

Then when death attacks a man the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?

True

Then Cebes, beyond question the soul is immortal and imperishable [107] and our souls will truly exist in another world!

I am convinced Socrates said Cebes, and have nothing more to object but if my friend Simmias or any one else has any further objection to make he had better speak out, and not keep silence since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said

But I have nothing more to say replied Simmias nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man

Yes Simmias replied Socrates that is well said and I may add that first principles even if they appear certain should be carefully considered and when they are satisfactorily ascertained then with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason you may I think, follow the course of the argument and if that be plain and clear there will be no need for any further enquiry

Very true

But then O my friends he said if the soul is really immortal what care should be taken of her not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful If death had only been the end of all the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying for they would have been happily quit not only of their body but of their own evil together with their souls But now inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed at the very beginning of his journey thither

For after death as they are going on

No

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Yes he said

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Yes abundantly proven Socrates, he replied

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each individual in whom he belonged in life leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below following the guide who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other and when they have there received their due and remained their time another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages Now this way to the other world is not [108] as Achilles says in the *Telephus* a single and straight path—if that were so no guide would be needed for no one could miss it but there are many partings of the road and windings as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings but the soul which desires the body and which as I was relating before has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, as after many sorrows and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered if she be impure and has led no impure deeds whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees and turns away no one will be her companion no one her guide but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled and when they are fulfilled, he is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless

What do you mean Socrates? said Simmias I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know and I should very much like to know in which of these you put faith.

And I Simmias, replied Socrates if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove and even if I could I fear Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed I may describe to you, however the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them

That said Simmias will be enough

Well then he said my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens and therefore has no need of air or of any similar force to be a support [109] but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise For that which being in equipoise is in the centre of that which is equally diffused will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate And this is my first notion

Which is surely a correct one said Simmias

Also I believe that the earth is very vast and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a small portion only about the sea like ants or frogs about a marsh and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places for everywhere on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect But the true earth is pure and situated in the pure heaven—there are the stars also and it is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether and of which our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness and having never lifted up his head and seen nor ever heard from one who had seen how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own And such is exactly our case for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth and fancy that we are on the surface and the air we call heaven in which we imagine that the stars move But the fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from reaching the surface of the air for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit or take the wings of a bird and come to the top then like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world he would see a world beyond and if the nature of man could sustain the sight he would acknowledge that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth [110] For our

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And the same may be said of the immortal if the immortal is also imperishable the soul when attacked by death cannot perish for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death or ever be dead any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even or fire or the heat in the fire of the cold. Yet a person may say But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd? Now to him who makes this objection we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable for this has not been acknowledged but if this had been acknowledged there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing

Very true

And the same may be said of the immortal if the immortal is also imperishable then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal but if not some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given

No other proof is needed he said for if the immortal being eternal is liable to perish then nothing is imperishable

Yes replied Socrates and yet all men will agree that God and the essential form of life and the immortal in general will never perish

Yes all men he said—that is true and what is more gods if I am not mistaken as well as

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible must not the soul, if she is immortal be also imperishable?

Most certainly

Then when death attacks a man the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?

True

Then Cebes beyond question the soul is immortal and imperishable [107] and our souls will truly exist in another world!

I am convinced Socrates, said Cebes and have nothing more to object but if my friend Simmias or any one else has any further objection to make, he had better speak out and not keep silence since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said

But I have nothing more to say replied Simmias nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man

Yes Simmias replied Socrates that is well said and I may add that first principles even if they appear certain should be carefully considered and when they are satisfactorily ascertained then with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason you may I think follow the course of the argument and if that be plain and clear there will be no need for any further enquiry

Very true

But then O my friends he said if the soul is really immortal what care should be taken of her not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful If death had only been the end of all the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying for they would have been happily quit not only of their body but of their own evil together with their souls But now inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed at the very beginning of his journey thither

For after death as they say the genius of

each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together—whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below. Now the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other and when they have there received their due and terminated their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, [108] as Anaxagoras says in the *Telephus*, a single and straight path—if that were so no guide would be needed, or no one could miss it—but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I learned from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where the wars meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings—but the soul which desires the body and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees and turns away—no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own habitation as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is varied in nature and extent—very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know—and I should very much like to know—in which of these you put faith.

And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you—although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear Simmias that my tale would come to an end before the argument was completed. I may write to you, however the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.

That, said Simmias, will be enough.

Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or of any similar force to be a support, [109] but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that which being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equally diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.

Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.

Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places—for everywhere on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true earth is pure and situated in the pure heaven—there are the stars also—and it is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether and of which our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth—which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars, he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. And such is exactly our case, for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface and the air we call heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from reaching the surface of the air—for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come to the top then like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world, he would see a world beyond and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. [110] For our

earth and the stones and the entire region which surrounds us are spoilt and corroded as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine, neither is there any noble or perfect growth but caverns only and sand and an endless slough of mud and even the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven I can tell you a charming tale Simmias which is well worth hearing.

And we Socrates replied Simmias shall be charmed to listen to you.

The tale my friend he said is as follows — In the first place the earth when looked at from above is in appearance streaked like one of those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces and is decked with various colours of which the colours used by painters on earth are in a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them and they are brighter far and clearer than ours there is a purple of wonderful lustre also the radiance of gold and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is made up and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water have a colour of their own and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of the other colours so that the whole presents a single and continuous appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair region everything that grows—trees and flowers and fruits—are in a like degree fairer than any here and there are hills having stones in them in a like degree smoother and more transparent and fairer in colour than our highly valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers and other gems which are but minute fragments of them for there all the stones are like our precious stones and fairer still. The reason is that they are pure and not like our precious stones infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth which also shines with gold and silver and the like [111] and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in all places making the earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men some in a middle region others dwelling about

the air as we dwell about the sea others in islands which the air flows round near the continent and in a word the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover the temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease and live much longer than we do and have sight and hearing and smell and all the other senses in far greater perfection in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell and they hear their voices and receive their answers and are conscious of them and hold converse with them and they see the sun moon and stars as they truly are and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

Such is the nature of the whole earth and of the things which are around the earth and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere some of them deeper and more extended than that which we inhabit others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours and some are shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations and there are passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth connecting them with one another and there flows out of and into them as into basins a vast tide of water and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers and springs hot and cold and a great fire and great rivers of fire and streams of liquid mud thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily and the lava streams which follow them) and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see saw in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down and is due to the following cause — There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all and pierces right through the whole earth [112] this is that chasm which Homer describes in the words

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¹ Cf. Revelation esp. 21: 18 ff.

ther and thither over the earth—just as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation—and the wind mingling with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts when the waters start with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions and fill them up like water raised by a pump and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither they again fill the hollows here and when these are filled flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places forming seas, and lakes and rivers and springs. Thence they again enter the earth some of them making a long circuit into many lands others going to a few places and not so distant and again fall into Tartarus some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose and others not much lower but all in some degree lower than the point from which they came. And some burst forth again on the opposite side and some on the same side and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent and descend as far as they can but always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers flowing in either direction can descend only in the centre and no further for opposite to the rivers is a precipice.

Now these rivers are many and mighty and diverse and there are four principal ones of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus which flows round the earth in a circle and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the Acherusian lake [113] this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time they are sent back to be born again as animals. The third river passes out between the two and near the place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea boiling with water and mud and proceeding muddy and turbid and winding about the earth comes among other places, in the extremities of the Acherusian lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon as the stream is called which throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark blue

colour like lapis lazuli and this is that river which is called the Stygian river and falls into and forms the Lake Styx and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters passes under the earth winding round in the opposite direction and comes near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the water of this river too mingles with no other but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon and the name of the river as the poets say is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of the other world and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally guides them first of all they have sentence passed upon them as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill go to the river Acheron and embarking in any vessels which they may find are carried in them to the lake and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others they are absolved and receive the rewards of their good deeds each of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege murders foul and violent or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes which although great are not unremediable—who in a moment of anger for example have done some violence to a father or a mother [114] and have repented for the remainder of their lives or who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and they are borne to the Acherusian lake and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged to have pity on them and to be kind to them and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail then they come forth and cease from their troubles but if not they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who have been pre-eminent for holiness of

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life are released from this earthly prison and go to their pure home which is above and dwell in the purer earth and of these such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body in mansions fairer still which may not be described and of which the time would fail me to tell

Wherefore Simmias seeing all these things what ought not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize and the hope great!

A man of sense ought not to say nor will I be very confident that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one and he ought to comfort himself with words like these which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore I say let a man be of good cheer about his soul who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and working harm rather than good has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and has arrayed the soul not in some foreign attire but in her own proper jewels temperance and justice and courage and nobility [115] and truth—in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world below when her hour comes. You Simmias and Cebes and all other men will depart at some time or other. Me already as a tragic poet would say the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison and I think that I had better repair to the bath first in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.

When he had done speaking Crito said And have you any commands for us Socrates—anything to say about your children or any other matter in which we can serve you?

Nothing particular Crito he replied only as I have always told you take care of your selves that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me and mine and to all of us whether you promise to do so or not. But if you have no thought for yourselves and care not to walk according to the rule which I have prescribed for you not now for the first time however much you may profess or promise at the moment it will be of no avail.

We will do our best said Crito. And in what way shall we bury you?

In any way that you like but you must get

hold of me and take care that I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile—I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see a dead body—and he asks How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed—these words of mine with which I was comforting you and myself have had as I perceive no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me to him now as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me but let the promise be of another sort for he was surety for me to the judges that I would remain and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain but go away and depart and then he will suffer less at my death and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot or say at the burial. Thus we lay out Socrates or. Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him, for false words are not only evil in themselves but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then my dear Crito and say that you are burying my body only [116] and do with that whatever is usual and what you think best.

When he had spoken these words he arose and went into a chamber to bathe. Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind talking and thinking of the subject of discourse and also of the greatness of our sorrow he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him—he had two young sons and an elder one—and the women of his family also came and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito then he dismissed them and returned to us.

Now the hour of sunset was near for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out he sat down with us again after his bath but not much was said. Soon the jailer who was the servant of the Eleven entered and stood by him saying—To you Socrates whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place I will not impute the angry feelings of other men who rage and swear at me when in obedience to the authorities I bid them drink

the poison—indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me for others, as you are a *art*, and not I am to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be—you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Socrates looked at him and said I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is, since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito, and therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared; if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill to-day, and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved—do not hurry—there is time enough.

Socrates said, Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right in not following their example; for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later: [117] I should only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing, and so in a life which is already forfeit. Please then to do as I say and not to refuse me.

Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by, and he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said, You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered, You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner without the least fear or change of colour or feature looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said, What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I or not? The man answered, We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he

said, but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world—even so—and so be it according to my prayer. Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow, but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast, so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor was I the first for Crito when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed, and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness. What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way; for I have been told that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then and have patience. When we heard his words we were ashamed and refrained our tears, and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs, and after a while he pressed his foot hard and asked him if he could feel, and he said [118] No, and then his leg and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself and said, When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said—they were his last words—he said, Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito, is there anything else? There was no answer to this question, but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend concerning whom I may truly say that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.

GORGIAS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE CALICLES SOCRATES CHAEREPHON GORGIAS POLUS.

Scene The house of Calicles

[447] *Calicles* THE wise man as the proverb says is late for a fray but not for a feast

Socrates And are we late for a feast?

Cal Yes and a delightful feast for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things

Soc It is not my fault, Calicles our friend Chaerephon is to blame for he would keep us loitering in the Agora

Chaerephon Never mind Socrates the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair for Gorgias is a friend of mine and I will make him give the exhibition again either now or if you prefer at some other time

Cal What is the matter Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?

Chaer Yes that was our intention in coming

Cal Come into my house then for Gorgias is staying with me and he shall exhibit to you

Soc Very good Calicles but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art and what it is which he professes and teaches he may as you [*Chaerephon*] suggest defer the exhibition to some other time

Cal There is nothing like asking him Socrates and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition for he was saying only just now that any one in my house might put any question to him and that he would answer

Soc How fortunate! will you ask him Chaerephon—?

Chaer What shall I ask him?

Soc Ask him who he is

Chaer What do you mean?

Soc I mean such a question as would elicit from him if he had been a maker of shoes the

answer that he is a cobbler Do you understand?

Chaer I understand and will ask him Tell me Gorgias is our friend Calicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?

Gorgias Quite right Chaerephon I was saying as much only just now [448] and I may add that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one

Chaer Then you must be very ready Gorgias

Gor Of that Chaerephon you can make trial
Polus Yes indeed and if you like, Chaerephon you may make trial of me too for I think that Gorgias who has been talking a long time is tired

Chaer And do you Polus think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

Pol What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?

Chaer Not at all—and you shall answer if you like

Pol Ask—

Chaer My question is this If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?

Pol Certainly

Chaer Then we should be right in calling him a physician?

Pol Yes

Chaer And if he had the skill of Aristophanes the son of Aglaophon or of his brother Polygnotus what ought we to call him?

Pol Clearly a painter

Chaer But now what shall we call him—

What is the art in which he is skilled?

Pol. O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind—such are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to a law, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.

Soc. Polus has been taught how to make a good speech, Gorgias—but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.

Gor. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.

Gor. Then why not ask him yourself?

Soc. But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer—for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has turned more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

Pol. What makes you say so, Socrates?

Soc. Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

Pol. Why did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?

Soc. Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question—nobody asked what was the quality—but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias [4.9] And I would still beg you briefly and clearly as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question—what are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?

Gor. Rhetoric, Socr. yes, is my art.

Soc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, I boast myself to be.

Soc. I should wish to do so.

Gor. Then pray do.

Soc. And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?

Gor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.

Soc. And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the

longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

Gor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer—but I will do my best to make them as short as possible for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

Soc. That is what I wanted Gorgias—exhibit the shorter method now—and the longer one at some other time.

Gor. Well, I will—and you will certainly say that you never heard a man use fewer words.

Soc. Very good then—as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned? I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?) with the making of garments?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

Gor. It is.

Soc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

Gor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.

Soc. I am glad to hear it—answer me in like manner about rhetoric—with what is rhetoric concerned?

Gor. With discourse.

Soc. What sort of discourse? Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

Gor. No.

Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And to understand that about which they speak?

Gor. Of course.

Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning [4.10] also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?

Gor. Just so.

Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

Gor Very true

Soc And the same *Gorgias* is true of the other arts—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do

Gor Clearly

Soc Then why if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse and all the other arts treat of discourse do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

Gor Because Socrates the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action as of the hand but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse

Soc I am not sure whether I entirely understand you but I dare say I shall soon know better please to answer me a question—you would allow that there are arts?

Gor Yes

Soc As to the arts generally they are for the most part concerned with doing and require little or no speaking in painting and statuary and many other arts the work may proceed in silence and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric

Gor You perfectly conceive my meaning *Soc* rates

Soc But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language and require either no action or very little as for example, the arts of arithmetic of calculation of geometry and of playing draughts in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action but in most of them the verbal element is greater—they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?

Gor Exactly

Soc And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric although the precise expression which you used was that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse and an adversary who wished to be captious might say And so *Gorgias* you call arithmetic rhetoric But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you [451]

Gor You are quite right Socrates in your apprehension of my meaning

Soc Well then let me now have the rest of

my answer—seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words and there are other arts which also use words tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned—Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now he might say

Socrates what is arithmetic? and I should reply to him as you replied to me that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words And then he would proceed to ask

Words about what? and I should reply Words about odd and even numbers and how many there are of each And if he asked again

What is the art of calculation? I should say That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words And if he further said

Concerned with what? I should say like the clerks in the assembly as aforesaid of arithmetic but with a difference the difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another And suppose, again I were to say that astronomy is only words—he would ask Words about what Socrates? and I should answer that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon and their relative swiftness

Gor You would be quite right Socrates

Soc And now let us have from you *Gorgias* the truth about rhetoric which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?

Gor True

Soc Words which do what? I should ask To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

Gor To the greatest Socrates and the best of human things

Soc That again *Gorgias* is ambiguous I am still in the dark for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song in which the singers enumerate the goods of life first health beauty next, thirdly as the writer of the song says wealth honestly obtained

[452] *Gor* Yes I know the song but what is your drift?

Soc I mean to say that the producers of those things which the author of the song praises that is to say the physician the trainer the money maker will at once come to you and first the physician will say O Socrates

Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his." And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply I am a physician." What do you mean? I shall say Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? Certainly he will answer "For is not health the greatest good?" What greater good can men have, Socrates? And after him the trainer will come and say I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine. To him again I shall say Who are you, honest friend and what is your business? I am a trainer," he will reply "and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body. When I have done with the trainer there arrives the money maker and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. "Consider Socrates, he will say whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth. Well you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? Yes," he replies. And who are you? A money maker. And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? Of course will be his reply. And we shall rejoice. Yes but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, What good? Let Gorgias answer. Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me. What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.

Gor That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states.

Sor And what would you consider this to be?

G What there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave and the money maker of whom our talk will be found to gather creatures not for his use, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

Sor Now I think, Gorgias, that you have more accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric and you mean to say (457) if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion, having no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do

you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

Gor No the definition seems to me very fair Socrates for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

Sor Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.

Gor What is coming Socrates?

Sor I will tell you. I am very well aware that I do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask—that is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question. If I asked, "What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?" and you said, "The painter of figures," should I not be right in asking

What kind of figures, and where do you find them?"

Gor Certainly.

Sor And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?

Gor True.

Sor But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered cry well?

Gor Quite so.

Sor Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

Gor He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.

Sor Again if I take the arts of which we were just now speaking—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

Gor Certainly.

Sor And therefore persuade us of them?

Gor Yes.

Sor Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artifice of persuasion?

Gor Clearly.

Gor Very true

Soc And the same Gorgias is true of the other arts—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do

Gor Clearly

Soc Then why if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse and all the other arts treat of discourse do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

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Gor You perfectly conceive my meaning Socrates

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you, Gorgias? they will say—"about what will you teach us to advise the state?—about the just and unjust only or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned? How will you answer them?"

Sor I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles and not at the suggestion of the builders.

Sor Such is the tradition, Gorgias about Themistocles and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.

[456] Gor And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers: they are the men who win their point.

Sor I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me when I look at the matter in this way to be a marvel of greatness.

Gor A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodias or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply a knife or hot iron to him and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state physician, the physician would have no chance but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used I believe any other competitive art, not against everybody—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of force because he has powers which are more than a match either to his friend or enemy: he ought not therefore to strike, stab or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained

in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions [457] and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself. I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject—in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek in fraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power: he ought to use rhetoric fairly as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death and not his instructor.

Sor You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, and you must have observed I think, that they do not always terminate in mutual edification or in the definition by either party of the subjects which they are discussing but disagreements are apt to arise—somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties concerning that their opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak not for the sake of disclosing the truth but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should

Soc And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion and about what—we shall answer persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even [454] and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking, are artificers of persuasion and of what sort and about what

Gor Very true

Soc Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

Gor True

Soc Seeing then that not only rhetoric works by persuasion but that other arts do the same as in the case of the painter a question has arisen which is a very fair one Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question?

Gor I think so

Soc Then if you approve the question Gorgias what is the answer?

Gor I answer Socrates that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies as I was just now saying and about the just and unjust

Soc And that Gorgias was what I was suspecting to be your notion yet I would not have you wonder if by and by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question for I ask not in order to confute you but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's words I would have you develop your own views in your own way whatever may be your hypothesis

Gor I think that you are quite right Socrates

Soc Then let me raise another question there is such a thing as having learned?

Gor Yes

Soc And there is also having believed?

Gor Yes

Soc And is the having learned the same as having believed and are learning and belief the same things?

Gor In my judgment Socrates they are not the same

Soc And your judgment is right as you may ascertain in this way—If a person were to say to you Is there Gorgias a false belief as well as a true?—you would reply, if I am not mistaken that there is

Gor Yes

Soc Well but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gor No

Soc No indeed and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ

Gor Very true

Soc And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

Gor Just so

Soc Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion—one which is the source of belief without knowledge as the other is of knowledge?

Gor By all means

Soc And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

[455] *Gor* Clearly Socrates that which only gives belief

Soc Then rhetoric as would appear is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

Gor True

Soc And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time?

Gor Certainly not

Soc Come then and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled and again when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged or a proposition taken then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians what do you say Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own For likely enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your pupil and in fact I see some, and a good many too who have this wish but they would be too modest to question you And therefore when you are interrogated by me I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them What is the use of coming to

Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.

Gor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

Soc. Say no more, for there you are right—and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust *artely* or he must be taught by you.

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And he who has learned music a musician?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned *anything*, whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And in the same way he who has learned what is just is just?

Gor. To be sure.

Soc. And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?

Gor. That is clearly the inference.

Soc. Surely then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And will therefore never be willing to do *injustice*?

Gor. Clearly not.

Soc. But do you remember saying just now that the *trainer* is not to be accused or banished if the pupil makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said?

Gor. Yes, it was.

Soc. But now we are affirming that the aforementioned rhetorician will never have done injustice at all?

Gor. True.

Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric trained of discourse, not [like

arithmetic] about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this said?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen [461] and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you so dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions—[do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Soc. Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions; and now if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—upon one condition.

Pol. What condition?

Soc. That you retract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first.

Pol. What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?

Soc. Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case.—shall not I be cry

like to cross-examine you [458] but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking and if you claim to be one of my sort let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done no matter—let us make an end of it

Gor I should say Socrates that I am quite the man whom you indicate but perhaps we ought to consider the audience, for before you came, I had already given a long exhibition and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else

Chær You hear the audience cheering *Gorgias* and Socrates which shows their desire to listen to you and for myself Heaven forbid that I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting and so ably maintained

Cal By the gods *Chærephon* although I have been present at many discussions I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased

Soc I may truly say *Callicles* that I am willing if *Corgias* is

Gor After all this Socrates I should be disgraced if I refused especially as I have promised to answer all comers in accordance with the wishes of the company then do you begin and ask of me any question which you like

Soc Let me tell you then *Gorgias* what surprises me in your words though I dare say that you may be right and I may have misunderstood your meaning You say that you can make any man who will learn of you a rhetorician?

Gor Yes

Soc Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, [459] and this not by instruction but by persuasion?

Gor Quite so

Soc You were saying in fact that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion

than the physician even in a matter of health?

Gor Yes with the multitude—that is

Soc You mean to say with the ignorant for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion

Gor Very true

Soc But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gor Certainly

Soc Although he is not a physician—is he?

Gor No

Soc And he who is not a physician must obviously be ignorant of what the physician knows

Gor Clearly

Soc Then when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?

Gor In the case supposed—Yes

Soc And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts the rhetorician need not know the truth about things he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

Gor Yes Socrates and is not this a great comfort?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

Soc Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us but I would rather begin by asking whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust base and honourable good and evil as he is of medicine and the other arts I mean to say does he really know anything of what is good and evil base or honourable just or unjust in them or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them when he does not know them and seem to be a good man [460] when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens,

Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.

Gor Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn at me these things as well.

Soc Say no more, for there you are right and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already or he must be taught by you.

Gor Certainly.

Soc Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

Gor Yes.

Soc And he who has learned music a musician?

Gor Yes.

Soc And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything, whatever it is that which his knowledge makes him.

Gor Certainly.

Soc And in the same way he who has learned what is just is just?

Gor To be sure.

Soc And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

Gor Yes.

Soc And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?

Gor That is clearly the inference.

Soc Surely then, the just man will never consent to do injustice.

Gor Certainly not.

Soc And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man?

Gor Yes.

Soc And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?

Gor Clearly not.

Soc But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pupil makes a wrong use of his pupil's art; and in like manner if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said?

Gor Yes, it was.

Soc But now we are affirming that the worst rhetorician will never have done injustice at all.

Gor True.

Soc And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not [like

arithmetic] about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this said?

Gor Yes.

Soc I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so that rhetoric which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen [461] and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polas And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What? because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you so dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your capacious questions—(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?) For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Soc Illustrious Polas, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions. and now if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—upon one condition.

Pol. What condition?

Soc That you contract, Polas, the propriety of speech in which you indulged at first.

Pol. What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?

Soc Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case.—shall not I be very

like to cross-examine you [458] but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking and if you claim to be one of my sort let us have the discussion out but if you would rather have done no matter—let us make an end of it.

Gor I should say Socrates that I am quite the man whom you indicate but perhaps we ought to consider the audience, for before you came I had already given a long exhibition and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

Chær You hear the audience cheering *Gorgias* and *Socrates* which shows their desire to listen to you and for myself Heaven forbid that I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting and so ably maintained.

Cal By the gods *Chærephon* although I have been present at many discussions I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased.

Soc I may truly say *Callicles* that I am willing if *Gorgias* is.

Gor After all this *Socrates* I should be disgraced if I refused especially as I have promised to answer all comers in accordance with the wishes of the company then do you begin and ask of me any question which you like.

Soc Let me tell you then *Gorgias* what surprises me in your words though I dare say that you may be right and I may have misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man who will learn of you a rhetorician?

Gor Yes.

Soc Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject [459] and this not by instruction but by persuasion?

Gor Quite so.

Soc You were saying in fact that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion

than the physician even in a matter of health?

Gor Yes with the multitude—that is.

Soc You mean to say with the ignorant for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.

Gor Very true.

Soc But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gor Certainly.

Soc Although he is not a physician—is he?

Gor No.

Soc And he who is not a physician must obviously be ignorant of what the physician knows.

Gor Clearly.

Soc Then when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?

Gor In the case supposed—Yes.

Soc And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts the rhetorician need not know the truth about things he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

Gor Yes *Socrates* and is not this a great comfort?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

Soc Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us but I would rather begin by asking whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust base and honourable good and evil as he is of medicine and the other arts. I mean to say does he really know anything of what is good and evil base or honourable, just or unjust in them or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them when he does not know them and seem to be a good man [460] when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens,

colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away

Gor Never mind him but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeiter of a part of politics

Sor I will try then to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken [464] my friend Polus shall refute me We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls?

Gor Of course.

Sor You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?

Gor Yes

Sor Which condition may not be really good but good only in appearance? I mean to say that there are many persons who appear to be in good health and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health

Gor True

Sor And this applies not only to the body but also to the soul in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

Gor Yes, certainly

Sor And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean The soul and body being two have two arts corresponding to them there is the art of politics attending on the soul and another art attending on the body of which I know no single name but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic as justice does to medicine and the two parts run into one another justice having to do with the same subject as legislation and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference No v seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good flattery knowing or rather guessing their natures has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine and pretends to know what food is the best for the body and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or

There is an untranslatable play on the name Polus which means a colt.

men who had no more sense than children as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food the physician would be starved to death [465] A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications And I do not call any irrational thing an art but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them

Cookery then I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine and tiring in like manner is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic and is knavish false, ignoble, illiberal working deceitfully by the help of lines and colours, and enamels and garments and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say after the manner of the geometers (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow)

as tiring gymnastic cookery medicine or rather

astuting gymnastic sophistry legislation and

as cookery medicine rhetoric justice.

And this I say is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection they are apt to be jumbled up together neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them For if the body presided over itself and were not under the guidance of the soul and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine but the body was made the judge of them and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted would prevail far and wide Chaos would come again, and cookery health and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric which in relation to the soul what cookery is to the body I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech when I would not allow you to discourse at length But I think that I may be excused because you did not understand me and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly and therefore I had to enter into

hardly used if when you are making a long oration [462] and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you and may not go away? I say rather if you have a real interest in the argument or to repeat my former expression have any desire to set it on its legs take back any statement which you please and in your turn ask and answer like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows—would you not?

Pol Yes

Soc And you like him invite any one to ask you about anything which he pleases and you will know how to answer him?

Pol To be sure

Soc And now which will you do ask or answer?

Pol I will ask and do you answer me, Socrates the same question which Gorgias as you suppose is unable to answer What is rhetoric?

Soc Do you mean what sort of an art?

Pol Yes

Soc To say the truth Polus it is not an art at all in my opinion

Pol Then what in your opinion is rhetoric?

Soc A thing which as I was lately reading in a book of yours you say that you have made an art

Pol What thing?

Soc I should say a sort of experience

Pol Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?

Soc That is my view but you may be of another mind

Pol An experience in what?

Soc An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification

Pol And if able to gratify others must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

Soc What are you saying Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

Pol Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?

Soc Will you who are so desirous to gratify others afford a slight gratification to me?

Pol I will

Soc Will you ask me what sort of an art is cookery?

Pol What sort of an art is cookery?

Soc Not an art at all Polus

Pol What then?

Soc I should say an experience

Pol In what? I wish that you would explain to me

Soc An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification Polus

Pol Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?

Soc No they are only different parts of the same profession

Pol Of what profession?

Soc I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous and I hesitate to answer lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession [463] For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practices I really cannot tell—from what he was just now saying nothing appeared of what he thought of his art but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole

Gor A part of what Socrates? Say what you mean and never mind me

Soc In my opinion then Gorgias the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all but the habit of a bold and ready wit which knows how to manage mankind this habit I sum up under the word flattery and it appears to me to have many other parts one of which is cookery which may seem to be an art but as I maintain is only an experience or routine and not an art—another part is rhetoric and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others thus there are four branches and four different things answering to them And Polus may ask if he likes for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not until I have first answered What is rhetoric? For that would not be right Polus but I shall be happy to answer if you will ask me What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Pol I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Soc Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric according to my view is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics

Pol And noble or ignoble?

Soc Ignoble I should say if I am compelled to answer for I call what is bad ignoble—though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before

Gor Indeed Socrates I cannot say that I understand myself

Soc I do not wonder Gorgias for I have not as yet explained myself and our friend Polus

Pol To be sure, Socrates.

Soc Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?

Pol I should.

[468] *Soc* And the things which are neither good nor evil and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil or of neither are such as sitting walking running sailing or again wood, stones, and the like—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?

Pol Exactly so.

Soc Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

Pol Clearly the indifferent for the sake of the good.

Soc When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?

Pol Yes.

Soc And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?

Pol Certainly.

Soc Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?

Pol Yes.

Soc And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do but that other thing for the sake of which we do them?

Pol Most true.

Soc Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

Pol You are right.

Soc Hence we may infer that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a hetæran, kills another or exiles another or despoils him of his property under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not so for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?

Pol Yes.

Soc But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?

Pol Well, I suppose not.

Soc Then if great power is a good as you allow will such a one have great power in a state?

Pol He will not.

Soc Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power and not do what he wills?

Pol As though you Socrates would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh no!

[469] *Soc* Justly or unjustly do you mean?

Pol In either case is he not equally to be envied?

Soc Forbear Polus!

Pol Why forbear?

Soc Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied but only to pity them.

Pol And are those of whom I spoke wretches?

Soc Yes, certainly they are.

Pol And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?

Soc No I do not say that of him but neither do I think that he is to be envied.

Pol Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?

Soc Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly in which case he is also to be pitied and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.

Pol At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?

Soc Not so much Polus, as he who kills him and not so much as he who is justly killed.

Pol How can that be, Socrates?

Soc That may very well be inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.

Pol But is it the greatest? Is not suffering in just or a greater evil?

Soc Certainly not.

Pol Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?

Soc I should not like either but if I must choose between them I would rather suffer than do.

Pol Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?

Soc Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.

Pol I mean as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing banishing doing in all things as you like.

Soc Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say do you reply to me. Suppose

an explanation [466] And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours I hope that you will speak at equal length but if I am able to understand you let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair And now you may do what you please with my answer

Pol What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?

Soc Nay I said a part of flattery if at your age Polus you cannot remember what will you do by and by when you get older?

Pol And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states under the idea that they are flatterers?

Soc Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?

Pol I am asking a question

Soc Then my answer is that they are not regarded at all

Pol How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?

Soc Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor

Pol And that is what I do mean to say

Soc Then if so I think that they have the least power of all the citizens

Pol What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile any one whom they please

Soc By the dog Polus I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours whether you are giving an opinion of your own or asking a question of me

Pol I am asking a question of you

Soc Yes my friend but you ask two questions at once

Pol How two questions?

Soc Why did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please?

Pol I did

Soc Well then I say to you that here are two questions in one and I will answer both of them And I tell you, Polus that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states as I was just now saying for they do literally nothing which they will but only what they think best

Pol And is not that a great power?

Soc Polus has already said the reverse

Soc No by the great—what do you call him?—not you for you say that power is a good to him who has the power

Pol I do

Soc And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best this is a good and

would you call this great power?

Pol I should not

Soc Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so you will have refuted [467] me but if you leave me unrefuted why the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states and the tyrants will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves if as you say power be indeed a good admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil

Pol Yes I admit that

Soc How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states unless Polus can refute Socrates and prove to him that they do as they will?

Pol This fellow—

Soc I say that they do not do as they will—now refute me

Pol Why have you not already said that they do as they think best?

Soc And I say so still

Pol Then surely they do as they will?

Soc I deny it

Pol But they do what they think best?

Soc Ay

Pol That Socrates is monstrous and absurd

Soc Good words good Polus as I may say in your own peculiar style but if you have any questions to ask of me either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself

Pol Very well I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean

Soc Do men appear to you to will that which they do or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine for example, at the bidding of a physician do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful or the health for the sake of which they drink?

Pol Clearly the health

Soc And when men go on a voyage or engage in business they do not will that which they are doing at the time for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

Pol Certainly

Soc And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it

Pol Yes

Soc And are not all things either good or evil or intermediate and indifferent?

more? he had a younger brother a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdicas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged. Archelaus, however had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him, that was not his notion of happiness but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus!

Soc I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And thus, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.

Pol. That is because you will not, for you surely must think as I do.

Soc. Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, [472] and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim: a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring witnesses in disproof of my statement—you may if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who are the row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him: or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi: summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose—they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me unless I

make you the one witness of my words: nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours: no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general: but mine is of another sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For indeed we are at issue about matters which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful: to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy: seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. But I say that this is an impossibility—here is one point about which we are at issue—very good. And do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

Pol. Certainly not: in that case he will be most miserable.

Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods [473] and men.

Pol. You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.

Soc. I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

Pol. Exactly so.

Soc. And you said the opposite?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?

Pol. By Zeus, I did.

Soc. In your own opinion, Polus.

Pol. Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.

Soc. You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miser-

that I go into a crowded Agora and take a dagger under my arm Polus, I say to you I have just acquired rare power and become a tyrant for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant Such is my great power in this city And if you do not believe me and I show you the dagger you would probably reply Socrates in that sort of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house which he pleases and the docks and triremes of the Athenians and all their other vessels whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?

Pol Certainly not such doing as this

[470] Soc But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?

Pol I can

Soc Why then?

Pol Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished

Soc And punishment is an evil?

Pol Certainly

Soc And you would admit once more my good sir that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage and that this is the meaning of great power and if not then his power is an evil and is no power But let us look at the matter in another way—we do not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking the infliction of death and exile and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?

Pol Certainly

Soc About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

Pol Yes

Soc Tell me then when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?

Pol I would rather Socrates that you should answer as well as ask that question

Soc Well Polus since you would rather have the answer from me I say that they are good when they are just and evil when they are unjust

Pol You are hard of refutation Socrates but might not a child refute that statement?

Soc Then I shall be very grateful to the child and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness And I hope that refute me you will and not weary of

doing good to a friend

Pol Yes Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy

Soc What events?

Pol You see I presume that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

Soc At any rate I hear that he is

Pol And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

Soc I cannot say Polus for I have never had any acquaintance with him

Pol And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

Soc Most certainly not

Pol Then clearly Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

Soc And I should speak the truth for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice

Pol What! and does all happiness consist in this?

Soc Yes indeed Polus that is my doctrine the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy as I maintain and the unjust and evil are miserable

[471] Pol Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?

Soc Yes my friend if he is wicked

Pol That he is wicked I cannot deny for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas he himself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas and if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave and then according to your doctrine he would have been happy But now he is unspeakably miserable for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes in the first place he invited his uncle and master Alcetas to come to him under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas has usurped and after entertaining him and his son Alexander who was his own cousin and nearly of an age with him and making them drunk he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night and slew them and got both of them out of the way and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men and was very far from repenting shall I tell you how he showed his re-

ly measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?

Pol Certainly.

Soc Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these that is to say in pleasure or utility or both?

Pol Very true.

Soc And of two deformed things that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so?

Pol Yes.

Soc But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say that suffering in wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?

Pol I did.

Soc Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both—does not that also follow?

Pol Of course.

Soc First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain. Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?

Pol No, Socrates certainly not.

Soc Then they do not exceed in pain?

Pol No.

Soc But it not in pain then not in both?

Pol Certainly not.

Soc Then they can only exceed in the other?

Pol Yes.

Soc That is to say in evil?

Pol True.

Soc Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

Pol Clearly.

Soc But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

Pol Yes.

Soc And that is now discovered to be more evil?

Pol True.

Soc And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer Polus, and fear not for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the a-gument's to physician without shrinking and either say Yes or No to me.

Pol I should say No.

Soc Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

Pol No not according to this way of putting the case Socrates.

Soc Then I said truly Polus, that neither you, nor I nor any man would rather do than suffer injustice for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.

Pol That is the conclusion?

Soc You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how unlike they are. All men with the exception of myself are of your way of thinking [476] but your single assent and witness are enough for me—I have no need of any other. I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question which is Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil as I supposed. Consider—You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?

Pol I should.

Soc And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.

Pol Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

Soc Consider again—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

Pol I should say so.

Soc And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

Pol Yes.

Soc And if the striker strikes violently or quickly that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?

Pol True.

Soc And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

Pol Yes.

Soc And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

Pol Certainly.

Soc And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

Pol Truly.

Soc And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?

Pol Yes.

Soc And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?

able—are you going to refute this proposition also?

Pol A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other Socrates

Soc Say rather Polus impossible for who can refute the truth?

Pol What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked mutilated has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him and having seen his wife and children suffer the like is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which as you say cannot be refuted?

Soc There again noble Polus you are raising hobgoblins instead of refuting me just now you were calling witnesses against me But please to refresh my memory a little did you say—in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant?

Pol Yes I did

Soc Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny nor he who suffers in the attempt for of two miserables one can not be the happier but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two Do you laugh Polus? Well this is a new kind of refutation—when any one says anything instead of refuting him to laugh at him

Pol But do you not think Socrates that you have been sufficiently refuted when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company

Soc O Polus I am not a public man and only last year when my tribe were serving as Prytanes and it became my duty as their president to take the votes [474] there was a laugh at me because I was unable to take them And as I failed then you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now but if as I was saying you have no better argument than numbers let me have a turn and do you make trial of the sort of proof which as I think is required, for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words and he is the person with whom I am arguing his suffrage I know how to take, but with the many I have nothing to do and do not even address myself to them May I ask then whether you will answer in

turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice and not to be punished than to be punished

Pol And I should say neither I nor any man would you yourself for example suffer rather than do injustice?

Soc Yes and you too I or any man would

Pol Quite the reverse neither you nor I nor any man

Soc But will you answer?

Pol To be sure I will for I am curious to hear what you can have to say

Soc Tell me then and you will know and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning which of the two Polus in your opinion is the worst?—to do injustice or to suffer?

Pol I should say that suffering was worst

Soc And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer

Pol To do

Soc And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

Pol Certainly not

Soc I understand you to say if I am not mistaken that the honourable is not the same as the good or the disgraceful as the evil?

Pol Certainly not

Soc Let me ask a question of you When you speak of beautiful things such as bodies colours figures sounds institutions do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard bodies for example are beautiful in proportion as they are useful or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators can you give any other account of personal beauty?

Pol I cannot

Soc And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were beautiful either by reason of the pleasure which they give or of their use or both?

Pol Yes I should

Soc And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?

Pol I should

Soc Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?

[475] *Pol* I think not

Soc And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

Pol To be sure Socrates and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility

Soc And deformity or disgrace may be equal

Soc And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

Pol To the judges, you mean

Soc—Who are to punish them?

Pol Yes.

Soc And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?

Pol Clearly

Soc Then the art of money making frees a man from poverty medicine from disease and justice from intemperance and injustice?

Pol That is evident

Soc Which then is the best of these three?

Pol Will you enumerate them?

Soc Money making medicine and justice

Pol Justice Socrates far excels the two others

Soc And justice if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?

Pol Yes

Soc But is the being healed a pleasant thing and are those who are being healed pleased?

Pol I think not.

Soc A useful thing then?

Pol Yes

Soc Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil and this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well?

Pol Certainly

Soc And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition who is healed or who never was out of health?

Pol Clearly he who was never out of health

Soc Yes for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils but in never having had them

Pol True

Soc And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil—whichever of them is the most miserable?

Pol Clearly he who is not healed

Soc And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils whichever?

Pol True

Soc And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?

Pol True

Soc He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils

Pol Clearly

Soc And he has the second place who is delivered from vice?

Pol True

Soc That is to say he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?

Pol Yes

Soc Then he lives worst, who having been unjust has no deliverance from injustice?

Pol Certainly

[4,9] Soc That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes and who being the most unjust of men succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment and thus as you say has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?

Pol True

Soc May not their way of proceeding my friend be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution and will not be cured because, like a child he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut—Is not that a parallel case?

Pol Yes truly

Soc He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour and if we are right, Polus in our previous conclusions they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body a soul I say which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils they provide themselves with money and friends and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion But if we, Polus are right, do you see what follows or shall we draw out the consequences in form?

Pol If you please.

Soc Is it not a fact that injustice and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?

Pol That is quite clear

Soc And further that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?

Pol True

Soc And not to suffer is to perpetuate the evil?

Pol Yes

Soc To do wrong then is second only in the scale of evils but to do wrong and not to be punished is first and greatest of all?

Pol That is evident

Soc Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting—that the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent?

Pol I agree

Soc Then as this is admitted let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

Pol Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that

Soc And suffering implies an agent?

Pol Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher

Soc And he who punishes rightly punishes justly?

Pol Yes

Soc And therefore he acts justly?

Pol Justly

Soc Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?

Pol That is evident

Soc And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?

Pol Certainly

Soc Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?

Pol True

Soc And if what is honourable then what is good for the honourable is either pleasant or useful? [477]

Pol Certainly

Soc Then he who is punished suffers what is good?

Pol That is true

Soc Then he is benefited?

Pol Yes

Soc Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term benefited? I mean that if he be justly punished his soul is improved

Pol Surely

Soc Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?

Pol Yes

Soc And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way—In respect of a man's estate do you see any greater evil than poverty?

Pol There is no greater evil

Soc Again in a man's bodily frame you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?

Pol I should

Soc And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?

Pol Of course

Soc And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice and the like?

Pol Certainly

Soc So then in mind, body and estate which are three you have pointed out three corresponding evils—justice, disease, poverty?

Pol True

Soc And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice and in general the evil of the soul?

Pol By far the most

Soc And if the most disgraceful then also the worst?

Pol What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc I mean to say that what is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful or both

Pol Certainly

Soc And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?

Pol It has been admitted

Soc And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain or most hurtful or both?

Pol Certainly

Soc And therefore to be unjust and intemperate and cowardly and ignorant is more painful than to be poor and sick?

Pol Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises

Soc Then if as you would argue not more painful the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil

Pol Clearly

Soc And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?

Pol Yes

Soc Then injustice and intemperance and in general the depravity of the soul are the greatest of evils!

Pol That is evident

Soc Now what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?

Pol Yes

Soc And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

Pol Very true

[478] *Soc* And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them

Pol To the physicians, Socrates

word or opinion of his but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the assembly you go over to his opinion and you do the same with Demus, the fair you, son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your listeners, and if a person were to express surprise at the success of what you say from time to time when under their influence, [432] you would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your listeners say unless they are prevented and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an *enigma* too, and therefore you need not wonder at me, but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy who is my lover, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my friend, neither is she capricious like my other lovers, for the son of Cleonias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow but philosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, and you have heard her tell myself. Her you must resist, and either now as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils or if you let a heretic word unrestrained, by the dog, the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my life should be unharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I produced, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.

Cal. O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer and seem to be running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into the same error himself which he accused Gorgias — for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered No and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you deservedly as I think but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot say very much for him when he conceived so you

that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for thus, as the admission which led to his being entangled by you and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth are appealing not to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, [433] he is compelled to contradict himself and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature and if he is talking of the rule of nature you slip away to custom as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil but conventionally to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live wretched when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak, and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests and they terrify the stronger sort of men and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them and they say that dishonesty is shameful and unjust meaning by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours for knowing their own inferiority I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Persians invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples) Nay but

Pol That is true

Soc Well and was not this the point in dispute my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy because he was a very great criminal and unpunished. I on the other hand maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished is and ought to be, the most miserable of all men and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer and he who escapes punishment more miserable than he who suffers — Was not that what I said?

Pol Yes

Soc And it has been proved to be true?

Pol Certainly

[480] *Soc* Well Polus but if this is true where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong for he will thereby suffer great evil?

Pol True

Soc And if he or any one about whom he cares does wrong he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished he will run to the judge as he would to the physician in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul must we not allow this consequence Polus if our former admissions are to stand — is any other inference consistent with them?

Pol To that Socrates there can be but one answer

Soc Then rhetoric is of no use to us Polus in helping a man to excuse his own injustice or that of his parents or friends or children or country but may be of use to anyone who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse — himself above all and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong he should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it that so the wrong doer may suffer and be made whole and he should even force himself and others not to shrink but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron not regarding the pain in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable let him who has done things worthy of stripes allow himself to be scourged if of bonds to be bound if of a fine to be fined if of exile to be exiled if of death to die himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations and using rhetoric to this end that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then

Polus rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say Yes or No to that?

Pol To me Socrates what you are saying appears very strange though probably in agreement with your premises

Soc Is not this the conclusion if the premises are not disproven?

Pol Yes it certainly is

Soc And from the opposite point of view if indeed it be our duty to harm another whether an enemy or not — I except the case of self-defence — then I have to be upon my guard — but if my enemy [481] injures a third person then in every sort of way by word as well as deed I should try to prevent his being punished or appearing before the judge and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape and not suffer punishment if he has stolen a sum of money let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and justice and if he has done things worthy of death let him not die but rather be immortal in his wickedness or if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes Polus rhetoric may be useful but is of small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice at least there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion

Cal Tell me Chaerephon is Socrates in earnest or is he joking?

Chær I should say Callicles that he is in most profound earnest but you may as well ask him

Cal By the gods and I will Tell me Socrates are you in earnest or only in jest? For if you are in earnest and what you say is true is not the whole of human life turned upside down and are we not doing as would appear in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?

Soc O Callicles if there were not some community of feelings among mankind however varying in different persons — I mean to say if every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species — I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both and both of us have two loves apiece — I am the lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias and of philosophy and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Now I observe that you with all your cleverness do not venture to contradict your favourite in any

any one of your sort, off to prison declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong: you must allow that you would not know what to do — there you would stand giddy and gaping and not having a word to say and when you went up before the Court even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of

An art which converts a man of sense into a fool

who is helpless and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his goods and has to live simply deprived of his rights of citizenship? — he being a man who if I may use the expression may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then my good friend take my advice, and refuse no more.

Learn the philosophy of sense and acquire the pleasure of wisdom

But a foolish desire

whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities

For they do

Give you plenty of material for dwelling

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honour who is well to do.

Sor. If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold should I not rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold and the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul and if the stone and I agreed in approving of her training then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state and that no other test was needed by me.

C. What is your meaning, Socrates?

Sor. I will tell you. I think that I have found in you the desired touchstone.

Cal. Why?

Sor. Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that it is a man's to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, [487] he ought to have three qualities — knowledge, goodness, and outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me because they are not wise as you are, others are wise but they will not tell me the truth because they have not the same interest in me

which you have and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends but they are not open spoken enough and they are too modest. Why their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them in the face of a large company on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient having received an excellent education to this many Athenians can testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you Callicles and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholgares studied together there were four of you and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried and as I know you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise you were afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends I have a sufficient evidence of your real good will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us and will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with me either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty nor yet from a desire to deceive me for you are my friend as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry Callicles than that which you censure me for making — What ought the character of a man to be and what his pursuits, and how far is he to go both in maturer years and in youth? [488] For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me now that you have begun until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented call me dolt and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by

these are the men who act according to nature yes by Heaven and according to the law of nature not perhaps according to that artificial law which we invent and impose upon our fellows of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards and tame them like young lions [484]—charming them with the sound of the voice and saying to them that with equality they must be content and that the equal is the honourable and the just But if there were a man who had sufficient force he would shake off and break through and escape from all this he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms and all our laws which are against nature the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us and the light of natural justice would shine forth And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem that

Law is the king of all of mortals as well as of immortals

this as he says

Makes might to be right doing violence with highest hand as I infer from the deeds of Heracles for without buying them—

—I do not remember the exact words but the meaning is that without buying them and without their being given to him he carried off the oxen of Geryon according to the law of natural right and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior And this is true as you may ascertain if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things for philosophy Socrates if pursued in moderation and at the proper age is an elegant accomplishment but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life Even if a man has good parts still if he carries philosophy into later life he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know he is inexperienced in the laws of the State and in the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man whether private or public and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general And people of this sort when they betake themselves to politics or business are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy For as Euripides says,

Every man shines in that and pursues that and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he most excels

but anything in which he is inferior [485] he avoids and depreciates and praises the opposite

from partiality to himself and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself The true principle is to unite them Philosophy as a part of education, is an excellent thing and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study but when he is more advanced in years the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate children For I love to see a little child who is not of an age to speak plainly lisping at his play there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years But when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words I am offended the sound is disagreeable and has to my ears the twang of slavery So when I hear a man lisping or see him playing like a child his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy when I see a youth thus engaged—the study appears to me to be in character and becoming a man of liberal education and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man who will never aspire to anything great or noble But if I see him continuing the study in later life and not leaving off I should like to beat him Socrates for as I was saying such a one even though he have good natural parts becomes effeminate He flies from the busy centre and the market place, in which as the poet says men become distinguished he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner Now I Socrates am very well inclined towards you and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion in the play of Euripides whom I was mentioning just now for I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother that you Socrates are careless about the things of which you ought to be careful and that you

Who have a soul so noble are remarkable for a puerile exterior

[486] *Neither in a court of justice could you state a case or give any reason or proof*

Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf

And you must not be offended my dear Socrates for I am speaking out of good will towards you if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus defenceless which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far For suppose that some one were to take you or

eral of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being wiser be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of food?

Cal Certainly

Soc Either then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, because he is better or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason of his authority but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles—am I not right, my friend?

Cal You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense I am not speaking of them.

Soc Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer Yes or No

Cal Yes.

Soc And ought not the better to have a larger share?

Cal Not of meats and drinks

Soc I understand then perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them?

Cal Fudge about coats!

Soc Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes the shoemaker clearly should talk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?

Cal Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?

Soc Or if this is not your meaning perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?

Cal How you go on, always talking in the same way Socrates!

[491] Soc Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.

Cal Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors as if this had to do with our argument.

Soc But why will you not tell me in what a

man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

Cal I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul

Soc See now most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the stronger then again as the wiser and now you bring forward a new notion the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous I wish my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all whom you affirm to be the better and superior and in what they are better?

Cal I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state—they ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects

Soc But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?

Cal What do you mean?

Soc I mean that every man is his own ruler but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself he is only required to rule others?

Cal What do you mean by his ruling over himself?

Soc A simple thing enough just what is commonly said that a man should be temperate and master of himself and ruler of his own pleasures and passions

Cal What innocently you mean those fools—the temperate?

Soc Certainly—any one may know that to be my meaning

Cal Quite so, Socrates and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost and not to chastise them but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence [492] to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility To thus however

natural justice. Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force—that the better should rule the worse—the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?

Cal Yes that is what I was saying and so I still aver

Soc And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right because they are superior and stronger as though the superior and stronger and better were the same or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker and the superior the worse or whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?

Cal I say unequivocally that they are the same

Soc Then the many are by nature superior to the one against whom as you were saying they make the laws?

Cal Certainly

Soc Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

Cal Very true

Soc Then they are the laws of the better for the superior class are far better as you were saying?

Cal Yes

Soc And since they are superior the laws which are made by them are by nature good?

Cal Yes

Soc And are not the many of opinion as you were lately saying that justice is equality [489] and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice?—is that so or not? Answer Callicles and let no modesty be found to come in the way—do the many think or do they not think thus?—I must beg of you to answer in order that if you agree with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an authority

Cal Yes the opinion of the many is what you say

Soc Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice and that justice is equality so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion when accusing me you said

¹ Cf. what is said of Gorgias by Callicles 482.

that nature and custom are opposed and that I knowing this was dishonestly playing between them appealing to custom when the argument is about nature and to nature when the argument is about custom?

Cal This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip? do you not see—have I not told you already that by superior I mean better—do you imagine me to say that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together their *ipssissima verba* are laws?

Soc Hol my philosopher is that your line!

Cal Certainly

Soc I was thinking Callicles that something of the kind must have been in your mind and that is why I repeated the question—What is the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant for you surely do not think that two men are better than one or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again and tell me who the better are if they are not the stronger and I will ask you great Sir to be a little milder in your instructions or I shall have to run away from you

Cal You are ironical

Soc No by the hero Zethus Callicles, by whose aid you were just now saying (486) many ironical things against me I am not—tell me then whom you mean by the better?

Cal I mean the more excellent

Soc Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser or if not whom?

[490] Cal Most assuredly I do mean the wiser

Soc Then according to you one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools and he ought to rule them and they ought to be his subjects and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching) if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?

Cal Yes that is what I mean and that is what I conceive to be natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior

Soc Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case. Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now there are sev-

And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?

Cal. You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left and this as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone—he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled—but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx.

Soc. But the more you pour in, the greater the waste and the holes must be large for the liquid to escape.

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant—you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And he is to be thirsting and drinking?

Cal. Yes, that is what I mean—he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

Soc. Cap Cal, excellent, go on as you have begun, and have no shame. I too, must disencumber myself of shame and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness?

Cal. What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator.

Soc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought—but you will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now answer my question.

Cal. I answer that even the scratcher would like pleasure.

Soc. And if pleasantly then also happily?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say that they too are happy if they only get enough of what they want?

Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument?

Soc. I tell my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says with-

out any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy [495] and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?

Cal. Well, then for the sake of consistency I will say that they are the same.

Soc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

Cal. Why that is what you are doing too, Socrates.

Soc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good—for if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow and many others.

Cal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.

Soc. And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?

Cal. Indeed I do.

Soc. Then as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?

Cal. By all means.

Soc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me—There is some thing, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

Cal. There is.

Soc. And were you not saying just now that some courage implied knowledge?

Cal. I was.

Soc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?

Cal. Certainly I was.

Soc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?

Cal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.

Soc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same—but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another or with the good.

Cal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he assent to this, or not?

Soc. He does not assent—neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will ad-

the many cannot attain and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness which they desire to conceal and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures and being unable to satisfy their pleasures they praise temperance and justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or sovereignty what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a man like him I say who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand in his way and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay Socrates for you profess to be a votary of the truth and the truth is this—that luxury and intemperance and licence if they be provided with means are virtue and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble agreements contrary to nature foolish talk of men nothing worth.¹

Soc. There is a noble freedom Callicles in your way of approaching the argument for what you say is what the rest of the world think but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me then—you say do you not that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them and that this is virtue?

Cal. Yes I do.

Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?

Cal. No indeed for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of all.

Soc. But surely life according to your view is an awful thing and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying

Who knows if life be not death and death life

and that we are very likely dead [493] I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we are actually dead and that the body (*σῶμα*) is our tomb (*σῆμα*)* and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down

and some ingenious person probably a Sicilian or an Italian playing with the word invented a tale in which he called the soul—because of its believing and make believe nature—a vessel and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part he compared to a vessel full of holes because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking Callicles for he declares that of all the souls in Hades meaning the invisible world (*αἰδές*) these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander as my informer assures me is the soul and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant which is likewise full of holes and therefore incontinent owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough but they show the principle which if I can I would fain prove to you that you should change your mind and instead of the intemperate and insatiate life choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you and however many tales I rehearse to you do you continue of the same opinion still?

Cal. The latter Socrates is more like the truth.

Soc. Well I will tell you another image which comes out of the same school—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure—There are two men both of whom have a number of casks the one man has his casks sound and full one of wine another of honey and a third of milk besides others filled with other liquids and the streams which fill them are few and scanty and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other in like manner can procure streams though not without difficulty but his vessels are leaky and unsound and night and day he is compelled to be filling them and if he pauses for a moment [494] he is in an agony of pain. Such are their respective lives—

An untranslatable pun—*διὰ τὸ πᾶσι ὁ τε καὶ πιστοῦν ὡς μὲν πλοῦς*

¹ Cf. Republic i 348

² Cf. Phaedrus 250

Soc I envy you, Calades, for having been introduced into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our moment—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?

Cal. True.

Soc And if he is hungry or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?

Cal. Very true.

Soc Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

Cal. Yes.

Soc But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted, so you still adhere to what you said?

Cal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

Soc Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment, but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly I think, have been considered by you when you denigrated them. Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?

Cal. Yes, I have.

Soc And a foolish man too?

Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

(98) Soc Nothing particular, if you will give me an answer.

Cal. Yes, I have.

Soc And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

Cal. Yes.

Soc Why do you rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?

Cal. They are much upon a par I think, in that respect.

Soc Enough. And did you ever see a coward in battle?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?

Cal. I should say "most" of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.

Soc No matter then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?

Cal. Greatly.

Soc And the foolish too would seem?

Cal. Yes.

Soc And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

Cal. Both are pained.

Soc And are they equally pained?

Cal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

Soc And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure?

Cal. I dare say.

Soc Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?

Cal. Yes.

Soc But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?

Cal. Yes.

Soc Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?

Cal. Yes.

Soc Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

Cal. I really do not know what you mean.

Soc Why do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?

Cal. Yes, I remember.

Soc And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?

Cal. I should.

Soc Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?

mit I suppose that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

Cal Yes

Soc And if they are opposed to each other then like health and disease they exclude one another a man cannot have them both, or be without them both at the same time?

Cal What do you mean?

Soc Take the case of any bodily affection — a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

[496] *Cal* To be sure

Soc But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?

Cal Certainly not

Soc And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?

Cal Certainly not

Soc That would surely be marvellous and absurd?

Cal Very

Soc I suppose that he is affected by them and gets rid of them in turns?

Cal Yes

Soc And he may have strength and weakness in the same way by fits?

Cal Yes

Soc Or swiftness and slowness?

Cal Certainly

Soc And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites evil and misery in a similar alternation?

Cal Certainly he has

Soc If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration

Cal I entirely agree

Soc Go back now to our former admissions — Did you say that to hunger I mean the mere state of hunger was pleasant or painful?

Cal I said painful but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant

Soc I know but still the actual hunger — painful am I not right?

Cal Yes

Soc And thirst too is painful?

Cal Yes very

Soc Need I adduce any more instances or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?

Cal I agree and therefore you need not adduce any more instances

Cf Republic II 436

Soc Very good And you would admit that to drink when you are thirsty is pleasant?

Cal Yes

Soc And in the sentence which you have just uttered the word thirsty implies pain?

Cal Yes

Soc And the word drinking is expressive of pleasure and of the satisfaction of the want?

Cal Yes

Soc There is pleasure in drinking?

Cal Certainly

Soc When you are thirsty?

Cal Yes

Soc And in pain?

Cal Yes

Soc Do you see the inference — that pleasure and pain are simultaneous when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous and do they not affect at the same time the same part whether of the soul or the body? — which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence Is not this true?

Cal It is

Soc You said also that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?

Cal Yes, I did

[497] *Soc* But you admitted that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?

Cal Clearly

Soc Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune or pain the same as evil fortune and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?

Cal I wish I knew Socrates what your quibbling means

Soc You know Callicles but you affect not to know

Cal Well get on and don't keep fooling then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me

Soc Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?

Cal I do not understand what you are saying

Gor Nay Callicles answer if only for our sakes — we should like to hear the argument out

Cal Yes Gorgias but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions

Gor What matter? Your reputation Callicles is not at stake Let Socrates argue in his own fashion

Cal Well then Socrates you shall ask these little peddling questions since Gorgias wishes to have them

Soc I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument—Does not a man cease from thirst and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?

Cal True.

Soc And if he is hungry or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?

Cal Very true.

Soc Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

Cal Yes.

Soc But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted; do you still adhere to what you said?

Cal Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

Soc Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful: there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment, but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly I think, have been considered by you when you identified them. Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

Cal Yes.

Soc And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?

Cal Certainly.

Soc And did you ever see a foolish child rejoicing?

Cal Yes, I have.

Soc And a foolish man too?

Cal Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

[498] Soc Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

Cal Yes, I have.

Soc And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

Cal Yes.

Soc Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?

Cal They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.

Soc Enough. And did you ever see a coward in battle

Cal To be sure.

Soc And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy—the coward or the brave?

Cal I should say most of both or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.

Soc No matter then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?

Cal Greatly.

Soc And the foolish so it would seem?

Cal Yes.

Soc And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

Cal Both are pained.

Soc And are they equally pained?

Cal I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

Soc And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure?

Cal I dare say.

Soc Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?

Cal Yes.

Soc But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?

Cal Yes.

Soc Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?

Cal Yes.

Soc Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

Cal I really do not know what you mean.

Soc Why do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?

Cal Yes, I remember.

Soc And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?

Cal Certainly.

Soc Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?

Cal Yes.

Soc And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?

Cal Yes.

Soc And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?

Cal I should.

Soc Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?

mit, I suppose that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

Cal Yes

Soc And if they are opposed to each other then like health and disease they exclude one another a man cannot have them both or be without them both at the same time?

Cal What do you mean?

Soc Take the case of any bodily affection — a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

[496] *Cal* To be sure

Soc But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?

Cal Certainly not

Soc And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?

Cal Certainly not

Soc That would surely be marvellous and absurd?

Cal Very

Soc I suppose that he is affected by them and gets rid of them in turns?

Cal Yes

Soc And he may have strength and weakness in the same way by fits?

Cal Yes

Soc Or swiftness and slowness?

Cal Certainly

Soc And does he have and not have good and happiness and their opposites evil and misery in a similar alternation?

Cal Certainly he has

Soc If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration

Cal I entirely agree

Soc Go back now to our former admissions—Did you say that to hunger I mean the mere state of hunger was pleasant or painful?

Cal I said painful but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant

Soc I know but still the actual hunger is painful am I not right?

Cal Yes

Soc And thirst too is painful?

Cal Yes very

Soc Need I adduce any more instances or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?

Cal I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances

Cf Republic iv 436

Soc Very good And you would admit that to drink when you are thirsty is pleasant?

Cal Yes

Soc And in the sentence which you have just uttered the word *thirsty* implies pain?

Cal Yes

Soc And the word *drinking* is expressive of pleasure and of the satisfaction of the want?

Cal Yes

Soc There is pleasure in drinking?

Cal Certainly

Soc When you are thirsty?

Cal Yes

Soc And in pain?

Cal Yes

Soc Do you see the inference—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous when you say that being thirsty you drink? For are they not simultaneous and do they not affect at the same time the same part whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence Is not this true?

Cal It is

Soc You said also that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?

Cal Yes I did

[497] *Soc* But you admitted that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?

Cal Clearly

Soc Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune or pain the same as evil fortune and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?

Cal I wish I knew Socrates what your quibbling means

Soc You know Callicles but you affect not to know

Cal Well get on and don't keep fooling then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me

Soc Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?

Cal I do not understand what you are saying

Gor Nay Callicles answer if only for our sakes—we should like to hear the argument out

Cal Yes Gorgias but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions

Gor What matter? Your reputation Callicles is not at stake Let Socrates argue in his own fashion

Cal Well then Socrates you shall ask these little peddling questions since Gorgias wishes to have them

sembly and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy—and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however you do not even now understand what I mean?

Cal No, I do not.

Soc Then I will explain myself more clearly seeing that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not—do you agree?

Cal I do.

Soc Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, (you) and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art as all and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure neither regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you

would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion or whether you differ.

Cal I do not differ on the contrary I agree for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.

Soc And is this notion true of one soul or of two or more?

Cal Equally true of two or more.

Soc Then a man may delight a whole assembly and yet have no regard for their true interests?

Cal Yes.

Soc Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather if you would prefer let me ask, and do you answer which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?

Cal I assent.

Soc And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?

Cal Yes.

Soc And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral [?] improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?

Cal There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.

Soc And what do you say of his father Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?

Cal That is my notion of them.

Soc And as for the Muse of Tragedy that solemn and august personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant voices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her character?

Cal There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.

Soc And is not that the sort of thing, Calli-

Cal Yes

Soc The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?

Cal Yes

Soc Have the wise man and the fool the brave and the coward joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?

Cal I should say that he has

Soc Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions [499] for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?

Cal Yes

Soc And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

Cal Certainly

Soc And he who has joy is good?

Cal Yes

Soc And he who is in pain is evil?

Cal Certainly

Soc The good and evil both have joy and pain but perhaps the evil has more of them?

Cal Yes

Soc Then must we not infer that the bad man is as good and bad as the good or perhaps even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same—can this be denied Callicles?

Cal I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play you like a child want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?

Soc Alas Callicles how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child some times saying one thing and then another as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business as they said of old and take what I can get out of you—Well then as I understand you to say I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?

Cal Yes

Soc The beneficial are good and the hurtful are evil?

Cal To be sure

Soc And the beneficial are those which do

some good and the hurtful are those which do some evil?

Cal Yes

Soc Take for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health or any other bodily excellence are good and their opposites evil?

Cal Certainly

Soc And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?

Cal To be sure

Soc And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?

Cal Certainly

Soc But not the evil?

Cal Clearly

Soc Because if you remember Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good—and will you agree with us in saying that the good is the end of all our actions and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good [500] and not the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two?

Cal I will

Soc Then pleasure like everything else is to be sought for the sake of that which is good and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?

Cal To be sure

Soc But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?

Cal He must have art

Soc Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus. I was saying as you will not have forgotten that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure and know nothing of a better and worse and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery which I do not call an art but only an experience was of the former class which is concerned with pleasure and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now by the god of friendship I must beg you Callicles not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life and to a man who has any sense at all what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the as-

order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other

Cal Why not give the name yourself *Soc* rates?

Soc Well if you had rather that I should I will and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me.

Healthy as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body whence comes health and every other bodily excellence is that true or not?

Cal True.

Soc And lawful and law are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul and these make men lawful and orderly—and so we have temperance and justice have we not?

Cal Granted

Soc And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree?

Cal I agree.

Soc For what use is there, Calicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?

[505] *Cal* I will not say No to it.

Soc For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil am I not right?

Cal Yes

Soc When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drunk when he is thirsty and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all men you will admit that?

Cal Yes.

Soc And does not the same argument hold of the soul my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy her desires ought to be controlled and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement.

Cal Yes

Soc Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?

Cal To be sure.

Soc And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?

Cal Yes

Soc Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control which you were just now preferring?

Cal I do not understand you *Socrates* and I wish that you would ask some one who does

Soc Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!

Cal I do not heed a word of what you are saying and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.

Soc What are we to do then? Shall we break off in the middle?

Cal You shall judge for yourself.

Soc Well but people say that a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle and I should not like to have the argument going about without a head please then to go on a little longer and put the head on

Cal How tyrannical you are *Socrates*! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you

Soc But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument.

Cal Cannot you finish without my help as ther talking straight on or questioning and answering yourself?

Soc Must I then say with Epicharmus I was men spoke before but now one shall be enough? I suppose that there is absolutely no help And it is I am to carry on the enquiry by myself I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter for the discovery of the truth is a common good And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion [506] But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore if my opponent says anything which is of force I shall be the first to agree with him I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.

Gor I think *Socrates*, that we should not go

Cl. Laws vi. 752.

cles which we were just now describing as flattery?

Cal Quite true

Soc Well now suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre there will remain speech?

Cal To be sure

Soc And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?

Cal Yes

Soc Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?

Cal True

Soc And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?

Cal Yes

Soc Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men women and children freemen and slaves And this is not much to our taste for we have described it as having the nature of flattery

Cal Quite true

Soc Very good And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches or are they too like the rest of mankind bent upon giving them pleasure forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest playing with the people as with children and trying to amuse them but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?

[503] *Cal* I must distinguish There are some who have a real care of the public in what they say while others are such as you describe

Soc I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts one which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation the other which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens and strives to say what is best whether welcome or unwelcome to the audience but have you ever known such a rhetoric or if you have and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp who is he?

Cal But indeed I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living

Soc Well then can you mention any one of a former generation who may be said to have improved the Athenians who found them worse and made them better from the day that he began to make speeches? for indeed I do not know of such a man

¹ Cf *Republic* iii 392 ff

Cal What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man and Cimon and Mikiades and Pericles who is just lately dead and whom you heard yourself?

Soc Yes Callicles they were good men if you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others but if not and if as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge the satisfaction of some desires makes us better and of others worse and we ought to gratify the one and not the other and there is an art in distinguishing them—can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them?

Cal No indeed I cannot

Soc Yet, surely Callicles if you look you will find such a one Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described Will not the good man who says whatever he says with a view to the best speak with a reference to some standard and not at random just as all other artists whether the painter the builder the shipwright or any other look all of them to their own work and do not select and apply at random what they apply but strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part [504] until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole and this is true of all artists and in the same way the trainers and physicians of whom we spoke before give order and regularity to the body do you deny this?

Cal No I am ready to admit it.

Soc Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good that in which there is disorder evil?

Cal Yes

Soc And the same is true of a ship?

Cal Yes

Soc And the same may be said of the human body?

Cal Yes

Soc And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent or that in which there is harmony and order?

Cal The latter follows from our previous admissions

Soc What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

Cal I suppose that you mean health and strength?

Soc Yes I do and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and

in earnest when I said that a man ought to excuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer is in that degree worse and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true.

And now these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen or to save them in the extremity of danger and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes—he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me a condition which, as you say is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you Callicles that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil, and to do spoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. [509] These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion would seem now to have been fixed and settled by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which relate to bonds of iron and adamant and unless you or some other still more enterprising her shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant of these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position and of what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than the greatest of evils, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not

Cl. Republic 12. 5-9 ff.

the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?—and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil, thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles?

Cal. Yes, quite right.

Soc. Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—by what devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the power or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?

Cal. He must have provided himself with the power that is clear.

Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art and if he has not studied and practised will he be unjust still? Surely you might say Callicles whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily but that all do wrong against their will?

[510] Cal. Granted Socrates, if you will only have done.

Soc. Then, as it would appear power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself or the equal and companion of the ruling power.

Cal. Well said Socrates and please to observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.

Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine. To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to him—like him like, as ancient sages say. Would you not agree to this?

Cal. I should.

Soc. But when the tyrant is rude and unedu-

our ways until you have completed the argument and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say

Soc I too Gorgias should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles and then I might have given him an Amphion in return for his Zethus¹ but since you, Callicles are unwilling to continue I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error And if you refute me I shall not be angry with you as you are with me but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul

Cal My good fellow never mind me but get on

Soc Listen to me then while I recapitulate the argument —Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same Callicles and I are agreed about that And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure And we are good and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That Callicles, is my conviction But the virtue of each thing whether body or soul instrument or creature when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them Am I not right? I maintain that I am And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes I say And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course And that which is orderly is temperate? [507] Assuredly And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give Callicles dear have you any?

Cal Go on my good fellow

Soc Then I shall proceed to add that if the temperate soul is the good soul the soul which is in the opposite condition that is the foolish and intemperate is the bad soul Very true

And will not the temperate man do what is proper both in relation to the gods and to men —for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper In his relation to other men he will do what is just

¹ See 485

and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not but what he ought whether things or men or pleasures or pains and patiently to endure when he ought and therefore Callicles, the temperate man being as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed and the evil man who does evil miserable now this latter is he whom you were applauding,—the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position and these things I affirm to be true And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him he had better order his life so as not to need punishment but if either he or any of his friends whether private individual or city are in need of punishment then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment if he would be happy This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man for he is incapable of communion and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship And philosophers tell us [508] Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order not disorder or misrule my friend But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty both among gods and men you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess and do not care about geometry —Well then either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted or if it is granted what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was

else, in his saving power for he sometimes is whose cut es. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker and the others whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say "I am better and better born." But if the better is not what I say and virtue consists only in a man's using himself and his, whatever may be his character then your opinion of the engine-maker and of the physician and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved—May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time?—he knows, as women say that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term—whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, [513] as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in the state whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us—I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power like the Thessalian enchantresses, who as they say bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will bow you the art of becoming great in the city and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, ay, or of Pyrilampes did he who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them will make you, as you desire, a statesman and orator for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and so it, and it lies any other. But perhaps you, sweet

Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?

Cal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be good words and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by them.

Soc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your soul is an adversary to me but I dare say that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly you may be convinced for all that. Please then to remember that there are two processes of training all things, including body and soul in the one, as we said we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them. Was not that the distinction which we drew?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery—was not that another of our conclusions?

Cal. Be it so, if you will have it.

Soc. And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to whether body or soul?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? [514] For we have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other good unless the mind of those who are to have the good whether money or office, or any other sort of power be gentle and good. Shall we say that?

Cal. Yes, certainly if you like.

Soc. Well then, if you and I Callicles, were intending to set about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake building, such as walls docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building and who taught us?—would not that be necessary Callicles?

Cal. True.

Soc. In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or of our friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not and if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our own undaunted

cated he may be expected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him

Cal That is true

Soc Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him and will never seriously regard him as a friend

Cal That again is true

Soc Then the only friend worth mentioning whom the tyrant can have will be one who is of the same character and has the same likes and dislikes and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him—he is the man who will have power in the state and no one will injure him with impunity—is not that so?

Cal Yes

Soc And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and formidable this would seem to be the way—he will accustom himself from his youth upward to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master and will contrive to be as like him as possible?

Cal Yes

Soc And in this way he will have accomplished as you and your friends would say the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?

Cal Very true

Soc But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite be true if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice and to have influence with him? [511] Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible and not be punished?

Cal True

Soc And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted and will not this be the greatest evil to him?

Cal You always contrive somehow or other Socrates to invert everything do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will if he has a mind kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

Soc Excellent Callicles I am not deaf and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true

Cal And is not that just the provoking thing?

Soc Nay not to a man of sense as the argument shows do you think that all our cares

should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law and which you advise me to cultivate?

Cal Yes truly and very good advice too

Soc Well my friend but what do you think of swimming is that an art of any great pretensions?

Cal No indeed

Soc And yet surely swimming saves a man from death and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim And if you despise the swimmers I will tell you of another and greater art the art of the pilot who not only saves the souls of men but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger just like rhetoric Yet his art is modest and unpretending it has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary and in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader demands only two obols if he brings us from Aegina to Athens or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt at the utmost two drachmae when he has saved as I was just now saying the passenger and his wife and children and goods and safely disembarked them at the Piraeus—this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon and he who is the master of the art and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea shore by his ship in an unassuming way For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow passengers he has benefited and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they [512] embarked and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitted for having escaped and is in no way benefited by him in having been saved from drowning much less he who has great and incurable diseases not of the body but of the soul which is the more valuable part of him neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man whether he be delivered from the sea or the law-courts or any other devourer—and so he reflects that such a one had better not live for he cannot live well¹

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour is not usually conceited any more than the engineer who is not at all better either the general or the pilot or any one

¹ Cf *Pepplic* iii 407

saying whether man is an animal?

Cal Certainly he is.

Soc And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?

Cal Yes.

Soc And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, and not more unjust?

Cal Quite true.

Soc And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of another mind?

Cal I agree.

Soc And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, and their savageness was shown towards himself which he must have been very far from desiring.

Cal Do you want me to agree with you?

Soc Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.

Cal Granted then.

Soc And if they were more savage, must they or have been more unjust and inferior?

Cal Granted again.

Soc Then upon this view Pericles was not a good statesman?

Cal That is, upon your view.

Soc Nay the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case of Cimon again. Did not the many persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanes. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say these things would never have happened to them. For the good characters are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken in their horses, and themselves become better characters, are thrown out—that is not the way either in chariot-racing or in any profession—What do you think?

Cal I should think not.

[517] Soc Well but I so, the truth is as I have said already that in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman—you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others yet they have turned out to be no better than our present ones and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery or they would not have fallen out of favour.

Cal But surely Socrates, no living man ever

came near any one of them in his performances.

Soc O my dear friend I say nothing against them regarded as the serving men of the State and I do think that they were certainly more serviceable than those who are living now and better able to gratify the wishes of the State but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them to have their way and using the powers which they had whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present statesmen although I do admit that they were more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way for during the whole time that we are arguing we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally in order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale or retail or he may be the maker of any of them—the baker or the cook or the weaver or the shoemaker or the currier and in so doing being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the body and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. [518] All other arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses.

Now when I say that all this is equally true of the soul you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words and then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been good trainees?—and you had replied Theonon, the baker Mithocous, who wrote the

skill—in that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master to show and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

Cal Certainly

Soc And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were physicians and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as state physicians, should I not ask about you and would you not ask about me? Well, but how about Socrates himself: has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as state physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art, which is a foolish thing?

[515] *Cal* True.

Soc And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious or unjust or intemperate or foolish and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer?

Cal You are contentious, Socrates.

Soc Nay, I ask you not from a love of contention, but because I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among us—whether when you come to the administration of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens?

Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said so, for if you will not answer for yourself, I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens.

Cal I do.

Soc But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?

Cal Yes.

Soc And therefore when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?

Cal Very likely.

Soc Nay, my friend, likely is not the word for if he was a good citizen, the inference is certain.

Cal And what difference does that make?

Soc None, only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles or on the contrary to have been corrupted by him, for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and money.

Cal You heard that Socrates, from the laughing set who bruise their ears.

Soc But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well known both to you and me, that at first Pericles was glorious and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the [516] Athenians—this was during the time when they were not so good—yet afterwards when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefactor.

Cal Well, but how does that prove Pericles badness?

Soc Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say?

Cal I will do you the favour of saying "yes."

Soc And will you also do me the favour of

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as if a man has been benefited in any other way if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer he might possibly defraud him of his pay if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed, for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly but by reason of injustice.

Cal. Very true.

Soc. And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?

Cal. Yes, we have found the reason.

Soc. But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?

Cal. True.

Soc. And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return otherwise not. Is this true?

Cal. It is.

[527] Soc. Then to which service of the State do you intend to determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible, or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.

Cal. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.

Soc. The flatterer? well, sir that is a noble invitation.

Cal. The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be—

Soc. Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and get my money for then I shall have to repeat the old answer that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly basely and if basely hurt himself.

Cal. Protagoras 2-8.

Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm? you seem to think that you are living in another country and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.

Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool. Calicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

Cal. By all means.

Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics. I am the only politician of my time. Now seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining favour and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you—he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cut up and burning and starving and suffocating you, [528] until you know not what to do—he gives you the bitterest poisons, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you! What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health," and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out!

Cal. I dare say.

Soc. Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?

Cal. He certainly would.

Soc. And I too shall be treated in the same way as I well know. If I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advan-

Sicilian cookery book Sarambus the vintner these are ministers of the body first rate in their art for the first makes admirable loaves the second excellent dishes and the third capital wine—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you *My friend you know nothing of gymnastics*, those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury who have no good or noble notions of their art and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval although the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run and become thinner than they were before and yet they in their simplicity will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to their entertainers but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease he who happens to be near them at the time and offers them advice is accused and blamed by them and if they could they would do him some harm while they proceed to eulogize the men who have been the real authors of the mischief

And that Callicles is just what you are now doing You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires and people say that they have made the city great not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that [519] and have left no room for justice and temperance And when the crisis of the disorder comes the people will blame the advisers of the hour and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles who are the real authors of their calamities and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades when they are losing not only their new acquisitions but also their original possessions not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs although you may perhaps be accessories to them A great piece of work is always being made as I see and am told now as of old about our statesmen When the State treats any of them as malefactors I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them after all their many services to the State that they should unjustly perish—so the tale runs But the cry is all a lie for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head The case of the professed statesman is I believe, very much like that of the professed

sophist for the sophists, although they are wise men are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them and defrauding them of their pay and showing no gratitude for their services yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good and whose injustice has been taken away from them and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational my friends than this? You Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator because you will not answer

Cal And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer?

Soc I suppose that I can just now at any rate the speeches which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me But I adjure you by the god of friendship my good sir do tell me whether there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good and then blaming him for being bad?

Cal Yes it appears so to me.

[520] *Soc* Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner?

Cal Yes but why talk of men who are good for nothing?

Soc I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city—do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend the sophist and the rhetorician as I was saying to Polus are the same or nearly the same but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing and sophistry a thing to be despised whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law or gymnastic to medicine The orators and sophists as I am inclined to think are the only class who can not complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others with out in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit Is not this a fact?

Cal Certainly it is

Soc If they were right in saying that they make men better then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them Where

alive, will remain as he is, after he is dead and the fat man will remain fat and soon and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word whatever was the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death either perfectly or in a great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles. When a man is stripped of the body all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view. And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially not knowing whose the soul is perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, [525] and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and intemperance, and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves.

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable and they are improved as in this world so also in another by pain and suffering for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples for as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring forever the most terrible and painful and fearful suffering as the penalty of their sins—their example hangs up as examples, in the prison house of the world below a spectacle and a warning to

all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them as I confidently affirm will be found Archelaus if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples most, as I believe are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public men for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this for they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who was a villain as suffering everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power and he was happier than those who had the power. No Callicles [526] the very bad men come from the class of those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise good men and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing and greatly to be praised and few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men however there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristides, the son of Lysonachus. But, in general great men are also bad my friend.

As I was saying Rhadamanthus when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows nothing about him neither who he is, nor who his parents are. He knows only that he has got hold of a villain and seeing this he stamps him as incurable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth he may have been a private man or not and I should say Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime. Him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same and they both have sceptres and judge but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him

*Hold sceptre of gold and sit gloriously
the dead*

Now I Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of Cf. Republic x. 615.

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Now this proper office of punishment is twofold he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable and they are improved, as in this world so also in another by pain and suffering, for there is no other way in which they can be deterred from their evil But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples for as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins—they suffer, and are set up as examples, in the prison house of the world below a spectacle and a warning to

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THE REPUBLIC

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES, who is the narrator GLAUCON ADEIMANTUS
POLEMARCHUS CEPHALUS THRASYMACHUS CLEITOPHON And others who are mentioned
and told The Scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piræus and the whole
dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timæus
Hermocrates Critias and a nameless person who are introduced in the Timæus



BOOK I

[327] I went down yesterday to the Piræus with Glaucon the son of Ariston that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants but that of the Thracians was equally if not more beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind and said that Polemarchus desires you to wait.

I turned round and asked him where his master was.

There he is said the youth, coming after you. If you will only wait a few minutes Polemarchus has appeared, and with him Adeimantus Glaucon's brother Niceratus the son of Nicias and several others who had been at the procession.

Polemarchus said to me I perceive Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

Bendis, the Thracian Artemis.

You are not far wrong, I said.

But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?

Of course.

And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain here you are.

May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

Certainly not, replied Glaucon.

Then we are not going to listen of that you may be assured.

[328] Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch race on horseback in honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

With horses! I replied. That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes said Polemarchus, and not only so but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then and do not be perverse.

Glaucon said I suppose since you insist, that we must.

Very good I replied.

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house and there we found his brothers

these things and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims I desire only to know the truth and to live as well as I can and when I die to die as well as I can. And to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And in return for your exhortation of me I exhort you also to take part in the great combat which is the combat of life and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me and say that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment of which I was speaking comes upon you: you will go before the judge, [5-7] the son of Aegina and when he has got you in his grip and is carrying you off you will gape and your head will swim round just as mine would in the courts of this world and very likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears and put upon you any sort of insult.

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale which you will condemn. And there might be reason in your condemning such tales if by searching we could find out anything better or truer but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said nothing remains unshaken but the saying that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to

be followed above all things as well in public as in private life and that when any one has been wrong in anything he is to be chastised and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others of the few or of the many and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him and all his actions should be done always with a view to justice.

Follow me then and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool and insults you if he has a mind let him strike you by Zeus and do you be of good cheer and do not mind the insulting blow for you will never come to any harm in the practise of virtue if you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds so utterly stupid are we! Let us then, take the argument as our guide which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go and in this exhort all men to follow not in the way to which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you, for that way Callicles, is nothing worth.

those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them: the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children: besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

That is true, he said.

Yes, that is very true: but may I ask another question?—What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before: the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things: suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great, he will many a time (he will wait up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings [331]. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age.

Hope (he says) cherisheth the soul of him who is just: a debtless soul is the best of his age, and the companion of his life—hope will lead him right, even to such endless bliss of mind.

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches I do not say to every man, but to a good man: is that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally, and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offences due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes, and therefore I say that, setting one thing against another of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is my opinion the greatest.

Well said, Cephalus, I replied, but as concerning justice, what is it—to speak the truth

and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me, and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind: ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought, or that I should be right in doing so any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

You are quite right, he replied.

But then I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus interposing.

I fear said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

To be sure he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?

He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.

I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses, and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt. [332]

True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Certainly not.

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

Certainly not, for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil.

You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver if the two parties are friends is not the repayment of a debt—that is what you would unagine him to say?

Yes.

And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

Lysias and Euthydemus and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian Charmantides the Paeanian and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly and then he said—

You don't come to see me, Socrates as often as you ought. If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city and therefore you should come oftener to the Piræus. For let me tell you that the more the pleasures of the body fade away the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these young men: we are old friends and you will be quite at home with us.

I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better Cephalus than conversing with aged men: for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go and of whom I ought to enquire whether the way is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the threshold of old age—Is life harder towards the end or what report do you give of it?

[329] I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together: we are birds of a feather as the old proverb says and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink, the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once but now that is gone and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles when in answer to the question: How does love suit with age? Sophocles—*are you still the man you were?* Peace, he replied, most gladly have I

escaped the thing of which you speak. I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom when the passions relax their hold: then as Sophocles says we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only but of many. The truth is Socrates that these regrets and also the complaints about relations are to be attributed to the same cause which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers: for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

I listened in admiration and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on—Yes, Cephalus, I said, but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus, they think that old age sits lightly upon you not because of your happy disposition but because you are rich and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

You are right, he replied, they are not convinced and there is something in what they say not however so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian [330] If you had been a native of my country or I of yours neither of us would have been famous. And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age the same reply may be made: for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.

May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

Acquired! Socrates, do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather whose name I bear doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony that which he inherited being much what I possess now but my father Lysias reduced the property below what it is at present and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.

That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money which is a characteristic rather of

Certainly
And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?

True.

And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

[334]

Certainly

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Then if the just man is good at keeping money he is good at stealing it.

That is implied in the argument.

Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his, affirms that

He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft to be practised however for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies—that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say but I still stand by the latter words.

Well, there is another question. By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really or only in seeming?

Surely he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

That is true.

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?

True.

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Certainly

But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong.

Nay Socrates the doctrine is immoral.

Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

I like that better

But see the consequence—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Very true, he said and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words "friend" and "enemy."

What was the error Polemarchus? I asked

We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good [335] and that he who seems only and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend and of an enemy the same may be said.

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes.

And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say it is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

But ought the just to injure any one at all? Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter

Deteriorated, that is to say in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

Of course.

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Certainly

And that human virtue is justice?

To be sure.

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result.

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

To be sure he said they are to receive what we owe them and an enemy as I take it owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him—that is to say evil

Simonides then after the manner of poets would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him and this he termed a debt

That must have been his meaning he said

By heaven! I replied and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine and to whom what answer do you think that he would make to us?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies

And what due or proper thing is given by cookery and to what?

Seasoning to food

And what is that which justice gives and to whom?

If Socrates we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies

That is his meaning then?

I think so

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

The physician

Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

The pilot

And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other

But when a man is well my dear Polemarchus there is no need of a physician?

No

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so

[333] You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

Yes

Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

Yes

Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes—that is what you mean?

Yes

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

In contracts, Socrates justice is of use

And by contracts you mean partnerships?

Exactly

But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?

The skilful player

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

Quite the reverse

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership

Yes Polemarchus but surely not in the use of money for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?

Certainly

And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

True

Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

When you want a deposit to be kept safely

You mean when money is not wanted but allowed to lie?

Precisely

That is to say justice is useful when money is useless?

That is the inference

And when you want to keep a pruning hook safe then justice is useful to the individual and to the state but when you want to use it then the art of the vine-dresser?

Clearly

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre and not to use them you would say that justice is useful but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Certainly

And so of all the other things—justice is useful when they are useless and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference.

Then justice is not good for much But let us consider this further point Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

Just as if the two cases were at all alike? he said

Why should they not be? I replied and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may notwithstanding the danger if upon reflection I approve of any of them

But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better he said than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Done to me!—as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me

What, and no payment! a pleasant notion! I will pay when I have the money I replied

But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon and you Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money for we will all make a contribution for Socrates

Yes he replied and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself, but take and pull in pieces the answer of some one else

Why my good friend I said how can any one answer who knows and says that he knows, just nothing and who even if he has some faint notions of his own is told by a man of authority not to utter them? [338] The natural thing is that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows Will you then kindly answer for the edification of the company and myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request and Thrasymachus as any one might see was in reality eager to speak for he thought that he had an excellent answer and would distinguish himself But at first he affected to insist on my answering at length he consented to begin Behold he said the wisdom of Socrates he refused to teach himself and goes about learning of others to whom he never even says Thank you

That I learn of others I replied is quite true but that I am ungrateful I highly deny I deny I have none, and therefore I pay in praise which is all I have and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer for I expect that you will answer well

Listen then he said I proclaim that justice

is nothing else than the interest of the stronger And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't

Let me first understand you I replied Justice as you say is the interest of the stronger What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancrator, is stronger than we are and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is and right and just for us?

That is abominable of you Socrates you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument

Not at all my good sir I said I am trying to understand them and I wish that you would be a little clearer

Well he said have you never heard that forms of government differ there are tyrannies and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know

And the government is the ruling power in each state?

Certainly

And the different forms of government make laws democratical aristocratically tyrannical with a view to their several interests and these laws which are made by them for their own interests are the justice which they deliver to their subjects and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law and unjust And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice which is the interest of the government and as the government must be supposed to have power [339] the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice which is the interest of the stronger

Now I understand you I said and whether you are right or not I will try to discover But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word interest which you forbid me to use It is true however that in your definition the words "of the stronger" are added

A small addition you must allow he said Great or small never mind about that we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say of the stronger about this addition I am not so sure and must therefore consider further

Proceed

Impossible

And can the just by justice make men unjust or speaking generally can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not.

Any more than heat can produce cold?

It cannot

Or drought moisture?

Clearly not

Nor can the good harm any one?

Impossible

And the just is the good?

Certainly

Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man but of the opposite who is the unjust?

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates

Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts and that good is the debt which a man owes to his friends and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies—to say this is not wise for it is not true if as has been clearly shown the injuring of another can be in no case just

I agree with you said Polemarchus

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or any other wise man or seer?

I am quite ready to do battle at your side he said

[336] Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

Whose?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban or some other rich and mighty man who had a great opinion of his own power was the first to say that justice is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies

Most true he said

Yes I said but if this definition of justice also breaks down what other can be offered?

Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasyarchus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands and had been put down by the rest of the company who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause he could no longer hold his peace and gathering himself up he came at us like a wild beast seeking to devour us. We were quite panic stricken at the sight of him

He roared out to the whole company What

folly Socrates has taken possession of you all?

And why sillybillies do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is you should not only ask but answer and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me. I must have clearness and accuracy

I was panic stricken at his words and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him I should have been struck dumb but when I saw his fury rising I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him

Thrasyarchus I said with a quiver don't be hard upon us Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold you would not imagine that we were knocking under to one another and so losing our chance of finding it. And why when we are seeking for justice a thing more precious than many pieces of gold do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay my good friend we are most willing and anxious to do so but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us

[337] How characteristic of Socrates! he replied with a bitter laugh—that is your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer and try irony or any other shuffle in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher Thrasyarchus I replied and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering, twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three for this sort of nonsense will not do for me—then obviously if that is your way of putting the question no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort Thrasyarchus what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning?—How would you answer him?

I shall not make the attempt my dear man but to avoid any misunderstanding, occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying he being the superior it is just that the inferior should execute—as he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

In the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if you can. I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

Why he said you made the attempt a minute ago and you failed.

Enough I said of these civil ties. It will be better that I should ask you a question. Is the physician taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

A healer of the sick, he replied.

And the pilot—that is to say the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors.

The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account. Neither is he to be called a sailor—the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

Very true, he said.

Now I said every art has an interest?

Certainly.

For which the art has to consider and provide?

Yes, that is the interest.

And the interest of any art is the perfection of things and nothing else?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply. Certainly the body has wants for the body may be ill and require to be cured and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers and this is the origin and intention of medicine as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

[342] Quite right, he replied.

Let us take the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore require

another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing—has art in itself I say any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another?—having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

Yes, clearly.

Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

True, he said.

Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship but the interests of the horse—neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True, he said.

But surely Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker that has been admitted?

Yes.

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?

That has been admitted.

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant Yes.

Then I said Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who in so far as he is a ruler considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject.

I will and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do

But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure he replied they are liable to err

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly and sometimes not?

True

When they make them rightly they make them agreeably to their interest when they are mistaken contrary to their interest you admit that?

Yes

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects—and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless

Then justice according to your argument is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

What is that you are saying? he asked

I am only repeating what you are saying I believe But let us consider Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes

Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury For if as you say justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands in that case O wisest of men is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do not what is for the interest but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer Socrates said Polemarchus

[340] Yes said Cleitophon interposing if you are allowed to be his witness

But there is no need of any witness said Polemarchus for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest and that for subjects to obey them is justice

Yes Polemarchus—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just

Yes Cleitophon but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger and while admitting both these propositions he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is

not for his own interest whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger

But said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest—this was what the weaker had to do and this was affirmed by him to be justice

Those were not his words rejoined Polemarchus

Never mind I replied if he now says that they are let us accept his statement Tell me, Thrasymachus I said did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Certainly not he said Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes I said my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken

You argue like an informer Socrates said you mean for example that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake in respect of the mistake? True we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake but this is only a way of speaking for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies they none of them err unless their skill fails them and then they cease to be skilled artists No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies though he is commonly said to err and I adopt the common mode of speaking But to be perfectly accurate since you are such a lover of accuracy we should say that the ruler in so far as he is a ruler is unerring [341] and being unerring always commands that which is for his own interest and the subject is required to execute his commands and therefore as I said at first and now repeat justice is the interest of the stronger

Indeed Thrasymachus and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Certainly he replied

And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

Nay he replied suppose is not the word—I know it but you will be found out and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail

injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong if so you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

And how am I to convince you he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

Heaven forbid! I said I would only ask you to be consistent or if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of the table or again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler I conceived that the art of the ruler considered as ruler whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say the true rulers, like being in authority.

Think! Nay I am sure of it.

Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they go on for the advantage not of themselves but of others? [346] Let me ask you a question. Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—medicine, for example, gives us health, navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

Yes, he said.

And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be impeded by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to

say would you that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

Certainly not.

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

I should say not.

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

Certainly not.

And we have admitted, I said that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Yes.

Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True, he replied.

And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?

I suppose not.

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Certainly he confers a benefit.

Then now Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests but, as we were before saying they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For [347] in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money

or suitable to his art to that he looks and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does

[343] When we had got to this point in the argument and everyone saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset Thrasy machus instead of replying to me, said Tell me Socrates have you got a nurse?

Why do you ask such a question I said when you ought rather to be answering?

Because she leaves you to snivel and never wipes your nose she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep

What makes you say that? I replied

Because you fancy that the shepherd or neat herder fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master and you further imagine that the rulers of states if they are true rulers never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night Oh no and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good that is to say the interest of the ruler and stronger and the loss of the subject and servant and injustice the opposite for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just he is the stronger and his subjects do what is for his interest and minister to his happiness which is very far from being their own Consider further most foolish Socrates that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust First of all in private contracts wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that when the partnership is dissolved the unjust man has always more and the just less Secondly in their dealings with the State when there is an income tax the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much Observe also what happens when they take an office there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses and getting nothing out of the public because he is just moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways [344] But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man I am speaking as before of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is more apparent and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men and the suffer-

ers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—that is to say tyranny which by fraud and force takes away the property of others not little by little but wholesale comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane private and public for which acts of wrong if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly he would be punished and incur great disgrace—they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples and man stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them then instead of these names of reproach he is termed happy and blessed not only by the citizens but by all who hear of him having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it And thus, as I have shown Socrates injustice when on a sufficient scale has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice and as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest

Thrasymachus when he had thus spoken, having like a bathman deluged our ears with his words had a mind to go away But the company would not let him they insisted that he should remain and defend his position and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us Thrasymachus I said in him excellent man how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

And do I differ from you he said as to the importance of the enquiry?

You appear rather I replied to have no care or thought about us Thrasymachus—whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know is to you a matter of indifference Prithoe friend [345] do not keep your knowledge to yourself we are a large party and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play For granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of

Now I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity an answer might have been given to you on received principles [339] but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

You have guessed most infallibly he replied. Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?—to refute the argument is your business.

Very true, I said that is what I have to do. But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.

And would he try to go beyond just action? He would not.

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage but he would not be able. Whether he would or would not be able, I said is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

True.

We may put the matter thus, I said—the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

Good again, he said.

And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Of course he said he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature he who is not, not.

Each of them I said is such as his like is?

Certainly he replied.

Very good Thrasymachus, I said and now to take the case of the arts you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

Yes.

And which is wise and which is foolish?

Clearly the musician is wise and he who is not a musician is foolish.

And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the non musician?

Of course.

[330] And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to go beyond the non physician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance in general see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

I dare say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to

or honour or a penalty for refusing

What do you mean Socrates? said Glaucon The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough but what the penalty is I do not understand or how a penalty can be a payment

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be as indeed they are a disgrace?

Very true

And for this reason, I said money and honour have no attraction for them good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves And not being ambitious they do not care about honour Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment And thus as I imagine is the reason why the forwardness to take office instead of waiting to be compelled has been deemed dishonourable Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself And the fear of this as I conceive induces the good to take office not because they would but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves but as a necessity and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves or indeed as good For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest but that of his subjects and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger This latter question need not be further discussed at present but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life Glaucon do you prefer?

I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous he answered

[348] Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes I heard him he replied but he has not convinced me

Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him if we can that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly he replied

If I said he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just and he answers and we rejoins there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side and in the end we shall want judges to decide but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did by making admissions to one another we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons

Very good, he said

And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said

That which you propose

Well then Thrasymachus I said suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?

Yes that is what I say and I have given you my reasons

And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

Certainly

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not

What else then would you say?

The opposite he replied

And would you call justice vice?

No I would rather say sublime simplicity

Then would you call injustice malignity?

No I would rather say discretion

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes he said at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust and who have the power of subduing states and nations but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cut purses Even this profession if undetected has advantages though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking

I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning Thrasymachus I replied but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue and justice with the opposite

Certainly I do so class them

Now I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity an answer might have been given to you on received principles [339] but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

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I dare say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to

gain more than his like but more than his un-
like and opposite?

I suppose so

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to
gain more than both?

Yes

But did we not say, Thrasymachus that the
unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike?
Were not these your words?

They were

And you also said that the just will not go
beyond his like but his unlike?

Yes

Then the just is like the wise and good and
the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That is the inference

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted

Then the just has turned out to be wise and
good and the unjust evil and ignorant

Thrasymachus made all these admissions
not fluently as I repeat them but with extreme
reluctance it was a hot summer's day and
the perspiration poured from him in torrents
and then I saw what I had never seen before
Thrasymachus blushing As we were now
agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom
and injustice vice and ignorance I proceeded
to another point

Well I said Thrasymachus that matter is
now settled but were we not also saying that
injustice had strength do you remember?

Yes I remember he said but do not suppose
that I approve of what you are saying or have
no answer if however I were to answer you
would be quite certain to accuse me of harangu-
ing therefore either permit me to have my
say out or if you would rather ask do so and
I will answer Very good as they say to
story telling old women and will nod Yes
and No

Certainly not I said if contrary to your real
opinion

Yes he said I will to please you since you
will not let me speak What else would you
have?

Nothing in the world I said and if you are
so disposed I will ask and you shall answer

Proceed

Then I will repeat the question which I
asked before in order that our examination of
the relative nature of justice and injustice (351)
may be carried on regularly A statement was
made that injustice is stronger and more power-
ful than justice but now justice having been
identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily

shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice
is ignorance this can no longer be questioned
by any one But I want to view the matter,
Thrasymachus in a different way You would
not deny that a state may be unjust and may be
unjustly attempting, to enslave other states, or
may have already enslaved them and may be
holding many of them in subjection?

True he replied and I will add that the best
and most perfectly unjust state will be most
likely to do so

I know I said that such was your position
but what I would further consider is whether
this power which is possessed by the superior
state can exist or be exercised without justice
or only with justice

If you are right in your view and justice is
wisdom then only with justice but if I am
right then without justice

I am delighted Thrasymachus to see you
not only nodding assent and dissent, but mak-
ing answers which are quite excellent

That is out of civility to you he replied

You are very kind I said and would you
have the goodness also to inform me whether
you think that a state or an army or a band of
robbers and thieves or any other gang of evil
doers could act at all if they injured one an-
other?

No indeed he said they could not

But if they abstained from injuring one an-
other then they might act together better?

Yes

And this is because injustice creates divisions
and hatreds and fighting and justice imparts
harmony and friendship is not that true,
Thrasymachus?

I agree he said because I do not wish to
quarrel with you

How good of you I said but I should like to
know also whether injustice having this tend-
ency to arouse hatred wherever existing
among slaves or among freemen will not make
them hate one another and set them at variance
and render them incapable of common action?

Certainly

And even if injustice be found in two only
will they not quarrel and fight and become
enemies to one another and to the just?

They will

And suppose injustice abiding in a single
person would your wisdom say that she loses
or that she retains her natural power?

Let us assume that she retains her power

Yet is not the power which injustice exer-
cises of such a nature that wherever she takes

up her abode, whether in a city in an army
[352] in a family or in any other body that
body is, to be in with, rendered incapable of
action by reason of sedition and dis-
traction and does it not become its own enemy
and at variance with all that opposes it, and
with the just? Is not this the case?

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally fatal when exist-
ing in a single person in the first place render-
ing him incapable of action because he is not
in unity with himself, and in the second place
making him an enemy to himself and the just?
Is not that true Thrasymachus?

Yes.

And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are
just?

Granted that they are.

But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the
gods, and the just will be their friend?

Fear away in triumph, and take your fill
of the argument. I will not oppose you, lest I
should displease the company.

Well then, proceed with your answers, and
let me have the remainder of my repast. For
we have already shown that the just are clearly
wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and
that the unjust are incapable of common action
nay more, that to speak as we did of men who
are evil acting at any time vigorously together
is not strictly true, for if they had been per-
fectly evil, they would have laid hands upon
one another but it is evident that there must
have been some remnant of justice in them,
which enabled them to combine if there had
not been they would have injured one another
as well as their cities they were but half
villains in their enterprises for had they been
whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would
have been utterly incapable of action. That, as
I believe, is the truth of the matter and not
what you said at first. But whether the just
have a better and happier life than the unjust is
a further question which we also proposed
to consider. I think that they have, and for the
reasons which I have given but still I should
like to examine further for no light matter is
at stake, nothing less than the rule of human
life.

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question. Would
you not say that a horse has some end?

I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of any
thing, would be that which could not be ac-
complished, or not so well accomplished,

by any other thing?

I do not understand, he said.

Let me explain. Can you see except with the
eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear except with the ear?

No.

These then may be truly said to be the ends
of these organs?

They may.

[353] But you can cut off a vine-branch with
a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other
ways?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruning hook
made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a
pruning hook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty
in understanding my meaning when I asked
the question whether the end of anything
would be that which could not be accom-
plished, or not so well accomplished, by any
other thing?

I understand your meaning, he said, and as-
sent.

And that to which an end is appointed has
also an excellence? Need I ask again whether
the eye has an end?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence
also?

True.

And the same is true of all other things they
have each of them an end and a special ex-
cellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they
are wanting in their own proper excellence and
have a defect instead?

How can they he said, if they are blind and
cannot see?

You mean to say if they have lost their prop-
er excellence, which is sight but I have not ar-
rived at that point yet. I would rather ask the
question more generally and only enquire
whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil
them by their own proper excellence, and
fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Certainly he replied.

I might say the same of the ears when de-
prived of their own proper excellence they

cannot fulfil their end?

True

And the same observation will apply to all other things?

I agree

Well and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly he said

And has not the soul an excellence also?

Yes

And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

She cannot

Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent and the good soul a good ruler?

Yes necessarily

And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted

Then the just soul and the just man will live well and the unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves

[354] And he who lives well is blessed and happy and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly

Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable?

So be it

But happiness and not misery is profitable

Of course

Then my blessed *Thrasymachos* injustice can never be more profitable than justice

Let this Socrates he said be your entertainment at the Bendideia

For which I am indebted to you I said now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless I have not been well entertained but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of jus-

tice and injustice I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy

BOOK II

[357] WITH these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion but the end in truth proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon who is always the most pugnacious of men was dissatisfied at *Thrasymachos* retirement he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me Socrates do you wish really to persuade us or only to seem to have persuaded us that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

I should wish really to persuade you I replied if I could

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now—How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes and independently of their consequences as for example harmless pleasures and enjoyments which delight us at the time although nothing follows from them?

I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied

Is there not also a second class of goods such as knowledge sight health which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?

Certainly I said

And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic and the care of the sick and the physician's art also the various ways of money making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable and no one would choose them for their own sakes but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

There is I said this third class also. But why do you ask?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

[358] In the highest class I replied—among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results

Then the many are of another mind they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class among goods which are pursued for the sake of rewards and of repu-

tion, but in themselves are disagreeable and ought to be avoided.

I know I said, that this is their manner of thinking and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.

I wish, he said, that you would bear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been: but in my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will of necessity but not as a good. And thirdly I will argue that there is reason in this: now for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinging in my ears: and on the other hand I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself: then I shall be satisfied: and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this: and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power: and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Indeed I do: nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking as I proposed of the nature and origin of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good: to suffer injustice, evil: but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither: hence there arise laws

and mutual covenants: and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice—it is a mean or compromise between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation: and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist: he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will: let us watch and see whether desire will lead them: then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia: there was a great storm and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening: where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring: this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king: into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger: and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand: when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. [359] He was astonished at this: and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared: he made several trials of the ring: and always with the

same result—when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen and with her help conspired against the king and slew him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other: no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could surely take what he liked out of the market or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure or kill or release from prison whom he would and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust: they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually but of necessity for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice and he who argues as I have been supposing will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot although they would praise him to one another's faces and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

Now if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust we must isolate them: there is no other way and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust and the just man entirely just: nothing is to be taken away from either of them and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft like the skilful pilot or physician who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits [361] and who if he fails at any point is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody) for the highest reach of injustice is to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must

assume the most perfect injustice: there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself: he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity wishing as Aeschylus says to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards: therefore, let him be clothed in justice only and have no other covering and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men and let him be thought the worst: then he will have been put to the proof and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme the one of justice and the other of injustice let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.

Heavens! my dear Glaucon I said how energetically you polish them up for the decision: first one and then the other as if they were two statues.

I do my best he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe but as you may think the description a little too coarse I ask you to suppose Socrates that the words which follow are not mine. Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice. They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged racked bound—will have his eyes burnt out and at last, after suffering every kind of evil he will be impaled. Then he will understand that he ought to seem only [362] and not to be just: the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality he does not live with a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only.

*His mind has a soil deep and fertile
Out of which spring his prudent counsels*

In the first place he is thought just, and there

fore bears rule in the city: he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies: moreover he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.

I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Ademantus, his brother interposed. Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

Why what else is there? I answered.

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.

Well, then, according to the proverb Let brother help brother—if he fails in any part do you assist him: although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.

Nonsense, he replied. But let me add some thing more. There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just [353] but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say rain upon the pious and thus accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just—

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain for he speaks of one whose fame is—

*As the fame of some Harcless kinsman who like a god
Marked justice to whom the black earth brings forth
Wheat and barley whose trees are bowed with fruit
And his sheep ever full to bear and the sea gives him fish*

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just: they take them down into the world below where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands: their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further: the posterity as they say of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain: they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust: nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, [364] but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy and to honour them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich

Eumops.

To bear acorn as their sustenance and be strong like me.

*And it is bowed down with the weight
like force*

men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms with rejoicings and feasts and they promise to harm an enemy whether just or unjust at a small cost with magic arts and incantations binding heaven as they say to execute their will And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod

Vice may be had in abundance without trouble the way is smooth and her dwelling place is near But before virtue the gods have set toil

and a tedious and uphill road then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men for he also says —

The gods too may be turned from their purpose and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by libations and the odour of fat when they have sinned and transgressed

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus who were children of the Moon and the Muses—that is what they say—according to which they perform their ritual and persuade not only individuals but whole cities that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour and are equally at the service of the living and the dead [365] the latter sort they call mysteries and they redeem us from the pains of hell but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us

He proceeded And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice and the way in which gods and men regard them how are their minds likely to be affected my dear Socrates—those of them I mean who are quick witted and like bees on the wing light on every flower and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar—

Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?

For what men say is that if I am really just and am not also thought just profit there is none but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable But if though unjust I

acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness to appearance I must devote myself I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus greatest of sages recommends But I hear some one exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult to which I answer Nothing great is easy Nevertheless the argument indicates thus if we would be happy to be the path along which we should proceed With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies and so partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or suppose them to have no care of human things—why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods and they do care about us yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings Let us be consistent then and believe both or neither If the poets speak truly [366] why then we had better be unjust and offer of the fruits of injustice for if we are just although we may escape the vengeance of heaven we shall lose the gains of injustice but if we are unjust we shall keep the gains and by our sinning and praying and praying and sinning the gods will be propitiated and we shall not be punished But then is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds Yes my friend will be the reflection but there are mysteries and atoning deities and these have great power That is what mighty cities declare and the children of the gods who were their poets and prophets bear a like testimony

On what principle then shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men in life and after death as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us Knowing all this Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth be willing

to honour justice or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my words and who is satisfied that justice is best still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will unless peradventure there be some one whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice or who has attained knowledge of the truth—but no other man. He only blames injustice who owing to cowardice or age or some weakness has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this Socrates was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us and ending with the men of our own time—no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul and invisible to any human or divine eye or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him justice is the greatest good [367] and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong but every one would have been his own watchman because afraid of the doing wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating in words—men stronger than these about justice and must be grossly as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this scheme not manfully as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false we shall say that

you do not praise justice but the appearance of it we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results but in a far greater degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or knowledge or health or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good—I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only. I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice magnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other—that is a manner of arguing which coming from them, I am ready to tolerate but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore I say not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus but on hearing these words I was quite delighted and said: Sons of an illustrious father [368] that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara.

Sons of Aristocles offspring of an illustrious hero

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of justice and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced—thus I infer from your general character for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two: on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving as I thought

the superiority which justice has over injustice And yet I cannot refuse to help while breath and speech remain to me I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence And therefore I had best give such help as I can

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop but to proceed in the investigation They wanted to arrive at the truth first, about the nature of justice and injustice and secondly about their relative advantages I told them what I really thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature and would require very good eyes Seeing then I said that we are no great wits I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus suppose that a short sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger—if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first and then proceed to the lesser—this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune

Very true said Adeimantus but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?

I will tell you I replied justice which is the subject of our enquiry is as you know some times spoken of as the virtue of an individual and sometimes as the virtue of a State

True he replied

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice first as they appear in the State [369] and secondly in the individual proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them

That he said is an excellent proposal

And if we imagine the State in process of creation we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also

I dare say

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered

Yes far more easily

But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said for to do so as I am inclined to think will be a very serious task Reflect therefore

I have reflected said Adeimantus and am anxious that you should proceed

A State I said arises as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind no one is self sufficing but all of us have many wants Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other

Then as we have many wants and many persons are needed to supply them one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State

True he said

And they exchange with one another and one gives and another receives under the idea that the exchange will be for their good

Very true

Then I said let us begin and create in idea a State and yet the true creator is necessity who is the mother of our invention

Of course he replied

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food which is the condition of life and existence

Certainly

The second is a dwelling and the third clothing and the like

True

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand We may suppose that one man is a husbandman another a builder some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men

Clearly

And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a common stock?—the individual husbandman for example producing for four and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time [370] and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes having no partnership with others but supplying himself all his own wants?

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything

Probably I replied that would be the better

way and when I hear you say this I am myself reminded that we are not all alike there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations or when he has only one?

When he has only one

Further there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure but the doer must follow up what he is doing and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.

Undoubtedly

Then more than four citizens will be required for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too needs many and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters and smiths, and many other artisans will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?

True

Yet even if we add shepherds, shepherds and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides—still our State will not be very large.

That is true yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.

Then, again there is the situation of the city—to find a place where nothing need be imported is altogether impossible.

Impossible

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from an other city?

They must

[371] But if the trader goes empty handed, has nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty handed.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will

Not to mention the importers and exporters who are called merchants?

Yes

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers

Then again within the city how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.

Clearly they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a market place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange?

Certainly

Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him—is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market place?

Not at all he will find people there who seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength and therefore of little use for any other purpose. Their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy.

This want, then creates a class of retail traders in our State. Is not "retailer" the term which is applied to those who sit in the market place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes he said

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companions. Still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour which accordingly they sell and are called if I do not mistake hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes

And now Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

I think so

Where then is justice and where is injustice and in what part of the State did they spring up?

[372] Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found any where else

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion I said we had better think the matter out and not shrink from the enquiry

Let us then consider first of all, what will be their way of life now that we have thus established them Will they not produce corn and wine and clothes and shoes and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work in summer commonly stripped and barefoot but in winter substantially clothed and shod They will feed on barley meal and flour of wheat baking and kneading them making noble cakes and loaves these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle And they and their children will feast drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads and hymning the praises of the gods in happy converse with one another And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means having an eye to poverty or war

But said Glaucon interposing you have not given them a relish to their meal

True, I replied I had forgotten of course they must have a relish—salt and olives and cheese and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare for a dessert we shall give them figs and peas and beans and they will roast myrtle berries and acorns at the fire drinking in moderation And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age and bequeath a similar life to their children after them

Yes Socrates he said and if you were providing for a city of pigs how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have Glaucon? I replied

Why, he said you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on

sofas, and dine off tables and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style

Yes I said now I understand the question which you would have me consider is not only how a State but how a luxurious State is created and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described But if you wish also to see a State at fever heat, I have no objection For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life [373] They will be for adding sofas and tables and other furniture also dainties and perfumes, and incense and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only but in every variety, we must go beyond the necessities of which I was at first speaking such as houses and clothes and shoes the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured

True he said

Then we must enlarge our borders for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors of whom one large class have to do with forms and colours another will be the votaries of music—poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists players dancers contractors also makers of divers kinds of articles including women's dresses And we shall want more servants Will not tutors be also in request and nurses wet and dry tire women and barbers as well as confectioners and cooks and swineherds, too who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State but are needed now? They must not be forgotten and there will be animals of many other kinds if people eat them

Certainly

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now and not enough?

Quite true

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage and they will want a slice of ours if like ourselves they exceed the limit of necessity and give them

set us up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth.

That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Most certainly he replied.

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

And our State must once more enlarge, and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army [374] which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Why? he said, are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said, not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State, the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.

I try true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring, as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made, but he and to every other who has was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long, and at no other, he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art to which is acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan, although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tool will make a man skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter and in a day

whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill and art, and application will be needed by him?

No doubt, he replied.

Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

Certainly.

Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

It will.

And the selection will be no easy matter, I said, but we must be brave and do our best.

We must.

[375] Is not the noble youth very like a well bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

What do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

I have.

Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones, his soul is to be full of spirit.

Yes.

But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another and with everybody else?

A difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.

Whereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

True, he said.

What is to be done then? I said, how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great

spirit for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible

I am afraid that what you say is true he replied

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded—My friend I said no wonder that we are in a perplexity for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us

What do you mean? he said

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities

And where do you find them?

Many animals I replied furnish examples of them, our friend the dog is a very good one you know that well bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances and the reverse to strangers

Yes I know

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not

Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian besides the spirited nature need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning

[376] The trait of which I am speaking I replied may be also seen in the dog and is remarkable in the animal

What trait?

Why a dog whenever he sees a stranger is angry when an acquaintance he welcomes him although the one has never done him any harm nor the other any good Did this never strike you as curious?

The matter never struck me before but I quite recognise the truth of your remark

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming—your dog is a true philosopher Why?

Why because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same he replied

And may we not say confidently of man also that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly

Then we have found the desired natures and now that we have found them how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length

Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us

Then I said my dear friend the task must not be given up even if somewhat long

Certainly not

Come then and let us pass a leisure hour in story telling and our story shall be the education of our heroes

By all means

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort?—and this has two divisions gymnastic for the body and music for the soul

True

Shall we begin education with music and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

By all means

And when you speak of music do you include literature or not?

I do

And literature may be either true or false? Yes

[377] And the young should be trained in both kinds and we begin with the false?

I do not understand your meaning he said

You know I said that we begin by telling children stories which though not wholly destitute of truth are in the main fictitious and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics

Very true

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics

Quite right he said

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work especially in

the case of a young and tender thing— for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad, and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands, but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater. I said for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely, he replied, but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said, and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said, the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable, but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too [378]—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons: if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they

should sacrifice not a common [Eleusian] pig, but some huge and unprocureable victim, and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State: the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous, and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I entirely agree with you, he said, in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments, and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us, we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens: this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and when they grow up the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal: anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable, and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied, but if any one asks where are such models to be found, and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?

[379] I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be

observed by them but to make the tales is not their business

Very true, he said but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied—God is always to be represented as he truly is what ever be the sort of poetry epic, lyric or tragic in which the representation is given

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly

And no good thing is hurtful?

No indeed

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous?

Yes

And therefore the cause of well being?

Yes

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things but of the good only?

Assuredly

Then God if he be good is not the author of all things as the many assert but he is the cause of a few things only and not of most things that occur to men For few are the goods of human life and many are the evils and the good is to be attributed to God alone of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere and not in him

That appears to me to be most true he said

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

Lie at the threshold of Zeus full of lots one of good the other of evil lots

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

Sometimes meets with evil fortune at her times with good

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmixed ill,

Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth
And again—

Zeus who is the dispenser of good and evil to us

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties which was really the work

of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus that [380]

God plants guilt among men when he deares utterly to destroy a house

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe—the subject of the tragedy in which these imbic verses occur—or of the house of Pelops or of the Trojan War or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well ordered commonwealth Such a fiction is suicidal ruinous impious

I agree with you he replied and am ready to give my assent to the law

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform—that God is not the author of all things but of good only

That will do he said

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape and now in another—sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper unage?

I cannot answer you he said without more thought

Well I said but if we suppose a change in anything that change must be effected either by the thing itself or by some other thing?

Most certainly

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by

meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Of course.

[381] And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?

True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things—furniture, houses, garments when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances very true.

Then everything which is good whether made by art or nature or both is least liable to suffer change from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

He cannot.

But may he not change and transform himself?

Clearly he said that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer or for the worse and more ugly?

If he change at all he can only change for the worse for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus but then would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Impossible.

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change being as supposed the fairest and best that is conceivable every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form.

That necessarily follows he said in my judgment.

Then I said my dear friend let none of the poets tell us that

The gods take the disguise of strangers in order to walk past and down cities in all sorts of forms.

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis neither let any one, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry introduce Heracles disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms.

For the life of good children is thus the river of life.

—let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods as they say Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.

Heaven forbid he said.

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?

Perhaps he replied.

Well but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie whether in word or deed or to put forth a phantom of himself?

[382] I cannot say he replied.

Do you not know I said that the true lie if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself or about the truest and highest matters there, above all he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

Still he said I do not comprehend you.

The reason is I replied that you attribute some profound meaning to my words but I am only saying that deception or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves which is the soul and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie is what mankind least like—that I say is what they utterly detest.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And as I was just now remarking this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods but also by men?

Yes.

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance or again when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or prevents is also in the tales of mythology of which we were just now speaking—because

observed by them but to make the tales is not their business

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Most certainly

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed for example, when healthiest and strongest the human frame is least liable to be affected by

Again

*The soul fly g from the limbs and so e so Ha-
des I me ting h r fate leaving manhood and
you h*

Again

[387] *And the soul with shrill ng cry passed
like an ke beneath the e rth*

And—

*It bats in hollow of mystic cavern u hen ter
any f them has dropped out of the str g and falls
from the rock fly shrills g ud cl g to one an-
other so d d they u th shrilling cry hold together
as they mo ed*

And we must beg Homer and the other poets
not to be an ery if we strike out these and sum-
lar passages, not because they are unpoetical,
or unattractive to the popular ear but because
the greater the poetical charm of them, the less
are they meet for the ears of boys and men who
are meant to be free, and who should fear
slavery more than death

Undoubtedly

Also we shall have to reject all the terrible
and appalling names wh ch describe the world
below—Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the
earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words
of which the ery mention causes a shudder to
pass through the inmost soul of him who hears
them. I do not say that these horrible stories
may not ha e a use of some kind but there is a
danger that the nerves of our guardians may be
rendered too excitable and effeminate by them

There is a real danger he said

Then we must have no more of them

True

Another and a nobler strain must be com-
posed and sung by us

Clearly

And shall we proceed to get rid of the weep-
ings and wailings of famous men?

They wul go w th the rest.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them?
Reflect our principle s that the good man ill
not co s der death terrible to any other good
man who is h s comrade

Yes that is our principle

And therefore he wll not sorrow for his de-
parted fr e d as tho gh he had suffered any
th g terr ble?

He wll not

Such an ne as we further maintain is suffi-

fund 1196.

Ibid xxiii. 00

Odyssey xx. 6.

cient for himself and his own happiness and
therefore is least in need of other men

True he said

And for this reason the loss of a son or
brother or the deprivation of fortune is to
him of all men least terrible

Assuredly

And therefore he wll be least likely to la-
ment, and will bear with the greatest equa-
nimity any misfortune of this sort which may
befall him

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less
than another

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the
lamentations of famous men and making them
over to women (and not even to women who
are good for anything) [388] or to men of a
baser sort that those who are being educated
by us to be the defenders of their country may
scorn to do the like

That will be very right.

Then we will once more entreat Homer and
the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is
the son of a goddess first lying on his side
then on his back, and then on his face then
starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the
shores of the barren sea now taking the sooty
ashes in both his hands and pouring them over
his head, or weeping and wailing in the various
modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should
he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as
praying and beseeching

*Roll g in the dirt cull g each man loudly by his
n me*

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all
events not to introduce the gods lamenting and
saying

*Alas! my misery! Al s that I bore the bravest to
my s iron*

But if he must introduce the gods at any rate
let him not dare so completely to misrepresent
the greatest of the gods as make him say—

*O h acens! u th my eyes eriy I behold a de-
fr d of m e chased o d nd ound the city
a d my h art is arrowful*

Or again

Woe is me that I m fated to have Sa pedon

Il d xxii. 10.

Ibid x. 23.

Ibid xx. 1. 424.

Ibid x. 23. 54.

Ib d xx. 1. 168.

we do not know the truth about ancient times
we make falsehood as much like truth as we
can and so turn it to account

Very true he said

But can any of these reasons apply to God?
Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity,
and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous he said

Then the lying poet has no place in our idea
of God?

I should say not

Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is
afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable

But he may have friends who are senseless or
mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a
friend of God

Then no motive can be imagined why God
should lie?

None whatever

Then the superhuman and divine is also
lutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes

Then is God perfectly simple and true both
in word and deed he changes not he deceives
not either by sign or word by dream or wak-
ing vision

[383] Your thoughts he said are the reflec-
tion of my own

You agree with me then I said that this is
the second type or form in which we should
write and speak about divine things The gods
are not magicians who transform themselves
neither do they deceive mankind in any way
I grant that

Then although we are admirers of Homer
we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus
sends to Agamemnon neither will we praise
the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says
that Apollo at her nuptials

*Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose
days were to be long and to know no sickness
And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things
blessed of heaven he raised a note of triumph and
cheered my soul And I thought that the word of
Phoebus being divine and full of prophecy would
not fail And now he himself who uttered the
strain he who was present at the banquet and who
said this—he it is who has slain my son*

These are the kind of sentiments about the
gods which will arouse our anger and he who
utters them shall be refused a chorus neither
shall we allow teachers to make use of them in
the instruction of the young meaning as we
do that our guardians as far as men can be

should be true worshippers of the gods and im-
itate them

I entirely agree he said in these principles
and promise to make them my laws

BOOK III

[386] Such then I said are our principles of
theology—some tales are to be told and others
are not to be told to our disciples from their
youth upwards if we mean them to honour the
gods and their parents and to value friendship
with one another

Yes and I think that our principles are right,
he said

But if they are to be courageous must they
not learn other lessons besides these and lessons
of such a kind as will take away the fear of
death? Can any man be courageous who has
the fear of death in him?

Certainly not he said

And can he be fearless of death or will he
choose death in battle rather than defeat and
slavery who believes the world below to be
real and terrible?

Impossible

Then we must assume a control over the nar-
rators of this class of tales as well as over the
others and beg them not simply to revile, but
rather to commend the world below intimating
to them that their descriptions are untrue, and
will do harm to our future warriors

That will be our duty he said

Then I said we shall have to obliterate many
obnoxious passages beginning with the verses,

*I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor
and portionless man than rule over all the dead
who have come to nought*

We must also expunge the verse which tells
us how Pluto feared

*Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the
gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and im-
mortals*

And again

*O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is
soul and ghostly form but no mind at all!*

Again of Tiresias

*[To him even after death did Persephone grant
mind] that he alone should be wise but the other
souls are sitting shades*

Odyssey iii 489

Iliad xx 64

Iliad xxiii 103

Odyssey x 495

And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

It is the Ladies are full of fire & desire and the cur-bearer carries round us & which he us from the bowl and pours into the cup

is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse

The love of pleasure is to die and meet despair from the

What would you say again in the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another

Without the knowledge of their parents

or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?

Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing.

But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear as, for example, what is said in the verses,

*He imitate his father and thus reproached his art
E'er my father for worse had then ended*

Certainly he said

In the next place, we must not let them be concerned in gifts or lovers of money

Certainly not.

Neither must we sing to them of

*Go to persuade gods & persuade
revere &*

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them, but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknow-

ledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector but that without payment he was unwilling to do so.

[391] Undoubtedly he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved.

Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,

Thou hast wronged me & for aarter most unpardonable of deities I only I would be ere in thee if I had only the power

or his subordination to the river-god,¹ on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair² which had been previously dedicated to the other river god Spercheus and that he actually performed this vow or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus,³ and slaughtered the captives at the pyre⁴ of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by a anger combined with overweening contempt of gods and men.

You are quite right, he replied.

And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Perithous son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods—both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men—sentiments

¹Ibid. ix. 9.

²Ibid. xii. 34.

³Ibid. ix. 51.

⁴Od. iv. 486.

⁵Ibid. ix. 17.

⁶Ibid. ix. 5.

¹Ibid. xii. 15.

²CE. I. 2. 392.

³Ibid. xiii. 15 ff.

⁴Ibid. xii. 130, —3 ff.

⁵Ibid. xiii. 151.

⁶Ibid. xiii. 394.

⁷Ibid. xiii. 15.

dearest of men to me subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius

For if my sweet Adeimantus our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods instead of laughing at them as they ought hardly will any of them deem that he himself being but a man can be dishonoured by similar actions, neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self control he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.

Yes he said that is most true

Yes I replied but that surely is what ought not to be as the argument has just proved to us and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better

It ought not to be

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.

So I believe

Then persons of worth even if only mortal men must not be represented as overcome by laughter and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

[389] Still less of the gods as you say he replied

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion

On your views, we must not admit them

On my views if you like to father them on me that we must not admit them is certain

Again truth should be highly valued if as we were saying a lie is useless to the gods and useful only as a medicine to men then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians private individuals have no business with them

Clearly not he said

Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying the rulers of the State should be the persons and they in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind and although the rulers have this privilege for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the

patient or the pupil of a gymnasiarch not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors

Most true, he said

If then the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State

*any of the craftsmen whether he be priest or physician or carpenter**

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State

Most certainly he said if our idea of the State is ever carried out

In the next place our youth must be temperate?

Certainly

Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally obedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?

True

Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomedes in Homer

Friend sit still and obey my word
and the verses which follow

The Greeks marched breathing prowess
in silent awe of their leaders

and other sentiments of the same kind

We shall

What of this line

O heavy with une who hast the eyes of a dog and
the heart of a stag

and of the words which follow? [390] Would you say that these or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers whether in verse or prose are well or ill spoken?

They are ill spoken

They may very possibly afford some amusement but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men—you would agree with me there?

Yes

* *Odyssey* xviii 383 ff

Iliad iv 41

Odyssey iii 8

Iliad iv 431

Iliad i 225

* *Ibid* xvi 433

Ibid i 599

Or if the poet \equiv try here appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However in order that I may make my meaning quite clear and that you may no more say "I don't understand," I will show how the change might be effected. If Homer had said, "The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achæans, and above all th' kings" and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre) "The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him—the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said—she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. [394] And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, revenging him of everything which he had done passing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achæans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god—and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narration.

I understand, he said.

Or you may suppose the opposite case—that the intermediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left.

That also he said, I understand you mean, for example as in tragedy.

You have conceived my meaning perfectly and I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative—instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy: there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker—of this the *ekphrasis* and *epic* afford the best example, and the combination of both is found in *epic*, and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?

Yes, he said. I see now what you meant. I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.

Yes, I remember.

In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art—whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter in what parts or should all imitation be prohibited?

You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?

Yes, I said, but there may be more than this in question. I really do not know as yet, but whether the argument may blow thither we go.

And go we will, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators or rather has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many, and that if he attempt many he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?

Certainly.

And thus \equiv equally true of imitation, no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?

He cannot.

[395] Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy—did you not just now call them imitators?

Yes, I did and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?

True.

Neither are comic and tragic actors the same yet all these things are but imitations.

They are so.

And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.

Quite true, he replied.

If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves

which as we were saying are neither pious nor true for we have already proved that evil can not come from the gods

Assuredly not

And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—

The kindred of the gods the relatives of Zeus whose ancestral altar the altar of Zeus is aloft in air on the peak of Ida

and who have

the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins

And therefore let us put an end to such tales lest they engender laxity of morals among the young [392]

By all means he replied

But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of let us see whether any have been omitted by us The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated has been already laid down

Very true.

And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject

Clearly so

But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present my friend

Why not?

Because if I am not mistaken we shall have to say that about men poets and story tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy and the good miserable and that in justice is profitable when undetected but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain—these things we shall forbid them to utter and command them to sing and say the opposite

To be sure we shall he replied

But if you admit that I am right in this then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending

I grant the truth of your inference

That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is and how naturally advantageous to the possessor whether he seems to be just or not.

Most true he said

Enough of the subjects of poetry let us now speak of the style and when this has been con-

sidered both matter and manner will have been completely treated

I do not understand what you mean said Ademantus

Then I must make you understand and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way You are aware I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events either past present or to come?

Certainly he replied

And narration may be either simple narration or imitation or a union of the two?

That again he said I do not quite understand

I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended Like a bad speaker therefore I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning You know the first lines of the *Iliad* [393] in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter and that Agamemnon slew into a passion with him whereupon Chryses failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God against the Achaeans Now as far as these lines

And he prayed all the Greeks but especially the two sons of Atreus the chiefs of the people

the poet is speaking in his own person he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer but the aged priest himself And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the *Odyssey*

Yes

And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?

Quite true

But when the poet speaks in the person of another may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who as he informs you is going to speak?

Certainly

And this assimilation of himself to another either by the use of voice or gesture is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?

Of course

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?

Very true

ments of a single harmony (for the changes are not great) and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?

That is quite true, he said.

Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all sorts of changes.

That is also perfectly true, he replied.

And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together.

They include all, he said.

And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles, or would you include the mixed?

I should prefer only to admit the pure modes of music.

Yes, I said, Adimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming, and indeed the panto-mime, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the world in general.

I do not deny it.

But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?

Yes, quite unsuitable.

And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a puer also and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?

True, he said.

[358] And thereto when any one of these parricidal gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will tell him down and worship him as a sweet and bold and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist: the law will not allow them. And so when we have adorned him with myrtle, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls beneath the rougher and severer poet or story-teller who will imitate the style of the urbane only, and will favour those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.

We certainly will, he said, if we have the power.

Then now my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished for the manner and manner have both been discussed.

I think so too, he said.

Next in order will follow melody and song.

That is obvious.

Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves.

I fear said Glaucon, laughing, that the word "every one" hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be though I may guess.

At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts—the words, the melody and the rhythm, that degree of know'ledge I may presuppose.

Yes, he said, so much as that you may.

And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music: both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?

Yes.

And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words.

Certainly.

Were we saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter that we had no need of lamentations and strains of sorrow?

True.

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell me.

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or *tenor* Lydian, and the full-toned or *bass* Lydian, and such like.

These then, I said, must be banished even to women who have a character to maintain: they are of no use, and much less to men.

Certainly.

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians.

Utterly unbecoming.

And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

[359] The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian, they are termed "relaxed."

Well, and are these of any military use?

Quite the reverse, he replied, and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.

wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State making this their craft and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end they ought not to practise or imitate anything else if they imitate at all they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession—the courageous temperate holy free and the like but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate Did you never observe how imitations beginning in early youth and continuing far into life at length grow into habits and become a second nature affecting body voice and mind?

Yes certainly he said

Then I said we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men to imitate a woman whether young or old quarrelling with her husband or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness or when she is in affliction or sorrow or weeping and certainly not one who is in sickness love or labour

Very right he said

Neither must they represent slaves male or female performing the offices of slaves?

They must not

And surely not bad men whether towards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink or who in any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbours in word or deed [396] as the manner of such is Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad for madness like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated

Very true he replied

Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers or oarsmen or boatswains or the like?

How can they he said when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these?

Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses the bellowing of bulls the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean thunder and all that sort of thing?

Nay he said if madness be forbidden neither may they copy the behaviour of madmen

You mean I said, if I understand you aright that there is one sort of narrative style which

may be employed by a truly good man who has anything to say and that another will be used by a man of an opposite character and education

And which are these two sorts? he asked

Suppose I answered that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on something saying or action of another good man—should imagine that he will like to personate him and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink or has met with any other disaster But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him he will not make a study of that he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models he feels the employment of such an art unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it

So I should expect he replied

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer that is to say his style will be both imitative and narrative but there will be very little of the former and a great deal of the latter Do you agree?

Certainly he said that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take [397]

But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything and the worse he is the more unscrupulous he will be nothing will be too bad for him and he will be ready to imitate anything not as a joke but in right good earnest and before a large company As I was just now saying he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder the noise of wind and hail or the creaking of wheels and pulleys and the various sounds of flutes pipes trumpets and all sorts of instruments he will bark like a dog bleat like a sheep or crow like a cock his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture and there will be very little narration

That he said will be his mode of speaking

These then are the two kinds of style?

Yes

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity the result is that the speaker if he speaks correctly is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the

Just so, he said they should follow the words
And will not the words and the character of
the style depend on the temper of the soul?

Yes.

And everything else on the style?

Yes.

Then beauty of style and harmony and grace
and good rhythm depend on simplicity—I
mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly
ordered mind and character not that other sim-
plicity which is only an euphemism for folly?

Very true, he replied.

And if our youth are to do their work in
life, must they not make these graces and har-
monies their perpetual aim?

They must.

[401] And surely the art of the painter and
every other creative and constructive art are
full of them—weaving embroidery architec-
ture, and every kind of manufacture also na-
ture, animal and vegetable—in all of them
there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugly-
ness and discord and inharmonious motion are
nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace
and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness
and virtue and bear their likeness.

That is quite true, he said.

But shall our superintendence go no further
and are the poets only to be required by us to
express the image of the good in their works
on pain if they do anything else, of expulsion
from our State? Or is the same control to be
extended to other artists, and are they also to
be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite
forms of vice and intemperance and meanness
and indecency in sculpture and building and
the other creative arts and is he who cannot
conform to this rule of ours to be prevented
from practising his art in our State lest the
taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We
would not have our guardians grow up amid
image of moral deformity as in some noxious
pasture, and there browse and feed upon many
a baneful herb and flower day by day little by
little, until they silently gather a festering mass
of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists
rather be those who are gifted to discern the
true nature of the beautiful and graceful then
will our youth dwell in a land of health amid
fair sights and sounds and receive the good in
everything and beauty the effluence of fair
works, shall flow into the eye and ear like a
health-giving breeze from a purer region and
intensely draw the soul from earliest years into
likeness and sympathy with the beauty of rea-
son.

There can be no nobler training than that
he replied.

And therefore, I said Glaucon musical train-
ing is a more potent instrument than any
other because rhythm and harmony find their
way into the inward places of the soul on
which they mightily fasten imparting grace,
and making the soul of him who is rightly edu-
cated graceful or of him who is ill-educated
ungraceful and also because he who has re-
ceived this true education of the inner being
will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults
in art and nature, [402] and with a true taste
while he praises and rejoices over and receives
into his soul the good and becomes noble and
good he will justly blame and hate the bad
now in the days of his youth even before he
is able to know the reason why and when rea-
son comes he will recognise and salute the
friend with whom his education has made him
long familiar.

Yes he said I quite agree with you in think-
ing that our youth should be trained in music
and on the grounds which you mention.

Just as in learning to read I said we were
satisfied when we knew the letters of the alpha-
bet, which are very few in all their recurring
sizes and combinations not slighting them as
unimportant whether they occupy a space large
or small but everywhere eager to make them
out and not thinking ourselves perfect in the
art of reading until we recognise them where-
ever they are found.

True—

Or as we recognise the reflection of letters
in the water or in a mirror only when we
know the letters themselves the same art and
study giving us the knowledge of both.

Exactly—

Even so as I maintain neither we nor our
guardians whom we have to educate, can ever
become musical until we and they know the
essential forms, in all their combinations and
can recognise them and their images wherever
they are found, not slighting them either in
small things or great but believing them all
to be within the sphere of one art and study.

Most assuredly.

And when a beautiful soul harmonises with
a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one
mould that will be the fairest of sights to him
who has an eye to see it?

The fairest indeed.

And the fairest is also the loveliest?

That may be assumed.

Cf. II. 368

I answered Of the harmonies I know nothing but I want to have one warlike to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action when there is no pressure of necessity and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer or man by instruction and admonition or on the other hand when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end not carried away by his success but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances and acquiescing in the event These two harmonies I ask you to leave the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate the strain of courage and the strain of temperance these I say leave

And these he replied are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking

Then I said if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

I suppose not

Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales or the makers of any other many stringed curious ly harmonised instruments?

Certainly not

But what do you say to flute makers and flute players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Clearly not

There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country

That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument

The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange I said

Not at all he replied

And so, by the dog of Egypt we have been unconsciously purging the State which not

long ago we termed luxurious

And we have done wisely he replied

Then let us now finish the purgation I said Next in order to harmonies rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules for we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre or metres of every kind but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life [400] and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit not the words to the foot and melody To say what these rhythms are will be your duty—you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.

But indeed, he replied I cannot tell you I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed just as in sounds there are four notes out of which all the harmonies are composed that is an observation which I have made But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say

Then I said we must take Damon into our counsels and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness or insolence or fury or other unworthiness and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm also a dactylic or heroic and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot long and short alternating, and unless I am mistaken he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm and assigned to them short and long quantities Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm or perhaps a combination of the two for I am not certain what he meant These matters however as I was saying had better be referred to Damon himself for the analysis of the subject would be difficult you know?

Rather so I should say

But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm

None at all

And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style and that harmony and discord in like manner follow low style for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words and not the words by them

The four notes of the tetrachord.

when they are campaigning on soldiers fare they have no fish although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire and not in volving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.

True.

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In prescribing them, however he is not singular. All professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind.

Yes, he said, and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.

Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?

I think not.

Nor if a man is to be in condition would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Certainly not.

Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionary?

Certainly not.

All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.

Exactly.

There complexity engendered licence, and here disease whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul and simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body.

Most true, he said.

[403] But when intemperance and disease multiply in a State, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.

Of course.

And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first rate physicians and judges but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of want of good breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender

himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him?

Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful. Would you say "most," I replied when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness. He imagines that he is a master in dishonesty, able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?

Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.

Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, or compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh, is not this, too, a disgrace?

Yes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and new fangled names to diseases.

Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer [406] drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley meal and grated cheese, which are certainly inflammatory and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan War do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.

Well, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition.

Not so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer and himself of a sickly constitution by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself and secondly the rest of the world.

How was that? he said.

By the invention of lingering death for he

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?

That is true he replied if the deficiency be in his soul but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it and will love all the same

I perceive, I said that you have or have had experiences of this sort and I agree But let me ask you another question Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?

How can that be? he replied pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain

Or any affinity to virtue in general?

[403] None whatever

Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?

Yes the greatest

And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?

No nor a madder

Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order—temperate and harmonious?

Quite true he said

Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?

Certainly not

Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?

No indeed Socrates it must never come near them

Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son and then only for a noble purpose and he must first have the other's consent and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse and he is never to be seen going further or if he exceeds he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste

I quite agree, he said

Thus much of music which makes a fair ending for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?

I agree he said

After music comes gymnastic in which our youth are next to be trained

Certainly

Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years the training in it should be careful and should continue through life Now my be-

lief is—and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own but my own belief is—not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul but on the contrary that the good soul by her own excellence improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say?

Yes I agree

Then to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body and in order to avoid prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject

Very good

That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is

Yes he said that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed

But next what shall we say of their food for the men are in training for the great contest of all—are they not?

Yes he said

[404] And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?

Why not?

I am afraid I said that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing and rather perilous to health Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart in ever so slight a degree from their customary regimen?

Yes, I do

Then I said a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes who are to be like wakeful dogs and to see and hear with the utmost keenness amid the many changes of water and also of food of summer heat and winter cold which they will have to endure when on a campaign they must not be liable to break down in health

That is my view

The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing

How so?

Why I conceive that there is a gymnastic which like our music is simple and good and especially the military gymnastic

What do you mean?

My meaning may be learned from Homer he you know feeds his heroes at their feasts

was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus: the remedies as they concerned, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others: the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

They were very acute persons: those sons of Asclepius.

Naturally so, I replied. Nevertheless the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us both—if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.

All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you. Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?

Yes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know I horn I think good?

Will you tell me?

I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same.

How so? he asked.

Why I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skillful physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease: they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body as I conceive is not the instrument with which they cure the body: in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which is become and is sick can cure nothing.

That is very true, he said.

[409] But with the judge it is otherwise: since he governs mind by mind, he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness: the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.

Yes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young: he should have learned to know evil not from his own soul but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience.

Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question) for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning, and suspicious nature of which we spoke—he who has committed many crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself; but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions: he cannot recognise an honest man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.

Most true, he said.

Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking, is not this man, but the other: for vice cannot know virtue too; but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not the vicious man has wisdom—in my opinion.

And in mine also.

Thus is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law which you will sanction in your state. [410] They will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body.

had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended and as recovery was out of the question he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian he could do nothing but attend upon himself and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen and so dying hard by the help of science he struggled on to old age

A rare reward of his skill!

Yes I said a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts the omission arose not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill This we remark in the case of the artisan but ludicrously enough do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort

How do you mean? he said

I mean this When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure—an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife—these are his remedies And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head and all that sort of thing he replies at once that he has no time to be ill and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment and therefore bidding good bye to this sort of physician he resumes his ordinary habits and either gets well and lives and does his business or if his constitution fails he dies and has no more trouble

Yes he said and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only

[407] Has he not I said an occupation and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?

Quite true he said

But with the rich man this is otherwise of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform if he would live

He is generally supposed to have nothing to do

Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?

Nay he said I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner

Let us not have a dispute with him about

this I said but rather ask ourselves Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question, whether this dicting of disorders which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?

Of that he replied there can be no doubt such excessive care of the body when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic is most inimical to the practice of virtue

Yes indeed I replied and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army or an office of state and what is most important of all irreconcilable with any kind of study or thought or self reflection—there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped for a man is always fancying that he is being made ill and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body

Yes likely enough

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life had a definite ailment such as these he cured by purges and operations and bade them live as usual herein consulting the interests of the State but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion he did not want to lengthen out good for nothing lives or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons—if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself or to the State

Then he said you regard Asclepius as a statesman

Clearly and his character is further illustrated by his sons Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines [408] of which I am speaking at the siege of Troy You will remember how when Pandarus wounded Menelaus they

Sucked the blood out of the wound and sprinkled soothing remedies

but they never prescribed what the patient

Iliad iv .18

was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus the remedies as they concerned, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others: the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

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And in mine also.

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but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves

That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State

And thus our youth having been educated only in that simple music which as we said inspires temperance will be reluctant to go to law

Clearly

And the musician who keeping to the same track in content to practise the simple gymnastic will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case

That I quite believe

The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature and not to increase his strength he will not like common athletes use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles

Very right, he said

Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed as is often supposed the one for the training of the soul the other for the training of the body

What then is the real object of them?

I believe I said that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul

How can that be? he asked

Did you never observe I said the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

In what way shown? he said

The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity the other of softness and effeminacy I replied

Yes he said I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him

Yet surely I said this ferocity only comes from spirit, which if rightly educated would give courage but if too much intensified is liable to become hard and brutal

That I quite think

On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness And this also when too much indulged will turn to softness but if educated rightly will be gentle and moderate

True

And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?

Assuredly

And both should be in harmony?

Beyond question

[411] And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?

Yes

And the inharmonious is cowardly and dishonest?

Very true

And when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron and made useful instead of brittle and useless But if he carries on the softening and soothing process in the next stage he begins to melt and waste until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul and he becomes a feeble warrior

Very true

If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished but if he have a good deal then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable—on the least provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished instead of having spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable

Exactly

And so in gymnastics if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit and he becomes twice the man that he was

Certainly

And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the Muses does not even that intelligence which there may be in him having no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture grow feeble and dull and blind his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment and his senses not being purged of their mists?

True he said

And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy uncivilized never using the weapon of persuasion—he is like a wild beast all violence and fierceness and knows no other way of dealing and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions and has no sense of propriety and grace

That is quite true he said

And as there are two principles of human na-

nurt, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God as I should say has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body) [412] in order that these two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.

That appears to be the intention.

And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions and best attempts them to the soul may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

You are quite right, Socrates.

And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last.

Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.

Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education. Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.

I dare say that there will be no difficulty.

Very good. I said then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?

Certainly.

There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.

Clearly.

And that the best of these must rule.

That is also clear.

Now are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Yes.

And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?

Yes.

And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?

True.

And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?

To be sure.

And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil for time is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?

Very true, he replied.

Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.

Those are the right men.

And they will have to be watched at every age in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.

How cast off? he said.

I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will [413] with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.

I understand, he said the willing loss of a resolution the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.

Why I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil and to possess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?

Yes, he replied. I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.

And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?

Still he replied. I do not understand you.

I fear that I must have been talking darkly like the tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others for get argument steals away the hearts of one class, and tune of the other and thus I call theft. Now you understand me?

Yes.

Those again who are forced are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.

I understand he said, and you are quite right.

And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence of fear?

Yes he said everything that deceives may be said to enchant.

Therefore, as I was just now saying we must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives

We must watch them from their youth upwards and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected That will be the way?

Yes

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities

Very right he replied

And then I said we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind and again pass them into pleasures and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments and of a noble bearing always good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State And he who at every age as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure [414] shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State he shall be honoured in life and death and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour the greatest that we have to give But him who fails we must reject I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed I speak generally and not with any pretension to exactness

And speaking generally I agree with you he said

And perhaps the word guardian in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home that the one may not have the will or the others the power to harm us The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers

I agree with you he said

How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers if that be possible and at any rate the rest of the

What sort of lie? he said

Nothing new I replied only an old Phœnician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places (as the poets say, and have made the world believe) though not in our time and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again or could now even be made probable if it did

How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

You will not wonder I replied at my hesitation when you have heard

Speak he said and fear not

Well then I will speak although I really know not how to look you in the face or in what words to utter the audacious fiction which I propose to communicate gradually first to the rulers then to the soldiers and lastly to the people They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us an appearance only reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured when they were completed the earth their mother sent them up and so their country being their mother and also their nurse they are bound to advise for her good and to defend her against attacks and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers

You had good reason he said to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell

[415] True I replied but there is more coming I have only told you half Citizens we shall say to them in our tale you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently Some of you have the power of command and in the composition of these he has mingled gold wherefore also they have the greatest honour others he has made of silver to be auxiliaries others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron and the species will generally be preserved in the children But as all are of the same original stock a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son or a silver parent a golden son And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers and above all else that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard or of which they are to be such good guardians as of the purity of the race They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron then nature orders

a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied there is no way of accomplishing this but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons sons, and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty I replied yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from without: there let them encamp and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.

Just so, he said.

And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.

Yes, I said but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shopkeepers.

What is the difference? he said.

[416] That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger or some evil habit or other would turn upon the sheep and worry them and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?

Truly monstrous, he said.

And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?

Yes, great care should be taken.

And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

But they are well-educated already he replied.

I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon I said. I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another and to those who are under their protection.

Very true, he replied.

And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

He must.

Then let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary: neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter: their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage: they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more: and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God: the divine metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture [417] for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undehiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens: hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both in themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

Yes, said Glaucon.

We must watch them from their youth upwards and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected That will be the way?

Yes

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities

Very right he replied

And then I said we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind and again pass them into pleasures and prove them more thoroughly than gold ■ proved in the furnace that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments and of a noble bearing always good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State And he who at every age as boy and youth and in mature life has come out of the trial victorious and pure [414] shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State he shall be honoured in life and death and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour the greatest that we have to give But him who fails we must reject I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed I speak generally and not with any pretension to exactness

And speaking generally, I agree with you he said

And perhaps the word guardian in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home that the one may not have the will or the others the power to harm us The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers

I agree with you he said

How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers if that be possible and at any rate the rest of the city?

What sort of lie? he said

Nothing new I replied only an old Phœnician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places (as the poets say and have made the world believe), though not in our time and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again or could now even be made probable if it did

How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

You will not wonder I replied at my hesitation when you have heard

Speak he said, and fear not

Well then I will speak although I really know not how to look you in the face or in what words to utter the audacious fiction which I propose to communicate gradually first to the rulers then to the soldiers and lastly to the people They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us an appearance only in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured when they were completed the earth their mother sent them up and so their country being their mother and also their nurse they are bound to advise for her good and to defend her against attacks and her citizens they are to regard ■ children of the earth and their own brothers

You had good reason he said to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell

[415] True I replied but there is more coming I have only told you half Citizens we shall say to them in our tale you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently Some of you have the power of command and in the composition of these he has mingled gold wherefore also they have the greatest honour others he has made of silver to be auxiliaries others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron and the species will generally be preserved in the children But as all are of the same original stock a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son or a silver parent a golden son And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers and above all else that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard or of which they are to be such good guardians as of the purity of the race They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron then nature orders

¹ Cf *Laws* ii 663

a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; there is then any possibility of making our citizens better in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing this but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons sons, and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however of the notion, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour: while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies who like wolves may come down on the road from without: there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.

Just so, he said.

And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.

Yes, I said, but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shopkeepers.

What is the difference, he said.

[416] That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger or some evil habit or other would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?

That monstrous, he said.

And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries be stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies.

Yes, great care should be taken.

And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

But they are well-educated already, he replied.

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¹Cf *Laws* II 663.

The process is as follows. When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Certainly not.

He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Very true.

And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes, he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

That is evident.

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

What evils?

[421] Wealth, I said, and poverty, the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.

That is very true, he replied, but still I should like to know Socrates how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the news of war.

There would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such enemy, but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.

How so? he asked.

In the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will betray dwarves fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.

And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers?

Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?

Certainly, he said, there could be nothing wonderful in that.

And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practise of boxing than they have in military qualities.

Likely enough.

Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

I agree with you for I think you right.

And suppose that before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth. Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may do you therefore come and help us in war and take the spoils of the other city. Who on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wary dogs, rather than with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?

That is not likely, and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.

But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!

Why so?

You ought to speak of other States in the plural number, not one of them is a city but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, [423] the other of the rich, these are at war with one another, and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark, if you treated them all as a single State. But if you dealt with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States. I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and truth, though the number not more than a thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.

That is most true, he said.

And what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include and beyond which they will not go?

What limit would you propose?

I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity, that, I think, is the proper limit.

BOOK IV

[419] HERE Adeimantus interposed a question. How would you answer, Socrates said he if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness the city in fact belongs to them but they are none the better for it whereas other men acquire lands and build large and handsome houses and have everything handsome about them offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account and practising hospitality moreover as you were saying just now they have gold and silver and all that is usual among the favourites of fortune but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?

[420] Yes I said and you may add that they are only fed and not paid in addition to their food like other men and therefore they can not if they would take a journey of pleasure they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy which as the world goes is thought to be happiness and many other similar accusations might be added.

But said he let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.

You mean to ask I said what will be our answer?

Yes

If we proceed along the old path my belief I said is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that even as they are our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class but the greatest happiness of the whole we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice and in the ill-ordered State injustice and having found them we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present I take it we are fashioning the happy State not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens but as a whole and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue and some one came up to us and said Why do you not put the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be purple but you have made them black—to him we might fairly answer Sir you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes consider rather wheth-

er by giving this and the other features their due proportion we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads and bid them till the ground as much as they like and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches and feast by the fireside, passing round the winecup while their wheel is conveniently at hand and working at pottery only as much as they like in this way we might make every class happy—and then as you imagine the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads [421] for if we listen to you the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman the potter will cease to be a potter and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society and pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seemingly and not real guardians then see how they turn the State upside down and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival who are enjoying a life of revelry not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth then the guardians and auxiliaries and all others equally with them must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

I think that you are quite right.

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.

What may that be?

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

What are they?

Wealth I said and poverty.

How do they act?

Yes.

But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters—I doubt if it is ever done nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting.

Impossible.

It would seem, Ademantus, that the direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?

To be sure.

Until some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?

That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied.

Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans about insult and injury or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and extractions of market and harbour dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men: what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them.

And without divine help, said Ademantus, they will go on for ever making and mending their law and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

You would compare them, I said, to those in abodes who, having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance.

Exactly.

[426] Yes, I said, and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctors, and increase and complicate their disorders, and always fancy that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.

Such cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.

Yes, I replied, and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wench-

ing and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.

Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming, in going in to a passion with a man who tells you what is right.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution, and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and laws upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman—do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Yes, he said, the States are as bad as the men, and I am very far from praising them.

But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and delicacy of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do, but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.

What do you mean? I said, you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.

Well, then, do not be angry with them for are they not as good as a play-thing, their hands at polity reforms such as I was describing, they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a Hydra?

[427] Yes, he said, that is just what they are doing.

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution, either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State, for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them, and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Very good, he said

Here then I said is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians. Let our city be accounted neither large nor small but one and self-sufficing.

And surely said he this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.

And the other said I of which we were speaking before is lighter still—I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes when naturally superior. The intention was that in the case of the citizens generally each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him: one to one work, and then every man would do his own business and be one and not many, and so the whole city would be one and not many.

Yes he said that is not so difficult.

The regulations which we are prescribing my good Adeimantus are not as might be supposed a number of great principles but trifles all if care be taken, as the saying is of the one great thing—a thing however which I would rather call not great, but sufficient for our purpose.

What may that be? he asked.

Education I said and nurture. If our citizens are well educated and grow into sensible men they will easily see their way through all these as well as other matters which I omit such, for example as marriage [424] the possession of women and the procreation of children which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common as the proverb says.

That will be the best way of settling them.

Also I said the State if once started well moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.

Very possibly he said.

Then to sum up. This is the point to which above all the attention of our rulers should be directed—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain them intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard

*The newest song which the singers have*¹

¹ *Odyssey* i 352

they will be afraid that he may be praising not new songs but a new kind of song and this ought not to be praised or conceived to be the meaning of the poet for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him—he says that when modes of music change the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.

Yes said Adeimantus and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.

Then I said our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?

Yes he said the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.

Yes I replied in the form of amusement and at first sight it appears harmless.

Why yes he said and there is no harm were it not that little by little this spirit of licence finding a home imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs whence, issuing with greater force it invades contracts between man and man and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions in utter recklessness ending at last Socrates by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.

Is that true? I said.

That is my belief he replied.

Then as I was saying our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system for if amusements become lawless and the youths themselves become lawless [425] they can never grow up into well-conducted and virtuous citizens.

Very true he said.

And when they have made a good beginning in play and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order then this habit of order in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them and if there be any fallen places in the State will raise them up again.

Very true he said.

Thus educated they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.

What do you mean?

I mean such things as these—when the young are to be silent before their elders how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit what honour is due to parents what garments or shoes are to be worn the mode of dressing the hair deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

Yes.

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Impossible.

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Yes, I replied, and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wench-

ing and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.

Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution, and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is held to be a great and good statesman—do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Yes, he said, the States are as bad as the men, and I am very far from praising them.

But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do, but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.

What do you mean? I said, you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

Nay, he said, certainly not in that case.

Well, then, do not be angry with them, for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing, they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?

[427] Yes, he said, that is just what they are doing.

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments, whether concerning laws or the constitution, either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State, for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them, and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Nothing to us I replied but to Apollo the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all

Which are they? he said

The institution of temples and sacrifices and the entire service of gods, demigods and heroes also the ordering of the repositories of the dead and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity He is the god who sits in the centre on the navel of the earth and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind

You are right and we will do as you propose

But where, amid all this is justice? son of Ariston tell me where Now that our city has been made habitable light a candle and search and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ from one another and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion whether seen or unseen by gods and men

Nonsense said Clinon did you not promise to search yourself saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?

I do not deny that I said so and as you remind me I will be as good as my word but you must join

We will he replied

Well then I hope to make the discovery in this way I mean to begin with the assumption that our State if rightly ordered is perfect

That is most certain

And being perfect is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just

That is likewise clear

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

[428] Very good

If there were four things and we were searching for one of them wherever it might be the one sought for might be known to us from the first and there would be no further trouble or we might know the other three first and then the fourth would clearly be the one left

Very true he said

And is not a similar method to be pursued

about the virtues which are also four in number?

Clearly

First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view and in this I detect a certain peculiarity

What is that?

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Very true

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge for not by ignorance but by knowledge do men counsel well?

Clearly

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Of course

There is the knowledge of the carpenter but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Certainly not that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Certainly not

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots I said nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them he said

Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes

Well I said and is there any knowledge in our recently founded State among any of the citizens which advises not about any particular thing in the State but about the whole and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

There certainly is

And what is this knowledge and among whom is it found? I asked

It is the knowledge of the guardians he replied and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians

And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

The smiths he replied will be far more numerous

Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest

And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself the whole State, [429] being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise and this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least

Most true

Thus, then I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has some how or other been discovered

And in my humble opinion very satisfactorily discovered he replied.

Again I said there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courage out to the State

How do you mean?

Why I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other

Certainly not.

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them and this is what you term courage

I should like to hear what you are saying once more for I do not think that I perfectly understand you

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education and I mean by the words under all circumstances to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear a man preserves and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

If you please

You know I said, that dyers when they want to dye wool for making the true sea purple begin by selecting their white colour first this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground

may take the purple hue in full perfection The dyeing then proceeds and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom But, when the ground has not been duly prepared you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour

Yes, he said I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

Then now I said you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers [430] and educating them in music and gymnastic we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure—mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye or by sorrow fear and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

But I agree he replied for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains and ought to have another name

Most certainly

Then I may infer courage is such as you describe?

Why yes, said I you may and if you add the words of a citizen you will not be far wrong—hereafter if you like, we will carry the examination further but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough

You are right, he replied

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first temperance and then justice which is the end of our search.

Very true.

Now can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

I do not know how that can be accomplished he said nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first

Certainly I replied I should not be justified in refusing your request

Then consider he said

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quarry will not escape

Good news he said

Truly I said we are stupid fellows
Why so?

Why my good sir at the beginning of our enquiry ages ago there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her noth-
ing, could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were seeking but at what was far off in the distance and therefore I suppose we missed her

What do you mean?

I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise her

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium

[433] Well then, tell me I said whether I am right or not. You remember the original principle which we were all ways laying down at the foundation of the State—that one man should practise one thing only—the thing to which his nature was best adapted—now justice is this principle or a part of it

Yes we often said that one man should do one thing only

Further we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody. We said so again and again and many others have said the same to us

Yes we said so

Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

I cannot, but I should like to be told

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted and that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us justice would be the fourth or remaining one

That follows necessarily

If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation of the soldiers, or the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers or health, this or that which I am mentioning and which is found in children and women, slave

and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject—the quality I mean of every one doing his own work and not being a busybody would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered

Certainly he replied there would be a difficulty in saying which

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues: wisdom, temperance, courage

Yes he said

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Exactly

Let us look at the question from another point of view. Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?

Certainly

And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?

Yes that is their principle

Which is a just principle?

Yes

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own and belongs to him?

[434] Very true

Think, now and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter and suppose them to exchange the implements or their duties or the same person to be doing the work of both or whatever be the change do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

Not much

But when the cobbler or any other man whose nature is designed to be a trader having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians for which he is unfitted and either to take the implements or the duties of the other or when one man is trader, legislator and warrior all in one then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State

Most true

Seeing then I said that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another or the change of one into another is the greatest harm to the State, and may be

Yes I replied I will and as far as I can at present see the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding

How so? he asked

Temperance I replied is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires this is obviously enough implied in the saying of a man being his own master and other traces of the same notion may be found in language

No doubt he said

There is something ridiculous in the expression master of himself [431] for the master is also the servant and the servant the master and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted

Certainly

The meaning is I believe that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle and when the better has the worse under control then a man is said to be master of himself and this is a term of praise but when owing to evil education or association the better principle which is also the smaller is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled

Yes there is reason in that

And now I said look at our newly-created State and there you will find one of these two conditions realized for the State as you will acknowledge may be justly called master of itself if the words temperance and self-mastery truly express the rule of the better part over the worse

Yes he said I see that what you say is true

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class

Certainly he said

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion are to be found only in a few and those the best born and best educated

Very true

These two as you may perceive have a place in our State and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few

That I perceive he said

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires and master of itself ours may

claim such a designation?

Certainly he replied

It may also be called temperate and for the same reasons?

Yes

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both as I should imagine he replied

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom each of which resides in a part only [432] the one making the State wise and the other valiant not so temperance, which extends to the whole and runs through all the notes of the scale and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth or anything else Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior as in the right to rule of either both in states and in individuals

I entirely agree with you

And so I said we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State The last of those qualities which make a state virtuous must be justice if we only knew what that was

The inference is obvious

The time then has arrived Glaucon when like huntsmen we should surround the cover and look sharp that justice does not steal away and pass out of sight and escape for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country, watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her and if you see her first let me know

Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him—that is about as much as I am good for

Offer up a prayer with me and follow

I will but you must show me the way

Here is no path I said and the wood is dark and perplexing still we must push on

Let us push on

Here I saw something Halloo! I said I begin to perceive a track and I believe that the

at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Very true.

And suppose the objector to refine still further and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot) his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves. We should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse us, or induce us to believe that the same thing at the same time, [437] in the same part or in relation to the same thing can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and pro et contra length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity and go forward on the understanding that hereafter if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all at them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the

desires in general and again willing and wishing—all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desires or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desires, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent as if he had been asked a question?

Very true.

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

Certainly.

Admitting this to be true of desire generally let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?

Let us take that class, he said.

The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Yes.

And here comes the point is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only not of drink qualified by anything else for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or in a word, drink of any particular sort but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink or if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink or if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive or if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

Yes, he said the simple desire is, as you say in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

[438] But here a confusion may arise and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only but good drink, or food only but good food for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink and the same is true of every other desire.

Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation, others are simple and have

most justly termed evil doing?

Precisely

And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

Certainly

This then is injustice and on the other hand when the trader the auxiliary and the guard can each do their own business that is justice and will make the city just

I agree with you

We will not I said be overpositive as yet but if on trial this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State there will be no longer any room for doubt if it be not verified we must have a fresh enquiry First let us complete the old investigation which we began as you remember under the impression that if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual That larger example appeared to be the State and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could knowing well that in the good State justice would be found Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual—if they agree we shall be satisfied or if there be a difference in the individual we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory [435] The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls

That will be in regular course let us do as you say

I proceeded to ask When two things a greater and less are called by the same name are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Like he replied

The just man then if we regard the idea of justice only will be like the just State?

He will

And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

True he said

And so of the individual we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State and he may be rightly described in the same terms because he is affected in the same manner?

Certainly he said

Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul has these three principles or not?

An easy question! Nay, rather Socrates, the prover holds that hard is the good

Very true I said, and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry

May we not be satisfied with that? he said—under the circumstances I am quite content

I too I replied shall be extremely well satisfied

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said

Must we not acknowledge I said that each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State and that from the individual they pass into the State?—how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians and in general the northern nations and the same may be said of the love of knowledge which is the special characteristic of our part of the world [436] or of the love of money which may with equal truth be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians

Exactly so he said

There is no difficulty in understanding this. None whatever

But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one whether that is to say we learn with one part of our nature are angry with another and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty

Yes he said there lies the difficulty

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different

How can we? he asked

I replied as follows The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time in contrary ways and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same we know that they are really not the same but different

Good

For example I said can the same thing be

also a dread and abhorrence of them [440] for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.

I have heard the story myself, he said.

The moral of the tale is that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.

Yes that is the meaning, he said.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason—but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor as I should imagine, in any one else?

Certainly not.

Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another the nobler he is the less able he is to feel indignant at any suffering such as hunger or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him—these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.

The illustration is perfect, he replied and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.

What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.

Most assuredly.

But a further question arises. Is passion dif-

ferent from reason also or only a kind of reason in which latter case instead of three principles in the soul [441] there will only be two the rational and the concupiscent or rather as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?

Yes, he said, there must be a third.

Yes, I replied, if passion which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

But that is easily proved.—We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason and most of them late enough.

Excellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer which have been already quoted by us,

He smote his breast and thus rebuked his heart

for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.

Very true, he said.

And so, after much tossing we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual and that they are three in number.

Exactly.

Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?

Certainly.

Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?

Assuredly.

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?

That follows of course.

We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.

We must recollect that the individual in
Od. 19. 17 quoted: *pra. III. 200*

their correlatives simple

I do not know what you mean

Well you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Certainly

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes

And the sometime greater to the sometime less and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly he said

And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms such as the double and the half or again the heavier and the lighter the swifter and the slower and of hot and cold and of any other relatives—is not this true of all of them?

Yes

And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition) but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge I mean for example that the science of house building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture

Certainly

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind and this is true of the other arts and sciences?

Yes

Now then if I have made myself clear you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives My meaning was that if one term of a relation is taken alone the other is taken alone if one term is qualified the other is also qualified I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy or of disease necessarily diseased or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil but only that when the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease it becomes defined and is hence called not merely science but the science of medicine

I quite understand, and I think as you do

[439] Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms having clearly a relation—

Yes thirst is relative to drink

And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink but thirst taken alone is

neither of much nor little nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?

Certainly

Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty desires only drink for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?

That is plain

And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink for as we were saying the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same

Impossible

No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls

Exactly so he replied

And might a man be thirsty and yet unwilling to drink?

Yes he said it constantly happens

And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink and something else forbidding him which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?

I should say so

And the forbidding principle is derived from reason and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?

Clearly

Then we may fairly assume that they are two and that they differ from one another the one with which a man reasons we may call the rational principle of the soul the other with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire may be termed the irrational or appetitive the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?

Yes he said we may fairly assume them to be different

Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul And what of passion or spirit? Is it a third or akin to one of the preceding?

I should be inclined to say—akin to desire

Well I said there is a story which I remember to have heard and in which I put faith The story is that Leontius the son of Aglaion coming up one day from the Piræus under the north wall on the outside observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution He felt a desire to see them and

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the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another or any of them to do the work of others—he sets in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and at peace with himself and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher lower and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together and is no longer many but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property or in the treatment of the body or in some affair of politics or private business always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition [444] he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

You have said the exact truth, Socrates.

Very good and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them we should not be telling a falsehood?

Most certainly not.

May we say so then?

Let us say so.

And now I said injustice has to be considered.

Clearly.

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles—a meddlesomeness, and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural assai—what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or again, of acting justly will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why I said they are like disease and health being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so? he said.

Why I said that which is healthy causes health and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health and beauty and well being of the soul and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?

True.

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.

[445] Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered. Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly if only unpunished and unreformed?

In my judgment, Socrates the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue or to escape from injustice and vice assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Yes, I said the question is as you say ridiculous. Still as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.

Certainly not, he replied.

Come up hither I said and behold the various forms of vice those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.

I am following you he replied proceed.

I said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are in

whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

Yes he said we must remember that too

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise and has the care of the whole soul to rule and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly

And as we were saying the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons [442] and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?

Quite true he said

And these two thus nurtured and educated and having learned truly to know their own functions will rule over the concupiscent which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain over this they will keep guard lest waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures as they are termed the concupiscent soul no longer confined to her own sphere should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects and overturn the whole life of man?

Very true he said

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without the one counselling and the other fighting under his leader and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

True

And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Right he replied

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules and which proclaims these commands that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?

Assuredly

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony in whom the one ruling principle of reason and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule and do not rebel?

Certainly he said that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual

And surely I said we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just

That is very certain

And is justice dimmer in the individual and is her form different or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?

There is no difference in my opinion he said

Because if any doubt is still lingering in our minds a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying

What sort of instances do you mean?

[443] If the case is put to us must we not admit that the just State or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this?

No one, he replied

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Never

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?

Impossible

No one will be less likely to commit adultery or to dishonour his father and mother or to fail in his religious duties?

No one

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business whether in ruling or being ruled?

Exactly so

Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I indeed

Then our dream has been realized and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction that some divine power must have conducted is to a primary form of justice has now been verified?

Yes certainly

And the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business and not another's was a shadow of justice and for that reason it was of use?

Clearly

But in reality justice was such as we were describing being concerned however not with the outward man but with the inward which is the true self and concernment of man for

the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another or any of them to do the work of others—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law and at peace with himself and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher lower and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together and is no longer many but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property or in the treatment of the body or in some affair of politics or private business always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, [444] he will call unjust action and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

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Clearly

But in reality justice was such as we were describing being concerned however not with the outward man but with the inward which is the true self and concernment of man for

would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.

Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you: they are not sceptical or hostile.

I said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Yes, he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse—the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about. I must declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honours and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind: but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer [451] which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish) but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a detractor about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to encourage me.

Glaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted before hand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a detractor: take courage then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds the law may hold in argument.

Then why should you mind?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out, and no properly comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.

For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way in my opinion of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and

watchdogs of the herd.

True.

Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations: then we shall see whether the result accords with our design.

What do you mean?

What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into hinds and shees, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labour enough for them?

No, he said, they share alike: the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.

But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

You cannot.

Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education? [452]

Yes.

The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.

Yes.

Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war which they must practise like the men?

That is the inference, I suppose.

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual may appear ridiculous.

No doubt of it.

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young: they certainly will not be a vision of beauty any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasium.

Yes indeed, he said, according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous.

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the vulgar which will be directed against this sort of innovation: how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon horseback!

numerable there being four special ones which are deserving of note

What do you mean? he said

I mean, I replied that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State

How many?

There are five of the State and five of the soul I said

What are they?

The first, I said is that which we have been describing and which may be said to have two names monarchy and aristocracy accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many

True he replied

But I regard the two names as describing one form only, for whether the government is in the hands of one or many if the Governor have been trained in the manner which we have supposed the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained

That is true he replied

BOOK V

[449] SUCH is the good and true City or State and the good and true man is of the same pattern and if this is right every other is wrong and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State but also the regulation of the individual soul and is exhibited in four forms

What are they? he said

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another when Polemarchus who was sitting a little way off just beyond Adeimantus began to whisper to him stretching forth his hand he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder and drew him towards him leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear of which I only caught the words Shall we let him off or what shall we do?

Certainly not said Adeimantus raising his voice

Who is it I said whom you are refusing to let off?

You said

I repeated Why am I especially not to be let off?

Why he said we think that you are lazy and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story and you fancy that we shall not notice your

any way of proceeding as if it were self-evident to everybody that in the matter of women and children friends have all things in common

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes he said but what is right in this particular case like everything else, requires to be explained for community may be of many kinds Please, therefore to say what sort of community you mean We have been long expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens—how they will bring children into the world and rear them when they have arrived, and in general what is the nature of this community of women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil And now since the question is still undetermined and you are taking in hand another State we have resolved as you heard [450] not to let you go until you give an account of all this

To that resolution, said Glaucon you may regard me as saying Agreed

And without more ado said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally agreed

I said You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said you ask me to begin again at the very foundation ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it

For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here said Thrasymachus—to look for gold or to hear discourse?

Yes but discourse should have a limit

Yes Socrates said Glaucon and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be

Yes my simple friend but the answer is the reverse of easy many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions For the practicability of what is said may be doubted and looked at in another point of view whether the scheme if ever so practicable

Why no, he said that was never considered by us

I said Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men and if this is admitted by us, then if bald men are cobblers, we should for bid the hairy men to be cobblers and converse ly?

That would be a jest, he said

Yes, I said, a jest and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged we should have argued, for example that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same nature.

True

Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Certainly

And if I said the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits

Very true he said

Next, we shall ask our opponent how in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life [455] the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be quite fair

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that in general a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy but after a little reflection there is no difficulty

Yes, perhaps

I suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State.

By all means

Let us say to him Come now and we will ask you a question — when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily another with difficulty a little

learning will lead the one to discover a great deal whereas the other after much study and application no sooner learns than he forgets or again did you mean that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind while the body of the other is a hindrance to him? — would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

No one will deny that

And can you mention any pursuit of man and in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving and the management of pan cakes and preserves in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?

You are quite right he replied in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex although many women are in many things superior to many men yet on the whole what you say is true

And if so my friend I said there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man

Very true

Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

That will never do

[456] One woman has a gift of healing another not one is a musician and another has no music in her nature?

Very true

And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Certainly

And one woman is a philosopher and another is an enemy of philosophy one has spirit and another is without spirit?

That is also true.

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Yes

Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness

Very true he replied

Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious Not long ago as we shall remind them the Hellenes were of the opinion which is still generally received among the barbarians that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation

No doubt

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good

Very true he replied

First then whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman [453] Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion

That will be much the best way

Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended

Why not? he said

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents They will say Socrates and Glaucon no adversary need convict you for you yourselves at the first foundation of the State admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature And certainly if I am not mistaken such an admission was made by us And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed? And we shall reply Of course they do Then we shall be asked Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different and such as are agreeable to their different natures? Certainly they should

But if so have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women whose natures are so entirely different ought

to perform the same actions? —What defence will you make for us my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections?

That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side

These are the objections Glaucon and there are many others of a like kind which I first saw long ago, they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children

By Zeus he said the problem to be solved is anything but easy

Why yes I said but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid-ocean he has to swim all the same

Very true

And must not we swim and try to reach the shore we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

I suppose so he said

Well then let us see if any way of escape can be found We acknowledged—did we not? that different natures ought to have different pursuits and that men's and women's natures are different And now what are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits—this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us

Precisely

[454] Verily Glaucon I said glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!

Why do you say so?

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing just because he cannot define and divide and so know that of which he is speaking and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion

Yes he replied such is very often the case but what has that to do with us and our argument?

A great deal for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition

In what way?

Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth that different natures ought to have different pursuits but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures

combined, I replied Now I meant that you should admit the utility and in this way as I thought I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility. But that little attempt is detected and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.

Well I said I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour let me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the [438] habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them they proceed with their plan and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart and I should like, with your permission to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all then if you have no objection I will endeavour with your help to consider the advantages of the measure and he after the question of possibility.

I have no objection proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other the guardians must themselves obey the laws and they must also instate the spirit of them in all details which are entrusted to their care.

That is right he said.

You I said who are their legislator having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them—they must be as far as possible of like natures with them and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own they will be together and will be brought up together and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a word I think?

Yes, he said—necessity not geometrical, but

another sort of necessity which lovers know and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

True I said and this, Glaucon like all the rest must proceed after an orderly fashion in a city of the blessed licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes he said and it ought not to be permitted.

Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

[439] Exactly.

And how can marriages be made most beneficial?—that is a question which I put to you because I see in your house dogs for hunting and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now I beseech you, do tell me have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why in the first place although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best.

And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if care was not taken in the breeding your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same of horses and animals in general?

Undoubtedly.

Good heavens! my dear friend, I said what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Certainly the same principle holds but why does this involve any particular skill?

Because, I said our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate with medicine. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough but when medicine has to be given then the doctor should be more of a man.

That is quite true he said but to what are you alluding?

I mean I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

And we were very right.

Obviously

And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character?

Very true

And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?

They ought

Then as we were saying before there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come round again

Certainly not

The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration and the contrary practice which prevails at present is in reality a violation of nature

That appears to be true

We had to consider first whether our proposals were possible and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Yes

And the possibility has been acknowledged?

Yes

The very great benefit has next to be established?

Quite so

You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian for their original nature is the same?

Yes

I should like to ask you a question

What is it?

Would you say that all men are equal in excellence or is one man better than another?

The latter

And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question!

You have answered me I replied Well and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

By far the best

And will not their wives be the best women?

Yes by far the best

And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

There can be nothing better

[457] And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic when present in such manner as we have described will accomplish?

Certainly

Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?

True

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country only in the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned to the women who are the weaker natures but in other respects their duties are to be the same And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking

A fruit of unripe wisdom

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at or what he is about—for that is, and ever will be the best of sayings *That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base*

Very true

Here then is one difficulty in our law about women which we may say that we have now escaped the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness

Yes that was a mighty wave which you have escaped

Yes I said but a greater is coming you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on let me see

The law I said which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded is to the following effect—that the wives of our guardians are to be common and their children are to be common and no parent is to know his own child nor any child his parent

Yes he said that is a much greater wave than the other and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable

I do not think I said that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common the possibility is quite another matter and will be very much disputed

I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both

You imply that the two questions must be

combined, I replied. Now I mean that you should admit the unlay and in this way as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility

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Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour let me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the [453] habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the advantages of the measure, and hereafter the question of possibility

I have no objection proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other: the guardians must themselves obey the laws, and they must also instil the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care

That is right, he said

You, I said, who are their legislators having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them—they must be as far as possible of like natures with them and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own: they will be together and will be brought up together and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessary is not too strong a word, I think?

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That is quite true, he said but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

And we were very right.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births

How so?

Why I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often and the inferior with the inferior as seldom as possible and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other if the flock is to be maintained in first rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd as the guardians may be termed breaking out into rebellion.

Very true.

Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms [460] and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.

Certainly he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together and then they will accuse their own ill luck and not the rulers.

To be sure he said.

And I think that our braver and better youth besides their other honours and rewards might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers whether male or female or both for offices are to be held by women as well as by men—

Yes—

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter but the offspring of the inferior or of the better when they chance to be deformed will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place as they should be.

Yes he said that must be done if the breed

of the guardians is to be kept pure.

They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognises her own child and other wet nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children?

Why said I, and so they ought. Let us now ever proceed with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?

Very true.

And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life and thirty in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman I said at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State and continue to bear them until forty a man may begin at five and twenty when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quietest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty five.

[461] Certainly he said both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigour.

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Very true he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true he replied.

This applies however only to those who are within the specified age after that we allow

them to range at will except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter or his mother or his mother's mother and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers or son's son or father's father and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

That also he said is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this—dating from the day of the hymeneal the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father and he will call their children his grandchildren and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to intermarry. Thus, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters if the lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity and also that nothing can be better—would you not?

[463] Yes, certainly.

Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State—what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?

No doubt.

Yes and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms "mine" and "not mine," "his" and "not his."

Exactly so.

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms "mine" and "not mine" in the same way to the same thing?

Quite true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body when but a finger of one of us is hurt the whole frame draws towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected and we say that the man has a pain in his finger and the same expression is used about any other part of the body which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.

Very true he replied and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil the whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.

Very good.

[463] Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?

True.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

They are called saviours and helpers, he replied

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and foster fathers

And what do they call them in other States?

Slaves

And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

Fellow rulers

And what in ours?

Fellow guardians

Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?

Yes very often

And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?

Exactly

But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?

Certainly he would not for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister or father or mother or son or daughter or as the child of parent of those who are thus connected with him

Capital I said but let me ask you once more. Shall they be a family in name only or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example in the use of the word father would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

These he said and none other for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be with me it is well or it is ill

[465] Most true

And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking were we not saying that they will

have their pleasures and pains in common?

Yes and so they will

And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call my own, and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Yes far more so than in other States.

And the reason of this over and above the general constitution of the State will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason

And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good as was implied in our own comparison of a well ordered State to the relation of the body and the members when affected by pleasure or pain?

That we acknowledged and very rightly

Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Certainly

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property their pay was to be their food which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians

Right he replied

Both the community of property and the community of families as I am saying tend to make them more truly guardians they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about mine and not mine each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them and therefore they all tend towards a common end

Certainly he replied

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own suits and complaints will have no existence among them they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion

Of course they will

Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them For that equals should defend themselves against equals we

shall maintain ~~in~~ be honourable and rich, ~~but~~ [465] we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity.

That is good he said.

Yes, and there is a further good in the law, viz., that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder unless the magistrates command him so, will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him, shame which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents, fear that the injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

That is true, he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?

Yes, there will be no want of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like even to mention the little mean-nesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice, such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pains which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessities for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

And from all these evils they will be delivered and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

How so?

The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State and the crown with

which they and their children are crowned in the fulness of all that life needs they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living and after death have an honourable burial.

Yes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.

Do you remember I said, how in the course of the previous discussion some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our [466] guardians unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?

Yes, I remember.

And what do you say now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors—is the life of shoemakers, or any other artisans or of husbandmen, to be compared with it?

Certainly not.

At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said else here, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, half is more than a whole.

If he were to consult me, I should say to him, Stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.

You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described—common education, common children, and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war, they are to keep watch together and to hunt together like dogs, and always and in all things as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes.

I agree with you, he replied.

The enquiry I said has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible—as among other animals, so also among

men—and if possible in what way possible?

You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest

There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them

How?

Why of course they will go on expeditions together and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough that, after the manner of the artisan's child they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up [467] and besides looking on they will have to help and be of use in war and to wait upon their fathers and mothers Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help long before they touch the wheel?

Yes I have

And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians will be?

The idea is ridiculous he said

There is also the effect on the parents with whom as with other animals the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valour

That is quite true Socrates and yet if they are defeated which may often happen in war how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as their parents and the State will never recover

True I said but would you never allow them to run any risk?

I am far from saying that

Well but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when if they escape disaster they will be the better for it?

Clearly

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred

Yes very important

This then must be our first step—to make our children spectators of war but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger then all will be well

True

Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war but to know as far as human foresight can what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

That may be assumed

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Very properly

Still the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen there is a good deal of chance about them?

True

Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape

What do you mean? he said

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war the horses must not be spirited and war like but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own [468] business and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape

I believe that you are right he said

Next as to war what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms or is guilty of any other act of cowardice should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan What do you think?

By all means I should say

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies he is their lawful prey and let them do what they like with him

Certainly

But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades every one of them in succession shall crown him What do you say?

I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Most certainly and I should be disposed to go further and say Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts So that if there be a lover in the army whether his love be youth or

maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour

Capital I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Agreed.

Again there is another manner in which according to Homer brave youths should be honoured for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chimes, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing

Most true, he said

Then in this, I said Homer shall be our teacher and we too at sacrifices and on the like occasions will honour the brave according to the measure of their valour whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning also with seats of precedence and as a full cup

and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them

That, he replied is excellent

Yes, I said and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say in the first place that he is of the golden race?

To be sure.

Nay have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

[469] *They are holy and get upon the earth as tho's of good vertues / as the guard's of ip-ch gifted men*

Yes and we accept his authority

We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages and what is to be their special distinction and we must do as he bids?

By all means

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes And not only they but any who are deemed pre-eminently good, whether they be from age or in any other way shall be admitted to the same honours.

That is very right, he said

Next how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

In what respect do you mean?

Iliad ii. 321

Iliad viii. 162.

First of all in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States or allow others to enslave them if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better

Then no Hellenic should be owned by them as a slave that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe

Certainly he said they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another

Next as to the slain ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead pretending that they are fulfilling a duty and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder

Very true.

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog he said

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we most certainly must

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods least of all the arms of Hellenes, [470] if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes and, indeed we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Very true.

Again as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure he said of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden in my judgment I would take the annual produce and no more Shall I tell you why?

Pray do

Why you see, there is a difference in the names discord and war and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and

foreign and the first of the two is termed discord and only the second war

That is a very proper distinction he replied And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?

Very good he said

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies and this kind of antagonism should be called war but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord they being by nature friends and such enmity is to be called discord

I agree

Consider then I said when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs and a city is divided if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever

Yes he said that is a better temper than the other

And will not the city which you are founding be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be he replied

Then will not the citizens be good and civilised?

Yes very civilised

And will they not be lovers of Hellas and think of Hellas as their own land and share in the common temples?

Most certainly

And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends [471] which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?

Certainly

They will use friendly correction but will not enslave or destroy their opponents they will be correctors not enemies?

Just so

And as they will not devour houses nor

as they all they burn whole popu

lation of a city—men women and children—are equally their enemies for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree he said that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another

Then let us enact this law also for our guardians—that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Agreed and we may agree also in thinking that these like all our previous enactments, are very good

But still I must say Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside—Is such an order of things possible, and how if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible would do all sorts of good to the State I will add what you have omitted that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors and will never leave their ranks for they will all know one another and each will call the other father brother son and if you suppose the women to join their armies whether in the same rank or in the rear either as a terror to the enemy or as auxiliaries in case of need I know that they will then be absolutely invincible and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge but as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them assuming then the existence of the State let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means—the rest may be left

[472] If I loiter for a moment you instantly make a raid upon me I said and have no mercy I have hardly escaped the first and second waves and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third which is the greatest and heaviest When you have seen and heard the third wave I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and investigate

The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible speak out and at once.

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.

True, he replied but what of that?

I was only going to ask whether if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough.

We are enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.

True, he said.

Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

He would be none the worse.

Well and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?

To be sure.

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Surely not, he replied.

That is the truth I said. But if at your request, I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, ha in this in view to repeat your former admissions.

What admissions?

[473] I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual whatever a man may think, always the nature of things, fall short of the truth?

What do you say?

I agree.

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we pro-

posed you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand and will be contented I am sure that I should be contented—will not you?

Yes, I will.

Let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form and let the change, if possible be of one thing only or if not, of two at any rate let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

Certainly he replied.

I think I said that there might be a reform of the State if only one change were made which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it? he said.

Now then, I said I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves yet shall the word be spoken even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonour and do you mark my words.

Proceed.

I said *Untill philosophers are kings or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy and political greatness and wisdom meet in one and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside and will never have rest from their evils—no nor the human race as I believe—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.* Such was the thought my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public in deed a hard thing.

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too [474] in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what and if you don't prepare an answer and put yourself in motion, you will be pained by their fine wits, and no mistake.

You got me into the scrape, I said.

And I was quite right however I will do all I can to get you out of it but I can only give you good will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now have

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Certainly

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Just so

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lation of a city—men, women and children—are equally their enemies for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses their enmity to them will only last until the more innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

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True again.

And of just and unjust, good and evil and of every other class, the same remark holds taken singly each of them is one but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?

Very true.

And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, art-loving practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.

How do you distinguish them? he said.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.

True, he replied.

Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.

Very true.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow—of such an one I ask, is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect is not the dreamer sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

But take the case of the other who recognises the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer or is he awake?

He is wide awake.

And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other who opines only has opinion?

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing, cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he

may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question. Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

I answer that he knows something.

Something that is or is not?

Something that is for how can that which is not ever be known?

[477] And are we assured after looking at the matter from many points of view that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not-being for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge, or an other faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a diversion.

What diversion?

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Yes, I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, colour and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty but that which has an other sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

ing such an auxiliary you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right

I ought to try I said since you offer me such invaluable assistance And I think that if there is to be a chance of our escaping we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State then we shall be able to defend ourselves There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State and others who are not born to be philosophers and are meant to be followers rather than leaders

Then now for a definition he said

Follow me I said and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation

Proceed

I dare say that you remember and therefore I need not remind you that a lover if he is worthy of the name ought to show his love not to some one part of that which he loves but to the whole

I really do not understand and therefore beg of you to assist my memory

Another person, I said might fairly reply as you do but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards Is not this a way which you have with the fair one has a snub nose and you praise his charming face the hook nose of another has you say a royal look while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity the dark visage is manly the fair are children of the gods and as to the sweet honey pale as they are called what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives and is not adverse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? [475] In a word there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring time of youth

If you make me an authority in matters of love for the sake of the argument I assent.

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine

Very good

And the same is true of ambitious men if they cannot command an army they are willing to command a file and if they cannot be honoured by really great and important per-

sons they are glad to be honoured by lesser and meaner people—but honour of some kind they must have.

Exactly

Once more let me ask Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?

The whole

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover not of a part of wisdom only but of the whole?

Yes of the whole

And he who dislikes learning especially in youth when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge just as he who refuses his food is not hungry and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

Very true he said

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

Glaucon said If curiosity makes a philosopher you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name All the lovers of it have a delight in learning and must therefore be included Musical amateurs too are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion if they could help while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus whether the performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are there Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes as well as the professors of quite minor arts are philosophers?

Certainly not I replied they are only an imitation

He said Whothere are the true philosophers?

Those I said who are lovers of the vision of truth

That is also good he said but I should like to know what you mean?

To another I replied I might have a difficulty in explaining but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.

What is the proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?

Certainly

[476] And inasmuch as they are two each of them is one?

True again.

And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds taken right each of them is one, but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many.

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Certainly.

But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we advise any youth, cardinal or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is such a difference in his way?

We must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.

Cook, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he

may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question. Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

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Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to non-being, for that intermediate between being and non-being, there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

Is being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a division.

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Yes, I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, colour and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Yes

And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty or in what class would you place it?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty and the mightiest of all faculties

And is opinion also a faculty?

Certainly he said for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion

And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

[478] Why yes he said how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?

An excellent answer proving I said that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them

Yes

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subjects?

That is certain

Being is the sphere or subject matter of knowledge and knowledge is to know the nature of being?

Yes

And opinion is to have an opinion?

Yes

And do we know what we opine? or is the subject matter of opinion the same as the subject matter of knowledge?

Nay he replied that has been already disproven if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject matter and if as we were saying opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same

Then if being is the subject matter of knowledge something else must be the subject matter of opinion?

Yes something else

Well then is not being the subject matter of opinion? or, rather how can there be an opinion at all about not being? Reflect when a man has an opinion has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible

He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

Yes

And not being is not one thing but properly speaking nothing?

True

Of not being ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative of being known?

True he said

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not being?

Not with either

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

That seems to be true

But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them in a greater clearness than knowledge or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

In neither

Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge but lighter than ignorance?

Both and in no small degree

And also to be within and between them?

Yes

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

No question

But were we not saying before that if any thing appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not being and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance but will be found in the interval between them?

True

And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

There has

Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not being and cannot rightly be termed either pure and simple this unknown term when discovered we may truly call the subject of opinion and assign each to their proper faculty—the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean

True

[479] This being premised I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold—he I say your lover of beautiful sights who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one and the just is one or that anything is one—to him I would appeal saying Will you be so very kind sir as to tell us whether of all these beautiful things there is one which will not be found ugly or of the just which will not be

found unjust or of the holy which will not so be ugly?

No, he replied the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly and the same is true of the rest.

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves—doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Quite true.

And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these more than by the opposites names.

True both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are named by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the cunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects on which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being, or not being, or both, or neither.

Then what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than between being, and not-being. For they are clear not in greater darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being.

That is quite true, he said.

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the mind rude entertains about the beautiful and about all other things are tossed about in some region which is half-way between pure being, and pure not-being?

We have.

Yes and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge being, the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.

Quite true.

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who neither see absolute beauty nor can follow any guide who points the way thither, who see the many just and not absolute justice, and the like—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

That is certain.

But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know and not to have opinion only.

Neither can that be denied.

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember [480] who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.

Yes, I remember.

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them not to be angry no man should be angry at what is true.

But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Assuredly.

BOOK VI

[484] And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.

And what is the next question? he asked.

Surely I said, the one which follows next in order inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State.

And how can we rightly answer that question?

Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State—let them be our guardians.

Very good.

Neither I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing—and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair and having perfect vision of the other

world to order the laws about beauty, goodness justice in this if not already ordered and to guard and preserve the order of them—are not such persons I ask, simply blind?

Truly he replied, they are much in that condition

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

There can be no reason he said for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities [485] they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect

Suppose then I said that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences

By all means

In the first place as we began by observing the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained We must come to an understanding about him and when we have done so then if I am not mistaken we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible and that those in whom they are united and those only should be rulers in the State

What do you mean?

Let us suppose that philosophical minds all ways love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption

Agreed

And further I said let us agree that they are lovers of all true being there is no part whether greater or less or more or less honourable which they are willing to renounce as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition

True

And if they are to be what we were describing is there not another quality which they should also possess?

What quality?

Truthfulness they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood which is their detestation and they will love the truth

Yes that may be safely affirmed of them

May be my friend I replied is not the word say rather must be affirmed for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections

Right he said

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?

Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom

and a lover of falsehood?

Never

The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Assuredly

But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel

True

He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul and will hardly feel bodily pleasure—I mean if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one

That is most certain

Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending have no place in his character

Very true

[486] Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered

What is that?

There should be no secret corner of illiberality nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human

Most true he replied

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence think much of human life?

He cannot

Or can such an one account death fearful?

No indeed

Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Certainly not

Or again can he who is harmoniously constituted who is not covetous or mean or boaster or a coward—can he I say ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

Impossible

Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle or rude and unsociable these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical

True

There is another point which should be remarked

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning for no one will love that which gives him

pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

That is certain.

Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?

Yes.

Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures. We must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?

Certainly.

And once more the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion? Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.

Certainly.

Well, and do not all these qualities which we have been enumerating go together and are they not, in a manner necessary to a soul which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?

[487] They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory and is quick to learn—noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?

The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.

And to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply but when you talk in this way a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers. They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions: these little accumulations, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skilful adversaries and have no

piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy when they carry on the study not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Well and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

I cannot tell, he replied, but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Hear my answer. I am of opinion that they are quite right.

Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.

Yes, Socrates, and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed. I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion but now hear the parable, [488] and then you will be still more amused at the meagreness of my imagination for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering—every one is of opinion that he has a right to steer though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any one who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them and if at any time they do not

prevail but others are preferred to them they kill the others or throw them overboard and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores thus eating and drinking they proceed on their voyage in such a manner as might be expected of them Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion they compliment with the name of sailor pilot able seaman and abuse the other sort of man whom they call a good for nothing but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds and whatever else belongs to his art if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship and that he must and will be the steerer whether other people like or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling [489] Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater a stargazer a good for nothing?

Of course said Adeimantus

Then you will hardly need I said to hear the interpretation of the figure which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State for you understand already

Certainly

Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities explain it to him and try to convince him that their having honour would be far more extraordinary

I will

Say to him that in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world he is right but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them and not to themselves The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature neither are the wise to go to the doors of the rich—the ingenious author of this saying told a lie—but the truth is that when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor to the physician he must go and he who wants to be governed to him who is able to govern The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him, although the present gov-

ernors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good for nothings and stargazers.

Precisely so he said

For these reasons and among men like these philosophy the noblest pursuit of all is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say that the greater number of them are arrant rogues and the best are useless in which opinion I agreed

Yes

And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?

True

Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?

By all means

And let us ask and answer in turn first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature [490] Truth as you will remember was his leader whom he followed always and in all things failing in this he was an impostor and had no part or lot in true philosophy

Yes that was said

Well and is not this one quality to mention no others greatly at variance with present notions of him?

Certainly he said

And have we not a right to say in his defence that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only but will go on—the keen edge will not be blunted nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being having begotten mind and truth he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly and then, and not till then will he cease from his travail.

Nothing he said can be more just than such a description of him

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

He will.

And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

Impossible.

Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved. We were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, a question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Exactly.

And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosopher's nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked—and, [491] when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy: what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak.

What are these corruptions? he said.

I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher's rare plant which is seldom seen among men.

Rare indeed.

And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures?

What causes?

In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular, he replied.

Then there are all the ordinary goods of life—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State—you understand the sort

of things—these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

I understand, but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why I said we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil in proportion to their vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than what is not.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

Certainly.

And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fullness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

There I think that you are right.

[492] And our philosopher follows the same analogy—he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?

When is this accomplished? he said.

When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly or in a court of law or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young

prevail, but others are preferred to them they kill the others or throw them overboard and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores thus, eating and drinking they proceed on their voyage in such a manner as might be expected of them Him who in their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion they compliment with the name of sailor pilot, able seaman and abuse the other sort of man whom they call a good for nothing but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds and whatever else belongs to his art if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship and that he must and will be the steerer whether other people like or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling [489] Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater a star gazer a good for nothing?

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And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only but will go on—the keen edge will not be blunted nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being having begotten mind and truth he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly and then, and not till then will he cease from his travail

Nothing he said can be more just than such a description of him

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

of his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Certainly he said

And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question

Falling at his feet, they will make requests of him and do him honour and flatter him because they want to get into their hands now the power which he will one day possess

That often happens he said

And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city rich and noble, and still properly young? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

To be sure he will

Now when he is in this state of mind if some one gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

Far otherwise

And men if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

[495] There can be no doubt of it.

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may if he be ill-educated divert him from philosophy no less than riches and their accessories and the other so-called goods of life?

We were quite right

Thus my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time this being the class

out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States

That is most true he said

And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete for her own have fallen away and forsaken her and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors enter in and dishonour her and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say her reprovers utter who of firm of her votaries that some are good for nothing and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

That is certainly what people say

Yes and what else would you expect, I said when you think of the puny creatures who seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles—like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary take a leap out of their trades into philosophy those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? And though philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meanesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts is not this unavoidable?

Yes

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter who is left poor and desolate?

[496] A most exact parallel.

What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?

There can be no question of it

And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is a rank above them what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms capturing to the ear having nothing in them genuine, ororthy of or akin to true wisdom?

No doubt, he said

Then, Adimantus, I said the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant perchance some noble and well-educated

man's heart, as they say leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do and as they are such will he be?

Yes Socrates necessity will compel him.

And yet I said there is a still greater necessity which has not been mentioned

What is that?

The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death which, as you are aware these new Sophists and educators who are the public, apply when their words are powerless

Indeed they do and in right good earnest

Now what opinion of any other Sophist or of any private person can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

None he replied

No indeed I said even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly there neither is nor has been nor is ever likely to be any different type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion—I speak my friend of human virtue only what is more than human as the proverb says is not included for I would not have you ignorant that in the present evil state of governments whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God [493] as we may truly say

I quite assent he replied

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation

What are you going to say?

Why that all those mercenary individuals whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do in fact teach nothing but the opinion of the many that is to say the opinions of their assemblies and this is their wisdom I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him—he would learn how to approach and handle him also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries and by what sounds when another utters them he is soothed or infuriated and you may suppose further that when by continually attending upon him he has become perfect in all this he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art which he proceeds to teach although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles

or passions of which he is speaking but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary having never himself seen and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either or the difference between them which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?

Indeed he would

And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude whether in painting or music or finally in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State making them his judges when he is not obliged the so-called necessity of Diomedes will oblige him to produce whatever they praise And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No nor am I likely to hear

You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful [494] or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Certainly not

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

They must

And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

That is evident.

Then do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence—these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes

Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all especially

—Id, in most cases they are extinguished more fully than Heraclitus said inasmuch as they ever light up again.

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years during his period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are Socrates! he said I am sure of that and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you and will never be convinced Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not make a quarrel, I said between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends although indeed, we were never enemies for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men or do something which may profit them against the day when they lie again and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather I replied of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to be led for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy consisting of words artificially brought together not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue—such a man ruling in a city which bears the same name, {499} they have never yet seen neither one nor many of them—do you think that they ever did?

No indeed.

No my friend, and they have seldom, if ever heard free and noble sentiments such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means their power seeking free truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly

on the subtleties of controversy of which the end is opinion and strife whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit not without fear and hesitation that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm if they were so we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Quite right.

If then in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken the perfected philosopher or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assent to the death, that this our constitution has been and is—yea and will be whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this that there is a difficulty we acknowledge ourselves.

My opinion agrees with yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friend I said, do not attack the multitude they will change their minds if not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of overeducation you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, {500} and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed—if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay let me answer for you, that in a few thus harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind.

I quite agree with you he said.

person, detained by exile in her service who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her or some lofty soul born in a mean city the politics of which he contemns and neglects and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts which they justly despise and come to her—or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages bridle for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy but ill health kept him away from politics My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning for rarely, if ever has such a monitor been given to any other man Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude and they know that no politician is honest nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others he holds his peace and goes his own way He is like one who in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along retires under the shelter of a wall and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness and depart in peace and good will with bright hopes

Yes he said and he will have done a great work before he departs

A great work—yes but not the greatest unless he find a State suitable to him [497] for in a State which is suitable to him he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country as well as of himself

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained the injustice of the charges against her has been shown—is there anything more which you wish to say?

Nothing more on that subject he replied but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her

Not any of them I said and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and

enstranged—as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil even so this growth of philosophy instead of persisting degenerates and receives another character But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things whether natures of men or institutions are but human—and now I know that you are going to ask What that State is

No he said there you are wrong for I was going to ask another question—whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors or some other?

Yes I replied ours in most respects but you may remember my saying before that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws

That was said he replied

Yes but not in a satisfactory manner you frightened us by interposing objections which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult and what still remains is the reverse of easy

What is there remaining?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State All great attempts are attended with risk hard is the good as men say

Still he said let the point be cleared up and the enquiry will then be complete

I shall not be hindered I said by any want of will but if at all by a want of power my zeal you may see for yourselves and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy not as they do now but in a different spirit

In what manner?

[498] At present I said the students of philosophy are quite young beginning when they are hardly past childhood they devote only the time saved from money making and house keeping to such pursuits and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic take themselves off In after life when invited by some one else they may perhaps go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business at last when they grow

ed, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.

But what ought to be their course?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years during this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them in use in the service of philosophy—as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said. I am sure of that and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced. Thrasymachus least of all.

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stroyed that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape—who will venture to affirm that?

Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will and he might bring in existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them though difficult, is not impossible.

Very good.

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed—how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women and the procreation of children and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying as you will remember that they were to be lovers of their country [503] tried by the test of pleasures and pains and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire was to be made a ruler and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said and then the argument turned aside and ruled her face not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

I perfectly remember he said.

Yes, my friend, I said and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word but now let me dare to say—that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean? he said.

You are aware, I replied that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted and who are to share in any office or command.

Certainly he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found?

Yes, indeed.

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all [504] or will faint under them as in any other studies and exertions.

Yes he said you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

You may remember I said that we divided the soul into three parts and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

Indeed he said if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?

Of course.

And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited and are always abusing them and finding fault with them—who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this

It is most unbecoming

For he Adeimantus whose mind is fixed upon true being has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men—his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable—which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another—but all in order moving according to reason—these he imitates—and to these he will as far as he can conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

Impossible

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order becomes orderly and divine as far as the nature of man allows—but like every one else he will suffer from detraction

Of course

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself but human nature generally—whether in States or individuals—in to that which he beholds elsewhere—will he think you be an unskilful artificer of justice temperance and every civil virtue?

Anything but unskilful

And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth—will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?

They will not be angry if they understand he said. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking? [501]

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men from which—as from a tablet—they will rub out the picture—and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not—herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator—they will have nothing to do either with individual or State and will inscribe no laws until they have either found or themselves made a clean surface

They will be very right, he said

Having effected this they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?

No doubt

And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards—I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man—and thus they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men—Homer calls the form and likeness of God

Very true he said

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in—until they have made the ways of men—as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Indeed he said—in no way could they make a fairer picture

And now I said—are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main—that the painter of constitutions is such an one as we are praising at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State—and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard?

Much calmer if there is any sense in them

Why—where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

They would not be so unreasonable,

Or that his nature—being such as we have delineated—is akin to the highest good?

Neither can they doubt this

But again will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable circumstances—will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

Surely not

Then will they still be angry at our saying that until philosophers bear rule—States and individuals will have no rest from evil nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

I think that they will be less angry

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle [502] and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason—cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means he said

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected—Will any one deny the other point—that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?

Surely no man he said

And when they have come into being—will any one say that they must of necessity be do-

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours. And if we only have a guardian who has thus knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied, but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

True, Socrates, but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that, but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true not on without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Very true.

And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Still I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal. If you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, I suggest, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise not.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

[507] I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only take, however this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no

A plea upon which means both offspring and interest.

intention of deceiving you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion and at many other times.

What?

The old story that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define to all of them many is applied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good and of other things to which the term many is applied, there is an absolute for they may be brought under a single idea which is called the essence of each.

Very true.

The many as we say are seen but not known and the ideas are known but not seen.

Exactly.

And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

The sight, he said.

And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

True.

But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

No, I never have, he said.

Then reflect, has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied, and the same is true of motion, if not all the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Certainly not.

But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

How do you mean?

Sight being as I conceive in the eyes and he who has eyes wanting to see colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied.

True, he said.

[508] Noble, then, is the bond which links

To what do you refer?

We were saying if I am not mistaken that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way at the end of which they would appear, but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you and so the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner whether you were satisfied or not it is for you to say.

Yes he said I thought and the other thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend I said a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are in dolent

r Yes I said and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

True.

The guardian then I said must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which as we were just now saying is his proper calling.

What he said is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice and the other virtues?

Yes I said there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

A right noble thought but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

Nay I said ask if you will but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times and now you either do not understand me or as I rather think you are disposed to be troublesome for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest [505] knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak concerning which as you have often heard me say we know so little and without

which any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people af- firm pleasure to be the good but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

How ridiculous!

Yes I said that they should begin by re- proaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it—for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term good—this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek in the case of the good appearance is despised by every one.

Very true he said.

Of this then which every soul of man pur- sues and makes the end of all his actions having a presentiment that there is such an end [506] and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things—of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State to whom every thing is entrusted to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure I said that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them and I sus- pect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. [510] And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like. Do you understand?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine now the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections thus divided have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images: the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

Then I will try again: you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science: these are their hypotheses, which they and every body are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others: but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

And do you not know also that although they make use of these visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking, not of these, but of the ideas which they resemble: not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things

themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

[511] That is true.

And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.

I understand you, he replied: not perfectly for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous: but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

You have quite concerned my meaning, I said, and now corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

together sight and visibility and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

May he said the reverse of ignoble

And which I said of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say

May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

How?

Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

No

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?

By far the most like

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?

Exactly

Then the sun is not sight but the author of sight who is recognized by sight

True he said

And this is he whom I call the child of the good whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind

Will you be a little more explicit? he said

Why you know I said that the eyes when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining but the moon and stars only see dimly and are nearly blind they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

Very true

But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Certainly

And the soul is like the eye when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing then she has opinion only and goes blinking about and is first of one opinion and then of another and seems to have no intelligence?

Just so

Now that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is

what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either [309] and as in the previous instance light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun and yet not to be the sun so in this other sphere science and truth may be deemed to be like the good but not the good the good has a place of honour yet higher

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

God forbid I replied, but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

In what point of view?

You would say would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things but of generation and nourishment and growth though he himself is not generation?

Certainly

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known but of their being and essence and yet the good is not essence but far exceeds essence in dignity and power

Glaucou said with a ludicrous earnestness By the light of heaven how amazing!

Yes I said and the exaggeration may be set down to you for you made me utter my fancies

And pray continue to utter them at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun

Yes I said there is a great deal more

Then omit nothing however slight

I will do my best I said but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted

You have to imagine then that there are two ruling powers and that one of them is set over the intellectual world the other over the visible. I do not say heaven lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (*o patos opatos*). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

I have

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts and divide each of them again in the same proportion and suppose the two main divisions to answer one to the visible and the other to the intelligible and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness and you will find that

the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. [510] And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like. Do you understand?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Very good.

Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner?

Thus—There are two subdivisions in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images: the enquiry can only be hypothetical and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end: in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

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I have

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts and divide each of them again in the same proportion and suppose the two main divisions to answer one to the visible and the other to the intelligible and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness and you will find that

Clearly he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them? Certainly he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before and which followed after and which were together and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future—do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer

Better to be the poor servant of a poor master

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live as after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation—would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the [517] den while his sight was still weak and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable)—would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came with his eyes and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if anyone tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

Then, entering the allegory I said, you may now append dear Glaucon, to the previous argument—the prisoner house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether truly or not only God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all and is seen only with an effort—and,

when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover I said you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend on human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell—which desire of theirs is very natural if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner if while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law or in other places about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

[518] Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye—and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being and he will pity the other or if he has a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just disjunction.

But then if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power

I understand, he replied and give my assent, and accept your arrangement

BOOK VII

[514] And now I said let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened—Behold! human beings living in an underground den which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den here they have been from their childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they can not move and can only see before them being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way and you will see if you look a low wall built along the way like the screen which marionette players have in front of them over which they show the puppets.

I see

And do you see I said men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels [515] and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking others silent

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners

Like ourselves I replied and they see only their own shadows or the shadows of one another which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True he said how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes he said

And if they were able to converse with one another would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question he replied

So then I said the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images

That is certain

And now look again and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of

them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light he will suffer sharp pains the glare will distress him and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows and then conceive some one saying to him that what he saw before was an illusion but that now when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True he said

And suppose once more that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself [516] is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities

Not all in a moment he said

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best next the reflections of men and other objects in the water and then the objects themselves then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly

Last of all he will be able to see the sun and not mere reflections of him in the water but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another and he will contemplate him as he is

Certainly

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to be hold?

dream only and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager the worst.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just, there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of *[521]* a ruler and then you may have a well-ordered State for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hankering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

And those who go on ought not to be lovers of the task. For if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

A question.

Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians. Surely they will be the men who are most about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and better life than that of politics.

They are the men, and I would choose them, he replied.

And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light—as some

are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster shell, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Quite so.

And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me. You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Yes, that as said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

What quality?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?

Just so.

There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?

True.

[522] Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?

No.

But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

Music, he said, as you will remember was the counterpart of gymnastic, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had hundred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature since all the useful arts were

In allusion to a game in which two parties find or pursue according to an order-shell which was thrown into the air and with the dark or light side upmost.

and capacity of learning exists in the soul already and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being and of the brightest and best of being or in other words of the good

Very true

And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already but has been turned in the wrong direction and is looking away from the truth?

Yes he said such an art may be presumed

And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable [519] or on the other hand hurtful and useless Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end he is the reverse of blind but his keen eye sight is forced into the service of evil and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?

Very true he said

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures such as eating and drinking which like leaden weights were attached to them at their birth and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below—if I say they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now

Very likely

Yes I said and there is another thing which is likely or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth nor yet those who never make an end of their education will be able ministers of State not the former because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions private as well as public nor the latter because they will not act at all except upon compulsion fancying that they

are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest

Very true he replied

Then I said the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now

What do you mean?

I mean that they remain in the upper world but this must not be allowed they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not

But is not this unjust? he said ought we to give them a worse life when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten my friend I said, the intention of the legislator who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest the happiness was to be in the whole State and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity making them benefactors of the State [520] and therefore benefactors of one another to this end he created them not to please themselves but to be his instruments in binding up the State

True he said I had forgotten

Observe Glaucon that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others we shall explain to them that in other States men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics and this is reasonable for they grow up at their own sweet will and the government would rather not have them Being self taught they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the five kings of yourselves and of the other citizens and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty Wherefore each of you when his turn comes must go down to the general under ground abode and get the habit of seeing in the dark When you have acquired the habit you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den and you will know what the several images are and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality and not a

intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy if that which is light is also heavy and that which is heavy light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner, they were not distinguished.

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the enquiry "What is great?" and "What is small?"

Exactly so.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse—those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions invite thought, those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer, for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying, is the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being, but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and in oneself the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision as to what is absolute unity?

This is the way in which the study of the one

has a power of drawing [325] and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely he said, this occurs notably in the case of one, for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said, and thus being true of one must be equally true of all numbers?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with numbers?

Yes.

And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?

Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical, for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe, and we must endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only, nor again, like merchants or retail-traders with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself, and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher and not of a shopkeeper!

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you decide, they multiply taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

That is very true.

reckoned mean by us?

Undoubtedly and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded and the arts are also excluded, what remains?

Well, I said there may be nothing left of our special subjects and then we shall have to take something which is not special but of universal application.

What may that be?

A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which every one first has to learn among the elements of education.

What is that?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two and three—in a word, number and calculation—do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy, which implies that they had never been numbered before and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection [523] but never to have been rightly used for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said, and I wish you would share the enquiry with me and say yes or no when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds, some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is imperatively demanded.

You are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not at all my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite, inviting objects are those which do. In this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer—here are three fingers—a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.

You may suppose that they are seen quite close. And here comes the point.

What is it?

Each of them equally appears a finger whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference, a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question, what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner, does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses, do they give perfect intimations of such matters? [524] Is not their mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

You are quite right, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this?

intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy if that which is light is also heavy and that which is heavy light?

Yes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be examined.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner they were not distinguished.

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

Was not this the beginning of the enquiry What is great? and What is small?

Exactly so.

And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse—those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought those which are not simultaneous do not.

I understood, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

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And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?

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That is very true.

[526] Now suppose a person were to say to them O my friends what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning in which as you say there is a unity such as you demand and each unit is equal invariable in divisible—what would they answer?

They would answer as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Yes that is a marked characteristic of it

And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge, and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been

Very true he said

And indeed you will not easily find a more difficult study and not many as difficult

You will not

And for all these reasons arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained and which must not be given up

I agree

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education And next shall we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Exactly so

Clearly he said we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war for in pitching a camp or taking up a position or closing or extending the lines of an army or any other military manœuvre whether in actual battle or on a march it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician

Yes I said but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry—whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good and thither as I was saying all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place where is the full perfection of being which she ought, by all means to behold

True he said

Then if geometry compels us to view being

it concerns us, if becoming only, it does not concern us?

[527] Yes that is what we assert.

Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometers.

How so?

They have in view practice only and are always speaking in a narrow and ridiculous manner of squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science

Certainly he said

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal and not of aught perishing and transient

That, he replied may be readily allowed and is true

Then my noble friend geometry will draw the soul towards truth and create the spirit of philosophy and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down

Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect

Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry Moreover the science has indirect effects which are not small

Of what kind? he said

There are the military advantages of which you spoke I said and in all departments of knowledge as experience proves any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not

Yes indeed he said there is an infinite difference between them

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Let us do so he replied

And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor

I am amused I said at your fear of the world which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which when by other pursuits lost and dimmed is by these

purified and illuminated and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning [528] and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement: at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves: whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:—in the first place, no government patronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honour to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made: since even now, disregarded as they are by the world and undervalued as they are by the State, and although none of their own uses can tell the use of them, still these studies to see their way by their natural charm, and very likely if they had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.

Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry: the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

The right order, he replied. And now Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, [529] my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

Every one but myself, I said, to every one else this may be clear, but not to me.

And what then would you say?

I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the perceptive, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton; but, in my opinion, that knowledge only, which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gazes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science: his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

I will tell you, I said. The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now these are to be apprehended by reason and intelli-

gence, but not by sight

True he replied

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge, their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus or some other great artist which we may chance to behold any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double or the truth of any other proportion [530]

No he replied such an idea would be ridiculous

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day or of both to the month, or of the month to the year or of the stars to these and to one another and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation—that would be absurd, and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth

I quite agree though I never thought of this before

Then I said in astronomy as in geometry we should employ problems and let the heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use

That he said is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers

Yes I said and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them if our legislation is to be of any value But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No he said not without thinking

Motion I said has many forms and not one only two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours and there are others as I imagine which may be left to wiser persons

But where are the two?

There is a second I said which is the counterpart of the one already named

And what may that be?

The second I said would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars so are the ears to hear harmonious motions, and these are sister sciences—as

the Pythagoreans say and we Glaucon agree with them?

Yes, he replied

But this, I said, is a laborious study and therefore we had better go and learn of them and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils ought also to attain and not to fall short of as I was saying that they did in astronomy [531] For in the science of harmony as you probably know the same thing happens The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labour like that of the astronomers is in vain

Yes by heaven! he said and us as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes as they call them they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbour's wall—one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same—either party setting their ears before their understanding

You mean I said those gentlemen who cease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives and make accusations against the strings both of backwardness and forwardness to sound but this would be tedious and therefore I will only say that these are not the men and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony For they too are in error like the astronomers they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard but they never attain to problems—that is to say they never reach the natural harmonies of number or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not

That he said is a thing of more than mortal knowledge

A thing I replied which I would rather call useful that is if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good but if pursued in any other spirit useless

Very true he said

Now when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and connection with one

another and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then I think, but not till then will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects otherwise there is no profit in them.

I suspect so but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean? I said the prelude or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

Assuredly not, he said I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them? [532]

Neither can this be supposed.

And so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate for sight, as you may remember was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Exactly he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in essence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water [which are daimē] and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image)—this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world—this power is given, as I was saying by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.

I agree in what you are saying he replied which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view is harder still to deny. This however is not a theme to be treated of in passing only but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain and describe that in like manner. Say then what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

[533] Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say but you would have seen something like reality of that I am confident.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does a way with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure the eye of the soul which is literally buried in an outlandish slough.

A play upon the word *ops* which means both law and train.

is by her gentle aid lifted upwards and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences but they ought to have some other name implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science and this in our previous sketch was called understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider?

Why indeed he said when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

At any rate we are satisfied as before to have four divisions: two for intellect and two for opinion and to call the first division science the second understanding the third belief and the fourth perception of shadows. [534] Opinion being concerned with becoming and intellect with being and so to make a proportion *As being is to becoming so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is to opinion so is science to belief and understanding to the perception of shadows.* But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect for it will be a long enquiry many times longer than this has been.

As far as I understand he said I agree.

And do you also agree, I said in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Yes he said how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections and is ready to disprove them not by appeals to opinion but to absolute truth never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good he apprehends only a shadow if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science—dreaming and slumbering in this life before he is well awake here he arrives at the world below and has his final quietus.

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State whom you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to

be like poets having no reason in them and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

Certainly not.

Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Yes he said you and I together will make it.

Dialectic, then as you will agree is the coping stone of the sciences and is set over them, no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go?

I agree, he said.

[535] But to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way they are to be assigned are questions which remain to be considered.

Yes, clearly.

You remember I said how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly he said.

The same natures must still be chosen and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and if possible to the fairest and, having noble and generous tempers they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

And what are these?

Such gifts as keenness and ready power of acquisition for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics the toil is more entirely the mind's own and is not shared with the body.

Very true he replied.

Further he of whom we are in search should have a good memory and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

Certainly he said he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is that those who study philosophy have no vocation and this, as I was before saying is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.

What do you mean?

In the first place her votary should not have a lame or halting industry—I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle as for example when a man is a lover of gymnastics.

Literally limes probably the starting-point of a race-course.

—be and hunting and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.

Certainly he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind allowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

[536] And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities states and individuals unconsciously err and the state makes a ruler and the individual a friend of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us and if only those whom we introduce to this art system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.

That would not be creditable.

Certainly not, I said, and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

I had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I said philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace and my anger made me too vehement.

I indeed I was listening and did not think so.

But I who am the speaker felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run much. Youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Of course.

And therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.

Why not?

Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.

Very true.

Then my good friend I said do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement [537] you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.

That is a very rational notion, he said.

Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on horseback and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said in all these things—labours, lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

At what age?

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Certainly he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honour and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Yes, I said, and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are more steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other ap-

pointed duties when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class and elevated to higher honour and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses and in company with truth to attain absolute being And here my friend great caution is required

Why great caution?

Do you not remark I said how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?

What evil? he said

The students of the art are filled with lawlessness

Quite true he said

Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?

In what way make allowance?

I want you I said by way of parallel to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth [538] he is one of a great and numerous family and has many flatterers When he grows up to manhood he learns that his alleged are not his real parents but who the real are he is unable to discover Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please

Then I should say that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need or to do or say anything against them and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter

He will

But when he has made the discovery I should imagine that he would diminish his honour and regard for them and would become more devoted to the flatterers their influence over him would greatly increase he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them and unless he were of an unusually good disposition he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations

Well all that is very probable But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way you know that there are certain principles about justice and honour which were taught us in childhood and under their pa-

rental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honouring them

That is true

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right and they continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers

True

Now when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honourable and he answers as the legislator has taught him and then arguments many and diverse refute his words until he is driven into believing that nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued do you think that he will still honour and obey them as before?

Impossible

And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, [539] and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described and also, as I was just now saying most excusable.

Yes, he said and I may add pitiable

Therefore that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic

Certainly

There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early for youngsters, as you may have observed when they first get the taste in their mouths argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them like puppy dogs they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them

Yes, he said there is nothing which they like better

And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence not only they but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world

Too true, he said

ut when a man begins to get older he will longer be guilty of such insanity he will take the dialectician who is seeking for truth, not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement and the greater moderation his character will increase instead of diminishing the honour of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for us, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as on any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be enough?

Would you say six or four years? he asked.

Say six years, I replied at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

[540] And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

Fifteen years, I answered and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation on the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lights all things, and behold the absolute good for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not although they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty, and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blessed and dwell there and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, at any case blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.

There you are right he said, since we have made them to share in all things like the men.

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed that is to say when the true philosopher kings are born in a State, one or more of them despising the honours of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honour that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how if ever such a constitution might come into being.

Enough then of the perfect State and of the man who bears its image—there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

There is no difficulty he replied and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

BOOK VIII

[543] And so Glaucon we have arrived at the conclusion on that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed

themselves will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing which are common to all and contain nothing private, or individual and about their property you remember what we agreed?

Yes I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind they were to be warrior athletes and guardians receiving from the other citizens in lieu of an annual payment only their maintenance and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State

True I said and now that this division of our task is concluded let us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path

There is no difficulty in returning you implied then as now that you had finished the description of the State you said that such a State was good and that the man was good who answered to it although [544] as now appears you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man And you said further that if this was the true form then the others were false and of the false forms you said as I remember that there were four principal ones and that their defects and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them were worth examining When we had seen all the individuals and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest and the worst the most miserable I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word and you began again and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived

Your recollection I said is most exact

Then, like a wrestler he replied you must put yourself again in the same position and let me ask the same questions and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then

Yes if I can I will I said

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking

That question I said is easily answered the four governments of which I spoke so far as they have distinct names are first those of Crete and Sparta which are generally applauded what is termed oligarchy comes next this is not equally approved and is a form of government which teems with evils thirdly

democracy which naturally follows oligarchy although very different and lastly comes tyranny great and famous which differs from them all and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State I do not know do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold and some other intermediate forms of government But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians

Yes he replied we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them

Do you know I said that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of oak and rock and not out of the human natures which are in them and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them?

Yes he said the States are as the men are they grow out of human characters

Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?

Certainly

Him who answers to aristocracy and whom we rightly call just and good [545] we have already described

We have

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures being the contentious and ambitious who answer to the Spartan polity also the oligarchical democratical and tyrannical Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice The enquiry will then be completed And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice

Certainly he replied we must do as you say

Shall we follow our old plan which we adopted with a view to clearness of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual and begin with the government of honour?—I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy We will compare with this the like character in the individual and after that, consider oligarchical man and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democracy

and lastly we will go and view the city of tyranny and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.

That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.

First, then, I said let us enquire how timocracy (the government of honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power: a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Very true, he said.

In what way then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer pray the Muses to tell us how discord first arose? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?

How would they address us?

[546] After this manner—A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last for ever but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution—in plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility and the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number: but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution [or squared and cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one

A civil number such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors—3, so that when the circle or turn represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.

another. The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with the (-) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies: the first a square which is a hundred times as great ($400=4 \times 100$) and the other a figure having one side equal to the former but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e. omitting fractions) the side of which is five ($7 \times 49 = 49 \times 100 = 4900$) each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, i.e. 50) or less by two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five— $50+50=100$) and a hundred cubes of three ($7 \times 100 = 2700+4900+100=8000$). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by undervaluing music which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. [547] And so iron will be mingled with silver and brass with gold and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. Thus the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung wherever arising—and this is their answer to us.

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Why yes, I said, of course they answer truly how can the Muses speak falsely?

And what do the Muses say next?

When discord arose then the two races were

Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three terms—the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3, 4, 5 which together $=6=16$.

Or the first square which is $100 \times 100 = 10,000$. The whole number will then be $1,500 =$ a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.

Or consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters, &c. $=100$.

drawn different ways the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver but the gold and silver rises not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners and they enslaved their friends and maintainers whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.

I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Very true.

Such will be the change and after the change has been made how will they proceed? Clearly the new State being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

True he said.

In the honour given to rulers in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts and trade in general in the institution of common meals and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training—in all these respects this State will resemble the former.

True.

But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest but are made up of mixed elements and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters [548] who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances and in the waging of everlasting wars—this State will be for the most part perfect.

Yes.

Yes, I said and men of this stamp will be covetous of money like those who live in oligarchies they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver which they will hoard in dark places having magazines and treasures of their own for the deposit and concealment of them also castles which are just nests for their eggs and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.

That is most true he said.

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law their father they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force for they have neglected her who is the true Muse the companion of reason and philosophy and have honoured gymnastic more than music.

Undoubtedly he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Why there is a mixture, I said but one thing, and one thing only is predominantly second—the spirit of contention and ambition and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

Assuredly he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this State which has been described in outline only the more perfect execution was not required for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust and to go through all the States and all the characters of men omitting none of them would be an interminable labour.

Very true he replied.

Now what man answers to this form of government—how did he come into being and what is he like?

I think said Adeimantus that in the spirit of contention which characterises him he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

Perhaps I said he may be like him in that one point but there are other respects in which he is very different.

In what respects?

He should have more of self assertion and be less cultivated and yet a friend of culture [549] and he should be a good listener but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man who is too proud for that and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority he is a lover of power and a lover of honour claiming to be a ruler not because he is eloquent or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.

Such an one will despise riches only when he

is young; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the envious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Who was that? said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes her abode in a man and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.

Good, he said.

Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Exactly.

His origin is as follows—He is often the young son of a brave father who dwells in an enlarged city of which he declines the honours and offices, and will not go to law or exert himself in any way but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

And how does the son come into being?

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further when she sees her husband not very eager about money and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly taking whatever happens to him quietly and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going, adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.

And you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be attached to the family from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son and if they see any one who owes money to his father or is wronging him in any way and he fails to prosecute them, [550] they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has not to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing, those who do their own business in the city are called sumpsons, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things—hearing too the words of his father and his, a nearer view of his way of life, and

making comparisons of him and others—is drawn opposite ways while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive and he being not originally of a bad nature but having kept bad company is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.

You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,

Is set over against a weaker State

or rather as our plan requires, begin with the State.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.

I understand, he replied.

Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.

How?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure for what do they or their wives care about the law?

Yes, indeed.

And then one seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Likely enough.

And so they grow richer and richer and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

[551] And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured.

Clearly.

And what is honoured is cultivated and that which has no honour is neglected

That is obvious

And so at last instead of loving contention and glory men become lovers of trade and money they honour and look up to the rich man and make a ruler of him and dishonour the poor man

They do so

They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship the sum is higher in one place and lower in another as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms if intimidation has not already done their work

Very true

And this speaking generally is the way in which oligarchy is established

Yes he said but what are the characteristics of this form of government and what are the defects of which we were speaking?

First of all I said consider the nature of the qualification Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes and is not this true of the government of anything?

I should imagine so

Except a city?—or would you include a city?

Nay he said the case of a city is the strongest of all inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all

This then will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Clearly

And here is another defect which is quite as bad

What defect?

The inevitable division such a State is not one but two States the one of poor the other of rich men and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another

That surely is at least as bad

Another discreditable feature is that for a like reason they are incapable of carrying on any war Either they arm the multitude and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy or if they do not call them out in the

hour of battle they are oligarchs indeed few to fight as they are few to rule And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes

How discreditable!

And as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings—they are husbandmen [552] tradesmen warriors all in one Does that look well?

Anything but well

There is another evil which is perhaps the greatest of all and to which this State first begins to be liable

What evil?

A man may sell all that he has and another may acquire his property yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part being neither trader nor artisan, nor horseman nor hoplite but only a poor helpless creature

Yes that is an evil which also first begins in this State

The evil is certainly not prevented there for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty

True

But think again In his wealthy days while he was spending his money was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject but just a spendthrift?

As you say he seemed to be a ruler but was only a spendthrift

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so Socrates

And God has made the flying drones Ademantus all without stings whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful stings of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers of the stingers come all the criminal class as they are termed

Most true he said

Clearly then whenever you see paupers in a State somewhere in that neighbourhood there are hidden away thieves and cut purses and robbers of temples and all sorts of male factors

Clearly

Well I said and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Yes, he said nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler

And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them rogues who have stings and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Certainly we may be so bold

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education ill training and an evil constitution of the State?

True.

Such then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy and there may be many other evils.

Very likely

[553] Then oligarchy or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth may now be dismissed Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

By all means

Does not the timocratic man change into the oligarchical on this wise?

How?

A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps but presently he sees him of a sudden founder ing against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death or exiled or deprived of the privileges of a citizen and all his property taken from him.

Nothing more likely

And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne humbled by poverty he takes to money making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Most true, he replied

And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of the so creign and taught them to know the place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisi-

tion of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Of all changes he said there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.

And the avaricious I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

[554] Very good

First then they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

Certainly

Also in their penurious laborious character the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable

True

He is a shabby fellow who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?

He appears to me to be so at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

You see that he is not a man of cultivation I said

I imagine not, he said had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour

Excellent I said Yet consider Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him drone like desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

True

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Where must I look?

You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly as in the guardianship of an orphan.

Aye

It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty he corrects his bad passions by an enforced virtue not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure

Yes indeed my dear friend but you will find that the natural desires of the drone com-

monly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own

Yes and they will be strong in him too

The man then will be at war with himself, he will be two men and not one but in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones

True

For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him

I should expect so

[555] And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory or other object of honourable ambition he will not spend his money in the contest for glory so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money

Very true

Can we any longer doubt then that the miser and money maker answers to the oligarchical State?

There can be no doubt

Next comes democracy of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic man and bring him up for judgment

That he said is our method

Well I said and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy rise? Is it not on this wise?—The good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible a desire which is insatiable?

What then?

The rulers being aware that their power rests upon their wealth refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?

To be sure

There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same State to any considerable extent one or the other will be disregarded

That is tolerably clear

And in oligarchical States from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Yes often

And still they remain in the city there they are ready to sting and fully armed and some of them owe money some have forfeited their citizenship a third class are in both predicaments and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property and against every body else and are eager for revolution

That is true

On the other hand the men of business, stooping as they walk and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined insert their sting—that is their money—into some one else who is not on his guard against them and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State

[556] Yes, he said there are plenty of them—that is certain

The evil blazes up like a fire and they will not extinguish it either by restricting a man's use of his own property or by another remedy

What other?

One which is the next best and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters—Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk and there will be less of this scandalous money making and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State

Yes they will be greatly lessened

At present the governors induced by the motives which I have named treat their subjects badly while they and their adherents especially the young men of the governing class are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind they do nothing and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain

Very true

They themselves care only for making money and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue

Yes quite as indifferent.

Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way whether on a pilgrimage or a march as fellow soldiers or fellow sailors aye and they may observe the behaviour of each other in the very moment of danger—for where danger is there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich—and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who

has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wit's end how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to de spoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another Our warriors are not good for much?

Yes he said I am quite aware that this is their way of talking

And as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within—in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness of which the occasions may be very slight the one party introducing from without their oligarchical the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself [557] and may be at times distracted even when there is no external cause

Yes, surely

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents slaughtering some and banishing some while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said that is the nature of democracy whether the revolution has been effected by arms or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is such will be the man

Clearly he said

In the first place are they not free and is not the city full of freedom and frankness—a man may say and do what he likes?

Thus said so he replied

And here freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Clearly

Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will

This then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spanned with every sort of flower And just as women and children think a variety of colours to be of all things most charming so there are many men to whom this State, which is spanned with the manners and characters of man

kind will appear to be the fairest of States

Yes

Yes my good Sir and there will be no better in which to look for a government

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there—they have a complete assortment of constitutions and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them and pick out the one that suits him then when he has made his choice he may found his State

He will be sure to have patterns enough

And there being no necessity I said for you to govern in this State even if you have the capacity or to be governed unless you like or go to war when the rest go to war or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed—there being no necessity also because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, [558] that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?

For the moment yes

And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how in a democracy many persons although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero and nobody sees or cares?

Yes, he replied, many and many a one.

See too I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy and the don't care about trifles and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city—as when we said that except in the case of some rarely gifted nature there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a study—how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman and promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend

Yes, she is of a noble spirit

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike

We know her well

Consider now I said what manner of man

the individual is *■* rather consider as in the case of the state how he comes into being

Very good he said

Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Exactly

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Obviously

Would you like for the sake of clearness to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should

Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly so because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary and cannot help it

[559] True

We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

We are not

And the desires of which a man may get rid if he takes pains from his youth upwards—of which the presence moreover does no good and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes certainly

Suppose we select an example of either kind in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good

Will not the desire of eating that is of simple food and condiments in so far as they are required for health and strength be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Yes

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly

And the desire which goes beyond this of more delicate food or other luxuries which might generally be got rid of if controlled and trained in youth and is hurtful to the body and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very true

May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who has surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true

Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical the following, as I suspect is commonly the process

What is the process?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may imagine the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?

Inevitably

And as in the city like was helping like and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?

Certainly

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him whether the influence of a father or of kindred advising or rebuking him [560] then there arises in him a faction and an opposite faction and he goes to war with himself

It must be so

And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical and some of his desires die and others are banished a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored?

Yes he said that sometimes happens

And then again after the old desires have been driven out fresh ones spring up which are akin to them and because he their father does not know how to educate them wax fierce and numerous

Yes he said that is apt to be the way

They draw him to his old associates and holding secret intercourse with them breed

and multiply in him.

Very true.

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.

None better.

False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place.

They are certain to do so.

And so the young man returns into the country of the loquacious, and takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day and then modesty which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being injured by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array hanging garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning, their praises and calling them by sweet names [561] insolence they term breeding and anarchy liberty and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Yes he said, the change in him is visible enough.

After this he lies on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to

their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Yes, he said that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute then he becomes a water-drinker and tries to get thin then he takes a turn at gymnastics some times idling and neglecting everything then once more living the life of a philosopher often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head and, if he is envious of any one who is a warrior off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom and so he goes on.

Yes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many—he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Just so.

[562] Let him then be set over against democracy he may truly be called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

Last of all comes the most beautiful of all man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant these we have now to consider.

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, in what manner does tyranny arise?—that it has a democratic origin is evident.

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from

oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?

How?

The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth—am I not right?

Yes

And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?

True

And democracy has her own good of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?

What good?

Freedom I replied which as they tell you in a democracy is the glory of the State—and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature design to dwell

Yes the saying is in everybody's mouth

I was going to observe that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy which occasions a demand for tyranny

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup bearers presiding over the feast and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom then unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught she calls them to account and punishes them and says that they are cursed oligarchs

Yes he replied a very common occurrence

Yes I said and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught she would have subjects who are like rulers and rulers who are like subjects these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public Now in such a State can liberty have any limit?

Certainly not

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them

How do you mean?

I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them and the son is on a level with his father he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents and this is his freedom and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic [563] and the stranger is quite as good as either

Yes he said that is the way

And these are not the only evils I said—there are several lesser ones In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his schol-

ars and the scholars despise their masters and tutors young and old are all alike and the young man is on a level with the old and is ready to compete with him in word or deed and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative and therefore they adopt the manners of the young

Quite true he said

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money whether male or female is just as free as his or her purchaser nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other

Why not as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

That is what I am doing, I replied and I must add that no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State for truly the she-dogs as the proverb says are as good as their she mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen and they will run at any body who comes their way if he does not leave the road clear for them and all things are just ready to burst with liberty

When I take a country walk he said I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing

And above all I said and as the result of all see how sensitive the citizens become they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length as you know they cease to care even for the laws written or unwritten they will have no one over them

Yes he said I know it too well

Such my friend I said is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny

Glorious indeed he said But what is the next step?

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy—the truth being that the excessive increase of any thing often causes a [564] reaction in the opposite direction and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life but above all in forms of government.

True

The excess of liberty whether in States or individuals seems only to pass into excess of slavery

Yes, the natural order

And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

As we might expect.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy and is the ruin of both?

Just so, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of men—mercenaries, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stungless, and others having stings.

A very just comparison.

These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Yes, by all means, he said.

Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes: for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

That is true.

And in the democracy they are certainly more numerous.

How so?

Because, in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the beehive and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traitors is sure to be the richest.

Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of money to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed

out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

[565] That is pretty much the case, he said.

The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.

And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

What else can they do?

And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?

True.

And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

That is exactly the truth.

Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

True.

The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.

Yes, that is their way.

This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs: when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Yes, that is quite clear.

How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycæan Zeus.

What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become

a wolf Did you never hear it?

O yes

And the protector of the people is like him having a mob entirely at his disposal he is not restrained from shedding the blood of his-men by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them making the life of man to disappear and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizen some he kills and others he banishes at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands and after this [566] what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies or from being a man become a wolf—that is a tyrant?

Inevitably

This I said is he who begins to make a party against the rich?

The same

After a while he is driven out but comes back in spite of his enemies a tyrant full grown

That is clear

And if they are unable to expel him or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation they conspire to assassinate him

Yes, he said, that is their usual way

Then comes the famous request for a body guard which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career—Let not the people's friend as they say be lost to them

Exactly

The people readily assent all their fears are for him—they have none for themselves

Very true

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this then my friend as the oracle said to Croesus By pebbly Hermus shore he flees and rests not and is not ashamed to be a coward

And quite right too said he for if he were he would never be ashamed again

But if he is caught he dies

Of course

And he the protector of whom we spoke is to be seen not larding the plain with his bulk but himself the overthrower of many standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand no longer protector but tyrant absolute

No doubt he said

And now let us consider the happiness of the Herodotus 2.55

man and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated

Yes he said let us consider that

At first in the early days of his power he is full of smiles and he salutes every one whom he meets—he to be called a tyrant who is making promises in public and also in private liberating debtors and distributing land to the people and his followers and wanting to be so kind and good to every one!

Of course he said

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty [567] and there is nothing to fear from them then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader

To be sure

Has he not also another object which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?

Clearly

And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom and of resistance to his authority he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war

He must

Now he begins to grow unpopular

A necessary result

Then some of those who joined in setting him up and who are in power speak their minds to him and to one another and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done

Yes that may be expected

And the tyrant if he means to rule, must get rid of them he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything

He cannot

And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant who is high minded who is wise who is wealthy happy man he is the enemy of them all and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no until he has made a purgation of the State.

Yes he said and a rare purgation

Yes I said not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body for they take away the worse and leave the better part but he does the reverse

If he is to rule I suppose that he cannot help himself

What a blessed alternative I said—to be

compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated or not to live at all!

Yes, that is the alternative

And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Certainly

And who are the devoted band and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord if he pays them

By the do, I said here are more drones of every sort and from every land.

Yes, he said, there are

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves he will then set them free and enrol them in his body guard

To be sure, he said and he will be able to trust them best of all

What a blessed creature I said, must this tyrant be he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted friends. [568]

Yes, he said they are quite of his sort

Yes, I said and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.

Of course

Verily then tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian

Why so?

Why because he is the author of the pregnant saying

They are all by his growth the wise

and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions

Yes he said and he also praises tyranny as godlike and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets

And therefore, I said the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who like after our manner if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny

Yes, he said those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuade, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies

Very true.

Moreover they are paid for this and receive

honour—the greatest honour as might be expected from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies but the higher they ascend our constitution hinders the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further

True

But we are wandering from the subject Let us therefore return and enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his

If he said there are sacred treasures in the city he will confiscate and spend them and in so far as the fortunes of assisted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

And when these fail?

Why clearly he said then he and his boon companions, whether male or female will be maintained out of his father's estate

You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being will maintain him and his companions?

Yes, he said they cannot help themselves

But what if the people fly into a passion and aver that a grown up son ought not to be supported by his father but that the father should be supported by the son? [569] The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic as they are termed And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates

By heaven he said then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom and when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong

Why you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Yes, he will having first disarmed him

Then he is a parricide and a cruel guardian of an aged parent and this is real tyranny about which there can be no longer a mistake as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves Thus liberty getting out of all order and

reason passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery

True he said

Very well and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Yes, quite enough, he said

BOOK IX

[571] LAST of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have once more to ask: how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live in happiness or in misery?

Yes he said he is the only one remaining

There is however I said a previous question which remains unanswered

What question?

I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be confused

Well he said it is not too late to supply the omission

Very true I said and observe the point which I want to understand. Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful: every one appears to have them but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason and the better desires prevail over them—either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak while in the case of others they are stronger and there are more of them

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep: then the wild beast within us gorged with meat or drink starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires and there is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest or any other unnatural union or parricide or the eating of forbidden food—which at such a time when he has parted company with all shame and sense a man may not be ready to commit

Most true he said

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries collecting him self in meditation after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little but just enough to lay them to sleep and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from

interfering with the [572] higher principle—which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown whether in past, present or future when again he has allayed the passionate element if he has a quarrel against anyone—I say when after pacifying the two irrational principles he rouses up the third which is reason before he takes his rest, then, as you know he attains truth most nearly and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions

I quite agree

In saying this I have been running into a digression but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us even in good men there is a lawless wild beast nature which peers out in sleep. Pray consider whether I am right, and you agree with me

Yes I agree

And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him but discountenanced the unnecessary which aim only in amusement and ornament?

True

And then he got into the company of a more refined licentious sort of people and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last being a better man than his corruptors he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life not of vulgar and slavish passion but of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes he said that was our view of him and is so still

And now I said years will have passed away and you must conceive this man such as he is, to have a son who is brought up in his father's principles

I can imagine him

Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father—he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant makers find that they are losing [573] their hold on him they contrive to implant in him a master

passion, to be lord over his idle and spend
thrift lusts—a sort of monstrous winged drone
—that is the only image which will adequately
describe him.

Yes he said, that is the only adequate image
of him.

And when his other lusts, amid clouds of
incense and perfumes and garlands and wines,
and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let
loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing
to the utmost the sting of desire which they im-
plant in his drone-like nature, then at last this
lord of the soul having Madness for the captain
of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy and if he
finds in himself any good opinions or appetites
in process of formation, and there is in him any
sense of shame remaining, to these better prin-
ciples he puts an end, and casts them forth until
he has purged away temperance and brought
in madness to the full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the ty-
rannical man is generated.

And is not this the reason why of old love
has been called a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

Further I said, has not a drunken man also
the spirit of a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged
and not right in his mind, will fancy that he
is able to rule, not only over men, but also over
the gods?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of
the word comes into being when, either under
the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he
becomes drunken, lustful, passionate? O my
friend, is not that so?

Assuredly.

Such is the man and such is his origin. And
next, how does he live?

Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were
to tell me.

I imagine I said, at the next step in his
progress, that there will be feasts and carous-
als and revellings and courtesans, and all that
sort of thing. Love is the lord of the house
with a firm, and orders all the concerns of his
soul.

That is certain.

Yes and every day and every night desires
grow up many and formidable, and their de-
mands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any are soon spent.

True.

Then comes debt and the cutting down of
his property.

Of course.

When he has nothing left, must not his de-
sires, crowding in the nest like young ravens,
[574] be crying aloud for food and he, goaded
on by them, and especially by Love himself,
who is in a manner the captain of them is in a
frenzy and would fain discover whom he can
defraud or despoil of his property in order
that he may gratify them?

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money no matter how if he
is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of
pleasures, and the new got the better of the old
and took away their rights, so he being younger
will claim to have more than his father and his
mother and if he has spent his own share of
the property he will take a slice of theirs.

No doubt he will.

And if his parents will not give way then he
will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.

Very true.

And if he fails, then he will use force and
plunder them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman fight for
their own, what then, my friend? Will the
creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing
over them?

Nay he said, I should not feel at all comfort
able about his parents.

But, O heavens! Adesmanthus, on account of
some new fang'd love of a harlot, who is any
thing but a necessary connection, can you be-
lieve that he would strike the mother who is
his ancient friend and necessary to his very
existence, and would place her under the au-
thority of the other when she is brought under
the same roof with her or that, under like cir-
cumstances, he would do the same to his
withered old father first and most indispensable
of friends, for the sake of some newly found
blooming youth who is the reverse of indis-
pensable?

Yes, indeed, he said I believe that he would.

Truly then, I said, a tyrannical son is a bless-
ing to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

He first takes their property and when that
fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in
the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house,
or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer—
next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile

the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated and are now the body guard of love and share his empire. These in his democratic days when he was still subject to the laws and to his father were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only: he will commit the foulest murder or eat forbidden food or be guilty of any other horrid act [575] Love is his tyrant and lives lordly in him and lawlessly and being himself a king leads him on as a tyrant leads a State to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain himself and the rabble of his associates: whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Yes indeed he said

And if there are only a few of them in the State and the rest of the people are well disposed they go away and become the body guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war and if there is no war they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.

What sort of mischief?

For example they are the thieves burglars cut purses footpads robbers of temples man stealers of the community or if they are able to speak they turn informers and bear false witness and take bribes.

A small catalogue of evils even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Yes I said but small and great are comparative terms and all these things in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength assisted by the infatuation of the people they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul and him they create their tyrant.

Yes he said and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield well and good but if they resist him as he began by beating his own father and mother so now if he has the power he beats them and will keep his dear old father land or motherland as the Cretans say in sub-

jection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.

Exactly.

When such men are only private individuals and before they get power this is their character: they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools or if they want anything from anybody they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them [576] they profess every sort of affection for them but when they have gained their point they know them no more.

Yes truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody: the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.

Certainly not.

And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?

No question.

Also they are utterly unjust if we were right in our notion of justice?

Yes he said and we were perfectly right.

Let us then sum up in a word I said the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Most true.

And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

That is certain said Glaucon taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most continually and truly miserable although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Yes he said inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State and the democratical man like the democratical State and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness so is man in relation to man?

To be sure.

Then comparing our original city which was under a king and the city which is under a tyrant how do they stand as to virtue?

They are the opposite extremes he said for one is the very best the other the very worst.

There can be no mistake, I said as to which is which and therefore I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And

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here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.

A fair invitation, he replied, and I see as every one must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.

And in estimating the men too may I not fairly make a like request, [577] that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger—he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?

That again he said is a very fair proposal. Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who will answer our enquiries.

By all means.

Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?

What do you mean? he asked.

Beginning with the State I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

No city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as master in such a State?

Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few but the people speaking generally and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.

Then if the man is like the State I said must not the same rule prevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity—the best elements in him are enslaved and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.

Inevitably

And would you say that the soul of such an

one is the soul of a freeman or of a slave?

He has the soul of a slave in my opinion. And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?

Utterly incapable.

And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires: there is a gadfly which goads her and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Certainly.

And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

[578] And the tyrannical soul must be all ways poor and insatiable?

True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes indeed.

Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Impossible.

Reflecting upon these and similar evils you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

And I was right, he said.

Certainly I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

There I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

He who is of a tyrannical nature and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said I gather that you are right.

Yes I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain and should not conjecture only for of all questions this respecting good and evil is the greatest.

Very true, he said.

Let me then offer you an illustration which may I think throw a light upon this subject
What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition for they both have slaves the only difference is that he has more slaves

Yes that is the difference

You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing But do you observe the reason of this?

Yes the reason is that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual

Very true I said But imagine one of these owners the master say of some fifty slaves together with his family and property and slaves carried off by a god into the wilderness where there are no freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

[579] Yes he said, he will be in the utmost fear

The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves and make many promises to them of freedom and other things much against his will—he will have to cajole his own servants

Yes he said that will be the only way of saving himself

And suppose the same god who carried him away to surround him with neighbours who will not suffer one man to be the master of another and who if they could catch the offender would take his life?

His case will be still worse if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound—he who being by nature such as we have described is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy and yet alone of all men in the city he is never allowed to go on a journey or to see the things which other freemen desire to see but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest

Very true he said

And amid evils such as these will not he who is all governed in his own person—the tyranni-

cal man I mean—whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all—will not he yet more miserable when instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life not in retirement but fighting and combating with other men

Yes he said the similitude is most exact

Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?

Certainly

He who is the real tyrant whatever men may think is the real slave and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy and has more wants than any one and is truly poor if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles and surely the resemblance holds?

Very true he said

[580] Moreover as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless more unjust more friendless more impious than he was at first he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself

No man of any sense will dispute your words

Come then I said and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness and who second and in what order the others follow there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical

The decision will be easily given he replied they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery

Need we hire a herald or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston [the best] has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?

Make the proclamation yourself, he said.
And shall I add, whether seen or unseen by
gods and men?"

Let the words be added

Then thus, I said, will be our first proof and
here is another which may also have some
weight.

What is that?

The second proof is derived from the nature
of the soul seeing that the individual soul like
the State, has been divided by us into three
principles, the division may I think, furnish a
new demonstration.

Of what nature?

It seems to me that to these three principles
three pleasures correspond also three desires
and governings powers.

How do you mean? he said.

There is one principle with which, as we
were saying, a man learns, another with which
he is angry the third, having many forms, has
no special name, but is denoted by the general
term appetite from the extraordinary strength
and vehemence of the desires of eating and
drinking, and the other sensual appetites which
are the main elements of it [531] also money
loving, because such desires are generally satis-
fied by the help of money.

That is true, he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures
of this third part were concerned with gain, we
should then be able to fall back on a single no-
tion and might truly and intelligibly describe
this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

I agree with you.

Again, is not the passionate element wholly
set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

True.

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambi-
tious—would the term be suitable?

Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, every one sees that the
principle of knowledge is wholly directed to
the truth, and cares less than either of the others
for gain or fame.

Far less.

Lover of wisdom, "lover of knowledge,"
are titles which we may truly apply to that part
of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls of one
class of men, another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

Then we may begin by assuming that there
are three classes of men—I very of wisdom,
lovers of honour lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasure, which
are their several objects?

Very true.

Now if you examine the three classes of men
and ask of them in turn which of their lives is
pleasantest, each will be found praising his own
and depreciating that of others the money
maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of
learning if they bring no money with the solid
advantages of gold and silver?

True he said.

And the lover of honour—what will be his
opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of
riches is vulgar while the pleasure of learning,
if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and non-
sense to him?

Very true.

And are we to suppose, I said, that the phi-
losopher sets any value on other pleasures in
comparison with the pleasure of knowing the
truth and in that pursuit abiding ever learn-
ing not so far indeed from the heaven of pleas-
ure? Does he not call the other pleasures neces-
sary under the idea that if there were no neces-
sary for them he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that, he replied.

Since, then the pleasures of each class and
the life of each are in dispute, and the question
is not which life is more or less honourable,
[532] or better or worse but which is the more
pleasant or painless—how shall we know who
speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is
any better than experience and wisdom and
reason?

There cannot be a better he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals,
which has the greatest experience of all the
pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover
of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth,
greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge
than the philosopher has of the pleasure of
gain?

The philosopher he replied, has greatly the
advantage for he has of necessity always
known the taste of the other pleasures from his
childhood upwards but the lover of gain in all
his experience has not of necessary tasted—or
I should rather say even had he desired, could
hardly have tasted—the sweetness of learning
and knowing truth.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advan-
tage over the lover of gain, for he has a double
experience?

Yes, very great

Again has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay he said all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their object for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers and as they all receive honour they all have experience of the pleasures of honour, but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only

His experience then will enable him to judge better than any one?

Far better

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly

Further the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason with whom as we were saying the decision ought to rest

Yes

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Certainly

If wealth and gain were the criterion then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?

Assuredly

Or if honour or victory or courage in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?

Clearly

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges—

The only inference possible he replied is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest

And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three [583] and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.

Unquestionably he said the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life

And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour who is nearer to himself than the money maker

Last comes the lover of gain?

Very true he said

Twice in succession then has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict and now comes the third trial which is decided to Olympian Zeus the saviour a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Yes the greatest but will you explain yourself?

I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions

Proceed

Say then is not pleasure opposed to pain?

True

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

There is

A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either—that is what you mean?

Yes

You remember what people say when they are sick?

What do they say?

That after all nothing is pleasanter than health But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill

Yes I know he said

And when persons are suffering from acute pain you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

I have

And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain and not any positive enjoyment is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes he said at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest

Again when pleasure ceases that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?

Doubtless he said

Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem

But can that which is neither become both?

I should say not

And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul are they not?

Yes

[584] But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion and is a mean between them?

Yes

How then can we be right in supposing

that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Impossible.

This then is an appearance only and not a reality: that is to say the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant, and all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition.

That is the inference.

Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell which are very great and have no antecedent pains: they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

No.

Such, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort—they are reliefs of pain.

That is true.

And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Yes.

Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Let me hear.

You would allow I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

I should.

And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

To be sure, he said: how can he think otherwise?

But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending.

No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are

unexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state: so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, (553) and in like manner when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure: they not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white—can you wonder I say at this?

No, indeed: I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.

Look at the matter thus—Hunger, thirst, and the like, are manifestations of the bodily state?

Yes.

And ignorance and folly are manifestations of the soul?

True.

And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?

Clearly from that which has more.

What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your judgment—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way—Which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures, or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?

Far purer he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Necessarily.

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in

the service of the soul?

Far less

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes

What is filled with more real existence and actually has a more real existence is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

Unquestionably

[586] Those then who know not wisdom and virtue and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality go down and up again as far as the mean and in this region they move at random throughout life but they never pass into the true upper world thither they neither look nor do they ever find their way neither are they truly filled with true being nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure Like cattle with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth that is to the dining table they fatten and feed and breed and in their excessive love of these delights they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent

Verily Socrates said Glaucon you describe the life of the many like an oracle

Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true and are coloured by contrast which exaggerates both light and shade and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth

Something of that sort must inevitably happen

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action be in the like case whether he

is envious and ambitious or violent and contentious or angry and discontented if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Yes he said the same will happen with the spirited element also

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them inasmuch as they follow truth and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Yes certainly the best is the most natural

And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle and there is no division the several parts are just and do each of them their own business [587] and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?

Exactly

But when either of the two other principles prevails it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?

True

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Yes

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Clearly

And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw at the greatest distance?

Yes

And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Yes

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure and the king at the least?

Certainly

But if so the tyrant will live most unpleasantly and the king most pleasantly?

Inevitably

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures one genuine and two spurious now the transgression

of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spur
our he has run a way from the region of law
and reason and taken up his abode with cer-
tain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and
the measure of his inferiority can only be ex-
pressed in a figure

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third
place from the oligarch the democrat was in
the middle?

Yes

And if there is truth in what has preceded
he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which
is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure
of the oligarch?

He will

And the oligarch is third from the royal
since we count as one royal and aristocratical?

Yes, he is third

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleas-
ure by the space of a number which is three
times three?

Manifestly

The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure de-
termined by the number of length will be a
plane figure.

Certainly

And if you raise the power and make the
plane a solid there is no difficulty in seeing how
vast is the interval by which the tyrant is
parted from the king

Yes the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

Or if some person begins at the other end
and measures the interval by which the king is
parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure he
will find him when the multiplication is com-
plete, living 27 times more pleasantly and the
tyrant more painfully by this same interval

What a wonderful calculation! And how
enormous is the distance which separates the
just from the unjust in regard to pleasure [588]
and pain!

Yet a true calculation I said, and a number
which nearly concerns human life, if human
beings are concerned with days and nights and
months and years

Yes he said human life is certainly con-
cerned with them

Then if the good and just man be thus su-
perior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his
superiority will be infinitely greater in prop-
erty of life and in beauty and virtue?

Immeasurably greater

Well I said, and now having arrived at this

The figure 9 why equals the number of
days and nights in the year

stage of the argument, we may revert to the
words which brought us hither Was not some-
one saying that injustice is as a gain in the per-
fectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Yes that was said

Now then, having determined the power and
quality of justice and injustice let us have a
little conversation with him

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul that he may
have his own words presented before his eyes.
Of what sort?

An ideal image of the soul like the composite
creations of ancient mythology such as the
Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus and there are
many others in which two or more different na-
tures are said to grow into one

There are said to have been such unions

Then do you now model the form of a multi-
tudinous many headed monster having a ring
of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild,
in which he is able to generate and metamorphose
at will

You suppose marvellous powers in the artist
but, as language is more pliable than wax or
any similar substance, let there be such a model
as you propose.

Suppose now that you make a second form
as of a lion, and a third of a man the second
smaller than the first, and the third smaller
than the second

That, he said, is an easier task and I have
made them as you say

And now join them and let the three grow
into one

That has been accomplished

Next fashion the outside of them into a sin-
gle image, as of a man, so that he who is not
able to look within, and sees only the outer
hull may believe the beast to be a single human
creature.

I have done so he said

And now to him who maintains that it is
profitable for the human creature to be unjust,
and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if
he be right, it is profitable for this creature to
feast the multitudinous monster and strength-
en the lion and the lion-like qualities [589]
but to starve and weaken the man who is con-
sequently liable to be dragged about at the
mercy of either of the other two and he is not
to attempt to familiarise or harmonise them
with one another—he ought rather to suffer
them to fight and bite and devour one another

Certainly he said that is what the approver
of injustice says.

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities and preventing the wild ones from growing: he should be making the lion heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the main tainer of justice will say.

And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Yes, from every point of view.

Come now, and let us gently reason with the unjust who is not intentionally in error. Sweet Sir, we will say to him: what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man, and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast? He can hardly avoid saying Yes—can he now?

Not if he has any regard for my opinion.

But if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question. Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to [590] that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse—I will answer for him.

Has not the intemperate been censured of old because in him the huge multi-formed monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?

Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed because

they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

True, he said.

And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle, the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.

Such appears to be the reason.

And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules, not as Thrasymachus supposed to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him, or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all as far as possible under the same government, friends and equals.

True, he said.

And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city, and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, [591] and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.

Yes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.

From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanised, the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty.

BOOK X

strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body

Certainly he said.

To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul and will disregard others?

Clearly he said.

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter: his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to temper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?

Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.

And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also observe: he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

Certainly not, he said.

He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want: and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.

Very true.

And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours as he deems likely to make him a better man [592] but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.

By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he has a divine call.

I understand you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only: for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth?

In heaven, I replied: there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholders may set his own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter: for he will consider the manner of that city having nothing to do with any other.

I think so, he said.

[595] Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.

To what do you refer?

To the rejection of imitative poetry which certainly ought not to be received: as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished.

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them.

Explain the purport of your remark.

Well I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company: but a man is not to be revered more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me then, or rather answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.

A likely thing then, that I should know.

[596] Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.

Very true, he said: but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?

Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner? Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form—do you understand me?

I do.

Let us take any common instance: there are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not?

Yes.

But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea—that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no

artificer makes the ideas themselves how could he?

Impossible

And there is another artist—I should like to know what you would say of him

Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen

What an extraordinary man!

Wait a little and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind but plants and animals himself and all other things—the earth and heaven and the things which are in heaven or under the earth he makes the gods also

He must be a wizard and no mistake

Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?

What way?

An easy way enough or rather there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens and the earth and yourself and other animals and plants and all the other things of which we were just now speaking in the mirror

Yes he said but they would be appearances only

Very good I said you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is as I conceive just such another—a creator of appearances is he not?

Of course

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Yes he said but not a real bed

[597] And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes not the idea which according to our view is the essence of the bed but only a particular bed?

Yes I did

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence but only some semblance of existence and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed or of any other workman has real existence he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth

At any rate he replied philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth

No wonder then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth

No wonder

Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is?

If you please

Well then here are three beds one existing in nature which is made by God as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker?

No

There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Yes

And the work of the painter is a third?

Yes

Beds, then are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them God the maker of the bed and the painter?

Yes there are three of them

God whether from choice or from necessity made one bed in nature and one only two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God

Why is that?

Because even if He had made but two a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others

Very true he said

God knew this and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed not a particular maker of a particular bed and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only

So we believe

Shall we, then speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes he replied inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things

And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not

Yet if he is not the maker what is he in relation to the bed?

I think he said that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make

Good I said then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Certainly, he said

And the tragic poet is an imitator and therefore like all other imitators he is third

model from the king, and from the truth?

That appears to be so.

Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter? [598]—I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view—obliquely or directly or from any other point of view—and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

Now let me ask you another question. Which is the art of painting, we agreed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example. A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

Certainly.

And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing, with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a divine creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most true.

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice and all the things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he know his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether there also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them,

they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations three removed from the truth, [599] and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?

The question, he said, should by all means be considered.

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as it he had nothing higher in him?

I should say not.

The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations, and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair, and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit.

Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer, not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer—we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand, but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. "Friend Homer," then we say to him, "if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image-matter or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others, but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us, but what city has anything to say about you?" Is there any city which he might name?

I think not, said Glaucon, not even the Homers themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

[600] Well but π there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels when he was alive?

There is not

Or is there any invention of his applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?

There is absolutely nothing of the kind

But if Homer never did any public service was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer that child of flesh whose name always makes us laugh might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity if as is said Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?

Yes I replied that is the tradition. But can you imagine Glaucon that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine I say that he would not have had many followers and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and a host of others have only to whisper to their contemporaries. You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education—and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling π part with them as with gold and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or if the master would not stay then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Yes Socrates that, I think π quite true

Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals beginning with Homer are only imitators, they copy images of virtue and the

like [601] but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who as we have already observed will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does and judge only by colours and figures

Quite so

In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics or of anything else in metre and harmony and rhythm he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them and recited in simple prose

Yes he said

They are like faces which were never really beautiful but only blooming and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly

Here is another point. The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

Yes

Then let us have a clear understanding and not be satisfied with half an explanation

Proceed

Of the painter we say that he will paint reins and he will paint a bit?

Yes

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Certainly

But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them only the horseman who knows how π use them—he knows their right form

Most true

And may we not say the same of all things? What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things one which uses another which makes π third which imitates them?

Yes

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure animate or inanimate and of every action of man is relative to the use for which

nature or the artist has intended them

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use. For example, the flute player will tell the flute maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

Of course.

The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

True.

The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief, and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say [602] whereas the user will have knowledge?

True.

But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have a right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

I suppose not.

The imitator, an artist, will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Nay, very much the reverse.

And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

Just so.

Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

Very true.

And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which thrice removed from the truth?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain. The body which is large when seen near appears small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water and crooked when in the water, and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Most true.

And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

True.

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time [603] about the same thing?

Very true.

Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

No doubt.

This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

Exactly

The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior and has inferior offspring

Very true

And is this confined to the sight only or does it extend to the hearing also relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Probably the same would be true of poetry

Do not rely I said on a probability derived from the analogy of painting but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad

By all means

We may state the question thus—Imitation imitates the actions of men whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine a good or bad result has ensued and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly Is there anything more?

No there is nothing else

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again for I remember that all this has been already admitted and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

And we were right he said

Yes I said thus far we were right but there was an omission which must now be supplied

What was the omission?

Were we not saying that a good man who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Yes

But will he have no sorrow or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing he will moderate his sorrow?

The latter he said is the truer statement

[604] Tell me will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals or when he is alone?

It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not

When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?

True

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him

to indulge his sorrow?

True

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object this, as we affirm necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

Certainly

One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

How do you mean?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best and that we should not give way to impatience as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil and nothing is gained by impatience also because no human thing is of serious importance and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required

What is most required? he asked

That we should take counsel about what has happened and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best not like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy raising up that which is sickly and fallen bawling the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

Yes he said that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune

Yes I said and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

Clearly

And the other principle which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation and can never have enough of them we may call irrational useless, and cowardly?

Indeed we may

And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers

Certainly

[605] Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made nor is his art intended to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper which is easily imitated?

Clearly

And now we may fairly take him and place

him by the side of the painter for he is like him in two ways first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in thus, I say he is like him and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way so in the soul of man, as we maintain the imitative poet implants an evil constitution for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth

Exactly

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed) is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly if the effect is what you say. Hear and judge. The best of us, as I conceive when we listen to a passage of Homer or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawing out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Yes, of course I know

But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves in the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient: this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation now deemed to be the part of a woman

Very true, he said

Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us could dominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

No he said that is certainly not reasonable. [606] Nay I said quite reasonable from one point of view

What point of view?

If you consider I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation and that this feeling, which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets—the better nature in each

of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is and making a fuss about his troubles he thinks that the pleasure is a gain and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

How very true!

And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness—the case of pity is repeated—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon is now let out again and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

Quite true, he said

And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue

I cannot deny it

Therefore, Glaucon I said whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things [607] and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him we may love and honour those who say these things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow

the honeyed muse to enter either in epic or lyric verse not law and the reason of mankind which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State

That is most true he said

And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described for reason constrained us But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of the yelping hound howling at her lord or of one mighty in the vain talk of fools and the mob of sages circumventing Zeus and the subtle thinkers who are beggars after all and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them Notwithstanding this let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms but we may not on that account betray the truth I dare say Glaucon that you are as much charmed by her as I am especially when she appears in Homer?

Yes indeed I am greatly charmed

Shall I propose then that she be allowed to return from exile but upon this condition only—that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly he said we shall be the gainers

If her defence fails then my dear friend like other persons who are enamoured of some thing but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up though not without a struggle We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us [603] and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest but so long as she

is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth and he who listens to her fearing for the safety of the city which is within him should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law

Yes he said I quite agree with you.

Yes I said my dear Glaucon for great is the issue at stake greater than appears whether a man is to be good or bad And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power aye or under the excitement of poetry he neglect justice and virtue?

Yes he said I have been convinced by the argument as I believe that any one else would have been

And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

What are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness

Why I said what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather nothing he replied

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole certainly But why do you ask?

Are you not aware I said that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said No by heaven And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes I said I ought to be and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it

I see a great difficulty but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light

Listen then

I am attending

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes he replied

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

[609] Yes

And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body as mildew of corn, and rot of timber or rust of copper and iron in everything or in almost everything there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed

Well I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing, that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body. The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body and all the things of which we were just now speaking come in annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied

Consider I said, Glaucon that even the badness of food whether staleness, decomposition or any other bad quality when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body

although if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this but that the body being one thing can be destroyed by the badness of food which is an other and which does not engender any natural infection—thus we shall absolutely deny?

Very true.

And on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul which is one thing can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes he said there is reason in that.

Either then let us refute this conclusion or while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body but that the soul or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.

And surely he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has and which kills them sooner or later but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Nay he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth and that injustice which, if it have the power will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye and well awake too so far removed is her dwelling place from being a house of death.

True, I said if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly be.

the honeyed muse in enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State

That is most true he said

And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described, for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, of which there are many proofs such as the saying of

the yelping hound howling at her lord or of one mighty in the vain talk of fools and the mob of sages circumventing Zeus and the

subtle thinkers who are beggars after all and there are innumerable other signs of an ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms, but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say Glaucon that you are as much charmed by her as I am especially when she appears in Homer?

Yes indeed I am greatly charmed

Shall I propose then that she be allowed to return from exile but upon this condition only—that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life and we will listen in a kindly spirit for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly he said we shall be the gainers

If her defence fails then my dear friend like other persons who are enamoured of some thing but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us [608] and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest, but so long as she

is unable to make good her defence this argument of ours shall be a charm to us which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth and he who listens to her fearing for the safety of the city which is within him should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law

Yes, he said I quite agree with you.

Yes I said my dear Glaucon for great is the issue at stake greater than appears whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power aye or under the excitement of poetry he neglect justice and virtue?

Yes he said I have been convinced by the argument as I believe that any one else would have been

And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

What are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness

Why I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather nothing he replied

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said. No by heaven. And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Yes I said I ought to be and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it

I see a great difficulty but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light

Listen then

I am attending

There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Yes he replied

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is evil and the saving and improving element the good?

[609] Yes

And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber or rust of copper and iron in everything or in almost everything there is an inherent evil and disease?

Yes, he said

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

True.

The good and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

That may be assumed

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review unrighteousness, in temperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body. The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body and all the things of which we were just now speaking, come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Yes

Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

It is, he replied

Consider I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body

although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself which is disease, brought on by this but that the body being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another and which does not engender any natural infection—thus we shall absolutely deny?

Very true.

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that.

Either then, let us refute this conclusion, or while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.

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Nay he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that in justice which, if it has the power will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye and well awake too so far removed is his dwelling place from being a house of death.

True, I said if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Yes, that can hardly be.

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil whether inherent or external [611] must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?

Certainly

That is the conclusion I said, and, if a true conclusion then the souls must always be the same for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal and all things would thus end in immortality.

Very true

But this we cannot believe—reason will not allow us—any more than we can believe the soul in her truest nature to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

What do you mean? he said

The soul I said being as is now proven immortal must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?

Certainly not

Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument and there are many other proofs but to see her as she really is not as we now behold her marred by communion with the body and other miseries you must contemplate her with the eye of reason in her original purity and then her beauty will be revealed and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea god Glaucus whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.

Where then?

At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up

around her because she feeds upon earth [612] and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are termed then you would see her as she is and know whether she have one shape only or many or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.

True, he replied.

And thus I said we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice which as you were saying are to be found in Homer and Hesiod but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just whether he have the ring of Gyges or not and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now Glaucon there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me then what you borrowed in the argument?

What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?

I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Then as the cause is decided I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us since she has been shown to confer reality and not to deceive those who truly possess her let what has been taken from her be given back that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also and which she gives to her own.

The demand he said is just.

In the first place, I said—and this is the first thing which you will have to give back—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.

Granted.

And if they are both known to them one must be the friend and the other the enemy of

the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?
True.

[613] And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Certainly

Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Yes, he said if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?

Certainly

Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?

That is my conviction

And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting place to the goal but not back again from the goal they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, sinking away with their ears dragging on their shoulders, and without a crown but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just, he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow

True.

And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older they become rulers in their own city if they care to be they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the

remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them that these things are true?

Certainly he said, what you say is true.

[614] These then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.

Yes, he said and they are fair and lasting

And yet I said all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Speak, he said there are few things which I would more gladly hear

Well I said, I will tell you a tale not one of the tales which Odysseus tells in the hero's abode, yet this too is a tale of a hero, for the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption his body was found unaffected by decay and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day as he was lying on the funeral pile he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth they were near together and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend the lower way on the left hand these also bore the symbols of their deeds but fastened on their backs. He drew near and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them and at the two other openings other souls some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travail some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey

and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival and those who knew one another embraced and conversed the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured [615] and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years) while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story Glaucon would take too long to tell but the sum was this—He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold or once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If for example there were any who had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies or been guilty of any other evil behaviour for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents and of murderers there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another

Where is Ardiaeus the Great? (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was—He comes not hither and will never come. And this said he was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern and having completed all our experiences were about to reascend when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others most of whom were tyrants and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals they were just, as they fancied about to return into the upper world but the mouth instead of admitting them gave a roar whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend and then wild men of fiery aspect who were standing by and heard

the sound [616] seized and carried them off and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand and threw them down and flayed them with scourges and dragged them along the road at the side carding them on thorns like wool and declaring to the passers by what were their crimes and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell. And of all the many terrors which they had endured he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice and when there was silence one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey and on the fourth day after he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light straight as a column extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth in colour resembling the rainbow only brighter and purer another day's journey brought them to the place and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above for this light is the belt of heaven and holds together the circle of the universe like the under girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out and into this is fitted another lesser one and another and another and four others making eight in all like vessels which fit into one another the whorls show their edges on the upper side and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest and the seven inner whorls are narrower in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size the fourth next to the sixth then comes the eighth the seventh is fifth the fifth is sixth the third is seventh last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest the eighth [or moon] coloured by the reflected light of the seventh [617] the second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another

and yellower than the preceding, the third [Venus] has the whitest light, the fourth [Mars] is reddish, the sixth [Jupiter] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion, but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth, next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together, third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion, the fourth, the third appeared fourth, and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity, and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads. Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future. Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis, but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order, then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius, and let him who draws first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her, he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—God is justified. When the Interpreter had thus spoken, he scattered lots indiscriminately among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him [618] all but Er himself (he was not allowed) and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives, and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man

in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary, and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or again for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors, and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women like wise, there was not however any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty and disease and health, and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme period of our human state, and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things, which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue: he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined: he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse, and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just, all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death [619]. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest coming upon tyrannies and similar calamities he do utter miserable songs to others and suffer yet worse himself, but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time. Even for the last comer if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless and let not the last despair. And when he had spoken he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated among other evils to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect and saw what was in the lot he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice forgetting the proclamation of the prophet for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself he accused chance and the gods and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State but his virtue was a matter of habit only and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs and also because the lot was a chance many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot he might as the messenger reported be happy here and also his journey to another life and return to this instead of being rough and underground would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious he said was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience [620] of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale birds on the other hand like the swan and other musicians wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon who would not be a man remembering the injustice which was done him in the

judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon who took the life of an eagle, born as, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta she seeing the great fame of an athlete was unable to resist the temptation and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts and far away among the last who chose the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice this genius led the souls first to Clotho and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand thus ratifying the destiny of each and then when they were fastened to this carried them to Atropos who spun the threads and made them irreversible [621] whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity and when they had all passed they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness whose water no vessel can hold of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in

manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say only in the morning awaking suddenly he found himself lying on the pyre

And thus, Glaucon the tale has been saved and has not perished and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way

and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods both while remaining here and when like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts we receive our reward And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing

And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time. Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair. And when he had spoken he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny, his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated among other evils to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect and saw what was in the lot he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet, for instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself he accused chance and the gods and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State but his virtue was a matter of habit only and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs and also because the lot was a chance many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot he might as the messenger reported be happy here and also his journey to another life and return to this instead of being rough and underground would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious he said was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience [620] of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers he beheld also the soul of Thamyris choosing the life of a nightingale, birds on the other hand like the swan and other musicians wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon who would not be a man remembering the injustice which was done him in the

judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle because, like Ajax he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta she seeing the great fame of an athlete was unable to resist the temptation and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts and far away among the last who chose the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares he had some difficulty in finding this which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else and when he saw it he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice this genius led the souls first to Clotho and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand thus ratifying the destiny of each and then when they were fastened to this carried them to Atropos who spun the threads and made them irreversible [621] whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity and when they had all passed they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness whose water no vessel can hold of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But

manner in which he returned to the body he could not say only in the morning awakening suddenly he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way

and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when like conquerors in the games we go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

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judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon who took the life of an eagle, because like Ajax he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Alcibiades seeing the great fame of an athlete was unable to resist the temptation and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts and far away among the last who chose the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares, he had some difficulty in finding this which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else and when he saw it he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice this genius led the souls first to Clotho and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand thus raising the destiny of each and then when they were fastened to this carried them to Atropos who spun the threads and made them irreversible [6.1] whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity and when they had all passed they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what

tim? Or rather was not the proposal too singular to be forgotten? for all wives and children were to be in common, to the intent that no one should ever know his own child, but they were to imagine that they were all one family: those who were within a suitable limit of age were to be brothers and sisters, those who were of an earlier generation parents and grandparents, and those of a younger children and grandchildren.

Tim. Yes, and the proposal is easy to remember as you say.

Soc. And do you also remember how, with a view of securing as far as we could the best breed, we said that the chief magistrates, male and female, should contrive secretly by the use of certain lots, so to arrange the nuptial meeting, that the bad of either sex and the good of either sex might pair with their like: and there was to be no quarrelling, on this account, for they would imagine that the union was a mere accident, and was to be attributed to the lot?

Tim. I remember.

Soc. And you remember how we said that the children of the good parents were to be educated, (19) and the children of the bad secretly dispersed among the inferior citizens: and while they were all growing up the rulers were to be on the look-out, and to bring up from below in their turn those who were worthy: and those among themselves who were unworthy were to take the place of those who came up?

Tim. True.

Soc. Then have I now given you all the heads of our yesterday's discussion? Or is there anything more, my dear Timaeus, which has been omitted?

Tim. Nothing, Socrates: it was just as you have said.

Soc. I should like, before proceeding further to tell you how I feel about the State which we have described. I might compare myself to a person who, on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art, or better still, alive but at rest, is seized with a desire of seeing them in motion or engaged in some struggle or contest to which their forms appear suited: this is my feeling about the State which we have been describing. There are considerations which all wives understand, and I should like to hear some one tell of our own city carrying on a struggle against her neighbours, and how she went out to war in a becoming manner: and when I was moved by the greatness of her actions and the unanimity of her words in dealing with other cities a result worthy of her training and education. Now I, Critias and Her-

mocrates, am conscious that I myself should never be able to celebrate the city and her citizens in a befitting manner: and I am not surprised at my own incapacity: to me the wonder is rather that the poets present as well as past are no better—not that I mean to deprecate them: but every one can see that they are a tribe of imitators, and will imitate best and most easily the life in which they have been brought up: while that which is beyond the range of a man's education he finds hard to carry out in action, and still harder adequately to represent in language. I am aware that the Sophists have plenty of brave words and fair conceits, but I am afraid that being only wanderers from one city to another and having never had habitations of their own, they may fail in their conception of philosophers and statesmen, and may not know what they do and say in time of war: when they are fighting or holding parley with their enemies. And thus people of your class are the only ones remaining who are fitted by nature and education to take part at once both in politics and philosophy. Here is Timaeus, (20) of Locris in Italy: a city which has admirable laws, and who is himself in wealth and rank the equal of any of his fellow-citizens: he has held the most important and honourable offices in his own state, and, as I believe, has scaled the heights of all philosophy: and here is Critias, whom every Athenian knows to be no novice in the matters of which we are speaking: and as to Hermocrates, I am assured by many witnesses that his genius and education qualify him to take part in any speculation of the kind. And therefore yesterday when I saw that you wanted me to describe the formation of the State, I readily assented, being very well aware, that, if you only would, none were better qualified to carry the discussion further: and that when you had engaged our city in a suitable war you of all men living could best exhibit her playing a fitting part. When I had completed my task, I in return imposed this other task upon you. You concurred together and agreed to entertain me to-day as I had entertained you, with a feast of discourse. Here am I in festive array and no man can be more ready for the promised banquet.

Her. And we too, Socrates, as Timaeus says, will not be wanting in enthusiasm: and there is no excuse for not complying with your request. As soon as we arrived yesterday at the guest-chamber of Critias, with whom we are staying, or rather on our way thither we talked the matter over: and he told us an ancient tra-

TIMAEUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES CRITIAS TIMAEUS HERMOCRATES

[17] *Socrates* ONE two three but where my dear Timaeus is the fourth of those who were yesterday my guests and are to be my entertainers to-day?

Timaeus He has been taken ill. Socrates for he would not willingly have been absent from this gathering.

Soc. Then if he is not coming you and the two others must supply his place.

Tim. Certainly and we will do all that we can having been handsomely entertained by you yesterday: those of us who remain should be only too glad to return your hospitality.

Soc. Do you remember what were the points of which I required you to speak?

Tim. We remember some of them and you will be here to remind us of anything which we have forgotten: or rather if we are not troubling you will you briefly recapitulate the whole and then the particulars will be more firmly fixed in our memories?

Soc. To be sure I will: the chief theme of my yesterday's discourse was the State—how constituted and of what citizens composed it would seem likely to be most perfect.

Tim. Yes Socrates and what you said of it was very much to our mind.

Soc. Did we not begin by separating the husbandmen and the artisans from the class of defenders of the State?

Tim. Yes.

Soc. And when we had given to each one that single employment and particular art which was suited to his nature we spoke of those who were intended to be our warriors and said that they were to be guardians of the city against attacks from within as well as from without, [18]

and to have no other employment: they were to be merciful in judging their subjects of whom they were by nature friends but fierce to their enemies when they came across them in battle.

Tim. Exactly.

Soc. We said if I am not mistaken that the guardians should be gifted with a temperament in a high degree both passionate and philosophical and that then they would be as they ought to be gentle to their friends and fierce with their enemies.

Tim. Certainly.

Soc. And what did we say of their education? Were they not to be trained in gymnastic and music and all other sorts of knowledge which were proper for them?

Tim. Very true.

Soc. And being thus trained they were not to consider gold or silver or anything else to be their own private property: they were to be like hired troops receiving pay for keeping guard from those who were protected by them—the pay was to be no more than would suffice for men of simple life and they were to spend in common and to live together in the continual practice of virtue, which was to be their sole pursuit.

Tim. That was also said.

Soc. Neither did we forget the women of whom we declared that their natures should be assimilated and brought into harmony with those of the men and that common pursuits should be assigned to them both in time of war and in their ordinary life.

Tim. That again was as you say.

Soc. And what about the procreation of chil-

den? Or rather was not the proposal too singular to be far, often? for all wives and children were to be in common to the intent that no one should ever know his own child, but they were to imagine that they were all one family: those who were within a suitable limit of age were to be brothers and sisters, those who were of an elder generation parents and grandparents, and those of a younger children and grandchildren.

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Soc. And you remember how we said that the children of the good parents were to be educated, [19] and the children of the bad secretly dispersed among the inferior citizens: and while they were all growing up the rulers were to be on the look-out, and to bring up from below in their turn those who were worthy and those among themselves who were unworthy were to take the places of those who came up?

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Her. And we too, Socrates, as Timaeus says, will not be wanting in enthusiasm: and there is no excuse for not complying with your request. As soon as we arrived yesterday at the guest-chamber of Critias with whom we are staying, or rather on our way thither we talked the matter over and he told us an ancient tra-

dition which I wish Critias that you would repeat to Socrates, so that he may help us to judge whether it will satisfy his requirements or not

Crit I will if Timaeus who is our other partner, approves

Tim I quite approve

Crit Then listen Socrates, to a tale which though strange is certainly true, having been attested by Solon who was the wisest of the seven sages. He was a relative and a dear friend of my great grandfather, Dropides as he himself says in many passages of his poems and he told the story to Critias my grandfather who remembered and repeated it to us. There were of old he said great and marvellous actions of the Athenian city [21] which have passed in to oblivion through lapse of time and the destruction of mankind and one in particular greater than all the rest. This we will now rehearse. It will be a fitting monument of our gratitude to you and a hymn of praise true and worthy of the goddess on this her day of festival

Soc Very good. And what is this ancient famous action of the Athenians which Critias declared on the authority of Solon to be not a mere legend but an actual fact?

Crit I will tell an old world story which I heard from an aged man for Critias at the time of telling it was as he said nearly ninety years of age and I was about ten. Now the day was that day of the Apaturia which is called the Registration of Youth at which according to custom our parents gave prizes for recitations, and the poems of several poets were recited by us boys and many of us sang the poems of Solon which at that time had not gone out of fashion. One of our tribe either because he thought so or to please Critias said that in his judgment Solon was not only the wisest of men but also the noblest of poets. The old man as I very well remember brightened up at hearing this and said smiling. Yes Amynander, if Solon had only like other poets made poetry the business of his life and had completed the tale which he brought with him from Egypt and had not been compelled by reason of the factions and troubles which he found stirring in his own country when he came home to attend to other matters in my opinion he would have been as famous as Homer or Hesiod or any poet.

And what was the tale about, Critias? said Amynander

About the greatest action which the Athenians ever did and which ought to have been the

most famous but, through the lapse of time and the destruction of the actors it has not come down to us

Tell us said the other the whole story and how and from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition

He replied —In the Egyptian Delta at the head of which the river Nile divides, there is a certain district which is called the district of Sais and the great city of the district is also called Sais and is the city from which King Amasis came. The citizens have a deity for their foundress she is called in the Egyptian tongue Neith and is asserted by them to be the same whom the Hellenes call Athene they are great lovers of the Athenians and say that they are in some way related to them. To this city came Solon and was received there with great honour [22] he asked the priests who were most skillful in such matters about antiquity and made the discovery that neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion wishing to draw them on to speak of antiquity he began to tell about the most ancient things in our part of the world—about Phoroneus, who is called the first man and about Niobe and after the Deluge of the survival of Deucalion and Pyrrha and he traced the genealogy of their descendants and reckoning up the dates, tried to compute how many years ago the events of which he was speaking happened. There upon one of the priests who was of a very great age said O Solon Solon you Hellenes are never anything but children and there is not an old man among you. Solon in return asked him what he meant. I mean to say he replied that in mind you are all young there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition nor any science which is hoary with age. And I will tell you why. There have been and will be again many destructions of mankind arising out of many causes the greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire and water and other lesser ones by innumerable other causes. There is a story which even you have preserved that once upon a time Phaethon the son of Helios having yoked the steeds in his father's chariot because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father burnt up all that was upon the earth and was himself destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now this has the form of a myth but really signifies a declination of the bodies moving in the heavens around the earth and a great conflagration of things upon the earth which recurs after

ing intervals at such times those who live upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more liable to destruction than those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore. And from this calamity the Nile, who is our never failing saviour, delivers and preserves us. When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with a deluge of water the survivors in your country are herdsmen and shepherds who dwell on the mountains, but those who like you, live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea. Whereas in this land, neither then nor at any other time, does the water come down from above on the fields, having always a tendency to come up from below for which reason the tiniduous preserved here are the most ancient.

The fact is, that wherever the extremity of winter frost or of summer sun does not prevent, mankind exist, sometimes in greater [23] sometimes in lesser numbers. And whatever has peopled either in your country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are informed—if there were any actions noble or great or in any other way remarkable, they have all been written down by us of old, and are preserved in our temples. Whereas just when you and other nations are beginning to be provided with letters and the other requisites of civilized life, after the usual interval, the stream from heaven, like a pestilence, comes pouring down, and leaves only those of you who are destitute of letters and education and so you have to begin all over again like children, and know nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among us or among yourselves. As for those genealogies of yours which you just now recounted to us, Solon, they are no better than the tales of children. In the first place you remember a single deluge only but there were many previous ones in the next place, you do not know that there formerly dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of men which ever lived, and that you and your whole city are descended from a small seed or remnant of them which survived. And thus was unknown to you, because, for many generations, the survivors of that destruction died, leaving no written word. For there was a time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the city which now is Athens was first in war and in every way the best governed of all cities, and is said to have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under the face of heaven.

Solon marvelled at his words, and earnestly requested the priests to inform him exactly and

in order about these former citizens. You are welcome to hear about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own sake and for that of your city and above all, for the sake of the goddess who is the common patron and parent and educator of both our cities. She founded your city a thousand years before ours, receiving from the Earth and Hephaestus the seed of your race, and afterwards she founded ours, of which the constitution is recorded in our sacred registers to be eight thousand years old. As touching your citizens of nine thousand years ago, [24] I will briefly inform you of their laws and of their most famous actions—the exact particulars of the whole we will hereafter go through as our leisure in the sacred registers themselves. If you compare these very laws with ours you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the older time. In the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is separated from all the others. Next, there are the artificers, who ply their several crafts by themselves and do not intermix; and also there is the class of shepherds and of hunters, as well as that of husbandmen and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are distinct from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law to devote themselves solely to military pursuits; moreover the weapons which they carry are shields and spears, a style of equipment which the goddess taught of Asiatics first to us, as in your part of the world first to you. Then as to wisdom do you observe how our law from the very first made a study of the whole order of things, extending even to prophecy and medicine which gives health, out of these divine elements deriving what was needful for human life, and adding every sort of knowledge which was akin to them. All this order and arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when establishing your city and she chose the spot of earth in which you were born, because she saw that the happy temperament of the seasons in that land would produce the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess, knowing as to both of war and of wisdom, selected and first of all settled that spot which was the most likely to produce men likest herself. And there you dwelt, having such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all mankind in all virtue, as became the children and disciples of the gods.

Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your state in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the rest in greatness and valour. For these histories tell of a mighty power which un-
Cl. Crit. 11. 108.

provoked made an expedition against the whole of Europe and Asia and to which your city put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic Ocean for in those days the Atlantic was navigable and there was an island situated in front of the straits which are by you called the Pillars of Heracles the island was larger than Libya and Asia put together, [25] and was the way to other islands and from these you might pass to the whole of the opposite continent which surrounded the true ocean for this sea which is within the Straits of Heracles is only a harbour having a narrow entrance but that other is a real sea and the surrounding land may be most truly called a boundless continent. Now in this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful empire which had rule over the whole island and several others and over parts of the continent and furthermore the men of Atlantis had subjected the parts of Libya within the columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. This vast power gathered into one endeavoured to subdue at a blow our country and yours and the whole of the region within the straits and then Solon your country shone forth in the excellence of her virtue and strength among all mankind. She was pre-eminent in courage and military skill and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when the rest fell off from her being compelled to stand alone after having undergone the very extremity of danger she defeated and triumphed over the invaders and preserved from slavery those who were not yet subjugated and generously liberated all the rest of us who dwell within the pillars. But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods and in a single day and night of misfortune all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth and the island of Atlantis in like manner disappeared in the depths of the sea. For which reason the sea in those parts is impassable and impenetrable because there is a shoal of mud in the way and this was caused by the subsidence of the island.

I have told you briefly Socrates what the aged Critias heard from Solon and related to us. And when you were speaking yesterday about your city and citizens the tale which I have just been repeating to you came into my mind and I remarked with astonishment how, by some mysterious coincidence, you agreed in almost every particular with the narrative of Solon but I did not like to speak at the moment [26] For a long time had elapsed and I had forgotten too much. I thought that I must first of all run over the narrative in my own

mind and then I would speak. And so I readily assented to your request yesterday considering that in all such cases the chief difficulty is to find a tale suitable to our purpose, and that with such a tale we should be fairly well provided.

And therefore, as Hermocrates has told you, on my way home yesterday I at once communicated the tale to my companions as I remembered it and after I left them during the night by thinking I recovered nearly the whole of it. Truly, as is often said the lessons of our childhood make a wonderful impression on our memories for I am not sure that I could remember all the discourse of yesterday but I should be much surprised if I forgot any of these things which I have heard very long ago. I listened at the time with childlike interest to the old man's narrative he was very ready to teach me, and I asked him again and again to repeat his words, so that like an indelible picture they were branded into my mind. As soon as the day broke, I rehearsed them as he spoke them to my companions that they as well as myself might have something to say. And now Socrates, to make an end of my preface I am ready to tell you the whole tale. I will give you not only the general heads but the particulars as they were told to me. The city and citizens which you yesterday described to us in fiction we will now transfer to the world of reality. It shall be the ancient city of Athens and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined were our venerable ancestors of whom the priest spoke they will perfectly harmonise and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians. Let us divide the subject among us and all endeavour according to our ability gracefully to execute the task which you have imposed upon us. Consider then Socrates if this narrative is suited to the purpose or whether we should seek for some other instead.

Soc. And what other Critias can we find that will be better than this which is natural and suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the very great advantage of being a fact and not a fiction? How or where shall we find another if we abandon this? We cannot [27] and therefore you must tell the tale and good luck to you and I in return for my yesterday's discourse will now rest and be a listener.

Crit. Let me proceed to explain to you Socrates the order in which we have arranged our entertainment. Our intention is that Timaeus, who is the most of an astronomer amongst us and has made the nature of the universe his

special study should speak first, beginning with the generation of the world and going down to the creation of man next, I am to receive the men whom he has created of whom some will have profited by the excellent education which you have given them and then in accordance with the tale of Solon and equally with his law we will bring them into court and make them citizens, as if they were those very Athenians whom the sacred Egyptian record has restored from oblivion and therefore and we will speak of them as Athenians and fellow-citizens.

Soe I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and splendid feast of reason. And now Timaeus, you, I suppose, should speak next, after duly calling upon the Gods.

Tim All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling at the beginning of every enterprise, whether small or great, always call upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the universe how created or how existing without creation, if we be not altogether out of our wits must invoke the aid of Gods and Goddesses and pray that our words may be acceptable to them and consistent with themselves. Let this then be our invocation of the Gods, to which I add an exhortation of my self to speak in such manner as will be most intelligible to you and will most accord with my own intent.

First then in my judgment, we must make a distinct one and ask. What is that which always is and has no becoming and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state (28) but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing, and never really is. Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fastens on the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern must necessarily be made fair and perfect but when he looks to the created only and uses a created pattern it is not fair or perfect. Was the heaven then or the world whether called by this or by any other more appropriate name—assuming the name I am asking a question which has to be asked at the beginning of an enquiry about anything—was the world I say always in existence and without beginning? or created and had a beginning? Created I reply being visible and tangible and having a

body and therefore sensible and all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense and are in a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must, as we affirm of necessity be created by a cause. But the father and maker of all this universe is just finding out and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And there is still a question to be asked about him. Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world—the pattern of the unchangeable or of that which is created? (29) If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true then to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must have looked to the eternal for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes. And having been created in this way the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable and must therefore of necessity if this is admitted be a copy of something. Now it is all important that the beginning of everything should be according to nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe when they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable—nothing less. But when they express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real words. As being is to becoming so is truth to belief. If then Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another do not be surprised. Enough if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others for we must remember that I who am the speaker and you who are the judges are only mortal men and ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.

Soe Excellent, Timaeus and we will do precisely as you bid us. The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us—may we beg of you to proceed to the strain?

Tim Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of generation. He was good and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy he desired that all things should be as like himself as

they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world [30] as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men. God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other. Now the deeds of the best could never be but have been other than the fairest, and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole, and that intelligence could not be present in any thing which was devoid of soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God.

This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage. In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part only, for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing, but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature [31]. Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with the original. For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them. In order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect animal, the creator made not two worlds, or an infinite number of them, but there is and ever will be one only, gotten and created heaven.

Now that which is created is of necessity cor-

poral, and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire, or tangible which has no solidity and nothing solid without earth. Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things can not be rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines, and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term is to it [32], and again when the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean—then the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will be all one. If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth, a single mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms, but now as the world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth), and thus he bound and put together a visible and tangible heaven. And for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, and it was harmonised by proportion, and therefore has the spirit of friendship, and having been reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer.

Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements, for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water, and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. His intention was, in the first place, that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole, and of perfect parts [33]; secondly, that it should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created, and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared, they decompose them, and by bringing diseases and old age upon them make them waste away—for this cause and on

these grounds he made the world one whole, having every part entire, and being therefore perfect and not liable to old age and disease. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a line, having its extremes in every direction equidistant from the centre, the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures, for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. Thus he finished off, making the surface smooth all around for many reasons in the first place, because the living being had no need of eyes when there was nothing remaining outside him to be seen, nor of ears when there was nothing to be heard, and there was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed, nor would there have been any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went from him or came into him, for there was nothing beside him. Of design he was created thus, his own waste providing his own food, and all that he did or suffered taking place in and by himself. For the Creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against any one, the Creator did not think it necessary to bestow upon him hands, nor had he any need of feet, [37] nor of the whole apparatus of walking, but the movement suited to his spherical form was assigned to him, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intellect, and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. All the other six motions were taken away from him, and he was made not to partake of their deviations. And as this circular movement required no feet, the universe was created without legs and without feet.

Such was the whole plan of the eternal God about the god that was to be, to whom for this reason he gave a body smooth and even, having a surface in every direction equidistant from the centre, a body entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the centre he put the soul, which he diffused throughout the body making it also to be the exterior environment of it and he made the universe a circle moving in a circle, one and solitary yet by reason of its excellence able to converse with

itself and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having, then, purposes in view he created the world a blessed god.

Now God did not make the soul after the body although we are speaking of them in this order for having brought them together he would never have allowed that the elder should be ruled by the younger but this is a random manner of speaking which we have, because somehow we ourselves too are very much under the dominion of chance. Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And he made her out of the following elements and on this wise. [38] Out of the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same and of the other and this compound he placed accordingly in a mean between the indivisible, and the divisible and material. He took the three elements of the same, the other and the essence, and mingled them into one form, compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same. When he had mingled them with the essence and out of three made one, he again divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each portion being a compound of the same, the other and the essence. And he proceeded to divide after this manner—First of all, he took away one part of the whole [1] and then he separated a second part which was double the first [2] and then he took away a third part which was half as much again as the second and three times as much as the first [3] and then he took a fourth part which was twice as much as the second [4] and a fifth part which was three times the third [5] and a sixth part which was eight times the first [6] and a seventh part which was twenty-seven times the first [7]. After this he filled up the double intervals [i.e. between 1, 2, 4, 8] and [3/6] the triple [i.e. between 1, 3, 9, 27] cutting off yet other portions from the mixture and placing them in the intervals, so that in each interval there were two kinds of means, the one exceeding and exceeded by equal parts of its extremes (as for example 1, 2, in which the mean 3 is one-third of 1 more than 1 and one-third of 2 less than 2) the other being that kind of mean which exceeds and is exceeded by an equal number. Where there were intervals of 2 and of 3 and of 4, made by the connecting terms in the former intervals, he filled up all

the intervals of $\frac{1}{3}$ with the interval of $\frac{1}{8}$ leaving a fraction over and the interval which this fraction expressed was in the ratio of 256 to 243. And thus the whole mixture out of which he cut these portions was all exhausted by him. This entire compound he divided lengthways into two parts which he joined to one another at the centre like the letter X and bent them into a circular form connecting them with themselves and each other at the point opposite to their original meeting point and comprehending them in a uniform revolution upon the same axis he made the one the outer and the other the inner circle. Now the motion of the outer circle he called the motion of the same and the motion of the inner circle the motion of the other or diverse. The motion of the same he carried round by the side to the right and the motion of the diverse diagonally to the left. And he gave dominion to the motion of the same and like for that he left single and undivided but the inner motion he divided in six places and made seven unequal circles having their intervals in ratios of two and three three of each and bade the orbits proceed in a direction opposite to one another and three [Sun Mercury Venus] he made to move with equal swiftness and the remaining four [Moon Saturn Mars Jupiter] to move with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another but in due proportion.

Now when the Creator had framed the soul according to his will he formed within her the corporeal universe and brought the two together and united them centre to centre. The soul interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumference of heaven of which also she is the external envelopment herself turning in herself began a divine beginning of never ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time [37]. The body of heaven is visible but the soul is invisible and partakes of reason and harmony and being made by the best of intellectual and everlasting natures is the best of things created. And because she is composed of the same and of the other and of the essence these three and is divided and united in due proportion and in her revolutions returns upon herself the soul when touching anything which has essence whether dispersed in parts or undivided is stirred through all her powers to declare the sameness or difference of that

¹ i. e. of the rectangular figure supposed to be inscribed in the circle of the same.

¹ i. e. across the rectangular figure from corner to corner

thing and some other and to what individuals are related and by what affected and in what way and how and when both in the world of generation and in the world of immutable being. And when reason which works with equal truth whether she be in the circle of the diverse or of the same—in voiceless silence holding her onward course in the sphere of the self moved—when reason I say is hovering around the sensible world and when the circle of the diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations of sense to the whole soul, then arise opinions and beliefs sure and certain. But when reason is concerned with the rational and the circle of the same moving smoothly declares it, then intelligence and knowledge are necessarily perfected. And if any one affirms that in which these two are found to be other than the soul he will say the very opposite of the truth.

When the father and creator saw the creature which he had made moving and living the created image of the eternal gods he rejoiced and in his joy determined to make the copy still more like the original and as this was eternal, he sought to make the universe eternal so far as might be. Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting but to bestow this attribute in its fulness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity and when he set in order the heaven he made this image eternal but moving according to number while eternity itself rests in unity and this image we call time. For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time and the past and future are created species of time which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence for we say that he was he is he will be but the truth is that he alone is properly attributed to him [38] and that was and will be are only to bespeak of becoming in time for they are motions but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time nor ever did or has become or hereafter will be older or younger nor is subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause. These are the forms of time which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Moreover when we say that what has become is become and what becomes is becoming and that what will become is about to become and that the non-existent is non-existent—all these are inaccurate modes of

expression But perhaps this whole subject will be more suitably discussed on some other occasion

Time then, and the heaven came into being at the same instant in order that, having been created together if ever there was to be a dissolution of them they might be dissolved together It was framed after the pattern of the eternal nature that it might resemble this as far as was possible for the pattern exists from eternity and the created heaven has been and is, and will be, in all time Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation of time The sun and moon and five other stars which are called the planets, were created by him in order to distinguish and preserve the numbers of time and when he had made their several bodies he placed them in the orbits in which the circle of the other was revolving—in seven orbits seven stars First there was the moon in the orbit nearest the earth, and next the sun in the second orbit above the earth then came the morning star and the star sacred to Hermes, moving in orbits which have an equal swiftness with the sun but in an opposite direction and this is the reason why the sun and Hermes and Lucifer overtake and are overtaken by each other To enumerate the places which he assigned to the other stars and to give all the reasons why he assigned them although a secondary matter would give more trouble than the primary These things at some future time, when we are at leisure may have the consideration which they deserve but not at present

Now when all the stars which were necessary to the creation of time had attained a motion suitable to them, and had become living creatures having bodies fastened by celestial chains, and learnt their appointed task [39] moving in the motion of the diverse which is diagonal and passes through and is governed by the motion of the same they revolved some in a larger and some in a lesser orbit—those which had the lesser orbit revolving faster and those which had the larger more slowly Now by reason of the motion of the same those which revolved fastest appeared to be overtaken by those which moved slower although they really overtook them for the motion of the same made them all turn in a spiral and because some went one way and some another that which receded most slowly from the sphere of the same which was the swift it appeared to follow it most nearly That their might be some visible measure of

their relative swiftness and slowness as they proceeded in their eight courses God lighted a fire, which we now call the sun in the second from the earth of these orbits, that it might give light to the whole of heaven and that the animals, as many as nature intended might participate in number learning arithmetic from the revolution of the same and the like Thus, then and for this reason the night and the day were created being the period of the one most intelligent revolution And the month is accomplished when the moon has completed her orbit and overtaken the sun and the year when the sun has completed his own orbit Mankind with hardly an exception have not remarked the periods of the other stars, and they have no name for them and do not measure them against one another by the help of number and hence they can scarcely be said to know that their wanderings, being infinite in number and admirable for their variety make up time And yet there is no difficulty in seeing that the perfect number of time fulfils the perfect year when all the eight revolutions, having their relative degrees of swiftness are accomplished together and attain their completion at the same time, measured by the rotation of the same and equally moving After this manner and for these reasons, came into being such of the stars as in their heavenly progress received reversals of motion to the end that the created heaven might imitate the eternal nature and be as like as possible to the perfect and intelligible animal

Thus far and until the birth of time the created universe was made in the likeness of the original but inasmuch as all animals were not yet comprehended therein it was still unlike What remained the creator then proceeded to fashion after the nature of the pattern Now as in the ideal animal the mind perceives ideas or species of a certain nature and number he thought that this created animal ought to have species of a like nature and number There are four such [40] one of them is the heavenly race of the gods another the race of birds whose way is in the air the third the watery species and the fourth the pedestrian and land creatures Of the heavenly and divine, he created the greater part out of fire that they might be the brightest of all things and fairest to behold and he fashioned them after the likeness of the universe in the figure of a circle and made them follow the intelligent motion of the supreme, distributing them over the whole circumference of heaven, which was to be a true cosmos or glorious world spangled with them all over

And he gave to each of them two movements the first a movement on the same spot after the same manner whereby they ever continue to think consistently the same thoughts about the same things, the second a forward movement in which they are controlled by the revolution of the same and the like but by the other five motions they were unaffected [cf. 43] in order that each of them might attain the highest perfection. And for this reason the fixed stars were created to be divine and eternal animals ever abiding and revolving after the same manner and on the same spot and the other stars which reverse their motion and are subject to deviations of this kind were created in the manner already described. The earth which is our nurse clinging around the pole which is extended through the universe he framed to be the guardian and artificer of night and day first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the attempt to tell all the figures of them circling, as in dance and their juxtapositions and the return of them in their revolutions upon themselves and their approximations, and to say which of these duties in their conjunctions meet, and which of them are in opposition, and in what order they get behind and before one another and when they are severally eclipsed to our sight and again reappear sending terrors and intimations of the future to those who cannot calculate their movements—to attempt to tell of all this without a visible representation of the heavenly system would be labour in vain. Enough on this head and now let what we have said about the nature of the created and visible gods have an end.

To know or tell the origin of the other divinities is beyond us and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods—that is what they say—and they must surely have known their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs still as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family we must conform to custom and believe them. In this manner then according to them the genealogy of these gods is to be received and set forth.

Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and Heaven and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea and all that generation [44] and from Cronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and Here, and all those who are said to be their brethren and others who were the children of these

Now, when all of them both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature had come into being the creator of the universe addressed them in these words. Gods children of gods who are my works and of whom I am the artificer and father my creations are indissoluble if so I will. All that is bound may be undone but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and happy. Wherefore since ye are but creatures ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble but ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which ye were bound at the time of your birth. And now listen to my instructions.—Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created—without them the universe will be incomplete for it will not contain every kind of animal which it ought to contain if it is to be perfect. On the other hand if they were created by me and received life at my hands they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that they may be mortal and that this universe may be truly universal do ye according to your natures betake yourselves to the formation of animals imitating the power which was shown by me in creating you. The part of them worthy of the name immortal which is called divine and is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and you—of that divine part I will myself sow the seed and having made a beginning I will hand the work over to you. And do ye then interweave the mortal with the immortal and make and beget living creatures and give them food and make them to grow and receive them again in death.

Thus he spake and once more into the cup in which he had previously mingled the soul of the universe he poured the remains of the elements and mingled them in much the same manner they were not however pure as before but diluted to the second and third degree. And having made it he divided the whole mixture into souls equal in number to the stars and assigned each soul to a star and having there placed them as in a chariot he showed them the nature of the universe and declared to them the laws of destiny according to which their first birth would be one and the same for all—no one should suffer a disadvantage at his hands they were to be sown in the instrument of time severally adapted to them [42] and to come forth the most religious of animals and human nature was of two kinds, the superior

race would hereafter be called man. Now when they should be implanted in bodies by necessity and be always gaining or losing some part of their bodily substance then in the first place it would be necessary that they should all have in them one and the same faculty of sensation. 2. Long out of irresistible impressions in the second place, they must have love in which pleasure and pain mingle also fear and anger and the feelings which are akin or opposite to them if they conquered these they would live righteously and if they were conquered by them, unrighteously. He who lived well during his appointed time was to return and dwell in his native star and there he would have a blessed and congenial existence. But if he failed in attaining this, at the second birth he would pass into a woman, and if, when in that state of being, he did not desist from evil he would continually be changed into some brute who resembled him in the evil nature which he had acquired, and would not cease from his toils and transformations until he followed the revolution of the same and the like within him and overcame by the help of reason the turbulent and irrational mob of later accretions, made up of fire and air and water and earth and returned to the form of his first and better state. Having given all these laws to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of future evil in any of them, the creator sowed some of them in the earth, and some in the moon and some in the other instruments of time and when he had sown them he committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul and having made all the suitable additions, to rule over them and to pilot the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner which they could, and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.

When the creator had made all these ordinances he remained in his own accustomed nature, and his children heard and were obedient to their father's word and receiving from him the immortal principle of a mortal creature, in imitation of their own creator they borrowed portions of fire, and earth, and water and air from the world [43] which were hereafter to be restored—these they took and welded them together not with the indissoluble chains by which they were themselves bound but with little pegs too small to be visible making up out of all the four elements each separate body and fastening the courses of the immortal soul in a body which was in a state of perpetual influx

and efflux. Now these courses, detained as in a vast river neither overcame nor were overcome but were hurrying and hurried on and so that the whole animal was moved and progressed irregularly however and irrationally and anyhow in all the six directions of motion, wandering backwards and forwards, and right and left and up and down and in all the six directions. For great as was the advancing and returning flood which provided nourishment the affections produced by external contact caused still greater tumult—when the body of any one met and came into collision with some external fire or with the solid earth or the gliding waters or was caught in the tempest borne on the air and the motions produced by any of these impulses were carried through the body to the soul. All such motions have consequently received the general name of "sensations" which they still retain. And they did in fact at that time create a very great and mighty movement uniting with the everflowing stream in stirring up and violently shaking the courses of the soul they completely stopped the revolution of the same by their opposing current, and hindered it from predominating and advancing and they so disturbed the nature of the other or diverse, that the three double intervals [i.e. between 1, 2, 4, 8] and the three triple intervals [i.e. between 1, 3, 9, 27] together with the mean terms and connecting links which are expressed by the ratios of 3, 2, and 4, 3 and of 9, 8—these, although they cannot be wholly undone except by him who united them were twisted by them in all sorts of ways and the circles were broken and disordered in every possible manner so that when they moved they were tumbling to pieces and moved irrationally at one time in a reverse direction, and then again obliquely and then upside down as you might imagine a person who is upside down and has his head leaning upon the ground and his feet up against something in the air and when he is in such a position both he and the spectator fancy that the right of either is his left and left right. If when powerfully experiencing these and similar effects the revolutions of the soul come in contact with some external thing [44] either of the class of the same or of the other they speak of the same or of the other in a manner the very opposite of the truth and they become false and foolish and there is no course or revolution in them which has a guiding or directing power and if again any sensations enter violently from without and drag after them the whole vessel of the soul

And he gave to each of them two movements the first a movement on the same spot after the same manner, whereby they ever continue to think consistently the same thoughts about the same things the second a forward movement in which they are controlled by the revolution of the same and the like but by the other five motions they were unaffected [cf. 43] in order that each of them might attain the highest perfection And for this reason the fixed stars were created to be divine and eternal animals ever abiding and revolving after the same manner and on the same spot and the other stars which reverse their motion and are subject to deviations of this kind were created in the manner already described The earth which is our nurse clinging around the pole which is extended through the universe he framed to be the guardian and artificer of night and day first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven Vain would be the attempt to tell all the figures of them circling as in dance and their juxtapositions and the return of them in their revolutions upon themselves and their approximations and to say which of these duties in their conjunctions meet, and which of them are in opposition and in what order they get behind and before one another and when they are severally eclipsed to our sight and again reappear sending terrors and intimations of the future to those who cannot calculate their movements—to attempt to tell of all this without a visible representation of the heavenly system would be labour in vain Enough on this head and now let what we have said about the nature of the created and visible gods have an end

To know or tell the origin of the other divinities is beyond us and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods—that is what they say—and they must surely have known their own ancestors How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs still as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family we must conform to custom and believe them In this manner then according to them the genealogy of these gods is to be received and set forth

Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and Heaven and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea and all that generation [41] and from Cronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and Here and all those who are said to be their brethren and others who were the children of these

Now when all of them both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature had come into being the creator of the universe addressed them in these words Gods children of gods who are my works and of whom I am the artificer and father my creations are indissoluble, if so I will All that is bound may be undone but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and happy Wherefore since ye are but creatures ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble but ye shall certainly not be dissolved nor be liable to the fate of death having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which ye were bound at the time of your birth And now listen to my instructions—Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created—without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will not contain every kind of animal which it ought to contain if it is to be perfect On the other hand if they were created by me and received life at my hands they would be on an equality with the gods In order then that they may be mortal and that this universe may be truly universal do ye according to your natures betake yourselves to the formation of animals imitating the power which was shown by me in creating you The part of them worthy of the name immortal which is called divine and is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and you—of that divine part I will myself sow the seed and having made a beginning I will hand the work over to you And do ye then interweave the mortal with the immortal and make and beget living creatures and give them food and make them to grow and receive them again in death

Thus he spake and once more into the cup in which he had previously mingled the soul of the universe he poured the remains of the elements and mingled them in much the same manner they were not however pure as before but diluted to the second and third degree And having made it he divided the whole mixture into souls equal in number to the stars and assigned each soul to a star and having there placed them as in a chariot he showed them the nature of the universe and declared to them the laws of destiny according to which their first birth would be one and the same for all—no one should suffer a disadvantage at his hands they were to be sown in the instruments of time severally adapted to them [42] and to come forth the most religious of animals and as human nature was of two kinds the superior

of one of the two concurring lights is reversed and this happens when the mirror is concave and its smooth surface repels the right stream of vision to the left side, and the left to the right. Or if the mirror be turned vertically then the concavity makes the countenance appear to be all upside down, and the lower rays are driven upwards and the upper downwards.

All these are to be reckoned among the second and co-operative causes which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far as possible, uses as his ministers. They are thought by most men not to be the second but the prime causes of all things, because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, and the like. But they are not so for they are incapable of reason or intellect the only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul whereas fire and water and earth and air are all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and knowledge ought to explore causes of intelligent nature first of all, and secondly of those things which being moved by others are compelled to move others. And this is what we too must do. Both kinds of causes should be acknowledged by us but a distinction should be made between those which are endowed with mind and are the workers of things fair and good and those which are deprived of intelligence and always produce chance effects without order or design. Of the second or co-operative causes of sight, which help to give to the eyes the power which they now possess, enough has been said. I will therefore now proceed to speak of the higher use and purpose for which God has given them to us [47]. The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never seen the stars and the sun and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered. But with the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years have created number and have given us a conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the universe and from this source we have derived philosophy than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. Thus is the greatest boon of sight and if the lesser benefits why should I speak of the ordinary man if he were deprived of them would bewail his loss but in vain. Thus much let me say however. God intended and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed

to the perturbed and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries. The same may be affirmed of speech and hearing, they have been given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason. For this is the principal end of speech whereto it most contributes. Moreover so much of music as is adapted to the sound of the voice and to the sense of hearing is granted to us for the sake of harmony and harmony which has motions akin to the revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by the intelligent votary of the Muses as given by them with a view to irrational pleasure, which is deemed to be the purpose of it in our day but as meant to correct any discord which may have arisen in the courses of the soul, and to be our ally in bringing her into harmony and agreement with herself and rhythm too was given by them for the same reason on account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail among mankind generally and to help us against them.

Thus far in what we have been saying with small exception, the works of intelligence have been set forth and now we must place by the side of them in our discourse the things which come into being through necessity—for the creation is mixed [48] being made up of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection and thus and after this manner in the beginning when the influence of reason got the better of necessity the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in which the work was accomplished he must include the other influence of the variable cause as well. Wherefore we must return again and find another suitable beginning as about the former matters so also about these. To which end we must consider the nature of fire, and water and air and earth such as they were prior to the creation of the heaven and what was happening to them in this previous state for no one has as yet explained the manner of their generation but we speak of fire and the rest of them whatever they mean as though men knew their natures and we maintain them to be the first principles and letters or elements of the whole, when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any sense even to syllables or first compounds. And let me say thus much. I will not now speak of the first principle or principles of all things, or by whatever

then the courses of the soul though they seem to conquer are really conquered

And by reason of all these affections the soul when encased in a mortal body now as in the beginning ■ at first without intelligence but when the flood of growth and nutriment abates and the courses of the soul, calming down, go their own way and become steadier as time goes on then the several circles return ■ their natural form and their revolutions are corrected and they call the same and the other by their right names and make the possessor of them to become a rational being And if these combine in him with any true nurture or education he attains the fulness and health of the perfect man and escapes the worst disease of all but if he neglects education he walks lame to the end of his life and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below This how ever is a later stage at present we must treat more exactly the subject before us which involves a preliminary enquiry into the generation of the body and its members and as to how the soul was created—for what reason and by what providence of the gods and holding fast to probability we must pursue our way

First then the gods imitating the spherical shape of the universe enclosed the two divine courses in a spherical body that namely which we now term the head being the most divine part of us and the lord of all that is in us to this the gods when they put together the body gave all the other members to be servants considering that it partook of every sort of motion In order then that it might not tumble about among the high and deep places of the earth but might be able to get over the one and out of the other they provided the body to be its vehicle and means of locomotion which consequently had length and was furnished with four limbs extended and flexible these God contrived to be instruments of locomotion with which it might take hold and find support [45] and so be able to pass through all places carrying on high the dwelling place of the most sacred and divine part of us Such was the origin of legs and hands which for this reason were attached to every man and the gods deeming the front part of man to be more honourable and more fit to command than the hinder part made us to move mostly in a forward direction Wherefore man must needs have his front part unlike and distinguished from the rest of his body

And so in the vessel of the head they first of all put a face in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the providence of

the soul and they appointed this part, which has authority to be by nature the part which is in front And of the organs they first contrived the eyes to give light and the principle according to which they were inserted was as follows So much of fire as would not burn but gave a gentle light they formed into a substance akin to the light of every-day life and the pure fire which is within us and related thereto they made to flow through the eyes in a stream smooth and dense compressing the whole eye, and especially the centre part so that it kept out everything of a coarser nature and allowed to pass only this pure element When the light of day surrounds the stream of vision then like falls upon like and they coalesce and one body is formed by natural affinity in the line of vision, wherever the light that falls from within meets with an external object And the whole stream of vision being similarly affected in virtue of similarity diffuses the motions of what it touches or what touches it over the whole body until they reach the soul causing that perception which we call sight But when night comes on and the external kindred fire departs then the stream of vision is cut off for going forth to an unlike element it is changed and extinguished being no longer of one nature with the surrounding atmosphere which is now deprived of fire and so the eye no longer sees and we feel disposed to sleep For when the eyelids which the gods invented for the preservation of sight are closed they keep in the internal fire and the power of the fire diffuses and equalises the inward motions when they are equalised there is rest and when the rest is profound [46] sleep comes over us scarce disturbed by dreams but where the greater motions still remain of whatever nature and in whatever locality they engender corresponding visions in dreams, which are remembered by us when we are awake and in the external world And now there is no longer any difficulty in understanding the creation of images in mirrors and all smooth and bright surfaces For from the communion of the internal and external fires and again from the union of them and their numerous transformations when they meet in the mirror all these appearances of necessity arise when the fire from the face coalesces with the fire from the eye on the bright and smooth surface And right appears left and left right because the visual rays come into contact with the rays emitted by the object in a manner contrary to the usual mode of meeting but the right appears right and the left left when the position

wonderful and inexplicable manner which we will hereafter investigate. For the present we have only to conceive of three natures: first that which is in process of generation; secondly that in which the generation takes place; and thirdly that of which the thing generated is a resemblance. And we may liken the receiving principle to a mother and the source or spring to a father and the intermediate nature to a child and may remark further that if the model is to take every variety of form, then the matter in which the model is fashioned will not be duly prepared unless it is formless, and free from the impress of any of those shapes which it is hereafter to receive from without. For if the matter were like any of the supervening forms, then whenever any opposite or entirely different nature was stamped upon its surface, it would take the impression badly because it would intrude its own shape. Wherefore, that which is to receive all forms should have no form as in making perfumes they first contrive that the liquid substance which is to receive the scent shall be as inodorous as possible or as those who wish to impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous impression to remain, [51] but begin by making the surface as even and smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of all eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form. Wherefore the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air or fire or water or any of their compounds or any of the elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong as far as however as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her nature which from time to time is inflamed and water that which is moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and air in so far as she receives the impressions of them.

Let us consider this question more precisely: Is there any self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing whatever besides them? And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name? Here is a ques-

tion which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined nor must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision: neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression equally long but if it is possible to set forth a great principle in a few words, that is just what we want.

Thus I state my view.—If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense and apprehended only by the mind if however as some say true opinion differs in no respect from mind then every thing that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature: the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion: the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason: the one cannot be overcome by persuasion but the other can and lastly every man may be said to share in true opinion but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, [52] uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other but invisible and imperceptible by any sense and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a third nature which is space and is eternal and admits not of destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason and is hardly real which we behold as in a dream: say of all existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. Of these and other things of the same kind, relating to the true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dreamlike sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth about them. For an image, since the reality after which it is modelled does not belong to it, and it exists ever as the fleeting shadow of some other must be inferred to be in another [i.e. in space] grasping existence in some way or other or it could not be at all. But true and exact reason, indicating the nature of true being maintains that while two things (i.e. the

name they are to be called for this reason—because it is difficult to set forth my opinion according to the method of discussion which we are at present employing. Do not imagine any more than I can bring myself to imagine that I should be right in undertaking so great and difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about probability I will do my best to give as probable an explanation as any other—or rather more probable and I will first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing and of all. Once more then at the commencement of my discourse I call upon God and beg him to be our saviour out of a strange and unwonted enquiry and to bring us to the haven of probability. So now let us begin again.

This new beginning of our discussion of the universe requires a fuller division than the former for then we made two classes now a third must be revealed. The two sufficed for the former discussion one which we assumed was a pattern intelligible and always the same [49] and the second was only the imitation of the pattern generated and visible. There is also a third kind which we did not distinguish at the time conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the argument seems to require that we should set forth in words another kind which is difficult of explanation and dimly seen. What nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being? We reply that it is the receptacle and in a manner the nurse of all generation. I have spoken the truth but I must express myself in clearer language and this will be an arduous task for many reasons and in particular because I must first raise questions concerning fire and the other elements and determine what each of them is for to say with any probability or certitude which of them should be called water rather than fire and which should be called any of them rather than all or some one of them is a difficult matter. How then shall we settle this point and what questions about the elements may be fairly raised?

In the first place we see that what we just now called water by condensation I suppose becomes stone and earth and this same element, when melted and dispersed passes into vapour and air. Air again when inflamed becomes fire and again fire when condensed and extinguished passes once more into the form of air and once more air when collected and condensed produces cloud and mist and from these when still more compressed comes flowing water and from water comes earth and stones once more and thus generation appears

to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus then as the several elements never present themselves in the same form how can any one have the assurance to assert positively that any of them whatever it may be, is one thing rather than another? No one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows—Anything which we see to be continually changing is for example fire we must not call this or that but rather say that it is of such a nature nor let us speak of water as this but always as such nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use of the words this and that supposing ourselves to signify something thereby for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as this, or that or relative to this or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply this to any of them but rather the word such which expresses the similar principle circulating in each and all of them for example that should be called fire which is of such a nature always and so of everything that has generation. That in which the elements severally grow up, and appear and decay is alone to be called by the name this or that [50] but that which is of a certain nature hot or white, or anything which admits of opposite qualities and all things that are compounded of them ought not to be so denominated. Let me make another attempt to explain my meaning more clearly. Suppose a person to make all kinds of figures of gold and to be always transmuting one form into all the rest—somebody points to one of them and asks what it is. By far the safest and truest answer is That is gold and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are formed in the gold these, as though they had existence, since they are in process of change while he is making the assertion but if the questioner be willing to take the safe and indefinite expression such we should be satisfied. And the same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies—that must be always called the same for while receiving all things, she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any way or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her she is the natural recipient of all impressions and is stirred and informed by them and appears different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a

broken up, many small bodies will spring up out of them and take their own proper figures or again, when many small bodies are dissolved into their triangles, if they become one, they will form one large mass of another kind. So much for their passage into one another. I have now to speak of their several kinds, and show out of what combinations of numbers each of them was formed. The first will be the simplest and smallest construction, and its element is that triangle which has its hypotenuse twice the lesser side. When two such triangles are joined at the diagonal, and thus repeated three times, and the triangles rest their diagonals and shorter sides on the same point as a centre, a single equilateral triangle is formed out of six triangles and four equilateral triangles, if put together make out of every three plane angles one solid angle, being that which is nearest to the most obtuse of plane angles [55] and out of the combination of these four angles arises the first solid form which distributes into equal and similar parts the whole circle in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid is formed out of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles and form one solid angle out of four plane angles, and out of six such angles the second body is completed. And the third body is made up of 120 triangular elements, forming twelve solid angles, each of them included in five plane equilateral triangles, having altogether twenty bases, each of which is an equilateral triangle. The one element [that is, the triangle which has its hypotenuse twice the lesser side] having generated these figures, generated no more but the use of the triangle produced the fourth elementary figure, which is compounded of four such triangles, joining their right angles in a centre, and forming one equilateral quadrangle. Six of these united form eight solid angles, each of which is made by the combination of three plane right angles the figure of the body thus composed is a cube, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There as yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe.

Now he who duly reflecting on all this, enquires whether the worlds are to be regarded as indefinite or definite in number will be of opinion that the notion of their indefiniteness is characteristic of a sadly indefinite and ignorant mind. He, however, who raises the question whether they are to be truly regarded as one or five, takes up a more reasonable position. Arguing from probabilities, I am of opinion that they

are one another regarding the question from another point of view will be of another mind. But, leaving this enquiry let us proceed to distribute the elementary forms, which have now been created in idea, among the four elements.

To earth, then, let us assign the cubical form for earth is the most immovable of the four and the most plastic of all bodies, and that which has the most stable bases must of necessity be of such a nature. Now of the triangles which we assumed at first, that which has two equal sides is by nature more firmly based than that which has unequal sides and of the compound figures which are formed out of either the plane equilateral quadrangle has necessarily a more stable basis than the equilateral triangle, both in the whole and in the parts. [56] We therefore in assigning this figure to earth we adhere to probability and to water we assign that one of the remaining forms which is the least moveable and the most moveable of them is fire and to air that which is intermediate. Also we assign the smallest body to fire, and the greatest to water and the intermediate in size to air and again the acutest body to fire, and the next in acuteness to air and the third to water. Of all these elements, that which has the fewest bases must necessarily be the most moveable, for it must be the acutest and most penetrating in every way and also the lightest as being composed of the smallest number of similar particles and the second body has similar properties in a second degree, and the third body in the third degree. Let it be agreed then, both according to strict reason and according to probability that the pyramid is the solid which is the original element and seed of fire and let us assign the element which was next in the order of generation to air and the third to water. We must imagine all these to be so small that no single particle of any of the four kinds is seen by us on account of their smallness but when many of them are collected together their aggregates are seen. And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, every here God as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has exactly perfected and harmonised in due proportion.

From all that we have just been saying about the elements or kinds the most probable conclusion is as follows — earth, when meeting with fire and dissolved by its sharpness whether the dissolution take place in the fire itself or perhaps in some mass of air or water is borne hither and thither until its parts, meeting together and mutually harmonising again be

image and space] are different they cannot exist one of them in the other and so be one and also two at the same time

Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts and my verdict is that being and space and generation these three existed in their three ways before the heaven and that the nurse of generation moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and receiving the forms of earth and air and experiencing all the affections which accompany these presented a strange variety of appearances and being full of powers which were neither similar nor equally balanced was never in any part in a state of equipoise but swaying unevenly hither and thither was shaken by them and by its motion again shook them and the elements when moved were separated and carried continually some one way some another as when grain is shaken and winnowed by fans and other instruments used in the threshing of corn [53] the close and heavy particles are borne away and settle in one direction and the loose and light particles in another In this manner the four kinds or elements were then shaken by the receiving vessel which moving like a winnowing machine scattered far away from one another the elements most unlike and forced the most similar elements into close contact Wherefore also the various elements had different places before they were arranged so as to form the universe At first they were all without reason and measure But when the world began to get into order fire and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves and were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of God this I say was their nature at that time and God fashioned them by form and number Let it be consistently maintained by us in all that we say that God made them as far as possible the fairest and best out of things which were not fair and good And now I will endeavour to show you the disposition and generation of them by an unaccustomed argument which I am compelled to use but I believe that you will be able to follow me for your education has made you familiar with the methods of science

In the first place then as is evident to all fire and earth and water and air are bodies And every sort of body possesses solidity and every solid must necessarily be contained in planes and every plane rectilinear figure is composed of triangles and all triangles are originally of two kinds both of which are made up of one right and two acute angles one of them has at

either end of the base the half of a divided right angle having equal sides while in the other the right angle is divided into unequal parts having unequal sides These then proceeding by a combination of probability with demonstration we assume to be the original elements of fire and the other bodies but the principles which are prior to these God only knows, and he of men who is the friend of God And next we have to determine what are the four most beautiful bodies which are unlike one another and of which some are capable of resolution in to one another for having discovered thus much we shall know the true origin of earth and fire and of the proportionate and intermediate elements And then we shall not be willing to allow that there are any distinct kinds of visible bodies fairer than these Wherefore we must endeavour to construct the four forms of bodies which excel in beauty and then we shall be able to say that we have sufficiently apprehended their nature [54] Now of the two triangles the isosceles has one form only the scalene or unequal sided has an infinite number Of the infinite forms we must select the most beautiful if we are to proceed in due order and any one who can point out a more beautiful form than ours for the construction of these bodies shall carry off the palm not as an enemy but as a friend Now the one which we maintain to be the most beautiful of all the many triangles (and we need not speak of the others) is that of which the double forms a third triangle which is equilateral the reason of this would be long to tell he who disproves what we are saying and shows that we are mistaken may claim a friendly victory Then let us choose two triangles out of which fire and the other elements have been constructed one isosceles the other having the square of the longer side equal to three times the square of the lesser side

Now is the time to explain what was before obscurely said there was an error in imagining that all the four elements might be generated by and into one another this I say was an erroneous supposition for there are generated from the triangles which we have selected four kinds—three from the one which has the sides unequal the fourth alone is framed out of the isosceles triangle Hence they cannot all be resolved into one another a great number of small bodies being combined into a few large ones or the converse But three of them can be thus resolved and compounded for they all spring from one, and when the greater bodies are

broken up many small bodies will spring up out of them and take their own proper figures or again, when many small bodies are dissolved into their triangles, if they become one, they will form one large mass of another kind. So much for their passage into one another. I have now to speak of their several kinds, and show out of what combinations of numbers each of them was formed. The first will be the simplest and smallest construction, and its element is that triangle which has its hypothenuse twice the lesser side. When two such triangles are joined at the diagonal and this is repeated three times, and the triangles rest their diagonals and shorter sides on the same point as a centre, a single equilateral triangle is formed out of six triangles and four equilateral triangles, if put together make out of every three plane angles one solid angle, being that which is nearest to the most obtuse of plane angles [35] and out of the combination of these four angles arises the first solid form which distributes into equal and similar parts the whole circle in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid is formed out of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles and form one solid angle out of four plane angles and out of six such angles the second body is completed. And the third body is made up of 120 triangular elements, forming twelve solid angles, each of them included in five plane equilateral triangles, having altogether twenty bases each of which is an equilateral triangle. The one element [that is, the triangle which has its hypothenuse twice the lesser side] having generated these figures generated no more but the smallest triangle produced the fourth elementary figure, which is compounded of four such triangles, joining their right angles in a centre and forming one equilateral quadrangle. Six of these united form eight solid angles, each of which is made by the combination of three plane right angles the figure of the body thus composed is a cube, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe.

Now he who duly reflects on all this enquires whether the world is to be regarded as indefinite or definite in number will be of opinion that the notion of their indefiniteness is characteristic of a sadly indefinite and ignorant mind. He however who raises the question whether they are to be truly regarded as one or five, takes up a more reasonable position. Arguing from probabilities, I am of opinion that they

are one another regarding the question from another point of view will be of another mind. But, leaving this enquiry let us proceed to distribute the elementary forms, which have now been created in idea, among the four elements.

To earth then, let us assign the cubical form for earth is the most immovable of the four and the most plastic of all bodies, and that which has the most stable bases must of necessity be of such a nature. Now of the triangles which have been assumed at first, that which has two equal sides is by nature more firmly based than that which has unequal sides and of the compound figures which are formed out of either the plane equilateral quadrangle has necessarily a more stable basis than the equilateral triangle both in the whole and in the parts [36]. Wherefore, in assigning this figure to earth we adhere to probability and to what we assign that one of the remaining forms which is the least movable and the most moveable of them to fire and to air that which is intermediate. Also we assign the smallest body to fire, and the greatest to water and the intermediate in size to air and again the acutest body to fire and the next in acuteness to air and the third to water. Of all these elements, that which has the fewest bases must necessarily be the most moveable, for it must be the acutest and most penetrating in every way and also the lightest as being composed of the smallest number of similar particles and the second body has similar properties in a second degree and the third body in the third degree. Let it be agreed then, both according to strict reason and according to probability that the pyramid is the solid which is the original element and seed of fire and let us assign the element which was next in the order of generation to air and the third to water. We must imagine all these to be so small that no single particle of any of the four kinds is seen by us on account of their smallness but when many of them are collected together their aggregates are seen. And the ratios of the numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere God as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has exactly perfected and harmonised in due proportion.

From all that we have just been saying about the elements or kinds the most probable conclusion is as follows—earth, when meeting with fire and dissolved by its sharpness, whether the dissolution take place in the fire itself or perhaps in some mass of air or water is borne hither and thither until its parts, meeting together and mutually harmonising again be

come earth, for they can never take any other form. But water when divided by fire or by air on re-forming may become one part fire and two parts air and a single volume of air divided becomes two of fire. Again when a small body of fire is contained in a larger body of air or water or earth and both are moving and the fire struggling to overcome and broken up then two volumes of fire form one volume of air and when air is overcome and cut up into small pieces two and a half parts of air are condensed into one part of water. Let us consider the matter in another way. When one of the other elements is fastened upon by fire [57] and is cut by the sharpness of its angles and sides it coalesces with the fire and then ceases to be cut by them any longer. For no element which is one and the same with itself can be changed by or change another of the same kind and in the same state. But so long as in the process of transition the weaker is fighting against the stronger the dissolution continues. Again when a few small particles enclosed in many larger ones are in process of decomposition and extinction they only cease from their tendency to extinction when they consent to pass into the conquering nature and fire becomes air and air water. But if bodies of an other kind go and attack them [i.e. the small particles] the latter continue to be dissolved until being completely forced back and dispersed they make their escape to their own kindred or else being overcome and assimilated to the conquering power they remain where they are and dwell with their victors and from being many become one. And owing to these affections, all things are changing their place for by the motion of the receiving vessel the bulk of each class is distributed into its proper place, but those things which become unlike themselves and like other things are hurried by the shaking into the place of the things to which they grow like.

Now all unmixed and primary bodies are produced by such causes as these. As to the subordinate species which are included in the greater kinds they are to be attributed to the varieties in the structure of the two original triangles. For either structure did not originally produce the triangle of one size only but some larger and some smaller and there are as many sizes as there are species of the four elements. Hence when they are mingled with themselves and with one another there is an endless variety of them, which those who would arrive at the probable truth of nature ought duly to consider.

Unless a person comes to an understanding about the nature and conditions of rest and motion he will meet with many difficulties in the discussion which follows. Something has been said of this matter already and something more remains to be said which is that motion never exists in what is uniform. For to conceive that anything can be moved without a mover is hard or indeed impossible and equally impossible to conceive that there can be a mover unless there be something which can be moved—motion cannot exist where either of these are wanting and for these to be uniform is impossible wherefore we must assign rest to uniformity and motion to the want of uniformity [58]. Now inequality is the cause of the nature which is wanting in uniformity and of this we have already described the origin. But there still remains the further point—why things when divided after their kinds do not cease to pass through one another and to change their place—which we will now proceed to explain. In the revolution of the universe are comprehended all the four elements and this being circular and having a tendency to come together compresses everything and will not allow any place to be left void. Wherefore also fire above all things penetrates everywhere, and air next, as being next in rarity of the elements and the two other elements in like manner penetrate according to their degrees of rarity. For those things which are composed of the largest particles have the largest void left in their compositions and those which are composed of the smallest particles have the least. And the contraction caused by the compression thrusts the smaller particles into the interstices of the larger. And thus, when the small parts are placed side by side with the larger and the lesser divide the greater and the greater unite the lesser all the elements are borne up and down and hither and thither towards their own places, for the change in the size of each changes its position in space. And these causes generate an inequality which is always maintained and is continually creating a perpetual motion of the elements in all time.

In the next place we have to consider that there are divers kinds of fire. There are for example first flame and secondly those emanations of flame which do not burn but only give light to the eyes. Thirdly the remains of fire, which are seen in red hot embers after the flame has been extinguished. There are similar differences in the air of which the brightest part is called the æther and the most turbid sort mist and darkness and there are various other

nameless kinds which arise from the inequality of the triangles. Water again, admits in the first part of a division into two kinds: the one liquid and the other fusile. The liquid kind is composed of the small and unequal particles of water and moves itself and is moved by other bodies owing to the want of uniformity and the shape of its particles whereas the fusile kind, being formed of large and uniform particles, is more stable than the other and is heavy and compact by reason of its uniformity. But when fire gets in and dissolves the particles and destroys the uniformity it has greater mobility and becoming fluid is thrust forth by the neighbouring air and spreads upon the earth and thus dissolution of the solid masses is called melting. /59/ And their spreading out upon the earth flowing. Again, when the fire goes out of the same substance, it does not pass into a vacuum, but into the neighbouring air and the air which is displaced forces to the liquid and solid mobile mass into the place which was occupied by the fire, and unites it with itself. Thus compressed the mass resumes its equilibrium and is again at unity with itself, because the fire which was the author of the inequality has retreated and thus departure of the fire is called cooling, and the coming to rest which follows upon it is termed congealment. Of all the kinds termed fusile, that which is the densest and is formed out of the finest and most uniform parts is that most precious possession called gold, which is hardened by filtration through rock: this is unique in kind, and has both a glittering and a yellow colour. A shoot of gold, which is so dense as to be very hard, and takes a black colour is termed adamant. There is also another kind which has parts nearly like gold, and of which there are several species, it is denser than gold, and it contains a small and fine portion of earth, and is therefore harder yet also lighter because of the great interstices which it has within itself and this substance, which is one of the bright and denser kinds of water when solidified is called copper. There is an alloy of earth mingled with it, which, when the two parts grow old and are diminished, shows itself separately and is called rust. The remaining phenomena of the same kind there will be no difficulty in reasoning out by the method of probabilities. A man may sometimes set aside meditations about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider the truths of generation which are probable only: he will thus gain a pleasure not to be repented of, and secure for himself what he lives a wise

and moderate pastime. Let us grant ourselves this indulgence, and go through the probabilities relating to the same subjects which follow next in order.

Water which is mingled with fire, so much as is fine and liquid (being so called by reason of its motion and the way in which it rolls along the ground) and soft, because its bases give way and are less stable than those of earth, when separated from fire and air and isolated, becomes more uniform, and by their retirement is compressed into itself and if the condensation be very great, the water above the earth becomes hail, but on the earth, ice: and that which is congealed to a less degree and is only half solid when above the earth is called snow and when upon the earth, and condensed from dew hoar frost. Then, again, there are the numerous kinds of water which have been mingled with one another and are distilled through plants which grow in the earth and thus whose class is called by the name of juices or saps. /60/ The unequal admixture of these fluids creates a variety of species: most of them are nameless, but four which are of a fiery nature are clearly distinguished and have names. First, there is wine, which warms the soul as well as the body; secondly there is the oily nature which is smooth and divides the visual ray and for this reason is bright and shining and of a glowering appearance, including pitch, the juice of the caustic berry, oil itself, and other things of a like kind; thirdly there is the class of substances which expand the contracted parts of the mouth, until they return to their natural state, and by reason of this property create sweetness,—these are included under the general name of honey and, lastly there is a frothy nature, which differs from all juices, having a burning quality which dissolves the flesh: it is called opor (a vegetable acid).

As to the kinds of earth, that which is altered through water passes into stone in the following manner.—The water which mixes with the earth and is broken up in the process changes into air and taking this form mounts into its own place. But as there is no surrounding vacuum it thrusts away the neighbouring air and thus being rendered heavy and, when it is displaced, having been poured around the mass of earth, firmly compresses it and drives it into the vacant space whence the new air had come up and the earth when compressed by the air into an indissoluble union with water becomes rock. The fairer sort is that which is made up

of equal and similar parts and is transparent that which has the opposite qualities is inferior But when all the watery part is suddenly drawn out by fire, a more brittle substance is formed to which we give the name of pottery Some times also moisture may remain and the earth which has been fused by fire becomes when cool a certain stone of a black colour A like separation of the water which had been copiously mingled with them may occur in two substances composed of finer particles of earth and of a briny nature out of either of them a half solid body is then formed soluble in water—the one soda which is used for purging away oil and earth and other salt, which harmonizes so well in combinations pleasing to the palate and is as the law testifies a substance dear to the gods The compounds of earth and water are not soluble by water but by fire only, and for this reason—Neither fire nor air melt masses of earth for their particles being smaller than the interspaces in its structure have plenty of room to move without forcing their way and so they leave the earth unmelted and undissolved but particles of water [61] which are larger force a passage and dissolve and melt the earth Wherefore earth when not consolidated by force is dissolved by water only when consolidated by nothing but fire for this is the only body which can find an entrance The cohesion of water again, when very strong is dissolved by fire only—when weaker then either by air or fire—the former entering the interstices and the latter penetrating even the triangles But nothing can dissolve air, when strongly condensed which does not reach the elements or triangles or if not strongly condensed then only fire can dissolve it As to bodies composed of earth and water while the water occupies the vacant interstices of the earth in them which are compressed by force the particles of water which approach them from without finding no entrance flow around the entire mass and leave it undissolved but the particles of fire entering into the interstices of the water do to the water what water does to earth and fire to air and are the sole causes of the compound body of earth and water liquefying and becoming fluid Now these bodies are of two kinds some of them, such as glass and the fusible sort of stones have less water than they have earth on the other hand substances of the nature of wax and incense have more of water entering into their composition

I have thus shown the various classes of bodies as they are diversified by their forms and

combinations and changes into one another and now I must endeavour to set forth their affections and the causes of them In the first place the bodies which I have been describing are necessarily objects of sense But we have not yet considered the origin of flesh or what belongs to flesh or of that part of the soul which is mortal And these things cannot be adequately explained without also explaining the affections which are concerned with sensation not the latter without the former and yet to explain them together is hardly possible, for which reason we must assume first one or the other and afterwards examine the nature of our hypothesis In order then that the affections may follow regularly after the elements let us presuppose the existence of body and soul

First let us enquire what we mean by saying that fire is hot and about this we may reason from the dividing or cutting power which it exercises on our bodies We all of us feel that fire is sharp and we may further consider the fineness of the sides and the sharpness of the angles and the smallness of the particles and the swiftness of the motion—all this makes the action of fire violent and sharp [62] so that it cuts whatever it meets And we must not forget that the original figure of fire (i.e. the pyramid), more than any other form has a dividing power which cuts our bodies into small pieces (*κεκρωτισται*) and thus naturally produces that affection which we call heat and hence the origin of the name (*θερμος κερμα*) Now the opposite of this is sufficiently manifest nevertheless we will not fail to describe it For the larger particles of moisture which surround the body entering in and driving out the lesser but not being able to take their places compress the moist principle in us and this from being unequal and disturbed is forced by them into a state of rest which is due to equability and compression But things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature at war and force themselves apart and to this war and convulsion the name of shivering and trembling is given and the whole affection and the cause of the affection are both termed cold That is called hard to which our flesh yields and soft which yields to our flesh and things are also termed hard and soft relatively to one another That which yields has a small base but that which rests on quadrangular bases is firmly posed and belongs to the class which offers the greatest resistance so too does that which is the most compact and therefore most repellent The nature of the light and the heavy will be best under

good when examined in connexion with our notions of above and below for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the universe is parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other the one a lower to which all things tend which have any bulk and an upper to which things only ascend against their will For as the universe is in the form of a sphere all the extremities being equidistant from the centre are equally extremities and the centre which is equidistant from them is equally to be regarded as the opposite of them all Such being the nature of the world when a person says that any of these points is above or below may he not be justly charged with using an improper expression? For the centre of the world cannot be rightly called either above or below but is the centre and nothing else and the circumference is not the centre, and has in no one part of itself a different relation to the centre from what it has in any of the opposite parts Indeed when it is in every direction similar how can one rightly give to it names which imply opposition? For if there were any solid body in equilibrium at the centre of the [63] universe there would be nothing to draw it to its extreme rather than to that, for they are all perfectly similar and if a person were to go round the world in a circle, he would often when standing at the antipodes of his former position speak of the same point as above and below for as I was saying just now to speak of the whole which is in the form of a globe as having one part above and another below is not like a sensible man

The reason why these names are used and the circumstances under which they are ordinarily applied by us to the division of the heavens, may be elucidated by the following supposition—if a person were to stand in that part of the universe which is the appointed place of fire, and where there is the great mass of fire to which fiery bodies gather—if I say he were to ascend thither and finding the power to do this, were to abstract particles of fire and put them in scales and weigh them and then raising the balance were to draw the fire by force towards the uncongenial element of the air it would be ery evident that he could compel the small mass more readily than the larger for when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power the smaller body must necessarily yield to the superior power with less reluctance than the larger and the larger body is called heavy and said to tend downwards, and the smaller body is called light and said to

tend upwards And we may detect ourselves who are upon the earth doing precisely the same thing For we often separate earthly natures, and sometimes earth itself and draw them into the uncongenial element of air by force and contrary to nature both clinging to their kindred elements But that which is smaller yields to the impulse given by us towards the dissimilar element more easily than the larger and so we call the former light and the place towards which it is impelled we call above and the contrary state and place we call heavy and below respectively Now the relations of these must necessarily vary because the principal masses of the different elements hold opposite positions for that which is light heavy below or above in one place will be found to be and become contrary and transverse and every way diverse in relation to that which is light, heavy below or above in an opposite place And about all of them this has to be considered—that the tendency of each towards its kindred element makes the body which is moved heavy and the place towards which the motion tends below but things which have an opposite tendency we call by an opposite name Such are the causes which we assign to these phenomena. As to the smooth and the rough any one who sees them can explain the reason of them to another For roughness is hardness mingled with irregularity [64] and smoothness is produced by the joint effect of uniformity and density

The most important of the affections which concern the whole body remains to be considered—that is the cause of pleasure and pain in the perceptions of which I have been speaking, and in all other things which are perceived by sense through the parts of the body and have both pains and pleasures attendant on them Let us imagine the causes of every affection, whether of sense or not to be of the following nature, remembering that we have already distinguished between the nature which is easy and which is hard to move for this is the direction in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to take A body which is of a nature to be easily moved on receiving an impression however slight spreads abroad the motion in a circle the parts communicating with each other until at last reaching the principle of mind they announce the quality of the agent But a body of the opposite kind being immobile, and not extending to the surrounding region, merely receives the impression and does not stir any of the neighbouring parts and since the parts do not distribute the original impression to others

er parts it has no effect of motion on the whole animal and therefore produces no effect on the patient This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthy parts of the human body whereas what was said above relates mainly to sight and hearing because they have in them the greatest amount of fire and air Now we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way An impression produced in us contrary to nature and violent if sudden is painful and again the sudden return to nature is pleasant but a gentle and gradual return is imperceptible and *vice versa* On the other hand the impression of sense which is most easily produced is most readily felt but is not accompanied by pleasure or pain such for example are the affections of the sight which as we said above is a body naturally uniting with our body in the day time (45) for cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the sight do not give pain nor is there pleasure when the sight returns to its natural state but the sensations are clearest and strongest according to the manner in which the eye is affected by the object and itself strikes and touches it there is no violence either in the contraction or dilation of the eye But bodies formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a struggle and then they impart their motions to the whole and cause pleasure and pain—pain when alienated from their natural conditions (65) and pleasure when restored to them Things which experience gradual withdrawals and emptyings of their nature and great and sudden replenishments fail to perceive the emptying but are sensible of the replenishment and so they occasion no pain but the greatest pleasure to the mortal part of the soul as is manifest in the case of perfumes But things which are changed all of a sudden and only gradually and with difficulty return to their own nature have effects in every way opposite to the former as is evident in the case of burnings and cuttings of the body

Thus have we discussed the general affections of the whole body and the names of the agents which produce them And now I will endeavour to speak of the affections of particular parts and the causes and agents of them as far as I am able In the first place let us set forth what was omitted when we were speaking of juices concerning the affections peculiar to the tongue These too like most of the other affections appear to be caused by certain contractions and dilations but they have besides more of roughness and smoothness than is found in

other affections for whenever earthy particles enter into the small veins which are the testing instruments of the tongue, reaching to the heart, and fall upon the moist delicate portions of flesh—when as they are dissolved they contract and dry up the little veins they are astringent if they are rougher but if not so rough then only harsh Those of them which are of an abstergent nature and purge the whole surface of the tongue if they do it in excess and so encroach as to consume some part of the flesh it self like potash and soda are all termed bitter But the particles which are deficient in the alkaline quality and which cleanse only moderately are called salt and having no bitterness or roughness are regarded as rather agreeable than otherwise Bodies which share in and are made smooth by the heat of the mouth and which are inflamed and again in turn inflame that which heats them and which are so light that they are carried upwards to the sensations of the head (66) and cut all that comes in their way by reason of these qualities in them are all termed pungent But when these same particles refined by putrefaction enter into the narrow veins and are duly proportioned to the particles of earth and air which are there they set them whirling about one another and while they are in a whirl cause them to dash against and enter into one another and so form hollows surrounding the particles that enter—which watery vessels of air (for a film of moisture sometimes earthy sometimes pure is spread around the air) are hollow spheres of water and those of them which are pure are transparent and are called bubbles while those composed of the earthy liquid which is in a state of general agitation and effervescence are said to boil or ferment—of all these affections the cause is termed acid And there is the opposite affection arising from an opposite cause when the mass of entering particles immersed in the moisture of the mouth is congenial to the tongue and smooths and oilsover the roughness and relaxes the parts which are unnaturally contracted and contracts the parts which are relaxed and disposes them all according to their nature—that sort of remedy of violent affections is pleasant and agreeable to every man and has the name sweet But enough of this

The faculty of smell does not admit of differences of kind for all smells are of a half formed nature and no element is so proportioned as to have any smell The veins about the nose are too narrow to admit earth and water and too wide to detain fire and air and for

this reason no one ever perceives the smell of any of them but smells always proceed from bodies that are damp or putrefying or liquefying, or evaporating, and are perceptible only in the intermediate state, when water is changing into air and air into water and all of them are either vapor or mist. That which is passing out of air into water is mist, and that which is passing from water into air is vapour and hence all smells are thinner than water and thicker than air. The proof of this is that when there is any obstruction to the respiration, and a man draws in his breath by force, then no smell filters through, but the air without the smell alone penetrates. [67] Wherefore the varieties of smell have no name and they have not many definite and simple kinds but they are distinguished only as painful and pleasant, the one sort irritating and disturbing the whole cavity which is situated between the head and the neck, the other having a soothing influence, and restoring this same region to an agreeable and natural condition.

In considering the third kind of sense, hearing we must speak of the causes in which it originates. We may in general assume sound to be a blow which passes through the ears, and is transmitted by means of the air the brain, and the blood in the soul and that hearing is the vibration of this blow which begins in the head and ends in the region of the liver. The sound which moves swiftly is acute, and the sound which moves slowly is grave, and that which is regular is equable and smooth and the reverse is harsh. A great body of sound is loud, and a small body of sound the reverse. Respecting the harmonies of sound I must hereafter speak.

There is a fourth class of sensible things, having many intricate varieties which must now be distinguished. They are called by the general name of colours, and are a flame which emanates from every sort of body and has particles corresponding to the sense of sight. I have spoken already in what has preceded of the causes which generate sight, and in this place it will be natural and suitable to give a rational theory of colours.

Of the particles coming from other bodies which fall upon the sight, some are smaller and some are larger and some are equal to the parts of the sight itself. Those which are equal are unperceptible, and we call them transparent. The larger produce contraction, the smaller dilation, in the sight exercising a power akin to that of hot and cold bodies on the flesh, or of ascendant bodies on the tongue or of those

heating bodies which we termed pungent. White and black are similar effects of contraction and dilation in another sphere, and for this reason have a different appearance. Wherefore, we ought to term white that which dilates the visual ray and the opposite of this is black. There is also a swifter motion of a different sort of fire which strikes and dilates the ray of sight until it reaches the eyes [68] forcing a way through their passages and melting them and eliciting from them a union of fire and water which we call tears, being itself an opposite fire which comes to them from an opposite direction—the inner fire flashes forth like lightning and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the moisture, and all sorts of colours are generated by the mixture. This affection is termed dazzling and the object which produces it is called bright and flashing. There is another sort of fire which is intermediate, and which reaches and mingles with the moisture of the eye without flashing and in this, the fire mingling with the ray of the moisture, produces a colour like blood, to which we give the name of red. A bright hue mingled with red and white gives the colour called auburn. The law of proportion however according to which the several colours are formed even if a man knew he would be foolish in telling for he could not give any necessary reason, nor indeed any tolerable or probable explanation of them. Again, red when mingled with black and white becomes purple, but it becomes amber when the colours are burnt as well as mingled and the black is more thoroughly mixed with them. Flame colour is produced by a union of auburn and dun, and dun by an admixture of black and white pale yellow by an admixture of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue and when dark blue mingles with white, a light blue colour is formed as flame-colour with black makes leek green. There will be no difficulty in seeing how and by what mixtures the colours derived from these are made according to the rules of probability. He, however who should attempt to verify all this by experiment would forget the difference of the human and divine nature. For God only has the knowledge and also the power which are able to combine many things into one and again resolve the one into many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accomplish either the one or the other operation.

These are the elements thus of necessity then subsisting, which the creator of the fairest and

best of created things associated with himself when he made the self sufficing and most perfect God using the necessary causes as his ministers in the accomplishment of his work but himself contriving the good in all his creations Wherefore we may distinguish two sorts of causes the one divine and the other necessary and may seek for the divine in all things as far as our nature admits [69] with a view to the blessed life but the necessary kind only for the sake of the divine considering that without them and when isolated from them these higher things for which we look cannot be apprehended or received or in any way shared by us

Seeing then that we have now prepared for our use the various classes of causes which are the material out of which the remainder of our discourse must be woven just as wood is the material of the carpenter, let us revert in a few words to the point at which we began and then endeavour to add on a suitable ending to the beginning of our tale

As I said at first when all things were in disorder God created in each thing in relation to itself and in all things in relation to each other all the measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive For in those days nothing had any proportion except by accident nor did any of the things which now have names deserve to be named at all—as for example fire water and the rest of the elements All these the creator first set in order and out of them he constructed the universe which was a single animal comprehending in itself all other animals mortal and immortal Now of the divine he himself was the creator but the creation of the mortal he committed to his offspring And they imitating him received from him the immortal principle of the soul and around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal body and made it to be the vehicle of the soul and constructed within the body a soul of another nature which was mortal subject to terrible and irresistible affections—first of all pleasure the greatest incitement to evil then pain which deters from good also rashness and fear two foolish counsellors anger hard to be appeased and hope easily led astray—these they mingled with irrational sense and with all daring love according to necessary laws and so framed man Wherefore fearing to pollute the divine any more than was absolutely unavoidable they gave to the mortal nature a separate habitation in another part of the body placing the neck between them to be the isthmus and boundary which they constructed between the

head and breast to keep them apart And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax they encased the mortal soul and as the one part of this was superior and the other inferior they divided the cavity of the [70] thorax into two parts as the women's and men's apartments are divided in houses and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition between them That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the head midway between the midriff and the neck in order that it might be under the rule of reason and might join with it in controlling and restraining the desires when they are no longer willing of their own accord to obey the word of command issuing from the citadel

The heart the knot of the veins and the fountain of the blood which races through all the limbs was set in the place of guard that when the might of passion was roused by reason making proclamation of any wrong assailing them from without or being perpetrated by the desires within quickly the whole power of feeling in the body perceiving these commands and threats might obey and follow through every turn and alley and thus allow the principle of the best to have the command in all of them But the gods foreknowing that the palpitating of the heart in the expectation of danger and the swelling and excitement of passion was caused by fire formed and implanted as a supporter to the heart the lung which was in the first place, soft and bloodless and also had within hollows like the pores of a sponge, in order that by receiving the breath and the drink it might give coolness and the power of respiration and alleviate the heat Wherefore they cut the air channels leading to the lung and placed the lung about the heart as a soft spring that when passion was rife within the heart beating against a yielding body might be cooled and suffer less and might thus become more ready to join with passion in the service of reason

The part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and the other things of which it has need by reason of the bodily nature they placed between the midriff and the boundary of the navel contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body and there they bound it down like a wild animal which was chained up with man and must be nourished if man was to exist They appointed this lower creation his place here in order that he might be always feeding at the manger and have his

dwelling as far as might be from the council chamber making as little noise and disturbance as possible, [71] and permitting the best part to advise quietly for the good of the whole. And knowing that this lower principle in man would not comprehend reason and even if attuning to some degree of perception would never naturally care for rational notions, but that it would be led away by phantasms and visions night and day—to be a remedy for this, God combined with it the liver and placed it in the house of the lower nature, contriving that it should be solid and smooth and bright and sweet, and should also have a bitter quality in order that the power of thought, which proceeds from the mind might be reflected as in a mirror which receives likenesses of objects and gives back images of them to the sight and so might strike terror into the desires, when, making use of the bitter part of the liver to which it is akin, it comes threatening and invading and diffusing this bitter element swiftly through the whole liver produces colours like bile, and contracting every part makes it wrinkled and rough and twisting out of its right place and torturing the lobe and closing and shutting up the vessels and gates, causes pain and loathing. And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration of the understanding pictures images of an opposite character and allays the bile and bitterness by refusing to stir or touch the nature opposed to itself but by making use of the natural sweetness of the liver corrects all things and makes them to be right and smooth and free, and renders the portion of the soul which resides about the liver happy and joyful enabling it to pass the night in peace, and to practise divination in sleep, inasmuch as it has no share in mind and reason. For the authors of our being remembering the command of their father when he bade them create the human race as good as they could, that they might correct our inferior parts and make them to attain a measure of truth placed in the liver the seat of divination. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration but when he receives the inspired word either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep or he is demented by some distemper or possess on. And he would not understand what he remembers to have been said [72] whether in a dream or when he was awake, by the prophetic and inspired nature, or would determine by reason the meaning of the apparitions which

he has seen, and what indications they afford to this man or that of past present or future good and evil must first recover his wits. But while he continues demented he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the words which he utters the ancient saying is very true that "only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself and his own affairs. And for this reason it is customary to appoint interpreters to be judges of the true inspiration. Some persons call them prophets they are quite untrue that they are only the expounders of dark sayings and visions, and are not to be called prophets at all but only interpreters of prophecy.

Such is the nature of the liver which is placed as we have described in order that it may give prophetic intimations. During the life of each individual these intimations are plainer but after his death the liver becomes blind, and the liver's oracles too obscure to be intelligible. The neighbouring organ [the spleen] is situated on the left hand side, and is constructed with a view of keeping the liver bright and pure—like a napkin always ready prepared and at hand to clean the mirror. And hence, when any impurities arise in the region of the liver by reason of disorders of the body the loose nature of the spleen, which is composed of a hollow and bloodless tissue, receives them all and clears them away and when filled with the unclean matter swells and festers, but, again when the body is purged settles down into the same place as before and is humbled.

Concerning the soul as to which part is mortal and which divine and how and why they are separated, and where located, if God acknowledges that we have spoken the truth, then and then only can we be confident still we may venture to assert that what has been said by us is probable, and will be rendered more probable by investigation. Let us assume thus much.

The creation of the rest of the body follows next in order and thus we may investigate in a similar manner. And it appears to be very meet that the body should be framed on the following principles—

The authors of our race were aware that we should be intemperate in eating and drinking and take a good deal more than was necessary or proper by reason of gluttony. In order then that disease might not quickly destroy us [73] and lest our mortal race should perish without fulfilling its end—intending to provide against this, the gods made what is called the lower belly to be a receptacle for the superfluous meat

and drink and formed the convolution of the bowels so that the food might be prevented from passing quickly through and compelling the body to require more food thus producing insatiable gluttony, and making the whole race an enemy to philosophy and music, and rebel lions against the divinest element within us

The bones and flesh and other similar parts of us were made as follows. The first principle of all of them was the generation of the marrow. For the bonds of life which unite the soul with the body are made fast there and they are the root and foundation of the human race. The marrow itself is created out of other materials. God took such of the primary triangles as were straight and smooth and were adapted by their perfection to produce fire and water and air and earth—these I say he separated from their kinds, and mingling them in due proportions with one another made the marrow out of them to be a universal seed of the whole race of mankind and in this seed he then planted and enclosed the souls and in the original distribution gave to the marrow as many and various forms as the different kinds of souls were here after to receive. That which like a field was to receive the divine seed he made round every way and called that portion of the marrow brain intending that when an animal was perfected the vessel containing this substance should be the head but that which was intended to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul he distributed into figures at once round and elongated and he called them all by the name marrow and to these as to anchors fastening the bonds of the whole soul he proceeded to fashion around them the entire frame work of our body constructing for the marrow first of all a complete covering of bone

Bone was composed by him in the following manner. Having sifted pure and smooth earth he kneaded it and wetted it with marrow and after that he put it into fire and then into water and once more into fire and again into water—in this way by frequent transfers from one to the other he made it insoluble by either. Out of this he fashioned [74] as in a lathe a globe made of bone which he placed around the brain and in this he left a narrow opening and around the marrow of the neck and back he formed vertebrae which he placed under one another like pivots beginning at the head and extending through the whole of the trunk. Thus wishing to preserve the entire seed he enclosed it in a stone like casing inserting joints and using in the formation of them the power

of the other or diverse as an intermediate nature that they might have motion and flexure. Then again considering that the bone would be too brittle and inflexible and when heated and again cooled would soon mortify and destroy the seed within—having this in view he contrived the sinews and the flesh that so binding all the members together by the sinews which admitted of being stretched and relaxed about the vertebrae he might thus make the body capable of flexion and extension while the flesh would serve as a protection against the summer heat and against the winter cold and also against falls softly and easily yielding to external bodies like articles made of felt and containing in itself a warm moisture which in summer exudes and makes the surface damp would impart a natural coolness to the whole body and again in winter by the help of this internal warmth would form a very tolerable defence against the frost which surrounds it and attacks it from without. He who modelled us considering these things mixed earth with fire and water and blended them and making a ferment of acid and salt he mingled it with them and formed soft and succulent flesh. As for the sinews he made them of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh attempered so as to be in a mean and gave them a yellow colour wherefore the sinews have a firmer and more glutinous nature than flesh but a softer and moister nature than the bones. With these God covered the bones and marrow binding them together by sinews and then enshrouded them all in an upper covering of flesh. The more living and sensitive of the bones he enclosed in the thinnest film of flesh and those which had the least life within them in the thickest and most solid flesh. So again on the joints of the bones where reason indicated that no more was required he placed only a thin covering of flesh that it might not interfere with the flexion of our bodies and make them unwieldy because difficult to move and also that it might not by being crowded and pressed and matted together destroy sensation by reason of its hardness [75] and impair the memory and dull the edge of intelligence. Wherefore also the thighs and the shanks and the hips and the bones of the arms and the forearms and other parts which have no joints and the inner bones which on account of the rarity of the soul in the marrow are destitute of reason—all these are abundantly provided with flesh but such as have mind in them are in general less fleshy except where the creator has made some part solely of flesh in order to give

sensation—as, for example, the tongue. But commonly this is not the case. For the nature which comes into being and grows up in us by a law of necessity does not admit of the combination of solid bone and much flesh with acute perceptions. More than any other part the framework of the head would have had them if they could have co-existed and the human race, having a strong and fleshy and sinewy head would have had a life twice or many times as long as it now has, and also more healthy and free from pain.

But our creators, considering whether they should make a longer-lived race which was worse, or a shorter-lived race which was better, preferred the conclusion that every one ought to prefer a shorter span of life, which was better to a longer one, which was worse and therefore they covered the head with thin bone, but not with flesh and sinews, since it had no joints and thus the head was added, having more wisdom and sensation than the rest of the body but also being in every man far weaker. For these reasons and after this manner God placed the sinews at the extremity of the head in a circle round the neck, and glued them together by the principle of likeness and fastened the extremities of the jaw bones to them below the face, and the other sinews he dispersed throughout the body fastening limb to limb. The framers of us framed the mouth as now arranged, having teeth and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good continuing the way in for necessary purposes, the way out for the best purposes for that is necessary which enters in and gives food to the body but the river of speech which flows out of a man and ministers to the intelligence, is the fastest and noblest of all streams. Still the head could neither be left a bare frame of bones, on account of the extremes of heat and cold in the different seasons, nor yet be allowed to be wholly covered and so become dull and senseless by reason of an overgrowth of flesh. The fleshy nature was not therefore wholly dried up [76] but a large sort of peel as parted off and remained over which is now called the skin. This met and grew by the help of the cerebral moisture, and became the circular envelopment of the head. And the moisture rising up under the sutures, watered and closed in the skin upon the crown forming a sort of knot. The diversity of the sutures was caused by the power of the courses of the soul and of the food, and the more these struggled against one another the more numerous they became and fewer if the struggle were

less violent. Thus skin the divine power pierced all round with fire and out of the punctures which were thus made the moisture issued forth, and the liquid and heat which was pure came away and a mixed part which was composed of the same material as the skin and had a fineness equal to the punctures, was borne up by its own impulse and extended far outside the head but being too slow to escape, was thrust back by the external air and rolled up underneath the skin where it took root. Thus the hair sprang up in the skin being akin to it because it is like threads of leather but rendered harder and closer through the pressure of the cold, by which each hair while in process of separation from the skin, is compressed and cooled. Wherefore the creator formed the head hairy making use of the causes which I have mentioned and reflecting also that instead of flesh the brain needed the hair to be a light covering or guard, which would give shade in summer and shelter in winter and at the same time would not impede our quickness of perception. From the combination of sinew, skin, and bone in the structure of the finger there arises a triple compound which, when dried up, takes the form of one hard skin partaking of all three natures, and was fabricated by these second causes, but designed by mind which is the principal cause with an eye to the future. For our creators well knew that women and other animals would some day be framed out of men and they further knew that many animals would require the use of nails for many purposes wherefore they fashioned in men at their first creation the rudiments of nails. For this purpose and for these reasons they caused skin, hair and nails to grow at the extremities of the limbs. And now that all the parts and members of the mortal animal had [77] come together since its life of necessity consisted of fire and breath and it therefore wasted away by dissolution and depletion, the gods contrived the following remedy. They mingled a nature akin to that of man with other forms and perceptions and thus created another kind of animal. These are the trees and plants and seeds which have been improved by cultivation and are now domesticated among us. Anciently there were only the wild kinds, which are older than the cultivated. For everything that partakes of life may be truly called a living being and the animal of which we are now speaking partakes of the third kind of soul which is said to be seated between the mortal and the immortal having no part in opinion or reason or mind

but only in feelings of pleasure and pain and the desires which accompany them. For this nature is always in a passive state revolving in and about itself, repelling the motion from without and using its own and accordingly is not endowed by nature with the power of observing or reflecting on its own concerns. Wherefore it lives and does not differ from a living being but is fixed and rooted in the same spot having no power of self motion.

Now after the superior powers had created all these natures to be food for us who are of the inferior nature they cut various channels through the body as through a garden that it might be watered as from a running stream. In the first place they cut two hidden channels or veins down the back where the skin and the flesh join which answered severally to the right and left side of the body. These they let down along the backbone so as to have the marrow of generation between them where it was most likely to flourish and in order that the stream coming down from above might flow freely to the other parts and equalise the irrigation. In the next place they divided the veins about the head and interlacing them they sent them in opposite directions those coming from the right side they sent to the left of the body and those from the left they diverted towards the right so that they and the skin might together form a bond which should fasten the head to the body since the crown of the head was not encircled by sinews and also in order that the sensations from both sides might be distributed over the whole body. And next they ordered the water courses of the body in a manner which I will describe [78] and which will be more easily understood if we begin by admitting that all things which have lesser parts retain the greater but the greater cannot retain the lesser. Now of all natures fire has the smallest parts and therefore penetrates through earth and water and air and their compounds nor can anything hold it. And a similar principle applies to the human belly for when meats and drinks enter it it holds them but it cannot hold air and fire because the particles of which they consist are smaller than its own structure.

These elements therefore God employed for the sake of distributing moisture from the belly into the veins weaving together a network of fire and air like a wheel having at the entrance two lesser wheels further he constructed one of these with two openings and from the lesser wheels he extended cords reaching all round to

the extremities of the network. All the interior of the net he made of fire but the lesser wheels and their cavity of air. The network he took and spread over the newly formed animal in the following manner—He let the lesser wheels pass into the mouth there were two of them and one he let down by the air pipes into the lungs the other by the side of the air pipes into the belly. The former he divided into two branches both of which he made to meet at the channels of the nose so that when the way through the mouth did not act the streams of the mouth as well were replenished through the nose. With the other cavity (i.e. of the greater wheel) he enveloped the hollow parts of the body and at one time he made all this to flow into the lesser wheels quite gently for they are composed of air and at another time he caused the lesser wheels to flow back again and the net he made to find a way in and out through the pores of the body and the rays of fire which are bound fast within followed the passage of the air either way never at any time ceasing so long as the mortal being holds together. This process as we affirm the name given named inspiration and expiration. And all this movement active as well as passive takes place in order that the body being watered and cooled may receive nourishment and life for when the respiration is going in and out and the fire which is fast bound within follows it and ever and anon moving to and fro enters through the belly and reaches the meat and drink [79] it dissolves them and dividing them into small portions and guiding them through the passages where it goes pumps them as from a fountain into the channels of the veins and makes the stream of the veins flow through the body as through a conduit.

Let us once more consider the phenomena of respiration and enquire into the causes which have made it what it is. They are as follows—Seeing that there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any of those things which are moved can enter and the breath is carried from us in to the external air the next point is, as will be clear to every one that it does not go into a vacant space but pushes its neighbour out of its place and that which is thrust out in turn drives out its neighbour and in this way everything of necessity at last comes round to that place from whence the breath came forth and enters in there and following the breath fills up the vacant space and this goes on like the rotation of a wheel because there can be no such thing as a vacuum. Wherefore also the breast and the

lungs, when they emit the breath are replenished by the air which surrounds the body and which enters in through the pores of the flesh and is driven round in a circle and again, the air which is sent away and passes out through the body forces the breath inwards through the passage of the mouth and the nostrils. Now the origin of this movement may be supposed to be as follows. In the interior of every animal the hottest part is that which is around the blood and veins: it is in a manner an internal fountain of fire, which we compare to the network of a steel being woven all of fire and extended through the centre of the body while the outer parts are composed of air. Now we must admit that heat naturally proceeds outward to its own place and to its kindred element and as there are two exits for the heat, the one out through the body and the other through the mouth and nostrils, when it moves towards the one, it drives round the air at the other and that which is driven round falls into the fire and becomes warm, and that which goes forth is cooled. But when the heat changes its place, and the particles at the other exit grow warmer the hotter air inclining in that direction and carried towards its native element, fire, pushes round the air at the other and this being affected in the same way and communicating the same impulse, a circular motion swaying to and fro is produced by the double process, which we call inspiration and expiration.

The phenomena of medical cupping glasses and of the swallowing of drink and of the projection of bodies, (80) whether discharged in the air or bowled along the ground, are to be investigated on a similar principle and swift and slow sounds which appear to be high and low and are sometimes discordant on account of their inequality and then again harmonical on account of the equality of the motion which they excite in us. For when the motions of the antecedent swifter sounds begin to pause and the two are equalised the slower sounds overtake the swifter and then propel them. When they overtake them they do not intrude a new and discordant motion but introduce the beginnings of a slower which answers to the swifter as it dies away thus producing a single mixed expression out of high and low whence arises a pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which the wise becomes a higher sort of delight, being an imitation of divine harmony in mortal motions. Moreover as to the flowing of water the fall of the thunderbolt, and the marvels that are observed about the attraction of am-

ber and the Heracleian stones—in none of these cases is there any attraction but he who investigates rightly will find that such wonderful phenomena are attributable to the combination of certain conditions—the non-existence of a vacuum the fact that objects push one another round and that they change places, passing severally into their proper positions as they are divided or combined.

Such as we have seen is the nature and such are the causes of respiration—the subject in which this discussion originated. For the fire cuts the food and following the breath surges up within fire and breath rising together and filling the veins by drawing up out of the belly and pouring into them the cut portions of the food and so the streams of food are kept flowing through the whole body in all animals. And fresh cuttings from kindred substances, whether the fruits of the earth or herb of the field which God planted to be our daily food acquire all sorts of colours by their intermixture but red is the most pervading of them being created by the cutting action of fire and by the impression which it makes on a moist substance and hence the liquid which circulates in the body has a colour such as we have described. The liquid itself we call blood which nourishes the flesh and the whole body (81) whence all parts are watered and empty places filled.

Now the process of repletion and evacuation is effected after the manner of the universal motion by which all kindred substances are drawn towards one another. For the external elements which surround us are always causing us to consume away and distributing and sending off like to like the particles of blood too which are divided and contained within the frame of the animal as in a sort of heaven are compelled to imitate the motion of the universe. Each therefore, of the divided parts within us, being carried to its kindred nature replenishes the void. When more is taken away than flows in then we decay and when less we grow and increase.

The frame of the entire creature when young has the triangles of each kind new and may be compared to the keel of a vessel which is just off the stocks: they are locked firmly together and yet the whole mass is soft and delicate, being freshly formed of marrow and nurtured on milk. Now when the triangles out of which meats and drinks are composed come in from without and are comprehended in the body being older and weaker than the triangles al-

ready there the frame of the body gets the better of them and its newer triangles cut them up and so the animal grows great, being nourished by a multitude of similar particles. But when the roots of the triangles are loosened by having undergone many conflicts with many things in the course of time they are no longer able to cut or assimilate the food which enters but are themselves easily divided by the bodies which come in from without. In this way every animal \equiv overcome and decays and this affection \equiv called old age. And at last when the bonds by which the triangles of the marrow are united no longer hold and are parted by the strain of existence, they in turn loosen the bonds of the soul and she, obtaining a natural release flies away with joy. For that which takes place according to nature \equiv pleasant but that which \equiv contrary to nature \equiv painful. And thus death if caused by disease or produced by wounds is painful and violent but that sort of death which comes with old age and fulfils the debt of nature is the easiest of deaths and is accompanied with pleasure rather than with pain.

Now every one can see whence diseases arise. There are four natures out of which the body is compacted [82] earth and fire and water and air and the unnatural excess or defect of these or the change of any of them from its own natural place into another or—since there are more kinds than one of fire and of the other elements—the assumption by any of these of a wrong kind or any similar irregularity, produces disorders and diseases for when any of them is produced or changed in a manner contrary to nature, the parts which were previously cool grow warm, and those which were dry become moist and the light become heavy and the heavy light all sorts of changes occur. For as we affirm a thing can only remain the same with itself whole and sound when the same is added to it or subtracted from it in the same respect and in the same manner and in due proportion and whatever comes or goes away in violation of these laws causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and corruptions. Now there is a second class of structures which are also natural, and this affords a second opportunity of observing diseases to him who would understand them. For whereas marrow and bone and flesh and sinews are composed of the four elements and the blood though after another manner is likewise formed out of them most diseases originate in the way which I have described but the worst of all owe their sever-

ty to the fact that the generation of these substances proceeds in a wrong order they are then destroyed. For the natural order is that the flesh and sinews should be made of blood the sinews out of the fibres to which they are akin and the flesh out of the clots which are formed when the fibres are separated. And the glutinous and rich matter which comes away from the sinews and the flesh not only glues the flesh to the bones but nourishes and imparts growth to the bone which surrounds the marrow and by reason of the solidity of the bones, that which filters through consists of the purest and smoothest and oiliest sort of triangles dropping like dew from the bones and water into the marrow.

Now when each process takes place in this order health commonly results when in the opposite order disease. For when the flesh becomes decomposed and sends back the wasting substance into the veins then an over supply of blood of diverse kinds mingling with air in the veins having variegated colours and bitter properties as well as acid and saline qualities contains all sorts of bile and serum and phlegm. For all things go the wrong way [83] and having become corrupted first they taint the blood itself and then ceasing to give nourishment to the body they are carried along the veins in all directions no longer preserving the order of their natural courses but at war with themselves because they receive no good from one another and are hostile to the abiding constitution of the body which they corrupt and dissolve. The oldest part of the flesh which is corrupted being hard to decompose, from long burning grows black and from being everywhere corroded becomes bitter and \equiv injurious to every part of the body which \equiv still uncorrupted. Sometimes when the bitter element is refined away the black part assumes an acidity which takes the place of the bitterness at other times the bitterness being tinged with blood has a redder colour and this when mixed with black takes the hue of grass and again an auburn colour mingles with the bitter matter when new flesh \equiv decomposed by the fire which surrounds the internal flame—to all which symptoms some physician perhaps or rather some philosopher who had the power of seeing in many dissimilar things one nature deserving of a name has assigned the common name of bile. But the other kinds of bile are variously distinguished by their colours. As for serum that sort which is the watery part of blood is innocent but that which is a secretion of black

and acid bile is malignant when mingled by the power of heat with any salt substance, and is then called acid phlegm.

Again, the substance which is formed by the liquefaction of new and tender flesh when air is present, is inflated and encased in liquid so as to form bubbles, which separately are invisible owing to their small size but when collected are of a bulk which is visible, and have a white colour arising out of the generation of foam—all this decomposition of tender flesh when intermingled with air is termed by us white phlegm. And the whey or sediment of newly-formed phlegm is sweat and tears, and includes the various daily discharges by which the body is purified. Now all these become causes of disease when the blood is not replenished in a natural manner by food and drink but gains bulk from opposite sources in violation of the laws of nature. [84] When the several parts of the flesh are separated by disease, if the foundation remains, the power of the disorder is only half as great, and there is still a prospect of an easy recovery but when that which binds the flesh to the bones is diseased, and no longer being separated from the muscles and sinews, ceases to give nourishment to the bone and to unite flesh and bone and from being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and dry owing to bad regimen, then all the substance thus corrupted crumbles away under the flesh and the sinews and separates from the bone, and the fleshy parts fall away from their foundation and leave the sinews bare and full of brine, and the flesh again gets into the circulation of the blood and makes the previously-mentioned disorders still greater. And if these bodily affections be severe, still worse are the prior disorders as when the bone itself, by reason of the density of the flesh, does not obtain sufficient air but becomes mouldy and hot and gangrened and receives no nutriment, and the natural process is inverted, and the bone crumbling passes into the food and the food into the flesh, and the flesh again falling into the blood makes all maladies that may occur more violent than those already mentioned. But the worst case of all is when the marrow is diseased, either from excess or defect and thus is the cause of the very greatest and most fatal disorders, in which the whole course of the body is reversed.

There is a third class of diseases which may be conceived of as arising in three ways for they are produced sometimes by wind and sometimes by phlegm, and sometimes by bile. When

the lung which is the dispenser of the air to the body is obstructed by rheums and its passages are not free some of them not acting while through others too much air enters then the parts which are unrefreshed by air corrode while in other parts the excess of air forcing its way through the veins distorts them and decomposing the body is enclosed in the midst of it and occupies the midriff thus numberless painful diseases are produced, accompanied by copious sweats. And oftentimes when the flesh is dissolved in the body wind generated within and unable to escape, is the source of quite as much pain as the air coming in from without but the greatest pain is felt when the wind gets about the sinews and the veins of the shoulders, and swells them up, and so twists back the great tendons and the sinews which are connected with them. These disorders are called tetanus and opisthotonus, by reason of the tension which accompanies them. The cure of them is difficult relief is in most cases given by fever supervening. [85] The white phlegm though dangerous when detained within by reason of the air bubbles, yet if it can communicate with the outside air is less severe, and only discolours the body generating leprous eruptions and similar diseases. When it is mingled with black bile and dispersed about the courses of the head which are the divinest part of us, the attack if coming on in sleep, is not so severe but when assailing those who are awake it is hard to be got rid of and being an affection of a sacred part, is most justly called sacred. An acid and salt phlegm again, is the source of all those diseases which take the form of catarrh but they have many names because the places into which they flow are manifold.

Inflammations of the body come from burnings and inflammings, and all of them originate in bile. When bile finds a means of discharge, it boils up and sends forth all sort of tumours but when imprisoned within it generates many inflammatory diseases, above all when mingled with pure blood since it then displaces the fibres which are scattered about in the blood and are designed to maintain the balance of rare and dense, in order that the blood may not be so liquefied by heat as to exude from the pores of the body nor again become too dense and thus find a difficulty in circulating through the veins. The fibres are so constituted as to maintain this balance and if any one brings them all together when the blood is dead and in process of cooling then the blood which remains becomes fluid, but if they are left alone they soon con-

geal by reason of the surrounding cold. The fibres having this power over the blood, bile, which is only stale blood and which from being flesh is dissolved again into blood at the first influx coming in little by little hot and liquid is congealed by the power of the fibres and so congealing and made to cool it produces internal cold and shuddering. When it enters with more of a flood and overcomes the fibres by its heat and boiling up throws them into disorder if it have power enough to maintain its supremacy it penetrates the marrow and burns up what may be termed the cables of the soul and sets her free but when there is not so much of it and the body though wasted still holds out the bile is itself mastered and is either utterly banished or is thrust through the veins into the lower or upper belly and is driven out of the body like an exile from a state in which there has been civil war [86] whence arise diarrhoeas and dysenteries and all such disorders. When the constitution is disordered by excess of fire continuous heat and fever are the result when excess of air is the cause then the fever is quotidian when of water which is a more sluggish element than either fire or air then the fever is a tertian when of earth which is the most sluggish of the four and is only purged away in a four fold period the result is a quartan fever which can with difficulty be shaken off.

Such is the manner in which diseases of the body arise the disorders of the soul which depend upon the body originate as follows. We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a want of intelligence and of this there are two kinds to wit madness and ignorance. In what ever state a man experiences either of them that state may be called disease and excessive pains and pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases to which the soul is liable. For a man who is in great joy or in great pain in his unseasonable eagerness to attain the one and to avoid the other is not able to see or to hear anything rightly but he is mad and is at the time utterly incapable of any participation in reason. He who has the seed about the spinal marrow too plentiful and overflowing like a tree overladen with fruit has many throes and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and their offspring and is for the most part of his life deranged because his pleasures and pains are so very great his soul is rendered foolish and disordered by his body yet he is regarded not as one diseased but as one who is voluntarily bad which is a mistake. The truth is that the

intemperance of love is a disease of the soul due chiefly to the moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements by the loose consistency of the bones. And in general all that which is termed the incontinence of pleasure and is deemed a reproach under the idea that the wicked voluntarily do wrong is not justly a matter for reproach. For no man is voluntarily bad but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of the body and bad education things which are hateful to every man and happen to him against his will. And in the case of pain too in like manner the soul suffers much evil from the body. For where the acid and briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humours wander about in the body and find no exit or escape but are pent up within and mingle their own vapours with the motions of the soul and are blended [87] with them they produce all sorts of diseases more or fewer and in every degree of intensity and being carried to the three places of the soul whichever they may severally assail they create infinite varieties of ill temper and melancholy of rashness and cowardice and also of forgetfulness and stupidity. Further when to this evil constitution of body evil forms of government are added and evil discourses are uttered in private as well as in public and no sort of instruction is given in youth to cure these evils then all of us who are bad become bad from two causes which are entirely beyond our control. In such cases the planters are to blame rather than the plants the educators rather than the educated. But however that may be we should endeavour as far as we can by education and studies and learning to avoid vice and attain virtue this however is part of another subject.

There is a corresponding enquiry concerning the mode of treatment by which the mind and the body are to be preserved about which it is meet and right that I should say a word in turn for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. Everything that is good is fair and the fair is not without proportion and the animal which is to be fair must have due proportion. Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them but of the highest and greatest we take no heed for there is no proportion or disproportion more productive of health and disease and virtue and vice than that between soul and body. This however we do not perceive nor do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul or conversely when a little soul is encased in a large body then the whole

animal is not fair for it lacks the most important of all symmetries but the due proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all things to him who has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long or which is unsymmetrical in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight, and also when doing its share of work, is much distressed and makes convulsive efforts, and often stumbles through awkwardness, and is the cause of infinite evil to its own self—in like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we call the living being, and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body (83) that soul, I say convulses and fills with disorders the whole inner nature of man and when eager in the pursuit of some sort of learning or study causes wasting—or again, when teaching or disputing in private or in public, and trifles and controversies arise inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums, and the nature of this phenomenon is not understood by most professors of medicine, who ascribe it to the opposite of the real cause. And once more, when a body large and too strong for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence, then inasmuch as there are two desires natural to man—one of food for the sake of the body and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of us—then, I say the motions of the stronger getting the better and increasing their own power but making the soul dull and stupid and forgetful engender ignorance, which is the greatest of diseases. There is one objection against both kinds of disproportion—that we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body and thus they will be on their guard against each other and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or any one else whose thoughts are much absorbed in some intellectual pursuit, must allow his body also to have due exercise, and practise gymnastic and he who is careful to fashion the body should in turn impart to the soul its proper motions, and should cultivate music and all philosophy if he would deserve to be called truly fair and truly good. And the separate parts should be treated in the same manner in imitation of the pattern of the universe for as the body is heated and also cooled when by the elements which enter into it, and is again dried up and moistened by external things, and experiences these and the like affections from both kinds of motions, the result is that the body if given up to motion when in a state of quiescence is overmastered

and perishes but if any one, in imitation of that which we call the foster mother and nurse of the universe, will not allow the body ever to be inactive, but is always producing motions and agitations through its whole extent which form the natural defence against other motions both internal and external and by moderate exercise reduces to order according to their affinities the particles and affections which are wandering about the body as we have already said when speaking of the universe he will not allow enemy placed by the side of enemy to stir up wars and disorders in the body but he will place friend by the side of friend so as to create health.

Now of all motions that is the best which is produced in a thing by itself (89) for it is most akin to the motion of thought and of the universe but that motion which is caused by others is not so good, and worst of all is that which moves the body when at rest, in parts only and by some external agency. Wherefore of all modes of purifying and reuniting the body the best is gymnastic the next best is a surging motion, as in sailing or any other mode of conveyance which is not fatiguing the third sort of motion may be of use in a case of extreme necessity but in any other will be adopted by no man of sense. I mean the purgative treatment of physicians for diseases unless they are very dangerous should not be irritated by medicines, since every form of disease is in a manner akin to the living being whose complex frame has an appointed term of life. For not the whole race only but each individual—barring inevitable accidents—comes into the world having a fixed span, and the triangles in us are originally framed with power to last for a certain time, beyond which no man can prolong his life. And this holds also of the constitution of diseases if any one regardless of the appointed time tries to subdue them by medicine, he only aggravates and multiplies them. Wherefore we ought always to manage them by regimen as far as a man can spare the time, and not provoke a disagreeable enemy by medicines.

Enough of the composite animal and of the body which is a part of him and of the manner in which a man may train and be trained by himself so as to live most according to reason and we must above and before all provide that the element which is to train him shall be the fairest and best adapted to that purpose. A minute discussion of this subject would be a serious task but if, as before, I am to give only an

outline, the subject may not unfitly be summed up as follows.

I have often remarked that there are three kinds of soul located within us having each of them motions and I must now repeat in the fewest words possible that one part if remaining inactive and ceasing from its natural motion must necessarily become very weak but that which is trained and exercised very strong Wherefore we should take care that the movements of the different parts [90] of the soul should be in due proportion

And we should consider that God gave the sovereign part of the human soul to be the divinity of each one being that part which as we say dwells at the top of the body and inasmuch as we are a plant not of an earthly but of a heavenly growth, raises us from earth to our kindred who are in heaven And in this we say truly for the divine power suspended the head and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began and thus made the whole body upright When a man is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition and is eagerly striving to satisfy them all his thoughts must be mortal and, as far as it is possible altogether to become such he must be mortal every whit, because he has cherished his mortal part But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him must have thoughts immortal and divine, if he attain truth and in so far as human nature is capable of sharing in immortality he must altogether be immortal and since he is ever cherishing the divine power and has the divinity within him in perfect order he will be perfectly happy Now there is only one way of taking care of things and this is to give to each the food and motion which are natural to it And the motions which are naturally akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe These each man should follow and correct the courses of the head which were corrupted at our birth and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the universe should assimilate the thinking being to the thought renewing his original nature and having assimilated them should attain to that perfect life which the gods have set before mankind both for the present and the future

Thus our original design of discoursing about the universe down to the creation of man is nearly completed A brief mention may be made of the generation of other animals so far as the subject admits of brevity in this manner our

argument will best attain a due proportion On the subject of animals then the following remarks may be offered Of the men who came into the world those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation [91] And this was the reason why at that time the gods created in us the desire of sexual intercourse, contriving in man one animated substance, and in woman another which they formed respectively in the following manner The outlet for drink by which liquids pass through the lung under the kidneys and into the bladder which receives and then by the pressure of the air emits them was so fashioned by them as to penetrate also into the body of the marrow which passes from the head along the neck and through the back and which in the preceding discourse we have named the seed And the seed having life and becoming endowed with respiration, produces in that part in which it respire a lively desire of emission and thus creates in us the love of procreation Wherefore also in men the organ of generation becoming rebellious and masterful like an animal disobedient to reason and maddened with the sting of lust seeks to gain absolute sway and the same is the case with the so-called womb or matrix of women the animal within them is desirous of procreating children and when remaining unfruitful long beyond its proper time gets discontented and angry and wandering in every direction through the body closes up the passages of the breath and by obstructing respiration drives them to extremity causing all varieties of disease until at length the desire and love of the man and the woman bringing them together and as it were plucking the fruit from the tree, sow in the womb as in a field animals unseen by reason of their smallness and without form these again are separated and matured within they are then finally brought out into the light, and thus the generation of animals is completed

Thus were created women and the female sex in general But the race of birds was created out of innocent light minded men who although their minds were directed toward heaven imagined in their simplicity that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be obtained by sight these were remodelled and transformed into birds and they grew feathers instead of hair The race of wild pedestrian animals, again came from those who had no philosophy in any of their thoughts and never considered at all about the nature of the

heavens, because they had ceased to use the courses of the head but followed the guidance of those parts of the soul which are in the breast. In consequence of these habits of theirs they had their front legs and their heads resting upon the earth to which they were drawn by natural affinity and the crowns of their heads were elongated and of all sorts of shapes into which the courses of the soul were crushed by reason of disuse. And this was the reason why they were created quadrupeds and polypods (92) God made the more senseless of them the more support that they might be more attracted to the earth. And the most foolish of them who trail their bodies entirely upon the ground and have no longer any need of feet, he made with out feet to crawl upon the earth. The fourth class were the inhabitants of the water these were made out of the most entirely senseless and ignorant of all, whom the transformers did

not think any longer worthy of pure respiration because they possessed a soul which was made impure by all sorts of transgression and instead of the subtle and pure medium of air they gave them the deep and muddy sea to be their element of respiration and hence arose the race of fishes and oysters, and other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations as a punishment of their outlandish ignorance. These are the laws by which animals pass into one another now as ever changing as they lose or gain wisdom and folly.

We may now say that our discourse about the nature of the universe has an end. The world has received animals mortal and immortal and is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible—the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect—the one only begotten heaven.

CRITIAS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE CRITIAS HERMOCRATES TIMAEUS, SOCRATES



[106] *Timaeus* How thankful I am Socrates that I have arrived at last and like a weary traveller after a long journey may be at rest! And I pray the being who always was of old and has now been by me revealed to grant that my words may endure in so far as they have been spoken truly and acceptably to him but if unintentionally I have said anything wrong I pray that he will impose upon me a just retribution and the just retribution of him who errs is that he should be set right. Wishing then to speak truly in future concerning the generation of the gods I pray him to give me knowledge which of all medicines is the most perfect and best. And now having offered my prayer I deliver up the argument to Critias who is to speak next according to our agreement.

Critias And I Timaeus accept the trust and as you at first said that you were going to speak of high matters, and begged that some forbearance might be shown to you I too ask the same or greater forbearance for what I am about to say. And although I very well know that my request may appear to be somewhat ambitious and discourteous I must make it nevertheless [107] For will any man of sense deny that you have spoken well? I can only attempt to show that I ought to have more indulgence than you because my theme is more difficult and I shall argue that to seem to speak well of the gods to men is far easier than to speak well of men to men for the inexperience and utter ignorance of his hearers about any subject is a great assistance to him who has to speak of it, and we know how ignorant we are concerning the gods. But I should like to make my meaning clearer if

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you will follow me. All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and representation. For if we consider the likenesses which painters make of bodies divine and heavenly and the different degrees of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives them we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains and the rivers and the woods and the universe and the things that are and move therein and further that knowing nothing precise about such matters we do not examine or analyze the painting all that is required is a sort of indistinct and deceptive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person endeavours to paint the human form we are quick at finding out defects and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of any one who does not render every point of similarity. And we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse we are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which has very little likeness to them but we are more precise in our criticism of mortal and human things. Wherefore if at the moment of speaking I cannot suitably express my meaning you must excuse me considering that to form approved likenesses of human things is the reverse of easy. This is what I want to suggest to you [108] and at the same time to beg Socrates that I may have not less but more indulgence conceded to me in what I am about to say. Which favour if I am right in asking I hope that you will be ready to grant.

Socrates Certainly Critias we will grant your request and we will grant the same by anticipation to Hermocrates as well as to you.

and Timæus for I have no doubt that when he comes a little while hence, he will make the same request which you have made. In order, then, that he may provide himself with a track before-hand, and not be compelled to say the same things over again, let him understand that indulgence is already extended by anticipation to him. And now friend Critias, I will announce to you the judgment of the theatre. They are of opinion that the last performer was wonderfully successful, and that you will need a great deal of indulgence before you will be able to take his place.

Hermocrates. The warning, Socrates, which you have addressed to him, I must also take to myself. But remember Critias, that faint heart never yet raised a trophy and therefore you must go and attack the argument like a man. First invoke Apollo and the Muses, and then let us hear you sound the praises and show forth the virtues of your ancient citizens.

Crit. Friend Hermocrates, you, who are stationed last and have another in front of you, have not lost heart as yet; the gravity of the situation will soon be revealed to you. Meanwhile I accept your exhortations and encouragements. But besides the gods and goddesses whom you have mentioned, I would specially invoke *Mnemosyne* for all the important part of my discourse is dependent on her favour and if I can recollect and retain enough of what was said by the priests and brought further by *Soma*, I doubt not that I shall satisfy the requirements of this theatre. And now making no more excuses, I will proceed.

Let us begin by observing first of all, that *ancient* was the sum of years which had elapsed since the war which was said to have taken place between those who dwelt outside the Plains of Heracles and all who dwelt within them; this was I am going to describe. Of the combatants on the one side, the city of Athens was reported to have been the leader and to have fought out the war; the combatants on the other side were commanded by the Kings of Atlantis, which, as I was saying, was an island greater in extent than Libya and Asia, and which afterwards sunk by an earthquake, became an impassable barrier of mud to voyagers sailing from hence to any part of the ocean. [109] The progress of the history will unfold the various nations of barbarians and families of Hellenes which then existed, as they successively appear on the scene but I must describe first of all Athenians of that day and their enemies who fought with them, and then the respective pow-

ers and governments of the two kingdoms. Let us give the precedence to Athens.

In the days of old the gods had the whole earth distributed among them by allotment. There was no quarrelling for you cannot rightly suppose that the gods did not know what was proper for each of them to have, or knowing this, that they would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which more properly belonged to others. They all of them by just apportionment obtained what they wanted, and peopled their own districts and when they had peopled them they tended us, their nurselings and possessions, as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion according to their own pleasure—thus did they guide all mortal creatures. Now different gods had their allotments in different places which they set in order Hephaestus and Athena, who were brother and sister and sprang from the same father having a common nature, and being united also in the love of philosophy and art, both obtained as their common portion this land, which was naturally adapted for wisdom and virtue and there they implanted brave children of the soil, and put into their minds the order of government; their names are preserved, but their actions have disappeared by reason of the destruction of those who received the tradition, and the lapse of ages. For when there were any survivors, as I have already said, they were men who dwelt in the mountains and they were ignorant of the art of writing, and had heard only the names of the chiefs of the land, but very little about their actions. The names they were willing enough to give to their children but the virtues and the laws of their predecessors, they knew only by obscure traditions and as they themselves and their children lacked for many generations the necessities of life, they directed their attention to the supply of their wants, and of them they conveyed, [110] to the neglect of events that had happened in times long past, for mythology and the enquiry into antiquity are first introduced into cities when they begin to have leisure, and when they see that the necessities of life have already been provided, but not before. And this is the reason why the names of the ancients have been preserved to us and not their actions. Thus

CE. *St. James* 17 ff.

CE. *Aristotle, Metaphysics* I. 2, 681, 22, 1

I infer because Solon said that the priests in their narrative of that war mentioned most of the names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus such as Cecrops and Erechtheus, and Erichthonius and Erysichthon and the names of the women in like manner. Moreover since military pursuits were then common to men and women the men of those days in accordance with the custom of the time set up a figure and image of the goddess in full armour to be a testimony that all animals which associate together male as well as female may if they please practise in common the virtue which belongs to them without distinction of sex.

Now the country was inhabited in those days by various classes of citizens—there were artisans and there were husbandmen and there was also a warrior class originally set apart by divine men. The latter dwelt by themselves and had all things suitable for nurture and education neither had any of them anything of their own but they regarded all that they had as common property nor did they claim to receive of the other citizens anything more than their necessary food. And they practised all the pursuits which we yesterday described as those of our imaginary guardians. Concerning the country the Egyptian priests said what is not only probable but manifestly true that the boundaries were in those days fixed by the Isthmus and that in the direction of the continent they extended as far as the heights of Cithaeron and Parnes the boundary line came down in the direction of the sea having the district of Oropus on the right and with the river Asopus as the limit on the left. The land was the best in the world and was therefore able in those days to support a vast army raised from the surrounding people. Even the remnant of Attica which now exists may compare with any region in the world for the variety and excellence of its fruits and the suitableness of its pastures to [111] every sort of animal which proves what I am saying but in those days the country was far as now and yielded far more abundant produce. How shall I establish my words? and what part of it can be truly called a remnant of the land that then was? The whole country is only a long promontory extending far into the sea away from the rest of the continent while the surrounding basin of the sea is everywhere deep in the neighbourhood of the shore. Many great deluges have taken place during the nine thousand years, for that is the number of years which have elapsed since the time of which I am speaking and during all

this time and through so many changes there has never been any considerable accumulation of the soil coming down from the mountains, as in other places but the earth has fallen away all round and sunk out of sight. The consequence is that in comparison of what then was, there are remaining only the bones of the wasted body as they may be called as in the case of small islands all the richer and softer parts of the soil having fallen away and the mere skeleton of the land being left. But in the primitive state of the country, its mountains were high hills covered with soil and the plains, as they are termed by us of Phelleus were full of rich earth and there was abundance of wood in the mountains. Of this last the traces still remain for although some of the mountains now only afford sustenance to bees not so very long ago there were still to be seen roofs of timber cut from trees growing there, which were of a size sufficient to cover the largest houses and there were many other high trees cultivated by man and bearing abundance of food for cattle. Moreover the land reaped the benefit of the annual rainfall not as now losing the water which flows off the bare earth into the sea but having an abundant supply in all places and receiving it into herself and treasuring it up in the close clay soil it let off into the hollows the streams which it absorbed from the heights, providing everywhere abundant fountains and rivers of which there may still be observed sacred memorials in places where fountains once existed and this proves the truth of what I am saying.

Such was the natural state of the country which was cultivated as we may well believe by true husbandmen who made husbandry their business and were lovers of honour and of a noble nature and had a soil the best in the world and abundance of water and in the heaven above an excellently tempered climate. Now the city in those days was arranged on this wise. In the first place the Acropolis was not as now [112] for the fact is that a single night of excessive rain washed away the earth and laid bare the rock at the same time there were earthquakes and then occurred the extraordinary inundation which was the third before the great destruction of Deucalion. But in primitive times the hill of the Acropolis extended to the Eridanus and Ilissus and included the Pnyx on one side, and the Lycabettus as a boundary on the opposite side to the Pnyx, and was all well covered with soil and level at the top except in one or two places.

Outside the Acropolis and under the sides of the hill were dwelt artisans, and such of the husbandmen as were tilling the ground near the warrior class dwelt by themselves around the temples of Athens and Hephaestus at the summit, which moreover they had enclosed with a single fence like the garden of a single house. On the north side they had dwellings in common and had erected halls for dining in winter and had all the buildings which they needed for their common life, besides temples, but there was no adorning of them with gold and silver for they made no use of these for any purpose; they took a middle course between meanliness and ostentation, and built modest houses in which they and their children's children grew old, and they banded them down to others who were like themselves, always the same. But in summer-time they left their garrets and gymnasia and dining halls, and then the southern side of the hill was made use of by them for the same purpose. Where the Acropolis now is there was a fountain, which was closed by the earthquake, and has left only the few small streams which still exist in the vicinity, but in those days the fountain gave an abundant supply of water for all and of suitably temperature in summer and in winter. This is how they dwelt, being the guardians of their own citizens and the leaders of the Hellenes, who were their willing followers. And they took care to preserve the same number of men and women through all time, being so many as were required for warlike purposes, then as now—that is to say about twenty thousand. Such were the ancient Athenians, and in this manner they righteously administered their own land and the rest of Hellas; they were renowned all over Europe and Asia for the beauty of their persons and for the many virtues of their souls, and of all men who lived in those days they were the most illustrious. And next, if I have not forgotten what I heard when I was a child, I will impart to you the character and origin of their adversaries. For friends should not keep their stories to themselves, but have them in common.

[113] Yet, before proceeding further in the narrative, I ought to warn you, that you must not be surprised if you should perhaps hear Hellenic names given to foreigners. I will tell you the reason of this. Solon, who was intending to use the tale for his poem, enquired into the meanings of the names, and found that the early Egyptians in writing them down had translated them into their own language, and

he recovered the meaning of the several names and when copying them out again translated them into our language. My great grandfather Dropides, had the original writing which is still in my possession, and was carefully studied by me when I was a child. Therefore if you hear names such as are used in this country you must not be surprised, for I have told how they came to be introduced. The tale, which was of great length, began as follows—

I have before remarked in speaking of the allotments of the gods, that they distributed the whole earth into portions differing in extent, and made for themselves temples and instituted sacrifices. And Poseidon, receiving for his lot the island of Atlantis, begat children by a mortal woman, and settled them in a part of the island, which I will describe. Looking towards the sea, but in the centre of the whole island, there was a plain which is said to have been the fairest of all plains and very fertile. Near the plain again, and also in the centre of the island at a distance of about fifty stadia, there was a mountain not very high on any side.

In this mountain there dwelt one of the earth-born primal men of that country whose name was Evemer and he had a wife named Leucippe, and they had an only daughter who was called Cleto. The maiden had already reached womanhood, when her father and mother died. Poseidon fell in love with her and had intercourse with her and breaking the ground, enclosed the hill in which she dwelt all round, making alternate zones of sea and land larger and smaller encircling one another; there were two of land and three of water which he turned as with a lathe, each having its circumference equidistant every way from the centre, so that no man could get to the island, for ships and voyages were not as yet. He himself, being a god, found no difficulty in making special arrangements for the centre island, bringing up two springs of water from beneath the earth, one of warm water and the other of cold, and making every variety of food to spring up abundantly from the soil. He also begat and brought up five pairs of twin male children and dividing the island of Atlantis into ten portions, [114] he gave to the first-born of the eldest pair his mother's dwelling and the surrounding allotment, which was the largest and best, and made him king over the rest; the others he made princes, and gave them rule over many men, and a large territory. And he named them all the eldest, who was the first king, he named Atlas, and after him the whole island and the

ocean were called Atlantic To his twin brother who was born after him and obtained as his lot the extremity of the island towards the Pillars of Heracles facing the country which is now called the region of Gades in that part of the world he gave the name which in the Hellenic language is Cumelus in the language of the country which is named after him Gadeirus Of the second pair of twins he called one Ampheres and the other Evaemon To the elder of the third pair of twins he gave the name Mneus and Autochthon to the one who followed him Of the fourth pair of twins he called the elder Elasippus and the younger Mestor And of the fifth pair he gave to the elder the name of Azaes and to the younger that of Diaprepes All these and their descendants for many generations were the inhabitants and rulers of divers islands in the open sea and also as has been already said they held sway in our direction over the country within the Pillars as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia

Now Atlas had a numerous and honourable family and they retained the kingdom the eldest son handing it on to his eldest for many generations and they had such an amount of wealth as was never before possessed by kings and potentates and is not likely ever to be again and they were furnished with everything which they needed both in the city and country For because of the greatness of their empire many things were brought to them from foreign countries and the island itself provided most of what was required by them for the uses of life In the first place they dug out of the earth whatever was to be found there solid as well as fusile and that which is now only a name and was then something more than a name orichalcum was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island being more precious in those days than anything except gold There was an abundance of wood for carpenter's work and sufficient maintenance for tame and wild animals More over there were a great number of elephants in the island [115] for as there was provision for all other sorts of animals both for those which live in lakes and marshes and rivers and also for those which live in mountains and on plains so there was for the animal which is the largest and most voracious of all Also whatever fragrant things there now are in the earth whether roots or herbage or woods or essences which distil from fruit and flower grew and thrived in that land also the fruit which admits of cultivation both the dry sort which is given us for nourishment and any other which we use for

food—we call them all by the common name of pulse and the fruits having a hard rind affording drinks and meats and ointments and good store of chestnuts and the like, which furnish pleasure and amusement and are fruits which spoil with keeping and the pleasant kind of dessert, with which we console ourselves after dinner when we are tired of eating—all these that sacred island which then bore held the light of the sun brought forth fair and wondrous and in infinite abundance With such blessings the earth freely furnished them meanwhile they went on constructing their temples and palaces and harbours and docks And they arranged the whole country in the following manner

First of all they bridged over the zones of sea which surrounded the ancient metropolis making a road to and from the royal palace And at the very beginning they built the palace in the habitation of the god and of their ancestors, which they continued to ornament in successive generations every king surpassing the one who went before him to the utmost of his power until they made the building a marvel to be held for size and for beauty And beginning from the sea they bored a canal of three hundred feet in width and one hundred feet in depth and fifty stadia in length which they carried through to the outermost zone making a passage from the sea up to this which became a harbour and leaving an opening sufficient to enable the largest vessels to find ingress More over they divided at the bridges the zones of land which parted the zones of sea leaving room for a single trireme to pass out of one zone into another and they covered over the channels so as to leave a way underneath for the ships for the banks were raised considerably above the water Now the largest of the zones into which a passage was cut from the sea was three stadia in breadth and the zone of land which came next of equal breadth but the next two zones the one of water the other of land were two stadia and the one which surrounded the central island was a stadium only in width [116] The island in which the palace was situated had a diameter of five stadia All this including the zones and the bridge, which was the sixth part of a stadium in width they surrounded by a stone wall on every side placing towers and gates on the bridges where the sea passed in The stone which was used in the work they quarried from underneath the centre island and from underneath the zones on the outer as well as the inner side One kind

was white, another black and a third red and as they quarried, they at the same time hallowed out double docks having roofs formed out of the native rock. Some of their buildings were simple, but in others they put together different stones, varying the colour to please the eye, and to be a natural source of delight. The entire circuit of the wall which went round the outermost zone, they covered with a coating of brass, and the circuit of the next wall they coated with tin, and the third which encompassed the citadel, flashed with the red light of orichalcum.

The palaces in the interior of the citadel were constructed on this wise—in the centre was a holy temple dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, which remained inaccessible and was surrounded by an enclosure of gold: this was the spot where the family of the ten princes first saw the light, and thither the people annually brought the fruits of the earth in their season from all the ten portions to be an offering to each of the ten. Here was Poseidon's own temple which was a stadium in length, and half a stadium in width and of a proportionate height, having a strange barbaric appearance. All the outside of the temple, with the exception of the pinnacles, they covered with silver and the pinnacles with gold. In the interior of the temple the roof was of ivory curiously wrought everywhere with gold and silver and orichalcum and all the other parts, the walls and pillars and floor they coated with orichalcum. In the temple they placed statues of gold: there was the god himself standing in a chariot—the charioteer of six winged horses—and of such a size that he touched the roof of the building with his head: around him there were a hundred Nereids riding on dolphins for such was thought to be the number of them by the men of those days. There were also in the interior of the temple other images which had been dedicated by private persons. And around the temple on the outside were placed statues of gold of all the descendants of the ten kings and of their wives and there were many other great offerings of kings and of private persons coming both from the city itself and from the foreign cities over which they held sway. There was in it too within its size and workmanship preponderated to this magnificence, [117] and the palace in like manner answered to the greatness of the kingdom and the glory of the temple.

In the next place they had fountains: one of cold and another of hot water in gracious plen-

ty flowing and they were wonderfully adapted for use by reason of the pleasantness and excellence of their waters. They constructed build-
ings about them and planted suitable trees: also they made cisterns, some open to the heavens, others roofed over to be used in winter as warm baths: there were the kings' baths, and the baths of private persons which were kept apart and there were separate baths for women, and for horses and cattle, and to each of them they gave as much adornment as was suitable. Of the water which ran off they carried some to the grove of Poseidon, where were growing all manner of trees of wonderful height and beauty owing to the excellence of the soil while the remainder was conveyed by aqueducts along the bridges to the outer circles and there were many temples built and dedicated to many gods: also gardens and places of exercise, some for men, and others for horses in both of the two islands formed by the zones and in the centre of the larger of the two there was set apart a race-course of a stadium in width, and in length allowed to extend all round the island, for horses to race in. Also there were guard-houses at intervals for the guards, the more trusted of whom were appointed to keep watch in the lesser zone, which was nearer the Acropolis while the most trusted of all had houses given them within the citadel near the persons of the kings. The docks were full of triremes and naval stores, and all things were quite ready for use. Enough of the plan of the royal palace.

Leaving the palace and passing out across the three harbours you came to a wall which began at the sea and went all round: this was everywhere distant fifty stadia from the largest zone or harbour and enclosed the whole the ends meeting at the mouth of the channel which led to the sea. The entire area was densely crowded with habitations and the canal and the largest of the harbours were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts who from their numbers kept up a multitudinous sound of human voices, and din and clatter of all sorts night and day.

I have described the city and the environs of the ancient place nearly in the words of Solon, and now I must endeavour to represent to you the nature and arrangement of the rest of the land [118]. The whole country was said by him to be very lofty and precipitous on the side of the sea but the country immediately about and surrounding the city was a level plain: it self surrounded by mountains which descended

towards the sea it was smooth and even and of an oblong shape extending in one direction three thousand stadia but across the centre in land it was two thousand stadia. This part of the island looked towards the south and was sheltered from the north. The surrounding mountains were celebrated for their number and size and beauty far beyond any which still exist having in them also many wealthy villages of country folk and rivers and lakes and meadows supplying food enough for every animal wild or tame and much wood of various sorts abundant for each and every kind of work.

I will now describe the plain as it was fashioned by nature and by the labours of many generations of kings through long ages. It was for the most part rectangular and oblong and where falling out of the straight line followed the circular ditch. The depth and width and length of this ditch were incredible and gave the impression that a work of such extent in addition to so many others could never have been artificial. Nevertheless I must say what I was told. It was excavated to the depth of a hundred feet and its breadth was a stadium everywhere it was carried round the whole of the plain, and wasted thousand stadia in length. It received the streams which came down from the mountains and winding round the plain and meeting at the city was there let off into the sea. Further inland likewise straight canals of a hundred feet in width were cut from it through the plain and again let off into the ditch leading to the sea—these canals were at intervals of a hundred stadia and by them they brought down the wood from the mountains to the city and conveyed the fruits of the earth in ships cutting transverse passages from one canal into another, and to the city. Twice in the year they gathered the fruits of the earth—in winter having the benefit of the rains of heaven and in summer the water which the land supplied by introducing streams from the canals.

As to the population each of the lots in the plain had to find a leader for the men who were fit for military service [119] and the size of a lot was a square of ten stadia each way and the total number of all the lots was sixty thousand. And of the inhabitants of the mountains and of the rest of the country there was also a vast multitude which was distributed among the lots and had leaders assigned to them according to their districts and villages. The leader was required to furnish for the war the sixth portion of a war-chariot, so as to make up a

total of ten thousand chariots also two horses and riders for them and a pair of chariot horses without a seat, accompanied by a horseman who could fight on foot carrying a small shield, and having a charioteer who stood behind the man at arms to guide the two horses also, he was bound to furnish two heavy armed soldiers, two archers two slingers three stone shooters and three javelin men who were light armed, and four sailors to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships. Such was the military order of the royal city—the order of the other nine governments varied and it would be wearisome to recount their several differences.

As to offices and honours the following was the arrangement from the first. Each of the ten kings in his own division and in his own city had the absolute control of the citizens, and in most cases of the laws punishing and slaying whomsoever he would. Now the order of precedence among them and their mutual relations were regulated by the commands of Poseidon whom which the law had handed down. These were inscribed by the first kings on a pillar of orichalcum which was situated in the middle of the island at the temple of Poseidon whither the kings were gathered together every fifth and every sixth year alternately thus giving equal honour to the odd and to the even number. And when they were gathered together they consulted about their common interests, and enquired if any one had transgressed in anything and passed judgment and before they passed judgment they gave their pledges to one another on this wise—There were bulls who had the range of the temple of Poseidon and the ten kings being left alone in the temple, after they had offered prayers to the god that they might capture the victim which was acceptable to him hunted the bulls without weapons but with staves and nooses and the bull which they caught they led up to the pillar and cut its throat over the top of it so that the blood fell upon the sacred inscription. Now on the pillar besides the laws there was inscribed an oath invoking mighty curses on the disobedient. When therefore after slaying the bull in the accustomed manner they had burnt its limbs, they filled a bowl of wine and cast in a clot of blood for each of them [120] the rest of the victim they put in the fire after having purified the column all round. Then they drew from the bowl in golden cups and pouring a libation on the fire they swore that they would judge according to the laws on the pillar and would punish him who in any point had already trans-

gressed them, and that for the future they would not, if they could help offend against the writing on the pillar and could neither command others, nor obey any ruler who commanded them, to act otherwise than according to the laws of their father Poseidon. This was the prayer which each of them offered up for himself and for his descendants, at the same time drinking and dedicating the cup out of which he drank in the temple of the god and after they had supped and satisfied their needs, when darkness came on, and the fire about the sacrifice was cool, all of them put on most beautiful azure robes, and sitting on the ground at night, over the embers of the sacrifices by which they had sworn and extinguishing all the fire about the temple, they received and gave judgment, if any of them had an accusation to bring against any one and when they had given judgment, at daybreak they wrote down the sentences on a golden tablet, and dedicated it together with their robes to be a memorial.

There were many special laws affecting the several kings inscribed about the temples, but the most important was the following. They were not to take up arms against one another and they were all to come to the rescue if any one in any of their cities attempted to overthrow the royal house like their ancestors, they were to deliberate in common about war and other matters giving the supremacy to the descendants of Atlas. And the king was not to have the power of life and death over any of his kinsmen unless he had the assent of the majority of the ten.

Such was the vast power which the god set in the low island of Atlantis and this he afterwards directed against our land for the following reasons as tradition tells. For many generations as long as the divine nature lasted in them, they were obedient to the laws, and

well affectioned towards the god whose seed they were for they possessed true and in every way great spirits, uniting gentleness with wisdom in the various chances of life and in their intercourse with one another. They despised everything but virtue caring little for their present state of life and thinking lightly of the possession of gold and other property which seemed only a burden to them neither were they intoxicated by luxury nor did wealth deprive them of their self-control (121) but they were sober and saw clearly that all these goods are increased by virtue and friendship with one another whereas by too great regard and respect for them they are lost and friendship with them. By such reflections and by the continuance in them of a divine nature the qualities which we have described grew and increased among them but when the divine portion began to fade away and became diluted too often and too much with the mortal admixture, and the human nature got the upper hand they then being unable to bear their fortune behaved unseemly and to him who had an eye to see, grew visibly debased for they were losing the fairest of their precious gifts but to those who had no eye to see the true happiness, they appeared glorious and blessed at the very time when they were full of avarice and unrighteous power. Zeus, the god of gods who rules according to law and is able to see into such things, perceiving that an honourable race was in a woeful plight, and wanting to inflict punishment on them, that they might be chastened and improve, collected all the gods into their most holy habitation which being placed in the centre of the world beholds all created things. And when he had called them together he spake as follows—

The fragment Critias thus breaks off in the middle of a sentence.

PARMENIDES

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE CEPHALUS ADEIMANTUS GLAUCON ANTIPHON PYTHODORUS
SOCRATES, ZENO PARMENIDES ARISTOTELLES *Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is sup-
posed to have been narrated in his presence by Antiphon the half brother of Adeimantus
and Glaucon to certain Clazomenians*



[126] We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens and met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus said Adeimantus taking me by the hand is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Yes that is why I am here. I wish to ask a favour of you.

What may that be? he said.

I want you to tell me the name of your half brother which I have forgotten. he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago. his father's name if I remember rightly was Pylampes?

Yes he said and the name of our brother Antiphon but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine. I said they are lovers of philosophy and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain Pythodorus a friend of Zeno and remembers a conversation which took place between Socrates Zeno and Parmenides many years ago Pythodorus having often recited it to him.

Quite true.

And could we hear it? I asked.

Nothing easier he replied when he was a youth he made a careful study of the piece at present his thoughts run in another direction like his grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But if that is what you want let us go and look for him he dwells at Melita which is quite near and he has only just left us to go home.

[127] Accordingly we went to look for him he was at home and in the act of giving a bribe to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith his brothers told him the purpose of our visit and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing and complained of the trouble but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno they came to Athens as he said at the great Panathenaea the former was at the time of his visit about 65 years old very white with age but well favoured Zeno was nearly 40 years of age tall and fair to look upon in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus outside the wall whither Socrates then a very young man came to see them and many others with him they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno which had been brought to Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides and had very nearly finished when Pythodorus entered and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty and heard the little that remained of the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed Socrates requested that the first thesis of the first argu-

ment might be read over again and thus having been done, he said What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is many it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like—is that your position?

Just so, said Zeno.

And if the unlike cannot be like or the like unlike, then according to you, being could not be many for this would involve an impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this there being in all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

[123] No, said Zeno, you have correctly understood my general purpose.

I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one with your friend ship but your second self in his writings too. He puts what you say in another way and would fain make believe that he is telling us some thing which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs and he on the other hand says There is no many and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm unity he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial trick as you imagine for what you speak of was an accident there was no pretence of a great purpose nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many whose attack I return with witest by retorting upon them that their hypotheses of the being of many if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypotheses of the being of one. Zeno for my master led me to write the book in the days of my youth but some one stole the copy and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not the mo-

ture, however of writing was not the ambition of an elder man but the pugnacity of a young one. Thus you do not seem to see Socrates though in other respects, as I was saying your notion is a very just one.

I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself [19] and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness and that in these two you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many participate—things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?—Where is the wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to be come unlike or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion would indeed be a wonder but there is nothing extraordinary Zeno in showing that the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest. I should be surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back and an upper and a lower half for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude when on the other hand he wants to prove that I am one, he will say that we who are here assembled are seven and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his case. So again if a person shows that such things as wood stones and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence of the one and many but he does not show that the many are one or the one many he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however as I just now suggested some one were to abstract simple notions of like unlike, one many rest, motion and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. Thus part of the argument

appears to be treated by you Zeno in a very spirited manner but as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are [130] apprehended by reason the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects

While Socrates was speaking Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument but still they gave the closest attention and often looked at one another and smiled as if in admiration of him When he had finished Parmenides expressed their feelings in the following words —

Socrates he said I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy tell me now was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?

I think that there are such ideas said Socrates

Parmenides proceeded And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good and of all that class?

Yes he said I should

And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures or of fire and water?

I am often undecided Parmenides as to whether I ought to include them or not

And would you feel equally undecided Socrates about things of which the mention may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair mud dirt or anything else which is vile and paltry would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates visible things like these are such as they appear to us and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them although I sometimes get disturbed and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea but then again when I have taken up this position I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense and perish and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking and occupy myself with them

Yes, Socrates said Parmenides that is because you are still young the time will come, if I am not mistaken when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not

despise even the meanest things at your age you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake and from which they derive their names [131] that similars for example become similar because they partake of similarity and great things become great because they partake of greatness and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful because they partake of justice and beauty?

Yes, certainly said Socrates that is my meaning

Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?

There cannot be he said

Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?

Why not Parmenides? said Socrates

Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself

Nay but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once and yet continuous with itself in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time.

I like your way, Socrates of making one in many places at once You mean to say that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men there would be one whole including many—is not that your meaning?

I think so

And would you say that the whole sail includes each man or a part of it only and different parts different men?

The latter

Then Socrates the ideas themselves will be divisible and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?

That seems to follow

Then would you like to say Socrates that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said

Suppose that you divide absolute greatness and that of the many great things each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

No

Or will each equal thing if possessing some small portion of equality less than absolute equality be equal to some other thing by virtue of that portion only?

Impossible

Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness: this is but a part of the small and therefore the absolutely small is greater: if the absolutely small be greater than to which the part of the small is added will be smaller and not greater than before.

How absurd!

Then in what way Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.

Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?

What question?

I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind is as follows [132]—You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all hence you conceive of greatness as one.

Very true, said Socrates.

And if you go on and allow your mind to like manner to embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these?

It would seem so.

Then another idea of greatness now comes moreover over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it and then another over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be two only and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.

And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?

Impossible, he said.

The thoughts must be of something?

Yes.

Of something which is or which is not?

Of something which is.

Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, be it a single form or nature?

Yes.

And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all be an idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that every

thing else partakes in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think, or that they are thoughts but have no thought?

The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are as it were, patterns fixed in nature and other things are like them and resemblances of them—what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Impossible.

And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?

They must.

And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?

Certainly.

Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light, [133] and if that be like anything else, another and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Quite true.

The theory then that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance has to be given up and some other mode of participation devised?

It would seem so.

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?

Yes, indeed.

And, further let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea, parting it off from other things.

What difficulty? he said.

There are many but the greatest of all is this—If an opponent argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you or any one who maintains the existence of ab-

solite essences will admit that they cannot exist in us

No, said Socrates for then they would be no longer absolute

True he said and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to one another their essence is determined by a relation among themselves and has nothing to do with the resemblances or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that name when we partake of them And the things which are within our sphere and have the same names with them are likewise only relative to one another and not to the ideas which have the same names with them but belong to themselves and not to them

What do you mean? said Socrates

I may illustrate my meaning in this way said Parmenides—A master has a slave now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them which is simply a relation of one man to another But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract [134] These natures have nothing to do with us nor we with them they are concerned with themselves only and we with ourselves Do you see my meaning?

Yes said Socrates I quite see your meaning And will not knowledge—I mean absolute knowledge—answer to absolute truth?

Certainly

And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?

Yes

But the knowledge which we have will answer to the truth which we have and again each kind of knowledge which we have will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly

But the ideas themselves as you admit we have not and cannot have?

No we cannot

And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes

And we have not got the idea of knowledge?

No

Then none of the ideas are known to us because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

I suppose not

Then the nature of the beautiful in itself and of the good in itself and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely are unknown to us?

It would seem so

I think that there is a stranger consequence still

What is it?

Would you or would you not say, that absolute knowledge if there is such a thing must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge and the same of beauty and of the rest?

Yes

And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Certainly

But then will God having absolute knowledge have a knowledge of human things?

Why not?

Because Socrates said Parmenides we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things nor human things in relation to them the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres

Yes that has been admitted

And if God has this perfect authority and perfect knowledge his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us or any human thing just as our authority does not extend to the gods nor our knowledge know anything which is divine so by parity of reason they being gods are not our masters neither do they know the things of men

Yet surely said Socrates to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous

[135] These Socrates said Parmenides are a few and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine each one of them to be an absolute unity He who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them—and even if they do exist he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man and he will seem to have reason on his side and as we were remarking just now will be very difficult to convince a man must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others

I agree with you Parmenides said Socrates and what you say is very much to my mind

And yet Socrates said Parmenides if a man fixing his attention on these and the like difficulties does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its

own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to be particularly noting.

Very true, he said.

But then, what is to become of philosophy? Whether shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?

I certainly do not see my way at present.

Yes, said Parmenides and I think that this answer, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally without sufficient previous training, I noticed your deficiency when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine but there is an art which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young or truth will elude your grasp.

And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?

That which you heard Zeno practising at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in reference to visible things, or to consider the question in that way but only in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.

Why yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience anything.

Quite true, said Parmenides but I think that you should go step further and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, [136] but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis and that will be still better training for you.

What do you mean, he said.

I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's about the many you should in your not only what will be the consequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and the many on the hypothesis of the being of the many but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other on the opposite hypothesis. Or again, if I know this or is not, what will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to them-

selves and to one another and so of unlikeness and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose any thing to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself and to any other things which you choose—to each of them singly to more than one, and to all and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you will you take some hypothesis and go through the steps?—then I shall apprehend you better.

That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.

Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.

Zeno answered with a smile—Let us make our petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him and if there were more of us I should not ask him for these are not subjects which any one, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience most people are not aware that this round about progress through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.

When Zeno had thus spoken Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process [137] I cannot refuse, said Parmenides and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well—this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypotheses of the one? and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not being of one?

By all means said Zeno

And who will answer me? he said Shall I propose the youngest? He will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and his answers will give me time to breathe

I am the one whom you mean Parmenides said Aristoteles for I am the youngest and at your service Ask and I will answer

Parmenides proceeded If one is he said the one cannot be many?

Impossible

Then the one cannot have parts and cannot be a whole?

Why not?

Because every part is part of a whole is it not?

Yes

And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?

Certainly

Then, in either case the one would be made up of parts, both as being a whole and also as having parts?

To be sure

And in either case the one would be many and not one?

True

But surely it ought to be one and not many?

It ought

Then if the one is to remain one it will not be a whole and will not have parts?

No

But if it has no parts it will have neither beginning middle nor end for these would of course be parts of it

Right

But then again a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?

Certainly

Then the one having neither beginning nor end is unlimited?

Yes unlimited

And therefore formless for it cannot partake either of round or straight

But why?

Why because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?

Yes

And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?

True

[138] Then the one would have parts and would be many if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly

But having no parts it will be neither straight nor round?

Right

And being of such a nature it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be either in another or in itself

How so?

Because if it were in another it would be encircled by that in which it was and would touch it at many places and with many parts but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature cannot be touched all round in many places

Certainly not

But if on the other hand one were in itself it would also be contained by nothing else but itself that is to say, if it were really in itself for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it

Impossible

But then that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once and if so one will be no longer one but two?

True

Then one cannot be anywhere either in itself or in another?

No

Further consider whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion

Why not?

Why because the one if it were moved would be either moved in place or changed in nature for these are the only kinds of motion

Yes

And the one when it changes and ceases to be itself cannot be any longer one

It cannot

It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?

Clearly not

Then can the motion of the one be in place?

Perhaps

But if the one moved in place must it not either move round and round in the same place or from one place to another?

It must

And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre and that which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the centre but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.

But perhaps the motion of the one consists
in change of place?
Perhaps so if it moves at all
And have we not already shown that it can
not be in anything?

Yes.

Then its coming into being in anything is
still more impossible—is it not?

I do not see why.

Why because anything which comes into
being in anything can neither as yet be in that
other thing while still coming into being nor
be also either out of it, if already coming into
being in it.

Certainly not.

And therefore whatever comes into being in
another must have parts and then one part
may be in, and another part out of that other
but that which has no parts can never be at one
and the same time neither wholly within nor
wholly without anything.

True.

And is there not a still greater impossibility
in that which has no parts, and is not a whole
coming into being anywhere, since it cannot
come into being either as a part or as a whole?

[139]

Clearly.

Then it does not change place by revolving
in the same spot, nor by going somewhere and
coming into being in something nor again by
changing in itself?

Very true.

Then in respect of any kind of motion the
one is unmovable?

Unmovable.

But neither can the one be in anything as we
affirm?

Yes, we said so.

Then it is never in the same?

Why not?

Because if it were in the same it would be in
something.

Certainly.

And we said that it could not be in itself, and
could not be in other?

True.

Then one is never in the same place?

It would seem not.

But that which is never in the same place is
neither quiet or at rest?

Never.

One then as would seem is neither at rest nor
in motion.

It certainly appears so.

Neither will it be the same with itself or other.

nor again other than itself or other.

How is that?

If other than itself it would be other than
one, and would not be one.

True.

And if the same with other it would be that
other and not itself so that upon this supposi-
tion too it would not have the nature of one,
but would be other than one?

It would.

Then it will not be the same with other or
other than itself?

It will not.

Neither will it be other than other while it
remains one for not one but only other can
be other than other and nothing else.

True.

Then not by virtue of being one will it be
other?

Certainly not.

But if not by virtue of being one not by vir-
tue of itself and if not by virtue of itself not
itself and itself not being other at all will not
be other than anything?

Right.

Neither will one be the same with itself.

How not?

Surely the nature of the one is not the nature
of the same.

Why not?

It is not when anything becomes the same
with anything that it becomes one.

What of that?

Anything which becomes the same with the
many necessarily becomes many and not one.

True.

But, if there were no difference between the
one and the same when a thing became the
same it would always become one and when
it became one, the same?

Certainly.

And therefore, if one be the same with it-
self it is not one with itself and will therefore
be one and also not one.

Surely that is impossible.

And if therefore the one can neither be other
than other nor the same with itself.

Impossible.

And thus the one can neither be the same, nor
other either in relation to itself or other?

No.

Neither will the one be like anything or un-
like itself or other.

Why not?

Because likeness is sameness of affections.

Yes.

And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?

That has been shown

[140] But if the one had any other affection than that of being one it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one which is impossible

True

Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?

Clearly not

Then it cannot be like another or like itself?

No

Nor can it be affected so as to be other for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one

It would

That which is affected otherwise than itself or another will be unlike itself or another for sameness of affections is likeness

True

But the one as appears never being affected otherwise is never unlike itself or other?

Never

Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?

Plainly not

Again being of this nature it can neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to other

How is that?

Why because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which it is equal

True

And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it the one will have more measures than that which is less and fewer than that which is greater?

Yes

And so of things which are not commensurate with it the one will have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is greater

Certainly

But how can that which does not partake of sameness have either the same measures or have anything else the same?

Impossible

And not having the same measures the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

It appears so

But again whether it have fewer or more measures it will have as many parts as it has measures and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures

Right

And if it were of one measure it would be equal to that measure yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality

It has

Then it will neither partake of one measure nor of many nor of few nor of the same at all nor be equal to itself or another nor be greater or less than itself or other?

Certainly

Well and do we suppose that one can be older or younger than anything or of the same age with it?

Why not?

Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other must partake of equality or likeness of time and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?

We did say so

And we also said that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness

[141] Very true

How then can one being of this nature be either older or younger than anything or have the same age with it?

In no way

Then one cannot be older or younger or of the same age either with itself or with another?

Clearly not.

Then the one being of this nature cannot be in time at all for must not that which is in time be always growing older than itself?

Certainly

And that which is older must always be older than something which is younger?

True

Then that which becomes older than itself also becomes at the same time younger than itself if it is to have something to become older than

What do you mean?

I mean this—A thing does not need to be come different from another thing which is already different it is different, and if its different has become it has become different if its different will be it will be different but of that which is becoming different there cannot have been or be about to be or yet be, a different—the only different possible is one which is becoming

That is inevitable

But surely the elder is a difference relative to the younger and to nothing else

True

Then that which becomes older than itself

must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Yes.

But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about to be, for the same time with itself?

That again is inevitable.

Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the same age with themselves and must also become at once older and younger than themselves?

Yes.

But the one did not partake of those affections?

Not at all.

Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?

So the argument shows.

Well, but do not the expressions *was*, and *has become*, and *was becoming*, signify a participation of past time?

Certainly.

And *do not will be*, *will become*, "*will have become*," signify a participation of future time?

Yes.

And *is*, or *becomes*," signifies a participation of present time?

Certainly.

And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now becoming, or is becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be, hereafter?

Most true.

But are there any modes of partaking of being, other than these?

There are none.

Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?

That is the inference.

Then the one is not at all?

Clearly not.

Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one: for if it were and partook of being it would already be: but if the argument is to be trusted, the one neither is nor is one?

[142] True.

But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?

Of course not.

Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?

Clearly not.

Then it is neither named, nor expressed nor opined, nor known nor does anything that is pertinent.

So we must infer

But can all this be true about the one?

I think not.

Suppose, now that we return once more to the original hypothesis: let us see whether on a further review any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning—if one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being but its being will not be the same with the one: for if the same, it would not be the being of the one nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow? but if one is—am I not right?

Quite right.

We mean to say that being has not the same significance as one?

Of course.

And when we put them together shortly and say *One is*, that is equivalent to saying *partakes of being*?

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow? Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

How so?

In this way—If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being: if being is one and if being and one are not the same and since the one, which we have assumed is, must not be the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Certainly.

And is each of these parts—one and being—to be simply called a part, or must the word *part* be relative to the word *whole*?

The latter.

Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Certainly.

Again, of the parts of the one, if it is—I mean being and one—does either fail to imply the

And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?

That has been shown

[140] But if the one had any other affection than that of being one it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one which is impossible

True

Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?

Clearly not

Then it cannot be like another or like itself?

No

Nor can it be affected so as to be other for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one

It would

That which is affected otherwise than itself or another will be unlike itself or another for sameness of affections is likeness

True

But the one, as appears never being affected otherwise is never unlike itself or other?

Never

Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?

Plainly not

Again being of this nature it can neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to other

How is that?

Why because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which it is equal

True

And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it the one will have more measures than that which is less and fewer than that which is greater?

Yes

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Certainly

But how can that which does not partake of sameness have either the same measures or have anything else the same?

Impossible

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It appears so

But again whether it have fewer or more measures it will have as many parts as it has measures and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures

Right

And if it were of one measure it would be equal to that measure yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality

It has

Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many nor of few nor of the same at all nor be equal to itself or another nor be greater or less than itself or other?

Certainly

Well and do we suppose that one can be older or younger than anything or of the same age with it?

Why not?

Why because that which is of the same age with itself or other must partake of equality or likeness of time and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?

We did say so

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PARMENIDES

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How then can one being of this nature be either older or younger than anything or have the same age with it?

In no way

Then one cannot be older or younger or of the same age either with itself or with an other?

Clearly not.

Then the one being of this nature cannot be in time at all for must not that which is in time be always growing older than itself?

Certainly

And that which is older must always be older than something which is younger?

True

Then that which becomes older than itself also becomes at the same time younger than itself if it is to have something to become older than

What do you mean?

I mean this — A thing does not need to be come different from another thing which is already different it is different, and if its different has become it has become different if its different will be it will be different but of that which is becoming different there cannot have been or be about to be or yet be, a different—the only different possible is one which is becoming

That is inevitable

But surely the elder is a difference relative to the younger and to nothing else

True

Then that which becomes older than itself

not also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Yes.

But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about to be, for the same time with itself?

That again is inevitable.

Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the same $\tau\epsilon$ with themselves — and must also become at once older and younger than themselves.

Yes.

But the one did not partake of those affections?

Not at all.

Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?

So the argument shows.

Well, but do not the expressions "was, and had become, and was becoming," signify a participation of past time?

Certainly.

And do not "will be," "will become," "will have become," signify a participation of future time?

Yes.

And is, or "becomes," signifies a participation of present time.

Certainly.

And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or is becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be, hereafter.

Most true.

But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?

There are none.

Then the one cannot possibly partake of being.

That is the inference.

Then the one is not at all?

Clearly not.

Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one for if it were and partook of being it would already be but if the argument is to be trusted, the one or there is not is one?

[142] True.

But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?

Of course not.

Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?

Clearly not.

Then it is neither named, nor expressed nor opined, nor known, nor does anything that is perceive it.

So we must infer

But can a λ thus be true about the one?

I think not.

Suppose, now that we return once more to the original hypothesis let us see whether on a further review any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning—If one is, can one be and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one for if the same, it would not be the being of the one nor would the one have participated in being for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one. but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow but if one is — am I not right?

Quite right.

We mean to say that being has not the same significance as one?

Of course.

And when we put them to, either shortly and say "One is," that is equivalent to saying "partakes of being."

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow? Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

How so?

In this way — If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being if being is one and if being and one are not the same and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being.

Certainly.

And is each of these parts—one and being—to be simply called a part, or must the word part be related to the word whole?

The latter.

Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Certainly.

Again, of the parts of the one, if it is—I mean being and one—does either fail to imply the

And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?

That has been shown

[140] But if the one had any other affection than that of being one it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one which is impossible

True

Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?

Clearly not

Then it cannot be like another or like itself?

No

Nor can it be affected so as to be other for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one

It would

That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike itself or another for sameness of affections is likeness

True

But the one, as appears never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other?

Never

Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?

Plainly not

Again being of this nature it can neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to other

How is that?

Why because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which it is equal

True

And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it the one will have more measures than that which is less and fewer than that which is greater?

Yes

And so of things which are not commensurate with it the one will have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is greater

Certainly

But how can that which does not partake of sameness have either the same measures or have anything else the same?

Impossible

And not having the same measures the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

It appears so

But again whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many parts as it has measures and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures

Right.

And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality

It has

Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many nor of few, nor of the same at all nor be equal to itself or another nor be greater or less than itself or other?

Certainly

Well and do we suppose that one can be older or younger than anything or of the same age with it?

Why not?

Why because that which is of the same age with itself or other must partake of equality or likeness of time and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?

We did say so

And we also said that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness

[141] Very true

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In no way

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Clearly not

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That is inevitable

But surely the elder is a difference relative to the younger and to nothing else

True

Then that which becomes older than itself

the smallest, and into being of all such, and is broken up more than all things: the divisions of it have no limit.

True.

Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Yes, the greatest number.

Is there any of these which is a part of being

and yet no part?

Impossible.

But if it is at all and so long, as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Certainly.

Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?

True.

But reflect.—Can one in its entirety be in many places at the same time?

No: I see the impossibility of that.

And if not in its entirety, then it is divided for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.

True.

And this which has parts will be as many as the parts are?

Certainly.

Then we were wrong, in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, but into parts equal to the one: the one is never wanting, to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and co-eternal.

Certainly that is true.

The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.

Further inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, [145] will be limited: for are not the parts contained by the whole?

Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the one if it has being is one and many whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?

Clearly.

And because having limits, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole has beginning and mid-

dle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

Then the one, as appears, will have being, middle, and end.

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes, or it would not be in the middle?

Yes.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Yes.

And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

And the one is the whole?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one, and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one: for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts: for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in it, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts: for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing: but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in an-

other? is the one wanting to being or being to the one?

Impossible

Thus each of the parts also has in turn both one and being and is at the least made up of two parts and the same principle goes on for ever and every part whatever has always these two parts for being always involves one, and one being so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two

[143] Certainly

And so the one if it is must be infinite in multiplicity?

Clearly

Let us take another direction

What direction?

We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?

Yes

And in this way the one if it has being has turned out to be many?

True

But now let us abstract the one which as we say partakes of being and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say it partakes—will this abstract one be one only or many?

One I think

Let us see—Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is not being but considered as one, only partook of being?

Certainly

If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being nor because being is being that it is other than the one but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference

Certainly

So that the other is not the same—either with the one or with being?

Certainly not

And therefore whether we take being and the other or being and the one or the one and the other in every such case we take two things which may be rightly called both

How so

In this way—you may speak of being?

Yes

And also of one?

Yes

Then now we have spoken of either of them?

Yes

Well and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?

Certainly

And if I speak of being and the other or of

the one and the other—in any such case do I not speak of both?

Yes

And must not that which is correctly called both be also two?

Undoubtedly

And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?

It cannot

Then if the individuals of the pair are together two they must be severally one?

Clearly

And if each of them is one then by the addition of any one to any pair the whole becomes three?

Yes

And three are odd, and two are even?

Of course

And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice that is if twice one makes two and thrice one three?

Certainly

There are two and twice and therefore there must be twice two and there are three and there is thrice and therefore there must be thrice three?

Of course

If there are three and twice there is twice three and if there are two and thrice there is thrice two?

Undoubtedly

[144] Here then we have even taken even times and odd taken odd times and even taken odd times and odd taken even times

True

And if this is so does any number remain which has no necessity to be?

None whatever

Then if one is number must also be?

It must

But if there is number there must also be many and infinite multiplicity of being for number is infinite in multiplicity and partakes also of being am I not right?

Certainly

And if all number participates in being every part of number will also participate?

Yes

Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things and nothing that is how ever small or however great, is devoid of it? And indeed the very supposition of this is absurd for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

In no way

And it is divided into the greatest and into

the same, and into being of all such, and is broken up more than all things: the divisions it has have no limit.

True.

Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Yes, the greatest number.

Is there any of these which is a part of being and yet no part?

Impossible.

But if it is at all and so long, as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Certainly.

Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of

True.

But respect—Can one in its entirety be in many places at the same time?

No: I see the impossibility of that.

And if not in its entirety, then it is divided, or it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless it is itself.

True.

And this which has parts will be as many as the parts are?

Certainly.

Then we were wrong in saying just now that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, but into parts equal to the one: the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being, two they are co-equal and co-eternal.

Certainly that is true.

The one itself, then, has not been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.

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Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the one if it has being is one and many whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number.

Clearly.

And because it has limits, also it has extremes.

Certainly.

And if a whole, having beginning and mid-

dle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes: or it would not be in the middle?

Yes.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Yes.

And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

And the one is the whole?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one: and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one: for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts: for the part in which it is wanting, is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts: for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing: but being a whole and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in an-

other but regarded as being all its parts is in itself, and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another

Certainly

The one then being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

How?

The one is at rest since it is in itself for being in one and not passing out of this [146] it is in the same which is itself

True

And that which is ever in the same must be ever at rest?

Certainly

Well and must not that on the contrary which is ever in other never be in the same and if never in the same never at rest and if not at rest, in motion?

True

Then the one being always itself in itself and other must always be both at rest and in motion?

Clearly

And must be the same with itself and other than itself and also the same with the others and other than the others this follows from its previous affections

How so?

Every thing in relation to every other thing is either the same or other or if neither the same nor other then in the relation of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part

Clearly

And is the one a part of itself?

Certainly not

Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?

It cannot

But is the one other than one?

No

And therefore not other than itself?

Certainly not

If then it be neither other nor a whole nor a part in relation to itself must it not be the same with itself?

Certainly

But then again a thing which is in another place from itself if this itself remains in the same place with itself, must be other than itself for it will be in another place?

True

Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?

Yes

Thus then as appears the one will be other than itself?

True

Well then if anything be other than any thing will it not be other than that which is other?

Certainly

And will not all things that are not one be other than the one and the one other than the not one?

Of course

Then the one will be other than the others?

True

But consider — Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other opposites to one another?

Of course

Then will the same ever be in the other or the other in the same?

They will not

If then the other is never in the same there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time for during that space of time however small the other would be in the same Is not that true?

Yes

And since the other is never in the same it can never be in anything that is

True

Then the other will never be either in the not one or in the one?

Certainly not

Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one or the not-one other than the one

No

Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another if not partaking of the other [147]

How can they be?

But if they are not other either by reason of themselves or of the other will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

They will

Again the not-one cannot partake of the one otherwise it would not have been not-one but would have been in some way one

True

Nor can the not-one be number for having number it would not have been not-one at all It would not

Again is the not-one part of the one or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

It would

If then in every point of view the one and the not-one are distinct then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another nor other than one another will be the same with one another —so we said?

Yes.

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.

Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference.

And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.

Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.

Yes.

And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

True.

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.

How do you mean?

I may take as an illustration the case of names. You give a name to a thing?

Yes.

And you may say the name once or oftener?

Yes.

And when you say it once you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?

Of course it is the same.

And is not "other" a name given to a thing?

Certainly.

Whenever then you use the word "other" whether once or oftener you name that of which it is the name, and to no "other" do you give the name?

True.

Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others in repeating the word "other" we speak of that nature in which the name is applied, and of no other?

Quite true.

Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, [143] is

that the word "other" is applied to both, will be in the same condition and that which is in the same condition is like?

Yes.

Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing for every thing is other than every thing.

True.

Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?

Yes.

And the other to the same?

True again.

And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?

Yes.

And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?

Certainly.

And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Yes.

But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it like and thus was the affection of otherness.

Yes.

The same then will make it unlike other wise it will not be the opposite of the other.

True.

Then the one will be both like and unlike the others like in so far as it is other and unlike in so far as it is the same.

Yes, that argument may be used.

And there is another argument.

What?

In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected others use is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise use affected is unlike.

True.

Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Certainly.

And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself?

Of course.

Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?—consider

I am considering

other but regarded as being all its parts in itself and therefore the one must be itself in it self and also in another

Certainly

The one then being of this nature is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

How?

The one is at rest since it is in itself for being in one and not passing out of this [146] it is in the same which is itself

True

And that which is ever in the same must be ever at rest?

Certainly

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True

Then the one being always itself in itself and other must always be both at rest and in motion?

Clearly

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True

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Yes

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Yes

And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is

True

Then the other will never be either in the not one or in the one?

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But if they are not other either by reason of themselves or of the other will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

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True

Nor can the not-one be number for having number it would not have been not-one at all

It would not

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It would

If then in every point of view the one and the not-one are distinct then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur: it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part: nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

Neither will greatness be in the one: for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely that in which greatness is: and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed: this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.

But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.

Then other things are not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness: nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another: nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality: and being on an equality must be equal.

Of course.

And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself: having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself: but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others?

Clearly so.

And yet the one, being itself in itself, will al-

so surround and be without itself [151] and as containing itself will be greater than itself and, as contained in itself will be less: and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.

But that which is in anything, will be less, and that in which it is will be greater: in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another: the one in the others and the others in the one if they are to be anywhere?

That is clear.

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them: and inasmuch as the others are in the one: the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Clearly.

And if it be greater and less and equal: it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures: and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself: and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself: and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?

True

And also in other things?

Yes

In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them and would touch itself only

Clearly

Then the inference is that it would touch both?

It would

But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to touch and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?

True

Then the one if it is to touch itself ought to be situated next to itself and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?

It ought

And that would require that the one should be two and be in two places at once [249] and this while it is one, will never happen

No

Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?

It cannot.

Neither can it touch others

Why not?

The reason is that whatever is to touch an other must be in separation from and next to that which it is to touch and no third thing can be between them

True

Two things then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

They are

And if to the two a third be added in due order the number of terms will be three and the contacts two?

Yes

And every additional term makes one additional contact whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms one contact is added to the contacts

True

Whatever is the whole number of things the contacts will be always one less

True

But if there be only one and not two there will be no contact?

How can there be?

And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True

Then they have no number if they have no one in them?

Of course not

Then the others are neither one nor two nor are they called by the name of any number?

No

One then, alone is one and two do not exist?

Clearly not

And if there are not two there is no contact?

There is not

Then neither does the one touch the others nor the others the one if there is no contact?

Certainly not

For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?

True

Further—is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?

How do you mean?

If the one were greater or less than the others or the others greater or less than the one they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others but if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another or if the one had smallness and the others greatness or the one had greatness and the others smallness—whichever kind had greatness would be greater and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly

Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is

How could they?

[250] If then smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly

Suppose the first is will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one or will contain the one?

Clearly

If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of *a.e.* but, if *τ* all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur: it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part: nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself: namely that in which greatness is: and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed: thus, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.

But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.

Then other things are not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another: nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality: and being on an equality must be equal.

Of course.

And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself: having neither greatness nor smallness in itself: it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself: but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others?

Clearly so.

And yet the one, being itself in itself, will al-

so surround and be without itself [151] and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself and, as contained in itself, will be less: and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.

But that which is in anything, will be less, and that in which it is will be greater: in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other *μ* besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another: the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

That is clear.

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one: which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them: and inasmuch as the others are in the one: the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Clearly.

And if it be greater and less and equal: it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions: more than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds: and of as many parts as measures: and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself: and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself: and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

Certainly

And the same will hold of its relation to other things, inasmuch as it is greater than them it will be more in number than them and inasmuch as it is smaller it will be less in number and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things it will be equal to them in number

Certainly

Once more then as would appear the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things

It will

Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others and again neither younger nor older than itself and others by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?

If one is being must be predicated of it?

Yes

But to be ($\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\iota$) is only participation of being in present time and to have been is the participation of being at a past time [152] and to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?

Very true

Then the one since it partakes of being partakes of time?

Certainly

And is not time always moving forward?

Yes

Then the one is always becoming older than itself since it moves forward in time?

Certainly

And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?

I remember

Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?

Certainly

Thus then the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?

Yes

And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming it gets in the point of time between was and will be which is now for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present?

No

And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older and no longer becomes but is older for if it went on it would never be reached by the present for it is the nature of that which goes on to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seiz-

ing the future while in process of becoming between them

True

But that which is becoming cannot skip the present when it reaches the present it ceases to become and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming

Clearly

And so the one when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and is then older

Certainly

And it is older than that than which it was becoming older and it was becoming older than itself

Yes

And that which is older is older than that which is younger?

True

Then the one is younger than itself when in becoming older it reaches the present?

Certainly

But the present is always present with the one during all its being for whenever it is it is always now

Certainly

Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?

Truly

And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

An equal time

But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself it is of the same age with itself?

Of course

And that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger?

No

The one then becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself? [153]

I should say not.

And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older or younger than they?

I cannot tell you

You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one—other would have been one but the others have multitude and are more than one?

They will have multitude

And a multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course

And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?

The lesser

Then the least is the first? And that is the one?

Yes.

Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being but all other things have also number being plural and not singular

They have.

And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later and the things which came into being later are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being, contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

And yet, surely the one was shown to have parts and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

Yes.

All a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all and after the beginning, the others follow until you reach the end?

Certainly

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes that is what we shall say

But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last, and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end

Clearly

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not beginning, or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being part, be also of necessity one?

Certainly

And will not the one come into being together with each part—together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added

to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, [154] nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger what shall we say? Shall we say as of being, so also of becoming, or otherwise?

I cannot answer

But I can venture to say that even if one thing were older or younger than another it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to any thing else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Of course.

Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same the one is and has become older and the other younger but they are no longer becoming so

True

And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are.

No.

But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way in what way?

Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

And what of that?

If the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

But consider again if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?

By a smaller portion.

Certainly

And the same will hold of its relation to other things inasmuch as it is greater than them it will be more in number than them and inasmuch as it is smaller it will be less in number and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things it will be equal to them in number

Certainly

Once more then as would appear the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things

It will

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How do you mean?

If one is being must be predicated of it?

Yes

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Very true

Then the one since it partakes of being partakes of time?

Certainly

And is not time always moving forward?

Yes

Then the one is always becoming older than itself since it moves forward in time?

Certainly

And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?

I remember

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Yes

And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming it gets to the point of time between was and will be which is now for surely in going from the past to the future it cannot skip the present?

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ing the future while in process of becoming between them

True

But that which is becoming cannot skip the present when it reaches the present it ceases to become and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming

Clearly

And so the one when in becoming older it reaches the present ceases to become and is then older

Certainly

And it is older than that than which it was becoming older and it was becoming older than itself

Yes

And that which is older is older than that which is younger?

True

Then the one is younger than itself when in becoming older it reaches the present?

Certainly

But the present is always present with the one during all its being for whenever it is it is always now

Certainly

Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?

Truly

And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

An equal time

But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself it is of the same age with itself?

Of course

And that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger?

No

The one then becoming and being the same time with itself neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself? [153]

I should say not

And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older or younger than they?

I cannot tell you

You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one—other would have been one but the others have multitude and are more than one?

They will have multitude

And a multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course

And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?

The lesser

Then the least is the first? And that is the one?

Yes.

Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being; but all other things have also number being plural and not singular.

They have.

And since it came into being, first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came into being later are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

And yet, surely the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

Yes.

And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow until you reach the end?

Certainly.

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole, and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes, that is what we shall say.

But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last, and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

Clearly.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not a beginning, or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also on necessity one?

Certainly.

And will not the one come into being together with each part—together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added

to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole: it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, [154] nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly.

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger: what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?

I cannot answer.

But I can venture to say that even if one thing were older or younger than another it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first: for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to any thing else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Of course.

Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same: the one is and has become older and the other younger: but they are no longer becoming so.

True.

And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are.

No.

But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.

In what way?

Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

And what of that?

If the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

But consider again: if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?

By a smaller portion.

Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Yes

And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older?

Yes younger

And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before in relation to the one

Certainly

Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older it never really is older [155] but is always becoming for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They cannot however have become for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior and the others become older than the one because they came into being later and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one because they were seen to be older and prior to the one

That is clear

Inasmuch then as one thing does not become older or younger than another in that they always differ from each other by an equal number the one cannot become older or younger than the others nor the others than the one but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion—in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one and the one than the others

Certainly

For all these reasons then the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others

Certainly

But since the one partakes of time and par-

takes of becoming older and younger must it not also partake of the past the present, and the future?

Of course it must

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Certainly

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?

True

And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?

Quite right

Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to the one

Certainly that is true

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider. If the one is both one and many as we have described and is neither one nor many and participates in time must it not in as far as it is one at times partake of being and in as far as it is not one at times not partake of being?

Certainly

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being or not partake of being when partaking of being?

Impossible

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same

True

[156] And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?

Impossible

And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

I should

And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?

I should

The one then as would appear becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being

Certainly

And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed when it becomes one it ceases to be many and when many it ceases to be one?

Certainly

And as it becomes one and many must it not necessarily experience separation and aggregation?

Yes, reply

And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?

Yes.

And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?

True.

And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?

How can it?

But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously a motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.

Impossible.

And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.

There cannot.

But neither can it change without changing.

True.

When then does it change for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?

It cannot.

And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing, really exist?

What thing?

The moment. For the moment seems to strip something out of which change takes place into either of two states for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.

So it appears.

And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to either for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either motion or at rest.

It will not.

[157] And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming—then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is nor is

not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.

Very true.

And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither one nor many neither separated nor aggregated and in the passage from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again it will be neither small nor great, nor equal nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.

True.

All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.

Of course.

But if one is, what will happen to the others—is not that also to be considered?

Yes.

Let us show then, if one is what will be the affections of the others than the one.

Let us do so.

Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one for if they were they could not be other than the one.

Very true.

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

In what way?

Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

So we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many and the parts will be parts of the one for each of the parts is not a part of many but of a whole.

How do you mean?

If anything were a part of many being itself one of them, it will surely be a part of itself which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one and if not a part of each one it will not be a part of any one of the many and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.

Clearly not.

Then the part is not a part of the many nor of all but π of a certain single form which we call a whole being one perfect unity framed out of all—of this the part will be a part

Certainly

If, then the others have parts they will participate in the whole and in the one

True

Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts

Certainly

And the same argument holds of each part for the part must participate in the one [158] for if each of the parts π a part this means I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self related otherwise it is not each

True

But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one for if not it would not merely have participated but would have been one whereas only the one itself can be one

Very true

Both the whole and the part must participate in the one for the whole will be one whole of which the parts will be parts and each part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.

True

And will not the things which participate in the one be other than it?

Of course

And the things which are other than the one will be many for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one they would be nothing

True.

But seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part and in the one as a whole are more than one must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

How so?

Let us look at the matter thus—Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one and do not partake of the one at the very time when they are partaking of it?

Clearly

They do so then as multitudes in which the one π not present?

Very true

And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction must not that least fraction if it does not partake of the one be a multitude and not one?

It must

And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature regarded simply and in itself will not they as far as we see them be unlimited in number?

Certainly

And yet when each several part becomes a part then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other and the whole in relation to the parts

Just so

The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves π and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another whereas in their own nature they have no limit

That is clear

Then the others than the one both as whole and parts are infinite and also partake of limit.

Certainly

Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves

How is that?

Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature they are all affected in the same way

True

And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way

Of course

But inasmuch as their state π both limited and unlimited they are affected in opposite ways

Yes

[159] And opposites are the most unlike of things

Certainly

Considered then in regard to either one of their affections they will be like themselves and one another considered in reference to both of them together most opposed and most unlike

That appears to be true

Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?

True

And they are the same and also different from one another and in motion and at rest and experience every sort of opposite affection as may be proved without difficulty of them since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?

True

Suppose now that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether the opposite of all this π or is not equal ly true of the others

But I mean.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, how must be the affections of the others?

Let us ask that question.

Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?

Why so?

Why because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them for the expression "one and the others" includes all there is.

Yes, all things.

Then we cannot suppose that there is any thing distinct from them in which both the one and the others might exist?

There is nothing.

Then the one and the others are never in the same?

True.

Then they are separated from each other?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?

Impossible.

Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Impossible.

Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?

It would seem not.

Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?

There is not.

Nor are the others many for if they were many each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many nor whole, nor part.

True.

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?

True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But for that which partakes of nothing, no partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?

Impossible.

[160] Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike

they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and thus has been shown to be impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort, for if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?

Yes, we ought.

What is the meaning of the hypothesis—if the one is not—is there any difference between this and the hypothesis—if the not one is not?

There is a difference, certainly.

Is there a difference only or rather are not the two expressions—if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

They are entirely opposed.

And suppose a person to say—if greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that "what is not" is other than other things?

To be sure.

And so when he says "if one is not" he clearly means, that what "is not" is other than all others—we know what he means—do we not?

Yes, we do.

When he says "one," he says something which is known and secondly something which is other than all other things—it makes no difference whether he predicate of one being, or not being—for that which is said "not to be" is known to be something, all the same and is distinguished from other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask. If one is not, what are the consequences? In the first place, as would appear there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, "if one is not," would not be known.

True

Secondly the others differ from it or it could not be described as different from the others?

Certainly

Difference then belongs to it as well as knowledge, for in speaking of the one as different from the others we do not speak of a difference in the others but in the one

Clearly so

Moreover the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to that and this and these and the like and is an attribute of this for the one or the others than the one could not have been spoken of nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or been spoken of nor could it have been said to be anything if it did not partake of some or of the other relations just now mentioned

True

Being then cannot be ascribed to the one since it is not but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many things [161] if it and nothing else is not if however neither the one nor the one that is not is supposed not to be and we are speaking of something of a different nature we can predicate nothing of it But supposing that the one that is not and nothing else is not then it must participate in the predicate "that" and in many others

Certainly

And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind

Certainly

And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?

Of course

And are not things other in kind unlike?

They are unlike

And if they are unlike the one that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?

Clearly so

Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?

That would seem to be true

And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself

How so?

If the one have unlikeness to one something else must be meant nor will the hypothesis relate to one but it will relate to something other than one?

Quite so

But that cannot be

No

Then the one must have likeness to itself?

It must

Again it is not equal to the others for if it were equal then it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality but if one has no being then it can neither be nor be like?

It cannot

But since it is not equal to the others neither can the others be equal to it?

Certainly not

And things that are not equal are unequal?

True

And they are unequal to an unequal?

Of course

Then the one partakes of inequality and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?

Very true

And inequality implies greatness and smallness?

Yes

Then the one if of such a nature has greatness and smallness?

That appears to be true

And greatness and smallness always stand apart?

True

Then there is always something between them?

There is

And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?

No it is equality which lies between them

Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality which lies between them?

That is clear

Then the one which is not partakes as would appear of greatness and smallness and equality?

Clearly

Further it must surely in a sort partake of being?

How so?

It must be so for if not then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not But if we speak the truth clearly we must say what is Am I not right?

[162] Yes

And since we affirm that we speak truly we must also affirm that we say what is?

Certainly

Then as would appear the one when it is not for if it were not to be when it is not but were to relinquish something of being so as to become not being it would at once be

Quite true

Then the one which is not if it is to main

and itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being: just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being: for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being—that is, the perfection of being: and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being, but of the being of not-being—that is the perfection of not-being.

Most true.

Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

Certainly.

Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?

Clearly.

And has not-being also, if it is not?

Of course.

But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?

Impossible.

Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Certainly.

And change is motion—we may say that?

Yes, motion.

And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

Yes.

And therefore is and is not in the same state?

Yes.

Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being?

That appears to be true.

But surely if it is now here among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

Impossible.

Then it cannot move by changing place?

No.

No can it turn on the same spot, for if nowhere touches it the same, for the same is and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?

It cannot.

Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

No.

Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?

True.

But if the one neither suffers alteration nor turns round in the same place nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?

Impossible.

Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest and that which is at rest must stand still?

Certainly.

Then the one that is not stands still and is also in motion?

That seems to be true.

But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration: for anything which is moved [163] in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another?

Yes.

Then the one, being moved, is altered?

Yes.

And further, if not moved in any way, it is not altered in any way?

No.

Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?

Right.

Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?

That is clear.

And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed, but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?

Very true.

And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed, and not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed, and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?

True.

And now let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether these or some other consequences will follow.

Let us do as you say.

If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the question.

Yes.

Do not the words "is not" signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?

Just so.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? or do we mean absolutely that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?

Quite absolutely

Then that which is not cannot be or in any way participate in being?

It cannot

And did we not mean by becoming and being destroyed the assumption of being and the loss of being?

Nothing else

And can that which has no participation in being either assume or lose being?

Impossible

The one then since it in no way is cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?

True

Then the one that is not since it in no way partakes of being neither perishes nor becomes?

No

Then it is not altered at all for if it were it would become and be destroyed?

True

But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?

Certainly not

Nor can we say that it stands if it is nowhere for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?

Of course

Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?

Neither

Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it for if there had been, [164] it would partake of being?

That is clear

And therefore neither smallness nor greatness nor equality can be attributed to it?

No

Nor yet likeness nor difference either in relation to itself or to others?

Clearly not

Well and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?

Certainly not

And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike the same or different in relation to it?

They cannot

Nor can what is not be anything or be this thing or be related to or the attribute of this or that or other or be past present or future Nor can knowledge or opinion or perception or expression or name or any other thing that is have any concern with it?

No

Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?

Such appears to be the conclusion

Yet once more if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that

Yes let us determine that.

The others must surely be for if they like the one were not we could not be now speaking of them

True

But to speak of the others implies difference—the terms other and different are synonymous?

True

Other means other than other and different, different from the different?

Yes

Then if there are to be others there is some thing than which they will be other?

Certainly

And what can that be?—for if the one is not they will not be other than the one

They will not

Then they will be other than each other for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing

True

And they are each other than one another as being plural and not singular for if one is not they cannot be singular but every particle of them is infinite in number and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction this which seemed one in a moment evanesces into many as in a dream and from being the smallest becomes very great in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?

Very true

And in such particles the others will be other than one another if others are and the one is not?

Exactly

And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one but not being one, if one is not?

True

And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one though it is really many?

It can

And there will seem to be odd and even among them which will also have no reality if one is not?

Yes

And there will appear to be a least among them and even this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small [165] fractions which are contained in it?

Certainly

PARMENIDES

And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle and thus would arise the appearance of equality

Yes.

And having neither beginning middle nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other

How so?

Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller because no unity can be conceived of any of them since the one is not.

Very true

And so all being whatever we think of must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?

Certainly

And such being when seen and distinctly and at a distance, appears to be one but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?

Nothing more certain

Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many if others than the one exist and not the one

They must

Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?

In what way?

Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?

True

But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different and because of the appearance of the difference different in kind from and unlike, themselves?

True

And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other

Certainly

And must they not be the same and yet differ not from one another and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated if the one is not and the many are?

Most true.

Once more let us go back to the beginning and ask if the one is not and the others of the one are what will follow

Let us ask that question

In the first place the others will not be one?

Impossible

Nor will they be many for if they were many one would be contained in them But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many

True.

If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one

[166] They are not

Nor do they appear either as one or many

Why not?

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others for that which is not has no parts.

True

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not being in connection with the others, nor is not being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No

Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others either as one or many for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

Then if one is not there is no conception of any of the others either as one or many for you cannot conceive the many without the one

It could seem not.

Nor as like or unlike?

No

Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be—the others neither are nor appear to be any of these if one is not?

True

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly If one is not then nothing is?

Certainly

Let thus much be said and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another all of them in every way are and are not, and appear to be as it appears not to be.

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THEAETETUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE SOCRATES THEODORUS THEAETETUS *Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara they enter the house and the dialogue is read to them by a servant*

[142] *Euclid* Have you only just arrived from the country *Terpsion*?

Terpsion No I came some time ago and I have been in the Agora looking for you and wondering that I could not find you

Euc But I was not in the city

Terp Where then?

Euc As I was going down to the harbour I met Theaetetus—he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth

Terp Was he alive or dead?

Euc He was scarcely alive for he has been badly wounded but he was suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army

Terp The dysentery you mean?

Euc Yes

Terp Alas! what a loss he will be!

Euc Yes *Terpsion* he is a noble fellow only to-day I heard some people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle

Terp No wonder I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else of him But why did he go on instead of stopping at Megara?

Euc He wanted to get home although I entreated and advised him to remain he would not listen to me so I set him on his way and turned back and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him and thought how remarkably this like all his predictions had been fulfilled I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death when Theaetetus was a youth and he had a memorable conversation with him which he repeated to me when I

came to Athens he was full of admiration of his genius and said that he would most certainly be a great man if he lived

Terp The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

[143] *Euc* No indeed not offhand but I took notes of it as soon as I got home these I filled up from memory writing them out at leisure and whenever I went to Athens I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten and on my return I made corrections thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down

Terp I remember—you told me and I have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing but have put off doing so and now why should we not read it through?—having just come from the country I should greatly like to rest

Euc I too shall be very glad of a rest for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum Let us go in then and while we are reposing the servant shall read to us

Terp Very good

Euc Here is the roll *Terpsion* I may observe that I have introduced Socrates not as narrating to me but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—these were Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene) and Theaetetus I have omitted for the sake of convenience the interlocutory words I said

I remarked "which he used when he spoke of himself and again he agreed or dis-

reed, in the answer lest the repetition of them should be troublesome

Terp Quite right, Euclid

Eucl And now boy you may take the roll and read

Euclid's servant reads

Socrates If I cared enough about the Cyprians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometers or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if you have met with any one who is good for anything.

Theodo Yes, Socrates. I have become acquainted with one very remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you. Seeing, [144] then that he has no personal attractions I may freely say that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled and he is exceedingly gentle and also the most courageous of men: there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other and should scarcely have thought possible for those who like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits have generally also quick tempers: they are sharp with rather than courageous and the steadier sort, when they have a fair study prove stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry and he is full of gentleness flowing on silently like a river of oil at his age it is wonderful.

Soc That is good news: whose son is he?

Theod The name of his father I have forgotten but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us: he and his companions have been announcing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished,

and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

Soc I know the youth but I do not know his name: he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian who was himself an eminent man and such another as his son is, according to your account of him. I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

Theod Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

Soc He must be a fine fellow: tell him to come and sit by me.

Theod I will. Come hither Theaetetus and sit by Socrates.

Soc By all means Theaetetus in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face for Theodorus says that we are alike and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre and he said that they were tuned alike should we at once take his word or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?

Theaetetus We should ask.

Soc And if we found that he was we should take his word and if not, not?

Theaet True.

Soc And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

[145] *Theaet* Certainly we should.

Soc And is Theodorus a painter?

Theaet I never heard that he was.

Soc Is he a geometer?

Theaet Of course he is, Socrates.

Soc And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician and in general an educated man?

Theaet I think so.

Soc If then he remarks on a similarity in our persons either by way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

Theaet I should say not.

Soc But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised and he again should be willing to exhibit himself.

Theaet Very true, Socrates.

Soc Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine and for you to exhibit since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you.

Theæt I am glad to hear it Socrates but what if he was only in jest?

Soc Nay Theodorus is not given to jesting and I cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do he will have to swear to his words and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him. Do not be shy then but stand to your word.

Theæt I suppose I must, if you wish it.

Soc In the first place I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus something of geometry perhaps?

Theæt Yes.

Soc And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

Theæt I do my best.

Soc Yes my boy and so do I and my desire is to learn of him or of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question? Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?

Theæt Of course.

Soc And by wisdom the wise are wise?

Theæt Yes.

Soc And is that different in any way from knowledge?

Theæt What?

Soc Wisdom are not men wise in that which they know?

Theæt Certainly they are.

Soc Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

Theæt Yes.

[146] *Soc* Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down as at a game of ball and shall be donkey as the boys say he who lasts out his competitors in the game with out missing shall be our king and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases. Why is there no reply? I hope Theodorus that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

Theod The reverse of rudeness Socrates but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows for the truth is that I am unused to your game of question and answer and I am too old to learn the young will be more suitable and they will improve more than I shall for youth is always able to improvise

And so having made a beginning with Theætetus I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off.

Soc Do you hear Theætetus what Theodorus says? The philosopher whom you would not like to disobey and whose word ought to be a command to a young man bids me interrogate you. Take courage then and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

Theæt Well, Socrates I will answer you and he bid me and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.

Soc We will if we can.

Theæt Then I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus—geometry and those which you just now mentioned—are knowledge and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen these each and all of them are knowledge.

Soc Too much Theætetus too much the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things when I am asking for one simple thing.

Theæt What do you mean Socrates?

Soc Perhaps nothing I will endeavour however to explain what I believe to be my meaning. When you speak of cobbling you mean the art or science of making shoes?

Theæt Just so.

Soc And when you speak of carpentering you mean the art of making wooden implements?

Theæt I do.

Soc In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts?

Theæt True.

Soc But that Theætetus was not the point of my question we wanted to know not the subjects nor yet the number of the arts or sciences for we were not going to count them but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

Theæt Perfectly right.

[147] *Soc* Let me offer an illustration. Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing—for example What is clay? and we were to reply that there is a clay of potters there is a clay of oven makers there is a clay of brick makers would not the answer be ridiculous?

Theæt Truly.

Soc In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of clay merely because we added of the image makers or of any other workers.

How can a man understand the name of any thing, when he does not know the nature of it?

Theaet. He cannot.

Soc. Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

Theaet. None.

Soc. Nor of any other science?

Theaet. No.

Soc. And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, A knowledge of this or that.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Moreover if he might answer shortly and simply but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay he might be said simply that clay is mouldered earth—what sort of clay is not to the point.

Theaet. Yes, Socrates there is no difficulty as you put the question. You mean if I am not mistaken something like what occurred in me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.

Soc. What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots such as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the unit. He selected other examples up to seventeen—there he stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

Soc. And did you find such a class?

Theaet. I think that we did but I should like to have your opinion.

Soc. Let me hear.

Theaet. We divided all numbers into two classes those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another which we compared to square figures and called square or equilateral numbers—that was one class.

Soc. Very good.

Theaet. The intermediate numbers, such as three and five and every other number which is made up of unequal factors [148] either of a greater multiplied by a less or of a less multiplied by a greater and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides—all these we compared to oblong figures and called them oblong numbers.

Soc. Capital and what followed?

Theaet. The lines or sides which have for their squares the equilateral plane numbers,

were called by us lengths or magnitudes and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers were called powers or roots. The reason of this latter name being that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement but in the value of the superficial content of their squares and the same about solids.

Soc. Excellent, my boys. I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

Theaet. But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge which is what you appear to want and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

Soc. Well but if some one were to praise you for running and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown up man, who was a great runner—would the praise be any the less true?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter as I just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?

Theaet. By heaven they should be the top of all perfection!

Soc. Well then be of good cheer do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

Theaet. I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

Soc. Come, you made a good beginning just now. Let your own answer about roots be your model and as you comprehended them all in one class try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.

Theaet. I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give nor hear of any one who answers as you would have him and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety.

Soc. These are the pangs of labour my dear Theaetetus you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

Theaet. I do not know, Socrates I only say what I feel.

[149] *Soc.* And have you never heard Simplicon that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly whose name was Phacnarete?

Theaet. Yes I have.

Soc And that I myself practise midwifery?

Theæt No never

Soc Let me tell you that I do though my friend but you must not reveal the secret as the world in general have not found me out and therefore they only say of me that I am the strangest of mortals and drivemen to their wits end Did you ever hear that too?

Theæt Yes

Soc Shall I tell you the reason?

Theæt By all means

Soc Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives and then you will see my meaning better—No woman as you are probably aware who is still able to conceive and bear attends other women but only those who are past bearing

Theæt Yes I know

Soc The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is not a mother and she honours those who are like herself but she could not allow the barren to be midwives because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear

Theæt I dare say

Soc And I dare say too or rather I am absolutely certain that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?

Theæt Very true

Soc And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing and if they think fit they can smother the embryo in the womb

Theæt They can

Soc Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

Theæt No never

Soc Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride more than cutting the umbilical cord And if you reflect you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited

Theæt Yes the same art

Soc And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?

[150] *Theæt* I should think not.

Soc Certainly not but midwives are respectable women who have a character to lose and

they avoid this department of their profession, because they are afraid of being called procuresses which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker

Theæt Clearly

Soc Such are the midwives whose task is a very important one but not so important as mine for women do not bring into the world at one time real children and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them if they did then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think so?

Theæt Indeed I should

Soc Well my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs but differs in that I attend men and not women and I look after their souls when they are in labour and not after their bodies and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth And like the midwives I am barren and the reproach which is often made against me that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself is very just—the reason is that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth And therefore I am not myself at all wise nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul but those who converse with me profit Some of them appear dull enough at first but afterwards as our acquaintance ripens if the god is gracious to them they all make astonishing progress and this is in the opinion of others as well as in their own It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making But to me and the god they owe their delivery And the proof of my words is that many of them in their ignorance either in their self conceit despising me or falling under the influence of others, have gone away too soon and have not only lost the children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up but have stuffed whatever else they had in them by evil communications, being sonder of lies and shams than of the truth and they have at last ended by seeing themselves as others see them to be great fools Aristides the son of Lysimachus is one of them [151] and there are many others The truants often return to

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and beg that I would consort with them again—they are ready to go to me on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dure are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to away in those who consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth. Night and day they are full of perpetuity and tra-ah which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them, and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying some one, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and many to other wise men. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour—great with some conception. Come, then, to me, who am a widower's son and myself a midwife, and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manners of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling, only they did not perceive that I acted from good will, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man—that was not within the range of their ideas. Neither am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question. What is knowledge?—and do not say that you cannot tell, but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.

Soc. Bravely said, boy, that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg.—You say that knowledge is perception.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Well, you have deluded yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge [152] it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras,

who has another way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not—you have read him?

Theaet. Yes, again and again.

Soc. Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and in me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?

Theaet. Yes, he says so.

Soc. A wise man is not likely to talk non-sense. Let us try to understand him the same way as he is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

Theaet. Quite true.

Soc. Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not or are we to say with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

Theaet. I suppose the last.

Soc. Then it must appear so to each of them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And "appears to him" means the same as "he perceives."

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances for things appear or may be supposed to be to each one such as he perceives them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then perception is always of existence, and being, the same as knowledge is unerring?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. (a the name of the Graces, what an all-mighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, his *Truth* in secret to his own disciples.

Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative—you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no single thing or quality but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which "becoming" is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heraclides, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. In allusion to a book of Protagoras which bore this title.

Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus the prince of Comedy and Homer of Tragedy when the latter sings of

O can whence sprang the gods and mother Tethys

does he not mean that all things are the off spring of flux and motion?

Theaet I think so

[153] *Soc* And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general and not appear ridiculous?

Theaet Who indeed Socrates?

Soc Yes Theaetetus and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming and inactivity of not being and destruction for fire and warmth which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things are born of movement and of friction which is a kind of motion—is not this the origin of fire?

Theaet It is

Soc And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

Theaet Certainly

Soc And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?

Theaet True

Soc And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed and improved and preserved by study and attention which are motions but when at rest which in the soul only means want of attention and study is uninformed and speedily forgets whatever she has learned

Theaet True

Soc Then motion is a good and rest an evil to the soul as well as to the body?

Theaet Clearly

Soc I may add that breathless calm stillness and the like waste and impair while wind and storm preserve and the palmary argument of all which I strongly urge is the golden chain in Homer by which he means the sun thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in their orbits all things human and divine are and are preserved but if they were chained up and their motions ceased then all things would be destroyed and as the saying is turned upside down

Theaet I believe Socrates that you have truly explained his meaning

Soc Then now apply his doctrine to percep-

Cf Cratylus 401 ff

tion my good friend and first of all to vision that which you call white colour is not in your eyes and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them And you must not assign any place to it for if it had position it would be and be at rest, and there would be no process of becoming

Theaet Then what is colour?

Soc Let us carry out the principle which has just been affirmed that nothing is self-existent and then we shall see that white, black and every other colour arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion [154] and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the active nor the passive element but something which passes between them and is peculiar to each percipient are you quite certain that the several colours appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you?

Theaet Far from it

Soc Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you because you are never exactly the same?

Theaet The latter

Soc And if that with which I compare myself in size or which I apprehend by touch were great or white or hot it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed nor again if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot could this when unchanged from within become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark

Theaet How? and of what sort do you mean?

Soc A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning Here are six dice which are more by a half when compared with four and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer How can you or any one maintain the contrary?

Theaet Very true

Soc Well then suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing how would you answer him Theaetetus?

Theaet I should say No Socrates if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer

Soc. Ca, all excellent! spoken like an oracle, but don't! And if you reply "Yes," there will be a case for Euripides: for our tongue will be convinced, but not our mind.

Theæt. Very true.

Soc. The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring match over this, and would have knocked their arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles—whether they are consistent with each other or not.

Theæt. Yes, that would be my desire.

Soc. And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, [155] and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as follows—first, that no-man can become greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself—you would agree?

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. Secondly that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

Theæt. Quite true.

Soc. Thirdly that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without becoming and having become.

Theæt. Yes, truly.

Soc. These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or again, in such a case as this—if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller than you, may with in a year without gaining, or losing in height, be not so tall—not that I should have lost, but that you would have increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not become for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing, somewhere of my height, and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you follow me, Theaetetus, for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now.

Theæt. Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them by the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean and in a moment to the well-known line of Euripides, *Hippolytus* 61—

there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumasia (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?

Theæt. Not as yet.

Soc. Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden "truth" of a famous man or school.

Theæt. To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.

Soc. Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that action or generation or anything, invisible can have real existence.

Theæt. Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable mortals.

[156] Soc. Yes, my boy, over barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing, but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny endless in number having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming, to the birth at the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling: there is the sense of heat, cold, pressure, pain, desire, fear and many more which have names, as well as innumerable others which are without them: each has its hundred objects—each variety of colour has a corresponding variety of sight, and so with sound and hearing, and with the rest of the senses and the objects kin to them. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?

Theæt. Indeed I do not.

Soc. Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker and the

slower elements have their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them and so they beget but what is begotten is swifter for it is carried to and fro and moves from place to place. Apply this to sense.—When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the sensation connatural with it which could not have been given by either of them going elsewhere then while the sight is flowing from the eye whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the colour and so the eye is fulfilled with sight and really sees and becomes not sight but a seeing eye and the object which combined to form the colour is fulfilled with whiteness and becomes not whiteness but a white thing whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured white. And this is true of all sensible objects hard warm and the like which are similarly to be regarded [157] as I was saying before not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them of whatever kind generated by motion in their intercourse with one another for of the agent and patient as existing in separation no trustworthy conception as they say, can be formed for the agent has no existence until united with the patient and the patient has no existence until united with the agent and that which by uniting with something becomes an agent by meeting with some other thing is converted into a patient. And from all these considerations as I said at first there arises a general reflection that there is no one self-existent thing but everything is becoming and in relation and being must be altogether abolished although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the term. But great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word something or belonging to something or to me or this or that or any other detaining name to be used in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed coming into being and passing into new forms nor can any name fix or detain them he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking not only of particulars but of aggregates such aggregates as are expressed in the word man or stone or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus are not these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?

Theaet. I do not know what to say Socrates for indeed, I cannot make out whether you are

giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.

Soc. You forget my friend that I neither know nor profess to know anything of these matters you are the person who in labour I am the barren midwife and this is why I soothe you and offer you one good thing after another that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day when this has been accomplished then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore keep up your spirits and answer like a man what you think!

Theaet. Ask me.

Soc. Then once more. Is it your opinion that nothing is but what becomes?—the good and the noble as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning?

Theaet. When I hear you discoursing in this style I think that there is a great deal in what you say and I am very ready to assent.

Soc. Let us not leave the argument unfinished then for there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases in particular about madness and the various illusions of hearing and sight or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the *esse percipi* theory appears to be [158] unmistakably refuted since in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions and far from saying that every thing is which appears we should rather say that nothing is which appears.

Theaet. Very true Socrates.

Soc. But then my boy how can any one contend that knowledge is perception or that to every man what appears is?

Theaet. I am afraid to say Socrates, that I have nothing to answer because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly when they imagine some of them that they are gods and others that they can fly and are flying in their sleep.

Soc. Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena notably about dreaming and waking?

Theaet. What question?

Soc. A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask.—How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping and all our thoughts are a dream or whether we are awake and talking to one another in the waking state?

Theæt. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more than the other for in both cases the facts precisely correspond and there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have been talking to one another in a dream and when in a dream we seem to be narrating dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.

Soc. You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised, and even there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true and during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other and are equally confident of both.

Theæt. Most true.

Soc. And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders the difference is only that the times are not equal.

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

Theæt. That would be in many ways ridiculous.

Soc. But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?

Theæt. I do not think that I can.

Soc. Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say as I imagine—Can that which is wholly other than something have the same quality as that from which it differs and observe, Theaetetus, that the word "other" means not "partially but wholly other."

[159] *Theæt.* Certainly putting the question as you do, that which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the same.

Soc. And must therefore be admitted to be unlike.

Theæt. True.

Soc. If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another when it becomes like we call it the same—when unlike, other?

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. And also that different combinations

will produce results which are not the same but different?

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. Let us take you and me, or anything, as an example—There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

Theæt. You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

Soc. Exactly that is my meaning.

Theæt. I answer they are unlike.

Soc. And if unlike, they are other?

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

Theæt. I should.

Soc. All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill.

Theæt. Of course.

Soc. And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

Theæt. True.

Soc. For as has been already acknowledged the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theæt. Certainly that has been already acknowledged.

Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter as I myself become not percipient but percipient?

Theæt. True.

Soc. There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception, [160] for another object would give another perception, and would make the percipient other and different, nor can that object which affects me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or

become similar for that too will produce an other result from another subject and become different

Theæt True

Soc Neither can I by myself have this sensation nor the object by itself, this quality

Theæt Certainly not

Soc When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing the object whether it become sweet bitter or of any other quality must have relation to a percipient nothing can become sweet which is sweet to no one

Theæt Certainly not

Soc Then the inference is that we [the agent and patient] are or become in relation to one another there is a law which binds us one to the other but not to any other existence nor each of us to himself and therefore we can only be bound to one another so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely—such is our conclusion

Theæt Very true, Socrates

Soc Then if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other I and no other am the percipient of it?

Theæt Of course

Soc Then my perception is true to me being inseparable from my own being and as Protagoras says to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me

Theæt I suppose so

Soc How then if I never err and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?

Theæt You cannot

Soc Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception and the meaning turns out to be the same whether with Homer and Heraclitus and all that company you say that all is motion and flux or with the great sage Protagoras that man is the measure of all things or with Theaetetus that given these premises perception is knowledge Am I not right Theaetetus and is not this your new-born child of which I have delivered you? What say you?

Theæt I cannot but agree Socrates

Soc Then this is the child however he may turn out which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world And now that he is

born [161] we must run round the hearth with him and see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham Is he to be reared in any case and not exposed? or will you bear to see him rejected and not get into a passion if I take away your first-born?

Theod Theaetetus will not be angry for he is very good natured But tell me, Socrates in heaven's name is this after all not the truth?

Soc You Theodorus are a lover of theories and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of them and can easily pull one out which will overthrow its predecessor But you do not see that in reality none of these theories come from me they all come from him who talks with me I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another and to receive them in a spirit of fairness And now I shall say nothing myself but shall endeavour to elicit something from our young friend

Theod Do as you say Socrates you are quite right

Soc Shall I tell you Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?

Theod What is it?

Soc I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog faced baboon or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation is the measure of all things then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole not to speak of his fellow men—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation and no man can discern another's feelings better than he or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false but each as we have several times repeated is to himself the sole judge and everything that he judges is true and right why my friend should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction and deserve to be well paid and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking *ad captandum* in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly [162] if to each man his own are right and this must be the case if Protagoras Truth is the real truth

and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

Theod. He was a friend of mine Socrates as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips nor can I oppose you when I agree with you please then to take Theaetetus again he seemed to answer very nicely.

Soc. If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own person?

Theod. Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will in consideration of my age and stiffness let some more supple youth try a fall with you and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

Soc. Your will is my will Theodorus as the proverbial philosophers say and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus. Tell me, Theaetetus in reference to what I was saying are you not lost in wonder like myself when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the level of the wisest of men or indeed of the gods?—for you would assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

Theaet. Certainly I should and I confess to you that I am lost in wonder. At first hearing I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one but now the face of things has changed.

Soc. Why my dear boy you are young and therefore your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, some one speaking on his behalf will doubtless say in reply—Good people young and old you meet and harangue and bring in the gods whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes which is a telling argument which the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probably with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance [163]. He or any other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry would not be worth an ace.

Theaet. But neither you nor we Socrates, would be satisfied with such arguments.

Soc. Then you and Theodorus mean to say

that we must look at the matter in some other way?

Theaet. Yes in quite another way.

Soc. And the way will be to ask whether perception is or is not the same as knowledge for this was the real point of our argument and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? for example shall we say that not having learned we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that we not only hear but know what they are saying? Or again if we see letters which we do not understand shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we aver that seeing them we must know them?

Theaet. We shall say Socrates that we know what we actually see and hear of them—that is to say we see and know the figure and colour of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them but we do not perceive by sight and hearing or know that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

Soc. Capital Theaetetus and about this there shall be no dispute because I want you to grow but there is another difficulty coming which you will also have to repulse.

Theaet. What is it?

Soc. Some one will say Can a man who has ever known anything and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have I fear a tedious way of putting a simple question which is only whether a man who has learned and remembers can fail to know?

Theaet. Impossible, Socrates the supposition is monstrous.

Soc. Am I talking nonsense then? Think is not seeing perceiving and is not sight perception?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if our recent definition holds every man knows that which he has seen?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is memory of something or of nothing?

Theaet. Of something surely.

Soc. Of things learned and perceived that is?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

Theaet True

Soc And if he closed his eyes would he forget?

[164] *Theaet* Who Socrates would dare to say so?

Soc But we must say so if the previous argument is to be maintained

Theaet What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you though I have a strong suspicion that you are right

Soc As thus he who sees knows as we say that which he sees for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same

Theaet Certainly

Soc But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw remembers when he closes his eyes that which he no longer sees

Theaet True

Soc And seeing is knowing, and therefore not seeing is not knowing?

Theaet Very true

Soc Then the inference is that a man may have attained the knowledge of something which he may remember and yet not know because he does not see and this has been affirmed by us to be a monstrous supposition

Theaet Most true

Soc Thus then the assertion that knowledge and perception are one involves a manifest impossibility?

Theaet Yes

Soc Then they must be distinguished?

Theaet I suppose that they must

Soc Once more we shall have to begin and ask What is knowledge? and yet Theaetetus what are we going to do?

Theaet About what?

Soc Like a good for nothing cock without having won the victory we walk away from the argument and crow

Theaet How do you mean?

Soc After the manner of disputers we were satisfied with mere verbal consistency and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an advantage Although professing not to be mere Eristics but philosophers I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons

Theaet I do not as yet understand you

Soc Then I will try to explain myself just now we asked the question whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know and we showed that a person who had

seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see and then he would at the same time remember and not know But this was an impossibility And so the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception

Theaet True

Soc And yet my friend I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras who was the father of the first of the two brats had been alive he would have had a great deal to say on their behalf But he is dead and we insult over his orphan child and even the guardians whom he left and of whom our friend Theodorus is one are unwilling to give any help and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself and see justice done?

[165] *Theod* Not I Socrates but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry Nevertheless I shall be grateful to you if you assist him

Soc Very good Theodorus you shall see how I will come to the rescue If a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?

Theod To both of us and let the younger answer he will incur less disgrace if he is discomforted

Soc Then now let me ask the awful question which is this —Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

Theod How shall we answer Theaetetus?

Theaet He cannot I should say

Soc He can if you maintain that seeing is knowing When you are imprisoned in a well as the saying is and the self assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed how will you answer the inevitable man?

Theaet I should answer Not with that eye but with the other

Soc Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time

Theaet Yes in a certain sense

Soc None of that he will reply I do not ask or bid you answer in what sense you know but only whether you know that which you do not know You have been proved to see that which you do not see and you have already admitted

that seeing is knowing and that not seeing is not-knowing. I leave you to draw the inference.

Theæt. Yes, the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

Soc. Yes, my marvel and there might have been yet worse things in store for you, if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near but not at a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity and so on without end. Such questions might have been put to you by a light armed mercenary who argued for pay. He would have lain in wait for you, and when you took up the position that sense is knowledge, he would have made an assault upon hearing, smelling and the other senses—he would have shown you no mercy and while you were lost in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he would have got you into his net, out of which you would not have escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sum to be paid for your release. Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

Theæt. By all means.

Soc. He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his behalf [166] and then he will close with us in disdain and say—The worthy Socrates asked a little boy whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing and the boy said No because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming and then Socrates made fun of poor me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping or if he has answered as I should have answered then I am refuted, but if he answers something else then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose that any one would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? Or if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all and not other many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, O my good sir he will say come to the argument in a more generous spirit and let us show if you can, that our sensations are

not relative and individual or if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes or if you will have the word is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig and you teach your hearers to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner but this is not to your credit. For I declare that the truth is as I have written and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as different things are and appear to him.

And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember what has been already said—that to the sick man his food appears to be and is better and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other [167] nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish and the healthy man because he has another is wise but the one state requires to be changed into the other the worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another think truly who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or think anything different from that which he feels and this is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better and not truer than others. And O my dear Socrates I do not call wise men tadpoles far from it. I say that they are the physicians of the human body and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations—aye and true ones and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states for whatever appears to a state to be just and fair so long as it is regarded as such is just and fair to it but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil

both in appearance and in reality And in like manner the Sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man and deserves to be well paid by them And so one man is wiser than another, and no one thinks falsely and you whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure On these foundations the argument stands firm which you Socrates may if you please overthrow by an opposite argument or if you like you may put questions to me—a method to which no intelligent person will object quite the reverse But I must beg you to put fair questions for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue and then always behaving unfairly in argument The unfairness of which I complain is that you do not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun but the dialectician will be in earnest and only correct his adversary when necessary telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault or that of the company which he has previously kept [168] If you do so your adversary will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself and not on you He will follow and love you and will hate himself and escape from himself into philosophy in order that he may become different from what he was But the other mode of arguing which is practised by the many will have just the opposite effect upon him and as he grows older instead of turning philosopher he will come to hate philosophy I would recommend you therefore as I said before not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper but to find out in a friendly and congenial spirit what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion and that to every individual and state what appears is In this manner you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different but you will not argue as you were just now doing from the customary use of names and words which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of ways causing infinite perplexity to one another Such Theodorus is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend had he been living he would have helped himself in a far more glorious style.

Theod You are jesting Socrates indeed your defence of him has been most valorous

Soc Thank you friend and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious as the text Man is the measure of all things was a solemn one and he reproached us with

making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument he also declared that we made a joke of him

Theod How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?

Soc Well and shall we do as he says?

Theod By all means

Soc But if his wishes are to be regarded you and I must take up the argument and in all seriousness and ask and answer one another for you see that the rest of us are nothing but boys In no other way can we escape the imputation that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are making fun with boys

Theod Well but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

Soc Yes Theodorus but not better than you and therefore please not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in my power your departed friend [169] and that you are to defend nothing and nobody At any rate my good man do not sheer off until we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry and the other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them

Theod He who is sitting by you Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument and when I said just now that you would excuse me and not like the Lacedaemonians compel me to strip and fight, I was talking nonsense—I should rather compare you to Sciron who threw travellers from the rocks for the Lacedaemonian rule is strip or depart but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of Antaeus you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him and he has been compelled to try a fall with you in argument

Soc There Theodorus you have hit off precisely the nature of my complaint but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old for I have met with no end of heroes many a Heracles many a Theseus mighty in words has broken my head nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise which inspires me like a passion Please then to try a fall with me whereby you will do yourself good as well as me

Theod I consent lead me whither you will for I know that you are like destiny no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for him But I am not disposed to go

further than you suggest

Soc Once will be enough and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly

Theod I will do my best to avoid that error

Soc In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom although he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this some who as he said were the wise excelled others

Theod Very true

Soc Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself instead of our answering for him there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here and some one may accuse us of speaking without authority on his behalf had we not better come to a clearer agreement about his meaning for a great deal may be at stake?

Theod True.

[1, a] *Soc* Then let us obtain not through any third person but from his own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement

Theod In what way?

Soc In this way—His words are: What seems to a man is to him

Theod Yes so he says

Soc And are not we Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man or rather of all mankind when we say that every one thinks himself wiser than other men in some things and their inferior in others? In the hour of danger when they are in perils of war or of the sea or of sickness do they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods and expect salvation from them only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them at least in their own opinion

Theod Certainly

Soc And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion

Theod Exactly

Soc Ho then, Protagoras would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true or sometimes

true and sometimes false? In either case the result is the same and their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me Theodorus do you suppose that you yourself or any other follower of Protagoras would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

Theod The thing is incredible Socrates

Soc And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things

Theod How so?

Soc Why suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true and declare your opinion to me let us assume as he argues that this is true to you. Now if so, you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon thousands who whenever you form a judgment take up arms against you and are of an opposite judgment and opinion deeming that you judge falsely?

Theod Yes indeed Socrates thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says who give me a world of trouble.

Soc Well but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?

Theod No other inference seems to be possible

Soc And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of all things [171] must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this and that the multitude does not agree with him you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true

Theod That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion

Soc And the best of the joke is that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false for he admits that the opinions of all men are true

Theod Certainly

Soc And does he not allow that his own opinion is false if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?

Theod Of course

Soc Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?

Theod They do not

Soc And he as may be inferred from his writings agrees that this opinion is also true

Theod Clearly

Soc Then all mankind beginning with Protagoras will contend or rather I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras I say will himself allow that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned—am I not right?

Theod Yes

Soc And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all will be true neither to himself nor to any one else?

Theod I think Socrates that we are running my old friend too hard

Soc But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless as he is older he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below he would have overthrown both of us again and again me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to me and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he is not within call we must make the best use of our own faculties such as they are and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing which no one will deny is that there are great differences in the understandings of men.

Theod In that opinion I quite agree

Soc And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras viz. that most things and all immediate sensations such as hot dry sweet are only such as they appear if however difference of opinion is to be allowed at all surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? for every woman child or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves

Theod I quite agree

[172] *Soc* Or again in politics while affirming that just and unjust honourable and disgraceful holy and unholy are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counsellor better than another—they will scarcely venture to maintain that what a city enacts in the belief that it is expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case I mean

when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or essence of their own—the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement and as long as the agreement lasts and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here arises a new question Theodorus which threatens to be more serious than the last.

Theod Well Socrates we have plenty of leisure

Soc That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and speak in court. How natural is this!

Theod What do you mean?

Soc I mean to say that those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such places as a freeman is in breeding unlike a slave

Theod In what is the difference seen?

Soc In the leisure spoken of by you which a freeman can always command he has his talk out in peace and like ourselves he wanders at will from one subject to another and from a second to a third—if the fancy takes him he begins again as we are doing now caring not whether his words are many or few his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on and not allowing him to expatiate at will and there is his adversary standing over him enforcing his rights the indictment which in their phraseology is termed the affidavit is recited at the time and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant and is continually disputing about a fellow-servant before his master who is seated and has the cause in his hands the trial is never about some indifferent matter but always concerns himself [173] and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been that he has become keen and shrewd he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed but his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence dangers and fears which were too much for his truth and honesty came upon him in early years when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them and he has been driven into

crooked ways from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stained and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood having no soundness in him and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher who is of our brotherhood or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of discussion which we claim.

Theod. Nay Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

Soc. Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery or the council or any other political assembly: they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are called of the state written or recited: the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens, do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say how many punts are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation: but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city: his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is flying all abroad as *Plato* says, measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety (114) but not condescending to anything which is within reach.

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will illustrate my meaning. Theodorus by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about *Thales*, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers.

For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbour: he is ignorant not only of what he is doing but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal: he is searching into the essence of man and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other—I think that you understand me Theodorus?

Theod. I do, and what you say is true.

Soc. And thus, my friend on every occasion private as well as public as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful and gives the impression of unbecomeliness. When he is reviled he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one and they do not interest him and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness and when others are being praised and glorified in the simplicity of his heart he cannot help joining into fits of laughter so that he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall which is his mountain pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth and when they sing the praises of family and say that someone is a gentleman because he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow vision in those (175) who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, innumerable. And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-nine ancestors, which goes back to *Heraclides*, the son of *Amphyryon*, he cannot

understand their poverty of ideas Why are they unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty fifth ancestor who might have been anybody and was such as fortune made him and he had a fiftieth and so on? He amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity Now in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar partly because he is thought to despise them and also because he is ignorant of what is before him and always at a loss

Theod That is very true, Socrates

Soc But O my friend when he draws the other into upper air and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow keen little legal mind is called to account about all this he gives the philosopher his revenge for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging whence he looks down into space which is a strange experience to him he being dismayed and lost and stammering broken words is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons for they have no eye for the situation but by every man who has not been brought up a slave Such are the two characters Theodorus the one of the freeman who has been trained in liberty and leisure whom you call the philosopher—him we can not blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task such as packing up bed-clothes or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly [176] but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven

Theod If you could only persuade everybody Socrates as you do me of the truth of your words there would be more peace and fewer evils among men

Soc Evils Theodorus can never pass away for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good Having no place among the gods in heaven of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this earthly

sphere Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can and to fly away is to become like God as far as this is possible and to become like him is to become holy just, and wise But O my friend you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice not merely in order that a man may seem to be good which is the reason given by the world and in my judgment is only a repetition of an old wives fable Whereas the truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous—he is perfect righteousness and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man and also his nothingness and want of manhood For to know this is true wisdom and virtue and ignorance of this is manifest folly and vice All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts are coarse and vulgar The unrighteous man or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them These are not mere good for nothing persons, mere burdens of the earth but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it for they do not know the penalty of injustice which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death as they suppose which evil doers often escape but a penalty which cannot be escaped

Theod What is that?

Soc There are two patterns eternally set before them the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched but they do not see them or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other [177] by reason of their evil deeds and the penalty is that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like. And if we tell them that unless they depart from their cunning the place of innocence will not receive them after death and that here on earth they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots.

Theod Very true, Socrates

Soc Too true, my friend as I well know there is however one peculiarity in their case when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy if they have the courage

to hear the argument out, and do not run away they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves: their rhetoric fades away and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow and drown the original argument to which, if you please, we will now return.

Theod For my part, Socrates I would rather have the digressions for at my age I find them easier to follow but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

Soc Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force this was especially asserted of justice but as to the good no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good than these, while they were in force, were really good—he who said so would be playing with the name good and would not touch the real question—it would be a mockery would it not?

Theod Certainly it would

Soc He ought not to speak of the name but of the thing which is contemplated under the name

Theod Right.

Soc Whatever be the term used the good or expedient is the aim of legislation and as far as she has an opinion the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expedient can legislation have any other aim?

[178] *Theod* Certainly not

Soc But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen?

Theod Yes I think that there are mistakes

Soc The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time which in other words is the future

Theod Very true.

Soc Suppose now that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples a question—O Protagoras we will say to him *Must it be as you declare the measure of all things—white, heavy, light of all such things be the judge for he has the criterion of them in himself and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences*

them to be he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so?

Theod Yes

Soc And do you extend your doctrine Protagoras (as we shall further say) to the future as well as to the present and has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be and do things always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat—When an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever and that this kind of heat is coming on and another person who is a physician thinks the contrary whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?—he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

Theod How ludicrous!

Soc And the vinegrower if I am not mistaken is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player?

Theod Certainly

Soc And in musical composition the musician will know better than the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think harmonious or of the reverse?

Theod Of course

Soc And the cook will be a better judge than the guest who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing but can we say that every one will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future?—nay would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince any one of us than the ordinary man?

Theod Certainly Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

[179] *Soc* To be sure friend who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him if he had really persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than every one could for himself?

Theod Who indeed?

Soc And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

Theod Quite true

Soc Then we may fairly argue against your master that he must admit one man to be wiser

than another and that the wiser is a measure but I who know nothing am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything

Theod That is the best refutation of him Socrates although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others who give the lie direct to his own opinion

Soc There are many ways Theodorus in which the doctrine that every opinion of every man is true may be refuted but there is more difficulty in proving that states of feeling which are present to a man and out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them are also untrue And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them for they may be unassailable and those who say that there is clear evidence of them and that they are matters of knowledge may probably be right in which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he identified perception and knowledge And therefore let us draw nearer as the advocate of Protagoras desires and give the truth of the universal flux a ring is the theory sound or not? at any rate no small war is raging about it and there are combatants not a few

Theod No small war indeed for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides the disciples of Heraclitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine

Soc Then we are the more bound my dear Theodorus to examine the question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves

Theod Certainly we are About these speculations of Heraclitus which as you say are as old as Homer or even older still the Ephesians themselves who profess to know them are downright mad and you cannot talk with them on the subject For in accordance with their text books they are always in motion but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question [180] and quietly asking and answering in turn they can no more do so than they can fly or rather the determination of these fellows not to have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation can express If you ask any of them a question he will produce as from a quiver sayings brief and dark and shoot them at you and if you inquire the reason of what he has said you will be hit by some other newfangled word and will make no way with any of them nor they with one another their great care is not to allow of any settled

principle either in their arguments or in their minds concerning as I imagine that any such principle would be stationary for they are at war with the stationary and do what they can to drive it out everywhere

Soc I suppose Theodorus that you have only seen them when they were fighting and have never stayed with them in time of peace for they are no friends of yours and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure as I imagine to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves

Theod Disciples! my good sir they have none men of their sort are not one another's disciples but they grow up at their own sweet will and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that he knows nothing From these men then as I was going to remark you will never get a reason whether with their will or without their will we must take the question out of their hands and make the analysis ourselves as if we were doing a geometrical problem

Soc Quite right too but as touching the aforesaid problem have we not heard from the ancients who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures that Oceanus and Tethys the origin of all things are streams and that nothing is at rest? And now the moderns, in their superior wisdom have declared the same openly that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion he will duly honour his teachers I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine Theodorus

Alone Being remains unmoved which is the name for the all

This is the language of Parmenides Melissus and their followers who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained and has no place which to move What shall we do friend with all these people for advancing step by step we have imperceptibly got between the combatants [181] and unless we can protect our retreat we shall pay the penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted the river gods and if we find any truth in them we will help them to pull us over and try to get away from the others But if the partisans of the whole appear to speak more truly we will fly off from

the part which would move the immovable, to them. And if we find that neither of them has anything reasonable to say we shall be in a ridiculous position having so great a concern of our own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?

Theod. Nay Socrates, not to examine those things which the two parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

Soc. Then examine we must, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, are so eager to proceed. The nature of motion appears to be the question with which we begin. What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? Is there only one kind of motion or as I rather incline to think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon this point in addition to my own, that I may err if I must err in your company. Tell me, then, when a thing changes from one place to another or goes round in the same place, is not that what is called motion?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing, remaining on the same spot, grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, may not this be properly called motion of another kind?

Theod. I think so.

Soc. Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then there are these two kinds, "change," and motion in place.

Theod. You are right.

Soc. And now having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another in one only?

Theod. Indeed, I do not know what to answer but I think they would say that all things are moved in both ways.

Soc. Yes, comrade for if not, they would have to say that the same things are in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

Theod. To be sure.

Soc. And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, [182] all things must always have every sort of motion?

Theod. Most true.

Soc. Consider a further point. did we not

understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as the following — are they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and that the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a perceptive, and the agent a quale instead of a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange and uncouth term to you, and that you do not understand the abstract expression. Then I will take concrete instances. I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence but when they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the one becomes a thing of a certain quality and the other a perceptive. You remember?

Theod. Of course.

Soc. We may leave the details of their theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned. Are all things in motion and flux?

Theod. Yes, they will reply.

Soc. And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished that is to say they move in place and are also changed?

Theod. Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

Soc. If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux.

Theod. Exactly.

Soc. But now since not even white continues to flow white, and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any colour be rightly used at all?

Theod. How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux?

Soc. And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

Theod. Certainly not, if all things are in motion.

Soc. Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not seeing, nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things partake of every kind of motion?

Theod. Certainly not.

Soc Yet perception is knowledge so at least Theaetetus and I were saying

Theod Very true

Soc Then when we were asked what is knowledge we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

Theod I suppose not

[183] *Soc* Here then is a fine result we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest But if nothing is at rest every answer upon whatever subject is equally right you may say that a thing is or is not thus or if you prefer becomes thus and if we say becomes we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest

Theod Quite true

Soc Yes Theodorus except in saying thus and not thus But you ought not to use the word thus for there is no motion in thus or in not thus The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words in which to express themselves and must get a new language I know of no word that will suit them except perhaps no how which is perfectly indefinite

Theod Yes that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home

Soc And so Theodorus we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a wise man only is a measure neither can we allow that knowledge is perception certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux unless perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is

Theod Very good Socrates and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed I am absolved from answering for this was the agreement

Theaet Not, Theodorus until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest as you were proposing

Theod You Theaetetus who are a young rogue must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith but should prepare to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument

Theaet Yes if he wish s but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest

Theod Invite Socrates to an argument—in vite horsemen to the open plain do but ask him and he will answer

Soc Nevertheless Theodorus I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus

Theod Not comply! for what reason?

Soc My reason is that I have a kind of reverence not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that All is one and at rest, as for the great leader himself Parmenides venerable and awful as in Homeric language he may be called—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him I met him when he was an old man and I was a mere youth and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind [184] And I am afraid that we may not understand his words and may be still further from understanding his meaning above all I fear that the nature of knowledge which is the main subject of our discussion may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse if we let them in—besides the question which is now stirring is of immense extent and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way or if treated adequately and at length will put into the shade the other question of knowledge Neither the one nor the other can be allowed but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge

Theaet Very well do so if you will

Soc Then now Theaetetus take another view of the subject you answered that knowledge is perception?

Theaet I did

Soc And if any one were to ask you With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear high and low sounds?—you would say if I am not mistaken

With the eyes and with the ears

Theaet I should

Soc The free use of words and phrases rather than minute precision is generally characteristic of a liberal education and the opposite is pedantic but sometimes precision is necessary and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness for which is more correct to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears or through the eyes and through the ears

Theaet I should say through Socrates rather than with

Soc Yes my boy for no one can suppose that in each of us as in a sort of Trojan horse there are perched a number of unconnected senses which do not all meet in some one nature the mind or whatever we please to call it of which they are the instruments and with which through them we perceive objects of sense

Theaet I agree with you in that opinion

Soc The reason why I am thus precise is,

because I want to know whether when we perceive black and white through the eyes and again, other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves and if you were asked you might refer all such perceptions to the body *Perib.* s however I had better allow you to answer for yourself and not interfere Tell me then are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet organs of the body?

Theaet. Of the body certainly

[185] *Soc.* And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another the objects of hearing for example cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

Theaet. Of course not

Soc. If you have any thought about both of them this common perception cannot come to you either through the one or the other organ?

Theaet. It cannot

Soc. How about sounds and colours in the first place you would admit that they both exist?

Theaet. Yes

Soc. And that either of them is different from the other and the same with itself?

Theaet. Certainly

Soc. And that both are two and each of them one?

Theaet. Yes

Soc. You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?

Theaet. I dare say

Soc. But through what do you perceive all this about them? for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common Let me give you an illustration of the point at issue—If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and colours are *saine* or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the question It would not be sight or hearing but some other

Theaet. Certainly the faculty of taste

Soc. Very good and now tell me what is the proper which discerns, not only in sensible objects but in all things, universal notions such as those which are called being and not being and those others about which we were just asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these notions?

Theaet. You are thinking of being and not being like and unlikeness sameness and difference and also unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense and

you mean to ask through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions

Soc. You follow me excellently *Theaetetus* that is precisely what I am asking

Theaet. Indeed *Socrates*, I cannot answer my only notion is that these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ but that the mind by a power of her own contemplates the universals in all things

Soc. You are a beauty *Theaetetus* and not ugly as *Theodorus* was saying for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good And besides being beautiful you have done me a kindness in releasing me from a very long discussion if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

Theaet. I am quite clear

[186] *Soc.* And to which class would you refer being or essence for thus, of all our notions, is the most universal?

Theaet. I should say to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself

Soc. And would you say this also of like and unlike same and other?

Theaet. Yes

Soc. And would you say the same of the noble and base and of good and evil?

Theaet. These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present with the future

Soc. And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

Theaet. Yes

Soc. But their essence and what they are and their opposition to one another and the essential nature of this opposition the soul herself endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them?

Theaet. Certainly

Soc. The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature but the reflections on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained if they are ever gained by education and long experience

Theaet. Assuredly

Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

Theaet. Impossible.

Soc. And can he who misses the truth of any thing have a knowledge of that thing?

Theæt He cannot.

Soc Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense but in reasoning about them, in that only and not in the mere impression truth and being can be attained?

Theæt Clearly

Soc And would you call the two processes by the same name when there is so great a difference between them?

Theæt That would certainly not be right

Soc And what name would you give to seeing hearing smelling being cold and being hot?

Theæt I should call all of them perceiving—what other name could be given to them?

Soc Perception would be the collective name of them?

Theæt Certainly

Soc Which as we say has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

Theæt Certainly not

Soc And therefore not in science or knowledge?

Theæt No

Soc Then perception Theætetus can never be the same as knowledge or science?

Theæt Clearly not Socrates and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception

[187] *Soc* But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not at the same time we have made some progress for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all but in that other process however called in which the mind is alone and engaged with being

Theæt You mean Socrates if I am not mistaken, what is called thinking or opining

Soc You conceive truly And now my friend please to begin again at this point and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded see if you have arrived at any clearer view and once more say what is knowledge

Theæt I cannot say Socrates that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion but I will venture to assert that knowledge is true opinion let this then be my reply and if this is hereafter disproved I must try to find another

Soc That is the way in which you ought to answer Theætetus and not in your former hesitating strain for if we are bold we shall gain one of two advantages either we shall find what we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we do not know—in either case we shall be richly rewarded And

now, what are you saying?—Are there two sorts of opinion one true and the other false and do you define knowledge to be the true

Theæt Yes according to my present view

Soc Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion?

Theæt To what are you alluding?

Soc There is a point which often troubles me and is a great perplexity to me both in regard to myself and others I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer

Theæt Pray what is it?

Soc How there can be false opinion—that difficulty still troubles the eye of my mind and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the question or begin over again in a new way

Theæt Begin again Socrates—at least if you think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?

Soc You are quite right and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again Better a little which is well done than a great deal imperfectly

Theæt Certainly

Soc Well and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false opinion and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion as though there were some natural distinction between them?

Theæt We certainly say so

[188] *Soc* All things and everything are either known or not known I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting because they have nothing to do with our present question

Theæt There can be no doubt Socrates if you exclude these that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing

Soc That point being now determined must we not say that he who has an opinion must have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know?

Theæt He must

Soc He who knows cannot but know and he who does not know cannot know?

Theæt Of course

Soc What shall we say then? When a man has a false opinion does he think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows and knowing both is he at the same time ignorant of both?

Theæt That Socrates is impossible

Soc But perhaps he thinks of something

which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know for example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates Theaetetus?

Theaet. How can he?

Soc. But surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does not know or what he does not know to be what he knows?

Theaet. That would be monstrous.

Soc. Where then is false opinion? For if all things are either known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded.

Theaet. Most true.

Soc. Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing into that of being and not being.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Soc. May we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks about anything that which is not, will necessarily think what is false whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?

Theaet. That, again, is not unlikely *Soc.* rates

Soc. Then suppose some one to say to us Theaetetus—Is it possible for any man to think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else? And suppose that we answer Yes, he can, when he thinks what is not true—That will be our answer?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But is there any parallel to this?

Theaet. What do you mean?

Soc. Can a man see something and yet see nothing?

Theaet. Impossible.

Soc. But if he sees any one thing he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things?

Theaet. I do not.

Soc. He then who sees some one thing sees something which is?

Theaet. Clearly.

[189] *Soc.* And he who hears anything hears some one thing and hears that which is?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And he who touches anything touches something which is one and therefore is?

Theaet. That again is true.

Soc. And does not he who thinks think some one thing?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And does not he who thinks some one thing think something which is?

Theaet. I agree.

Soc. Then he who thinks of that which is not thinks of nothing?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. And he who thinks of nothing does not think at all?

Theaet. Obviously.

Soc. Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else?

Theaet. Clearly not.

Soc. Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?

Theaet. It would seem so.

Soc. Then false opinion has no existence in us either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?

Theaet. What?

Soc. May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy, a person may make an exchange in his mind and say that one real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which is but he puts one thing in place of another and missing the aim of his thoughts he may be truly said to have false opinion.

Theaet. Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth when a man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion.

Soc. I see Theaetetus that your fear has disappeared and that you are beginning to despise me.

Theaet. What makes you say so?

Soc. You think, if I am not mistaken that your truly false is safe from censure and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow or a heavy which is light or any other self-contradictory thing which works, not according to its own nature but according to that of its opposite. But I will not insist upon this for I do not wish needlessly to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy or the thought of something else?

Theaet. I am.

Soc. It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?

Theaet. True.

Soc But must not the mind or thinking power which misplaces them have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?

Theaet Certainly

Soc Either together or in succession?

Theaet Very good

Soc And do you mean by conceiving the same which I mean?

Theaet What is that?

Soc I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything [190] I speak of what I scarcely understand but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them affirming and denying And when she has arrived at a decision either gradually or by a sudden impulse and has at last agreed and does not doubt this is called her opinion I say then that to form an opinion is to speak and opinion is a word spoken—I mean to oneself and in silence not aloud or to another What think you?

Theaet I agree

Soc Then when any one thinks of one thing as another he is saying to himself that one thing is another?

Theaet Yes

Soc But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base or the unjust just or best of all—have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay not even in sleep did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even or anything of the kind?

Theaet Never

Soc And do you suppose that any other man either in his senses or out of them ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse or that two are one?

Theaet Certainly not

Soc But if thinking is talking to oneself no one speaking and thinking of two objects and apprehending them both in his soul will say and think that the one is the other of them and I must add that even you lover of dispute as you are had better let the word *other* alone [i.e. not insist that one and other are the same] I mean to say that no one thinks the noble to be base or anything of the kind

Theaet I will give up the word *other* *Soc* rates and I agree to what you say

Soc If a man has both of them in his thoughts he cannot think that the one of them is the other?

Both words in Greek are called *er po ci Par menides* 147 *Euthydemus* 301

Theaet True

Soc Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?

Theaet True for we should have supposed that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all

Soc Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other And therefore he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense for neither in this any more than in the previous way can false opinion exist in us

Theaet No

Soc But if *Theaetetus* this is not admitted we shall be driven into many absurdities.

Theaet What are they?

Soc I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the matter from every point of view [191] For I should be ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak But if we find the solution and get away from them we may regard them only as the difficulties of others and the ridicule will not attach to us On the other hand if we utterly fail I suppose that we must be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea sick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor and to do anything to us Listen then while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty

Theaet Let me hear

Soc I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know and that there is a way in which such a deception is possible

Theaet You mean to say as I suspected at the time that I may know *Socrates* and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me and whom I mistake for him—then the deception will occur?

Soc But has not that position been relinquished by us because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know?

Theaet True

Soc Let us make the assertion in another form which may or may not have a favourable issue but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested Tell me then whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?

Theaet Certainly you may

Soc. And another and another?

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men, harder in some and having more or less of purity in one than another and in some of an intermediate quality.

Theæt. I see.

Soc. Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory the mother of the Muses and that when we wish to remember anything, which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is impressed as long as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know.

Theæt. Very good.

Soc. Now when a person has this knowledge, and is considering something, which he sees or hears, may not false opinions arise in the following manner?

Theæt. In what manner?

Soc. When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the possibility of this.

Theæt. And how would you amend the former statement?

[12a] Soc. I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which must be excluded.

(1) No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur when he only knows one, and does not know and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that one thing, which he does not know is another thing, which he does not know or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor (2) that one thing, which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives nor again (3) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coincident with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and if which he has the impression coincident with sense;—thus last

case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor (4) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the memorial coincident with sense, is something else which he knows nor so long as these agree, can he think that a thing, which he knows and perceives is another thing, which he perceives or that a thing, which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive—nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is another thing, which he does not perceive—All these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if any, which remain, are the following.

Theæt. What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you better but at present I am unable to follow you.

Soc. A person may think that some things which he knows, or which he perceives and does not know are some other things which he knows and perceives or that some things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives.

Theæt. I understand you less than ever now.

Soc. Hear me once more, then—I know, Theodorus, and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort of person Theaetetus is, at one time see them and at another time do not see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way and at another time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind.

Theæt. Very true.

Soc. Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or may not perceive sensibly that which he knows.

Theæt. True.

Soc. And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and some times will be perceived and only perceived?

Theæt. That is also true.

[12b] Soc. See whether you can follow me better now. Socrates can recognize Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he perceive them in any other way. He cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right?

Theæt. You are quite right.

Soc Then that was the first case of which I spoke

Theaet Yes

Soc The second case was that I knowing one of you and not knowing the other and perceiving neither, can never think him whom I know to be him whom I do not know

Theaet True

Soc In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do not know I need not again go over the catalogue of excluded cases, in which I can not form a false opinion about you and Theodorus either when I know both or when I am in ignorance of both or when I know one and not the other And the same of perceiving do you understand me?

Theaet I do

Soc The only possibility of erroneous opinion is when knowing you and Theodorus and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you given as by a seal but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance I try to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression and to fit this into its own print if I succeed, recognition will take place but if I fail and transpose them putting the foot into the wrong shoe—that is to say putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression or if my mind like the sight in a mirror which is transferred from right to left err by reason of some similar affection then heterodoxy and false opinion ensues

Theaet Yes Socrates you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful exactness

Soc Or again when I know both of you and perceive as well as know one of you but not the other and my knowledge of him does not accord with perception—that was the case put by me just now which you did not understand

Theaet No, I did not

Soc I meant to say that when a person knows and perceives one of you and his knowledge coincides with his perception he will never think him to be some other person whom he knows and perceives and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception—for that also was a case supposed

Theaet True

Soc But there was an omission of the further case, in which as we now say [194] false opinion may arise when knowing both and seeing or having some other sensible perception of both I fail in holding the seal over

against the corresponding sensation like a bad archer I miss and fall wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood

Theaet Yes it is rightly so called

Soc When therefore perception is present to one of the seals or impressions but not to the other and the mind fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present in any case of this sort the mind is deceived in a word if our view is sound there can be no error or deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived but only in things which are known and perceived in these alone opinion turns and twists about and becomes alternately true and false—true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false when they go awry and crooked

Theaet And is not that Socrates nobly said?

Soc Nobly! yes but wait a little and hear the explanation and then you will say so with more reason for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.

Theaet Undoubtedly

Soc And the origin of truth and error is as follows—When the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant and smooth and perfectly tempered then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the heart of the soul as Homer says in a parable meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax (*κρηνη*) these I say being pure and clear and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting and minds such as these easily learn and easily retain and are not liable to confusion but have true thoughts for they have plenty of room and having clear impressions of things as we term them quickly distribute them into their proper places on the block And such men are called wise Do you agree?

Theaet Entirely

Soc But when the heart of any one is shaggy—a quality which the all wise poet commends—or muddy and of impure wax or very soft or very hard then there is a corresponding defect in the mind—the soft are good at learning but apt to forget and the hard are the reverse the shaggy and rugged and gruffy or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in their composition [195] have the impressions indistinct as also the hard for there is no depth in them and the soft too are indistinct for their impressions are easily confused and effaced Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul which has no room These are the natures which have

false opinion for when they see or hear or think of anything they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions—in their stupidity they confuse them and are apt to see and hear and think amiss—and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.

Theaet No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that.

Soc Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?

Theaet Certainly.

Soc And of true opinion also?

Theaet Yes.

Soc We have at length satisfactorily proven that beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?

Theaet Undoubtedly.

Soc Alas, Theaetetus! what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond of talking!

Theaet What makes you say so?

Soc Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always arguing on all sides of a question whose dullness cannot be convinced and who will never leave off?

Theaet But what puts you out of heart?

Soc I am not only out of heart but in positive despair for I do not know what to answer if any one were to ask me—O Socrates, have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises either in the comparison of perceptions with one another nor yet in thought but in the union of thought and perception? Yes, I shall say with the complacency of one who thinks that he has made a noble discovery.

Thaet I see no reason why we should be hampered of our demonstrations, Socrates.

Soc He will say you mean to argue that the man whom we only think of and do not see cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or touch but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my meaning I shall reply.

Theaet Quite right.

Soc Well then he will say according to that argument the number eleven which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought. How would you answer him?

Thaet I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the eleven or twelve which are seen or handled but that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind.

Soc Well but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind five and seven [196]—I do not mean five or seven men or horses, but five or seven in the abstract, which as we say are recorded on the waxen block, and in which false opinion is held to be impossible—did no man ever ask himself how many these numbers make when added together and answer that they are eleven while another thinks that they are twelve, or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve?

Theaet Certainly not many would think that they are eleven and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still for I assume you to be speaking of numbers in general.

Soc Exactly and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?

Theaet Yes that seems to be the case.

Soc Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows but this as we said was impossible and afforded an irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion because otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time.

Theaet Most true.

Soc Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought and thus we are obliged to say either that false opinion does not exist or that a man may not know that which he knows—which alternative do you prefer?

Theaet It is hard to determine, Socrates.

Soc And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But as we are at our wits' end suppose that we do a shameless thing?

Theaet What is it?

Soc Let us attempt to explain the verb *to know*.

Theaet And why should that be shameless?

Soc You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed not to know the nature.

Thaet Nay but I am well aware.

Soc And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is to be explaining the verb *to know*? The truth is Theaetetus that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words *we know* and *do not know* and

we have or have not science or knowledge, as if we could understand what we are saying to one another so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge and at this moment we are using the words we understand we are ignorant as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science

Theæt But if you avoid these expressions Socrates how will you ever argue at all?

[197] *Soc* I could not being the man I am. The case would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic and O that such an one were present! for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But seeing that we are no great wits shall I venture to say what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.

Theæt Then by all means venture and no one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms.

Soc You have heard the common explanation of the verb to know?

Theæt I think so but I do not remember it at the moment.

Soc They explain the word to know as meaning to have knowledge.

Theæt True.

Soc I should like to make a slight change and say to possess knowledge.

Theæt How do the two expressions differ?

Soc Perhaps there may be no difference but still I should like you to hear my view that you may help me to test it.

Theæt I will if I can.

Soc I should distinguish having from possessing for example a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear and then we should say not that he has but that he possesses the garment.

Theæt It would be the correct expression.

Soc Well may not a man possess and yet not have knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds—doves or any other birds—and to be keeping them in an aviary which he has constructed at home we might say of him in one sense that he always has them because he possesses them might we not?

Theæt Yes.

Soc And yet in another sense he has none of them but they are in his power and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own and can take and have them whenever he likes—he can catch any which he likes and

let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases.

Theæt True.

Soc Once more then in what preceded we made a sort of waxen figure in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds—some flocking together apart from the rest others in small groups others solitary flying anywhere and everywhere.

Theæt Let us imagine such an aviary—and what is to follow?

Soc We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge and that when we were children this receptacle was empty whenever a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge and this is to know.

Theæt Granted.

[198] *Soc* And further when any one wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences and having taken to hold it and again to let them go how will he express himself?—will he describe the catching of them and the original possession in the same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example.—You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

Theæt To be sure.

Soc Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general.

Theæt I follow.

Soc Having the use of the art the arithmetician if I am not mistaken has the conceptions of number under his hand and can transmit them to another.

Theæt Yes.

Soc And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them and when receiving to learn them and when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know them.

Theæt Exactly.

Soc Attend to what follows must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?

Theæt True.

Soc And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head or things about him which are numberable?

Theæt Of course he can.

Soc And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?

Theæt Very true.

Soc And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows as if he did not

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know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers—you have heard these perplexing questions raised?

Theæt I have.

Soc May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed but has not at hand in his mind.

Theæt True.

Soc That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering or a grammarian about reading. Shall we say that although he knows he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?

Theæt It would be too absurd, Socrates.

Soc Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he does not know [199] although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theæt That again would be an absurdity.

Soc Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?—any one may twist and turn the words knowing and learning in any way which he likes but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses and therefore in no case can a man not know that which he knows but he may get a false opinion about it for he may have the knowledge not of this particular thing but of some other—when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake that is to say when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring dove which he had in his mind when he wanted the pigeon.

Theæt A very apt explanation.

Soc But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived and has an opinion of what is and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?

Theæt Yes.

Soc And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man not knowing what he knows for we are

not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.

Theæt What is it?

Soc How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?

Theæt What do you mean?

Soc In the first place how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows not by reason of ignorance but by reason of his own knowledge? And again is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?—you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

Theæt Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our buds whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well flying about together in the mind and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge and sometimes a form of ignorance and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance but a true one from knowledge about the same thing.

Soc I cannot help praising you Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words [200]. Let us grant what you say—then according to you he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right?

Theæt Yes.

Soc He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?

Theæt Of course not.

Soc He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?

Theæt Certainly.

Soc Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?

Theæt Clearly.

Soc And thus, after going a long way round we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us—O my excellent friends, he will say laughing if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or if he knows neither of them can he think that the one which he knows

not ■ another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images and which he may be said to know while he possesses them even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus in a perpetual circle you will be compelled to go round and round and you will make no progress. What are we to say in reply Theætetus?

Theætetus Indeed Socrates I do not know what we are to say

Soc Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is, that must be first ascertained then, the nature of false opinion?

Theætetus I cannot but agree with you Socrates so far as we have yet gone

Soc Then once more what shall we say that knowledge is?—for we are not going to lose heart as yet

Theætetus Certainly I shall not lose heart if you do not

Soc What definition will be most consistent with our former views?

Theætetus I cannot think of any but our old one Socrates

Soc What was it?

Theætetus Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion and true opinion is surely unerring and the results which follow from it are all noble and good

Soc He who led the way into the river, Theætetus said The experiment will show [201] and perhaps if we go forward in the search we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for but if we stay where we are nothing will come to light

Theætetus Very true let us go forward and try

Soc The trail soon comes to an end for a whole profession is against us

Theætetus How is that and what profession do you mean?

Soc The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like but they do not teach them Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to con-

vince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence of which they were not eye witnesses while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra?

Theætetus Certainly not they can only persuade them

Soc And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?

Theætetus To be sure

Soc When therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them and not in any other way and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them they judge without knowledge and yet are rightly persuaded if they have judged well

Theætetus Certainly

Soc And yet O my friend if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge and therefore I must infer that they are not the same

Theætetus That is a distinction Socrates which I have heard made by some one else but I had forgotten it He said that true opinion combined with reason was knowledge but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable—such was the singular expression which he used—and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable

Soc Excellent but then how did he distinguish between things which are and are not knowable? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale

Theætetus I do not know whether I can recall it but if another person would tell me I think that I could follow him

Soc Let me give you then a dream in return for a dream—Methought that I too had a dream and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded have no reason or explanation you can only name them [202] but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them for in the one case existence in the other non-existence is already implied neither of which must be added if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone It should not be called itself or that or each or alone or this or the like for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them whereas, if the first elements could be described and had a defini-

tion of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primal elements can be defined: they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a denotation. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known: but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge: for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing: but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?

Theæt. Precisely.

Soc. And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?

Theæt. Exactly.

Soc. Then may we assume, Theætetus, that to-day and in this casual manner we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found.

Theæt. At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement.

Soc. Which is probably correct—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me.

Theæt. What was it?

Soc. What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all—That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known.

Theæt. And was that wrong?

Soc. We shall soon know: for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used.

Theæt. What hostages?

Soc. The letters, which are the elements and the syllables, which are the combinations,—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet?

[203] *Theæt.* Yes, he did.

Soc. Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather test ourselves.—What was the

way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a denotation, but that letters have no definition?

Theæt. I think so.

Soc. I think so too: for suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name—Theætetus, he says, what is SO?

Theæt. I should reply S and O.

Soc. That is the denotation which you would give of the syllable?

Theæt. I should.

Soc. I wish that you would give me a similar denotation of the S.

Theæt. But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing: B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undenned for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only but no definition at all.

Soc. Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?

Theæt. Yes: I think that we have.

Soc. Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?

Theæt. I think so.

Soc. And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?

Theæt. I should say that we mean all the letters.

Soc. Take the case of the two letters S and O which form the first syllable of my own name: must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them?

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. He knows, that is, the S and O?

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?

Theæt. Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.

Soc. But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first: and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed.

Theæt. Yes, with wonderful celerity.

Soc. Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single

idea framed out of them having a separate form distinct from them

Theæt Very true and a more likely notion than the other

Soc Take care let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory

[204] *Theæt* No indeed

Soc Let us assume then as we now say that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements — of letters or of any other elements

Theæt Very good

Soc And it must have no parts

Theæt Why?

Soc Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts Or would you say that a whole although formed out of the parts is a single notion different from all the parts?

Theæt I should

Soc And would you say that all and the whole are the same or different?

Theæt I am not certain but as you like me to answer at once I shall hazard the reply that they are different

Soc I approve of your readiness *Theaetetus* but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer

Theæt Yes the answer is the point

Soc According to this new view the whole is supposed to differ from all?

Theæt Yes

Soc Well but is there any difference between all [in the plural] and the all [in the singular]? Take the case of number — When we say one two three four five six or when we say twice three or three times two or four and two or three and two and one are we speaking of the same or of different numbers?

Theæt Of the same

Soc That is of six?

Theæt Yes

Soc And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?

Theæt True

Soc Again in speaking of all [in the plural] there not one thing which we express?

Theæt Of course there is

Soc And that is six?

Theæt Yes

Soc Then in predicating the word all of things measured by number we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?

Theæt Clearly we do

Soc Again the number of the acre and the acre are the same are they not?

Theæt Yes

Soc And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?

Theæt Yes

Soc And the army is the number of the army and in all similar cases the entire number of anything is the entire thing?

Theæt True

Soc And the number of each is the parts of each?

Theæt Exactly

Soc Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?

Theæt Clearly

Soc But all the parts are admitted to be the all if the entire number is the all?

Theæt True

Soc Then the whole is not made up of parts for it would be the all if consisting of all the parts?

Theæt That is the inference

Soc But is a part a part of anything but the whole?

Theæt Yes of the all

[205] *Soc* You make a valiant defence *Theaetetus* And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?

Theæt Certainly

Soc And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all — if wanting in anything both equally lose their entirety of nature

Theæt I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all

Soc But were we not saying that when a thing has parts all the parts will be a whole and all?

Theæt Certainly

Soc Then as I was saying before must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters and then the letters are not parts of the syllable or that the syllable will be the same with the letters and will therefore be equally known with them?

Theæt You are right

Soc And in order to avoid this we suppose it to be different from them?

Theæt Yes

Soc But if letters are not parts of syllables can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?

Theæt No indeed *Socrates* for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts

Soc Quite true *Theaetetus*, and therefore

according to our present view a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?

Theaet True.

Soc But do you remember my friend that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded nor can one rightly attribute to them the words "being or this," because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were undefinable and unknown?

Theaet I remember

Soc And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other

Theaet No other reason can be given.

Soc Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters if it has no parts and is one form?

Theaet To be sure.

Soc If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole?

Theaet True.

Soc But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?

Theaet I cannot deny that

Soc We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, [206] but not the letters.

Theaet Certainly not if we may trust the argument.

Soc Well but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him when you remember your own experience in learning to read?

Theaet What experience?

Soc Why that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear in order that, when you heard them spoken, you saw them written, you might not be confused by their position.

Theaet Very true.

Soc And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note the notes, as every one would allow are the elements or letters of music?

Theaet Exactly

Soc Then if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and

compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense?

Theaet Exactly

Soc And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

Theaet We must not

Soc Well and what is the meaning of the term "explanation"? I think that we have a choice of three meanings.

Theaet What are they?

Soc In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, unaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?

Theaet Certainly he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself.

Soc And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything and if so all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.

Theaet True.

Soc Let us not therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word for perhaps he only intended to say that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything [207] he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing.

Theaet As for example, Socrates?

Soc As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now neither you nor I could describe all of them individually but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer that a waggon consists of wheels axle, body rims, yoke.

Theaet Certainly

Soc And our opponent will probably laugh at us just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and give a grammatical ac-

of the name of Theætetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is attained only, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. In the same general way we might also have true opinion about a wagon, but he who can describe its structure by an enumeration of the hundred parts, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a wagon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements.

Theæt. And do you not agree in that view Socrates?

Soc. If you do, my friend, but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or letter combinations or them to be irrational—as this you know?

Theæt. Precisely.

Soc. Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that one same thing is composed of different elements at different times?

Theæt. Assuredly not.

Soc. And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

Theæt. You mean that I mistook the letters and misapplied the syllables?

Soc. Yes.

Theæt. To be sure I perfectly remember and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge.

Soc. When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theætetus, [αὐτῷ] and thinks that he ought to write and does write *Th* and *e*—but, again, meaning to write the name of Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *T* and *e*—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names?

Theæt. We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.

Soc. And in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?

Theæt. He may.

Soc. And in that case, when he knows the

order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?

Theæt. Clearly.

Soc. But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge.

Theæt. Yes.

Soc. And yet he will have explanations, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote and this we shall also be explanation.

Theæt. True.

Soc. Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.

Theæt. It would seem so.

Soc. And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who manifests knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third.

Theæt. You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition?

Soc. There is, further, the popular way of setting the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

Theæt. Can you give me any example of such a definition?

Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun I think that you would be content with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.

Theæt. Certainly.

Soc. Understand why—the reason is, as I am just now saying, that if you get at the distinctive and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get the definition or explanation of it. But were you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only fix a definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theæt. I understand you, and your point of definition is in my judgment correct.

Soc. But he, who having right opinion and anything, can find out the difference which

inrushes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion

Theaet. Yes that is what we are maintaining

Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus on a nearer view I find myself quite disappointed the picture, which at a distance was not so bad has now become altogether unintelligible

Theaet. What do you mean?

[209] *Soc.* I will endeavour to explain I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition then I have knowledge but if not, opinion only

Theaet. Yes

Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference

Theaet. True

Soc. But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing character

Theaet. I suppose not

Soc. Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another

Theaet. True

Soc. Tell me, now—How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus to be a man who has nose eyes and mouth and every other member complete how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some other barbarian?

Theaet. How could it?

Soc. Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose and eyes but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me?

Theaet. Certainly not

Soc. Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen and until your other peculiarities have a like distinctness and when I meet you tomorrow the right opinion will be recalled?

Theaet. Most true

Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

Theaet. Clearly

Soc. What then shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? Is the meaning is, that would form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing the proposal is ridiculous

Theaet. How so?

Soc. We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them and so we go round and round—the revolution of the scytal or pestle, or any other rotatory machine in the same circles, is as nothing compared with such a requirement and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul utterly benighted

Theaet. Tell me what were you going to say just now when you asked the question?

Soc. If my boy the argument in speaking of adding the definition had used the word to know and not merely have an opinion of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end for to know is surely to acquire knowledge

[210] *Theaet.* True

Soc. And so when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer Right opinion with knowledge—knowledge, that is of difference for this, as the said argument maintains is adding the definition

Theaet. That seems to be true

Soc. But how utterly foolish when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! And so Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?

Theaet. I suppose not

Soc. And are you still in labour and travail my dear friend or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge in the birth?

Theaet. I am sure Socrates that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me

Soc. And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?

Theaet. Very true

Soc. But if Theaetetus you should ever conceive afresh you will be all the better for the present investigation and if not you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know These are the limits of my art I can no further go nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous

count of the name of Theaetetus and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name—that would be true opinion and not knowledge for knowledge as has been already remarked is not attained until, combined with true opinion there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed

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Theaet And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?

Soc If you do my friend but I want to know first whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational—is this your view?

Theaet Precisely

Soc Well and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times?

Theaet Assuredly not

Soc And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

Theaet You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?

Soc Yes

Theaet To be sure I perfectly remember and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge

Soc When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus [208] and thinks that he ought to write and does write *Th* and *e* but again meaning to write the name of Theodorus thinks that he ought to write and does write *T* and *e*—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names?

Theaet We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge

Soc And in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?

Theaet He may

Soc And in that case when he knows the

order of the letters and can write them out correctly he has right opinion?

Theaet Clearly

Soc But although we admit that he has right opinion he will still be without knowledge?

Theaet Yes

Soc And yet he will have explanations as well as right opinion for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote and this we admit to be explanation

Theaet True

Soc Then my friend there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge

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Soc And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge one of which must as we said be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third

Theaet You are quite right there is still one remaining The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech the second which has just been mentioned is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements But what is the third definition?

Soc There is further the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others

Theaet Can you give me any example of such a definition?

Soc As for example in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth

Theaet Certainly

Soc Understand why—the reason is, as I was just now saying that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing then as many persons affirm you will get at the definition or explanation of it but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs

Theaet I understand you and your account of definition is in my judgment correct

Soc But he who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which dis-

SOPHIST

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE THEODORUS, THEAETETUS, SOCRATES. In ELEATIC STRANGE, whom Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them
The young SOCRATES, who is a silent auditor



[216] *Theodorus* Here we are, Socrates, true to our agreement of yesterday and we bring with us a stranger from Elea, who is a disciple of Parmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher.

Socrates Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially the god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and that the good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those higher powers, a cross-examining deity who has come to spy out our weakness in argument, and to cross-examine us?

Theod Nay Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious sort—he is too good for that. And in my opinion, he is not a god at all but divine he certainly is, for this is a title which I should give to all philosophers.

Soc Capital my friend! and I may add that they are almost as hard to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as are not merely made up for the occasion appear in various forms unrecognized by the ignorance of men, and they hover about cities, as Homer declares, looking from above upon human life and some think nothing of them, and others can never think enough and some times they appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists and then, again, to many they seem to be no better than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic friend, if he would tell us, [217] what is thought about them in Italy and to whom the terms are applied.

Theod What terms?

Soc Sophist, statesman, philosopher

Theod What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask?

Soc I want to know whether by his countrymen they are regarded as one or two or do they as the names are three, distinguish also three kinds, and assign one to each name?

Theod I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss the question. What do you say Stranger?

Stranger I am far from objecting. Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty in replying that by us they are regarded as three. But to define precisely the nature of each of them is by no means a slight or easy task.

Theod You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very question which we were asking, our friend before we came hither and he excused himself to us, as he does now to you although he admitted that the matter had been fully discussed, and that he remembered the answer.

Soc Then do not, Stranger deny us the first fact which we ask of you. I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg of you to say whether you like and are accustomed to make a long oration on a subject which you want to explain to another or to proceed by the method of question and answer. I remember hearing a very noble discussion in which Parmenides employed the latter of the two methods, when I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years.

Sir I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly and is light in hand if not, I would rather have my own say.
Cf. Parmenides 137 ff.

men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I like my mother have received from God: she delivered women and I deliver men: but they must be young and noble and fair.

And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon where I am to meet Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning Theodorus, I shall hope to see you again at this place.

¹Cf. *Euthyphro* sub fin. *Meno* sub fin.

Sir And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts: there is exchange, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase, and the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed conquest?

Theæt That is implied in what has been said.

Sir And may not conquest be again subdivided?

Theæt How?

Sir Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?

Theæt Yes.

Sir And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be further divided?

Theæt How would you make the division?

Sir Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.

Theæt Yes, if both kinds exist.

[220] *Sir* Of course they exist, but the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except some sorts of diving and other small matters may be omitted: the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.

Theæt Yes.

Sir And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land animal hunting which has many kinds and names, and water animal hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim?

Theæt True.

Sir And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?

Theæt Certainly.

Sir Fowl, now, is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.

Theæt True.

Sir The hunting of an animal who lives in the water has the general name of fishing.

Theæt Yes.

Sir And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?

Theæt What are they?

Sir There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which takes them by a blow.

Theæt What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

Sir As to the first kind—all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, may be truly called an enclosure.

Theæt Very true.

Sir For which reason twig baskets, casting nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed enclosures?

Theæt True.

Sir And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture with enclosures, or something of that sort?

Theæt Yes.

Sir The other kind which is practised by a blow with hooks and three pronged spears when summed up under one name may be called striking, unless you, Theætetus, can find some better name?

Theæt Never mind the name—what you suggest will do very well.

Sir There is one mode of striking which is done at night, and by the light of a fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing or spear-throwing by firelight.

Theæt True.

Sir And the fishing by day is called by the general name of barbing, because the spears, too, are barbed at the point.

Theæt Yes, that is the term.

Sir Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from above is called spear-throwing, because this is the way in which the three pronged spears are mostly used.

Theæt Yes, it is often called so.

Sir Then now there is only one kind remaining.

Theæt What is that?

Sir When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body as he is with the spear, but only about the head and mouth, [221] and is then drawn out from below upwards with reeds and rods—What is the right name of that mode of fishing? Theætetus?

Theæt I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.

Sir Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of the thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was hunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals, half of this was hunting water animals—of this again the under half was fishing, half of fishing was striking, a part of striking was fishing with a barb, and one half of this again being the kind which strikes with a hook and draws the fish from below upwards, is the art which we have been seeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling or drawing up (*οραλιευτική η αραχθία*).

Theæt The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out.

Soc Any one of the present company will respond kindly to you and you can choose whom you like of them I should recommend you to take a young person—*Theaetetus* for example—unless you have a preference for some one else

Sir I feel ashamed *Socrates* being a new comer into your society instead of talking a little and hearing others talk to be spinning out a long soliloquy or address as if I wanted to show off For the true answer will certainly be a very long one a great deal longer than might be expected from such a short and simple question At the same time I fear that I may seem rude and ungracious if I refuse your courteous request [218] especially after what you have said For I certainly cannot object to your proposal that *Theaetetus* should respond having already conversed with him myself and being recommended by you to take him

Theaetetus But are you sure Stranger that this will be quite so acceptable to the rest of the company as *Socrates* imagines?

Sir You hear them applauding *Theaetetus* after that there is nothing more to be said Well then I am to argue with you and if you tire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me

Theaet I do not think that I shall tire and if I do I shall get my friend here young *Socrates*, the namesake of the elder *Socrates* to help he is about my own age and my partner at the gymnasium and is constantly accustomed to work with me

Sir Very good you can decide about that for yourself as we proceed Meanwhile you and I will begin together and enquire into the nature of the *Sophist* first of the three I should like you to make out what he is and bring him to light in a discussion for at present we are only agreed about the name but of the thing to which we both apply the name possibly you have one notion and I another whereas we ought always to come to an understanding about the thing itself in terms of a definition and not merely about the name minus the definition Now the tribe of *Sophists* which we are investigating is not easily caught or defined and the world has long ago agreed that if great subjects are to be adequately treated they must be studied in the lesser and easier instances of them before we proceed to the greatest of all And as I know that the tribe of *Sophists* is troublesome and hard to be caught I should recommend that we practise beforehand the method which is to be applied to him on some

simple and smaller thing unless you can suggest a better way

Theaet Indeed I cannot

Sir Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will be a pattern of the greater?

Theaet Good

Sir What is there which is well known and not great and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an *angler*? He is familiar to all of us and not a very interesting or important person

Theaet He is not

[219] *Sir* Yet I suspect that he will furnish us with the sort of definition and line of enquiry which we want

Theaet Very good

Sir Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not having art but some other power

Theaet He is clearly a man of art

Sir And of arts there are two kinds?

Theaet What are they?

Sir There is agriculture and the tending of mortal creatures and the art of constructing or moulding vessels and there is the art of imitation—all these may be appropriately called by a single name

Theaet What do you mean? And what is the name?

Sir He who brings into existence something that did not exist before is said to be a producer and that which is brought into existence is said to be produced

Theaet True

Sir And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterized by this power of producing?

Theaet They are

Sir Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or creative art

Theaet Very good

Sir Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition then comes trade fighting hunting And since none of these produces anything but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed or in preventing others from conquering things which exist and have been already produced—in each and all of the branches there appears to be an art which may be called *acquisitive*

Theaet Yes that is the proper name

Sir Seeing then that all arts are either a *quisitive* or creative in which class shall we place the art of the *angler*?

Theaet Clearly in the *acquisitive* class

men of wealth and rank—such is the conclusion

Theæt Just so

Sir Let us take another branch of his genealogy for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art and if we look back at what has preceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking

Theæt In what respect?

Sir There were two sorts of acquisition—art the one concerned with hunting the other with exchange

Theæt There were

Sir And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of giving and the other of selling

Theæt Let us assume that.

Sir Next, we will suppose the art of selling to be divided into two parts.

Theæt How?

Sir There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a man's own productions another which is the exchange of the works of others.

Theæt Certainly

Sir And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city being about half of the whole, termed retailing?

Theæt Yes.

Sir And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?

Theæt To be sure

Sir And you are aware that this exchange of the merchant is of two kinds—it is partly concerned with food for the use of the body and partly with the food of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for money

Theæt What do you mean?

Sir You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul the other kind you surely understand

Theæt Yes.

Sir Take music or general and painting and marionette playing and many other things, [224] which are purchased in one city and a great way and sold in another—wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or amusement—may not he who takes them about and sells them be quite as truly called merchant as he who sells meats and drink?

Theæt To be sure he may

Sir And would you not call by the same name him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theæt Certainly I should

Sir Of this merchandise of the soul may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?

Theæt Certainly

Sir The latter should have two names,—one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge.

Theæt Of course.

Sir The name of art seller corresponds well enough to the latter but you must try and tell me the name of the other

Theæt He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking no other name can possibly be right.

Sir No other and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue

Theæt Quite true.

Sir And there may be a third reappearance of him—for he may have settled down in a city and may fabricate as well as buy these same wares intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist?

Theæt Certainly

Sir Then that part of acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of virtue, you would again term Sophistry?

Theæt I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument.

Sir Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another aspect of sophistry

Theæt What is it?

[225] *Sir* In the acquisition there was a subdivision of the combative or fighting art.

Theæt There was

Sir Perhaps we had better divide it.

Theæt What shall be the divisions?

Sir There shall be one division of the combative, and another of the pugnacious

Theæt Very good

Sir That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily strength may be properly called by some such name as violent.

Theæt True.

Str And now following this pattern let us endeavour to find out what a Sophist is

Theæt By all means

Str The first question about the angler was whether he was a skilled artist or unskilled?

Theæt True

Str And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough master of his craft?

Theæt Certainly not unskilled, for his name as indeed you imply must surely express his nature

Str Then he must be supposed to have some art

Theæt What art?

Str By heaven they are cousins! it never occurred to us

Theæt Who are cousins?

Str The angler and the Sophist

Theæt In what way are they related?

Str They both appear to me to be hunters

Theæt How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken

Str You remember our division of hunting into hunting after swimming animals and land animals

Theæt Yes

Str And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals saying that there were many kinds of them?

[222] *Theæt* Certainly

Str Thus far then the Sophist and the angler starting from the art of acquiring take the same road?

Theæt So it would appear

Str Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal hunting the one going to the sea shore and to the rivers and to the lakes and angling for the animals which are in them

Theæt Very true

Str While the other goes to land and water of another sort—rivers of wealth and broad meadow lands of generous youth and he also intending to take the animals which are in them

Theæt What do you mean?

Str Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions

Theæt What are they?

Str One is the hunting of tame and the other of wild animals

Theæt But are tame animals ever hunted?

Str Yes if you include man under tame animals But if you like you may say that there are no tame animals or that if there are man is not among them or you may say that man is a tame animal but is not hunted—you shall de-

cide which of these alternatives you prefer

Theæt I should say Stranger, that man is a tame animal and I admit that he is hunted.

Str Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts

Theæt How shall we make the division?

Str Let us define piracy man stealing tyranny the whole military art by one name as hunting with violence

Theæt Very good

Str But the art of the lawyer of the popular orator and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion

Theæt True

Str And of persuasion there may be said to be two kinds?

Theæt What are they?

Str One is private and the other public

Theæt Yes each of them forms a class

Str And of private hunting one sort receives hire and the other brings gifts

Theæt I do not understand you

Str You seem never to have observed the manner in which lovers hunt

Theæt To what do you refer?

Str I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in addition to other inducements

Theæt Most true

Str Let us admit this then to be the amatory art

Theæt Certainly

Str But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who buys his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his maintenance in return we should all if I am not mistaken describe as possessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant [23]

Theæt Certainly

Str And that sort which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue and demands a reward in the shape of money may be fairly called by another name?

Theæt To be sure

Str And what is the name? Will you tell me?

Theæt It is obvious enough for I believe that we have discovered the Sophist which is as I conceive, the proper name for the class described

Str Then now Theaetetus his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative acquisitive family—which hunts animals—living—land—tame animals which hunts man—privately—for hire—taking money in exchange—having the semblance of education and this is termed Sophistry and is a hunt after young

the purification of inanimate substances—to
the arts of fulling and of furbishing in gen-
eral, and in a number of minute particulars,
has in a variety of names which are thought re-
dundant.

Theæt. Very true.

Sir. There can be no doubt that they are
laughable, *Theætetus* but then the
dialectical art never considers whether the ben-
efit to be derived from the purge is greater or
less than that to be derived from the sponges,
and has not more interest in the one than in the
other besides our wish to know what is and is
not kindred in all arts with a view to the ac-
quisition of intelligence and having this in
view she honours them all alike, and when she
makes comparisons, she counts one of them not
a whit more ridiculous than another nor does
she esteem him who adduces as his example
of wisdom, the general art at all more de-
corous than another, but esteems that of the ver-
min-destroyer but only as the greater pretender
of the two. And as to your question concerning
the name which was to comprehend all these
arts of purification, whether of animate or in-
animate bodies, the art of dialectic is in no wise
particular about fine words, if she may be only
allowed to have a general name for all other
purifications, binding them up together and
separating them off from the purification of the
soul or intellect. If or this is the purification at
which she wants to arrive, and thus we should
understand to be her aim.

Thæt. Yes, I understand and I agree that
there are two sorts of purification, and that one
of them is concerned with the soul and that
there is another which is concerned with the
body.

Sir. Excellent and now listen to what I am
going to say and try to divide further the first
of the two.

Theæt. Whatever line of division you sug-
gest, I will endeavour to assent to you.

Sir. Do we admit that virtue is distinct from
vice in the soul?

Thæt. Certainly.

Sir. And purification was to leave the good
and to cast out what is bad?

Theæt. True.

Sir. Then any taking away of evil from the
soul may be properly called purification?

Theæt. Yes.

And in the soul there are two kinds of

Thæt. Yes, what are they?

[228] *Sir.* The one may be compared to dis-

ease in the body the other to deformity.

Theæt. I do not understand.

Sir. Perhaps you have never reflected that
disease and discord are the same.

Theæt. To this, again, I know not what I
should reply.

Sir. Do you not conceive discord to be a dis-
solution of kindred elements, originating in
some disagreement?

Theæt. Just that.

Sir. And is deformity anything but the want
of measure, which is always unsightly?

Theæt. Exactly.

Sir. And do we not see that opinion is opposed
to desire, pleasure to anger reason to pain and
that all these elements are opposed to one an-
other in the souls of bad men?

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir. And yet they must all be akin.

Theæt. Of course.

Sir. Then we shall be right in calling vice a
discord and disease of the soul?

Theæt. Most true.

Sir. And when things having motion, and
aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss
their aim and glance aside, shall we say that
this is the effect of symmetry among them, or
of the want of symmetry?

Theæt. Clearly of the want of symmetry.

Sir. But surely we know that no soul is volun-
tarily ignorant of anything?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Sir. And what is ignorance but the aberration
of a mind which is bent on truth and in which
the process of understanding is perverted?

Theæt. True.

Sir. Then we are to regard an unintelligent
soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?

Theæt. Very true.

Sir. Then there are these two kinds of evil in
the soul—the one which is generally called vice,
and is obviously a disease of the soul.

Theæt. Yes.

Sir. And there is the other which they call
ignorance and which because existing only in
the soul, they will not allow to be vice.

Theæt. I certainly admit what I at first dis-
puted—that there are two kinds of vice in the
soul and that we ought to consider cowardice,
intemperance, and injustice to be all alike forms
of disease in the soul and ignorance, of which
there are all sorts of varieties, to be deformity.

Sir. And in the case of the body are there not
two sorts which have to do with the two bodily
states?

Thæt. What are they?

Sir And when the war is one of words it may be termed controversy?

Theaet Yes

Sir And controversy may be of two kinds

Theaet What are they?

Sir When long speeches are answered by long speeches and there is public discussion about the just and unjust that is forensic controversy

Theaet Yes

Sir And there is a private sort of controversy which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?

Theaet Yes that is the name

Sir And of disputation that sort which is only a discussion about contracts and is carried on at random and without rules of art is recognized by the reasoning faculty to be a distinct class but has hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one from us

Theaet No for the different sorts of it are too minute and heterogeneous

Sir But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about justice and injustice in their own nature and about things in general we have been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic)?

Theaet Certainly

Sir And of argumentation one sort wastes money and the other makes money

Theaet Very true

Sir Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name

Theaet Let us do so

Sir I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation of which the style is far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers may be fairly termed loquacity such is my opinion

Theaet That is the common name for it

Sir But now who the other is who makes money out of private disputation it is your turn to say

Theaet There is only one true answer he is the wonderful Sophist of whom we are in pursuit and who reappears again for the fourth time

[226] *Sir* Yes and with a fresh pedigree for he is the money making species of the Eristic disputatious controversial pugnacious combative acquisitive family as the argument has already proven

Theaet Certainly

Sir How true was the observation that he

was a many sided animal and not to be caught with one hand as they say!

Theaet Then you must catch him with two

Sir Yes we must if we can And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants

Theaet Yes there are many such which of them do you mean?

Sir I mean such as sifting straining winnowing threshing

Theaet Certainly

Sir And besides these there are a great many more such as carding spinning adjusting the warp and the woof and thousands of similar expressions are used in the arts

Theaet Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?

Sir I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of division

Theaet Yes

Sir Then if as I was saying there is one art which includes all of them ought not that art to have one name?

Theaet And what is the name of the art?

Sir The art of discerning or discriminating

Theaet Very good

Sir Think whether you cannot divide this

Theaet I should have to think a long while

Sir In all the previously named processes either like has been separated from like or the better from the worse

Theaet I see now what you mean

Sir There is no name for the first kind of separation of the second which throws away the worse and preserves the better I do know a name

Theaet What is it?

Sir Every discernment or discrimination of that kind as I have observed is called a purification

Theaet Yes that is the usual expression

Sir And any one may see that purification is of two kinds

Theaet Perhaps so if he were allowed time to think but I do not see at this moment

Sir There are many purifications of bodies which may with propriety be comprehended under a single name

Theaet What are they and what is their name?

[227] *Sir* There is the purification of living bodies in their inward and in their outward parts of which the former is duly effected by medicine and gymnastic, the latter by the not very dignified art of the bath man and there is

Sir Let us should assign to them too high a prerogative.

Theæt Yet the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of purification.

Sir Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the fiercest of animals, has to a dog who is the gentlest. But he who would not be found tripping ought to be very careful in this matter of comparisons for they are most slippery things. Nevertheless let us assume that the Sophists are the men I say this provisionally for I think that the line which divides them will be marked enough if proper care is taken.

Theæt Likely enough.

Sir Let us grant, then, that from the discerning art comes purification, and from purification let there be separated off a part which is concerned with the soul of this mental purification instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of education, that refutation of a notion which has been discovered in the present argument and let this be called by you and me the nobly-descended art of Sophistry.

Theæt Very well and yet, considering the number of forms in which he has presented himself, I begin to doubt how I can with any truth or confidence describe the real nature of the Sophist.

Sir You naturally feel perplexed and yet I think that he must be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb says, when every way is blocked there is no escape now then is the time of all others to set upon him.

Theæt True.

Sir First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we are resting we may reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and youth.

Theæt Yes.

Sir In the second place, he was a merchant in the goods of the soul.

Theæt Certainly.

Sir In the third place he has turned out to be a dealer of the same sort of wares.

Theæt Yes and in the fourth place, he himself manufactured the learned wares which he sold.

Sir Quite right I will try and remember this fifth myself. He belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero of debate, who professed the eristic art.

Theæt True.

Sir The sixth point was doubtful and yet we at last agreed that he was a purger of souls, who

cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge.

Theæt Very true.

[232] *Sir* Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending is not understood.

Theæt I should imagine this to be the case.

Sir At any rate we will understand him and no indolence shall prevent us. Let us begin again, then and re-examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist there was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic of him.

Theæt To what are you referring?

Sir We were saying of him if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer?

Theæt We were.

Sir And does he not also teach others the art of disputation?

Theæt Certainly he does.

Sir And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute? To begin at the beginning—Does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?

Theæt At any rate he is said to do so.

Sir And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth and the like?

Theæt Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.

Sir Then again, in private conversation when any casual assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such persons are tremendous arguers, and are able to outpart their own skill to others.

Theæt Undoubtedly.

Sir And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?

Theæt Why no one would have anything to say to them, if they did not make these professions.

Sir In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in answer to any question is written down in a popular form and he who likes may learn.

Theæt I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?

Sir Yes, my friend and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?

Theæt Certainly there does not seem to be

Str There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity and medicine which has to do with disease

Theaet True

[229] *Str* And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice is not chastisement the art which is most required?

Theaet That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind

Str Again of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?

Theaet True

Str And of the art of instruction shall we say that there is one or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones Think

Theaet I will

Str I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the answer to this question

Theaet How?

Str If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold answering to the two divisions of ignorance

Theaet Well and do you see what you are looking for?

Str I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts of ignorance put together

Theaet What is it?

Str When a person supposes that he knows and does not know this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect

Theaet True

Str And this if I am not mistaken is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of stupidity

Theaet True

Str What name then shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?

Theaet The instruction which you mean Stranger is I should imagine not the teaching of handicraft arts but what, thanks to us has been termed education in this part of the world

Str Yes Theaetetus and by nearly all Hellenes But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division

Theaet We have

Str I think that there is a point at which such a division is possible

Theaet Where?

Str Of education one method appears to be rougher and another smoother

Theaet How are we to distinguish the two?

Str There is the time honoured mode which our fathers commonly practised towards their sons and which is still adopted by many—either of roughly reproving their errors [230] or of gently advising them which varieties may be correctly included under the general term of admonition

Theaet True

Str But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good—

Theaet There they are quite right

Str Accordingly they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way

Theaet In what way?

Str They cross examine a man's words when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side show that they contradict one another about the same things in relation to the same things and in the same respect He seeing this is angry with himself and grows gentle towards others and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions in a way which is most amusing to the hearer and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted and from refutation learns modesty he must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows and no more

Theaet That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind

Str For all these reasons Theaetetus we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications and he who has not been refuted though he be the Great King himself is in an awful state of impurity he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest

Theaet Very true

Str And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to say the Sophists [231]

Theaet Why?

Theæt That is my view as far as I can judge although at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.

Sir And the wish of all of us, who are your friends is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad [235] reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being or are we all disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?

Theæt But how can he Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children a play?

Sir Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.

Theæt Certainly we must.

Sir And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of diabolical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.

Theæt What is that?

Sir The inference that he is a juggler.

Theæt Precisely my own opinion of him.

Sir Then clearly we ought as soon as possible to divide the image making art, and go down into the net, and if the Sophist does not run away from us to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them to divide again and follow him up until in some sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.

Theæt Well said and let us do as you propose.

Sir Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.

Theæt Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?

Sir One is the art of likeness making—generally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportion of the original's median length and breadth and depth each thing receiving also its appropriate colour.

Theæt Is not this always the art of imitation?

Sir Not always in works either of sculpture or of painting which are of any magnitude [236] there is a certain degree of deception for if artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works the upper part, which is farther off would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower which is nearer and so they give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful disregarding the real ones.

Theæt Quite true.

Sir And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?

Theæt Yes.

Sir And may we not, as I did just now call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?

Theæt Let that be the name.

Sir And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful which appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works of such magnitude they would appear not even like that to which they profess to be like? May we not call these appearances since they appear only and are not really like?

Theæt Certainly.

Sir There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting and in all imitation.

Theæt Of course.

Sir And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?

Theæt Most fairly.

Sir These then are the two kinds of image making—the art of making likenesses and phantastic or the art of making appearances?

Theæt True.

Sir I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist nor am I even now able to see clearly in which is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the clearest manner he has got into an impossible place.

Theæt Yes, he has.

Sir Do you speak advisedly or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?

Theæt May I ask to what you are referring?

Sir My dear friend we are engaged in a very difficult speculation—there can be no doubt of that for how a thing can appear and seem and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, [237] has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any one

much which is left out

Sir But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear

[233] *Theæt* To what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand your present question

Sir I ask whether anybody can understand all things

Theæt Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible!

Sir But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?

Theæt He cannot

Sir Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?

Theæt To what do you refer?

Sir How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then to quote your own observation no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.

Theæt They certainly would not

Sir But they are willing

Theæt Yes they are

Sir Yes and the reason as I should imagine is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?

Theæt Certainly

Sir And they dispute about all things?

Theæt True

Sir And therefore to their disciples they appear to be all wise?

Theæt Certainly

Sir But they are not for that was shown to be impossible

Theæt Impossible of course

Sir Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things which is not the truth?

Theæt Exactly no better description of him could be given

Sir Let us now take an illustration which will still more clearly explain his nature

Theæt What is it?

Sir I will tell you and you shall answer me giving your very closest attention Suppose that a person were to profess not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things by a single art

Theæt All things?

Sir I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter for you do not understand the meaning of all

Theæt No I do not

Sir Under all things I include you and me, and also animals and trees

Theæt What do you mean

Sir Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me and all creatures

[234] *Theæt* What would he mean by making? He cannot be a husbandman—for you said that he is a maker of animals

Sir Yes and I say that he is also the maker of the sea and the earth and the heavens, and the gods and of all other things and further that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence

Theæt That must be a jest

Sir And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another at a small cost and in a short time is not that a jest?

Theæt Certainly

Sir And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?

Theæt Certainly not and imitation is a very comprehensive term which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things

Sir We know of course that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter and by the painter's art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children to whom he shows his pictures at a distance into the belief that he has the absolute power of making what ever he likes

Theæt Certainly

Sir And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?

Theæt Yes why should there not be another such art?

Sir But as time goes on and their hearers advance in years and come into closer contact with realities and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained so that the great appears small to them and the easy difficult and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?

Theæt. What do you mean? Speak more clearly.

Sir Do not expect clearness from me. For I who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one for I say not being. Do you understand?

Theæt. Yes.

Sir And a little while ago I said that not being is unutterable, unspeakable, undescribable do you follow?

Theæt. I do after a fashion.

Sir When I introduced the word "is," did I not contradict what I said before?

[239] *Theæt.* Clearly.

Sir And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one?

Theæt. Yes.

Sir And when I spoke of not-being as undescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular did I not refer to not-being as one?

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined as one or many and should not even be called "it," for the use of the word "it" would imply a form of unity.

Theæt. Quite true.

Sir How then, can any one put any faith in me? For now as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being but come, let us try the experiment with you.

Theæt. What do you mean?

Sir Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner without introducing into either existence or un-ty or plurality.

Theæt. It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you thus discomfited.

Sir Say no more of ourselves but until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be let out of his hole.

Theæt. Most true.

Sir And if we say to him that he professes an art of making appearances, he will grapple with us and exert our argument upon ourselves and when we call him an image-maker he will say Pray what do you mean at all by an image?

—and I should like to know Theætetus, how we can possibly answer the younger's question?

Theæt. We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplications.

Sir I see, Theætetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist.

Theæt. Why do you think so?

Sir He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none.

Theæt. What do you mean?

Sir When you tell him of some thing existing in a mirror or in sculpture, [240] and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all he will say that he is asking about an idea.

Theæt. What can he mean?

Sir The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak of as many and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your ground against him?

Theæt. How Stranger can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true?

Sir And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean?

Theæt. Certainly not another true thing but only a resemblance.

Sir And you mean by true that which really is?

Theæt. Yes.

Sir And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?

Theæt. Exactly.

Sir A resemblance, then, is not really real, if as you say not true?

Theæt. Nay but it is in a certain sense.

Sir You mean to say not in a true sense?

Theæt. Yes it is in reality only an image.

Sir Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal.

Theæt. In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved!

Sir Strange! I should think so. See how by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being.

Theæt. Yes, indeed, I see.

Sir The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.

Theæt. How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?

Sir When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory do we mean

say or think that falsehood really exists and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus the task is a difficult one

Theaet Why?

Sir He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not being for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But my boy in the days when I was a boy the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson—always repeating both in verse and out of verse

Keep your mind from this way of enquiry for never will you show that not being is

Such is his testimony which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?

Theaet Never mind about me. I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way and that you should take me with you.

Sir Very good and now say do we venture to utter the forbidden word not being?

Theaet Certainly we do.

Sir Let us be serious then and consider the question neither in strife nor play suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was asked

To what is the term not being to be applied?—do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply and what answer he would make to the enquirer?

Theaet That is a difficult question and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself.

Sir There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate not being is not applicable to any being.

Theaet None certainly.

Sir And if not to being then not to some thing?

Theaet Of course not.

Sir It is also plain that in speaking of some thing we speak of being for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.

Theaet Impossible.

Sir You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?

Theaet Yes.

Sir Some in the singular ($\tau\epsilon$) you would say is the sign of one some in the dual ($\tau\upsilon\epsilon$) of two some in the plural ($\tau\upsilon\epsilon\varsigma$) of many?

Theaet Exactly.

Sir Then he who says not something must

say absolutely nothing.

Theaet Most assuredly.

Sir And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says not being does not speak at all.

Theaet The difficulty of the argument can no further go.

[238] *Sir* Not yet my friend is the time for such a word for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest touching the very foundation of the matter.

Theaet What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.

Sir To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?

Theaet Certainly.

Sir But can anything which is be attributed to that which is not?

Theaet Impossible.

Sir And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?

Theaet Yes surely number if anything has a real existence.

Sir Then we must not attempt to attribute to not being number either in the singular or plural?

Theaet The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.

Sir But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?

Theaet How indeed?

Sir When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not being?

Theaet Certainly.

Sir But on the other hand when we say what is not do we not attribute unity?

Theaet Manifestly.

Sir Nevertheless we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not being?

Theaet Most true.

Sir Do you see then that not being in itself can neither be spoken uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable unutterable, unspeakable indescribable?

Theaet Quite true.

Sir But if so I was wrong in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.

Theaet What is there a greater still behind?

Sir Well I am surprised after what has been said already that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.

ed as self-evident, lest we may have fallen into some confusion and be too ready to assent to one another fancying that we are quite clear about them.

Theaet Say more distinctly what you mean

Sir I think that Parmenides and all who ever yet undertook to determine the number and nature of existences talked to us in rather a light and easy strain

Theaet How?

Sir As if we had been children to whom they repeated each his own mythus or story—one said that there were three principles and that one time there was war between certain of them and then again there was peace, and they were married and begat children and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles—a moist and a dry or a hot and a cold and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics however in our part of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature one this is their mythus, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is safer and to say that being is one and many and that these are held together by enmity and friendship ever parting or meeting as the severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace. [243] but admit a relaxation and alternation of them—peace and unity some times prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality and war by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine, but sages, antiquity and famous men should have reference and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them with out offence—

Theaet What thing?

Sir That they went on their several ways disdaining to not cease to perplex themselves they did not care whether they took us with them or left us behind them

Theaet How do you mean?

Sir I mean to say that when they talk of one, more elements which are or have become or rebecoming or again of heat mingling with cold summing some other part of the whole separation and mixture—tell me, Theaetetus do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I, a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what is meant by the term not being which is present subject of dispute and now you see

in what a fix we are about it.

Theaet I see

Sir And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity about being and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word we understand him quite easily although we do not know about not being. But we may be equally ignorant of both

Theaet I dare say

Sir And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned

Theaet True

Sir The consideration of most of them may be deferred but we had better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them

Theaet Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must first investigate what people mean by the word being

Sir You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right method I conceive will be to call into our presence the dualistic philosophers and to interrogate them. Come, we will say "Ye, who affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the universe, what is this term which you apply to both of them and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them are? How are we to understand the word are? Upon your view are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two—three in all and not two? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being and yet attribute being equally to both of them for if you did whichever of the two is identified with being will comprehend the other and so they will be one and not two

Theaet Very true

Sir But perhaps you mean to give the name of "being" to both of them together?

Theaet Quite likely

[244] *Sir* "Then friends," we shall reply to them the answer is plainly that the two will still be resolved into one.

Theaet Most true

Sir "Since then we are in a difficulty please to tell us what you mean when you speak of being—for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning whereas once thought that we understood you but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you when we entirely misunderstand you." There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question either of the dualists or of the pluralists?

that our soul is led by his art to think falsely or what do we mean?

Theæt There is nothing else to be said

Sir Again false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth—You would assent?

Theæt Certainly

Sir You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?

Theæt Of course

Sir Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?

Theæt Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible

Sir And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all?

Theæt Yes

Sir And here, again, is falsehood?

Theæt Falsehood—yes

Sir And in like manner a false proposition will be deemed to be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are and the existence of things which are not

Theæt There is no other way in which a false proposition can arise

[241] *Sir* There is not but the Sophist will deny these statements. And indeed how can any rational man assent to them when the very expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable unspeakable indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his point *Theætetus*?

Theæt Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion that falsehood exists in opinion and in words for in maintaining this we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not being which we admitted just now to be an utter impossibility

Sir How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious

Theæt They are indeed

Sir We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite

Theæt If that is the case we cannot possibly catch the Sophist

Sir Shall we then be so faint hearted as to give him up?

Theæt Certainly not I should say if we can get the slightest hold upon him

Sir Will you then forgive me and as your words imply not be altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?

Theæt To be sure I will

Sir I have a yet more urgent request to make

Theæt Which is—?

Sir That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide

Theæt And why?

Sir Because in self defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense not being is, and that being on the other hand is not

Theæt Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed

Sir Yes a blind man, as they say might see that and unless these questions are decided in one way or another no one when he speaks of false words or false opinion or idols or images or imitations or appearances or about the arts which are concerned with them can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions

Theæt Most true

[242] *Sir* And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's argument for if I am to be over scrupulous I shall have to give the matter up

Theæt Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so

Sir I have a third little request which I wish to make

Theæt What is it?

Sir You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel—that I have no heart for this argument?

Theæt I did

Sir I tremble at the thought of what I have said and expect that you will deem me mad when you hear of my sudden changes and shifts let me therefore observe that I am examining the question entirely out of regard for you

Theæt There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any impropriety to you if you attempt this refutation and proof take heart therefore, and proceed

Sir And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I must take is—

Theæt Which?—Let me hear

Sir I think that we had better first of all consider the points which at present are regard

Sir We are far from having exhausted the most exact thinkers who treat of being and not being. But let us be content to leave them, [46] and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being.

Theæt. Then now we will go to the others.

Sir There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them: they are fighting with one another about the nature of existence.

Theæt. How is that?

Sir Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they denote being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

Theæt. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

Sir And that is the reason why their opposites enviously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, manfully contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas: the bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the only truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the two armies, Theætetus, there is always an endless combat raging concerning these matters.

Theæt. True.

Sir Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

Theæt. How shall we get it out of them?

Sir Which those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty: for they are civil people enough: but there will be very great difficulty or rather an absolute impossibility in getting an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?

Theæt. What?

Sir Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and when their opinion will be more worth having, or that which better men acknowledged has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are not re-

specters of persons, but seekers after truth.

Theæt. Very good.

Sir Then now on the supposition that they are improved, let us ask them to state their views, and do you interpret them.

Theæt. Agreed.

Sir Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

Theæt. Of course they would.

Sir And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?

Theæt. Certainly they do.

Sir Meaning to say the soul is something which exists?

[27] Theæt. True.

Sir And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the possession of justice and wisdom, and the opposite under opposite circumstances?

Theæt. Yes, they do.

Sir But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir And, allowing that justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and their opposites exist, as well as a soul in which they inhere, do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?

Theæt. They would say that hardly any of them are visible.

Sir And would they say that they are corporeal?

Theæt. They would distinguish the soul would be said by them to have a body: but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal.

Sir Verily Theætetus, I perceive a great improvement in them: the real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been deterred by no shame at all, but would have obstinately asserted that nothing in which they are not able to squeeze in their hands.

Theæt. That is pretty much their notion.

Sir Let us push the question: for if they will admit that any even the smallest particle of being is incorporeal, it is enough they must then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have in their mind's eye when they say of both

Theæt Certainly not

Sir And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all—must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by being?

Theæt By all means

Sir Then let them answer this question: One you say alone is? Yes they will reply

Theæt True

Sir And there is something which you call being?

Theæt Yes

Sir And is being the same as one and do you apply two names to the same thing?

Theæt What will be their answer, Stranger?

Sir It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question

Theæt Why so?

Sir To admit of two names and to affirm that there is nothing but unity is surely ridiculous?

Theæt Certainly

Sir And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?

Theæt How so?

Sir To distinguish the name from the thing implies duality

Theæt Yes

Sir And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be compelled to say that it is the name of nothing or if he says that it is the name of something even then the name will only be the name of a name and of nothing else

Theæt True

Sir And the one will turn out to be only one of one and being absolute unity will represent a mere name

Theæt Certainly

Sir And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is or the same with it?

Theæt To be sure they would and they actually say so

Sir If being is a whole as Parmenides sings,—
Every way like unto the fullness of a well rounded sphere

*Evenly balanced from the centre on every side
And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way*

Neither on this side nor on that—

then being has a centre and extremes and having these must also have parts

Theæt True

[245] *Sir* Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts and in this way being all and a whole may be one?

Theæt Certainly

Sir But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?

Theæt Why not?

Sir Because, according to right reason that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible

Theæt Certainly

Sir But this indivisible if made up of many parts will contradict reason

Theæt I understand

Sir Shall we say that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?

Theæt That is a hard alternative to offer

Sir Most true for being having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one and the all is therefore more than one

Theæt Yes

Sir And yet if being be not a whole though having the attribute of unity and there be such a thing, as an absolute whole being lacks some thing of its own nature?

Theæt Certainly

Sir Upon this view again being having a defect of being will become not being?

Theæt True

Sir And again the all becomes more than one for being and the whole will each have their separate nature

Theæt Yes

Sir But if the whole does not exist at all all the previous difficulties remain the same and there will be the further difficulty that besides having no being being can never have come into being

Theæt Why so?

Sir Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole so that he who does not give whole a place among beings cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing

Theæt Yes that certainly appears to be true

Sir Again how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of that quantity

Theæt Exactly

Sir And there will be innumerable other points each of them causing infinite trouble him who says that being is either one or two

Theæt The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this for one objection connects with another and they are always involving what has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity

SOPHIST

and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Sr. Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere?

Theæt. No.

Sr. And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet venture to speak confidently about anything?

Theæt. Yes, with all our might.

Sr. Then the philosopher who has the truest reference for these qualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms, and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say entreatingly "Give us both," so he will include both the mobile and immovable in his definition of being and not-being.

Theæt. Most true.

Sr. And now do we seem to have gained a false notion of being?

Theæt. Yes truly.

Sr. Was, Theætetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it.

Theæt. What do you mean?

Sr. O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?

Theæt. I certainly thought that we were, and I do not at all understand how we never found out our desperate case.

[250] *Sr.* Reflect after having made these admissions, may we not be justly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those who said that all was hot and cold?

Theæt. What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?

Sr. To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting the same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on.

Theæt. True.

Sr. Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?

Theæt. Of course.

Sr. And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?

Theæt. I should.

Sr. And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Sr. Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?

Theæt. Of course not.

Sr. Then you conceive of being as something and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are alike included, and, observing that they both participate in being, you declare that they are.

Theæt. Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third thing when we say that rest and motion are.

Sr. Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them.

Theæt. So it would appear.

Sr. Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest.

Theæt. That is very much the truth.

Sr. Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind?

Theæt. Where, indeed?

Sr. I scarcely think that he can look any where for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion, but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible?

Theæt. Utterly impossible.

Sr. Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.

Theæt. What?

Sr. When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty—do you remember?

Theæt. To be sure.

Sr. And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?

Theæt. I should say. Stranger that we are in one which is, if possible, even greater.

Sr. Then let us acknowledge the difficulty, and as being and not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly [251] the other will equally appear, and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of steering our way in between them, without any great discredit.

Theæt. Very good.

Sr. Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of the same thing.

Theæt. Give an example.

Sr. I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many names—that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having numberless other attributes, and in the same way any

of them that they are. Perhaps they may be in a difficulty, and if this is the case there is a possibility that they may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of being having nothing of their own to offer.

Theaet. What is the notion? Tell me, and we shall soon see.

Sir. My notion would be that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another or to be affected by another if only for a single moment however trifling the cause and how ever slight the effect has real existence and I hold that the definition of being is simply power.

Theaet. They accept your suggestion having nothing better of their own to offer.

Sir. Very good perhaps we as well as they may one day change our minds [248] but for the present, this may be regarded as the understanding which is established with them.

Theaet. Agreed.

Sir. Let us now go to the friends of ideas of their opinions too you shall be the interpreter.

Theaet. I will.

Sir. To them we say—You would distinguish essence from generation?

Theaet. Yes they reply.

Sir. And you would allow that we participate in generation with the body and through perception but we participate with the soul through thought in true essence and essence you would affirm to be always the same and immutable whereas generation or becoming varies?

Theaet. Yes that is what we should affirm.

Sir. Well fair sirs we say to them what is this participation which you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition?

Theaet. What definition?

Sir. We said that being was an active or passive energy, arising out of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one another. Perhaps your ears *Theaetetus* may fail to catch their answer which I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it.

Theaet. And what is their answer?

Sir. They deny the truth of what we were just now saying to the aborigines about existence.

Theaet. What was that?

Sir. Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being?

Theaet. True.

Sir. They deny this and say that the power of doing or suffering is confined to becoming and that neither power is applicable to being.

Theaet. And is there not some truth in what they say?

Sir. Yes but our reply will be that we want to ascertain from them more distinctly whether they further admit that the soul knows and that being or essence is known.

Theaet. There can be no doubt that they say so.

Sir. And is knowing and being known doing, or suffering or both or is the one doing and the other suffering or has neither any share in either?

Theaet. Clearly neither has any share in either for if they say anything else, they will contradict themselves.

Sir. I understand but they will allow that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being in so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge and is therefore in motion for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm.

Theaet. True.

[249] *Sir.* And O heavens can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?

Theaet. That would be a dreadful thing to admit. Stranger.

Sir. But shall we say that being has mind and not life?

Theaet. How is that possible?

Sir. Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being but that it has no soul which contains them?

Theaet. And in what other way can it contain them?

Sir. Or that being has mind and life and soul but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved?

Theaet. All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.

Sir. Under being then, we must include motion and that which is moved.

Theaet. Certainly.

Sir. Then *Theaetetus* our inference is, that if there is no motion neither is there any mind anywhere or about anything or belonging to any one.

Theaet. Quite true.

Sir. And yet this equally follows if we grant that all things are in motion—upon this view too mind has no existence.

Theaet. How so?

Sir. Do you think that sameness of condition

and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Sir. Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere?

Theæt. No.

Sir. And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind and yet ventures to speak confidently about anything.

Theæt. Yes, with all our might.

Sir. Then the philosopher who has the truest reverence for these qualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms, and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say entreatingly to us both, so he will include both the movable and immovable in his definition of being and all.

Theæt. Most true.

Sir. And now do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being?

Theæt. Yes truly.

Sir. Alas, *Theætetus*, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it.

Theæt. What do you mean?

Sir. O my friend do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?

Theæt. I certainly thought that we were and I do not at all understand how we not to found out our desperate case.

{250} *Sir.* Reflect, after having made these admissions, may we not be justly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those who said that all was hot and cold?

Theæt. What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?

Sir. To be sure I will and I will remind you of them by putting the same questions to you which I did to them and then we shall get on.

Theæt. True.

Sir. Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposit one to one another?

Theæt. Of course.

Sir. And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?

Theæt. I should.

Sir. And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Sir. Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?

Theæt. Of course not.

Sir. Then you conceive of being as something and distinct nature under which rest and motion are alike included and observing that they both participate in being you declare that they are.

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Theæt Certainly.

Str Then *Theætetus* our inference is, that if there is no motion neither is there any mind anywhere or about anything or belonging to any one.

Theæt Quite true.

Str And yet this equally follows if we grant that all things are in motion—upon this view too mind has no existence.

Theæt How so?

Str Do you think that sameness of condition

Theæt. True.

Sr. But does every one know what letters will mix with what. Or is art required in order to do so?

Theæt. Art is required.

Sr. What art?

Theæt. The art of grammar.

Sr. And is not this also true of sounds high and low — is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is ignorant, not a musician?

Theæt. Yes.

Sr. And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art.

Theæt. Of course.

Sr. And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will mix and what will not, proceed by the help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if we connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible?

Theæt. To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.

Sr. How are we to call it? By Zeus, he has we are lighted unwittingly upon our feet and solve science, and in looking for the Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unwittingly?

Theæt. What do you mean?

Sr. Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?

Theæt. That is what we should say.

Sr. Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is one to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form kind together into a single whole and perceiving many such wholes, and many forms, exist only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

Theæt. Quite true.

Sr. And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?

Theæt. Who but he can be worthy?

Sr. In this region we shall always discover the philosopher if we look for him like the

Sophist [254] he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

Theæt. For what reason?

Sr. Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?

Theæt. It seems to be so.

Sr. And the philosopher always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.

Theæt. Yes, that seems to be quite as true as the other.

Sr. Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.

Theæt. Very good.

Sr. Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being we may at least not fall short in the consideration of them, so far as they concern within the scope of the present enquiry. If peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed.

Theæt. We must do so.

Sr. The most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning — being, and rest and motion.

Theæt. Yes, by far.

Sr. And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another.

Theæt. Quite incapable.

Sr. Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?

Theæt. Of course.

Sr. That makes up three of them.

Theæt. To be sure.

Sr. And each of these is other than the remaining two but the same with itself.

Theæt. True.

thing else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many and under many names

Theæt. That is true.

Sir. And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros whether young or old for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many or the many one and great is their delight in denying that a man is good, for man they insist is man and good is good I dare say that you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters—they are often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs which they believe to be the height of wisdom

Theæt. Certainly I have

Sir. Then not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being let us put our questions to them as well as to our former friends

Theæt. What questions?

Sir. Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or anything to anything and assume that they do not mingle and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things communicable and others not?—Which of these alternatives, *Theætetus* will they prefer?

Theæt. I have nothing to answer on their behalf Suppose that you take all these hypotheses in turn and see what are the consequences which follow from each of them

Sir. Very good and first let us assume them to say that nothing is capable of participating in anything else in any respect [252] in that case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all

Theæt. They cannot

Sir. But would either of them be if not participating in being?

Theæt. No

Sir. Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned as well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting kinds for all these add on a notion of being some affirming that things are truly in motion, and others that they are truly at rest

Theæt. Just so

Sir. Again those who would at one time compound and at another resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating infinity or dividing them into finite elements and forming compounds out of these

whether they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous would be talking nonsense in all this if there were no admixture.

Theæt. True

Sir. Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want to carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything because participating in some affection from another by the name of that other

Theæt. Why so?

Sir. Why because they are compelled to use the words to be apart from others and itself and ten thousand more which they cannot give up but must make the connecting links of discourse and therefore they do not require to be refuted by others but their enemy as the saying is inhabits the same house with them they are always carrying about with them an adversary, like the wonderful ventriloquist *Eurycles* who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them

Theæt. Precisely so a very true and exact illustration

Sir. And now if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another—what will follow?

Theæt. Even I can solve that riddle

Sir. How?

Theæt. Why because motion itself would be at rest and rest again in motion if they could be attributed to one another

Sir. But this is utterly impossible

Theæt. Of course

Sir. Then only the third hypothesis remains

Theæt. True

Sir. For surely either all things have communion with all or nothing with any other thing or some things communicate with some things and others not

Theæt. Certainly

Sir. And two out of these three suppositions have been found to be impossible

Theæt. Yes

Sir. Every one then who desires to answer truly will adopt the third and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some.

Theæt. Quite true

[253] *Sir.* This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters for some letters do not fit each other while others do

Theæt. Of course.

Sir. And the vowels especially are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another

Sir Then, according to this view motion is other and also not other?

Theæt. True.

Sir What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than the three and not other than the fourth—for we agreed that there are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make enquiry?

Theæt. Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it appeared to be just now.

Sir Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than being?

Theæt. Without the least fear.

Sir The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?

Theæt. Nothing can be plainer.

Sir Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class, for the nature of the other entering into them all makes each of them other than being, and so non-existent and therefore of all of them in like manner we may truly say that they are not, and again inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.

Theæt. So we may assume.

Sir Every class, then, has plurality of being, and infinity of not being.

[257] *Theæt.* So we must infer.

Sir And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many other things as it is not for not being these things is itself one and is not the other things, which are infinite in number.

Theæt. That is not far from the truth.

Sir And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the nature of classes to have communion with one another and if any one denies our present statement [viz. that being is not, etc.] let him first argue with our former conclusion [i.e. respecting the communion of ideas] and then he may proceed to argue with what follows.

Theæt. Nothing can be farther.

Sir Let me ask you to consider a further question.

Theæt. What question?

Sir When we speak of not-being we speak I suppose, not of something opposed to being but only different.

Theæt. What do you mean?

Sir When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Sir The negative particles, ν and μ , when prefixed to words, do not imply opposition but only difference from the words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words which follow them.

Theæt. Quite true.

Sir There is another point to be considered if you do not object.

Theæt. What is it?

Sir The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions I believe.

Theæt. How so?

Sir Knowledge like the other is one and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them their own particular nature and hence there are many arts and kinds of knowledge.

Theæt. Quite true.

Sir And is not the case the same with the parts of the other which is also one?

Theæt. Very likely but will you tell me how?

Sir There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

Theæt. There is.

Sir Shall we say that this has or has not a name?

Theæt. It has for whatever we call not beautiful is other than the beautiful not than something else.

Sir And now tell me another thing.

Theæt. What?

Sir Is the not beautiful anything, but this—an existence parted off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of view opposed to an existing something?

Theæt. True.

Sir Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being?

Theæt. Very true.

Sir But upon this view is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?

Theæt. Not at all.

[258] *Sir* And the not great may be said to exist equally with the great?

Theæt. Yes.

Sir And in the same way the just must be placed in the same category with the not just—the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.

Theæt. True.

Sir The same may be said of other things, seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.

Theæt. Of course.

Sir Then as would appear the opposition of

Sir But then what is the meaning of these two words, same and other? Are they two new kinds other than the three and yet always of necessity intermingling with them and are we to have five kinds instead of three or when we speak of the same and other [255] are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds?

Theaet Very likely we are

Sir But, surely motion and rest are neither the other nor the same

Theaet How is that?

Sir Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common cannot be either of them

Theaet Why not?

Sir Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion for either of them being predicated of both will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature because partaking of its opposite

Theaet Quite true

Sir Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?

Theaet Yes

Sir Then we must not assert that motion any more than rest is either the same or the other

Theaet No we must not

Sir But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?

Theaet Possibly

Sir But if they are identical then again in saying that motion and rest have being we should also be saying that they are the same

Theaet Which surely cannot be

Sir Then being and the same cannot be one

Theaet Scarcely

Sir Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class which is now to be added to the three others

Theaet Quite true

Sir And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class?

Theaet Very likely

Sir But you would agree if I am not mistaken that existences are relative as well as absolute?

Theaet Certainly

Sir And the other is always relative to other?

Theaet True

Sir But this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed for if the other like being were absolute as well as relative then there would have been a kind of other which was not other than other And now we

find that what is other must of necessity be what it is in relation to some other

Theaet That is the true state of the case

Sir Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected classes

Theaet Yes

Sir And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another not by reason of their own nature but because they partake of the idea of the other

Theaet Quite true.

Sir Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the five

Theaet How?

Sir First there is motion which we affirm to be absolutely other than rest what else can we say?

Theaet It is so

Sir And therefore is not rest

Theaet Certainly not

Sir And yet is because partaking of being

[256] *Theaet* True

Sir Again motion is other than the same?

Theaet Just so

Sir And is therefore not the same.

Theaet It is not

Sir Yet surely motion is the same, because all things partake of the same

Theaet Very true

Sir Then we must admit and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms same and not the same in the same sense but we call it the same in relation to itself because partaking of the same and not the same because having communion with the other it is thereby severed from the same and has become not that but other and is therefore rightly spoken of as not the same

Theaet To be sure

Sir And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary

Theaet Quite right—that is on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another and others not

Sir That such a communion of kinds is according to nature we had already proved before we arrived at this part of our discussion

Theaet Certainly

Sir Let us proceed then May we not say that motion is other than the other having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?

Theaet That is certain

Cl. supra 252

Theæt. Why so?

Sir Why that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of being, for if we could not the worst of all consequences would follow: we should have no philosophy. Moreover the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment: if utterly deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

Theæt. Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.

Sir Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.

Theæt. What explanation?

Sir Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes diffused over all being.

Theæt. True.

Sir And thence arises the question whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.

Theæt. How so?

Sir If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible: for to think or to say what is not—is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

Theæt. That is quite true.

Sir And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit.

Theæt. Yes.

Sir And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.

Theæt. To be sure.

Sir Into that region on the Sophist, as we said, made his escape; and when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood: no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood; as much as not-being did not in any way partake of being.

Theæt. True.

Sir And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being; and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction; but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and phantasmagoria, in which I have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being; and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And,

with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find it can we may find also that they have communion with not-being { 61 } and having made out the connection of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.

Theæt. Certainly. Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist, but at first that he was of a class not easily caught; for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man himself. And even now we have with difficulty got through his first defence, which is the not-being of not-being; and lo! here is another; for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of language and opinion; and there will be another and another line of defence without end.

Sir Any one Theætetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer for what would he who is dispirited at a false progress do if he were making none at all, or even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart as the proverb says, will never take a city; but now that we have succeeded thus far the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier.

Theæt. Very true.

Sir Then as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both altogether true, and neither of them either false.

Theæt. True.

Sir Then now let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected.

Theæt. And what is the question at issue about names?

Sir The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.

Theæt. Clearly the last is true.

Sir I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected?

Theæt. What are you saying?

Sir What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of

a part of the other and of a part of being to one another is if I may venture to say so as truly essence as being itself and implies not the opposite of being but only what is other than being

Theaet Beyond question

Sir What then shall we call it?

Theaet Clearly not being and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search

Sir And has not this as you were saying as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found to be great and the beautiful beautiful and the not great not great and the not beautiful not beautiful in the same manner not being has been found to be and is not being and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being. Do you *Theaetetus* still feel any doubt of this?

Theaet None whatever

Sir Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides prohibition?

Theaet In what?

Sir We have advanced to a further point and shown him more than he forbade us to investigate

Theaet How is that?

Sir Why because he says—

Not being never is and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of enquiry

Theaet Yes he says so

Sir Whereas we have not only proved that things which are not are but we have shown what form of being not being is for we have shown that the nature of the other is and is distributed over all things in their relations to one another and whatever part of the other is contrasted with being this is precisely what we have ventured to call not being

Theaet And surely Stranger we were quite right

Sir Let not any one say then that while affirming the opposition of not being to being we still assert the being of not being for as to whether there is an opposite of being to that enquiry we have long said good bye—it may or may not be [259] and may or may not be capable of definition. But as touching our present account of not being let a man either convince us of error, or so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying that there is a communion of classes and that being and difference or

other traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate so that the other partakes of being and by reason of this participation is and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other and being other than being it is clearly a necessity that not being should be. And again being through partaking of the other becomes a class other than the remaining classes and being other than all of them is not each one of them and is not all the rest, so that undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not and all other things whether regarded individually or collectively in many respects are and in many respects are not

Theaet True

Sir And he who is sceptical of this contradiction must think how he can find something better to say or if he sees a puzzle and his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to him that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties for there is no charm in such puzzles and there is no difficulty in detecting them but we can tell him of something else the pursuit of which is noble and also difficult

Theaet What is it?

Sir A thing of which I have already spoken—letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty he should be able to follow and criticize in detail every argument and when a man says that the same is in a manner other or that other is the same to understand and refute him from his own point of view and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other or the other same or the great small or the like unlike and to delight in always bringing forward such contradictions is no real refutation but is clearly the new born babe of some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being

Theaet To be sure

Sir For certainly my friend the attempt to separate all existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an educated or philosophical mind

Theaet Why so?

Sir The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning [260] for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attempt to discourse of reason

Theaet True

Sir And observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one thing mingles with another

Theæt. Unquestionably.

Sir. And it would be no sentence at all if here were no subject for as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.

Theæt. Quite true.

Sir. When other then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.

Theæt. Most true.

Sir. And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false.

Theæt. How so?

Sir. You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.

Theæt. Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.

Sir. Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?

Theæt. Quite true.

Sir. But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?

Theæt. True.

Sir. And we know that there exists a speech.

Theæt. What exists?

Sir. Affirmation.

[264] *Theæt.* Yes, we know it.

Sir. When the affirmation or denial takes place in silence and in the mind only has it you any other name by which to call it but opinion?

Theæt. There can be no other name.

Sir. And when opinion is presented, not simply but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination?

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir. And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and opinion the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language, should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth.

Theæt. Certainly.

Sir. Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected—For just now it seemed to be an undertaking, a task which would never be accomplished.

Theæt. I perceive.

Sir. Then let us not be discouraged about the

future but now having made this discovery let us go back to our previous classification.

Theæt. What classification?

Sir. We divided image-making into two sorts the one likeness-making, the other imaginative or phantastic.

Theæt. True.

Sir. And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist.

Theæt. We did say so.

Sir. And our heads began to go round more and more when it was asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as falsehood.

Theæt. True.

Sir. And now since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.

Theæt. Quite possible.

Sir. And we have already admitted in what preceded that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?

Theæt. Yes.

Sir. Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class, always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties. [265] and reached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits.

Theæt. Very good.

Sir. You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into creative and acquisitive.

Theæt. Yes.

Sir. And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandise and the like.

Theæt. Very true.

Sir. But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the art of creation for imitation is a kind of creation—of images however as we said firm, and not of real things.

Theæt. Quite true.

Sir. In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.

Theæt. What are they?

Sir. One of them is human and the other divine.

Theæt. I do not follow.

Sir. Every power as you may remember our

intimation of being which are given by the voice

Theaet What are they?

Str One of them is called nouns and the other verbs

Theaet Describe them

[262] *Str* That which denotes action we call a verb

Theaet True

Str And the other which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions we call a noun

Theaet Quite true

Str A succession of nouns only is not a sentence any more than of verbs without nouns

Theaet I do not understand you

Str I see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse

Theaet What do you mean?

Str I mean that words like walks runs sleeps or any other words which denote action however many of them you string together do not make discourse

Theaet How can they?

Str Or again when you say lion, stag horse or any other words which denote agents—neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse for there is no express on of action or inaction or of the existence of existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds until verbs are mingled with nouns then the words fit and the smallest combination of them forms language and is the simplest and least form of discourse

Theaet Again I ask What do you mean?

Str When any one says A man learns should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?

Theaet Yes

Str Yes for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is or is becoming or has become or will be. And he not only names but he does something by connecting verbs with nouns and therefore we say that he discourses and to this connection of words we give the name of discourse

Theaet True

Str And as there are some things which fit one another and other things which do not fit so there are some vocal signs which do and others which do not combine and form discourse

Theaet Quite true

Str There is another small matter

Theaet What is it?

Str A sentence must and cannot help having a subject

Theaet True

Str And must be of a certain quality

Theaet Certainly

Str And now let us mind what we are about.

Theaet We must do so

Str I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined by the help of a noun and a verb and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks

Theaet I will to the best of my power

[263] *Str* Theaetetus sits—not a very long sentence

Theaet Not very

Str Of whom does the sentence speak and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell

Theaet Of me I am the subject

Str Or this sentence again—

Theaet What sentence?

Str Theaetetus with whom I am now speaking is flying

Theaet That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me and to apply to me

Str We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality

Theaet Yes

Str And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?

Theaet The one as I imagine is false and the other true

Str The true says what is true about you?

Theaet Yes

Str And the false says what is other than true?

Theaet Yes

Str And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?

Theaet True

Str And says that things are real of you which are not for as we were saying in regard to each thing or person there is much that is and much that is not

Theaet Quite true

Str The second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition

Theaet Yes this was implied in our recent admission

Str And in the second place, it related to a subject?

Theaet Yes

Str Who must be you and can be nobody else?

Theæt. Yes.

Sir Let this, then, be named the art of imitation and this the province assigned to it: as for the other division, we are weary and will give thee up, leaving, to some one else the duty of naming the class and giving it a suitable name.

Theæt. Let us do as you say—assign a sphere to each and leave the other.

Sir There is a further division, *Theætetes*, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.

Theæt. Let me hear.

Sir There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know and what line of instruction can there possibly be greater than that which divines ignorance from knowledge?

Theæt. There can be no greater.

Sir Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?

Theæt. Naturally.

Sir And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many have no knowledge of either but only a sort of opinion, do let her to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed.

Theæt. Yes, that is very common.

Sir And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?

Theæt. The very opposite.

Sir Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator—to be distinguished from the other as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows.

Theæt. True.

Sir Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task for among the ancients there was some confusion of words, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation or appearance—that which coexists with science, scientific or learned imitation.

Theæt. Granted.

Sir The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

Theæt. I see true.

Sir Let us, then, examine our imitator of ap-

pearance, and see whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him.

Theæt. Let us examine him.

Sir Indeed there is a very considerable crack for if you look, you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature, [63] who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies the other sort has knowledge about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

Theæt. There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

Sir Shall we regard one as the simple imitator—the other as the dissembling, or ironical imitator?

Theæt. Very good.

Sir And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?

Theæt. Answer yourself.

Sir Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two: there is the dissembler who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, and the dissembler who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

Theæt. What you say is most true.

Sir And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the statesman or the popular orator?

Theæt. The latter.

Sir And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?

Theæt. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is ignorant but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word *wisdom*. What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist.

Sir Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?

Theæt. By all means.

Sir He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows—who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of phantasia which is a branch of image-making in so that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine—any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.

Theæt. Undoubtedly.

saying originally, which causes things to exist not previously existing was defined by us as creative

Theæt I remember

Str Looking now, at the world and all the animals and plants at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots as well as at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth fusile or non fusile shall we say that they come into existence—not having existed previously—by the creation of God or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them?

Theæt What is it?

Str The opinion that nature brings them in to being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?

Theæt I dare say that owing to my youth I may often waver in my view but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to God I defer to your authority

Str Nobly said *Theætetus* and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind I would have gently argued with you and forced you to assent but as I perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which as you say attracts you I will not forestall the work of time Let me suppose then that things which are said to be made by nature are the work of divine art and that things which are made by man out of these are work of human art And so there are two kinds of making and production the one human and the other divine

Theæt True

Str Then now subdivide each of the two sections which we have already

Theæt How do you mean?

[266] *Str* I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of production or invention as you have already made a lateral one

Theæt I have done so

Str Then now there are in all four parts or segments—two of them have reference to us and are human and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine

Theæt True

Str And again in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way one part in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves but the two remaining parts may be called the making of likenesses and so the productive art is again divided into two parts

Theæt Tell me the divisions once more.

Str I suppose that we and the other animals, and the elements out of which things are made—fire water and the like—are known by us to be each and all the creation and work of God

Theæt True

Str And there are images of them, which are not them but which correspond to them and these are also the creation of a wonderful skill

Theæt What are they?

Str The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire or the reflection which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their surface with an external light and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight

Theæt Yes and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine hand

Str And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building and another by the art of drawing which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?

Theæt Quite true

Str And other products of human creation are also twofold and go in pairs there is the thing with which the art of making the thing is concerned and the image with which imitation is concerned

Theæt Now I begin to understand and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production and each of them twofold in the lateral division there is both a divine and a human production in the vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes

Str And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part was to have been likeness-making and the other phantastic if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being

Theæt Yes

Str And this appeared to be the case and therefore now without hesitation we shall number the different kinds as two

Theæt True

[267] *Str* Then now let us again divide the phantastic art.

Theæt Where shall we make the division?

Str There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument

Theæt What do you mean?

Str When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.

Thæst. Yet.

So Let this, then, be named the art of imitation, and this the province assigned to it: as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of naming the class and giving it a suitable name.

Thæst. Let us do as you say—assign a sphere to the one and leave the other.

So There is a further distinction, *Thæstetis*, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.

Thæst. Let me hear.

So There are some who imitate, knowing, and they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?

Thæst. There can be no greater.

So Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure.

Thæst. Naturally.

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Sir Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?

Theæt. Naturally.

Sir And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many having no knowledge of either but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed?

Theæt. Yes, that is very common.

Sir And do they always fail in their attempt to be both right just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?

Theæt. The very opposite.

Sir Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator—to be distinguished from the other as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?

Theæt. True.

Sir Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance—that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation.

Theæt. Granted.

Sir The former is our present concern for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed but not among those who have knowledge.

Theæt. Very true.

Sir Let us, then, examine our imitator of ap-

pearance, and see whether he is sound like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him.

Theæt. Let us examine him.

Sir Indeed there is a very considerable crack for if you look, you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature, [68] who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies the other sort has knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

Theæt. There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

Sir Shall we regard one as the simple imitator—the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?

Theæt. Very good.

Sir And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?

Theæt. Answer yourself.

Sir Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two there is the dissembler who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech and the dissembler who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

Theæt. What you say is most true.

Sir And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the statesman or the popular orator?

Theæt. The latter.

Sir And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?

Theæt. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is ignorant but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word σοφός. What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist.

Sir Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?

Theæt. By all means.

Sir He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows—who belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction is an imitator of appearance and is separated from the class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human and not divine—any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.

Theæt. Undoubtedly.

STATESMAN

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE THEODORUS SOCRATES THE ELEATIC STRANGER
THE YOUNGER SOCRATES



[257] *Socrates* I owe you many thanks indeed Theodorus for the acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger

Theodorus And in a little while Socrates you will owe me three times as many when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and of the Philosopher as well as of the Sophist

Soc Sophist statesman philosopher! O my dear Theodorus do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?

Theod What do you mean Socrates?

Soc I mean that you rate them all at the same value whereas they are really separated by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express

Theod By Ammon the god of Cyrene Socrates that is a very fair hit and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry I will retaliate on you at some other time but I must now ask the Stranger who will not I hope tire of his goodness to us to proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher whichever he prefers

Stranger That is my duty Theodorus having begun I must go on and not leave the work unfinished But what shall be done with Theaetetus?

Theod In what respect?

Str Shall we relieve him and take his companion the Young Socrates instead of him? What do you advise?

Theod Yes give the other a turn, as you propose The young always do better when they have intervals of rest

[258] *Soc* I think Stranger that both of them may be said to be in some way related to me for the one as you affirm has the cut of my ugly face¹ the other is called by my name And we should always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his conversation I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday and I have just been listening to his answers my namesake I have not yet examined but I must Another time will do for me to-day let him answer you

Str Very good Young Socrates do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?

Young Socrates I do

Str And do you agree to his proposal?

Y Soc Certainly

Str As you do not object still less can I After the Sophist then I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of enquiry And please to say whether he too should be ranked among those who have science

Y Soc Yes

Str Then the sciences must be divided as before?

Y Soc I dare say

Str But yet the division will not be the same?

Y Soc How then?

Str They will be divided at some other point.

Y Soc Yes

Str Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find and separate off and set our seal upon this and we will set the mark of another class upon all diverging paths Thus the soul will conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.

Cf. *Theaetetus* 143.

Y Soc To find the path is your business
Stranger and not mine.

Soc Yes, Socrates, but the discovery when
once made, must be yours as well as mine

Y Soc Very good

Soc Well, and are not arithmetic and certain
other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge,
wholly separated from action?

Y Soc True.

Soc But in the art of carpentering and all
other handicrafts, the knowledge of the work-
man is merged in his work—he not only knows,
but he also makes things which previously did
not exist.

Y Soc Certainly

Soc Then let us divide sciences in general in
to those which are practical and those which
are purely intellectual

Y Soc Let us assume these two divisions of
science, which is one whole.

Soc And are statesman “king” master
or householder one and the same or is there
a science or art answering to each of these names?
Or rather allow me to put the matter in another
way

[259] *Y Soc* Let me hear

Soc If any one who is in a private station has
the skill to advise one of the public physicians,
must not he also be called a physician?

Y Soc Yes

Soc And if any one who is in a private sta-
tion is able to advise the ruler of a country, may
not he be said to have the knowledge which the
ruler himself ought to have?

Y Soc True

Soc But surely the science of a true king is
royal science?

Y Soc Yes

Soc And will not he who possesses this knowl-
edge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a pri-
vate man when regarded only in reference to
his art, be truly called royal?

Y Soc He certainly ought to be

Soc And the householder and master are the
same?

Y Soc Of course

Soc Again a large household may be com-
pared to a small state—will they differ at all
as far as government is concerned?

Y Soc They will not

Soc Then returning to the point which we
were just now discussing, do we not clearly see
that there is one science of all of them, and this
science may be called either royal or political or
common, will not quarrel with any one
about the name.

Y Soc Certainly not.

Soc This, too, is evident that the king cannot
do much with his hands or with his whole
body towards the maintenance of his empire
compared with what he does by the intelligence
and strength of his mind

Y Soc Clearly not

Soc Then shall we say that the king has a
greater affinity to knowledge than to manual
arts and to practical life in general?

Y Soc Certainly he has

Soc Then we may put all together as one and
the same—statesmanship and the statesman—
the kingly science and the king

Y Soc Clearly

Soc And now we shall only be proceeding in
due order if we go on to divide the sphere of
knowledge?

Y Soc Very good

Soc Think whether you can find any point
or parting in knowledge

Y Soc Tell me of what sort

Soc Such as this: You may remember that we
made an art of calculation?

Y Soc Yes

Soc Which was unmistakably one of the
arts of knowledge?

Y Soc Certainly

Soc And to this art of calculation which dis-
cerns the differences of numbers shall we as-
sign any other function except to pass judg-
ment on their differences?

Y Soc How could we?

Soc You know that the master builder does
not work himself but is the ruler of workmen?

Y Soc Yes

Soc He contributes knowledge not manual
labour?

Y Soc True

[260] *Soc* And may therefore be justly said to
share in theoretical science?

Y Soc Quite true.

Soc But he ought not, like the calculator, to
regard his functions as at an end when he has
formed a judgment—he must assign to the in-
dividual workmen the appropriate task until
they have completed the work

Y Soc True

Soc Are not all such sciences, no less than
arithmetic and the like, subjects of pure knowl-
edge and is not the difference between the two
classes that the one sort has the power of judg-
ing only and the other of ruling as well?

Y Soc That is evident

Soc May we not very properly say that of all
knowledge, there are two divisions—one which

rules, and the other which judges?

Y Soc I should think so

Str And when men have anything to do in common that they should be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?

Y Soc Very true

Str Then while we are at unity among our selves we need not mind about the fancies of others?

Y Soc Certainly not

Str And now in which of these divisions shall we place the king?—Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of command—for he is a ruler?

Y Soc The latter clearly

Str Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer which parts off the king from the herald

Y Soc How is this?

Str Why does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others which have been sold before?

Y Soc Certainly he does

Str And is not the herald under command and does he not receive orders and in his turn give them to others?

Y Soc Very true

Str Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the art of the herald the interpreter the boatswain the prophet and the numerous kindred arts which exercise command or as in the preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers or sellers for them selves and of retailers—seeing too that the class of supreme rulers or rulers for themselves is almost nameless—shall we make a word following the same analogy and refer kings to a supreme or ruling for self science leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking the ruler and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler

Y Soc Very good

[261] *Str* Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man who gives his own commands and him who gives another's. And now let us see if the supreme power allows of any further division

Y Soc By all means

Str I think that it does and please to assist me in making the division

Y Soc At what point?

Str May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something?

Y Soc Certainly

Str Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced into two classes

Y Soc How would you divide them?

Str Of the whole class some have life and some are without life

Y Soc True

Str And by the help of this distinction we may make if we please a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands

Y Soc At what point?

Str One part may be set over the production of lifeless the other of living objects and in this way the whole will be divided

Y Soc Certainly

Str That division then is complete and now we may leave one half and take up the other which may also be divided into two

Y Soc Which of the two halves do you mean?

Str Of course that which exercises command about animals. For surely the royal science is not like that of a master workman a science presiding over lifeless objects—the king has a nobler function, which is the management and control of living beings

Y Soc True

Str And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to be sometimes a tending of the individual in other cases a common care of creatures in flocks?

Y Soc True

Str But the statesman is not a tender of individuals—not like the driver or groom of a single ox or horse—he is rather to be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen

Y Soc Yes I see thanks to you

Str Shall we call this art of tending many animals together the art of managing a herd or the art of collective management?

Y Soc No matter—whichever suggests itself to us in the course of conversation

Str Very good Socrates and if you continue to be not too particular about names you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old man. And now as you say leaving the discussion of the name [262]—can you see a way in which a person by showing the art of herding to be of two kinds may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of things to be then sought amongst half that number?

Y Soc I will try—there appears to me to be one management of men and another of beasts

Str You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and manly style but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think that we had better avoid

Y Soc What is the error?

Sir I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion which is not a species, from many larger portions: the part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made: and you were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to man: and thus led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chop off too small a piece, my friend: the safer way is to cut through the middle: which is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.

Y Soc What do you mean, Stranger?

Sir I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good parts, Socrates: and although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try as we proceed, so make my meaning a little clearer.

Y Soc What was the error of which, as you say we were guilty in our recent division?

Sir The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of the world: here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or common language, they include under the single name of "barbarians," and because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even or of the human species, if you divided them into male and female and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes. [263]

Y Soc Very true: but I wish that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made some what plainer.

Sir O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. But we must now return to our subject and hereafter when there

is a leisure hour we will follow up the old track: at the same time, I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare—

Y Soc What?

Sir That a class and a part are distinct.

Y Soc What did I hear then?

Sir That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a class: that is the view which I should always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.

Y Soc So be it.

Sir There is another thing which I should like to know.

Y Soc What is it?

Sir The point at which we digressed for: if I am not mistaken, the exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two species of animals: man being one, and all brutes making up the other.

Y Soc True.

Sir I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the common name of brutes.

Y Soc That again is true.

Sir Suppose now O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,—here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid.

Y Soc How can we be safe?

Sir If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less likely to fall into that error.

Y Soc We had better not take the whole?

Sir Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.

Y Soc How?

Sir You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living creatures,—I mean, with animals in herds?

Y Soc Yes.

[264] Sir In that case, there was already implied a division of all animals into tame and wild: those whose nature can be tamed are called tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.

Y Soc True

Str And the political science of which we are in search is and ever was concerned with tame animals and is also confined to gregarious animals

Y Soc Yes

Str But then we ought not to divide as we did taking the whole class at once Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at the political science for this mistake has already brought upon us the misfortune of which the proverb speaks

Y Soc What misfortune?

Str The misfortune of too much haste which is too little speed

Y Soc And all the better Stranger we got what we deserved

Str Very well Let us then begin again and endeavour to divide the collective rearing of animals for probably the completion of the argument will best show what you are so anxious to know Tell me then—

Y Soc What?

Str Have you ever heard as you very likely may—for I do not suppose that you ever actually visited them—of the preserves of fishes in the Nile and in the ponds of the Great King or you may have seen similar preserves in wells at home?

Y Soc Yes to be sure I have seen them and I have often heard the others described

Str And you may have heard also and may have been assured by report although you have not travelled in those regions of nurseries of geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?

Y Soc Certainly

Str I asked you because here is a new division of the management of herds into the management of land and of water herds

Y Soc There is

Str And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing of herds into two corresponding parts the one the rearing of water and the other the rearing of land herds?

Y Soc Yes

Str There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the royal art for it is evident to everybody

Y Soc Certainly

Str Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?

Y Soc How would you divide them?

Str I should distinguish between those which fly and those which walk

Y Soc Most true

Str And where shall we look for the politi-

cal animal? Might not an idiot so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?

Y Soc Certainly

Str The art of managing the walking animal has to be further divided just as you might have an even number

Y Soc Clearly

[65] *Str* Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or class which the argument aims at reaching—the one is speedier way which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large the other agrees better with the principle which we were laying down that as far as we can we should divide in the middle but it is longer We can take either of them whichever we please

Y Soc Cannot we have both ways?

Str Together? What a thing to ask! but if you take them in turn you clearly may

Y Soc Then I should like to have them in turn

Str There will be no difficulty as we are near the end if we had been at the beginning or in the middle I should have demurred to your request but now in accordance with your desire let us begin with the longer way while we are fresh we shall get on better And now attend to the division

Y Soc Let me hear

Str The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into two classes

Y Soc Upon what principle?

Str The one grows horns and the other is without horns

Y Soc Clearly

Str Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian animals into two corresponding parts and define them for if you try to invent names for them you will find the intricacy too great

Y Soc How must I speak of them then?

Str In this way let the science of managing pedestrian animals be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd and the other to the herd that has no horns

Y Soc All that you say has been abundantly proved and may therefore be assumed

Str The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd who have no horns

Y Soc That is evident

Str Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections and endeavour to assign to him what is his?

Y Soc By all means

Str Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet or by their mix-

ing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean

Y Soc What?

Sir I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another

Y Soc Yes

Sir But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not mix the breed

Y Soc Very true

Sir And of which was the Statesman charge, —of the mixed or of the unmixed race?

Y Soc Clearly of the unmixed

Sir I suppose that we must divide this again as before

Y Soc We must

[266] Sir Every tame and herding animal has now been split up with the exception of two species for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned among gregarious animals

Y Soc Certainly not but how shall we divide the two remaining species?

Sir There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry

Y Soc What is that?

Sir The diameter and, again the diameter of a diameter

Y Soc What do you mean?

Sir How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?

Y Soc Just so

Sir And the power of the remaining kind being the power of twice two feet may be said to be the diameter of our diameter

Y Soc Certainly and now I think that I pretty nearly understand you

Sir In these divisions, Socrates, I deserv what would make another famous jest

Y Soc What is it?

Sir Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and swiftest of creation and have been running a race with them

Y Soc I remark that very singular coincidence

Sir And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?

Y Soc Indeed I should

Sir And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king is found running about with the herd and in close competition with the bird-catcher who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life

Y Soc Certainly

Sir Then he is, Socrates, a still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the en-

CI V B A

quiry about the Sophist

Y Soc What?

Sir That the dialectical method is no respect of persons, and does not set the great above the small but always arrives in her own way at the truest result

Y Soc Clearly

Sir And now I will not wait for you to ask me, but will of my own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king

Y Soc By all means

Sir I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land animals into biped and quadruped and since the winged herd and that alone, comes out in the same class with man we should divide bipeds into those which have feathers and those which have not and then they have been divided and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of state for that too is a vocation which belongs to him

[267] Y Soc Very good you have paid me the debt—I mean that you have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digress on by way of interest

Sir Then now let us go back to the beginning and join the links which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art

Y Soc By all means

Sir The science of pure knowledge had as we said originally a part which was the science of rule or command and from this was derived another part, which was called command or self on the analogy of selling for self an important section of this was the management of living animals and this again was further limited to the management of them in herds, and again in herds of pedestrian animals The chief division of the latter was the art of managing, pedestrian animals which are without horns this again has a part which can only be comprehended under one term by joining together three names—shepherding pure bred animals The only further subdivision is the art of man herding—this has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after and have now found being at once the royal and political

Y Soc To be sure

Sir And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say?

Y Soc What?

CI Sophist 227

CI Rep b1 c 11 507

Str Do you think I mean that we have really fulfilled our intention?—There has been a sort of discussion and yet the investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out this is where the enquiry fails

Y Soc I do not understand

Str I will try to make the thought which is at this moment present in my mind clearer to us both

Y Soc Let me hear

Str There were many arts of shepherding and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?

Y Soc Yes

Str And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing not horses or other brutes but the art of rearing man collectively?

Y Soc True

Str Note, however a difference which distinguishes the king from all other shepherds

Y Soc To what do you refer?

Str I want to ask whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd?

Y Soc What do you mean?

Str I mean to say that merchants husband men, providers of food and also training masters and physicians will all contend with the herdsmen of humanity whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the care of rearing or managing [268] mankind and that they rear not only the common herd but also the rulers themselves

Y Soc Are they not right in saying so?

Str Very likely they may be and we will consider their claim But we are certain of this—that no one will raise a similar claim as against the herdsman who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his herd he is also their matchmaker and accoucher no one else knows that department of science And he is their merry maker and musician as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences and no one can console and soothe his own herd better than he can either with the natural tones of his voice or with instruments And the same may be said of tenders of animals in general

Y Soc Very true

Str But if this is as you say can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?

Y Soc Surely not

Str Had we not reason just now¹ to apprehend that although we may have described a sort of royal form we have not as yet accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature until we have disengaged and separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives?

Y Soc Very true

Str And that Socrates is what we must do if we do not mean to bring disgrace upon the argument at its close

Y Soc We must certainly avoid that

Str Then let us make a new beginning and travel by a different road

Y Soc What road?

Str I think that we may have a little amusement there is a famous tale of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven and then we may resume our series of divisions and proceed in the old path until we arrive at the desired summit Shall we do as I say?

Y Soc By all means

Str Listen, then to a tale which a child would love to hear and you are not too old for childish amusement

Y Soc Let me hear

Str There did really happen and will again happen like many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes You have heard no doubt and remember what they say happened at that time?

Y Soc I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden lamb

[269] *Str* No not that but another part of the story which tells how the sun and the stars once rose in the west and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion and gave them that which they now have as a testimony to the right of Atreus

Y Soc Yes there is that legend also

Str Again we have been often told of the reign of Cronos

Y Soc Yes very often

Str Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earthborn and not begotten of one another?

Y Soc Yes that is another old tradition

Str All these stories and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful have a common origin many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages or are repeated only in a disconnected form but the origin of them is what no

¹ CE 267

one has told, and may as well be told now for the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.

Y. Sor. Very good and I hope that you will give the whole story and leave out nothing.

Sir. Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its course and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally rectified intelligence from its author and creator turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction.

Y. Sor. Why is that?

Sir. Why because only the most divine things of all remain ever unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by the Creator with many plonies, partake of a bodily nature and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But the motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and of the same kind and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two opposite courses (20) or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is guided at one time by an external power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the eternal, hard of the Creator and again, when let go, moves spontaneously being set free at such a time as to him, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement. This is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest point.

Y. Sor. Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable indeed.

Sir. Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said the nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all these wonders. It is this.

Y. Sor. What?

Sir. The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion of the universe.

Y. Sor. How is that the cause?

Sir. Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to be the greatest and most complete.

Y. Sor. I should imagine so.

Sir. And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.

Y. Sor. Such changes would naturally occur.

Sir. And animals, as we know survive with difficulty great and serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at once.

Y. Sor. Very true.

Sir. Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, which extends also to the life of man. Few survivors of the one are left and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable phenomena and of one in particular which takes place at the time when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which we are now living.

Y. Sor. What is it?

Sir. The life of all animals first came to a standstill and the mortal nature ceased to be or look older and was then reversed and grew young and delicate. The white locks of the aged darkened again and the cheeks of the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom. The bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller continually by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly born child in mind as well as body in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes and in a few days were no more seen.

[271] Y. Sor. Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those days and in what way were they begotten of one another?

Sir. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then or later of nature as the procreation of animals from one another. The earth-born race, of which we hear in story was the one which existed in those days—they rose again from the ground and of this tradition which is now a-days often unduly discredited our ancestors, who were nearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into being at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is after the return of age to youth follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth to life simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their generation has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and live in the opposite order unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. According to this tradition they

of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of earth born and so the above legend clings to them

Y Soc Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded but tell me was the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in that cycle of the world or in this? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both

Sir I see that you enter into my meaning — no that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world but to the previous one in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe and the several parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities as is the way in some places still There were demi-gods who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd neither was there any violence or devouring of one another or war or quarrel among them and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings which belonged to that dispensation The reason why the life of man was as tradition says spontaneous is as follows In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them just as man who is by comparison a divine being still rules over the lower animals Under him there were no forms of government or separate possession of women and children [272] for all men rose again from the earth having no memory of the past And although they had nothing of this sort the earth gave them fruits in abundance which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden and were not planted by the hand of man And they dwelt naked and mostly in the open air for the temperature of their seasons was mild and they had no beds but lay on soft couches of grass which grew plentifully out of the earth Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos Socrates the character of our present life which is said to be under Zeus you know from your own experience Can you and will you determine which of them you deem the happier?

Y Soc Impossible

Sir Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?

Y Soc By all means

Sir Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos having this boundless leisure and the power of holding intercourse not only with men but with the brute creation had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy conversing with the brutes as well as with one another and

learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times happier than the men of our own day Or again if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full and told stories to one another and to the animals—such stories as are now attributed to them—in this case also as I should imagine the answer would be easy But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and discussion, we had better let the matter drop and give the reason why we have unearthed this tale and then we shall be able to get on

In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place and the earth born race had all perished and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number of times the pilot of the universe let the helm go and retired to his place of view and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the supreme power being informed of what was happening let go the parts of the world which were under their control [273] And the world turning round with a sudden shock being impelled in an opposite direction from beginning to end was shaken by a mighty earthquake which wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased and the universal creature once more at peace attained to a calm and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course having the charge and rule of himself and of all the creatures which are contained in him and executing as far as he remembered them the instructions of his Father and Creator more precisely at first but after words with less exactness The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in him this was inherent in the primal nature which was full of disorder until attaining to the present order From God the constructor the world received all that is good in him but from a previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness which thence derived first of all passed into the world and were then transmitted to the animals While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the animals the evil was small and great the good which he produced but after the separation when the world was let go at first all proceeded well enough

but, as time went on there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to the world and to the things contained in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all in his tender care, seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seized himself at the helm and bringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal.

And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in stature, and the newly born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. [2-4] All things changed uniting and following the conclusion of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture for no animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency of other creature beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and generate and receive nourishment, as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at the real end of this discourse for although there might be much to tell of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or resource, the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great strait, wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and education as was indispensable for his life. For when Prometheus, the

artisan by Hephaestus and his fellow worker Athena seeds and plants by others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame human life since the care of the Gods, as it was at first, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate and so low ever changing as he changes, and ever living and growing at one time in one manner and at another time in another. Enough of the story which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse.

1 Soc What was this great error of which you speak?

Sir There were two the first a lesser one, the other as an error on a much larger and grander scale.

1 Soc What do you mean?

[275] Sir I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and statesman of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of a human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to have been a man and this was a great error. Again, we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining how this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible but still it was true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first.

Y Soc Very good.

Sir Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the statesman we must define the nature of his office.

1 Soc Certainly.

Sir And the myth was introduced in order to show not only that all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human beings.

Y Soc Very true.

Sir And I cannot help thinking Socrates, that the form of the divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king whereas the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education.

1 Soc Certainly.

Sir Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether like the divine shepherd,

they are above their subjects or on a level with them

Y Soc Of course

Str To resume — Do you remember that we spoke of a command for self exercised over animals not singly but collectively which we called the art of rearing a herd?

Y Soc Yes I remember

Str There somewhere lay our error for we never included or mentioned the Statesman and we did not observe that he had no place in our nomenclature

Y Soc How was that?

Str All other herdsmen rear their herds, but this is not a suitable term to apply to the Statesman we should use a name which is common to them all

Y Soc True if there be such a name

Str Why is not care of herds applicable to all? For this implies no feeding or any special duty if we say either tending the herds or managing the herds or having the care of them the same word will include all and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest as the argument seems to require

[276] *Y Soc* Quite right but how shall we take the next step in the division?

Str As before we divided the art of rearing herds accordingly as they were land or water herds winged and wingless mixing or not mixing the breed horned and hornless so we may divide by these same differences the tending of herds comprehending in our definition the kingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos

Y Soc That is clear but I still ask what is to follow

Str If the word had been managing herds instead of feeding or rearing them no one would have argued that there was no care of men in the case of the politician although it was justly contended that there was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name or at least if there were many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an art than any king

Y Soc True

Str But no other art or science will have a prior or better right than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in general

Y Soc Quite true

Str In the next place Socrates we must surely notice that a great error was committed at the end of our analysis

Y Soc What was it?

Str Why, supposing we were ever so sure

that there is such an art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds there was no reason why we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be said

Y Soc Certainly not

Str Our first duty as we were saying was to remodel the name so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions

Y Soc How can they be made?

Str First by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or manager

Y Soc True

Str And the art of management which is assigned to man would again have to be subdivided

Y Soc On what principle?

Str On the principle of voluntary and compulsory

Y Soc Why?

Str Because if I am not mistaken there has been an error here for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together whereas they are utterly distinct like their modes of government

Y Soc True

Str Then now as I said let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts on the principle of voluntary and compulsory

Y Soc Certainly

Str And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny and the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman?

[277] *Y Soc* I think Stranger that we have now completed the account of the Statesman

Str Would that we had Socrates but I have to satisfy myself as well as you and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet perfected like statues who in their too great haste having overdone the several parts of their work lose time in cutting them down so too we partly out of haste partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our former error and also because we imagined that a king required grand illustrations have taken up a marvellous lump of fable and have been obliged to use more than was necessary This made us discourse at large and, nevertheless the story never came to an end And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly drawn in outline but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours Now to intelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language

and discourse than by any painting, or work of art to the same sort by works of art.

Y. Sir Very true but what is the imperfection which still remains I wish that you would tell me.

S. The h. her ideas, my dear friend, can barely be set forth except through the medium of examples every man seems to know all things in a clumsy sort of way and then again to wick up and to know nothing.

Y. Sir What do you mean?

S. I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about our experience of knowledge.

Y. Sir Why so?

S. Why because my "example" requires the assistance of another example.

Y. Sir Proceed you need not fear that I shall tire.

S. I will proceed, finding as I do such a ready learner in you when children are beginning to know their letters—

Y. Sir What are you going to say?

S. That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very short and easy syllables, [2-8] and are able to tell them correctly.

Y. Sir Certainly.

S. Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think and speak falsely of them.

Y. Sir Very true.

S. Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know be—

Y. Sir Be what?

S. To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with the cases in which they do not as yet know and to know them that the letters are the same, and have the same character in both combination, until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and not another and is always called by the same name.

Y. Sir Certainly.

S. Are not examples formed in this manner. We take a thing, and compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing of which we have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true notion, which includes both of them.

Y. Sir Exactly.

S. Can we wonder then, that the soul has

the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth in each particular and then, again, in other cases is altogether at sea having somehow or other a correct notion of combinations but when the elements are transferred into the long and difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?

Y. Sir There is nothing wonderful in that.

S. Could any one, my friend who began with false opinion expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?

Y. Sir Hardly.

S. Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature of example in general in a small and particular instance afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, which is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover by rules of art what the management of cities is and then the dream will become a reality to us.

Y. Sir Very true.

[29] S. Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care of states, let us part them all off and leave them alone and, as I was saying a model or example of this process has first to be framed.

Y. Sir Exactly.

S. What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example at hand, we choose weaving or more precisely weaving of wool—this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our meaning.

Y. Sir Certainly.

S. Why should we not apply to weaving, the same processes of division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to that which is needed for our purpose?

Y. Sir How do you mean?

S. I shall reply by actually performing the process.

Y. Sir Very good.

S. All things which we make or acquire are either created or prevented of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and all so defenses and defenses are either military weapons or protections and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings and coverings are blankets and garments and garments are some of them in

one piece and others of them are made in several parts and of these latter some are stitched others are fastened and not stitched and of the not stitched some are made of the sinews of plants and some of hair, and of these again some are cemented with water and earth and others are fastened together by themselves And these last defences and coverings which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes and the art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation [280] the art of clothing just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the State, and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that in the previous case the royal science differed from the political?

Y Soc Most true

Sir In the next place let us make the reflection that the art of weaving clothes which an incompetent person might fancy to have been sufficiently described has been separated off from several others which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts

Y Soc And which are the kindred arts?

Sir I see that I have not taken you with me So I think that we had better go backwards starting from the end We just now parted off from the weaving of clothes the making of blankets which differ from each other in that one is put under and the other is put round and these are what I termed kindred arts

Y Soc I understand

Sir And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of flax and cords and all that we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing of which the most important part is the cobbler's art

Y Soc Precisely

Sir Then we separated off the currier's art which prepared coverings in entire pieces and the art of sheltering and subtracted the various arts of making water tight which are employed in building and in general in carpentering and in other crafts and all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence and are concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors being divisions of the art of joining and we also cut off the manufacture of arms which is a section of the great and manifold art of making defences and we orig-

inally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left as would appear the very art of which we were in search the art of protection against winter cold which fabricates woollen defences and has the name of weaving

Y Soc Very true

[281] Sir Yes my boy but that is not all for the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving

Y Soc How so?

Sir Weaving is a sort of uniting?

Y Soc Yes

Sir But the first process is a separation of the cloited and matted fibres?

Y Soc What do you mean?

Sir I mean the work of the carder's art for we cannot say that carding is weaving or that the carder is a weaver

Y Soc Certainly not

Sir Again if a person were to say that the art of making the warp and the woof was the art of weaving he would say what was paradoxical and false

Y Soc To be sure

Sir Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes or are we to regard all these as arts of weaving?

Y Soc Certainly not

Sir And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes they will dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving and though assigning a larger sphere to that will still reserve a considerable field for themselves

Y Soc Very true

Sir Besides these there are the arts which make tools and instruments of weaving and which will claim at least to be co-operative causes in every work of the weaver

Y Soc Most true

Sir Well then suppose that we define weaving or rather that part of it which has been selected by us to be the greatest and noblest of arts which are concerned with woollen garments—shall we be right? Is not the definition although true wanting in clearness and completeness for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?

Y Soc True

Sir Then the next thing will be to separate them in order that the argument may proceed in a regular manner?

Y Soc By all means

Sir Let us consider in the first place th-

there are two kinds of arts entering into every thing which is done

Y Soc What are they?

Sir The one kind is the conditional or co-operative; the other the principal cause

Y Soc What do you mean?

Sir The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing but which furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture without which the several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative but those which make the things themselves are causal

Y Soc A very reasonable distinction

Sir Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal

Y Soc Very true.

[382] Sir The arts of washing and mending and the other preparatory arts which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art of adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the fuller's art.

Y Soc Very good

Sir Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment form a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged—the art of working in wool

Y Soc To be sure

Sir Of working in wool again there are two divisions, and both these are parts of the two arts at once

Y Soc How is that?

Sir Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other processes of wool working which separate the composite, may be classed together as belonging both to the art of wool working and also to one of the two great arts which are of universal application—the art of composition and the art of division

Y Soc Yes.

Sir To the latter belonging carding and the other processes of which I have just now speaking the art of discernment or division is in wool and yarn which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with the hands as artously described under all the names which I just now mentioned

Y Soc Very true

Sir Again, let us take some process of wool working which is also a portion of the art of composition and discerning the elements of division which we found there make two

halves one on the principle of composition and the other on the principle of division

Y Soc Let that be done.

Sir And once more Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs at once both to wool working and composition if we are ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving

Y Soc We must

Sir Yes, certainly and let us call one part of the art the art of twisting threads, the other the art of combining them

Y Soc Do I understand you in speaking of twisting to be referring to manufacture of the warp?

Sir Yes, and of the wool too how if not by twisting is the wool made?

Y Soc There is no other way

Sir Then suppose that you define the warp and the wool for I think that the definition will be of use to you

Y Soc How shall I define them?

Sir Is thus A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise and breadthwise is said to be pulled out

Y Soc Yes.

Sir And the wool thus prepared when twisted by the spindle and made into a firm thread is called the warp and the art which regulates these operations the art of spinning, the warp

Y Soc True

Sir And the threads which are more loosely spun having a softness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force used in dressing the cloth—the threads which are thus spun are called the wool [383] and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning, the wool

Y Soc Very true

Sir And, now there can be no mistake about the nature of the part of weaving which we have undertaken to define For when that part of the art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp and wool, the entire woven substance is called by us a woollen garment and the art which presides over this is the art of weaving

Y Soc Very true

Sir But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and wool instead of making a long and useless circuit?

Y Soc I thought, Stranger that there was nothing useless in what was said

Sir Very likely but you may not always think so my sweet friend and in case any feeling of

one piece and others of them are made in several parts and of these latter some are stitched others are fastened and not stitched and of the not stitched some are made of the sinews of plants and some of hair, and of these again some are cemented with water and earth and others are fastened together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes and the art which superintends them we may call from the nature of the operation [280] the art of clothing just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the State and may we not say that the art of weaving at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes differs only in name from this art of clothing in the same way that in the previous case the royal science differed from the political?

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Y Soc By all means

Sir Let us consider in the first place the

things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real terms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one another and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same, and so fall into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not desert until he has found all the differences contained in it which form distinct classes, nor again should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on this head and also of excess and defect: we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.

Y Soc We will not forget.

Sir And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the conduct of such arguments in general.

Y Soc What is this new question?

Sir Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that particular word, or of all words?

Y Soc Clearly in order that he may have a better knowledge of all words.

Sir And in our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?

Y Soc Clearly as in the former example, the purpose is general.

Sir Such is would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed out when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or argument (286) whereas the greatest and best truths have no outward image of themselves subsist to man, which he wishes to satisfy the soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to train ourselves to go and accept a rational account

CL. Phaedrus 250.

of them for immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way and all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on great.

Y Soc Very good.

Sir Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.

Y Soc What is it?

Sir I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but irrelevant and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.

Y Soc Very good. Will you proceed?

Sir Then I would like to observe that you and I remembering what has been said should praise or blame the length or shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one another but with what is fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said, was to be borne in mind.

Y Soc Very true.

Sir And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting, for we should only want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, if at all as a secondary matter and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry not our first, but our second object: the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of discourse according to species—whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses on such occasions and can not away with their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious (283) but he should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself—he should pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let

dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your mind as it very well may let me lay down a principle which will apply to arguments in general

Y Soc Proceed

Str Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and defect and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this kind

Y Soc Let us do so

Str The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following —

Y Soc What?

Str Length and shortness excess and defect with all of these the art of measurement is conversant

Y Soc Yes

Str And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts with a view to our present purpose

Y Soc Where would you make the division?

Str As thus I would make two parts one having regard to the relativity of greatness and smallness to each other and there is another, without which the existence of production would be impossible

Y Soc What do you mean?

Str Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be called greater with reference to the less alone and the less less with reference to the greater alone?

Y Soc Yes

Str Well but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean both in speech and action and is not this a reality and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?

Y Soc Plainly

Str Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways and not as we were saying before only relatively to one another but there must also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard would you like to hear the reason why?

Y Soc Certainly

[284] *Str* If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less there will never be any comparison of either with the mean

Y Soc True

Str And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as un-

realities but as real evils which occasion a difficulty in action and the excellence of beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure

Y Soc Certainly

Str But if the science of the Statesman disappears the search for the royal science will be impossible

Y Soc Very true

Str Well then as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not being had an existence because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another but also have to do with the production of the mean for if this is not admitted neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science

Y Soc Yes we must certainly do again what we did then

Str But this Socrates is a greater work than the other of which we only too well remember the length I think however that we may fairly assume something of this sort—

Y Soc What?

Str That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth meanwhile the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less not only with one another but also with a view to the attainment of the mean seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining for if there are arts there is a standard of measure and if there is a standard of measure there are arts but if either is wanting there is neither

Y Soc True and what is the next step?

Str The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts as we have said already and to place in the one part all the arts which measure number length depth breadth swiftness with their opposites and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean and the fit and the opportune and the due, and with all those words in short which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes

Y Soc Here are two vast divisions embracing two very different spheres

[285] *Str* There are many accomplished men Socrates who say believing themselves to speak wisely that the art of measurement is universal and has to do with all things And this means what we are now saying for all

products of the human body and minister to the body [299] will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of nourish men, unless you have any better name to offer. This, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be ascribed to the Statesman's art.

Y Soc Certainly not.

Sir These seven classes include nearly every description of property with the exception of tame animals. Consider—there was the original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment, small things, which may be included under one of these—as for example, coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character of any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame animals, except slaves.

Y Soc Very true.

Sir The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and political science.

Y Soc I agree.

Sir Let us go a little nearer in order that we may be more certain of the complexion of this remaining class.

Y Soc Let us do so.

Sir We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we anticipated.

Y Soc Who are they?

Sir Those who have been purchased and have so become possessions: these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.

Y Soc Certainly not.

Sir First, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalize the products of husbandry and the other arts, some sell in the market-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in ex-

change for money or for other products—[299] the money-changer, the merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics?

Y Soc No, unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.

Sir But surely men whom we see acting as hucksters and vendors, and too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in royal science?

Y Soc Certainly not.

Sir But what would you say of some other servicable officials?

Y Soc Who are they and what services do they perform?

Sir There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the government of states—what shall we call them?

Y Soc They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you just now called them, but not themselves rulers.

Sir There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be found somewhere in this neighbourhood.

Y Soc Very true.

Sir Well let us draw nearer and try the claims of some who have not yet been tested in the first place, there are diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to men.

Y Soc True.

Sir There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art.

Y Soc Yes, clearly.

Sir And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track for the priest and the diviner resemble men with pride and prerogative, and they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude of their enterprises in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get exiled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the

us return to our Statesman and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving

Y Soc Very good—let us do as you say

Str The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of shepherds and indeed from all those which have to do with herds at all. There still remain however of the causal and co-operative arts those which are immediately concerned with States and which must first be distinguished from one another

Y Soc Very good

Str You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two halves: the reason will be very evident as we proceed

Y Soc Then we had better do so

Str We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs since we cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide everything into as few parts as possible

Y Soc What is to be done in this case?

Str What we did in the example of weaving—all those arts which furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative

Y Soc Yes

Str So now and with still more reason all arts which make any implement in a State whether great or small may be regarded by us as co-operative: for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would be possible and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a product of the kingly art

Y Soc No indeed

Str The task of separating this class from others is not an easy one: for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions in a city of which I have a word to say

Y Soc What class do you mean?

Str A class which may be described as not having this power: that is to say not like an instrument framed for production but designed for the preservation of that which is produced

Y Soc To what do you refer?

Str To the class of vessels as they are comprehensively termed which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry of things prepared in the fire or out of the fire [288] this is a very large class and has if I am not mistaken literally nothing to do with the royal art of which we are in search

Y Soc Certainly not

Str There is also a third class of possessions to be noted different from these and very ex-

Cf Phaedrus 65

tensive: moving or resting on land or water honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has one name because it is intended to be sat upon: being always a seat for some thing

Y Soc What is it?

Str A vehicle which is certainly not the work of the Statesman but of the carpenter, potter and coppersmith

Y Soc I understand

Str And is there not a fourth class which is again different and in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained—every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures whether of earth or stone and ten thousand other things? all of which being made for the sake of defence may be truly called defences and are for the most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver rather than of the Statesman

Y Soc Certainly

Str Shall we add a fifth class of ornamentation and drawing and of the imitations produced by drawing and music which are designed for amusement only and may be fairly comprehended under one name?

Y Soc What is it?

Str Plaything is the name

Y Soc Certainly

Str That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them for none of these things have a serious purpose—amusement is their sole aim

Y Soc That again I understand

Str Then there is a class which provides materials for all these: out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their works—this manifold class I say which is the creation and offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?

Y Soc What do you mean?

Str I am referring to gold, silver and other metals and all that wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of carpentry and plating and there is the process of barking and stripping the cuticle of plants and the currier's art which strips off the skins of animals and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyrus and cords and provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds—the whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of man and with this the kingly science has no concern at all

Y Soc True

Str The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their particles with the

intimated will be our duty

Sir Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?

Y Soc Impossible

Sir But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred or say fifty who could?

Y Soc In that case political science would certainly be the easiest of all sciences: there could not be found in a city of that number as many really first-rate draught players, if judged by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument.

[293] *Sir* Thank you for reminding me, and the consequence is that any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two or at any rate of a few.

Y Soc Certainly

Sir And these, whether they rule with the will or against the will of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be supposed according to our present view to rule on some scientific principle just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment—in-cision, burning, or the infliction of some other pain—whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other way or even fastens his patients in a phylactery, all the same, so long as he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine or of any other art of command.

Y Soc Quite true

Sir Then that can be the only true form of government in which the governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere pretender, whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves—none of these things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the ruler.

Y Soc True

Sir And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State by killing some or exiling some, whether they reduce the size of the body or por- te by sending out from the

have swarms of citizens, or by introducing persons from without, increase it while they act according to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with a view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real, but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are worse: the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others.

[294] *Sir* I agree. Stranger, in the greater part of what you say, but as to their ruling without laws—the expression has a harsh sound.

[295] *Sir* You have been too quick for me, Socrates. I was just going to ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government without laws.

Y Soc Certainly

Sir There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?

Y Soc Why?

Sir Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all, and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.

Y Soc Of course not.

Sir But the law is always striving to make one—like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in sudden changes of circumstances. When something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.

Y Soc Certainly the law treats us all precisely in the manner which you describe.

Sir A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple.

Y Soc True.

Sir Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be investigated.

Y Soc Certainly

Sir Let me ask, whether you have not next

highest magistracies and here at Athens the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon

Y Soc Precisely

[291] *Str* But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng as the former class disappears and the scene changes?

Y Soc Whom can you mean?

Str They are a strange crew

Y Soc Why strange?

Str A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe for many of them are like lions and centaurs and many more like satyrs and such weak and shifty creatures — Protean shapes quickly changing into one another's forms and natures and now Socrates I begin to see who they are

Y Soc Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision

Str Yes every one looks strange when you do not know him and just now I myself fell in to this mistake—at first sight coming suddenly upon him I did not recognize the politician and his troop

Y Soc Who is he?

Str The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry

Y Soc That is a hope not lightly to be renounced

Str Never if I can help it and first let me ask you a question

Y Soc What?

Str Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?

Y Soc Yes

Str And after monarchy next in order comes the government of the few?

Y Soc Of course

Str Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude which is called by the name of democracy?

Y Soc Certainly

Str And do not these three expand in a manner into five producing out of themselves two other names?

Y Soc What are they?

Str There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary poverty and riches law and the absence of law which men now a-days apply to them the two first they subdivide accordingly

and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names royalty and tyranny

Y Soc Very true

Str And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and oligarchy

Y Soc Certainly

[292] *Str* Democracy alone whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or against their consent always in ordinary language has the same name

Y Soc True

Str But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined by these characteristics of the one the few or the many of poverty or wealth of voluntary or compulsory submission of written law or the absence of law, can be a right one?

Y Soc Why not?

Str Reflect and follow me

Y Soc In what direction?

Str Shall we abide by what we said at first or shall we retract our words?

Y Soc To what do you refer?

Str If I am not mistaken we said that royal power was a science?

Y Soc Yes

Str And a science of a peculiar kind which was selected out of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative?

Y Soc Yes

Str And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and another over living animals and so we proceeded in the division step by step up to this point not losing the idea of science but unable as yet to determine the nature of the particular science?

Y Soc True

Str Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle of the State cannot be the few or many the voluntary or involuntary poverty or riches but some notion of science must enter into it if we are to be consistent with what has preceded

Y Soc And we must be consistent

Str Well then in which of these various forms of States may the science of government which is among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire be supposed to reside? That we must discover and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be politicians but are not, although they persuade many and shall separate them from the wise king

Y Soc That as the argument has already

case, but evil, or disgrace or injustice

Y Soc Quite true.

Sr And when the citizen contrary to law and custom, is compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before the last and most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who compelled him.

Y Soc Very true.

Sr And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man unjust? May not any man, rich or poor with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the true principle of government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects [297] As the pilot, by watching continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew—not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law—preserves the lives of his fellow sailors, even so and in the self same way may there not be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a singular spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them and, as far as may be, to make them better from being worse.

Y Soc No one can deny what has been now said.

Sr Neither if you consider can any one deny the other statement.

Y Soc What was it?

Sr We said that no great number of persons whoever they may be, can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely but that the true government is to be found in a small body or in an individual and that other States are but imitations of this as we said a little while ago some for the better and some for the worse.

Y Soc What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous remark about imitations.

Sr And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not seek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this matter.

Y Soc What do you mean?

Sr The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar but we may attempt to express it thus. —Supposing the government of

which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must use the written laws of this—in no other way can they be saved they will have to do what is now generally approved although not the best thing in the world.

Y Soc What is this?

Sr No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme penalties and this is very right and good when regarded as the second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?

Y Soc By all means.

Sr I must again have recourse to my favourite images through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.

Y Soc What images?

Sr The noble pilot and the wise physician who is worth many another man—in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover some image of the king.

Y Soc What sort of an image?

[298] Sr Well such as this—Every man will reflect that he suffers strange things at the hands of both of them the physician saves any whom he wishes to save and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats—cutting or burning them and at the same time requiring them to bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute of which little or nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics and the finale is that he receives money from the relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind they intentionally play false and lead you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight and are guilty of other roguesries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration that neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling may offer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases—whether as to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements which are required in

ings for gymnastic contests in your city such as there are in other cities at which men compete in running wrestling and the like?

Y Soc Yes they are very common among us

Str And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you remember?

Y Soc To what do you refer?

Str The training masters do not issue minute rules for individuals or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution they think that they ought to go more roughly to work and to prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority

Y Soc Very true

Str And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all they send them forth together and let them rest together from their running wrestling or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be

Y Soc True

[295] *Str* And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the herd and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another will not be able in enacting for the general good to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case

Y Soc He cannot be expected to do so

Str He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority roughly meeting the cases of individuals and some of them he will deliver in writing and others will be unwritten and these last will be traditional customs of the country

Y Soc He will be right

Str Yes quite right for how can he sit at every man's side all through his life prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty? Who Socrates would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the royal science if he had been able to do this would have imposed upon himself the restriction of a written law

Y Soc So I should infer from what has now been said

Str Or rather my good friend from what is going to be said

Y Soc And what is that?

Str Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician or trainer who is about to go into a far country and is expecting to be a long time away from his patients—thinking that his instructions will not be remembered unless they are written down he will leave notes of them for the use of his pupils or patients

Y Soc True

Str But what would you say if he came back sooner than he had intended and owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other celestial influences something else happened to be better for them—would he not venture to suggest this new remedy although not contemplated in his former prescription? Would he persist in observing the original law neither himself giving any new commandments nor the patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed under the idea that this course only was healthy and medicinal all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art would not all such enactments be utterly ridiculous?

Y Soc Utterly

Str And if he who gave laws written or unwritten determining what was good or bad honourable or dishonourable just or unjust, to the tribes of men who flock together in their several cities and are governed in accordance with them if I say the wise legislator were suddenly to come again [296] or another like to him is he to be prohibited from changing them?—would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?

Y Soc Certainly

Str Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in point?

Y Soc I do not recall what you mean at the moment

Str They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be improved he must first persuade his own State of the improvement and then he may legislate but not otherwise

Y Soc And are they not right?

Str I dare say But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good what is this violence to be called? Or rather before you answer let me ask the same question in reference to our previous instances

Y Soc What do you mean?

Str Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient of whatever sex or age whom he compels against his will to do something for his good which is contrary to the written rules what is this compulsion to be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art or a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such violence is applied to charge the physician who practises the violence with want of skill or aggravating his disease.

Y Soc Most true

Str In the political art error is not called dis-

men, having fixed laws, in acting, contrary to them with a view to something better would only be acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?

1. Sir Certainly

Sir If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill but if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no longer

1. Sir Quite true.

Sir And the principle that no great number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.

1. Sir Yes, it has.

Sir Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.

1. Sir Impossible.

Sir Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.

1. Sir Very good.

Sir When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called aristocracy and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy

1. Sir True.

Sir Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation of him who knows, we call him a king and if he rules according to law we give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge.

1. Sir To be sure.

Sir And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his name will surely be the same—he will be called a king; and thus the six names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one

1. Sir That is true

Sir And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of his imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant?

1. Sir Certainly

Sir And thus we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies—because men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority or is able and willing in the pursuit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and

holily to all they fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us for it there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State

1. Sir To be sure.

Sir But then as the State is not like a bee hive, and has no natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavor to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government

1. Sir True

Sir And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in customs, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, would ruin all that it touched Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them like ships at sea, founder from time to time and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish through the badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths—I mean to say that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge

1. Sir Very true.

Sir Then the question arises—which of these untrue forms of government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all oppressive and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems to influence all our actions we must examine it.

1. Sir Yes, we must

Sir You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the hardest and the easiest.

Y. Sir What do you mean?

Sir I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I mentioned at the beginning of this discussion—monarchy the rule of the few and the rule of the many

Y. Sir True.

Sir If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the true one may be distinguished as a seventh.

navigation and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage how to behave when encountering pirates and what is to be done with the old fashioned galleys if they have to fight with others of a similar build—and that whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns or enacted although unwritten to be national customs and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion

Y Soc What a strange notion!

Str Suppose further that the pilots and physicians are appointed annually either out of the rich or out of the whole people and that they are elected by lot and that after their election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules

Y Soc Worse and worse

Str But hear what follows—When the year of office has expired the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by [299] lot out of the whole people and anybody who pleases may be their accuser and may lay to their charge that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors and if either of them is condemned some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or pay

Y Soc He who is willing to take a command under such conditions deserves to suffer any penalty

Str Yet once more we shall have to enact that if any one is detected enquiring into piloting and navigation or into health and the true nature of medicine or about the winds or other conditions of the atmosphere contrary to the written rules and has any ingenious notions about such matters he is not to be called a pilot or physician but a cloudy prating sophist—further on the ground that he is a corrupter of the young who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner and to exercise an arbitrary rule over their patients or ships any one who is qualified by law may inform against him and indict him in some court and then if he is found to be persuading any whether young or old to act contrary to the written law he is to be punished with the utmost rigour for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws and as touch-

ing healing and health and piloting and navigation the nature of them is known to all for anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs If such were the mode of procedure Socrates about these sciences and about generalship and any branch of hunting or about painting or imitation in general or carpentry or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or planting or if we were to see an art of rearing horses or tending herds or divination or any ministerial service or draught playing or any science conversant with number whether simple or square or cube or comprising motion—I say if all these things were done in this way according to written regulations and not according to art what would be the result?

Y Soc All the arts would utterly perish and could never be recovered because enquiry would be unlawful And human life, which is bad enough already would then become utterly unendurable

[300] *Str* But what if while compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws some one elected by a show of hands or by lot, and he caring nothing about the laws were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favour and without knowledge—would not this be a still worse evil than the former?

Y Soc Very true

Str To go against the laws which are based upon long experience and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass them would be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law?

Y Soc Certainly

Str Therefore as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to break the law in any respect whatever

Y Soc True

Str The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have knowledge?

Y Soc Certainly they would

Str And as we were saying he who has knowledge and is a true Statesman will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art without regard to the laws when he is of opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better

Y Soc Yes we said so

Str And any individual or any number of

Y Soc Far superior

Sir And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?

Y Soc Of course.

Sir Very good and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?

Y Soc That power I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.

Sir And to what science do we give the power of determining whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one or to refrain altogether?

Y Soc To that science which governs the arts of speech and persuasion.

Sir Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?

Y Soc Very good.

Sir Rhetoric seems to be quite distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet ministering to it.

Y Soc Yes

Sir But what would you think of another sort of power or science?

Y Soc What science?

Sir The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies—is that to be regarded as a science or not?

Y Soc How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?

Sir And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war or to make peace the same as this or different?

Y Soc If we are to be consistent, we must say different.

{305} Sir And we must also suppose that this rules the other if we are not to give up our former notion?

Y Soc True

Sir And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?

Y Soc No other

Sir The art of the general is only ministerial and therefore not political?

Y Soc Exactly

Sir Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge

Y Soc Very good

Sir Does he do anything, but decide the dealings of men with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator—showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity or by

any sort of favour or enmity into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?

Y Soc No his office is such as you describe.

Sir Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal power?

Y Soc True

Sir The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act but to rule over those who are able to act the king ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.

Y Soc True.

Sir And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or one another but are each of them concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several actions.

Y Soc I agree.

Sir And the science which is over them all and has charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all in to one if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call politics.

Y Soc Exactly so

Sir Then now that we have discovered the various classes in a State shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?

{306} Y Soc I greatly wish that you would. Sir Then I must describe the nature of the royal job and show how the various threads are woven into one piece.

Y Soc Clearly

Sir A task has to be accomplished which although difficult, appears to be necessary.

Y Soc Certainly the attempt must be made.

Sir To a sume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants who appeal to popular opinion.

Y Soc I do not understand

Sir Let me put the matter in another way. I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?

Y Soc Certainly I should.

Sir And you would think temperance to be different from courage and likewise to be a part of virtue?

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Y Soc How would you make the division?

Str Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny the rule of the few into aristocracy which has an auspicious name and oligarchy and democracy or the rule of the many which before was one must now be divided

Y Soc On what principle of division?

Str On the same principle as before although the name is now discovered to have a twofold meaning For the distinction of ruling with law or without law applies to this as well as to the rest

Y Soc Yes

Str The division made no difference when we were looking for the perfect State as we showed before But now that this has been separated off and as we said the others alone are left for us the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all

Y Soc That would seem to follow from what has been said

Str Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws is the best of all the six and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to the subject

Y Soc True

[303] *Str* The government of the few which is intermediate between that of the one and many is also intermediate in good and evil but the government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil when compared with the others because the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them And this therefore is the worst of all lawful governments and the best of all lawless ones If they are all without the restraints of law democracy is the form in which to live is best if they are well ordered then this is the last which you should choose as royalty the first form is the best with the exception of the seventh for that excels them all and is among States what God is among men

Y Soc You are quite right and we should choose that above all

Str The members of all these States with the exception of the one which has knowledge may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partisans—upholders of the most monstrous idols and themselves idols and being the greatest imitators and magicians they are also the greatest of Sophists

Y Soc The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians as they are termed

Str And so our satyric drama has been played out and the troop of Centaurs and Satyrs however unwilling to leave the stage have at last been separated from the political scene

Y Soc So I perceive

Str There remain however natures still more troublesome because they are more nearly akin to the king and more difficult to discern the examination of them may be compared in the process of refining gold

Y Soc What is your meaning?

Str The workmen begin by sitting away the earth and stones and the like there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to gold which can only be separated by fire—copper silver and other precious metals these are at last refined away by the use of tests, until the gold is left quite pure

Y Soc Yes that is the way in which these things are said to be done

Str In like manner all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left there remain the nobler arts of the general and the judge and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art [304] and persuades men to do justice and assists in guiding the helm of States—How can we best clear away all these leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed?

Y Soc That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted

Str If the attempt is all that is wanting he shall certainly be brought to light and I think that the illustration of music may assist in exhibiting him Please to answer me a question

Y Soc What question?

Str There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in general?

Y Soc There is

Str And is there any higher art or science having power to decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned—what do you say?

Y Soc I should answer that there is

Str And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the others?

Y Soc Yes

Str And ought the other sciences to be superior to this or no single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others?

Y Soc The latter

Str You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which teaches?

Sir And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. Are they not always warning their country to go to war owing to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty and either utterly ruin their native land or enslave and subject it to its foes?

Y Soc That, again, is true.

Sir Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one another?

Y Soc We cannot deny it.

Sir And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one another and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are endowed with them?

Y Soc True.

Sir Let us consider a further point.

Y Soc What is it?

Sir I want to know whether any constructive art will make any even the most trivial thing out of bad and good materials indistinguishable if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, work out some nature of idea?

Y Soc To be sure.

Sir Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided but will begin by testing human natures in play and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes—she will herself give orders, and maintain authority just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works which she deems necessary for making the web.

Y Soc Quite true.

Sir In like manner the royal science appears to me to be the mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly power will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are vi-

olently carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.

Y Soc That is commonly said.

{309} Sir But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows under the yoke of slavery.

Y Soc Quite right.

Sir The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the Statesman, the kindly art blends and weaves together taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the wool—these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner.

Y Soc In what manner?

Sir First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal nature, and binds that with human cords.

Y Soc I do not understand what you mean.

Sir The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.

Y Soc Yes what else should it be?

Sir Only the Statesman and the good legislator having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.

Y Soc Likely enough.

Sir But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names which are the subject of the present enquiry.

Y Soc Very right.

Sir The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?

Y Soc Certainly.

Sir And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.

Y Soc True

Str I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them

Y Soc What is it?

Str That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature

Y Soc How singular!

Str Yes very—for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one another

Y Soc Yes

Str Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally true or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some respect

Y Soc Tell me how we shall consider that question

Str We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes

Y Soc Explain what are they?

Str Acuteness and quickness whether in body or soul or in the movement of sound and the imitations of them which painting and music supply you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when others praised them

Y Soc Certainly

Str And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?

Y Soc I do not

Str I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which is passing in my mind

Y Soc Why not?

Str You fancy that this is all so easy Well let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they fall When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness whether of mind or body or sound we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage

Y Soc How?

Str We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly and vigorous too and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common attribute of all these natures we certainly praise them

[307] *Y Soc* True

Str And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?

Y Soc To be sure

Str And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?

Y Soc How do you mean?

Str We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow and quiet working of the intellect and of steadiness and gentleness in action of smoothness and depth of voice and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general when these have a proper solemnity Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order

Y Soc Very true.

Str But when on the other hand either of these is out of place the names of either are changed into terms of censure

Y Soc How so?

Str Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness and we may observe that for the most part these qualities and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions and if we pursue the enquiry we shall find that men who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another

Y Soc In what respect?

Str In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned and very likely of many others According to their respective affinities in either class of actions they distribute praise and blame—praise to the actions which are akin to their own blame to those of the opposite party—and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them

Y Soc True

Str The difference between the two classes is often a trivial concern but in a state and when affecting really important matters be comes of all disorders the most hateful

Y Soc To what do you refer?

Str To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life For the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly doing their own business this is their manner of behaving with all men at home and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with foreign States And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace which is often out of season where their influence prevails they become by degrees unwelcome and bring up their young men to be like themselves they are at the mercy of their enemies whence in a few years they and their children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves

[308] *Y Soc* What a cruel fate!

Sir And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. Are they not always making their country to go to war owing to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty and either utterly ruin their native land or enslave and subject it to its foes?

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Y Soc Certainly.

Sir And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.

Y Soc Quite true

Sir Can we say that such a connection as this will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good or that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?

Y Soc Impossible

[310] *Sir* But in those who were originally of a noble nature and who have been nurtured in noble ways and in those only may we not say that union is implanted by law and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?

Y Soc Very true

Sir Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in imagining or when you have imagined in creating the other bonds which are human only

Y Soc How is that and what bonds do you mean?

Sir Rights of intermarriage and ties which are formed between States by giving and taking children in marriage or between individuals by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage connections with our due regard to what is best for the procreation of children

Y Soc In what way?

Sir They seek after wealth and power which in matrimony are objects not worthy even of a serious censure

Y Soc There is no need to consider them at all

Sir More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make family their chief aim and to indicate their error

Y Soc Quite true

Sir They act on no true principle at all they seek their ease and receive with open arms those who are like themselves and hate those who are unlike them being too much influenced by feelings of dislike

Y Soc How so?

Sir The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own and as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class and the courageous do the same they seek natures like their own whereas they should both do precisely the opposite

Y Soc How and why is that?

Sir Because courage when untempered by the gentler nature during many generations

may at first bloom and strengthen but at last bursts forth into downright madness

Y Soc Like enough

Sir And then, as the soul which is over full of modesty and has no element of courage in many successive generations is apt to grow too indolent and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless

Y Soc That again is quite likely

Sir It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and good—indeed in this single work the whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave but to weave them together like the warp and the woof by common sentiments and honours and reputation [311] and by the giving of pledges to one another and out of them forming one smooth and even web to entrust to them the offices of State

Y Soc How do you mean?

Sir Where one officer only is needed you must choose a ruler who has both these qualities—when many you must mingle some of each for the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe but is wanting in thoroughness and go

Y Soc Certainly that is very true

Sir The character of the courageous on the other hand falls short of the former in justice and caution but has the power of action in a remarkable degree and where either of these two qualities is wanting there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private life

Y Soc Certainly they cannot

Sir This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits and enfold ing therein all other inhabitants of cities whether slaves or freemen binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them and in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city in no particular fails to secure their happiness

Y Soc Your picture Stranger of the king and statesman no less than of the Sophist is quite perfect.

PHILEBUS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS



[11] *Soc* —*et* OBSERVE, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are now going to take from Philebus and what the other position is which I maintain and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?

Protarchus By all means.

Soc Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?

Philebus Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.

Soc And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?

Pro I cannot do otherwise, *sc.* since our excellent Philebus has left the field.

Soc Surely the truth about these matters

ought, by all means, to be ascertained.

Pro Certainly.

Soc Shall we further agree—

Pro To what?

Soc That you and I must endeavour to indicate some state and disposition of the soul which has the property of making all men happy.

Pro Yes, by all means.

Soc And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?

Pro True.

Soc And what if there be a third state, which

is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this life, which really has the power of making men happy turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom. [12]

Pro True.

Soc Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated—do you agree?

Pro Certainly.

Soc And what do you say, Philebus?

Phi I say and shall always say that pleasure is easily the conqueror, but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

Pro You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?

Phi True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my soul of you, and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.

Pro You may appeal to us, who too will be the witnesses of your words. And now Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we will proceed with the argument.

Soc Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

Pro Very good.

Soc The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss, let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin,

and consider what her nature is. She has one name and therefore you would imagine that she is one and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike?

Pro. Why Socrates they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure—that is like himself?

Soc. Yes my good friend, just as colour is like colour—in so far as colours are colours there is no difference between them and yet we all know that black is not only unlike but even absolutely opposed to white or again as figure is like figure for all figures are comprehended under one class and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another [13] and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things: therefore do not rely upon this argument which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.

Pro. Very likely but how will this invalidate the argument?

Soc. Why I shall reply that dissimilar as they are you apply to them a new predicate for you say that all pleasant things are good now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue as we are doing that pleasures are oftener bad than good but you call them all good and at the same time are compelled if you are pressed to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures which makes you designate all of them as good.

Pro. What do you mean Socrates? Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and others bad?

Soc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another and sometimes opposed?

Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.

Soc. That is a return to the old position Protarchus and so we are to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures but that they

are all alike and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce our dull minds but we go on arguing all the same like the weakest and most inexperienced reasoners?

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Why I mean to say that in self-defence I may if I like follow your example and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike and the result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing and the argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back and return to the old position then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another.

Pro. How do you mean?

Soc. Shall I Protarchus have my own question asked of me by you?

Pro. What question?

Soc. Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind and those other qualities which I when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good affirmed to be good are not in the same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. The sciences are a numerous class and will be found to present great differences. But even admitting that like the pleasures they are opposite as well as different [14] should I be worthy of the name of dialectician if in order to avoid this difficulty I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science and another—would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy?

Pro. May none of this befall us except the deliverance! Yet I like the even handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then that there are many and diverse pleasures and many and different sciences.

Soc. And let us have no concealment Protarchus of the differences between my good and yours but let us bring them to the light in the hope that in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good or wisdom or some third quality for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth.

Pro. Certainly we ought.

Soc. Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument rests.

Pro. What principle?

Soc A principle about which all men are at wars in a difficulty and some men sometimes against their will.

Pro. Speak plainer

Soc The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature, for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful propositions, and he who affirms either is very open to attack.

Pro. Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many dividing the single "me" into many "me's," and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy and in ten thousand other ways?

Soc Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own words "Why then" is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.

Pro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged? [15]

Soc When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed but when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to them, and similar matters and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy.

Pro. Of what nature?

Soc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real existence and then how each individual unity being always the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the unity of the world of generation, or as self-entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same can be at the same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to which

they relate they are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.

Pro. Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.

Soc. That is what I should wish.

Pro. And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed. Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir him up with questions.

Soc. Good and where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?

Pro. How?

Soc. We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and that now as in time past, they run about together in and out of every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and locating them together now unfolding and dividing them he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are older or younger [16] or of his own age—that makes no difference neither father nor mother does he spare no human being, who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.

Pro. Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean but is there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into that way and we will do our best to follow for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant.

Soc. The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need.

Pro. Tell us what that is.

Soc. One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of application it is the

and consider what her nature is. She has one name and therefore you would imagine that she is one and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!

Pro Why, Socrates they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure—that is like himself?

Soc Yes my good friend just as colour is like colour—in so far as colours are colours there is no difference between them and yet we all know that black is not only unlike but even absolutely opposed to white or again as figure is like figure for all figures are comprehended under one class and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another [13] and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things therefore do not rely up on this argument which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.

Pro Very likely but how will this invalidate the argument?

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Pro What question?

Soc Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind and those other qualities which I when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good affirmed to be good are not in the same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.

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Pro May none of this befall us except the deliverance! Yet I like the even handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume then that there are many and diverse pleasures and many and different sciences.

Soc And let us have no concealment. Protarchus of the differences between my good and yours but let us bring them to the light in the hope that in the process of testing them they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good or wisdom or some third quality for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth.

Pro Certainly we ought.

Soc Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument rests.

Pro What principle?

Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth observing that the human voice was infinite first distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the semi-vowels) these too exist in a definite number and lastly he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, and divided these, and like wise the two other classes of vowels and semi-vowels, into the individual sounds and told the number of them and gave to each and all of them the name of letters and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all and in consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters.

Phi The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement but I still feel the defect of which I just now complained.

Soc Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?

Phi Yes that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.

Soc Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which as you say you have been so long asking?

Phi How so?

Soc Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?

Phi Certainly.

Soc And we maintain that they are each of them one?

Phi True.

Soc And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is how they are one and also many [i.e. how they have one genus and many species] and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity?

[19] *Pro* That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has in curiosity brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him there may be something ridiculous in my being, unable to answer and therefore imposing the task upon you when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer the result in this would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider then what we are to do.—Socrates, if I understood him rightly is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature

of them and the same of wisdom.

Soc Most true O son of Callias and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything, that has unity likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.

Pro That seems to be very near the truth Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all things and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell you. You Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good you answered—No not those but another class of goods and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said and very properly in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled and you agreed and placed yourself at our disposal. And now as children say what has been fairly given cannot be taken back cease then to fight against us in this way.

Soc In what way?

[20] *Phi* Do not perplex us and keep asking questions of us to which we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give. Let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer do you answer as you have promised. Consider then, whether you will decide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds or you may let the matter drop if you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.

Soc If you say that I have nothing to apprehend for the words "if you are willing" dispel all my fear and moreover a god seems to have recalled something to my mind.

Phi What is that?

Soc I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good but some third thing which was different from them and better than either. If this be clearly established

parent of all the discoveries in the arts

Pro Tell us what it is

Soc A gift of heaven which as I conceive the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus and therewith a blaze of light and the ancients who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are handed down the tradition that whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many and have the finite and infinite implanted in them seeing then that such is the order of the world we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry this unity we shall find in every thing Having found it we may next proceed to look for two if there be two or, if not then for three or some other number subdividing each of these units until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite but also a definite number the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered—then and not till then we may rest from division and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity This as I was saying is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another which the gods have handed down to us [17] But the wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity Having no method they make their one and many anyhow and from unity pass at once to infinity the intermediate steps never occur to them And thus I repeat is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic

Pro I think that I partly understand you Socrates but I should like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying

Soc I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet Protarchus which you were made to learn as a child

Pro How do they afford an illustration?

Soc The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite

Pro Very true

Soc And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian

Pro Very true.

Soc And the knowledge which makes a man

a musician is of the same kind

Pro How so?

Soc Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?

Pro Certainly

Soc And there is a higher note and a lower note and a note of equal pitch—may we affirm so much?

Pro Yes

Soc But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you knew though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of music

Pro Nothing

Soc But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions and the systems compounded out of them which our fathers discovered and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human body which when measured by numbers ought as they say to be called rhythms and measures and they tell us that the same principle should be applied to every one and many—when I say you have learned all this, then my dear friend you are perfect and you may be said to understand any other subject when you have a similar grasp of it But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them when not classified creates in every one of us a state of infinite ignorance and he who never looks for number in anything will not himself be looked for in the number of famous men

[18] *Pro* I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent Philebus

Phi I think so too but how do his words bear upon us and upon the argument?

Soc Philebus is right in asking that question of us Protarchus

Pro Indeed he is and you must answer him

Soc I will but you must let me make one little remark first about these matters I was saying that he who begins with any individual unity should proceed from that not to infinity but to a definite number and now I say conversely that he who has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity but he should look about for some number representing a certain quantity and thus out of all end in one And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters

Pro What do you mean?

Soc Some god or divine man who in the

chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.

Pro Certainly that seems to be true.

Soc And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?

Phr Neither in your "mind" the good, *Soc* rates, for that will be open to the same objections.

Soc Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my mind but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. How ever I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place and does not, if I may trust my own mind attain even to the third.

Pro Truly Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall in fighting for the palm [23] she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.

Soc Well but had we not better leave her now and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?

Pro Nonsense, Socrates.

Soc Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?

Pro Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument.

Soc Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from those which I used before some, however of

the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?

Pro Of course you must.

Soc Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.

Pro What do you mean?

Soc Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather if you do not object, into three classes.

Pro Upon what principle would you make the division?

Soc Let us take some of our newly found notions.

Pro Which of them?

Soc Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence and also an infinite?

Pro Certainly.

Soc Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration.

Pro What do you mean my good friend?

Soc I say that a fourth class is still wanted.

Pro What will that be?

Soc Find the cause of the third or compound and add this as a fourth class to the three others.

Pro And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?

Soc Not, I think, at present but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have it.

Pro Certainly.

Soc Let us begin with the first three and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed let us endeavor to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.

[24] *Pro* If you would explain to me a little more about them perhaps I might be able to follow you.

Soc Well the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite. I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many and the finite may be hereafter discussed.

Pro I agree.

Soc And now consider well for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end the more and less would themselves have an end.

then pleasure will lose the victory for the good will cease to be identified with her —Am I not right?

Pro Yes

Soc And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed

Pro Capital Socrates pray go on as you propose

Soc But let us first agree on some little points

Pro What are they?

Soc Is the good perfect or imperfect?

Pro The most perfect Socrates of all things

Soc And is the good sufficient?

Pro Yes, certainly and in a degree surpassing all other things

Soc And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good and are eager to catch and have the good about them and care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good

Pro That is undeniable

Soc Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom and pass them in review

Pro How do you mean?

Soc Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good it cannot be supposed to want anything but if either is shown to want anything then it cannot really be the chief good

[21] *Pro* Impossible

Soc And will you help us to test these two lives?

Pro Certainly

Soc Then answer

Pro Ask

Soc Would you choose Protarchus to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Pro Certainly I should

Soc Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

Pro Certainly not

Soc Reflect would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?

Pro Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things

Soc Living thus you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?

Pro I should

Soc But if you had neither mind nor memory, nor knowledge nor true opinion you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence

Pro Certainly

Soc And similarly if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure and your life would be the life not of a man but of an oyster or *pulmo marinus*. Could this be otherwise?

Pro No

Soc But is such a life eligible?

Pro I cannot answer you Socrates the argument has taken away from me the power of speech

Soc We must keep up our spirits —let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn

Pro And what is this life of mind?

Soc I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things but having no sense of pleasure or pain and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?

Pro Neither life Socrates appears eligible to me or is likely as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else

[22] *Soc* What would you say Protarchus, to both of these in one or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

Pro Out of the union that is of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

Soc Yes that is the life which I mean

Pro There can be no difference of opinion not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two and in addition to them

Soc But do you see the consequence?

Pro To be sure I do The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal

Soc Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life and if any of us had chosen any other he would have

Soc Or again when cold and heat prevail does not the introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmony?

Pro Certainly

Soc And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?

Pro Most true

Soc I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul. O my beautiful Philebus the goddess methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things and that there was in them no limit in pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order whereby as you say Philebus, she torments or as I maintain, delivers the soul.—What think you, Protarchus?

Po Her ways are much to my mind Soc rates.

Soc You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?

Pro Yes, I think that I understand you you mean to say that the infinite is one class and that the finite is a second class of existences but what you would make the third I am not so certain.

Soc That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear friend but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed with the name of more and less and therefore appeared one.

Po True

Soc And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily acknowledged it to be by nature one.

Po Yes

Soc Yes, indeed and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being effected by the measure which the limit introduces.

Po I understand

Soc Still there was as we said a fourth class to be in estimated, and you must assist in the investigation for does not everything which comes into being of necessity come into being through a cause?

Po Yes certainly for how can there be any thing which has no cause?

Soc And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?

[27] Pro Very true.

Soc And the same may be said of the patient, or effect we shall find that they too differ as I was saying only in name—shall we not?

Pro We shall

Soc The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?

Pro Certainly

Soc Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same but different?

Pro True

Soc Did not the things which were generated and the things out of which they were generated furnish all the three classes?

Pro Yes.

Soc And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them—and may therefore be called a fourth principle?

Pro So let us call it.

Soc Quite right but now having distinguished the four I think that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order.

Pro By all means

Soc Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited and the second the finite or limited then follows the third an essence compound and generated and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.

Pro Certainly not.

Soc And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?

Pro We were

Soc And now having determined these points shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?

Po I dare say

Soc We said if you remember that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror—did we not?

Pro True.

Soc And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?

Pro Beyond a doubt.

Soc This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class which is not composed of any two particular ingredients but of all the elements of infinity bound down by the finite,

Pro That is most true

Soc Ever as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less

Pro Yes

Soc Then says the argument there is never any end of them and being endless they must also be infinite

Pro Yes Socrates that is exceedingly true

Soc Yes my dear Protarchus and your answer reminds me that such an expression as exceedingly which you have just uttered and also the term gently have the same significance as more or less for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity—they are always introducing degrees into actions instituting a comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle and at each creation of more or less quantity disappears. For as I was just now saying if quantity and measure did not disappear but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives these last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted there can be no longer a hotter or a colder (for these are always progressing and are never in one stay) but definite quantity is at rest and has ceased its progress. Which proves that comparatives such as the hotter and the colder are to be ranked in the class of the infinite

Pro Your remark certainly has the look of truth Socrates but these subjects as you were saying are difficult to follow at first I think however that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or twice there would be a substantial agreement between us

Soc Yes, and I will try to meet your wish but as I would rather not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars let me know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite—

[25] *Pro* What?

Soc I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less or are denoted by the words exceedingly gently extremely and the like may not be referred to the class of the infinite which is their unity for as was asserted in the previous argument all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought together and have the mark or seal of some one nature if possible set upon them—do you remember?

Pro Yes

Soc And all things which do not admit of more or less but admit their opposites that is to say first of all equality and the equal or

again the double or any other ratio of number and measure—all these may, I think be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite what do you say?

Pro Excellent Socrates

Soc And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound kind?

Pro You I think will have to tell me that.

Soc Rather God will tell you if there be any God who will listen to my prayers

Pro Offer up a prayer then and think

Soc I am thinking Protarchus and I believe that some God has befriended us

Pro What do you mean and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?

Soc I will tell you and do you listen to my words

Pro Proceed

Soc Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?

Pro True

Soc Add to them drier wetter more, less, swifter slower greater smaller and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity of more and less

Pro In the class of the infinite you mean?

Soc Yes and now mingle this with the other

Pro What is the other?

Soc The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together as we did the infinite but perhaps it will come to the same thing if we do so now—when the two are combined a third will appear

Pro What do you mean by the class of the finite?

Soc The class of the equal and the double and any class which puts an end to difference and opposition and by introducing number creates harmony and proportion among the different elements

Pro I understand you seem to me to mean that the various opposites when you mingle with them the class of the finite takes certain forms

Soc Yes, that is my meaning

Pro Proceed

Soc Does not the right participation in the finite give health—in disease for instance?

Pro Certainly

[26] *Soc* And whereas the high and low the swift and the slow are infinite or unlimited does not the addition of the principles afore said introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?

Pro Yes certainly

I am not mistaken of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?

Pro Why, how could any man who gave another be deceived in his senses?

Soc I do not think that he could—but now go on to the next step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?

Pro We did.

Soc And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered to be a body because made up of the same elements.

Pro Very true.

Soc But is our body nourished wholly by this body or is this body nourished by our body thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?

Pro That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.

[30] *Soc* Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?

Pro What question?

Soc May our body be said to have a soul?

Pro Clearly.

Soc And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way surer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

Pro Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

Soc Why, yes, Protarchus, for surely we can not imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the touch, which enters into all things, governs our bodies, souls, and the art of self-maintenance, and of healing disease and operating in other ways to heal and organize has in it too all the attributes of wisdom—we can not, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the cause, heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only surer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest thing.

Pro Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

Soc Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintain that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken as well as a presiding cause, if not a power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

Pro Most justly.

Soc And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?

Pro Certainly not.

Soc And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other attributes by which they are pleased to be called.

Pro Very true.

Soc Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.

Pro True.

Soc And they furnish an answer to my enquiry (cf. 28) for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of all, and I think that you now have my answer.

Pro I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered.

Soc A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts earnest.

[31] *Pro* Very true.

Soc I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.

Pro True.

Soc And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?

Pro Yes.

Soc And let us remember too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this family, and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.

Pro I shall be sure to remember.

Soc We must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined, and yet pleasure cannot be rightly treated apart from pain.

Pro If this is the road, let us take it.

Soc I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.

Pro What do you mean?

Soc I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.

Pro And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforementioned classes is the mixed one?

Soc I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.

and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life

Pro Most true

Soc And what shall we say Philebus of your life which is all sweetness and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?

Phi Let me hear

Soc Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

Phi They belong to the class which admits of more. Socrates, for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree

[28] *Soc* Nor would pain Philebus be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now—admitting if you like that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes O Protarchus and Philebus can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point

Phi You magnify, Socrates the importance of your favourite god

Soc And you my friend are also magnifying your favourite goddess but still I must beg you to answer the question

Pro Socrates is quite right Philebus and we must submit to him

Phi And did not you Protarchus propose to answer in my place?

Pro Certainly I did but I am now in a great strait and I must entreat you Socrates to be our spokesman and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite

Soc I must obey you Protarchus nor is the task which you impose a difficult one but did I really as Philebus implies disconcert you with my playful solemnity when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?

Phi You did indeed, Socrates

Soc Yet the answer is easy since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind if you do not object a little more fully

Phi Take your own course Socrates and never mind length we shall not tire of you

Soc Very good let us begin then, Protarchus by asking a question

Pro What question?

Soc Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley or on the contrary, as our fathers have declared ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom

Pro Wide asunder are the two assertions illustrious Socrates for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world and of the sun, and of the moon and of the stars and of the whole circle of the heavens and never will I say or think otherwise

Soc Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine—not merely reasserting the notions of others without risk to ourselves [29]—but shall we share in the danger and take our part of the reproach which will await us when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?

Pro That would certainly be my wish

Soc Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument

Pro Let me hear

Soc We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals fire water air and as the storm tossed sailor cries land [1 e, earth] reappear in the constitution of the world

Pro The proverb may be applied to us for truly the storm gathers over us and we are at our wit's end

Soc There is something to be remarked about each of these elements

Pro What is it?

Soc Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us and that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them there is fire within us and in the universe

Pro True

Soc And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty and in every power that fire has

Pro Most true

Soc And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us or is the fire in you and me and in other animals dependent on the universal fire?

Pro That is a question which does not deserve an answer

Soc Right and you would say the same if Cf. 28 30

impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her ownest or the second place, should she have to return to the first.

Pro. Just so.

Soc. The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying, is purely mental, is entirely dependent on memory.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. I must first of all analyse memory or rather perception which is prior to memory if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up.

Pro. How will you proceed?

Soc. Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other affections which strike through both soul and body and impart a shock to both and to each of them.

Po. Granted.

Soc. And the soul may be truly said to be conscious of the first but not of the second?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense for forgetfulness is the exit of memory which in this case has not entered and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction do you see?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Then just be so good as to change the terms.

Po. How shall I change them?

[34] Soc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body say unconsciousness.

Pro. I see.

Soc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. Then now we know the meaning of the word.

Po. Yes.

Soc. And memory may I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?

Pro. Right.

Soc. But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?

Pro. I think so.

Soc. And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering when by herself some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. There is a reason why I say all this.

Pro. What is it?

Soc. I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only apart from the body and the previous analysis helps to show the nature of both.

Pro. Then now Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.

Soc. There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole composition of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.

Pro. Ay let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.

Soc. Nay Protagoras, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.

Pro. A fair retort but let us proceed.

Soc. Did we not place hunger thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And yet they are very different what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?

Pro. By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily answered but it must be answered.

Soc. Then let us go back to our examples.

Pro. Where shall we begin?

Soc. Do we mean anything when we say "a man thirsts"?

Po. Yes.

Soc. We mean to say that he "is empty"?

Pro. Of course.

Soc. And is not thirst desire?

Pro. Yes, of drink.

[35] Soc. Would you say of drink, or of repletion with drink?

Pro. I should say of repletion with drink.

Soc. Then he who is empty desires, as would appear the opposite of what he experiences for he is empty and desires to be full?

Pro. Clearly so.

Soc. But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or

Pro Very good

Soc Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four

Pro That which followed the infinite and the finite and in which you ranked health and if I am not mistaken harmony

Soc Capital and now will you please to give me your best attention?

Pro Proceed I am attending

Soc I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain

Pro That is very probable

Soc And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment

Pro I believe that you are right Socrates but will you try to be a little plainer?

Soc Do not obvious and every day phenomena furnish the simple illustration?

Pro What phenomena do you mean?

Soc Hunger for example is a dissolution and a pain

Pro True

Soc Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasurer

[32] *Pro* Yes

Soc Thirst again is a destruction and a pain but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure once more the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant

Pro Very true

Soc And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite which as I was observing before make up the class of living beings is pain and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?

Pro Granted what you say has a general truth

Soc Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?

Pro Good

Soc Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing and an expecta-

tion of pain fearful and anxious

Pro Yes this is another class of pleasures and pains which is of the soul only apart from the body and is produced by expectation

Soc Right for in the analysis of these pure, as I suppose them to be the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned and whether pleasure and pain like heat and cold and other things of the same kind are not some times to be desired and sometimes not to be desired as being not in themselves good but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good

Pro You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue

Soc Well then assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution And mind what you say I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain great or small?

Pro Certainly not

[33] *Soc* Then here we have a third state over and above that of pleasure and of pain?

Pro Very true

Soc And do not forget that there is such a state it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure whether we remember this or not And I should like to say a few words about it

Pro What have you to say?

Soc Why you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state

Pro You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?

Soc Yes and if I remember rightly when the lives were compared no degree of pleasure whether great or small was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom

Pro Yes certainly we said so

Soc Then he will live without pleasure and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?

Pro If so the gods at any rate cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow

Soc Certainly not—there would be a great

Pro. Right.

Soc. I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.

Pro. How so?

Soc. Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?

Pro. To be sure I do.

Soc. Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?

Pro. So we have always held, Socrates.

[3] Soc. But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?

Pro. I think that we should.

Soc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And such a thing as pleasure?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And an opinion must be of something?

Pro. True.

Soc. And a man must be pleased by some thing.

Pro. Quite correct.

Soc. And whether the opinion be right or wrong makes no difference: it will still be an opinion.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not will always have a real feeling of pleasure.

Pro. Yes: that is also quite true.

Soc. Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?

Pro. Yes: that is the question.

Soc. You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality: and this is what you think should be examined?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And further: even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity: as was indeed said long ago by us.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?

Pro. Quite true, Socrates.

Soc. And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure: and in like manner of the reverse of rightness?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if the thing, opined be erroneous, might we not say that opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?

Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken: how could we?

Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?

[38] Pro. Certainly it does: and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false.

Soc. How eagerly Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure!

Pro. Nay Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.

Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?

Pro. There must be a very great difference between them.

Soc. Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.

Pro. Lead, and I will follow.

Soc. Well, then, my view is—

Pro. What is it?

Soc. We agree—do we not?—that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these—upon true and false opinion, I mean.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?

Pro. Of what nature?

Soc. An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.

Pro. Very likely.

Soc. Soon he begins to interrogate himself.

memory to any apprehension of replenishment of which he has no present or past experience?

Pro Impossible

Soc And yet he who desires surely desires something?

Pro Of course

Soc He does not desire that which he experiences for he experiences thirst and thirst is emptiness but he desires replenishment?

Pro True

Soc Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?

Pro There must

Soc And that cannot be the body for the body is supposed to be emptied?

Pro Yes

Soc The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory as is obvious, for what other way can there be?

Pro I cannot imagine any other

Soc But do you see the consequence?

Pro What is it?

Soc That there is no such thing as desire of the body

Pro Why so?

Soc Why because the argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state

Pro Yes

Soc And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state

Pro True

Soc And the argument having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul

Pro Most true

Soc The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience

Pro Quite right

Soc Let me make a further observation the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections

Pro Of what affections and of what kind of life are you speaking?

Soc I am speaking of being emptied and replenished and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings as well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it

Pro True

Soc And what would you say of the intermediate state?

Pro What do you mean by intermediate?

Soc I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which if they would only return would relieve him but as yet he has them not May we not say of him that he is in an intermediate state? [36]

Pro Certainly

Soc Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?

Pro Nay I should say that he has two pains in his body there is the actual experience of pain and in his soul longing and expectation

Soc What do you mean Protarchus by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled and at other times be quite in despair?

Pro Very true

Soc And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?

Pro Certainly

Soc Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?

Pro I suppose so

Soc But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled there will be the double experience of pain You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single case possible

Pro Quite true Socrates

Soc Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?

Pro What question?

Soc Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?

Pro But how Socrates can there be false pleasures and pains?

Soc And how Protarchus can there be true and false fears or true and false expectations or true and false opinions?

Pro I grant that opinions may be true or false but not pleasures

Soc What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry

Pro There I agree

Soc And yet my boy for you are one of Philebus boys (cf 16) the point to be considered is whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument

Pro Surely

Soc No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed what is said should be pertinent

that they are false pleasures.

Pro. They are.

Soc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?

Pro. Doubtless.

Soc. Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous misnomer of the true, and there are pains of a similar character?

Pro. There are.

Soc. And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And this was the source of false opinion and opinion—am I not right?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?

Pro. How do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have a real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow, and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had a real existence, and, more often than true, are never likely to exist.

Pro. Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.

Soc. And may not the same be said about fear and shame, and the like—are they not often false?

Pro. Quite so.

Soc. And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?

Pro. In no other way.

[41] Soc. Nor can pleasures be considered to be bad except in so far as they are false.

Pro. Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth, for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.

Soc. Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption, we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.

Pro. Very true, that is to say, at there are such pleasures.

Soc. I think that there are, Protagoras, but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Then now like wrestlers, let us ap-

proach and grasp this new argument.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. We are maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul—do you remember?

Pro. Yes, I remember that you said so.

Soc. And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.

Pro. What am I to infer?

Soc. That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously, and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown.

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. And there is another point to which we have agreed.

Pro. What is it?

Soc. That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites.

Pro. Certainly we said so.

Soc. But how can we rightly judge of them?

Pro. How can we?

Soc. It is our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure.

Pro. Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.

[42] Soc. Well take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely, and do we not find the same misnomer happening in the case of pleasures and pains?

Pro. Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.

Soc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.

Pro. What was that?

Soc. Then these opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison, the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures.

Pro In what manner?

Soc He asks himself— What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree? This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance

Pro True

Soc To which he may guess the right answer, saying, as if in a whisper to himself— It is a man

Pro Very good

Soc Or again he may be misled and then he will say— No it is a figure made by the shepherds

Pro Yes

Soc And if he has a companion he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds and what was before an opinion has now become a proposition

Pro Certainly

Soc But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time

Pro Very true

Soc Well now I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of this phenomenon

Pro What is your explanation?

Soc I think that the soul at such times is like a book

Pro How so?

[39] *Soc* Memory and perception meet and they and their attendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the soul and when the inscribing feeling writes truly then true opinions and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls—but when the scribe within us writes falsely the result is false

Pro I quite assent and agree to your statement

Soc I must bespeak your favour also for another artist who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul

Pro Who is he?

Soc The painter who after the scribe has done his work draws images in the soul of the things which he has described

Pro But when and how does he do this?

Soc When a man besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them—is not this a very common mental phenomenon?

Pro Certainly

Soc And the images answering to true opin-

ions and words are true and to false opinions and words false are they no?

Pro They are

Soc If we are right so far there arises a further question

Pro What is it?

Soc Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?

Pro I should say in relation to all times alike

Soc Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future?

Pro Most true

Soc And do all those writings and paintings which as we were saying a little while ago are produced in us, relate to the past and present only and not to the future?

Pro To the future very much

Soc When you say Very much you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence?

Pro Exactly

Soc Answer me another question

Pro What question?

Soc A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods is he not?

Pro Certainly he is

Soc And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?

[40] *Pro* True

Soc And all men as we were saying just now are always filled with hopes?

Pro Certainly

Soc And these hopes as they are termed are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?

Pro Yes

Soc And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold and pleasures ensuing and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune

Pro True

Soc And may we not say that the good being friends of the gods have generally true pictures presented to them and the bad false pictures?

Pro Certainly

Soc The bad too have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good but I presume

Soc And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?

Pro They say so

Soc And they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure

Pro I suppose not.

Soc And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures they are wrong

Po But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.

Soc Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just now saying or that they are two only—the one being a state of pain, which is an evil and the other a cessation of pain which is of itself a good, and is called pleasant?

Pro But why Socrates do we ask the question as all? I do not see the reason.

Soc You, Protarchus have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus

Pro And who may they be?

Soc Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy who deny the very existence of pleasure.

Pro Indeed!

Soc They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

Po And would you, Socrates have us agree with them?

Soc Why no I would rather use them as a sort of diviners who divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound and her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view we will bring her up for judgment.

Po Well said

Soc Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say something of this sort they would begin at the beginning, and ask whether if we wanted to know the nature of any quality such as hardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus shall answer these severe gentlemen so you answer me

Pro By all means, and I reply to them, that

you should look at the greatest instances

Soc Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, [45] but at the most extreme and most vehement?

Pro In that every one will agree.

Soc And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures as we have often said are the pleasures of the body?

Pro Certainly

Soc And are they felt by us to be as become greater when we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer or we shall come to grief

Pro How will that be?

Soc Why because we might be tempted to answer "When we are in health"

Pro Yes, that is the natural answer

Soc Well but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?

Pro True

Soc And do not people who are in a fever or any similar illness feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?

Pro That is obvious as soon as it is said.

Soc Well then shall we not be right in saying that if a person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish—do not imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well but understand that I am speaking of the magnitude of pleasure. I want to know where pleasures are found to be most intense. For as I say we have to discover what is pleasure and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence

Pro I think I follow you.

Soc You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you do or not, Protarchus. Answer now and tell me whether you see I will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance? Reflect before you speak.

Pro I understand you, and see that there is a great difference between them the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of "Never too much," which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with delight.

Soc Very good and if this be true then the

Pro Certainly and for the reason which you mention

Soc And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are you will acknowledge that this element is illusory and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true

Pro Certainly not

Soc Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings which are still more false than these

Pro What are they and how shall we find them?

Soc If I am not mistaken I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions and dissolutions and repletions and evacuations and also by growth and decay?

Pro Yes that has been often said

Soc And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?

Pro Right

Soc But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes

Pro When can that be Socrates?

Soc Your question Protarchus does not help the argument

Pro Why not Socrates?

Soc Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine

Pro And what was that?

Soc Why Protarchus admitting that there is no such interval I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?

Pro You mean what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?

Soc Yes

Pro Why then Socrates I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain

[43] *Soc* Very good but still if I am not mistaken you do assert that we must always be experiencing one of them that is what the wise tell us for say they all things are ever flowing up and down

Pro Yes and their words are of no mean authority

Soc Of course for they are no mean authorities themselves and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight

Pro How?

Soc To them we will say Good but are we, or living things in general always conscious of what happens to us—for example, of our growth or the like? Are we not on the contrary almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena? You must answer for them

Pro The latter alternative is the true one

Soc Then we were not right in saying just now that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?

Pro True

Soc A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be—

Pro What?

Soc If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither

Pro That Socrates is the more correct mode of speaking

Soc But if this be true the life to which I was just now referring again appears

Pro What life?

Soc The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of joy

Pro Very true

Soc We may assume then that there are three lives one pleasant one painful and the third which is neither what say you?

Pro I should say as you do that there are three of them

Soc But if so the negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure

Pro Certainly not

Soc Then when you hear a person saying that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things what would you understand him to mean by that statement?

Pro I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain

Soc Let us take any three things or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold the second silver and there shall be a third which is neither

Pro Very good

Soc Now can that which is neither be either gold or silver?

Pro Impossible

Soc No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful

Pro Certainly not

[44] *Soc* And yet my friend there are as we know persons who say and think so

Pro Certainly

Soc. And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?

Pro. They say so.

Soc. And they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure.

Pro. I suppose not.

Soc. And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are wrong.

Pro. But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.

Soc. Then shall we take the view that they are like, as we were just now saying, or that they are two only—the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is called pleasure?

Pro. But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see the reason.

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Soc. They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

Pro. And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?

Soc. Why no, I would rather use them as a sort of drimmers, who divine the truth, not by means of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has at the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence is declared by them to be wandering, and not pleasure. Thus is the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view we will bring her up for judgment.

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Pro. In that every one will agree.

Soc. And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of the body?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater when we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer or we shall come to grief.

Pro. How will that be?

Soc. Why because we might be tempted to answer "When we are in health."

Pro. Yes, that is the natural answer.

Soc. Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?

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Pro. I understand you, and see that there is a great difference between them: the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of "never too much," which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wanton becomes madness and makes them shout with delight.

Soc. Very good, and if this be true, then the

greatest pleasures and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body and not in a virtuous state

[46] *Pro* Certainly

Soc And ought we not to select some of these for examination and see what makes them the greatest?

Pro To be sure we ought

Soc Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain disorders

Pro What disorders?

Soc The pleasures of unseemly disorders which our severe friends utterly detest

Pro What pleasures?

Soc Such for example as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching which is the only remedy required For what in Heaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?—Pleasure or pain?

Pro A villainous mixture of some kind *Soc* rates I should say

Soc I did not introduce the argument O Protarchus with any personal reference to Philabus but because without the consideration of these and similar pleasures we shall not be able to determine the point at issue

Pro Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures

Soc You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?

Pro Exactly

Soc There are some mixtures which are of the body and only in the body and others which are of the soul and only in the soul while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains common both to soul and body which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains

Pro How is that?

Soc Whenever in the restoration or in the derangement of nature a man experiences two opposite feelings for example when he is cold and is growing warm or again when he is hot and is becoming cool and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other—the sweet has a bitter as the common saying is and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction

Pro That description is very true to nature

Soc And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal and sometimes one or other of them predominates?

Pro True

Soc Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure an example is afforded by itching of which we were just now speaking and by the

tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected then if you put them to the fire and as a last resort apply cold to them you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts [47] and this is due to the forcible separation of what is united or to the union of what is separated and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain

Pro Quite so

Soc Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man and the slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle and causes a gentle irritation or again the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him—he even leaps for joy he assumes all sorts of attitudes he changes all manner of colours he gasps for breath and is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations

Pro Yes indeed

Soc He will say of himself and others will say of him that he is dying with these delights and the more dissipated and good for nothing he is the more vehemently he pursues them in every way of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind

Pro That Socrates is a very true description of the opinions of the majority about pleasures

Soc Yes Protarchus quite true of the mixed pleasures which arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to the body whether of pleasure or pain and the two unite and form one mixture Concerning these I have already remarked that when a man is empty he desires to be full and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity But now I must further add what I omitted before that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable) pleasure and pain coalesce in one

Pro I believe that to be quite true

Soc There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains

Pro What is that?

Soc The union which as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings

Pro What do you mean?

Soc Why do we not speak of anger fear
sorrow love, emulation envy and the
like, as pains which belong to the soul only?

Pro Yes.

Soc And shall we not find them also full of
the most wonderful pleasures? need I remind
you of the anger?

*Which are even a worse man's than
a distasteful honey and the honeycomb?*

And you remember how pleasures mingle with
pains in lamentation [43] and bereavement?

Pro Yes, there is a natural connection be-
tween them.

Soc And you remember also how at the sight
of tragedies the spectators smile through their
tears?

Pro Certainly I do.

Soc And are you aware that even at a com-
edy the soul experiences a mixed feeling, of pain
and pleasure?

Pro I do not quite understand you.

Soc I admit, Proarchus, that there is some
difficulty in recognizing this mixture of feel-
ings at a comedy.

Pro There is, I think.

Soc And the greater the obscurity of the
case the more desirable is the examination of
it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases
of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.

Pro Proceed.

Soc I have just mentioned envy would you
not call that a pain of the soul?

Pro Yes.

Soc And yet the envious man finds some
thing in the misfortunes of his neighbours at
which he is pained?

Pro Certainly.

Soc And ignorance, and what is termed
do-mineering, are surely an evil?

Pro To be sure.

Soc From these considerations learn to know
the nature of the ridiculous.

Pro Explain.

Soc The ridiculous is in short the specific
name which is used to describe the vicious form
of a certain habit and of vice in general it is
that kind which is most at variance with the
description at Delphi.

Pro You mean, Socrates know thyself.

Soc I do and the opposite would be, know
not thyself.

Pro Certainly.

Soc And now O Protarchus, try to divide
this into three.

Pro Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.

Soc Do you mean to say that I must make
the division for you?

Pro Yes, and what is more, I beg that you
will.

Soc Are there not three ways in which igno-
rance of self may be shown?

Pro What are they?

Soc In the first place, about money the ig-
norant may fancy himself richer than he is.

Pro Yes, that is a very common error.

Soc And still more often he will fancy that
he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has
some other advantage of person which he really
has not.

Pro Of course.

Soc And yet surely by far the greatest num-
ber err about the goods of the mind they im-
agine themselves to be much better men than
they are. [49]

Pro Yes that is by far the commonest delu-
sion.

Soc And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the
one which the mass of mankind are always
claiming, and which most arouses in them a
spirit of contention and lying conceit of wis-
dom?

Pro Certainly.

Soc And may not all this be truly called an
evil condition?

Pro Very evil.

Soc But we must pursue the division a step
further Protarchus, if we would see in envy of
the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure
and pain.

Pro How can we make the further division
which you suggest?

Soc All who are silly enough to entertain
this lying conceit of themselves may of course
be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two
classes—one having power and might and the
other the reverse.

Pro Certainly.

Soc Let us, then, be the principle of divi-
sion those of them who are weak and unable
to revenge themselves, when they are laughed
at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who
can defend themselves may be more truly de-
scribed as strong and formidable for ignorance
in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because
harmful to others both in reality and in fiction,
but powerless ignorance may be reckoned and
in truth is, ridiculous.

Pro That is very true, but I do not as yet see
where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.

Soc Well, then, let us examine the nature of
envy.

Pro Proceed

Soc Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure and also an unrighteous pain?

Pro Most true

Soc There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?

Pro Certainly not

Soc But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes—is not that wrong?

Pro Undoubtedly

Soc Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?

Pro True

Soc And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty of wisdom and of wealth are ridiculous if they are weak and detestable when they are powerful. May we not say as I was saying before that our friends who are in this state of mind when harmless to others are simply ridiculous?

Pro They are ridiculous

Soc And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?

Pro Certainly

Soc And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?

Pro Clearly we feel pleasure

[50] *Soc* And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?

Pro Certainly

Soc Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends' pleasure in mingling with envy mingles with pain for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain and laughter is pleasant and so we envy and laugh at the same instant

Pro True

Soc And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations and in tragedy and comedy not only on the stage but on the greater stage of human life and so in endless other cases

Pro I do not see how any one can deny what you say Socrates however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion

Soc I mentioned anger desire sorrow fear love emulation envy and similar emotions as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named did I not?

Pro Yes

Soc We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger

Pro I see

Soc Then many other cases still remain?

Pro Certainly

Soc And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections and I thought that when I had given you the illustration you would have let me off and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul and the soul without the body as well as the two united are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words—if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction and go to other matters which remain to be settled before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands

Pro Very good Socrates in what remains take your own course

Soc Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn this is the natural and necessary order

[51] *Pro* Excellent

Soc These in turn then I will now endeavour to indicate for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain I do not agree but as I was saying I use them as witnesses that there are pleasures which seem only and are not and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms yet are intermingled with pains and are partly alleviations of agony and distress both of body and mind

Pro Then what pleasures Socrates should we be right in conceiving to be true?

Soc True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form and most of those which arise from smells those of sound again and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain

Pro Once more Socrates I must ask what you mean

Soc My meaning is certainly not obvious and I will endeavour to be plainer I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures which the many would

suppose to be my meaning but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning; lines and rulers and measurers of angles for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character and have similar pleasures now do you understand my meaning?

Pro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning clear.

Soc. When sounds are smooth and clear and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.

Pro. Yes, there are such pleasures.

Soc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain, and all pleasures however and whenever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

Pro. I understand.

[52] Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.

Pro. And this is the case.

Soc. Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loves his knowledge are there not pains of forgetting?

Pro. Not necessarily but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.

Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.

Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.

Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And now having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure: the great, the

the whether more or less frequent, we

shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less which pours through body and soul alike and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.

Pro. Quite right, Socrates.

Soc. Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.

Pro. What is it?

Soc. When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess abundance, greatness and sufficiency in what relation do these terms stand to truth?

Pro. Why do you ask Socrates?

Soc. Because, Protarchus I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. Let us investigate all the pure kinds first selecting for consideration a single instance.

Pro. What instance shall we select?

[53] Soc. Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?

Pro. Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

Soc. True, Protarchus and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

Pro. Right.

Soc. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.

Pro. Perfectly right.

Soc. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasures: one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.

Pro. Assuredly and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.

Soc. But what do you say of another question—have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do

Pro Proceed

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those to be my measure—but, says the argument, understood me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are turned out of them by turning, fishes and birds and measures of apler for these affections to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but that they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and yet have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And then are colours which are of the same character and have similar pleasures, now do you understand my meaning?

Pro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I have dug you out as to make your meaning clear.

Sor. When sounds are smooth and clear and to a simple pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.

Pro. Yes, there are such pleasures.

Sor. The pleasures of smell are of a less either of sort, but yet have no necessary admixture of pain, and all pleasures, however and whatever experienced, which are unattended by pain, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

Pro. I understand.

[51] Sor. To them may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.

Pro. And this is the case.

Sor. Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge—does not as knowledge, are there not pains of learning?

Pro. Not necessarily, but there may be times of remorse, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.

Sor. Yes, my friend, but at present we are concerned only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.

Pro. Is it the case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain?

Sor. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are mingled with pain, and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.

Pro. Quite true.

Sor. And now having fairly separated the two pleasures and those which may be rightly called impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are of the few have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure, the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we

shall be right in referring to the class of the minor, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.

Pro. Quite right, Socrates.

Sor. Said there is something more to be considered about pleasures.

Pro. What is it?

Sor. When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency in what relation do these terms stand to truth?

Pro. Why do you ask, Socrates?

Sor. Because, Proarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.

Pro. Most true.

Sor. Let us investigate all the pure kinds, first selecting for consideration a single instance.

Pro. What instance shall we select?

[52] Sor. Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.

Pro. Very good.

Sor. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity or that which is most undiminished and freest from any admixture of other colours?

Pro. Clearly that which is most undiluted and.

Sor. True, Proarchus, and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

Pro. Right.

Sor. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.

Pro. Perfectly right.

Sor. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasures; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or undiluted with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.

Pro. Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.

Sor. But what do you say of another question—have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do

Pro Proceed

Soc Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure and also an unrighteous pain?

Pro Most true

Soc There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?

Pro Certainly not

Soc But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes—is not that wrong?

Pro Undoubtedly

Soc Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?

Pro True

Soc And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty of wisdom and of wealth are ridiculous if they are weak and detestable when they are powerful. May we not say as I was saying before that our friends who are in this state of mind when harmless to others are simply ridiculous?

Pro They are ridiculous

Soc And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?

Pro Certainly

Soc And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?

Pro Clearly we feel pleasure

[50] *Soc* And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?

Pro Certainly

Soc Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends' pleasure in mingling with envy mingles with pain for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant and so we envy and laugh at the same instant

Pro True

Soc And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations and in tragedy and comedy not only on the stage but on the greater stage of human life and so in endless other cases

Pro I do not see how any one can deny what you say Socrates however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion

Soc I mentioned anger desire sorrow fear love emulation, envy and similar emotions as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named did I not?

Pro Yes

Soc We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger

Pro I see

Soc Then many other cases still remain?

Pro Certainly

Soc And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections and I thought that when I had given you the illustration you would have let me off and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul and the soul without the body as well as the two united are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words—if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction and go to other matters which remain to be settled before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands

Pro Very good Socrates in what remains take your own course

Soc Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn this is the natural and necessary order

[51] *Pro* Excellent

Soc These in turn then I will now endeavour to indicate for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain I do not agree but as I was saying I use them as witnesses that there are pleasures which seem only and are not and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms yet are intermingled with pains and are partly alleviations of agony and distress both of body and mind

Pro Then what pleasures Socrates should we be right in conceiving to be true?

Soc True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form and most of those which arise from smells those of sound again and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain

Pro Once more, Socrates I must ask what you mean

Soc My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures which the many would

in anything else, but that good is in the soul
 and that the only good of the soul is
 justice and that courage or temperance or
 endurance, or any other good of the soul,
 is not really a good—and is there not yet a
 further absurdity in our being compelled to say
 that he who has a feeling of pain and not of
 pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering
 the pain, even though he be the best of men
 and again, that he who has a feeling of pleas-
 ure, is so far as he is pleased at the time, when
 he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue?

Pro Nothing, Socrates, can be more un-
 reasonable than all this.

Soc And now having subjected pleasure to
 every sort of test, let it not appear to be too
 spacious of mind and knowledge: let us ring
 their metal bravely and see if there be un-
 soundness in any part, until we have found out
 what in them is of the purest nature, and then
 the truest elements both of pleasure and knowl-
 edge may be brought up for judgment.

Pro Right.

Soc Knowledge has two parts—the one pro-
 ductive, and the other educational?

Pro True.

Soc And in the productive or handicraft
 arts, is not one part more akin to knowledge,
 and the other less and may not the one part
 be regarded as the pure, and the other as the
 impure?

Pro Certainly.

Soc Let us separate the superior or dominant
 elements in each of them.

Pro What are they and how do you sepa-
 rate them?

Soc I mean to say that if arithmetic, mensu-
 ration, and weighing, be taken away from any
 art, that which remains will not be much.

Pro Not much, certainly.

Soc The rest will be only conjecture, and the
 better use of the senses which is given by expe-
 rience and practice, in addition to a certain
 power of guessing, which is commonly called
 art, and is perfected by attention and pains.
 [56]

Pro Nothing more, assuredly.

Soc Music, for instance, is full of this em-
 piricism for sounds are harmonized, not by
 measure, but by skilful conjecture: the music
 of the universe is always trying to guess the pitch
 of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed
 up with much that is doubtful and has little
 which is certain.

Pro Most true.

Soc And the same will be found to hold good

of medicine and husbandry and piloting and
 generalship.

Pro Very true.

Soc The art of the builder on the other
 hand, which uses a number of measures and
 instruments, attains by their help to a greater
 degree of accuracy than the other arts.

Pro How is that?

Soc In ship-building and house building
 and in other branches of the art of carpen-
 ting the builder has his rule, labour, compass,
 line, and a most ingenious machine for straight-
 ening wood.

Pro Very true, Socrates.

Soc Then now let us divide the arts of which
 we were speaking, into two kinds—the arts
 which like music, are less exact in their results,
 and those which, like carpentering, are more
 exact.

Pro Let us make that division.

Soc Of the latter class, the most exact of all
 are those which we just now spoke of as pri-
 mary.

Pro I see that you mean arithmetic, and the
 kindred arts of weighing and measuring.

Soc Certainly, Proarchus, but are not these
 also distinguishable into two kinds?

Pro What are the two kinds?

Soc In the first place, arithmetic is of two
 kinds, one of which is popular and the other
 philosophical.

Pro How would you distinguish them?

Soc There is a wide difference between
 them, Proarchus; some arithmeticians reckon
 unequal units—as for example, two armies, two
 acres, two very large things or two very small
 things. The party who are opposed to them in-
 sist that every unit in ten thousand must be the
 same as every other unit.

Pro Undoubtedly there is, as you say a great
 difference among the varieties of the science
 and there may be reasonably supposed to be
 two sorts of arithmetic.

Soc And when we compare the art of in-
 surance which is used in building with phil-
 osophical geometry [57] or the art of com-
 putation which is used in trading with exact
 calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs
 that it is one or two?

Pro On the analogy of what has preceded,
 I should be of opinion that they were severally
 two.

Soc Right, but do you understand why I
 have discussed the subject?

Pro I think so, but I should like to be told
 by you.

not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?

Pro What do they mean?

Soc I will explain to you my dear Protarchus what they mean by putting a question

Pro Ask and I will answer

Soc I assume that there are two natures one self-existent and the other ever in want of something

Pro What manner of natures are they?

Soc The one majestic ever the other inferior

Pro You speak riddles

Soc You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them

Pro I should think so

Soc Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and are present everywhere

Pro Yet a third time I must say Be a little plainer, Socrates

Soc There is no difficulty, Protarchus the argument is only in play and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives) and that other things are the ends to which the former class subserve (absolutes)

Pro Your many repetitions make me slow to understand

[54] *Soc* As the argument proceeds my boy I dare say that the meaning will become clearer

Pro Very likely

Soc Here are two new principles

Pro What are they?

Soc One is the generation of all things and the other is essence

Pro I readily accept from you both generation and essence

Soc Very right and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence or essence for the sake of generation?

Pro You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?

Soc Yes

Pro By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question

Soc I mean O my Protarchus to ask whether you would tell me that ship building is for the sake of ships or ships for the sake of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question

Pro Why do you not answer yourself Socrates?

Soc I have no objection but you must take your part

Pro Certainly

Soc My answer is that all things instrumental remedial material are given to us with a view to generation and that each generation is relative to or for the sake of some being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence

Pro Assuredly

Soc Then pleasure being a generation must surely be for the sake of some essence?

Pro True

Soc And that for the sake of which something else is done must be placed in the class of good and that which is done for the sake of something else in some other class my good friend

Pro Most certainly

Soc Then pleasure being a generation will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?

Pro Quite right

Soc Then as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only and had no true being at all for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.

Pro Assuredly

Soc And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end

Pro Of whom are you speaking and what do they mean?

Soc I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at the process as if it were pleasure and they say that they would not wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be mentioned

[55] *Pro* That is certainly what they appear to think

Soc And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?

Pro Certainly

Soc Then he who chooses thus would choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life in which as we were saying was neither pleasure nor pain but only the purest possible thought

Pro He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities Socrates.

Soc Great, indeed and there is yet another of them

Pro What is it?

Soc Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body or

Pro Very true

Soc And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be changeable when judged by the strict rule of truth, ever become certain?

Pro Impossible

Soc How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?

Pro How indeed?

Soc Then mind and reason once when employed out such changing things do not attain the highest truth?

Pro I should imagine not.

Soc And now let us bid farewell a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias and upon behalf of the argument a single point.

Pro What point?

Soc Let us say that the stable and pure and is and unalloyed has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unaltered, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has and that all other things are to be reckoned in a second or inferior class.

Pro Very true

Soc And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?

Pro That is natural

Soc And are not mind and wisdom the things which are to be honoured most?

Pro Yes.

Soc And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of the being?

Pro Certainly

Soc And these were the names which I addressed to the rivals of pleasure?

Pro Very true, Socrates.

Soc In the next place as to the mixture, here the ingredients pleasure and wisdom and may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands

Pro Yes

Soc And now we must begin to mix them?

Pro By all means

Soc But had it not better have a preliminary and refresh our memories?

Pro Of what?

Soc Of that which I have already mentioned. It says the proverb [60] that we ought to do at twice and even thrice that which is good

Pro Certainly

Soc Well then by Zeus, let us proceed and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.

Pro Let me hear

Soc Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings at which all ought to aim and moreover that it is the chief good of all and that the two names good and pleasant are correctly given to one thing, and one nature. Socrates on the other hand begins by denying this and further says, that in nature as in name they are two and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protagoras?

Pro Certainly

Soc And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?

Pro What was it?

Soc That the good differs from all other things.

Pro In what respect?

Soc In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency and is never in need of anything else.

Pro Exactly

Soc And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, ascribing to each a distinct life so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?

Pro We did.

Soc And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?

Pro Certainly not

Soc And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire—I will not say pleasure however abundant or intense if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection however momentary of the feeling—but would he desire to have anything at all if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure rather than with a certain degree of pleasure or all pleasure devoid of wisdom rather than with a certain degree of wisdom?

Pro Certainly not Socrates but why repeat such questions any more?

[61] Soc Then the perfect and universally

Soc The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.

Pro Clearly that was the intention.

Soc And has not the argument in what has preceded already shown that the arts have different provinces and vary in their degrees of certainty?

Pro Very true.

Soc And just now did not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term thus making us believe in the unity of that art and then again as if speaking of two different things proceed to enquire whether the art as pursued by philosophers or as pursued by non-philosophers has more of certainty and purity?

Pro That is the very question which the argument is asking.

Soc And how Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?

Pro O Socrates we have reached a point at which the difference of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.

Soc Then the answer will be the easier.

Pro Certainly and let us say in reply that those arts into which arithmetic and mensuration enter far surpass all others and that of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth.

Soc Then ^{now} ^{is} your judgment and this is the answer which upon ^{of} misinterpretation? will give to all masters of the art?

Pro What answer?

Soc That there are two arts of arithmetic and two of mensuration and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature and yet only one name.

Pro Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you speak Socrates and hope for good luck.

Soc We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences.

Pro Very good.

Soc And yet, Protarchus dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us if we do not award to her the first place.

[58] *Pro* And pray what is dialectic?

Soc Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of which we are now speaking for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality

and sameness and unchangeableness, is by the truest of all. But how would you answer this question Protarchus?

Pro I have often heard Gorgias maintain Socrates that the art of persuasion has surpassed every other this as he says, is by the best of them all for to it all things submit not by compulsion but of their own free will. Now I should not like to quarrel either with you or with him.

Soc You mean to say that you would like to desert if you were not ashamed?

Pro As you please.

Soc May I not have led you into a misapprehension?

Pro How?

Soc Dear Protarchus, I never asked what was the greatest or best or usefulness of all sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy and the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And as of Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he is not quarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior to the particular of essential truth as in the comparison of white colours, a bird whiteness if that can be only pure, was said to be superior to a great mass which is impure. And so let us give our best attention and consider not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power of accuracy of their study which the soul has to learn the truth and of doing all things to the sake of a clear search into the pure elements of mind and intelligence, and then we must be able to say whether the sciences of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the power of truth or whether there be with others which has this

and is it with the of all it is the nature of all the claims? is the art of science of all the

Pro Who is the true nature of the hardly thing and destiny is the nature of the a firmer grasp in the nature of the

[59] *Soc* Do you are not that the arts in general they make use of objects engaged in the investigation? Even he who supplied with nature is required things of this world he or acted upon is not in which his life is spent.

Pro True.

Soc He is labouring but about things which

Pro Very true.

Soc And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be changeable when judged by the strict rule of truth, ever become certain?

Pro Impossible.

Soc How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?

Pro How indeed?

Soc Then mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth?

Pro I should imagine not.

Soc And now let us bid farewell a long farewell to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias and argue on behalf of the argument a single point.

Pro What point?

Soc Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.

Pro Very true.

Soc And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?

Pro That is natural.

Soc And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most?

Pro Yes.

Soc And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?

Pro Certainly.

Soc And these were the names which I adduced of the values of pleasure?

Pro Very true, Socrates.

Soc In the next place as to the mixture here are the ingredients pleasure and wisdom and we may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands.

Pro Yes.

Soc And now we must begin to mix them?

Pro By all means.

Soc But how do we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories?

Pro Of what?

Soc Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb [60] that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good.

Pro Certainly.

Soc Well then by Zeus let us proceed and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.

Pro Let me hear.

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Pro Certainly.

Soc And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?

Pro What was it?

Soc That the good differs from all other things.

Pro In what respect?

Soc In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency and is never in need of anything else.

Pro Exactly.

Soc And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?

Pro We did.

Soc And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?

Pro Certainly not.

Soc And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire—I will not say pleasure however abundant or intense if he has no real perception that he is pleased nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection however momentary of the feeling—but would he desire to have anything at all if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question: can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure rather than with a certain degree of pleasure or all pleasure devoid of wisdom rather than with a certain degree of wisdom?

Pro Certainly not Socrates but why repeat such questions any more?

[61] Soc Then the perfect and universally

Soc Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture

[65] *Pro* Certainly

Soc Then if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only with three we may catch our prey Beauty Symmetry Truth are the three and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them

Pro Quite right

Soc And now Protarchus any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good and more honourable among gods and men

Pro Clearly and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end

Soc We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind and pronounce upon them for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin

Pro You are speaking of beauty truth, and measure?

Soc Yes Protarchus take truth first and after passing in review mind truth pleasure pause awhile and make answer to yourself—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth

Pro There is no need to pause for the difference between them is palpable pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world and it is said that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest perjury is excused by the gods for pleasures like children have not the least particle of reason in them whereas mind is either the same as truth or the most like truth and the truest

Soc Shall we next consider measure in like manner and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom or wisdom than pleasure?

Pro Here is another question which may be easily answered for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge

Soc Very good, but there still remains the third test Has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

Pro No one, *Socrates* either awake or dreaming ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly at any time past present or future

Soc Right

Pro But when we see some one indulging in pleasures perhaps in the greatest of pleasures

[66] the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed and so we put them out of sight and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day

Soc Then Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere by word of mouth to this company and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions nor yet the second but that in measure and the mean and the suitable and the like, the eternal nature has been found

Pro Yes that seems to be the result of what has been now said

Soc In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient and all which are of that family

Pro True

Soc And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom you will not be far wrong if I divine aright.

Pro I dare say

Soc And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class and form the fourth as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is

Pro Surely

Soc The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless being the pure pleasures of the soul herself as we termed them which accompany some the sciences and some the senses

Pro Perhaps

Soc And now as Orpheus says

With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song

Here at the sixth award let us make an end all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse

Pro True

Soc Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said thus offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus

Pro How?

Soc Philebus affirmed that pleasure was all ways and absolutely the good

Pro I understand this third libation *Soc* rates of which you spoke meant a recapitulation

Soc Yes but listen to the sequel convinced of what I have just been saying and feeling indignant at the doctrine which is maintained

not by Philebus only but by thousands of others, I assumed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure.

Pro. True.

Soc. But, suspecting that there were other things which were also better I went on to say, but if there was anything better than either then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.

Pro. You did.

(67) *Soc.* Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the unsatisfactory nature of both of them.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. But, though they must both resign in

favour of another mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And, according to the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth.

Pro. True.

Soc. But not first: no not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so — although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy.

Pro. And now Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.

Soc. And will you let me go?

Pro. There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an argument.

Soc Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture

[65] *Pro* Certainly

Soc Then if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may catch our prey Beauty Symmetry Truth are the three and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them

Pro Quite right

Soc And now Protarchus any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good and more honourable among gods and men

Pro Clearly and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end

Soc We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind and pronounce upon them for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin

Pro You are speaking of beauty truth, and measure?

Soc Yes Protarchus take truth first and after passing in review mind truth pleasure pause awhile and make answer to yourself—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth

Pro There is no need to pause for the difference between them is palpable pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world and it is said that in the pleasures of love which appear to be the greatest perjury is excused by the gods for pleasures, like children have not the least particle of reason in them whereas mind is either the same as truth or the most like truth and the truest

Soc Shall we next consider measure in like manner and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom or wisdom than pleasure?

Pro Here is another question which may be easily answered for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge

Soc Very good but there still remains the third test Has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

Pro No one Socrates either awake or dreaming ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly at any time past present or future

Soc Right

Pro But when we see some one indulging in pleasures perhaps in the greatest of pleasures

[66] the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed and so we put them out of sight and consign them to darkness under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day

Soc Then Protarchus you will proclaim everywhere by word of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions nor yet the second, but that in measure and the mean and the suitable and the like the eternal nature has been found

Pro Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said

Soc In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family

Pro True

Soc And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright

Pro I dare say

Soc And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class and form the fourth as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is

Pro Surely

Soc The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless being the pure pleasures of the soul herself as we termed them which accompany some the sciences, and some the senses

Pro Perhaps

Soc And now as Orpheus says

With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song

Here at the sixth award let us make an end all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse

Pro True

Soc Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said thus offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus

Pro How?

Soc Philebus affirmed that pleasure was all ways and absolutely the good

Pro I understand this third libation Socrates of which you spoke meant a recapitulation

Soc Yes but listen to the sequel convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling in dignant at the doctrine which is maintained

en to protect an army they should be continued in peace. For what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name in many every city is in a natural state of war with every other not indeed proclaimed by treaty, but everlasting. And if you look closely you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator and institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.

1st You a year to me, Stranger or to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well-ordered state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war am I right in supposing this to be your meaning?

Cle Certainly and our Lacedæmonian friend, if I am not mistaken, will agree with me.

Meg Why my good friend, how could any Lacedæmonian say anything else?

1st And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages?

Cle To both alike.

1st The case is the same?

Cle Yes.

1st And in the village will there be the same war of family against family and of individual against individual?

Cle The same.

1st And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy—what shall we say?

Cle O Athenian Stranger—inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself, because you go back to first principles—you have thrown light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just saying—that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately his own.

(*1st* My good sir what do you mean?)—

Cle Moreover there is a victory and defeat—the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats—which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another but of himself this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us.

[627] *1st* Let us now reverse the order of the argument. Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own inferior may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?

Cle You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self?

1st Yes.

Cle You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.

1st Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. But I now quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good.

Cle Your remark, Stranger is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly deny it.

1st Here is another case for consideration—in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.

Cle Very possibly.

1st And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they conquer and inferior when they are conquered for we are not now considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.

Cle What you say Stranger is most true.

Meg Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as it has gone.

1st Again might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?

Cle Certainly.

1st Now which would be the better judge—one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves or one who, while allowing the good to govern let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or

LAWS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE *An* ATHENIAN STRANGER CLEINIAS *a Cretan*,
MEGILLUS, *a Lacedaemonian*

BOOK I

[624] *Athenian Stranger* TELL me Strangers is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?

Cleinias A God Siranger in very truth a God among us Cretans he is said to have been Zeus but in Lacedaemon whence our friend here comes I believe they would say that Apollo is their lawgiver would they not Megillus?

Megillus Certainly

Ath And do you Cleinias believe as Homer tells that every ninth year Minos went to converse with his Olympian sire and was inspired by him to make laws for your cues?

Cle Yes that is our tradition and there was Rhadamanthus a brother of his with whose name you are familiar he is reputed to have been the justest of men [625] and we Cretans are of opinion that he earned this reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive

Ath Yes and a noble reputation it was worthy of a son of Zeus As you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions I dare say that you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and laws on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them for I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is considerable and doubtless there are shady places under the lofty trees which will protect us from this scorching sun Being no longer young we may often stop to rest beneath them and get over the whole journey without difficulty be guiling the time by conversation

Cle Yes Stranger and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses which are of rare height and beauty and there are green meadows in which we may repose and converse

Ath Very good

Cle Very good indeed and still better when we see them let us move on cheerily

Ath I am willing—And first I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises and wear arms

Cle I think Siranger that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to any one Look at the character of our country Crete is not like Thessaly a large plain and for this reason they have horsemen in Thessaly and we have runners—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot but then if you have runners you must have light arms—no one can carry a heavy weight when running and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all his arrangements—the common meals if I am not mistaken were instituted by him for a similar reason because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another [626] and if in war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed under oth

LAWS I

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LAWS

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE *An Athenian Stranger* *Cleimias, a Cretan*
Megillus, a Lacedaemonian

BOOK I

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Cress he is as faithful in a war as gold and silver
is in his gold and silver

And such an one is far better as we affirm than the other in a more difficult kind of war much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage are better than courage only: for a man cannot be found and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his end and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception unwary, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove. I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was placed by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth-rate.

So Stranger we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which is far beneath him.

Let Nay I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lysurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war.

Cle. What ought we to say then?

Let What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence—that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only and thus the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answers to the kinds of virtue, not in the way in which modern editors of laws make them, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about adulteries and heresies, another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. [631] But we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law but I thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and was aimed forth my subsequent remarks. Will it rank under justice, temperance, and wisdom.

you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?

Cle. By all means.

Let You ought to have said, Stranger—The Cretan laws are with reason famous among the Hellenes for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy and they confer every sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine and the state which attains the greater at the same time acquires the less, or not having the greater has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto] but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and thus is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards and in reference to all their intercourse with one another he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. [632] Also with regard to anger and terror and the other perturbations of the soul which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war or poverty or the opposite of these, in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary he should

third I suppose in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, [628] who finding the family distracted not only did not destroy any one but reconciled them to one another for ever after and gave them laws which they mutually observed and was able to keep them friends

Cle The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator

Ath And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war

Cle Very true

Ath And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war or that kind of intestine war called civil which no one if he could prevent would like to have occurring in his own state and when occurring every one would wish to be quit of as soon as possible?

Cle He would have the latter chiefly in view

Ath And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties and by the victory of the other or that peace and friendship should be re-established and that, being reconciled they should give their attention to foreign enemies?

Cle Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state

Ath And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?

Cle Certainly

Ath And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best?

Cle To be sure

Ath But war whether external or civil is not the best and the need of either is to be deprecated but peace with one another and good will are best Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing but as a necessity a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge And in like manner no one can be a true statesman whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state who looks only or first of all to external warfare nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war and not war for the sake of peace

Cle I suppose that there is truth Stranger in that remark of yours and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions and also of the Lacedaemonian

[629] *Ath* I dare say but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators instead of gently

questioning them seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest Please follow me and the argument closely — And first I will put forward Tyrtæus an Athenian by birth but also a Spartan citizen who of all men was most eager about war Well he says I sing not I care not about any man even if he were the richest of men and possessed every good (and then he gives a whole list of them) if he be not at all times a brave warrior I imagine that you too must have heard his poems our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them

Meg Very true

Cle And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete

Ath Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtæus O most divine poet, we will say to him the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnossus do, as I believe entirely agree with you But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men tell us then do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtæus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly that war is of two kinds—one which is universally called civil war and is as we were just now saying of all wars the worst the other as we should all admit in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of war fare

Cle Certainly far milder

Ath Well now when you praise and blame war in this high flown strain whom are you praising or blaming and to which kind of war are you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war if I am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those

Who refuse to look upon fields of blood and will not draw near and strike at their enemies

And we shall naturally go on to say to him—You Tyrtæus as it seems praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war and he must admit this

Cle Evidently

Ath They are good but we say that there are still better men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles [630] And we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis citizen of Megara in Sicily

My I was able to tell you, Stranger many laws which were directed against pain but I do not know that I can point out any great or serious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure there are some lesser provisions, however which I might mention.

Cle Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all equally prominent in the Cretan laws.

Alc No wonder my dear friends and if, as is very likely in our search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of another, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another says.

Cle You are quite right, Athenian Stranger and we will do as you say.

Alc At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of irritation.

Cle Certainly not.

Alc I will not at present determine whether he who censures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian laws is right or wrong. But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For assuming that you have made very good laws, one of the best of them will be the law forbidding any young men to enquire whom of them are right or wrong but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the laws are all good, for they came from God and any one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any defect in your laws may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in rank when no young man is present.

[635] *Cle* Exactly so, Stranger and like a diviner although not there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator and to say what is most true.

Alc As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these very matters now that we are alone.

Cle True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong by who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be all the better for it.

Alc Very good however I am not going to say anything against your laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to achieve all great pleasures and amusements and

never to touch them whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears and sorrows, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them, and would become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class, and in another and even a worse manner they will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words?

Cle On first hearing what you say appears to be the truth but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be very childish and simple.

Alc Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage comes temperance) what institutions shall we find relating to temperance, either in Crete or Lacedaemon, which, like your military institutions, differ from those of any ordinary state.

[636] *Meg* That is not an easy question to answer still I should say that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for the promotion both of temperance and courage.

Alc There seems to be a difficulty Stranger with regard to states, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no dispute about them. As in the human body the regimen which does good in one way does harm in another and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles as is shown in the case of the Miesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to downgrade the ancient and natural custom of love below

see how they order all this and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another and honour those who obey the law and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things—some who walk by intelligence others by true opinion only and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the laws of Zeus as they are termed and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves.

Cle How shall we proceed, Stranger?

Ath I think that we must begin again as before and first consider the habit of courage and then we will go on and discuss another and then another form of virtue if you please. In this way we shall have a model of the whole and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the way. And when we have gone through all the virtues we will show by the grace of God that the institutions of which I was speaking look to virtue.

[633] *Meg* Very good and suppose that you first criticize this praiser of Zeus and the laws of Crete.

Ath I will try to criticize you and myself as well as him for the argument is a common concern. Tell me—were not first the *syssitia* and secondly the *gymnasia* invented by your legislator with a view to war?

Meg Yes.

Ath And what cometh third and what fourth? For that I think is the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining parts of virtue no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is provided the meaning is clear.

Meg Then I or any other Lacedaemonian would reply that hunting is third in order.

Ath Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.

Meg I think that I can get as far as the fourth

head which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain hand-to-hand fights, also in stealing with the prospect of getting a good beating there is, too, the so-called *Crypteia* or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown—our people wander over the whole country by day and by night and even in winter have not a shoe to their foot, and are without beds to lie upon and have to attend upon themselves. Marvellous too is the endurance which our citizens show in their naked exercises, contending against the violent summer heat and there are many similar practices to speak of which in detail would be endless.

Ath Excellent. O Lacedaemonian Stranger. But how ought we to define courage? Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains or also against desires and pleasures and against flatteries which exercise such a tremendous power that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?

Meg I should say the latter.

Ath In what preceded as you will remember our Cnossian friend was speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves—Were you not, Cleinias?

Cle I was.

Ath Now which is in the truest sense inferior the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?

Cle I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense than the other who is overcome by pain.

Ath But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg [634] able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?

Cle Able to meet both. I should say.

Ath Then let me once more ask what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains but which set a person in the midst of them and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this nature among you—What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain conquering what they ought to conquer and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?

another way Let me give you an illustration of what I mean — You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind of food whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way or to whom, or with what, or in what case and how wheat is to be given And this is just what we are doing in this discussion At the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures which is absurd For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak

with authority because we have many witnesses and others because they see those who abhor conquering in battle, and thus again is disputed by us Now I cannot say that I shall be satisfied, if we go on discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way And about this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way which I hold to be the right one for if number is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with you, who are only two cities

[639] *Meg* I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.

Alc Let me put the matter thus — Suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have, and then some one who had seen goats feed in a without a goatherd in cultivated spots and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any other animal who has no keeper or a bad keeper would there be any sense or justice in such censure?

Meg Certainly not.

Alc Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is sea sick or not? What do you say?

Meg I say that he is not a good captain if, although he has nautical skill he is liable to sea-sickness.

Alc And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?

Meg Impossible.

Alc And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?

Meg He is a miserable fellow not fit to be a commander of men, but only of old women.

Alc And what would you say of some one who blames or praises any sort of meeting

which is intended by nature to have a ruler and is well enough when under his presidency? The critic, however has never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a president but always without a ruler or with a bad one — when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings, are we to suppose that what they say is of any value?

Meg Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a meeting when rightly ordered.

Alc Reflect may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a kind of meeting?

Meg Of course.

Alc And did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly ordered? Of course you two will answer that you have never seen them at all because they are not customary or lawful in your country but I have come across many of them in many different places, and moreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went as I may say and never did I see or hear of anything of the kind which was carried on altogether rightly in some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly wrong.

Alc What do you mean, Stranger by this remark? Explain. For we, as you say from our inexperience in such matters might very likely not know even if they came in our way what was right or wrong in such societies.

[640] *Alc* Likely enough then let me try to be your instructor You would acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of man kind, of whatever sort, there ought to be a leader?

Alc Certainly I should.

Alc And we were saying just now that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man?

Alc We were.

Alc The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears?

Alc That again is true.

Alc And if there were a possibility of having a general of an army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means appoint him?

Alc Assuredly.

Alc Now however we are speaking not of a general who is to command an army when foe meets foe in time of war but of one who is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace.

Alc True.

Alc And that sort of meeting, if attended

the level not only of man but of the beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others and is true also of most other states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse between men and women but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving the story we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain both in states and in individuals: these are two fountains which nature lets flow and he who draws from them where and when and as much as he ought is happy and this holds of men and animals—of individuals as well as states and he who indulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time is the reverse of happy.

Meg I admit Stranger that your words are well spoken and I hardly know what to say in answer to you but still I think that the Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan laws I shall leave the defence to my Cnossian friend. But the laws of Sparta [637] in as far as they relate to pleasure appear to me to be the best in the world for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and licence and every other folly the law has clean driven out and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them and any one who meets a drunken and disorderly person will immediately have him most severely punished and will not let him off on any pretence not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival although I have remarked that this may happen at your performances on the cart, as they are called and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival but nothing of the sort happens among us.

Ath O Lacedaemonian Stranger these festivities are praiseworthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to retaliate an Athenian has only to point out the licence

which exists among your women. To all such accusations whether they are brought against the Tarentines or us or you there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees any inhabitant will naturally answer him—Wonder not O stranger this is our custom and you may very likely have some other custom about the same things. Now we are speaking my friends not about men in general but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let us then discourse a little more at length about intoxication which is a very important subject and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator. I am not speaking of drinking or not drinking wine at all but of intoxication. Are we to follow the custom of the Scythians and Persians and Carthaginians, and Celts and Iberians and Thracians who are all warlike nations or that of your countrymen for they as you say, altogether abstain? But the Scythians and Thracians both men and women drink unmixed wine which they pour on their garments and thus they think a happy and glorious institution. The Persians again are much given to other practices of luxury which you reject but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and Scythians. [638] *Meg* O best of men we have only to take arms into our hands and we send all these nations flying before us.

Ath Nay my good friend do not say that there have been as there always will be flights and pursuits of which no account can be given and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser as the Syracusans have done the Locrians who appear to be the best governed people in their part of the world or as the Athenians have done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the same sort of thing) all this is not to the point let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say nothing at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such and such a custom is honourable and another not. And first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very matters.

Meg How do you mean?

Ath All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion seem to me to proceed in

became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken the common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature and is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to

Cle Yes, Stranger and when you have heard me speak, say boldly what is in your thoughts. Let me remind you of a tie which unites you to Greece. You must have heard here the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my family and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war in accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.

[643] *Ath* You seem to be quite ready to listen, and I am also ready to perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysius.

Cle Let us proceed, if you please.

Ath Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you?

Cle Let us hear

Ath According to my view any one who would be good at anything must practise that thing, from his youth upwards both in sport and earnest, in its several branches for example, he who is to be a good builder should play at building children's houses he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground and those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. They should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the chil-

dren's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?

Cle Certainly

Ath Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader or of a captain of a ship and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey [644] This is the only education which upon our view deserves the name that other sort of training which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

Cle Very true and we entirely agree with you

Ath And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.

Cle You are quite right.

Ath Let me now proceed if I can to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.

Cle Proceed.

Ath Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?

Cle We do

Ath And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.

with drunkenness is apt to be unquiet

Cle Certainly the reverse of quiet.

Ath In the first place, then the revellers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler?

Cle To be sure no men more so

Ath And we ought if possible to provide them with a quiet ruler?

Cle Of course

Ath And he should be a man who understands society for his duty is to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the time and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion

Cle Very true

Ath Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels? For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken and not over wise only by some special good fortune will he be saved from doing some great evil

Cle It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved

Ath Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way possible in states and that some one blames the very fact of their existence—he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice which he only sees very much mismanaged he shows in the first place that he is not aware of the mismanagement and also not aware that everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong because done without the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship [641] chariot army—anything in short of which he has the direction?

Cle The last remark is very true. Stranger and I see quite clearly the advantage of an army having a good leader—he will give victory in war to his followers which is a very great advantage and so of other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast and I want you to tell me what great good will be effected supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly established

Ath If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or of a single chorus—when the question is put in that form we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of education in general the answer is easy—that education makes good men and that good men act nobly and conquer their enemies in battle because they are good. Education certainly

gives victory although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education for many have grown insolent from victory in war and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors but education is never suicidal

Cle You seem to imply my friend that convivial meetings when rightly ordered are an important element of education

Ath Certainly I do

Cle And can you show that what you have been saying is true?

Ath To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions is an attribute of the Gods not given to man. Stranger but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions

Cle Your opinion Stranger about the questions which are now being raised is precisely what we want to hear

Ath Very good. I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to be a great talker whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity [642] and the Cretans have more wit than words. Now I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small materials. For drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature without correct principles of music these are necessary to any clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject and music again runs up into education generally and there is much to be said about all this. What would you say then to leaving these matters for the present and passing on to some other question of law?

Meg O Athenian Stranger let me tell you what perhaps you do not know that our family is the progeny of your state. I imagine that from their earliest youth all boys when they are told that they are the progeny of a particular state feel kindly towards their second country and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the days of my boyhood how when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians they used to say to me—See Megillus how ill or how well as the case might be has your state treated us and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I

became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken: the common saying is quite true that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature and is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.

Cle Yes, Stranger and when you have heard me speak, say boldly what is in your thoughts. Let me remind you of a tie which unites you to Crito. You must have heard here the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my family and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war in accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you: thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.

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Cle Certainly.

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Cle Very true and we entirely agree with you.

Ath And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves and bad men who are not.

Cle You are quite right.

Ath Let me now proceed if I can to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.

Cle Proceed.

Ath Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?

Cle We do.

Ath And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.

Cle Exactly

Ath Also there are opinions about the future which have the general name of expectations, and the specific name of fear when the expectation is of pain, and of hope when of pleasure and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them and this when embodied in a decree by the State is called Law

Cle I am hardly able to follow you proceed however as if I were

Meg I am in the like case

Ath Let us look at the matter thus May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods either their plaything only, or created with a purpose—which of the two we cannot certainly know? But we do know that these affections in us are like cords and strings which pull us different and opposite ways and to opposite actions and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go but to pull with it against all the rest [645] and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason called by us the common law of the State there are others which are hard and of iron but this one is soft because golden and there are several other kinds Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best which is law For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle and not violent her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost and the meaning of the expression superior or inferior to a man's self will become clearer and the individual attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet should live according to its rule while the city receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things should embody it in a law to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us And when they have become clearer education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer and in particular that question of convivial entertainment which may seem perhaps to have been a very trifling matter and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary

Cle Perhaps however the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse

Ath Very good let us proceed with any en-

quiry which really bears on our present object

Cle Proceed

Ath Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink—what will be the effect on him?

Cle Having what in view do you ask that question?

Ath Nothing as yet but I ask generally when the puppet is brought to the drink what sort of result is likely to follow I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly what I am now asking is this—Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves?

Cle Very greatly

Ath And are perception and memory and opinion and prudence heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?

Cle Yes they entirely desert him

Ath Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child?

Cle He does

Ath Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?

Cle The least

[646] *Ath* And will he not be in a most wretched plight?

Cle Most wretched

Ath Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?

Cle Well said Stranger

Ath Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?

Cle I suppose that there is you at any rate were just now saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine

Ath True I was and I am ready still seeing that you have both declared that you are anxious to hear me

Cle To be sure we are if only for the strangeness of the paradox which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation

Ath Are you speaking of the soul?

Cle Yes

Ath And what would you say about the body my friend? Are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity leanness ugliness decrepitude?

Cle Certainly

Ath Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop and takes medicine, is he not quite aware that soon and for many days afterwards he will be in a state of body which he

would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?

Cle Yes, all that is well known.

Alc Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Cle Very good.

Alc And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?

Cle Certainly.

Alc And the same view may be taken of the practice of drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?

Cle To be sure.

Alc If such convalescences should turn out to have any advantage equal in importance to that of gymnastics, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain.

Cle True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them.

Alc That is just what we must endeavour to show. And let me ask you a question—Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear which are very different?

Cle What are they?

Alc There is the fear of expected evil.

Cle Yes.

Alc And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil [637] because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.

Cle Certainly.

Alc These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.

Cle Very true.

Alc And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.

Cle True.

Alc Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely secures victory and safety in war? For there are two things which secure victory—confidence before the enemy, and fear of disgrace before friends.

Cle There are.

Alc Then each of us should be fearless and

also fearful; and why we should be either has now been determined.

Cle Certainly.

Alc And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears.

Cle Clearly.

Alc And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character—since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been—and are we to suppose that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play by word, deed and act, will still be perfectly temperate?

Cle A most unlikely supposition.

Alc Suppose that some God had given a fear poison to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at every draught as a child of misfortune, and that he feared everything happening or about to happen to him, and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence [638] of the draught.

Cle But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among men?

Alc No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say to him, O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretan, or for any other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?

Cle "I should," will be the answer of every one.

Alc And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no greater danger than the reverse.

Cle In that proposition every one may safely agree.

Alc And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them, and also honouring them,

but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him and if he underwent the trial well and manfully you would let him go unscathed but if ill you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether although you have no reason for abstaining?

Cle He would be certain Stranger to use the potion

Ath This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person or to a few or indeed to any number and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only rather than with any number of other things whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude and there contend with his fears because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others and display his power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the draught—his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness but was always himself and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.

Cle Yes, Stranger in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control

[649] *Ath* Let us return to the lawgiver and say to him — Well lawgiver there is certainly no such fear potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered, for witchcraft has no place at our board But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boast ing?

Cle I suppose that he will say Yes—meaning that wine is such a potion

Ath Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened and fancying himself wise he is brimming over with lawlessness and has no more fear or respect and is ready to do or say anything

Cle I think that every one will admit the truth of your description

Meg Certainly

Ath Now let us remember as we were saying that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul first the greatest courage secondly the greatest fear—

Cle Which you said to be characteristic of reverence if I am not mistaken

Ath Thank you for reminding me But now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites

Cle That is probably the case

Ath There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base

Cle True

Ath Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these?—when we are under the influence of anger love, pride, ignorance avarice cowardice? or when wealth beauty strength and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? What is better adapted than the festive use of wine in the first place to test and in the second place to train the character of a man if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper or more innocent? For do but consider which is the greater risk.—Would you rather test a man of a morose and savage nature which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself [650] or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love entrust your wife, or your sons or daughters to him perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might mention numberless cases in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport and without paying dearly for experience And I do not believe that either a Cretan or any other man will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer cheaper, and speedier than any other

Cle That is certainly true

Ath And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them and that art if I am not mistaken, is politics

Cle Exactly so

BOOK II

[62] *Athenian Stranger* And now we have to consider whether the insight into human nature is the only benefit derived from well ordered potations, or whether there are not other advantages great and much to be desired. The argument seems to imply that there are. But how and in what way these are to be attained, will have to be considered attentively or we may be entangled in error.

Cleinas Proceed.

1st Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education which [653] if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of moral intercourse.

Cle You talk rather grandly.

1st Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the two perceptions of children, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and vice are originally present to them. As to wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in years, and we may say that he who possesses them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a perfect man. Now I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children,—when pleasure, and friendship and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, taken as a whole, is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and to love what you ought to love from the beginning of life to the end, may be separated off and, in my view will be rightly called education.

Cle I think *Stranger* that you are quite right in all that you have said and are saying about education.

1st I am glad to hear that you agree with me for indeed, the discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered is a principle of education has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pay in the toils which our race is born to undergo have appointed holy festivals, wherein men alternate rest with labour and have given them the Muses and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be companions in their revels that they may improve their education by taking part in the festivals of the Gods, and with their help I should like to know whether a

common saying is in our opinion true to nature or not. For men say that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices: they are always wanting to move and cry out, some leaping and skipping and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something, others uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas the animals have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony as they are called to us, the Gods who, as we say, have been appointed to be our companions in the dance [634] have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm and so they stir us into life and we follow them joining hands together in dances and songs and these they call choruses which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the Muses? What do you say?

Cle I assent.

1st And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus and the educated is he who has been well trained?

Cle Certainly.

1st And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?

Cle True.

1st Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well?

Cle I suppose that he will.

1st Let us see what are we saying?

Cle What?

1st He sings well and dances well now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good?

Cle Let us make the addition.

1st We will suppose that he knows the good to be good and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly which now is the better trained in dancing and music—he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner but has no delight in good or hatred of evil or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil?

Cle There is a great difference, *Stranger* in the two kinds of education.

1st If we three know what is good in song and dance, then we truly know also who is educated and who is uneducated but if not, then we certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and whether there is any or not.

Cle True

Ath Let us follow the scent like hounds and go in pursuit of beauty of figure and melody and song and dance if these escape us there will be no use in talking about true education whether Hellenic or barbarian

Cle Yes

Ath And what is beauty of figure or beautiful melody? When a manly soul is in trouble [655] and when a cowardly soul is in similar case are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds?

Cle How can they when the very colours of their faces differ?

Ath Good my friend I may observe how ever in passing that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm so that you may speak of a melody or figure having good rhythm or good harmony—the term is correct enough but to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a good colour as the masters of choruses do is not allowable although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward praising the one and censuring the other And not to be tedious let us say that the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body or of images of virtue are without exception good and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good

Cle Your suggestion is excellent and let us answer that these things are so

Ath Once more are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance?

Cle Far otherwise

Ath What then leads us astray? Are beautiful things not the same to us all or are they the same in themselves but not in our opinion of them? For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more beautiful than forms of virtue or that he himself delights in the forms of vice and others in a muse of another character And yet most persons say that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls But this is intolerable and blasphemous there is however a much more plausible account of the delusion

Cle What?

Ath The adaptation of art to the characters of men Choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions fortunes dispositions—each particular is imitated and those to whom the words or songs or dances are suited either by nature or habit or both

cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them and calling them beautiful But those whose natures or ways, or habits are unsuited to them cannot delight in them or applaud them and they call them base There are others again whose natures are right and their habits wrong or whose habits are right and their natures wrong and they praise one thing but are pleased at another [656] For they say that all these imitations are pleasant but not good And in the presence of those whom they think wise they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner or of deliberately lending any countenance to such proceedings and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them

Cle Very true

Ath And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?

Cle I think that there is

Ath I think is not the word but I would say rather I am certain For must they not have the same effect as when a man associates with bad characters whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes and only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his own badness? In that case he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure even though he be ashamed to praise them And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?

Cle I know of none

Ath Then in a city which has good laws or in future ages is to have them bearing in mind the instruction and amusement which are given by music can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the dance any thing which they themselves like in the way of rhythm or melody or words to the young children of any well conditioned parents? Is the poet to train his choruses as he pleases without reference to virtue or vice?

Cle That is surely quite unreasonable and is not to be thought of

Ath And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of Egypt

Cle And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?

Ath You will wonder when I tell you Long ago they appear to have recognized the very principle of which we are now speaking—that their young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue These they fixed and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples and no painter or artist is allowed to

may be upon them or to leave the traditional forms and invent new ones. To this day no alteration is allowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago—this is literally true and no exaggeration—their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day [657] but are made with just the same skill.

Cle How extraordinary!

Ath I should rather say How state manlike how worthy of a legislator! I know that other things in Egypt are not so well. But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of God, or of a divine person. In Egypt they have a tradition that their ancient chants which have been preserved for so many ages are the composition of the Goddess Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies he may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not strength enough to corrupt the consecrated song and dance under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate they are far from being corrupted in Egypt.

Cle Your arguments seem to prove your point.

Ath May we not confidently say that the true use of music and of choral festivities is as follows: We rejoice when we think that we prosper and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?

Cle Exactly.

Ath And when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be still?

Cle True.

Ath Our young men break forth into dancing and singing and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. Having lost our agility we delight in their sports and merry making because we live to think of our former selves and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of our youth.

Cle Very true.

Ath Is it altogether unmeaning to say as the common people do about festivals, that he should be adjudged the wisest of men and the

winner of the palm who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth? For on such occasions and when mirth is the order of the day ought not he to be honoured most and, as I was saying bear the palm [658] who gives most mirth to the greatest number? Now is this a true way of speaking or of acting?

Cle Possibly.

Ath But, my dear friend let us distinguish between different cases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment. One way of considering the question will be to imagine a festival at which there are entertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical and equestrian contests: the citizens are assembled prizes are offered and proclamation is made that any one who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the spectators—there is to be no regulation about the manner how but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor and deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates. What is likely to be the result of such a proclamation?

Cle In what respect?

Ath There would be various exhibitions: one man like Homer will exhibit a rhapsody another a performance on the lute one will have a tragedy and another a comedy. Nor would there be anything astonishing in some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet show. Suppose these competitors to meet and not these only but innumerable others as well—can you tell me who ought to be the victor?

Cle I do not see how any one can answer you, or pretend to know unless he has heard with his own ears the several competitors: the question is absurd.

Ath Well, then if neither of you can answer shall I answer this question which you deem so absurd?

Cle By all means.

Ath If very small children are to determine the question they all decide for the puppet show.

Cle Of course.

Ath The older children will be advocates of comedy educated women, and young men and people in general will favour tragedy.

Cle Very likely.

Ath And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure in hearing a rhapsody recited well the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* or one of the Hesiodic poems and would award the victory to him. But, who would really

be the victor?—that is the question

Cle Yes

Ath Clearly you and I will have to declare that those whom we old men adjudge victors ought to win for our ways are far and away better than any which at present exist anywhere in the world

Cle Certainly

Ath Thus far I too should agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure. But the pleasure must not be that of chance, persons the fairest music is that which delights the best and best educated [659] and especially that which delights the one man who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. And therefore the judges must be men of character, for they will require both wisdom and courage: the true judge must not draw his inspiration from the theatre nor ought he to be unnerved by the clamour of the many and his own incapacity nor again knowing the truth ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a lying judgment with the very same lips which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre but in his proper place as their instructor and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. The ancient and common custom of Hellas which still prevails in Italy and Sicily did certainly leave the judgment to the body of spectators who determined the victor by show of hands. But this custom has been the destruction of the poets for they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste of their judges and the result is that the spectators instruct themselves—and also it has been the ruin of the theatre: they ought to be having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a higher pleasure but now by their own act the opposite result follows. What inference is to be drawn from all this? Shall I tell you?

Cle What?

Ath The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time is that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason which the law affirms and which the experience of the eldest and best has agreed to be truly right. In order then that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at variance with the law and those who obey the law but may rather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged—in order I say to

produce this effect, chants appear to have been invented which really enchant, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. And because the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious training they are called plays and songs and are performed in play just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them whole some diet in pleasant meats and drinks [660] but unwholesome diet in disagreeable things, in order that they may learn as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. And similarly the true legislator will persuade and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express as he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men.

Cle But do you really imagine Stranger that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day? As far as I can observe except among us and among the Lacedaemonians there are no regulations like those of which you speak. In other places novel ties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law but at the instigation of lawless pleasures and these pleasures are so far from being the same as you describe the Egyptian to be or having the same principles that they are never the same.

Ath Most true Cleinias and I daresay that I may have expressed myself obscurely and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some really existing state of things whereas I was only saying what regulations I would like to have about music and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part. For when evils are far gone and irremediable the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary. But as we do not really differ will you let me ask you whether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?

Cle Certainly they are.

Ath And if they were extended to the other Hellenes would it be an improvement on the present state of things?

Cle A very great improvement if the customs which prevail among them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail.

Ath Let us see whether we understand one another—Are not the principles of education

and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is *fortunate* and happy and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak and whether he be rich or poor and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of *Cinyras* or *Alcidas*, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery? Is the poet says, and with truth. I ung not I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, nor having justice let him who "draws" tear and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just man? But if he be unjust, [661] I would not have him look calmly upon bloody death, nor "surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas" and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear and in general to have all the senses perfect or gain, to be a tyrant and do as you like and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. But you and I say that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions to the unjust they are all including in health, the great test of evils. For in truth, to have sight and hear and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal but not to great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?

Cle I think that we partly agree and partly do not.

1st When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which I sit, and when he is pre-eminently strong and courage and has the gift of immortality and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature—of such an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather than happy.

Cle That is quite true

1st Once more Suppose that he be valiant and strong and handsome and rich and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, [662] still if he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of you agree that he will of necessity live badly? You will surely grant so much?

Cle Certainly

1st And an evil life too?

Cle I am not equally disposed to grant that.

1st Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?

Cle How can I possibly say so?

1st How! Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind for now we are of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is as plain as the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing and the just another and there are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in a manner different from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age and I may say indeed from the world in general. For tell me, my good friends, by Zeus and Apollo tell me, if I were to ask these same Gods who were your legislators—Is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest?—and they were to reply that there are two and thereupon I proceeded to ask, (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry) Which are the happier—those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest—that would be a very strange answer which I should not like to put into the mouth of the Gods. The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that I reply—O my father did you not wish me to live as happily as possible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live as justly as possible. Now here the giver of the rule, whether he be legislator or father will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, every one hear

in him would enquire [663] if I am not mistaken what is that good and noble principle in life which the law approves and which is superior to pleasure. For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame coming from Gods and men though good and noble are nevertheless unpleasant and infamous pleasant? Certainly not sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable although there is no pleasure in it and that the doing wrong is pleasant but evil and base?

Cle Impossible

Ath The view which identifies the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator and is in his opinion infamous for no one if he can help will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth: he will persuade the citizens in some way or other by customs and praises and words that just and unjust are shadows only and that injustice which seems opposed to justice when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant but that from the just man's point of view the very opposite is the appearance of both of them.

Cle True

Ath And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment—that of the inferior or of the better soul?

Cle Surely that of the better soul

Ath Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?

Cle That seems to be implied in the present argument

Ath And even supposing this were otherwise and not as the argument has proven still the lawgiver who is worth anything if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do what is right not on compulsion but voluntarily

Cle Truth Stranger is a noble thing and a lasting but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded

Ath And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so improbable has been readily

believed and also innumerable other tales

Cle What is that story?

Ath The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything [664] so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side

Cle I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying

Ath The next suggestion which I have to offer is that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken or are about to speak, and the sum of them shall be that the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is also the best—we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might address to them

Cle I assent to what you say

Ath First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children which is to sing lustily the heaven taught lay to the whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty who will call upon the God Paean to testify to the truth of their words and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. Thirdly the choir of elder men who are from thirty to sixty years of age will also sing. There remain those who are too old to sing and they will tell stories illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle.

Cle Who are those who compose the third choir Stranger? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them

Ath And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a view to them

Cle Will you try to be a little plainer?

Ath I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse as you will remember of the fiery nature of young creatures. I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner and that no other animal attained to any perception of order

[665] but man only. Now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which his voice and his feet are duly mingled is called harmony and both together are termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our payfellows and leaders in the dance and Dionysus, as I dare say that you will remember was the third.

Cl. I quite remember.

Alc. Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of Dionysus.

Cl. How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men. If you really mean that those who are above thirty and may be fifty or from fifty to sixty years of age are to dance in his honour.

Alc. Very true, and therefore it must be shown that there is good reason for the proposal.

Cl. Certainly.

Alc. Are we agreed thus far?

Cl. About what?

Alc. That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the whole city should never cease charming themselves with the strains of which we have spoken, and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them?

Cl. Every one will agree.

Alc. Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence, has the greatest influence sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?

Cl. But, says the argument, we cannot let them off.

Alc. Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum? Will this be the way?

Cl. What?

Alc. When man is advancing in years he is afraid and reluctant to sing—he has no pleasure in his own performances and if compulsion is used he will be more and more ashamed the older and more discern he grows—will not this tru

Cl. Certainly.

Alc. Well, and will he not be yet more

ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?—and if more over when he is required to do so like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry [666] he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit.

Cl. No doubt.

Alc. How then shall we reassure him and get him to sing? Shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age? We will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire, whether in the body or in the soul until they begin to go to work—this is a precaution which has to be taken against the excitableness of youth—afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and from excess of wine when, at length he has reached forty years after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all to the mystery and festivity of the elder men making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness of old age that in age we may renew our youth and forget our sorrows, and also in order that the nature of the soul like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more impressible. In the first place will not any one who is thus mellowed be more ready and less ashamed to sing—I do not say before a large audience but before a moderate company, nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to enchant?

Cl. He will be far more ready.

Alc. There will be no impropriety in our using such a method of persuading them to join with us in song.

Cl. None at all.

Alc. And what strain will they sing and what muse will they hymn? The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.

Cl. Certainly.

Alc. And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a choric strain?

Cl. Truly. Stranger we of Crete and Laconia know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our choros.

Alc. I dare say for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song in your military way of life which is

in him would enquire [663] if I am not mistaken what is that good and noble principle in life which the law approves and which is superior to pleasure. For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame coming from Gods and men though good and noble are nevertheless unpleasant and infamous pleasant? Certainly not sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable although there is no pleasure in it and that the doing wrong is pleasant but evil and base?

Cle Impossible

Ath The view which identifies the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator and is, in his opinion infamous for no one if he can help will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy especially in childhood the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth: he will persuade the citizens in some way or other by customs and praises and words that just and unjust are shadows only and that injustice, which seems opposed to justice when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant but that from the just man's point of view the very opposite is the appearance of both of them.

Cle True

Ath And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment—that of the inferior or of the better soul?

Cle Surely that of the better soul

Ath Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?

Cle That seems to be implied in the present argument

Ath And even supposing this were otherwise and not as the argument has proven still the lawgiver who is worth anything if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good could not invent a more useful lie than this or one which will have a better effect in making them do what is right not on compulsion but voluntarily

Cle Truth Stranger is a noble thing and a lasting but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded

Ath And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus which is so improbable has been readily

believed and also innumerable other tales

Cle What is that story?

Ath The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything [664] so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side

Cle I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying

Ath The next suggestion which I have to offer is that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken or are about to speak and the sum of them shall be that the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is also the best—we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might address to them

Cle I assent to what you say

Ath First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children which is to sing lustily the heaven taught lay to the whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty who will call upon the God Paean to testify to the truth of their words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. Thirdly the choir of elder men who are from thirty to sixty years of age will also sing. There remain those who are too old to sing and they will tell stories illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle.

Cle Who are those who compose the third choir Stranger? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them

Ath And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a view to them

Cle Will you try to be a little plainer?

Ath I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse as you will remember of the fiery nature of young creatures. I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner and that no other animal attained to any perception of order

[665] but man only Now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled is called harmony: and both together are termed choric song And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our paytellers and leaders in the dance and Dionysus, as I dare say that you will remember was the third.

Cle I quite remember

1st Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of Dionysus

Cle How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men if you really mean that those who are above thirty and may be fifty or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to dance in his honour

1st Very true and therefore it must be shown that there is good reason for the proposal.

Cle Certainly

1st Are we agreed thus far?

Cle About what?

1st That every man and boy slave and free both sexes, and the whole city should never cease charman themselves with the strains of which we have spoken and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them?

Cle Every one will agree

1st Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?

Cle But, says the argument, we cannot let them off

1st Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum Will this be the way?

Cle What?

1st When a man is advancing in years, he is afraid and reluctant to sing—he has no pleasure in his own performances and if compulsion is used, he will be more and more ashamed the older and more discreet he grows—is not this true?

Cle Certainly

1st Well and will he not be yet more

ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?—and if more over when he is required to do so like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master he is pinched and hungry [666] he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit.

Cle No doubt.

1st How then shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? Shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire whether in the body or in the soul until they begin to go to work—this is a precaution which has to be taken against the excitableness of youth—afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and from excess of wine when at length, he has reached forty years after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness of old age that in age we may renew our youth and forget our sorrows and also in order that the nature of the soul like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more impresible In the first place will not any one who is thus mellowed be more ready and less ashamed to sing—I do not say before a large audience but before a moderate company nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said to chant, and to enchant?

Cle He will be far more ready

1st There will be no impropriety in our using such a method of persuading them to join with us in song

Cle None at all

1st And what strain will they sing and what muse will they hymn? The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.

Cle Certainly

1st And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a choric strain?

Cle Truly Stranger we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus

1st I dare say for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song in your military way of life which is

modelled after the camp and not like that of dwellers in cities and you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom to attend to him alone and trains and rubs him down privately and gives him the qualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier but also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one as we said at first would be a greater warrior than he of whom Tyrtæus sings, [667] and he would honour courage everywhere but always as the fourth and not as the first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.

Cle Once more stranger I must complain that you depreciate our lawgivers.

Ath Not intentionally if at all my good friend but whither the argument leads, thither let us follow for if there be indeed some strain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres I should like to impart it to those who as we say are ashamed of these and want to have the best.

Cle Certainly.

Ath When things have an accompanying charm either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility possessed by them—for example I should say that eating and drinking and the use of food in general have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure but that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness of the things served up to us which is their true rightness.

Cle Just so.

Ath Thus, too I should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure but that the right and the profitable the good and the noble are qualities which the truth gives to it.

Cle Exactly.

Ath And so in the imitative arts—if they succeed in making likenesses and are accompanied by pleasure may not their works be said to have a charm?

Cle Yes.

Ath But equal proportions whether of quality or quantity and not pleasure speaking generally would give them truth or rightness.

Cle Yes.

Ath Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality but exists solely for the sake of the accompany-

ing charm and the term pleasure is most appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are absent.

Cle You are speaking of harmless pleasure are you not?

Ath Yes and this I term amusement when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of.

Cle Very true.

Ath Then if such be our principles we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion and this is true of all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical because some body thinks or likes something but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth and by no other whatever.

Cle Quite true.

[668] *Ath* Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?

Cle Certainly.

Ath Then when any one says that music is to be judged of by pleasure his doctrine can not be admitted and if there be any music of which pleasure is the criterion such music is not to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence but only the other kind of music which is an imitation of the good.

Cle Very true.

Ath And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant but for that which is true and the truth of imitation consists as we were saying in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality.

Cle Certainly.

Ath And every one will admit that musical compositions are all imitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this?

Cle They will.

Ath Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each composition is for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the piece and what it represents he will never discern whether the intention is true or false.

Cle Certainly not.

Ath And will he who does not know what is true be able to distinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very clear but perhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another way.

Cle How?

Ath There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?

Cle Yes.

Ath And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed? I mean for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body and the true situation of the parts what those proportions are and how the parts fit into one another in due order also their colours and conformations or whether this is all confused in the execution do you think that any one can know about this who does not know what the animal is which has been imitated?

Cle Impossible.

Ath But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a man who has received in the hand of the artist all his proper parts and colours and shapes, [669] must we not also know whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in beauty?

Cle If this were not required Stranger we should all of us be judges of beauty.

Ath Very true and may we not say that in everything imitated whether in drawing music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three things—he must know in the first place of what the imitation is secondly he must know that it is true and thirdly that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?

Cle Certainly.

Ath Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of music. Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a man makes a mistake here he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women nor after combining the melodies with the gestures of freemen would they add on the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort nor beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, would they assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character nor would they mix up the cries and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and so make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who as Orpheus says, are ripe for true pleasure. The experienced see all

this confusion and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody setting bare words to metre and also separating the melody and the rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words it is very difficult to recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm or to see that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing which aims only at sweetness and smoothness and a brutish noise and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song [670] is exceedingly coarse and tasteless. The use of either instrument, when unaccompanied leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all rational enough. But we are considering not how our choristers who are from thirty to fifty years of age and may be over fifty are not to use the Muses but how they are to use them. And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty year-old choristers who are to sing may be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms otherwise how can they ever know whether a melody would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet has assigned to it?

Cle Clearly they cannot.

Ath The many are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to sing and step in rhythm by force. It never occurs to them that they are ignorant of what they are doing. Now every melody is right when it has suitable harmony and rhythm and wrong when unsuitable.

Cle That is most certain.

Ath But can a man who does not know a thing as we were saying know that the thing is right?

Cle Impossible.

Ath Then now as would appear we are making the discovery that our newly appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and although they are their own masters, compel to sing must be educated to such an extent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms and be able to select what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing and may sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger men to welcome with

dutiful delight good dispositions Having such training they will attain a more accurate knowledge than fall to the lot of the common people or even of the poets themselves For the poet need not know the third point viz whether the imitation is good or not though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm [671] But the aged chorus must know all the three that they may choose the best and that which is nearest to the best for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue And now the original design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the Chorus of Dionysus has been accomplished to the best of our ability and let us see whether we were right—I should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on this as we were saying at first will certainly be the case

Cle Certainly

Ath Every man has a more than natural elevation his heart is glad within him and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at such a time he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all mankind

Cle Quite true

Ath Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the drinkers become like iron heated in the fire and grow softer and younger and are easily moulded by him who knows how to educate and fashion them just as when they were young and that this fashioner of them is the same who prescribed for them in the days of their youth viz the good legislator and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet which when a man is confident bold and impudent and unwilling to wait his turn and have his share of silence and speech and drinking and music will change his character into the opposite—such laws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear which will take up arms at the approach of insolence being that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame?

Cle True

Ath And the guardians of these laws and fellow workers with them are the calm and sober generals of the drinkers and without their help there is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against enemies when the commander of an army is not himself calm and he who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts who are more than sixty years of age shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who disobeys military leaders or even greater

Cle Right

Ath If then drinking and amusement were regulated in this way would not the companions of our revels be improved? they would part better friends than they were [672] and not as now enemies Their whole intercourse would be regulated by law and observant of it and the sober would be the leaders of the drunken

Cle I think so too if drinking were regulated as you propose

Ath Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and unfit to be received into the State For wine has many excellences and one pre-eminent one about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the many from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said

Cle To what do you refer?

Ath There is a tradition or story which has somehow crept about the world that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Here and that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madresses in others for which reason he gave men wine Such traditions concerning the Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered I only know that no animal at birth is mature or perfect in intelligence and in the intermediate period in which he has not yet acquired his own proper sense he rages and roars without rhyme or reason and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme or reason and this as you will remember has been already said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic

Cle To be sure I remember

Ath And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang from this beginning among men and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?

Cle Certainly

Ath The other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge and in order to make him mad but our present doctrine on the contrary is that wine was given him as a balm and in order to implant modesty in the soul and health and strength in the body

Cle That Stranger is precisely what was said

Ath Then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?

Cf *Euthyphro* 6 ff *Republic* ii 3, 3 iii 388, 408

Cf 653

Cle What is the other half and how do you divide the subject?

Ath The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education and of this art, rhythms and harmonies form the part which is to do with the voice.

Cle Yes.

Ath The movement of the body has rhythm in common with the movement of the voice but gesture is peculiar to it, whereas song is simply the movement of the voice.

Cle Most true.

[673] Ath And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the soul we have ventured to term music.

Cle We were right.

Ath And the movement of the body when regarded as an amusement, we termed dancing but when extended and pursued with a view to the excellence of the body this scientific training may be called gymnastic.

Cle Exactly.

Ath Music, which is one half of the choral art, may be said to have been completely discussed. Shall we proceed to the other half or not? What would you like?

Cle My good friend when you are talking with a Cretan and Lacedaemonian and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer are either of us likely to make to such an enquiry?

Ath An answer is contained in your question and I understand and accept what you say not only as an answer but also as a command to proceed with gymnastic.

Cle You quite understand me do as you say.

Ath I will and there will not be any difficulty in speaking intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more familiar than with music.

Cle There will not.

Ath Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals man, as we were saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and entered dancing and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral art?

Cle Very true.

Ath And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us and there still remains another to be discussed.

Cle Exactly.

Ath I have first a final word to add to my

Cle II. 813, 814.

discourse about drink, if you will allow me to do so.

Cle What more have you to say?

Ath I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures designing to gain the victory over them—in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only and

however likes may drink whenever he likes [674] and with whom he likes and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should practise drinking. I would go further than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all but that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female should ever drink wine and that no magistrates should drink during their year of office, nor should pilots of vessels or judges while on duty taste wine at all nor any one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance nor in the day time at all unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine nor again at night, when any one either man or woman is minded to get children. There are numberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine so that if what I say is true no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and their way of life in general will follow an appointed order and their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and the least common of the employments. And this Stranger shall be the crown of my discourse about wine if you agree.

Cle Excellent we agree.

BOOK III

[6, 6] Athenian Stranger ENOUGH of this And that, then is to be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man be able to judge of it best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or evil?

Cle Yes What do you mean?

Ath I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during its finite ages.

Cle How so?

Ath Why do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

Cle Hardly

Ath But you are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

Cle Certainly

Ath And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being during this period and as many perished? And has not each of them had every form of government many times over now growing larger now smaller and again improving or declining?

Cle To be sure

Ath Let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these changes for that will probably explain the first origin and development of forms of government

Cle Very good You shall endeavour to impart your thoughts to us and we will make an effort to understand you

[677] *Ath* Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?

Cle What traditions?

Ath The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and pestilences and in many other ways, and of the survival of a remnant?

Cle Every one is disposed to believe them

Ath Let us consider one of them that which was caused by the famous deluge

Cle What are we to observe about it?

Ath I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill shepherds—small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains

Cle Clearly

Ath Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts and the various devices which are suggested to the dwellers in cities by interest or ambition and with all the wrongs which they contrive against one another

Cle Very true

Ath Let us suppose then that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time

Cle Very good

Ath Would not all implements have then perished and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom have utterly disappeared?

Cle Why yes my friend and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is evident

that the arts were unknown during ten thousand times ten thousand years And no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus Orpheus and Palamedes—since Marsyas and Olympus invented music and Amphion the lyre—not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday

Ath Have you forgotten Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?

Cle I suppose that you mean Epimenides

Ath The same, my friend he does indeed far overleap the heads of all mankind by his invention for he carried out in practice, as you declare, what of old Hesiod only preached

Cle Yes according to our tradition

Ath After the great destruction may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort—In the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land, a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world [678] and there might be a few goats these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who tended them?

Cle True

Ath And of cities or governments or legislation about which we are now talking do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

Cle None whatever

Ath And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have cities and governments and arts and laws and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

Cle What do you mean?

Ath Why my good friend how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development whether of virtue or of vice?

Cle I understand your meaning and you are quite right

Ath But as time advanced and the race multiplied the world came to be what the world is

Cle Very true

Ath Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment but little by little, during a very long period of time

Cle A highly probable supposition

Ath At first they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain

Cle Of course

Ath The fewness of the survivors at that time

Cle 1 642

would have made them all the more desirous of seeing one another but then the means of travelling either by land or sea had been almost entirely lost, as I may say with the loss of the arts and there was great difficulty in getting at one another for iron and brass and all metals were jumbled together and had disappeared in the chaos nor was there any possibility of extracting ore from them and they had scarcely any means of felling timber Even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved in the mountains they must quickly have worn out and vanished and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived

Cle There could not have been

Atk In how many generations would this be attained?

Cle Clearly not for many generations

Atk During this period and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and brass and the like would disappear

Cle Certainly

Atk Faction and war would also have died out in those days and for many seasons

Cle How could that be?

Atk In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and good will towards one another and, secondly they would have no occasion to quarrel about their subsistence, [679] for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases and from their pasture land they would obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh moreover they would procure other food by the chase not to be despised either in quantity or quality They would also have abundance of clothing and bedding and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not for the plastic and weaving arts do not require any use of iron and God has given to us two arts to man in order to provide him with all such things, that, when reduced to the last extremity the human race may still grow and increase Hence in those days mankind were not very poor nor was poverty a cause of difference among them, and rich they could not have been having neither gold nor silver—such at that time was their condition And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles in it there is no insolence or injustice nor again are there any contentions or enmities And therefore they were good, and also because they were what is called simple-

minded and when they were told about good and evil they in their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised it No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood as men do now but what they heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them

Cle That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here

Atk Would not many generations living on in a simple manner although ruder perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed—although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, I say be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and altogether more just? The reason has been already explained

Cle Very true.

Atk I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what is about to follow has been and will be said, with the intention of explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, [680] and who was their lawgiver

Cle And thus far what you have said has been very well said

Atk They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at this early period they lived by habit and the customs of their ancestors, as they are called.

Cle Probably

Atk But there was already existing a form of government which if I am not mistaken is generally termed a lordship and thus still remains in many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians and is the government which is declared by Homer to have prevailed among the Cyclopes

Thy have either councils nor judgments but they dwell in hollow caves on the tops of high mountains and cry out as law to him who and child nor do they do or busy themselves about one another

Cle That seems to be a charming poet of yours I have read some other verses of his, which are very clever but I do not know much of him, far foreign poets are very little read among the Cretans

Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1. 2, 1252 17 7
Odyssey 11. 112, ff.

Ath Why do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

Cle Hardly

Ath But you are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

Cle Certainly

Ath And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being during this period and as many perished? And has not each of them had every form of government many times over, now growing larger now smaller, and again improving or declining?

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Ath The same my friend he does indeed far overleap the heads of all mankind by his invention for he carried out in practice as you declare what of old Hesiod only preached

Cle Yes according to our tradition

Ath After the great destruction may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort—In the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world [678] and there might be a few goats these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who tended them?

Cle True

Ath And of cities or governments or legislation about which we are now talking do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

Cle None whatever

Ath And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have cities and governments and arts and laws and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

Cle What do you mean?

Ath Why my good friend how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice?

Cle I understand your meaning and you are quite right

Ath But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is

Cle Very true

Ath Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment but little by little during a very long period of time

Cle A highly probable supposition

Ath At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain

Cle Of course

Ath The fewness of the survivors at that time

Cle 64.

Megillus But they are in La edaemon, and he appears to be the prince of them all the man ner of life however which he describes is not Spartan but rather Ionian and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying when he traces up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to barbarism

Ath Yes he does confirm it and we may ac cept his witness to the fact that such forms of government sometimes arise

Cle We may

Ath And were not such states composed of men who had been dispersed in single habita tions and families by the poverty which at tended the devastations and did not the eldest then rule among them because with them gov ernment originated in the authority of a father and a mother whom, like a flock of birds they followed forming one troop under the patri archal rule and sovereignty of their parents which of all sovereignties is the most just?

Cle Very true

Ath After this they came together in greater numbers and increased the size of their cities and betook themselves to husbandry first of all at the foot of the mountains [681] and made enclosures of loose walls and works of defence in order to keep off wild beasts thus creating a single large and common habitation

Cle Yes at least we may suppose so

Ath There is another thing which would probably happen

Cle What?

Ath When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original ones each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger every family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from one another would have peculiar customs in things divine and hu man which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them and these customs would incline them to or der when the parents had the element of order in their nature and to courage when they had the element of courage And they would natu rally stamp upon their children and upon their children's children their own likings and as we are saying they would find their way into the larger society having already their own peculiar laws

Cle Certainly

Ath And every man surely likes his own laws best and the laws of others not so well

Cle True

Ath Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of legislation

Cle Exactly

Ath The next step will be that these persons who have met together will select some ar biters who will review the laws of all of them and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes and who act in a manner their kings allowing them to choose those which they think best. These per sons will themselves be called legislators and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy or perhaps monarchy out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live

Cle Yes that would be the natural order of things

Ath Then now let us speak of a third form of government in which all other forms and conditions of politics and cities concur

Cle What is that?

Ath The form which in fact Homer indi cates as following the second This third form arose when, as he says Dardanus founded Dar damia

For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a city of speaking men but they were still dwelling at the foot of many fountains near Ida

For indeed [682] in these verses and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks the words of God and nature for poets are a divine race and often in their strains by the aid of the Muses and the Graces they attain truth

Cle Yes

Ath Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale which will probably be found to il lustrate in some degree our proposed design — Shall we do so?

Cle By all means

Ath Ilium was built when they had descend ed from the mountain in a large and fair plain on a sort of low hill watered by many rivers descending from Ida

Cle Such is the tradition

Ath And we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages after the deluge?

Ath A marvellous forgetfulness of the for mer destruction would appear to have come over them when they placed their town right under numerous streams flowing from the heights trusting for their security to not very high hills either

Cle There must have been a long interval clearly

Ath And as population increased many

³ *Iliad* xx 216 ff

noble interests, than are here presented to his view

Alb Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important question.

Meg Very true.

Alb Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we ourselves at this moment, of ten fancy that they see some beautiful thing which might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make a right use of it in some way and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other?

Meg To what are you referring, and what do you mean?

Alb I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used and I was just laughing at myself.

Meg But were you not right and wise in speaking, as you did, and we in assenting to you?

Alb Perhaps and yet I cannot help observing, that any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling, that—“If the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he achieve!”

[65.] *Meg* And would he not be justified?

Alb Reflect in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just. First, in reference to the question in hand—If the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly how would they have attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian whatever they and their descendants desired. What other aim would they have had?

Meg Very good.

Alb Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.

Meg He would.

Alb Well no and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?

Meg What is it?

Alb The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible—at any rate, things human—may come to pass in accordance with his soul's desire.

Meg Certainly.

Alb And having this desire always, and at every time of life, in youth, in manhood in age he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.

Meg No doubt.

Alb And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves.

Meg We do.

Alb Dear is the son to the father—the younger to the elder.

Meg Of course.

Alb And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.

Meg When the son is young and foolish, you mean?

Alb Yes, or when the father in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour under the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?

Meg I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. But every state and every individual ought to pray and strive for wisdom. [658]

Alb Yes and I remember and you will remember what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest—I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am warning that you should and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already that not so vardice

to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner

Meg Exactly

Ath Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health and make the body whole without any very great infliction of pain

Meg Certainly

Ath There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws

Meg What advantage?

Ath The legislators of that day when they equalized property escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation if a person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality Now in general when the legislator attempts to make a new settlement of such matters every one meets him with the cry that he is not to disturb vested interests—declaring with imprecations that he is introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his wits end whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for distributing the land—there was nothing to hinder them and as for debts they had none which were considerable or of old standing

Meg Very true

Ath But then my good friends why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly?

[685] *Meg* How do you mean and why do you blame them?

Ath There were three kingdoms and of these two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws and the only one which remained was the Spartan

Meg The question which you ask is not easily answered

Ath And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws this being our old man's sober game of play whereby we beguile the way as I was saying when we first set out on our journey

Meg Certainly and we must find out why this was

Ath What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such cities? or what settlements of states are greater or more famous?

CL. v. 736.

* Cf. i. 625.

Meg I know of none

Ath Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not only for the protection of Peloponnesus but of all the Hellenes, in case they were attacked by the barbarians? For the inhabitants of the region about Ilium when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan war relied upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus which still existed and had a great prestige the people of those days fearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the Great King And the second capture of Troy was a serious offence against them because Troy was a portion of the Assyrian Empire To meet the danger the single army was distributed between three cities by the royal brothers, sons of Heracles—a fair device as it seemed and a far better arrangement than the expedition against Troy For, firstly, the people of that day had as they thought in the Heracidae better leaders than the Pelopidae in the next place they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy for although the latter conquered the Trojans they were themselves conquered by the Heracidae—Achaeans by Dorians May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states?

Meg Quite true

[686] *Ath* And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers and had taken the advice of oracles and in particular of the Delphian Apollo be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established?

Meg Of course they would

Ath Yet these institutions of which such great expectations were entertained seem to have all rapidly vanished away with the exception as I was saying of that small part of them which existed in your land And this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two others whereas if the original idea had been carried out and they had agreed to be one their power would have been invincible in war

Meg No doubt

Ath But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration

Meg Certainly no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and

noble interests, than are here presented to his

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Ath Well, now and does not this argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?

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Meg Certainly.

Ath And having this desire always and at every time of life in youth in manhood in age he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.

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Alc But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration

Meg Certainly no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments bringing the salvation or destruction of great and

1st There is a seventh kind of rule: such is awarded by lot, and is dear to the Gods and a ken of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls a ruler: and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject: and this we affirm to be quite just.

Cle Certainly

1st "Then now," as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, you see, legislator, the principles of government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each other. There is one discovered a fountain head of seditions to which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated their own maxims and ruined themselves: and the great and famous Helleni power of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely Menod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole? His meaning was that when to take the whole would be dangerous and to take the half would be the safe and moderate course: then the moderate or better was more than the immoderate or worse."

Cle Very true

1st And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when found among kings than when among peoples?

[691] *Cle* The probability is that ignorance will be a disorder especially prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.

1st Is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that time was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe by word and oath? This want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord.

Cle Very likely

1st Good: and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing and no great difficulty in telling after the evil has happened: but to foresee and to have the remedy at the time would have been a much wiser head than ours.

Meg What do you mean?

1st Any one who looks at what has occurred in the Lacedæmonians. Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.

Meg Speak a little more clearly

1st Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.

Meg What is it?

1st That if any one gives too great a power to anything too large a sail to a vessel too much food to the body too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, every thing is overthrown, and in the wantonness of excess runs in the one case to disorders and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say my dear friends that there is no soul of man young and irresponsible who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power—no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends when this happens his kingdom is undermined and all his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:—

Meg What?

1st A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one: and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age. [692] making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third saw your perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot: and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since if there had been only the original legislators Temenus Clesphontes and the other contemporaries as far as they were concerned not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved for they had no proper experience in legislation or they would surely not have imagined that oaths could moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting: there is no wisdom as I have already said in judging after

was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then and is still and all ways will be the case as I will endeavour if you will allow me to make out and demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends in the course of the argument.

Cle Pray go on Stranger—compliments are troublesome but we will show not in word but in deed how greatly we prize your words for we will give them our best attention and that is the way in which a freeman best shows his approval or disapproval.

Meg Excellent Cleinias let us do as you say.

Cle By all means if Heaven wills Go on.

Ath Well then proceeding in the same train of thought I say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power and that now as then ignorance is ruin. And if this be true the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power.

Cle That is evident.

[689] *Ath* Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say for my opinion is—

Cle What?

Ath That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is in my opinion the worst ignorance and also the greatest because affecting the great mass of the human soul for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge or opinion or reason which are her natural lords that I call folly just as in the state when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws or again in the individual when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance whether in individuals or in states. You will understand Stranger that I am speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.

Cle Yes my friend we understand and agree.

Ath Let us then in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him he must be stigmatized as ignorant even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments and feats of mental dexterity and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb they know neither how to read nor how to swim and to them as to men of sense authority is to be committed. For O my friends how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a saviour of the state he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom. Let this then as I was saying be laid down by us.

Cle Let it be so laid down.

Ath I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

Cle Certainly.

[690] *Ath* And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities whether great or small and similarly in families? What are they and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority which is always just—that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring?

Cle There is.

Ath Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble and thirdly that the elder should rule and the younger obey.

Cle To be sure.

Ath And fourthly that slaves should be ruled and their masters rule?

Cle Of course.

Ath Fifthly if I am not mistaken comes the principle that the stronger shall rule and the weaker be ruled?

Cle That is a rule not to be disobeyed.

Ath Yes and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures and is according to nature as the Theban poet Pindar once said and the sixth principle and the greatest of all is that the wise should lead and command and the ignorant follow and obey and yet O thou most wise Pindar as I should reply to him this surely is not contrary to nature but according to nature being the rule of law over willing subjects and not a rule of compulsion.

Cle Most true.

Ath There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune. He on whom the lot falls is a ruler and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject and thus we affirm to be quite just.

Cle Certainly.

Ath Then now "as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, you see, legislator the principles of government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each other. There we have discovered a fountain head of seditions, to which you must attend. And first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic power of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely Hesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole? His meaning was, that when to take the whole would be dangerous and to take the half would be the safe and moderate course, then the moderate or better was more than the immoderate or worse.

Cle Very true.

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Cle Very likely.

Ath Good and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing and neglecting difficulty in telling after the evil has happened but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours.

Meg What do you mean?

Ath A foolish head looks at what has occurred without looking at the means. *Meg* Thus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.

Meg Speak a little more clearly.

Ath Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.

Meg What is it?

Ath That if any one gives too great a power to anything too large a soul to a vessel too much food to the body too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, every thing is overthrown and in the wantonness of excess runs in the one case to disorders and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say my dear friends, that there is no soul of man young and irresponsible who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power—no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends when this happens his kingdom is undermined and all his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time what happened was as follows—

Meg What?

Ath A God, who watched over Sparta seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited tempered your unborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age. [692] making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third saw your swelling and foaming and desired to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators Temenus Cresphontes and their contemporaries as far as they were concerned not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit interested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting there is no wonder as I have already said in judging after

the event there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. But if any one could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived, and no Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.

Cle True

Alc There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them, and the discredit was not that the conquerors did not win glorious victories both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was first of all the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against Lacedæmon, and was thus preventing her from rendering assistance, while the city of Argos which had the precedence at the time of the distribution when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian would not answer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas in connection with that war which are far from honourable, nor indeed can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader for the truth is that unless the Athenians and Lacedæmonians [693] acting in concert had warded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of Hellas would have been fused in a chaos of Hellenes mingling with one another of barbarians mingling with Hellenes and Hellenes with barbarians, just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered and live miserably. These Cleinias and Megillus are the reproaches which we have to make against statesmen and legislators, as they are called past and present, if we would analyse the causes of their failure and find out what else might have been done. We said for instance just now that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers, and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same, but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these aims are really the same, and if so, a variety in the modes of

expression ought not to disturb us.

Cle Let us resume the argument in that spirit. And now, speaking of friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish that you would tell me at what, in your opinion, the legislator should aim.

Alc Hear me then, there are two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived, and one of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy, the Persians have the highest form of the one, and we of the other, almost all the rest is I was saying are variations of these. Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in a measure, the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well governed which is not made up of both.

Cle Impossible

Alc Neither the one, if it be exclusively and excessively attached to monarchy, nor the other, if it be similarly attached to freedom, observes moderation, but your states, the Lacedæmonian and Cretan, have more of it, and the same was the case with the Athenians and Persians of old time, but now they have less. Shall I tell you why?

[694] *Cle* By all means, if it will tend to elucidate our subject.

Alc Hear then. — There was a time when the Persians had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others, the rulers gave a share of freedom to the subjects and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on better terms with their generals and showed themselves more ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise man among them, who was able to give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the public, for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech and gave honour to those who could advise him in any matter. And the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of mind among them.

Cle That certainly appears to have been the case.

Alc How then was this advantage lost under Cambyzes, and again recovered under Darius? Shall I try to divine?

Cle The enquiry, no doubt, has a bearing upon our subject.

Alc I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had never given his mind
Cl. vi. 756 Aristotle *Polit.* ii. 6. 1. 66. 17

to education, and never attended to the order of his household.

Cle What makes you say so?

Alc I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier and entrusted the education of his children to the women and they brought them up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were blessed already and needed no more blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way and they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. This was how they brought them up.

Cle A splendid education truly!

Alc Such an one as women were likely to give them, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich and in the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and had no time to look after them.

Cle What would you expect?

Alc Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many herds of men and other animals [695] but he did not consider that those to whom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling which was Persian for the Persians are shepherds—sons of a rugged land, which is a stern mother and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the open air and go without sleep and also to fight, if fighting is required. He did not observe that his sons were trained differently through the so-called blessing of being royal they were educated in the Median fashion by women and eunuchs, such led to their becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreprieved. And so after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fulness of luxury and licence, took the kingdom and first one slew the other because he could not endure a rival and, afterwards the slayer himself mad with wine and brutality lost his kingdom through the Medes and the Eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of Cambyses.

Cle So runs the tale and such probably were the facts.

Alc Yes and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.

Cle True

Alc Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. When he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions. Aristotle, *Politics* II, 2, 1324 10-15.

tions and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining: he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his laws the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised—thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not most justly say "O Darius, how came you to bring up Xerxes in the same way in which Cyrus brought up Cambyses, and not to see his fatal mistake?" For Xerxes, being the creation of the same education met with much the same fortune as Cambyses and from that time until now there has never been a really great king among the Persians although they are all called Great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance as I maintain the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons [696] for never will boy or man young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. And thus, I say is what the legislator has to consider and what at the present moment has to be considered by us. Justly may you O Lacedaemonians, be praised in that you do not give special honour or a special education to wealth rather than to poverty or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no man ought to have pre-eminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift of foot or fair or strong unless he have some virtue in him nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance.

Meg What do you mean, Stranger?

Alc I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?

Meg To be sure

Alc Then now hear and judge for yourself—Would you like to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control over himself?

Meg Heaven forbid!

Alc Or an artist, who was clever in his profession but a rogue?

Meg Certainly not

Alc And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?

Meg Impossible

Ath Any more than our pattern wise man whom we exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason can be intemperate?

Meg No

Ath There is a further consideration relating to the due and undue award of honours in states

Meg What is it?

Ath I should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues existing alone in the soul of man is rightly to be praised or blamed?

Meg I cannot tell

Ath And that is the best answer for which ever alternative you had chosen I think that you would have gone wrong

Meg I am fortunate

Ath Very good a quality, which is a mere appendage of things which can be praised or blamed does not deserve an expression of opinion but is best passed over in silence

Meg You are speaking of temperance?

Ath Yes but of the other virtues that which having this appendage is also most beneficial will be most deserving of honour and next that which is beneficial in the next degree and so each of them will be rightly honoured according to a regular order

Meg True

[697] *Ath* And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?

Meg Certainly he should

Ath Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details But the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and second and third class we who are lovers of law may make ourselves

Meg Very good

Ath We maintain then that a State which would be safe and happy as far as the nature of man allows must and ought to distribute honour and dishonour in the right way And the right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance to be the condition of them and to assign the second place to the goods of the body and the third place to money and property And if any legislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of honour or in any way preferring that which is really last may we not say that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?

Meg Yes let that be plainly declared

¹ Cf 689

Ath The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far to enlarge We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse And we affirm the reason of this to have been that they too much diminished the freedom of the people and introduced too much of despotism and so destroyed friendship and community of feeling And when there is an end of these no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of the people but on behalf of themselves and if they think that they can gain ever so small an advantage for themselves they devastate cities and send fire and desolation among friendly races And as they hate ruthlessly and horribly so are they hated and when they want the people to fight for them they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives on their behalf their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of battle and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom they hire as if they were in want of more men And they cannot help being stupid since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong which are made in a state are a trifle, [698] when compared with gold and silver

Meg Quite true

Ath And now enough of the Persians and their present maladministration of their government which is owing to the excess of slavery and despotism among them

Meg Good

Ath Next we must pass in review the government of Attica in like manner and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all superior authority is not by any means so good as government by others when properly limited which was our ancient Athenian constitution at the time when the Persians made their attack on Hellas or speaking more correctly on the whole continent of Europe There were four classes, arranged according to a property census and reverence was our queen and mistress and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws which then prevailed Also the vastness of the Persian armament both by sea and on land caused a helpless terror which made us more and more the servants of our rulers and of the laws and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed among us About ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis Darius came leading a Persian host by command of Darius which was expressly directed against the Athenians and Eretrians having orders to carry them away captive and

these orders he was to execute under pain of death. Now Darius and his myriads soon became complete masters of Eretria, and he sent a fearful report to Athens that no Eretrian had escaped him for the soldiers of Darius had joined hands and netted the whole of Eretria. And this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes, and above all to the Athenians, and they dispatched embassies in all directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief with the exception of the Lacedæmonians and they either because they were detained by the Messenian war which was then going on, or for some other reason of which we are not told, came a day too late for the battle of Marathon. After a while, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and in numerous threats came from the king. Then, as time went on, a rumour reached us that Darius had died, and that his son, who was young and hot-headed, /699/ had come to the throne and was persisting in his design. The Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon and hearing of the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the host of ships considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expedition, when the Persians destroyed Eretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least on land nor when they looked to the sea, could they desert any hope of salvation for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. One chance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only one. They saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly impossible victory and borne up by this hope, they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the Gods. All these things created in them the spirit of friendship there was the fear of the moment, and there was that higher fear which they had acquired by obedience to their ancient laws, and which I have several times in the preceding discourse called reverence, of which the good man ought to be a willing servant, and of which the coward is independent and fearless. If this fear had not possessed them, they would never have met the enemy or defended their temples and sepulchres and their country and their thing that was near and dear to them, as they did but I rule by little they would have

been all scattered and dispersed

Meg Your words, Athenian are quite true and worthy of yourself and of your country

Ath They are true, Megillus and to you who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that day. And I would wish you and Cleinias to consider whether my words have not also a bearing on legislation for I am not discoursing only for the pleasure of talking but for the argument's sake. Please to remark that the experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain sense, the same for as they led their people into utter servitude, so we too led ours into all freedom. And now how shall we proceed? for I would like you to observe that our previous arguments have a good deal to say for themselves.

[100] *Meg* True but I wish that you would give us a fuller explanation.

Ath I will. Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not as now the master but rather the willing servant of the laws.

Meg What laws do you mean?

Ath In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music—that is to say such music as then existed—in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning. Now music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed pæans, and another celebrating the birth of Dionysus, called, I believe, "dithyrambs." And they used the actual word laws, or *nomoi*, for another kind of song: and to this they added the term "citharœdic." All these and others were duly distinguished nor were the performers allowed to confuse one style of music with another. And the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical shouts of the multitude, as in our days, nor in applause and clapping of hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a stick. Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe they would never have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then as time went on the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar and lawless *iano at on*. They were men of genius, but they had no perception of what is just and

lawful in music raging like Bacchanals; and possessed with inordinate delights—mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre and making one general confusion ignorantly affirming that music has no truth and whether good or bad can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such licentious works and adding to them words as licentious they have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness and made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about melody and song. [701] And in this way the theatres from being mute have become vocal as though they had understanding of good and bad in music and poetry, and instead of an aristocracy an evil sort of teatrocracy has grown up. For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of educated persons no fatal harm would have been done, but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness—freedom came following afterwards and men fancying that they knew what they did not know had no longer any fear and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is this shamelessness which is so evil a thing but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?

! Meg Very true

Ath Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom of disobedience to rulers* and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father mother elders and when near the end the control of the laws also and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges and no regard at all for the Gods—herein they exhibit and imitate the old so-called Titanic nature and come to the same point as the Titans when they rebelled against God leading a life of endless evils. But why have I said all this? I ask because the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle and then we shall not as the proverb says fall off our ass. Let us then once more ask the question, To what end has all this been said?

Meg Very good

Ath Thus then has been said for the sake—

Meg Of what?

Ath We were maintaining that the lawgiver

* Cf Republic iii 397 ff

* Cf Aristotle Politics viii 6

1 Cf Republic iv 4 4

ought to have three things in view—first that the city for which he legislates should be free and secondly be at unity with herself and thirdly should have understanding—these were our principles were they not?

Meg Certainly

Ath With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free and now we are considering which of them is the right form we took a mean in both cases of despotism in the one and of liberty in the other and we saw that in a mean they attained their perfection but that when they were carried to the extreme of either slavery or licence neither party were the gainers

[702] Meg Very true

Ath And that was our reason for considering the settlement of the Dorian army and of the city built by Dardanus at the foot of the mountains and the removal of cities to the sea shore and of our mention of the first men, who were the survivors of the deluge. And all that was previously said about music and drinking and what preceded was said with the view of seeing how a state might be best administered and how an individual might best order his own life. And now Megillus and Cleinias how can we put to the proof the value of our words?

Cle Stranger I think that I see how a proof of their value may be obtained. This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly fortunate, and just what I at this moment want most auspiciously have you and my friend Megillus come in my way. For I will tell you what has happened to me and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen. The greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony and they have entrusted the management of the affair to the Cnossians and the Cnossian government to me and nine others. And they desire us to give them any laws which we please whether taken from the Cretan model or from any other and they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better. Grant me then this favour which will also be a gain to yourselves—Let us make a selection from what has been said and then let us imagine a State of which we will suppose ourselves to be the original founders. Thus we shall proceed with our enquiry and at the same time I may have the use of the framework which you are constructing for the city which is in contemplation

Ath Good news Cleinias if Megillus has no objection you may be sure that I will do all in my power to please you

Cle Thank you.
Meg And so will I.
Cle Excellent and now let us begin to frame
 the State.

BOOK IV

[*meg*] *takes a S. paper* And now what will this city be? I do not mean to ask what is or will hereafter be the name of the place: that may be determined by the accident of locality or of the original settlement—a river or fountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly founded city: but I do want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland.

Cle As I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.

1st And are there harbours on the seaboard?

Cle Excellent harbours, Stranger: there could not be better.

1st Ah! what a prospect! And is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations?

Cle Hardly in need of anything.

1st And is there any neighbouring State?

Cle None whatever: and that is the reason for selecting the place in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region has been deserted from time immemorial.

1st And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood?

Cle Like the rest of Crete in that.

1st You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?

Cle Exactly.

1st Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous: had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importation rather than a productive country, some to play saw you would have been needed, and legislators more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and dissolvement of manners. But there is some sort in the eighty stadia although the sea is too near: especially if, as you say, the harbours are so good. [05] Still we may be content. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality filling the streets with mercurials and shopkeepers, and besetting in the souls of men unclean and unfaithful ways—making the state unfrigidly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations.

Cle Aristotle, *Politics* II. 6, 1327 11 3—

tions. There is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home: and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been abundance, there might have been a great export trade and a great return of gold and silver which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments: this was said by us, if you remember in the previous discussion.

Cle I remember and am of opinion that we both were and are in the right.

1st Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship-building?

Cle There is no fir of any consequence, nor pine, and not much cypress: and you will find very little stone pine or plane wood, which shipwrights always require for the interior of ships.

1st These are also natural advantages.

Cle Why so?

1st Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies in what is mischievous.

Cle How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking?

1st Remember my good friend, what I said at first about the Cretan laws, that they look to one thing only and thus as you both agreed, was war: and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good: but in that they regarded a part only and not the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your turn will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue only. For I consider that the true lawgiver like an archer aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, [706] and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue. I was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing: and I was thinking, or a case in which a manum people are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I do not speak from any desire or record past grievances) but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of Africa to pay him a cruel tribute: and in those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the country filled with ship-timber and therefore they could not readily build them. Hence they could not learn how to imitate their enemy at sea, and in this way becoming sailors themselves, directly repel their enemies. Better

Cle II. 6 9.

Cle II. 6 9.

for them to have lost many times over the seven youths than that heavy armed and stationary troops should have been turned into sailors and accustomed to be often leaping on shore, and again to come running back to their ships or should have fancied that there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly and that there were good reasons and plenty of them for a man throwing away his arms and betaking himself to flight—which is not dishonourable as people say, at certain times. This is the language of naval warfare and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we should not teach bad habits least of all to the best part of the citizens. You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer by whom Odysseus is introduced rebuking Agamemnon because he desires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans—he gets angry with him and says

Who at a time when the battle is in full cry biddest to drag the well benched ships into the sea that the prayers of the Trojans may be accomplished yet more and high ruin fall upon us. For the Achaeans will not maintain the battle when the ships are drawn into the sea but they will look behind and will cease from strife in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious [707]

You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea in the neighbourhood of fighting men to be an evil—horses might be trained in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover naval powers which owe their safety to ships do not give honour to that sort of warlike excellence which is most deserving of it. For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain and the oarsman and all sorts of rather inferior persons cannot rightly give honour to whom honour is due. But how can a state be in a right condition which cannot justly award honour?

Cle It is hardly possible I admit and yet stranger we Cretans are in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.

Ath Why yes and that is an opinion which is widely spread both among Hellenes and barbarians. But Megillus and I say rather that the battle of Marathon was the beginning and the battle of Plataea the completion of the great deliverance and that these battles by land made the Hellenes better whereas the sea fights of Salamis and Aramisium—for I may as well put them both together—made them no better if I may say so without offence about the battles which helped to save us. And in estimating the

goodness of a state we regard both the situation of the country and the order of the laws considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable thing for men as the vulgar think but the continuance of the best life while we live and that again if I am not mistaken is a remark which has been made already.

Cle Yes.

Ath Then we have only to ask whether we are taking the course which we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states.

Cle The best by far.

Ath And now let me proceed to another question. Who are to be the colonists? May any one come out of all Crete and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence? For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general invitation to any Hellene who likes to come. And yet I observe that to your country settlers have come from Argos and [708] Aegina and other parts of Hellas. Tell me then whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise?

Cle They will come from all Crete and of other Hellenes Peloponnesians will be most acceptable. For as you truly observe there are Cretans of Argive descent and the race of Cretans which has the highest character at the present day is the Gortynian and this has come from Gortys in the Peloponnesus.

Ath Cities find colonization in some respects easier if the colonists are one race which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a single country either when friends leave friends owing to some pressure of population or other similar necessity or when a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This however which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race and language and laws and in common temples and rites of worship but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws or any form of constitution differing from that which they had at home and although the badness of their own laws may have been the cause of the factions which prevailed among them yet from the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which

Cf ii 661.

were then run, and the leader of the colony who is their legislator finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand the confederates and several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws but then, to make them combine and pull together as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years, and yet there is nothing which tends more to the improvement of mankind than legislation and concentration.

Cle No doubt but I should like to know why you say so.

Alc My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators but if the word be to the purpose, there can be no harm. And yet, why am I disquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human beings.

[To Alc.] Cle To what are you referring?

Alc I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constant overturning governments and changing laws. And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of the sailor and the poet, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth or all of them.

Cle What is it?

Alc That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with him in the government of human affairs. There is, however a third and an extreme view that art should be there also for I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great assistance in having the aid of the pilot's art. You would agree?

Cle Yes.

Alc And does not like principle apply to legislation as well as to other things, even supposing all the conditions to be favourable which are needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator must from time to time appear on the scene.

Cle Most true.

Alc In each case the artist would be able to

pray rightly for certain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then only require to exercise his art?

Cle Certainly.

Alc And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were bidden to offer up each their special prayer would do so?

Cle Of course.

Alc And the legislator would do likewise?

Cle I believe that he would.

Alc "Come, legislator" we will say to him "what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?" How ought he to answer this question? Shall I give his answer?

Cle Yes.

Alc He will say— Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory let him be quick at learning and of a courageous and noble nature let him have that quality which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, [710] if there is to be any good in them."

Cle I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?

Alc Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of whom some live contentedly and others incontinent but when isolated, was as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I think that you must understand my meaning.

Cle Certainly.

Alc Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny.

Cle By what possible arguments, Stranger can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine?

Alc There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature?

Cle You would assume, as you say a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory courageous, of a noble nature?

Alc Yes and you must add fortunate and Cle in 696.

his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished God has done all that he ever does for a state which he desires to be eminently prosperous. He has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers and third best for a state in which there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase and diminishes with the diminution of the number.

Cle You mean to say I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect form of government takes place most easily less easily when from an oligarchy and in the third degree from a democracy is not that your meaning?

Ath Not so. I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny and secondly out of a monarchy and thirdly out of some sort of democracy fourth in the capacity for improvement comes oligarchy which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state and when the ruling element is numerically small, and at the same time very strong [711] as in a tyranny there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.

Cle How? I do not understand.

Ath And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?

Cle No and I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one.

Ath And yet where there is a tyranny you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking.

Cle What do you mean?

Ath I mean that you might see how without trouble and in no very long period of time the tyrant if he wishes can change the manners of a state he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice whichever he prefers he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others and degrading those who disobey.

Cle But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example

set to them and how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them?

Ath Let no one my friends persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which states change their laws than when the rulers lead such changes never have, nor ever will come to pass in any other way. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages but when once it is surmounted ten thousand or rather all blessings follow.

Cle Of what are you speaking?

Ath The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the character of Nestor who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech and yet more in his temperance. This however according to the tradition was in the times of Troy in our own days there is nothing of the sort but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being or is now among us blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general. When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance [712] then the best laws and the best constitution come into being but in no other way. And let what I have been saying be regarded as a kind of sacred legend or oracle and let this be our proof that in one point of view there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected granting our supposition.

Cle How do you mean?

Ath Let us try to amuse ourselves old boys as we are by moulding in words the laws which are suitable to your state.

Cle Let us proceed without delay.

Ath Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state may he hear and be propitious to us and come and set in order the State and the laws!

Cle May he come!

Ath But what form of polity are we going to give the city?

Cle Tell us what you mean a little more clearly. Do you mean some form of democracy, or oligarchy or aristocracy or monarchy? For we cannot suppose that you would include tyranny.

Ath Which of you will first tell me to which

of these classes his own government is to be preferred?

Megillus Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?

Cle Perhaps you should

Meg And yet, Stranger I perceive that I cannot say without more thought, what I should call the government of Lacedæmon for it seems to me to be like a tyranny—the power of our Ephors is marvellously tyrannical and some times it appears to me to be of all cities the most democratical and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy? We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only to be the most ancient of all monarchies and therefore when asked on a sudden I cannot precisely say which form of government the Spartan is.

Cle I am in the same difficulty *Megillus* for I do not feel confident that the policy of Cæus is any of these.

Ask The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have politics, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merely aggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of a part of their own state, [713] and each of them is named after the dominant power they are not politics at all. But if states are to be named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who rules — or — the men

Cle And who is this God?

Ask May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I may be better able to answer your question shall I?

Cle By all means

Ask In the primal world and a long while before the cities came into being whose settlements we have described there is said to have been in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and life, of which the best-ordered of existing states is a copy

Cle It will be very necessary to hear about that.

Ask I quite agree with you and therefore I have introduced the object.

Cle Most appropriate lately and since the tale is to the point, you will do well in giving us the whole story

Ask I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been a fol-
low:—Cronos knew what we ourselves

Cle See *ima* 71

Cle Aristotle, P 11

6, 1262 ~ 41.

were declaring that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities: he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen or goats of goats but we ourselves are a superior race and rule over them. In like manner God in his love of mankind placed over us the demons who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice over failing, made the tribes of men happy and united. And this tradition which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law [714] meaning by the very term law the distribution of mind. But if either a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires—wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder and this evil spirit having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an individual—then as I was saying, salvation is hopeless. And now Cleinias we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine.

Cle Certainly we will

Ask You are aware—are you not—that there are often said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments and if the latter we have already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. Now you must regard that as a matter of first rate importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general but only the interest and power and preservation of the established form of government: this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice.

Cle How?

Cle *in* 691

Supra 712.

Ath Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger

Cle Speak plainer

Ath I will — Surely they say the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state?

Cle True

Ath Well they would add and do you suppose that tyranny or democracy or any other conquering power does not make the continuance of the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their laws?

Cle How can they have any other?

Ath And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just?

Cle Naturally

Ath This then is always the mode and fashion in which justice exists

Cle Certainly if they are correct in their view

Ath Why yes this is one of those false principles of government to which we were referring

Cle Which do you mean?

Ath Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to govern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children and the elder the younger and the noble the ignoble? And there were many other principles if you remember and they were not always consistent. One principle was this very principle of might, and we said that Pindar considered violence natural and justified it

[715] *Cle* Yes I remember

Ath Consider then to whom our state is to be entrusted. For there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states——

Cle What thing?

Ath That when there has been a contest for power those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendants—they live watching one another the ruling class being in perpetual fear that some one who has a recollection of former wrongs will come into power and rise up against them. Now according to our view such governments are not politics at all nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not politics but parties and their notions of justice are

Republic 1 338 = 367

² Cf iii 690

simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich or because he possesses any other advantage such as strength or stature, or again birth but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state he shall win the palm and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods and the second to him who bears the second palm and on a similar principle shall all the other offices be assigned to those who come next in order. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law I give them this name not for the sake of novelty but because I certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the well or ill being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority I perceive to be on the highway to ruin but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers and the rulers are the inferiors of the law has salvation and every blessing which the Gods can confer.

Cle Truly Stranger you see with the keen vision of age

Ath Why yes every man when he is young has that sort of vision dullest and when he is old keenest

Cle Very true

Ath And now what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived and proceed to make our speech to them?

Cle Certainly

Ath Friends we say to them — God as the old tradition declares holding in his hand the beginning middle and end of all that is, [716] travels according to his nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his end. Justice always accompanies him and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice he who would be happy holds fast and follows in her company with all humility and order but he who is lifted up with pride or elated by wealth or rank or beauty who is young and foolish and has a soul hot with insolence and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler but is able himself to be the guide of others he I say is left deserted of God and being thus deserted he takes to him others who are like himself and dances about throwing all things into confusion and many think that he is a great man but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve and is utterly destroyed and his family and city with him. Wherefore seeing that human things are thus ordered what should a

rise man do or think, or not do or think.

Cle Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of God there can be no doubt of that.

S Then what life is agreeable to God, and become in his followers? One only expressed care for all in the old saying that like agrees with like, with measure measure, but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have. Now God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man as men commonly say (Protagoras) the words are far more true of him. And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like him and such as he is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like him and the intemperate man is unlike him, and different from him, and unjust. And the same applies to other things, and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings—that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and had converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and every fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of this is true for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God can without impropriety receive gifts. [717] Wherefore the way to do only waste their much service to the Gods, but when offered by any holy man, such service is most acceptable to them. This is the mark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the State, honour should be given to the Gods below they should receive everything in even numbers, and at the second choice, and all omen, while the odd numbers, and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and ancestral Gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them. Next comes the honour of the parents, to whom, as I meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oddest of all debts, considering that in which man has been born, to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to min-

ister to them, first, in his property secondly in his person, and thirdly in his soul in return for the endless care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to utter or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them for of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe. Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over all such matters. When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed he should give way to them for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents. And let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them [718] and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing thus, and living after this manner we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us [i.e., the demons] and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and fellow-citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life—these things, I say the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of thinking and yet, if said in the form of law would be out of place—of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. Now what will be the form of such prefaces? There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing.

Cle What is that?

1st I should wish the citizens to be as readily persuaded to virtue as possible, this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws

Cle Certainly

1st The proposal appears to me to be of some value and I think that a person will listen with more gentleness and good will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good or as quickly good as possible. The case of the many proves the wisdom of Hesiod who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and can be travelled without perspiring because it is so very short.

But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour and long and steep is the way thither [719] and rugged at first but when you have reached the top although difficult before it is then easy.

Cle Yes and he certainly speaks well

1st Very true and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me

Cle Proceed

1st Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator and say to him—O, legislator, speak, if you know what we ought to say and do you can surely tell

Cle Of course he can

1st Did we not hear you just now saying¹ that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? For that they would not know in which of their words they went against the laws to the hurt of the state

Cle That is true

1st May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets?

Cle What answer shall we make to him?

1st That the poet according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us and is accepted of all men when he sits down on the tripod of the muse is not in his right mind like a fountain he allows to flow out freely whatever comes in and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions and thus to contradict himself neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing than he has said than in another. But this is not the case in a law the legislator must give not two rules about the same

Cf 11 656 ff

thing, but one only. Take an example from what you have just been saying². Of three kinds of funerals there is one which is too extravagant another is too niggardly the third is a mean and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife and she bade me bury her and describe her burial in a poem I should praise the extravagant sort and a poor miserly man who had not much money to spend would approve of the niggardly, and the man of moderate means who was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legislator must not barely say a moderate funeral but you must define what moderation is and how much unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.

Cle Certainly not

1st And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws but to say at once Do this avoid that—and then holding the penalty in terror, to go on to another law offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he is legislating [720] after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors as I may remind you, some have a gentler others a ruder method of cure and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. What I mean to say is that besides doctors there are doctors servants who are also styled doctors.

Cle Very true

1st And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters empirically and not according to the natural way of learning as the manner of freemen is who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart scientifically to their pupils. You are aware that there are these two classes of doctors?

Cle To be sure

1st And did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients in states slaves and free men and the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves or wait for them in the dispensaries—practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients individually or let them talk about their own individual complaints? The slave doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests as if he had exact knowledge and when he has given his orders like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance in some other servant who is ill and so he relieves the master of the

Cf 717

house of the care of his invalid slaves But the other doctor who is a freeman attends and practices upon freemen and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends and is at once getting information from the sick man and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health he attempts to effect a cure Now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way or he who works in one way and that the suder and inferior?

Cle I should say Stranger that the double way is far better

Ath Should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation?

Cle Certainly I should

[722] Ath What will be our first law? Will not the legislator observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about births?

Cle He will

Ath In all states the birth of children goes back to the connection of marriage?

Cle Very true.

Ath And according to the true order the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state?

Cle Quite so

Ath Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form it may run as follows —A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty five or if he does not he shall pay such and such a fine or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the simple law about marriage. The double law would run thus —A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty five, considering that in a manner the human race naturally partakes of immortality which every man is by nature inclined to desire to the utmost for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Now mankind are coeval with all time and always following and will ever follow the course of time and so they are immortal because they leave children children behind them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. And if a man voluntarily deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or

children, is impiety. He who obeys the law shall be free and shall pay no fine but he who is disobedient, and does not marry when he has arrived at the age of thirty five shall pay a yearly fine of a certain amount in order that he may not imagine his celibacy to bring ease and profit to him and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the two forms of the law you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws—whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length.

Meg The shorter form Stranger would be more in accordance with Lacedaemonian custom although for my own part if any one were to ask me which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favour of the longer [722] and I would have every law made after the same pattern if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

Cle Thank you, Megillus

Ath Whether in the abstract, words are to be many or few is a very foolish question the best form and not the shortest, is to be approved nor is length at all to be regarded. Of the two forms of law which have been recited the one is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as the other but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, which I was just now mentioning. And yet legislators never appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they might use in legislation—persuasion and force for in dealing with the rude and uneducated multitude they use the one only as far as they can they do not mingle persuasion with coercion but employ force pure and simple. Moreover there is a third point, sweet friends which ought to be, and never is regarded in our existing laws.

Cle What is it?

Ath A point arising out of our previous discussion which comes into my mind in some mysterious way. All this time, from early dawn until noon have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat now we are going to promulgate our laws and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason—Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and ornaments, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be per-

formed lyric measures and music of every other kind have preludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics no one has ever yet uttered any prelude or composed or published any as though there was no such thing in nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is—these double laws of which we were speaking are not exactly double but they are in two parts, [723] the law and the prelude of the law. The arbitrary command which was compared to the commands of doctors whom we described as of the meaner sort was the law pure and simple and that which preceded and was described by our friend here as being hortatory only was although in fact an exhortation likewise analogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law was intended to create good will in the person whom he addressed in order that by reason of this good will he might more intelligently receive his command that is to say the law. And therefore in my way of speaking this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the law. And I must further proceed to observe that to all his laws and to each separately the legislator should prefix a preamble he should remember how great will be the difference between them, according as they have or have not such preambles as in the case already given.

Cle The lawgiver if he asks my opinion will certainly legislate in the form which you advise.

Ath I think that you are quite right. Cleinias in affirming that all laws have preambles and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning for that which is to follow is most important and it makes all the difference whether we clearly remember the preambles or not. Yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws small and great alike should have preambles of the same kind any more than all songs or speeches although they may be natural to all they are not always necessary and whether they are to be employed or not has in each case to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician or in the present instance, of the lawgiver.

Cle That I think is most true. And now Stranger without delay let us return to the argument, and as people say in play make a second

and better beginning if you please with the principles which we have been laying down which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before but of which we may now make a preamble and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge then that we have a preamble. About the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents enough has been already said and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete and after that you shall go through the laws themselves.

[724] *Ath* I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about Gods and demi gods and about parents living or dead and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day?

Cle Exactly.

Ath After this, as is meet and for the interest of us all, I the speaker and you the listeners will try to estimate all that relates to the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens as regards both their occupations and amusements and thus arrive as far as in us lies at the nature of education. These then are the topics which follow next in order.

Cle Very good.

BOOK V

[726] *Athenian Stranger* LISTEN all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods and about our dear forefathers—Of all the things which a man has next to the Gods his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts the better and superior which rules and the worse and inferior which serves [727] and the ruling part of him is always to be preferred to the subject. Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next to the Gods who are our masters and those who in order follow them [i.e. the demons] to honour his own soul which every one seems to honour but no one honours as he ought for honour is a divine good and no evil thing is honourable and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or gift or any sort of compliance without making her in any way better seems to honour her but honours her not at all. For example every man from his very boyhood fancies that he is able to know everything and thinks that he honours his soul by praising her and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul and is

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far from honouring her whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as second only to the Gods. Again when a man thinks that others are to be blamed and not himself for the errors which he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which befall him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her he only dishonours her and fills her full of evil and remorse or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves but gives way before them then by yielding he does not honour the soul but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good does he honour her but yet once more he dishonours her for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil he yields to her and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows the world of the Gods be low instead of being evil may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what must this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul and this is false for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession [728] nor again, when a person is willing or not unwilling to acquire dishonest gains does he then honour his soul with gifts—far otherwise he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator and abstain as very possible away from the one and practise the other to the utmost of his power does not know that in all these respects he is most foully and desperately abusing his soul which is the divine part of man for no one, I may say ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing—namely to grow into the likeness of bad men and growing like them to fly off in the converse of the good and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of

the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another—a suffering which is not justice but retribution for justice and the just are noble whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon injustice and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable—in the former case because he is not cured while in the latter he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.

Speaking generally our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior which is susceptible of improvement as far as this is possible. And of all human possessions, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil and track out and find the chief good which when a man has found he should take up his abode with it during the remainder of his life. Wherefore the soul also is second (or next to God) in honour and third as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural order. Having determined this we have next to consider that there is a natural honour of the body and that of honours some are true and some are counterfeit. To decide which are which is the business of the legislator and he I suspect, would intimate that they are as follows—Honour is not to be given to the fair body or to the strong or the swift or the tall or to the healthy body (although many may think otherwise) any more than to their opposites but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent and the other liberal and base and money and property and distinction all go to the same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions [729] among states and individuals and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery and at the same time is in need of the necessities of life is the best and most harmonious of all being in accord and agreement with our nature and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of riches but the spirit of reverence. We indeed fancy that they will inherit reverence from us if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition

which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful for where old men have no shame there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice. He who honours his kindred and reveres those who share in the same Gods and are of the same blood and family may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do for him greater and more important than they themselves deem them and his own favours to them less than theirs to him will have their good will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens he is by far the best who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country and who of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. In his relations to strangers a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God than wrongs done to citizens for the stranger having no kindred and friends is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore also he who is most able to avenge him is most zealous in his cause and he who is most able is the genius and the god of the stranger [730] who follow in the train of Zeus the god of strangers. And for this reason he who has a spark of caution in him will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow countrymen that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents and himself, and his own affairs and in relation to the state and his friends and kindred both in what concerns his own countrymen and in what concerns the stranger. We will now consider what manner of man he must be who

would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law but of praise and blame only in which praise and blame educate a man and make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.

Truth is the beginning of every good thing both to Gods and men and he who would be blessed and happy should be from the first a partaker of the truth that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is enviable for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend and as time advances he becomes known and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is in the wane so that whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary.—Worthy of honour is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour if he not only does no injustice himself but hinders others from doing any the first may count as one man the second is worth many men because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom and all other goods which may be imparted to others as well as acquired by a man for himself he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men and he who is willing [731] yet is not able may be allowed the second place but he who is jealous and will not if he can help allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good is deserving of blame the good however which he has is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by him but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. Let every man then freely strive for the prize of virtue and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man but the envious who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And so he makes the whole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant but he should also be gentle. From the

cruel or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done to him by others a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this As to the actions of those who do evil but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils and least of all in the most honourable part of himself And the soul, as we said in of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable In the soul then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils The unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied in any case and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger not getting into a passion like a woman, and nursing ill feeling But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil the vials of our wrath should be poured out, wherefore I say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to be both gentle and passionate.

Of all evils the greatest is one which in the souls of most men is innate and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting I mean, what is expressed in the saying that Every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend. Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, [732] the good and the honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer himself to the truth. But he who would be a great man ought to regard not himself or his interests but what is just, whether the just act be his own or that of another Through a similar error men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore let every man avoid excess of self love and condescend to follow a better man than himself not allowing any false shame to stand in the way There are also minor precepts which are often repeated and are quite as useful a man should recollect them and remind himself of them. For when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing,

CL. REF. M. 1. 232.

in too and recollection flows in while wisdom is departing Therefore I say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears, and should exhort his neighbour to do the same he should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy and seek to behave with propriety whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he may ever hope, in the case of good men, that whatever afflictions are to befall them in the future God will lessen and that present evils he will change for the better and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added to them and that they will be fortunate Such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another never losing an opportunity but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others of all these things both in jest and earnest.

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices which men ought to follow and as to the sort of persons who they ought severally to be But of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must for to men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life not only as the fairest in appearance, but as being one which if a man will only taste, and not while still in his youth desert for another [733] he will find to surpass also in the very thing which we all of us desire—I mean in having a greater amount of pleasure and less of pain during the whole of life. And this will be plain if a man has a true taste of them as will be quickly and clearly seen. But what is a true taste? That we have to learn from the argument—the point being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature One life must be compared with another the more pleasurable with the more painful after this manner—We desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain and we also wish for less pain and greater pleasure but less pleasure and greater pain we do not wish for and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire And all these differ or do not differ severally in number

which only tells them that the young ought all ways to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful for where old men have no shame there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice. He who honours his kindred and reveres those who share in the same Gods and are of the same blood and family may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do for him greater and more important than they themselves deem them and his own favours to them less than theirs to him will have their good will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens he is by far the best who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country and who of all mankind is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God than wrongs done to citizens for the stranger having no kindred and friends is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore also he who is most able to avenge him is most zealous in his cause and he who is most able is the genius and the god of the stranger [730] who follow in the train of Zeus the god of strangers. And for this reason he who has a spark of caution in him will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed whether against strangers or fellow countrymen that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

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introduction, for the sake of illustration but what relates to man is of the highest importance and the legislator should make enquiries, and indicate what is proper for each one in the way of punishment and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city—there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult, and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect, but the legislator who, not being a despot, sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving rigorous punishment and infliction, death or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of the whole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows.—when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich—these, [736] who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and thus dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to do this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. But as, when many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or mountain torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. But, seeing that we are now only discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the desired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join and be citizens of our state, after we have tested them by every sort of persuasion and for a sufficient time, we will prevent them from coming but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with open arms.

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours—that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driv-

en by necessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet return to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished by those who have abundance of land, and having also many children, are willing in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the great beginning of salvation to a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances but if the change be based upon an unsober principle, the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. [737] That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how if we had not escaped, we might have escaped and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but freedom from aversion and a sense of justice—upon this rock our city shall be built for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to whom God has given, as he has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free from enmity—that they should create themselves enemies by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness.

How then can we rightly order the distribution of the land? In the first place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the number and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life—more than this is not required and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their neighbours, and also to give them the power of rendering efficient aid to their neighbours when they are wronged. After having taken a survey of theirs and their neighbours' territory we will determine the limits of them

and magnitude and intensity and equality and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of choice in relation to desire. And such being the necessary order of things we wish for that life in which there are many great and intense elements of pleasure and pain and in which the pleasures are in excess and do not wish for that in which the opposites exceed nor again do we wish for that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble and the pains exceed. And when as I said before there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life this is to be regarded by us as the balanced life while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature desire. And if we wish for any others I say that we desire them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist.

Now what lives are they and how many in which having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites and making of them a law choosing I say the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life and the rational another and the courageous another and the healthful another and to these four let us oppose four other lives—the foolish the cowardly the intemperate the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle having gentle pains and gentle pleasures and placid desires and loves not insane [734] whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things and has violent pains and pleasures and vehement and stinging desires and loves utterly insane and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in greatness and number and frequency. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. And if this is true the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives either from ignorance or from want of self-control or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life: they both have pleasures and pains but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now our inten-

tion in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to be the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less frequent than the intemperate and the wise life than the foolish life and the life of courage than the life of cowardice one of each pair exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain: the courageous surpassing the cowardly and the wise exceeding the foolish. And so the one class of lives exceeds the other class in pleasure: the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives, and generally speaking that which has any virtue whether of body or soul is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and reputation and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite.

Enough of the preamble and now the laws should follow or to speak more correctly an outline of them. As then in the case of a web or any other tissue the warp and the woof can not be made of the same materials [735] but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity—in a similar manner those who are to hold great offices in states should be distinguished truly in each case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education. Let us suppose that there are two parts in the constitution of a state—one the creation of offices the other the laws which are assigned to them to administer.

But before all this comes the following consideration—The shepherd or herdsman or breeder of horses or the like when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals: he will divide the healthy and unhealthy and the good breed and the bad breed and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest reflecting that his labours will be vain and have no effect either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal if he should neglect to purify them. Now the case of other animals is not so important—they are only worth

Cf. Statesman 309

in fact as well as in theory. And now let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be 5040—this will be a convenient number, and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment. The houses and the land will be divided in the same way so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts and then into three and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely to be useful to all cities [738] and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty nine divisors and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and peace and for all contracts and dealings including taxes and divisions of the land. These properties of number should be ascertained at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one in respect of Gods and temples—the temples which are to be built in each city and the Gods or demi gods after whom they are to be called—if he be a man of sense he will make no change in anything which the oracle of Delphi or Dodona or the God Ammon or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connection with mystic rites either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place and on the strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images and altars and temples and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator but he should assign to the several districts some God or demi god or hero and, in the distribution of the soil should give to these first their chosen domain and all things fitting that the inhabitants of the several districts may meet at fixed times and that they may readily supply their various wants and entertain one another with sacrifices and become friends and acquaintances

for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another. When not light but darkness and ignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no one will receive the honour of which he is deserving or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entitled wherefore in every state, above all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him but that he be always true and simple and that no deceitful person take any advantage of him.

[739] The next move in our pastime of legislation like the withdrawal of the stone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one will probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time. And yet, if a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see that our city is ordered in a manner which if not the best is the second best. Perhaps also some one may not approve this form because he thinks that such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government the best, the second and the third best which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. Following this method in the present instance let us speak of the states which are respectively first second and third in excellence, and then we will leave the choice to Cleinias now or to any one else who may hereafter have to make a similar choice among constitutions and may desire to give to his state some feature which is congenial to him and which he approves in his own country.

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that Friends have all things in common. Whether there is anywhere now or will ever be this communion of women and children and of property in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life and things which are by nature private such as eyes and ears and hands have become common and in some way see and hear and act in common and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man acting upon any other principle will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods one or more than one, happy are the

Cf. *Republic* i. 462, ff

body and, first of all that of the soul and the state which we are describing will have been nobly constituted if it ordains honours accordingly to this scale [744] But if in any of the laws which have been ordained health has been preferred to temperance or wealth to health and temperate habits that law must clearly be wrong Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question—What do I want? and Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark? In this way and in this way only he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation

Let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have mentioned

It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal but seeing that this is not possible and one man will have greater possessions than another for many reasons and in particular in order to preserve equality in special crises of the state qualifications of property must be unequal in order that offices and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth and not solely in the virtue of his ancestors or himself nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty and so by a law of inequality which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible and there will be no quarrels and disputes To which end there should be four different standards appointed according to the amount of property there should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these or similar names they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case on becoming richer from being poorer or poorer from being richer The form of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as follows—In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues—not faction, but rather distraction—there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty nor again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot thought to be preferred, and no ruler nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case This the leg-

islator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple or as much as four times the amount of this But if a person have yet greater riches whether he has found them or they have been given to him or he has made them in business or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure [745] if he give back the surplus to the state and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation but if he disobeys this our law any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods And let every possession of every man with the exception of the lot be publicly registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy and quite simple

The next thing to be noted is that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the country we should choose a place which possesses what is suitable for a city and this may easily be imagined and described Then we will divide the city into twelve portions first founding temples to Hestia to Zeus and to Athena, in a spot which we will call the Acropolis, and surround with a circular wall making the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point The twelve portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are of good land shall be smaller while those of inferior quality shall be larger The number of the lots shall be 5040 and each of them shall be divided into two and every allotment shall be composed of two such sections one of land near the city the other of land which is at a distance This arrangement shall be carried out in the following manner The section which is near the city shall be added to that which is on the borders, and form one lot and the portion which is next nearest shall be added to the portion which is next farthest and so of the rest Moreover in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less And the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts and arrange the rest of their property as far as possible so as to form twelve equal parts and there shall be a registration of all After this they shall assign

ter of reproach to a freeman and should never want to acquire riches by any such means

[742] Further the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess gold and silver but only coin for daily use which is all most necessary in dealing with artisans and for payment of hirelings whether slaves or immigrants by all those persons who require the use of them Wherefore our citizens as we say should have a coin passing current among themselves but not accepted among the rest of mankind with a view however to expeditions and journeys to other lands—for embassies or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald the state must also possess a common Hellenic currency If a private person is ever obliged to go abroad let him have the consent of the magistrates and go and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining let him give the surplus back to the treasury and receive a corresponding sum in the local currency And if he is discovered to appropriate it let it be confiscated and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally with him who brought the money and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back In marrying and giving in marriage no one shall give or receive any dowry at all and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend nor shall he lend money upon interest and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest That these principles are best any one may see who compares them with the first principle and intention of a state The intention as we affirm of a reasonable statesman is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator namely that the state for the true interests of which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible and should possess gold and silver and have the greatest empire by sea and land—thus they imagine to be the real object of legislation at the same time adding inconsistently that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible But they do not see that some of these things are possible and some of them are impossible and he who orders the state will desire what is possible and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible The citizen must indeed be happy and good and the legislator will seek to make him so but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be not at least in the sense in which the many speak of riches [743] For they

mean by the rich the few who have the most valuable possessions although the owner of them may quite well be a rogue And if this is true I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy—he must be good as well as rich And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time he can not be Some one will ask why not? And we shall answer—Because acquisitions which come from sources which are just and unjust indifferently are more than double those which come from just sources only and the sums which are expended neither honourably nor disgracefully are only half as great as those which are expended honourably and on honourable purposes Thus if the one acquires double and spends half the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he The first—I am speaking of the saver and not of the spender—is not always bad he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad but as I was saying a good man he never is For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly and spends neither justly nor unjustly will be a rich man if he be also thrifty On the other hand the utterly bad is in general profligate and therefore very poor while he who spends on noble objects and acquires wealth by just means only can hardly be remarkable for riches any more than he can be very poor Our statement then, is true that the very rich are not good and if they are not good they are not happy But the intention of our laws was that the citizens should be as happy as may be and as friendly as possible to one another And men who are always at law with one another and amongst whom there are many wrongs done can never be friends to one another but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight Therefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock but only the produce of agriculture and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist—I mean soul and body which without gymnastics and without education will never be worth anything and therefore, as we have said not once but many times the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest and the interest about money when rightly regarded is the third and lowest of them midway comes the interest of the

man can, and frame his laws accordingly. And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country.

Cleinas. Your words, Athenian Stranger are excellent, and I will do as you say.

BOOK VI

[151] *Athenian Stranger* And now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of magistrates.

Cleinas. Very good.

151 In the ordering of a state there are two parts, first, the number of the magistrates, and the mode of establishing them; and, secondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be provided for each of them, suitable in nature and number. But before electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season about the election of them.

Cle. What have you got to say?

152 I think this is what I have to say — Every one can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable officers, not only will there be no use in having the good laws — not only will they be ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them.

Cle. Of course.

153 Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of our intended state. In the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power and their families, should severally have a satisfactory proof of what they are, from youth upward until the time of election in the next place, those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are strangers to one another and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

Cle. If possible.

154 The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. I will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you told me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the people of Crete, [152] and I am to help you by the intention of the present romance. I certainly would not like

to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head — a headless monster is such a hideous thing.

Cle. Excellent, Stranger.

155 Yes, and I will be as good as my word.

Cle. Let us by all means do as you propose.

156 That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us.

Cle. But God will be gracious.

157 Yes, and under his guidance let us consider a further point.

Cle. What is it?

158 Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

Cle. What had you in your mind when you said that?

159 I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been unusual with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state. I say if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance — then, I think that there would be very little danger at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent.

Cle. A reasonable supposition.

160 Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the difficulty for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the other Cretans, should not be taxed with barely discharging their duty to the colony but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the offices which are first created by them in the best and surest manner. Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care the others are of less importance.

Cle. What method can we devise of electing them?

161 This will be the method — Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, [153] and the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of those latter the Cnosians shall make a present to your colony and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state and if you

twelve lots to twelve Gods and call them by their names and dedicate to each God their several portions and call the tribes after them And they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the country and every man shall have two habitations one in the centre of the country, and the other at the extremity Enough of the manner of settlement

Now we ought by all means to consider that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described neither can all things coincide as they are wanted [746] Men who will not take offence at such a mode of living together and will endure all their life long to have their property fixed at a moderate limit and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator as is evident from these enactments will certainly forbid them and will endure further the situation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings roundabout—all this is as if the legislator were telling his dreams or making a city and citizens of wax There is truth in these objections and therefore every one should take to heart what I am going to say Once more, then the legislator shall appear and address us—O my friends, he will say to us do not suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in your words but I am of opinion that in matters which are not present but future he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest, and that if he finds any part of this work impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it, you must allow the legislator to perfect his design and when it is perfected you should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all ought always to make his work self-consistent

Having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts let us now see in what way this may be accomplished There is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which they include or in seeing the other numbers which are consequent upon them, and are produced out of them up to 5040 wherefore the law ought to order phra

Cf *Ibid* ii. 6 1265^a 18-25

tries and demes and villages and also military ranks and movements as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid and weights as to be commensurable and agreeable to one another Nor should we fear the appearance of minuteness if the law commands that all the vessels which a man possesses should have a common measure, when we consider generally that the divisions and variations of [747] numbers have a use in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible both in themselves and as measures of height and depth and in all sounds and in motions as well those which proceed in a straight direction upwards or downwards, as in those which go round and round The legislator is to consider all these things and to bid the citizens as far as possible not to lose sight of numerical order for no single instrument of youthful education has such mighty power both as regards domestic economy and politics and in the arts as the study of arithmetic Above all arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn retentive shrewd and aided by art divine he makes progress quite beyond his natural powers All such things if only the legislator by other laws and institutions can banish meanness and covetousness from the souls of men so that they can use them properly and to their own good will be excellent and suitable instruments of education But if he cannot he will unintentionally create in them instead of wisdom the habit of craft which evil tendency may be observed in the Egyptians and Phoenicians and many other races through the general vulgarity of their pursuits and acquisitions whether some unworthy legislator of theirs has been the cause or some impediment of chance or nature For we must not fail to observe O Megillus and Cleinias that there is a difference in places and that some beget better men and others worse and we must legislate accordingly Some places are subject to strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse winds and violent heats some by reason of waters or again from the character of the food given by the earth, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or evil but produces similar results in their souls And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is a divine inspiration and in which the demi gods have their appointed lots and are propitious not adverse to the settlers in them To all these matters the legislator if he have any sense in him will attend as far as

Cf *Republic* vii. 5 6

man can and frame his laws accordingly And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country

Cleinias As Your words, Athenian Stranger are excellent, and I will do as you say

BOOK VI

[751] *Athenian Stranger* And now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of magistracies.

Cleinias Very good

1st In the ordering of a state there are two parts: first, the number of the magistracies, and the mode of establishing them; and, secondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be provided for each of them, suitable in nature and number. But before electing, the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season about the election of them.

Cle What have you got to say?

1st This is what I have to say—every one can see that although the work of legislation is a most important matter yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only will there be no use in having the good laws—not only will they be ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them.

Cle Of course

1st Then no, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of our intended state. In the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power and their families should severally have given satisfactory proof of what they are, from youth upward until the time of election. In the next place, those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law and be well educated that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are strangers to one another and also uneducated will aoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

Cle Impossible.

1st The matter is set on us, and excuses will not serve the turn. I will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you tell me with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the people of Crete [752] and I am to help you by the introduction of the present romance. I certainly should not like

to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head—a headless monster in such a hideous thing.

Cle Excellent, Stranger

1st Yes, and I will be as good as my word.

Cle Let us by all means do as you propose.

1st That we will by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us.

Cle But God will be gracious

1st Yes, and under his guidance let us consider a further point.

Cle What is it?

1st Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

Cle What had you in your mind when you said that?

1st I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them and become habituated to them take their part in the public elections of the state I say if this could be accomplished and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance—then, I think that there would be very little danger at the end of the time of a state thus trained not being permanent.

Cle A reasonable supposition.

1st Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the difficulty for I maintain Cleinias, that the Cnossians, above all the other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the offices which are first created by them in the best and surest manner. Above all this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care the others are of less importance.

Cle What method can we devise of electing them?

1st This will be the method—Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnossians have precedence over the other states, they should in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, [753] and the remainder from the citizens of Cnossus. Of those latter the Cnossians shall make a present to your colony and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state and if you

and they cannot be persuaded to go the Cnossians may fairly use a little violence in order to make you

Cle But why Stranger do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city?

Ath O Cleinias Athenians proud and Sparta too and they are both a long way off But you and likewise the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe I have been speaking of the way in which the new citizens may be best managed under present circumstances but in after ages if the city continues to exist let the election be on this wise All who are horse or foot soldiers or have seen military service at the proper ages when they were severally fitted for it shall share in the election of magistrates and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state deems most venerable and every one shall carry his vote to the altar of the God writing down on a tablet the name of the person for whom he votes and his father's name and his tribe, and ward and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner Any one who pleases may take away any tablet which he does not think properly filled up and exhibit it in the Agora for a period of not less than thirty days The tablets which are judged to be first to the number of 300, shall be shown by the magistrates to the whole city and the citizens shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer and this second selection to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the citizens in the third let any one who pleases select whom he pleases out of the 100 walking through the parts of victims and let them choose for magistrates and proclaim the seven and thirty who have the greatest number of votes But who Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates and the scrutinies of them? If we reflect we shall see that cities which are in process of construction like ours must have some such persons who cannot possibly be elected before there are any magistrates and yet they must be elected in some way and they are not to be inferior men but the best possible For as the proverb says a good beginning is half the business and to have begun well is praised by all and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business [754] and has never been praised by any one enough

Cle That is very true

Ath Then let us recognize the difficulty and make clear to our own minds how we begin

¹ Cf. Aristotle *Politics* ii 6 1265^a 26-33

ning is to be accomplished There is only one proposal which I have to offer, and that is one which under our circumstances is both necessary and expedient

Cle What is it?

Ath I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother who are no other than the colonizing state. Well I know that many colonies have been and will be at enmity with their parents But in early days the child as in a family loves and is beloved even if there come a time later when the tie is broken still while he is in want of education he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them and flies to his relatives for protection and finds in them his only natural allies in time of need and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnossians, as is shown by their care of the new city and there is a similar feeling on the part of the young city towards Cnosus And I repeat what I was saying—for there is no harm in repeating a good thing—that the Cnossians should take a common interest in all these matters, and choose as far as they can the eldest and best of the colonists to the number of not less than a hundred and let there be another hundred of the Cnossians themselves These I say on their arrival should have a joint care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny When this has been effected the Cnossians shall return home and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness I would have the seven and thirty now and in all future time, chosen to fulfil the following duties—Let them in the first place be the guardians of the law and secondly of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class three allowed to the second two to the third and a single mina to the fourth And if any one despising the laws for the sake of gain be found to possess anything more which has not been registered let all that he has in excess be confiscated and let him be liable to a suit which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate And let any one who will indict him on the charge of loving base gains and proceed against him before the guardians of the law [755] And if he be cast let him lose his share of the public possessions and when there is any public distribution let him have nothing but his original lot and let him be written down a condemned man as long as he lives in some place in which

any one who pleases can read about his offences. The guardian of the law shall not hold office less than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will be permitted to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.

These are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law as the work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them their further duties. And now we may proceed in order to speak of the election of other officers for generals have to be elected, and these again must have their ministers, commanders, and counsels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more properly called by their popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose as generals men who are natives of the city and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the age for military service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name whom he prefers in the place of whom, and make oath that he is better and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote shall be admitted to the final election and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny like the guardians of the law. And let the generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe and there shall be a right of counter proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. And the pyrranes and council are elected, the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are to vote for the generals (and for the counsels of horse) but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields [i.e., the hoplites] [756]. Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the general but captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry these shall be proposed by the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the counter proposal of

other candidates shall be arranged in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the election the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice but if the dispute be raised a third time, the officers who preside at the several elections shall decide.

The council shall consist of 30 or 32 members—360 will be a convenient number for subdivision. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class. First, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class they shall be compelled to vote and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the candidates have been selected, some one shall mark them down this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day candidates shall be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day and on the third day a selection shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes, vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day candidates shall be selected from the fourth and smallest class they shall be selected by all but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished—he who is of the second class shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, for all the citizens to see, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny—These are to form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy and democracy [757] and such a mean the state ought always to observe for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. For to unequal equals become unequal if they are not harmonized by measure and both by reason of equality and by reason of inequality citizens are filled with seditions.

The old saying that equality makes friendship happy and also true but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant For there are two equalities which are called by the same name but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another one of them may be introduced with out difficulty by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours this is the rule of measure weight and number which regulates and apportions them But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind which is not so easily recognized This is the judgment of Zeus among men it avails but little that little however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states For it gives to the greater more and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each and above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue and to the less less and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of states at which we ought to aim and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded and any other city which may be hereafter founded To this the legislator should look—not to the interests of tyrants one or more or to the power of the people but to justice always which as I was saying is the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words just equal in a secondary sense in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot in order to avoid the discontent of the people and so we invoke God and fortune in our prayers and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice And therefore although we are compelled to use both equalities we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible [758]

Thus O my friends and for the reasons given should a state act which would endure and be saved But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning rulers must join hands with rulers and watchers with watchers receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual succession Now a multitude can never fulfil a duty of this sort with anything like energy

Moreover the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes They will therefore have to be arranged in twelve portions answering to the twelve months and furnish guardians of the state each portion for a single month Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them whether to give information or to put one of those questions, to which when asked by other cities a city should give an answer and to which if she ask them herself she should receive an answer or again when there is a likelihood of internal commotions which are always liable to happen in some form or other they will if they can prevent their occurring or if they have already occurred will lose no time in making them known to the city and healing the evil Wherefore also this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies and of the dissolutions of them ordinary as well as extraordinary All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year and to rest during the remaining eleven portions

Thus will the city be fairly ordered And now who is to have the superintendence of the country and what shall be the arrangement? Seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the streets of the city and of the houses and buildings and harbours and the agora and fountains and sacred domains and temples and the like?

Cle To be sure there ought

[759] *Ath* Let us assume then that there ought to be servants of the temples and priests and priestesses There must also be superintendents of roads and buildings who will have a care of men that they may do no harm and also of beasts both within the enclosure and in the suburbs Three kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed in order that the city may be suitably provided according to her needs Those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the city and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests Those who hold hereditary offices as priests or priestesses shall not be disturbed but if there be few or none such as is probable at the foundation of a new

city priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the Gods who have no servants. Some of our officers shall be elected, and others appointed by lot, those who are of the people and those who are not of the people mingling in a friendly manner in every place and say that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. The officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot in this way their election will be commuted in God, that he may do what is agreeable to him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now the laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and interpreters appointed, under whose direction they should be used. The tenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no longer and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age—the laws shall be the same about priestesses. As for the interpreters, they shall be appointed thus—let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of four and let each group select four one out of each tribe within the group, three times and let the three who have the greatest number of votes [out of the twelve appointed by each group] after undergoing a scrutiny nine in all, be sent to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each triad their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner let them be interpreters for life, and when any one dies let the four tribes select another from the tribe of the deceased. Moreover besides priests and interpreters, there must be treasurers, who will take charge of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred domains, and shall have authority over the produce and the letting of them and three of them shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater [760] temples, and two for the lesser and one for the least of all the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as that of the generals. This shall be the order of the temples.

Let everything have a guard as far as possible. Let the defence of the city be committed to the generals, and taxarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of

Cl. 55.

the city and of the agora when the election of them has been completed. The defence of the country shall be provided for as follows.—The entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the tribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch and let each body of five have the power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own tribe—these shall be not less than twenty five years of age, and not more than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every month the various districts, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole country. The term of service for commanders and for watchers shall continue during two years. After having had their stations allotted to them, they will go from place to place in regular order making their round from left to right as their commanders direct them (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that they are to go to the east). And at the commencement of the second year in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at any one season of the year but may also have experience of the manner in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left from place to place in succession, until they have completed the second year. In the third year other wardens of the country shall be chosen and commanders of the watch, five for each division, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. While on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to the following points.—In the first place, they shall see that the country is well protected against enemies they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by fortifications keep off the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from doing any harm to the country or the property they shall use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot. These will be their instruments whom they will superintend, [761] taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends there shall be ways for man and beasts of burden and for cattle, and they shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can and shall provide

Cl. Aristotle, *Politics* vii. 5. 13.6 32.

against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land when they come down from the mountains into the hollow dells and shall keep in the overflow by the help of works and ditches in order that the valleys receiving and drinking up the rain from heaven and providing fountains and streams in the fields and regions which lie underneath may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains of water whether of rivers or of springs shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty and let them bring together the streams in subterraneous channels and make all things plentiful and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the neighbourhood they shall conduct the water to the actual temples of the Gods and so beautify them at all seasons of the year. Everywhere in such places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves and warm baths for the aged placing by them abundance of dry wood for the benefit of those labouring under disease—there the weary frame of the rustic worn with toil will receive a kindly welcome far better than he would at the hands of a not over wise doctor.

The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental they will provide a pleasing amusement but they will be a serious employment too for the sixty wardens will have to guard their several divisions not only with a view to enemies but also with an eye to professing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens and any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another let the five wardens decide small matters on their own authority but where the charge against another relates to greater matters the seven teen composed of the fives and twelves shall determine any charges which one man brings against another not involving more than three minae. Every judge and magistrate shall be liable to give an account of his conduct in office except those who like kings have the final decision. Moreover as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks [762] or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe or decide suits unjustly or if they yield to the influences of flattery let them be publicly dishonoured and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country if the question be of a mina let them submit

to the decision of the villagers in the neighbourhood but in suits of greater amount or in the case of lesser if they refuse to submit trusting that their monthly removal into another part of the country will enable them to escape—in such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant who refused to submit a double penalty.

The wardens and the overseers of the country while on their two years service shall have common meals at their several stations and shall all live together and he who is absent from the common meal or sleeps out if only for one day or night unless by order of his commanders or by reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe his name in the agora as not having kept his guard let him be deemed to have betrayed the city as far as lay in his power and let him be disgraced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him and is willing to punish him. If any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity the whole company of sixty shall see to it and he who is cognizant of the offence and does not bring the offender to trial shall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself and shall pay a heavier fine and be incapable of ever commanding the young. The guardians of the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters and shall either prevent or punish offenders. Every man should remember the universal rule that he who is not a good servant will not be a good master a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon commanding well first upon serving the laws which is also the service of the Gods in the second place upon having served ancient and honourable men in the days of his youth. Furthermore during the two years in which any one is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to be of a simple and humble kind. When the twelve have been chosen [763] let them and the five meet together and determine that they will be their own servants and like servants will not have other slaves and servants for their own use neither will they use those of the villagers and husbandmen for their private advantage but for the public service only and in general they should make up their minds to live independently by themselves servants of each other and of themselves. Further at all seasons of the year summer and winter alike let them be under arms and survey minutely the whole country thus they will at once keep guard and at the same

¹ Cf. viii 843.

time acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality. There can be no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country, and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police, or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service.

After the wardens of the country we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country were sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide the twelve parts of the city into three, like the former they shall have care of the ways, and of the different high roads, such lead out of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made according to law—also of the waters, which the guardians of the supply preserve and convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. These also should be men of influence, and at leisure to take care of the public interest. Let every man propose as a warden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the laws laid down for them. Next let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city—these when they have undergone a scrutiny are to be declared magistrates. Every one shall vote for every one, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let any one who likes go to the assembly and to the general council shall be compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. But the third and fourth class shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off with a fine, unless the magistrates have commanded all to

cf. 1. 633.

be present, in consequence of some urgent necessity. The wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and fountains which are in the agora, and they shall see that no one injures anything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be a slave or stranger, but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double that amount. And let the wardens of the city have a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department, and let them impose fines by their own authority up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora.

In the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music and gymnastic, two kinds of each—of the one kind the business will be education, of the other the superintendence of contests. In speaking of education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and of school buildings for boys and girls, and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music: these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastics, and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men shall judge of horses, but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing and of imitation—first mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choral song. First of all we must choose directors for the choruses of boys, and men and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and for our other musical arrangements [765]—one director will be enough for the choruses, and he should be not less than forty years of age. One director will also be enough to introduce the solo singers, and to give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age. The director and manager of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner—Let any persons who commonly take an interest in such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose as director some one who understands music, and he in the scrutiny may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill

and defended on the other hand by those who say that he has Ten're to be elected by vote and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny and lead the choruses for a year according to law And in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and concert music for that year, and he who is thus elected shall deliver the award to the judges In the next place we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens and the three first classes shall be compelled to go to the election but the lowest may stay away with impunity and let there be three elected by lot out of the twenty who have been chosen previously and they must also have the vote and approval of the examiners But if any one is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision others shall be chosen in the same manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny

There remains the minister of the education of youth male and female he too will rule according to law one such minister will be sufficient and he must be fifty years old and have children lawfully begotten both boys and girls by preference at any rate, one or the other He who is elected and he who is the elector should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest for the first shoot of any plant if it makes a good start towards the attainment of its natural excellence has the greatest effect on its maturity and this is not only true of plants [766] but of animals wild and tame and also of men Man as we say is a tame or civilized animal nevertheless he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized but if he be insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter In the first place he who would be rightly provident about them should begin by taking care that he is elected who of all the citizens is in every way best him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint guardian and superintendent To this end all the magistrates with the exception of the council and prytanes shall go to the temple of Apollo and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be the best superintendent of education And he who has the greatest number of votes after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all

the magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the guardians of the law—shall hold office for five years and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office

If any one dies while he is holding a public office and more than thirty days before his term of office expires let those whose business it is elect another to the office in the same manner as before And if any one who is entrusted with orphans dies let the relations both on the father's and mother's side who are residing at home including cousins appoint another guardian within ten days or be fined a drachma a day for neglect to do so

A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city and again if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings than the litigants as is the case in arbitrations he will never be able to decide justly wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well nor a few if they are bad The point in dispute between the parties should be made clear and time and deliberation and repeated examination greatly tend to clear up doubts For this reason he who goes to law with an other should go first of all to his neighbours and friends who know best the questions at issue And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory decision [767] let him have recourse to another court and if the two courts cannot settle the matter let a third put an end to the suit

Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things and the judge though he be not a magistrate yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit Regarding then the judges also as magistrates let us say who are fit to be judges and of what they are to be judges and how many of them are to judge in each suit Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves choosing certain persons by agreement And let there be two other tribunals one for private causes when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision the other for public causes in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual and is willing to vindicate the common interests And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified and who they are to be In the first place let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who

are tryin causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows — All the officers of state, as well annual as those holding offic. for a longer period when the new year is about to commence, in the mo. in following after the summer solstice, on the last day but one of the year shall meet in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall delect one judge from every magistracy to be their first fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and hol est manner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The councilors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes and any one else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury and to the party who brought the suit.

[68] In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and they ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is as if we imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe and the judges shall be chosen by lot — they shall give their decisions once and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with

that court which as we maintain has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes.

Thus much of the courts of law which as I was saying cannot be precisely defined either as being or not being offices a superficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation — let us then expect them at the end. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning middle, and end, and is complete in every part. At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what has preceded. And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work of legislation.

Cle I like what you have said Stranger and I particularly like your manner of tackling on the beginning of your new discourse to the end of the former one.

[769] 1th Thus far then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off well.

Cle You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?

1th Perhaps but I should like to know whether you and I are agreed about a certain thing.

Cle About what thing?

1th You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their pictures — they are always putting in or taking out colours or whatever be the term which artists employ they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more beautiful.

Cle I know something of these matters from report, although I have never had any great acquaintance with the art.

1th No matter we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding — Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful manner in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as time went on — do you not see that being a

Cle. ix. 853, ff. an. 956, ff.

mortal unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist and who will further brighten up and improve the picture all his great labour will last but a short time?

Cle True

Ath And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness in the second place as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted which some one coming after him must correct if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate but to improve in the state which he has established?

Cle Assuredly that is the sort of thing which every one would desire

Ath And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws he should finish what he has to say and not leave the work incomplete

Cle By all means

[770] *Ath* And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?

Cle What have we to do?

Ath As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law and are our selves in the evening of life and they as compared with us are young men we ought not only to legislate for them but to endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators themselves as far as this is possible

Cle Certainly if we can

Ath At any rate we must do our best

Cle Of course

Ath We will say to them—O friends and saviours of our laws in laying down any law there are many particulars which we shall omit and this cannot be helped at the same time we will do our utmost to describe what is important and will give an outline which you shall fill up And I will explain on what principle you are to act Megillus and Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these matters and we are of opinion that we have spoken well And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us and become our disciples and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian

of the law ought to keep in view There was one main point about which we were agreed—that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man whether this was to be gained by study or habit or some mode of acquisition or desire or opinion or knowledge—and this applies equally to men and women, old and young—the aim of all should always be such as I have described anything which may be an impediment the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors and he has to fly an exile he must be and endure all such trials rather than accept another form of government which is likely to make men worse These are our original principles and do you now fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better [771] but embrace those which have and with gladness receive and live in them bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods as they are termed of a different kind

Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion And we must first return to the number 5040—the entire number had and has a great many convenient divisions and the number of the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 21×20 [5040 — (21×20) i.e. 5040 — 420 = 12] also has them And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven corresponding to the months and in the revolution of the universe Every city has a guiding and sacred principle given by nature but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others and has been more sacred and fortunate In our opinion nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven and that admits of a very easy correction for if turning to the dividend (5040) we deduct two families the defect in the division is cured And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure But for the present trusting to the mere assertion of this principle

Cf Timaeus 39 47

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Cf Timaeus 39 47

and as we make the same and assenting to each person some God or son of a God, let us permit such and sacred rites, and let the law at its kind assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month—two assemblies for the tribes, and seven for the city according to their distance be one in honour of the Gods and once in a year, and we second to promote friendship and better acquaintance as the phrase is, and every sort of good relationship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those to whose families and whom they marry and with those to whom they give in marriage. In such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem it all important, or a good mistake, and for this serious purpose let games be instituted in which youths and maidens shall dance together [72] seeing one another and being acquainted at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty.

The directors of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators of these games, and they together with the guardians of the law will legislate in any matters which we have counted for as we said, where there are minor and minute details, the legislators must leave out something. And the annual officers who by experience and know what is wanted, must make arrangements and improvements by year until such enactments and provisions are wisely determined. A ten years experience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars, will be quite sufficient, and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall refer the questions which come under their power to the guardians of the law and correct them, until all is perfect, and from that time there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never able to help, to change anything, or if some necessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods and if they are all agreed in that case they may make the change, but if they are not agreed, by no manner of means, and no man who dares shall prevail, as the law enacts.

Whether any one of or twenty-five years or age having seen and been seen by others, be loitering himself to have found a marriage con-

nection which is to his mind, and suitable for the pleasure of children, let him marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate. For as Cletius says, every law should have a suitable prelude.

Oh! You recollect at the right moment. Stranger and do not miss the opportunity which the argument affords of saying, a word in season.

[73] Tell I thank you. We will say to him who is born of good parents.—O my son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one but if other things are equal, always to honour inferiors, and with them to form connections—thus will be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are united for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all marriages.—Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself but after that which is most beneficial to the state. For somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likeliest to himself and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition and hence there arise in most states the very results which we least desire to happen. Now to add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family nor the powerful into the family of the powerful but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker and the quicker with the slower may awaken an error as well as laugh at in the minds of many for there is a difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the madder wine is hot and dry but when charmed by a soberer God, rectifies a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temperate drink. Yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same result occurs. Wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but we should

Cf. — 1 and Aristotle, Politics vii. 16,

135. — 31

Cf. — 32

Cf. — 33

mortal unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further brighten up and improve the picture: all his great labour will last but a short time?

Cle True

Ath And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness in the second place as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted which some one coming after him must correct if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate but to improve in the state which he has established?

Cle Assuredly that is the sort of thing which every one would desire

Ath And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws he should finish what he has to say and not leave the work incomplete

Cle By all means

[770] *Ath* And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?

Cle What have we to do?

Ath As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law and are ourselves in the evening of life and they as compared with us are young men we ought not only to legislate for them but to endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators themselves as far as this is possible

Cle Certainly, if we can

Ath At any rate we must do our best

Cle Of course

Ath We will say to them—O friends and saviours of our laws in laying down any law there are many particulars which we shall omit and this cannot be helped at the same time we will do our utmost to describe what is important and will give an outline which you shall fill up And I will explain on what principle you are to act Megillus and Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these matters and we are of opinion that we have spoken well And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us and become our disciples and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian

of the law ought to keep in view There was one main point about which we were agreed—that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man whether this was to be gained by study, or habit or some mode of acquisition or desire or opinion or knowledge—and this applies equally to men and women old and young—the aim of all should always be such as I have described anything which may be an impediment the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly an exile he must be and endure all such trials rather than accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse These are our original principles and do you now fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better [771] but embrace those which have and with gladness receive and live in them bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods as they are termed of a different kind

Let us proceed to another class of laws beginning with their foundation in religion And we must first return to the number 5040—the entire number had and has a great many convenient divisions and the number of the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 21×20 [5040 — (21×20) i.e. $5040 - 420 = 4620$] also has them And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe Every city has a guiding and sacred principle given by nature but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others and has been more sacred and fortunate In our opinion nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven and that admits of a very easy correction for if turning to the dividend (5040) we deduct two families the defect in the division is cured And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure But for the present trusting to the mere assertion of this prin-

Cf Timæus 39 47

minor. And especially on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For the beginning, which is also a God dwelling, in man, [7-6] preserves all things, it is met with proper respect from each individual. He who marries is further to consider that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young and there he is to marry and make a home for himself and bring up his children, going away from his father and mother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character but excessive intercourse not having the desire which is created by time, insensibly dissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety wherefore a man and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another and worshipping the Gods according to law for ever.

In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. There is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring most kinds of property but there is great difficulty in what relates to slaves. And the reason is that we speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.

Megillus I do not understand Stranger what you mean.

Ath I am not surprised Megillus, for the state of the Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Hecataeans who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark in passing which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. It was this—We know that all would agree that we should have the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house—such tales are well known.

Meg To be sure.

Ath But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt and that no man of

sense ought to trust them? And the wisest of our poets, speaking of Zeus, says

For even Zeus takes away his slave and turns him
[—] of men on the day of misery in which.

Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves in their minds—some of them utterly distrust their servants, and as if they were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their souls three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before—and others do just the opposite.

Meg True.

Ath Then what are we to do in our own country Stranger seeing that there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?

Ath Well Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome animal and therefore he is not very manageable nor likely to become so, when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman and master.

Cle That is obvious.

Ath He is a troublesome piece of goods as has been often shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti as they are called. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two remedies alone remain to us—not to have the slaves of the same country nor if possible speaking the same language in this way they will more easily be held in subjection. Secondly we should tend them carefully not only out of regard to them but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them if possible even more justice than to those who are our equals for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice and hates injustice is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice will best sow the seeds of virtue in them and this may be truly said of every master and tyrant and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve and not admonished as if they were freemen which will only make them contented [778] The language used to a servant Cf Aristotle, *Tolice* ii 20 1330 23 33

try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry and him who is too desirous of making a rich marriage we should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches not however by any compulsion of written law,

Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage and let us remember what was said before—that a man should cling to immortality, [774] and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place for ever. All this and much more may be truly said by way of prelude about the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens and is still unmarried at thirty five years of age let him pay a yearly fine—he who is of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae the third class shall pay sixty drachmae and the fourth thirty drachmae and let the money be sacred to *Here* he who does not pay the fine annually shall owe ten times the sum which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact, and if he fails in doing so let him be answerable and give an account of the money at his audit. He who refuses to marry shall be thus punished in money and also be deprived of all honour which the younger show to the elder let no young man voluntarily obey him and if he attempt to punish any one let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured person and he who is present and does not come to the rescue shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad citizen. Of the marriage portion I have already spoken^a and again I say for the instruction of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty has a compensation for the citizens of our state are provided with the necessities of life and wives will be less likely to be insolent and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of property. And he who obeys this law will do a noble action but he who will not obey and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest or more than a mina or a mina and a half if he be of the third or second classes or two minae if he be of the highest class shall owe to the public treasury a similar sum and that which is given or received shall be sacred to *Herè* and *Zeus* and let the treasurers

of these Gods exact the money as was said before about the unmarried—that the treasurers of *Herè* were to exact the money or pay the fine themselves

The betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a grandfather in the second degree and in the third degree, betrothal by brothers who have the same father but if there are none of these alive the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner in cases of unexampled fatality the next of kin and the guardians shall have authority. What are to be the rites before marriages or any other sacred acts relating either to future, present or past marriages [775] shall be referred to the interpreters and he who follows their advice may be satisfied. Touching the marriage festival they shall assemble not more than five male and five female friends of both families, and a like number of members of the family of either sex and no man shall spend more than his means will allow he who is of the richest class may spend a mina—he who is of the second half a mina and in the same proportion as the census of each decreases all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste and uninstructed in the laws of bridal song. Drunkenness is always improper except at the festivals of the God who gave wine and peculiarly dangerous when a man is engaged in the business of marriage at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their wits about them—they ought to take care that their offspring may be born of reasonable beings for on what day or night Heaven will give them increase who can say? Moreover they ought not to be begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication but their offspring should be compact and solid quiet and compounded properly whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions and beside himself both in body and soul. Wherefore also the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase and is likely to beget offspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy and cannot be expected to walk straight either in body or mind. Hence during the whole year and all his life long and especially while he is begetting children he ought to take care and not intentionally do what is injurious to health or what involves insolence and wrong for he cannot help leaving the impression of himself on the souls and bodies of his offspring and he begets children in every way

for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and that there is no necessary of order in all things he, I say who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake. Why have I made this remark? Why because I am going to enact that the bridegrooms should sit at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. This was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger which caused the passage of the law and which would be likely to occur in thinly peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose among you.

Cle Likely enough.

Alc I said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. There is, however another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at present it does not. The institution of which I am about to speak is not easily described or executed and would be like the legislator combing wool into the fire," as people say or perforce any other impossible and useless feat.

Cle What is the cause, Stranger of this exhibition?

Alc You shall hear without any fruitless loss of time. That which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered [781] and at this point the argument is now waiting. For with you, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are, as I said, a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might

Cle 6-5, 613

have been far better if they had been only regulated by law for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the consequence of such neglect is more than twice as important. The careful consideration of this matter and the arranging and ordering, on a common principle of all our institutions relating both to men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state. But at present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they have never been established at all and how can any one avoid being utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show in public how much they eat and drink? There is nothing at which the sex is more likely to take offence. For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And therefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising a tremendous outcry but in this state perhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper but if you had rather not, I will refrain.

Cle There is nothing which we should both of us like better Stranger than to hear what you have to say.

Alc Very good and you must not be surprised if I go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the subject of law.

Cle True.

Alc Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. Every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been [782] or that it began as a woman when ago.

Cle Certainly.

Alc Well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions of states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly and diverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the

Aristotle, Politics 2. 13, 1250 8-4
Cle 6-6.

ought always to be that of a command¹ and we ought not to jest with them whether they are males or females—this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters

Cle True

Ath Now that each of the citizens is provided as far as possible with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do we may next proceed to describe their dwellings

Cle Very good

Ath The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be taken of all the buildings and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. These *Cleinias* were matters which properly came before the marriages but as we are only talking there is no objection to changing the order. If however our plan of legislation is ever to take effect then the house shall precede the marriage if God so will and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage but at present we are only describing these matters in a general outline

Cle Quite true

Ath The temples are to be placed all round the agora and the whole city built on the heights in a circle for the sake of defence and for the sake of purity. Near the temples are to be placed buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their due and the places will be regarded as most holy partly because they have to do with holy things and partly because they are the dwelling places of holy Gods and in them will be held the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offenses may fitly take place. As to the walls *Megillus* I agree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth and that we should not attempt to disinter them there is a poetical saying which is finely expressed that walls ought to be of steel and iron and not of earth besides how ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench and to keep off the enemy by fortifications under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory and then that we should surround ourselves with a wall which in the first place is by no means conducive to the health of cities

and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy in the minds of the inhabitants inviting men to run hither instead of repelling their enemies [779] and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night but that when they are protected by walls and gates then they may sleep in safety as if they were not meant to labour and did not know that true repose comes from labour and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble. But if men must have walls the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets.² The form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect and being easily guarded will be infinitely better for security. Until the original building is completed these should be the principal objects of the inhabitants and the wardens of the city should superintend the work and should impose a fine on him who is negligent and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness and not allow a private person to encroach upon any public property either by buildings or excavations. Further they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient. And now that these matters and the buildings about the agora and the gymnasia and places of instruction and theatres are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation

Cle By all means

Ath Assuming that marriages exist already *Cleinias* the mode of life during the year after marriage before children are born will follow next in order. In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which is to be superior to other cities is a matter not at all easy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already but this will be the greatest of them and the most disagreeable to the many. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true *Cleinias*

[780] *Cle* Certainly

Ath He who imagines that he can give laws

Cf Ibid II 1330 A 27

¹ *Cf Aristotle Politics* I 13 1260 2-8

² *Cf Ibid* VII 12 1331 29-31

³ *Cf Ibid* II 1330 31 35

shall choose an orator to defend in the law and shall by their permission and appointment. The women who prove over these matters may enter into the houses of the towns and pass by adulterers and partly by women make them free over their guilt and error if they resist, let the women go and all the guardians of the law and the guardians shall protect them, but if they too cannot prevent them, they shall bring the matter before the people, and let them write up their names and take care that they cannot retract such and such an one; and let him who is so written up, if it is done in a court of law convict those who have married his name, be deprived of the images of a citizen in the following respects—let him not go to weddings nor to the public things after the birth of children and if he go, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity and let the same regulations be about women, let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or go to musical and birthday festivals, if she in her name be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law a man or woman have connection with another man or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who refrains in such matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem—that is to say [735] dishonour. Now if the greater part of mankind behave modestly the enactments of law may be set to number but, if they are disorderly the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of existence to every child, whether boy or girl. Let every phratra have inscribed on a whitened wall the names of the successive archons by whom the years are reckoned. And near to them let the living members of the phratra be inscribed and when they depart life let them be erased. The limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty years at the longest—for a man, from thirty to thirty five years and let a woman hold office at forty and a man at thirty years. Let a man go out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any need to make use of her in

military service, let the same of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to sixty years of age and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.

BOOK VII

[35] And now assembling children of both sexes to be reared born, it will be proper for us to consider in the next place, their nurture and education: this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought a subject fitted rather for precept and admonition than for law. In private life there are many little things, not now apparent, arising out of the pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which run counter to the intention of the legislator and make the characters of the citizens various and dissimilar—this is an evil in states for by reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence, there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law, because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing the law in small matters. The result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you be silent. I speak somewhat darkly but I shall endeavour also to bring my words into the light of day for I acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am saying.

Clearchus. Very true.

Athenian Stranger. or Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body?

Cle. Undoubtedly.

Str. And nothing can be plainer than that the finest bodies are those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?

Cle. Certainly.

Str. And do we not further observe that the first shoot of every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest? Many will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not reach twice the height which he attained at five.

Cle. True.

Str. Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source of endless evils in the body?

Cle. Yes.

[39] *Str.* And the body should have the most exercise when it receives most nourishment?

Cle. But, Stranger are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly-born infants?

seasons in which animals may be expected to have undergone innumerable transformations of themselves?

Cle No doubt.

Ath And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had previously no existence and also olives and the gifts of Demeter and her daughter of which one Triptolemus was the minister and that before these existed animals took to devouring each other as they do still?

Cle True

Ath Again the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists among many nations while on the other hand we hear of other human beings who did not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey, and similar pure offerings but no flesh of animals from these they abstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them and might not stain the altars of the Gods with blood For in those days men are said to have lived a sort of Orphic life having the use of all lifeless things but abstaining from all living things

Cle Such has been the constant tradition and is very likely true

Ath Some one might say to us What is the drift of all this?

Cle A very pertinent question Stranger

Ath And therefore I will endeavour to clear up as I can to draw the natural inference

Cle Proceed

Ath I see that among men all things depend upon three wants and desires of which the end is virtue if they are rightly led by them or the opposite if wrongly Now these are eating and drinking which begin at birth—every animal has a natural desire for them and is violently excited and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appetites and get rid of all the corresponding pains—and the third and greatest and [783] sharpest want and desire breaks out last and is the fire of sexual lust which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness And these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx

But to return—After marriage let us speak of the birth of children and after their birth of their nurture and education In the course of discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive at the common ta-

bles Whether such associations are to be confined to men or extended to women also we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them As I said before, we shall see them more in detail and shall be better able to lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them

Cle Very true

Ath Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken for hereafter there may be need of them

Cle What do you bid us keep in mind?

Ath That which we comprehended under the three words—first eating secondly drinking thirdly the excitement of love

Cle We shall be sure to remember Stranger

Ath Very good Then let us now proceed to marriage and teach persons in what way they shall beget children threatening them, if they disobey with the terrors of the law

Cle What do you mean?

Ath The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they can Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing but when they do not give their mind or have no mind they fail wherefore let the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom and particularly at the time when their children are not yet born [784] And let the women whom we have chosen be the overseers of such matters and let them in whatever number large or small and at whatever time the magistrates may command assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyia during a third part of the day and being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they see whether man or woman of those who are begetting children disregarding the ordinances given at the time when the nuptial sacrifices and ceremonies were performed Let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer during the time when marriage is fruitful But if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding the office of overseer and be divorced for their mutual benefit If however any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party they

making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind which takes the place of their frenzy And to express what I mean in a word there is a good deal to be said in favour of this treatment

Cle Certainly

Ath But if fear has such a power we ought to infer from these facts, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will be made more liable to fear and every one will allow that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage

Cle No doubt

Ath And on the other hand the habit of overcoming from our youth upwards the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an exercise of courage

Cle True.

Ath And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in the soul

Cle Quite true.

Ath Further a cheerful temper or the reverse, may be regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand or with cowardice on the other

Cle To be sure.

Ath Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what extent we may if we please, without difficulty implant either character in the young

Cle Certainly

Ath There is a common opinion that luxury makes the disposition of youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles that on the other hand excess of a and savage servitude makes men mean and abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates

Cle But how must the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction?

Ath I will tell you how—Every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry and this is especially the case with man and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal

Cle Quite true

Ath Do not nurses when they want to know what an infant desires [792] judge by the signs—when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to

Cle R f bl a. 356.

be pleased but when he weeps and cries out then he is not pleased For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate Now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and in a very considerable portion of life to be passed all or well

Cle True

Ath Does not the discontented and ungrievous nature appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?

Cle Certainly

Ath Well but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursing should have as little of sorrow and fear and in general of pain as was possible might we not expect in early childhood to make his soul more gentle and cheerful?

Cle To be sure, Stranger—more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures.

Ath There I can no longer agree, Cleinias you amaze me To bring him up in such a way would be his utter ruin for the beginning is always the most crucial part of education Let us see whether I am right

Cle Proceed

Ath The point about which you and I differ is of great importance and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures nor on the other hand entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state, which I just spoke of as gentle and benign and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God. Now I say he among men, too who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit—he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains nor should we allow any one, young or old male or female to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly born infant for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrafted by habit. Nay more if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains and should at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness

[93] *Cle* You need not ask Megillus, Stranger which of us has most truly spoken for I myself agree that all men ought to avoid the

Cle Ar i de l l r c s vii i 13,6 34,9.

Cle Ref bl x. 6. 9.

Ath Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn

Cle What do you mean, my good sir? In the process of gestation?

Ath Exactly I am not at all surprised that you have never heard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures which although strange I will endeavour to explain to you

Cle By all means

Ath The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at Athens. Not only boys but often older persons are in the habit of keeping quails and cocks which they train to fight one another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise for in addition to this, they carry them about tucked beneath their armpits holding the smaller birds in their hands the larger under their arms and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of health that is to say not their own health but the health of the birds whereby they prove to any intelligent person that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements when they are moved without weariness whether the motion proceeds from themselves or is caused by a swing or at sea or on horseback or by other bodies in whatever way moving and that thus gaining the mastery over food and drink they are able to impart beauty and health and strength. But admitting all this what follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before it hardens and after birth swathe the infant for two years? Suppose that we compel nurses under penalty of a legal fine to be always carrying the children somewhere or other either to the temples or into the country or to their relations' houses until they are well able to stand and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are too young—they should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year the nurses should be strong and there should be more than one of them. Shall these be our rules and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? [790] No no the penalty of which we were speaking will fall upon our own heads more than enough

Cle What penalty?

Cf Republic v 459

* *Cf Aristotle Politics* vii. 17 1336 8-15

Ath Ridicule and the difficulty of getting the feminine and servant like dispositions of the nurses to comply

Cle Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?

Ath The reason is that masters and freemen in states when they hear of it are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due regulation of private life in cities stability in the laying down of laws is hardly to be expected and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned and adopting them may order his house and state well and be happy

Cle Likely enough

Ath And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the rules relating to their bodies

Cle By all means

Ath Let us assume then as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures that nursing and moving about by day and night is good for them all and that the younger they are the more they will need it infants should live if that were possible as if they were always rocking at sea. This is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest but on the contrary motion—rocking them in their arms nor do they give them silence but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music

Cle Well Stranger and what is the reason of this?

Ath The reason is obvious

Cle What?

Ath The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this [791] sort the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one and produces a peace and calm in the soul and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart which is a thing much to be desired sending the children to sleep and

Cf Republic v 449

* *Cf Aristotle Politics* vii. 1, 1336 8-15.

similar instruments, as I was saying, it is of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very great importance to the warrior who has iron weapons, bows and javelins, and the like also to all, when in heavy armour he has to fight against heavy armour. And there is a very great difference between one who has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. For as he who is perfectly skilled in the *Pancratium* or boxing or wrestling is not unable to fight from his left side, and does not lump and draggle in confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in heavy-armed fighting and in all other things, if I am not mistaken, the like holds—be who has these double powers of attack and defence ought not in any case to leave them either unused or untrained, if he can help; and if a person had the nature of Geryon or Briareus he ought to be able with his hundred hands to throw a hundred darts. Now the magistrates, male and female, should see to all these things, the women superintending the dancing and amusements of the children, and the men superintending their education that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can help, spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches—one of gymnastics, which is concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul. And gymnastic has also two branches—dancing and wrestling; and one sort of dancing, imitates musical recreation, and aims at preserving dignity and freedom, the other aims at producing beauty, agility and beauty in the limbs and parts of the body. So, the proper flexion and extension to each of them, a harmonious motion being diffused everywhere, and forming a suitable accompaniment to the dance. (96) As regards wrestling, the tricks which Amaltes and Ceryon devised in their systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or the tricks of boxing which Epimenus invented, are useless and unsuitable for war and do not deserve to have much said about them; but the art of wrestling erect and keeping free the neck and hands and sides, working with energy and constancy with a composed strength, and for the sake of health—these are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to be enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that part of legislation and we will desire the one to give their

instructions freely and the others to receive them thankfully. Nor again, must we omit suitable imitations of war in our choruses here in Crete you have the armed dances of the Cretes, and the Lacedæmonians have those of the Dioscuri. And our virgin lady delighting in the amusement of the dance, thought it not fit to amuse herself with empty hands: she must be clothed in a complete suit of armour and in this attire go through the dance; and youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her exceeding highly the favour of the Goddess, both with a view to the necessities of war and to festive occasions: it will be right also for the boys, until such time as they go out to war to make processions and supplications to all the Gods in goodly array armed and on horseback, in dances, and marches, fast or slow, offering up prayers to the Gods and to the sons of Gods and also engaging in contests and preludes of contests, if at all, with these objects. For these sorts of exercises, and no others, are useful both in peace and war and are beneficial alike to states and to private houses. But other labours and sports and exercises of the body are unworthy of freemen, (97) Megillus and Clinias.

I have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which I said at first ought to be described if you know of any better will you communicate your thoughts?

Cle It is not easy Stranger to put aside these principles of gymnastic and wrestling and to enunciate better ones.

Atk Now we must say what has yet to be said about the gifts of the Muses and of Apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all and that gymnastic alone remained: but now we see clearly what points have been omitted, and should be first proclaimed of these, then, let us proceed to speak.

[98] Cle By all means.

Atk Let me tell you once more—although you have heard me say the same before—that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker and by the hearer about anything that is very singular and unusual. For my tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell and yet I have a confidence which makes me go on.

Cle What has it you to say Stranger?

Atk I say that in states generally no one has observed that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want

Cf. 814.

Cf. Critas. 110.

Cf. II. 6-7.

life of unmingled pain or pleasure and pursue always a middle course And having spoken well may I add that you have been well answered?

Ath Very good Cleinias and now let us all three consider a further point

Cle What is it?

Ath That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature And the reflection which lately arose in our minds¹ that we can neither call these things laws nor yet leave them unmentioned is justified for they are the bonds of the whole state and come in between the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down they are just ancestral customs of great antiquity which if they are rightly ordered and made habitual shield and preserve the previously existing written law but if they depart from right and fall into disorder then they are like the props of buidlers which slip away out of their place and cause a universal ruin—one part drags another down and the fair superstructure falls because the old foundations are undermined Reflecting upon this Cleinias you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way omitting nothing whether great or small of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another and therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws

Cle Very true we are disposed to agree with you

Ath Up to the age of three years whether of boy or girl if a person strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a principal aim he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures But at three four five and even six years the childish nature will require sports now is the time to get rid of self will in him punishing him but not so as to disgrace him We were saying about slaves that we ought neither to add insult to punishment so as to anger them [794] nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed and a like rule is to be observed in the case of the free born Children at that age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for themselves when they meet And

all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages the several families of a village uniting on one spot The nurses are to see that the children behave properly and orderly—they themselves and all their companies are to be under the control of twelve matrons one for each company who are annually selected to inspect them from the women previously mentioned [i.e. the women who have authority over marriage] whom the guardians of the law appoint. These matrons shall be chosen by the women who have authority over marriage one out of each tribe all are to be of the same age and let each of them as soon as she is appointed hold office and go to the temples every day punishing all offenders male or female, who are slaves or strangers by the help of some of the public slaves but if any citizen disputes the punishment let her bring him before the wardens of the city or if there be no dispute let her punish him herself After the age of six years the time has arrived for the separation of the sexes—let boys live with boys and girls in like manner with girls Now they must begin to learn—the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow the javelin and sling and the girls too if they do not object at any rate until they know how to manage these weapons and especially how to handle heavy arms for I may note that the practice which now prevails is almost universally misunderstood

Cle In what respect?

Ath In that the right and left hand are supposed to be by nature differently suited for our various uses of them whereas no difference is found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs but in the use of the hands we are as it were, maimed by the folly of nurses and mothers for although our several limbs are by nature balanced we create a difference in them by bad habit In some cases this is of no consequence as for example when we hold the lyre in the left hand and the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the same distinction in other cases [795] The custom of the Scythians proves our error for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and draw the arrow to them with their right but use either hand for both purposes. And there are many similar examples in chariotteering and other things, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker than the right act contrary to nature In the case of the plectrum which is of horn only and

¹ Cf. 788

² Cf. 1. 777

Gods, and to consecrate the several odes to Gods and heroes: and if any one offers any other hymns or dances to any one of the Gods, the priests and priestesses acting in concert with the guardians of the law shall with the sanction of religion and the law exclude him and he who is excluded if he do not submit shall be liable all his life long to have a suit of impiety brought against him by any one who likes.

Cle Very good

Ath In the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is due to ourselves.

Cle To what are you referring?

Ath I mean that any young man and much more any old one, when he sees or hears any thing strange or unaccustomed does not at once run to embrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is at a place where three paths meet and does not very well know his way—he may be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to himself and them, Which is the way? and will not move forward until he is satisfied that he is going right. And this is what we must do in the present instance—a strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen which requires the utmost consideration and we should not at our age be too ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can say anything certain all in a moment.

Cle Most true.

Ath Then we will allow time for reflection and decide when we have given the subject sufficient consideration. But that we may not be hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us proceed to the conclusion of them in due order for very possibly if God will the exposition of them when completed may throw light on our present perplexity.

Cle Excellent, Stranger let us do as you propose.

Ath Let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our laws (*pois*) [800] and this latter be the name which the ancients gave to lyric songs, they probably would not have very much objected to our proposed application of the word. Someone, I think asleep or awake, must have had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. And let our decree be as follows—No one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and consecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth any more than he would offend against any other

Cf. III. 102.

law. And he who observes this law shall be blameless but he who is disobedient, as I was saying shall be punished by the guardians of the laws and by the priests and priestesses. Suppose that we imagine this to be our law.

Cle Very good

Ath Can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule? Let us see. I think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for composers. One of these models shall be as follows—If when a sacrifice is going on and the victims are being burnt according to law—if I say any one whom may be a son or brother standing by another at the altar and over the victims horribly blasphemes will not his words inspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his father and of his other kinsmen?

Cle Of course

Ath And this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. A magistrate offers a public sacrifice and there come in not one but many choruses, who take up a position a little way from the altar and from time to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred rites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms and melodies most sorrowful to hear and he who at the moment when the city is offering sacrifice makes the citizens weep most carries away the palm of victory. Now ought we not to forbid such strains as these? And if ever our citizens must hear such lamentations then on some unblest and inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired minstrels like those hirelings who accompany the departed at funerals with barbarous Carian chants. That is the sort of thing which will be appropriate if we have such strains at all and let the apparel of the singers be, not circlets and ornaments of gold but the reverse. Enough of all this. I will simply ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song—

Cle What?

[801] *Ath* That we should avoid every word of evil omen let that kind of song which is of good omen be heard everywhere and always in our state. I need hardly ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me.

Cle By all means that law is approved by the suffrages of us all.

Ath But what shall be our next musical law or type? Ought not prayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?

Cle Certainly

Ath And our third law if I am not mis-

of permanence in legislation. For when plays are ordered with a view to children having the same plays and amusing themselves after the same manner and finding delight in the same playthings the more solemn institutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. Whereas if sports are disturbed and innovations are made in them and they constantly change and the young never speak of their having the same likings or the same established notions of good and bad taste either in the bearing of their bodies or in their dress but he who devises something new and out of the way in figures and colours and the like is held in special honour we may truly say that no greater evil can happen in a state¹ for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the manners of the young, and making the old to be dishonoured among them and the new to be honoured. And I affirm that there is nothing which is a greater injury to all states than saying or thinking thus. Will you hear me tell how great I deem the evil to be?

Cle You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?

Ath Exactly.

Cle If you are speaking of that you will find in us hearers who are disposed to receive what you say not unfavourably but most favourably.

Ath I should expect so.

Cle Proceed.

Ath Well then let us give all the greater heed to one another's words. The argument affirms that any change whatever except from evil is the most dangerous of all things: this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds in the management of our bodies and the habits of our minds—true of all things except as I said before of the bad. He who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort of meat or drink any drink or to do any work which they can get may see that they are at first disordered by them but afterwards as time goes on their bodies grow adapted to them and they learn to know and like variety and have good health and enjoyment of life [798] and if ever afterwards they are confined again to a superior diet at first they are troubled with disorders and with difficulty become habituated to their new food. A similar principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men and the natures of their souls. For when they have been brought up in certain laws which by some Divine Providence have remained unchanged during long ages so that

no one has any memory or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are then every one is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. The legislator must somehow find a way of unplanting this reverence for antiquity and I would propose the following way—People are apt to fancy as I was saying before that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change and they readily comply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him not considering that these children who make innovations in their games when they grow up to be men will be different from the last generation of children and being different, will desire a different sort of life and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws and no one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils and require the utmost provision.

Cle To be sure.

Ath And now do we still hold to our former assertion that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men?² What say you?

Cle That is the only doctrine which we can admit.

Ath Must we not then try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song? nor must any one be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures.

Cle Most true.

[799] *Ath* Can any of us imagine a better mode of effecting this object than that of the Egyptians?

Cle What is their method?

Ath To consecrate every sort of dance or melody. First we should ordain festivals—calculating for the year what they ought to be and at what time and in honour of what Gods sons of Gods and heroes they ought to be celebrated and in the next place what hymns ought to be sung at the several sacrifices and with what dances the particular festival is to be honoured. This has to be arranged at first by certain persons and when arranged the whole assembly of the citizens are to offer sacrifices and libations to the Fates and all the other

¹ Cf. ii 655 ff.

² Cf. Republic ii. 424.

and that which tends to courage, may be fairly called manly; but that which inclines to modesty and temperance [803] may be declared both in law and in ordinary speech to be the more womanly quality. Thus, then, will be the natural order of them.

Let us now speak of the manner of teaching and instructing them, and the persons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be instructed. As the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and thus, as it were, draws the ship in outline, so do I seek to distinguish the patterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of different men's souls, seeking truly to consider by what means, and in what ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. Now human affairs are hardly worth considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest about them—a sad necessity constrains us. And having got thus far there will be a fitness in our completing the matter if we can only find some suitable method of doing so. But what do I mean? Some one may ask this very question, and quite rightly too.

CL. Certainly.

AL. I say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and about a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that God is the natural and worthy object of our most serious and blessed endeavours, for man, as I said before, is made to be the plaything of God, and thus, truly considered, is the best of him, wherefore also every man and woman should walk seriously and pass life in the nobest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they are at present.

CL. In what respect?

AL. At present they think that their serious pursuits should be for the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which must be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that there neither is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is nevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. And therefore, as we say every one of us should live the life of peace as long, and as well as he can. And what is the right way of living? Are we to live in sports always? If so, in what kind of sports? We ought to live sacrificing, and singing and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the Gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and conquer them in battle. The type

of song or dance by which he will propitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to proceed have been cut for him. He will go forward in the spirit of the poet [804]

Telemachus some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart but other things God will suggest for I deem that thou wast of born or brought up without the will of the Gods

And this ought to be the view of our alumnus: they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that any other things their Genius and God will suggest to them—he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature, being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality.

MEGILLUS. You have a low opinion of mankind, Stranger.

AL. Nay Megillus, be not amazed, but for give me—I was comparing them with the Gods; and under that feeling I spoke. Let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some consideration.

NEXT follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all these are to be in three places in the midst of the city and outside the city and in the surrounding country also in three places, there shall be schools for horse exercise, and large grounds arranged with a view to archery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and practise. Of these mention has already been made, and if the mention be not sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them in law. In these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers, who shall be brought from foreign parts by pay and let them teach those who attend the schools the art of war and the art of music, and the children shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not please there shall be compulsory education. As the saying is, of all and sundry as far as this is possible and the pupils shall be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their parents. My law would apply to females as well as males they shall both go through the same exercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and horsemanship are as suitable to women as to men. Of the truth of this

Of. see iii. 26 ff

CL. vi. 64, 79.

CL. Aristotle, Politics vol. i. 133² 21 34

CL. Republic 401 ff.

CL. 6.4

CL. 6.4

taken will be to the effect that our poets understanding prayers to be requests which we make to the Gods, will take especial heed that they do not by mistake ask for evil instead of good. To make such a prayer would surely be too ridiculous

Cle Very true.

Ath Were we not a little while ago quite convinced that no silver or golden *Plutus* should dwell in our state?

Cle To be sure

Ath And what has it been the object of our argument, to show? Did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil? And if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or words, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good in matters of the highest import than which as I was saying there can be few greater mistakes. Shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the Muses—

Cle What?—will you explain the law more precisely?

Ath Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful or just or beautiful or good which are allowed in the state? nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law and they are satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music and as to the director of education these have been already indicated. Once more then as I have asked more than once shall this be our third law and type, and model—What do you say?

Cle Let it be so by all means

Ath Then it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the Gods intermingled with prayers and after the Gods prayers and praises should be offered in like manner to demigods and heroes suitable to their several characters

Cle Certainly

Ath In the next place there will be no objection to a law that citizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds either with their souls or with their bodies and have been obedient to the laws should receive eulogies this will be very fitting

[802] *Cle* Quite true

Ath But to honour with hymns and paeans

¹ Cf. v 741

² Cf. vi 64

³ Cf. vi 765

Cf. *Republic* x 607

gyrics those who are still alive is not safe a man should run his course and make a fair ending and then we will praise him and let praise be given equally to women as well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. The order of songs and dances shall be as follows—There are many ancient musical compositions and dances which are excellent and from these the newly founded city may freely select what is proper and suitable and they shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age who shall make the selection and any of the old poems which they deem sufficient they shall include any that are deficient or altogether unsuitable, they shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend taking into their counsel poets and musicians and making use of their poetical genius but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order that they may regulate dancing music, and all choral strains according to the mind of the judges and not allowing them to indulge, except in some few matters their individual pleasures and fancies. Now the irregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by attuning to law and order and rejecting the honeyed Muse—not however that we mean wholly to exclude pleasure which is the characteristic of all music. And if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of discretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music when he hears the opposite he detests it and calls it illiberal but if trained in the sweet and vulgar music he deems the severer kind cold and displeasing. So that as I was saying before while he who hears them gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other the one has the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men whereas the other makes them worse

Cle Very true

Ath Again we must distinguish and determine on some general principle what songs are suitable to women and what to men and must assign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. It is shocking for a whole harmony to be inharmonical or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical and this will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. And therefore the legislator must assign to these also their forms. Now both sexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity belong to them and those of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference. The grand

* Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* viii. 6 1341 12-15 viii. 7 1342 21 28

no work remaining to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live *like a beast*? Such a life is neither just nor honourable, nor can he who lives it find meaning his due, and the due reward of the *man-faced beast* is that he should be torn *in pieces* by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by brave deeds and toil. These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never be exactly carried into execution under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals: but if we can attain the second-best form of polity we shall be very well off. And to men living under this second polity there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the greatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law. For the life which may be truly said to be concerned with the virtue of body and soul is twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories, which debars a man from every employment of life. For there ought to be no bye work interfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body and instruction and education for the soul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation, and therefore to this end all freemen ought to arrange the way in which they will spend their time during the whole course of the day from morning till evening, and from evening till the morning of the next morn^g. There may seem to be some propriety in the legislator determining minutely the numberless details of the management of the house, including such particulars as the duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city: for that any citizen should *conquer* during the whole of any night in sleep, [803] instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to awake and get up—this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice should be deemed base and unworthy of a free man: also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by her handmaidens instead of herself first *awakening* them, is that the slaves, male and female and the serving-boys, and, if that were possible, everybody and everything in the house should regard a base life if they rise early they may add of them do much of their public and of their household business, as mag-

Cf. Republic 466.

istrates in the city and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the sun is up. Much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions which they perform. For no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead: but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health: and much sleep is not required, if the habit of moderation be once firmly formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honoured and revered by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state.

A night which is passed in such a manner in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages infuses a sort of courage into the minds of the citizens. When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. Now neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated: he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridles in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the management of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness: then, again, being a freeman, he must be controlled by teachers, no matter what they teach, and by studies: but he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor if any of them does anything wrong: and he who comes across him and does not interpose upon him the punishment which he deserves, [804] shall incur the greatest disgrace: and let the guardian of the law who is the director of education, see to him who coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned, does not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a way which he ought not: let him keep a sharp look-out, and take especial care of the training of our children, directing their natures, and always turning them to good according to the law.

But how can our law sufficiently train the director of education himself: for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing has been said either clear or satisfactory? Now as far as pos-

Cf. Republic 466.

I am persuaded from ancient tradition and at the present day there are said to be countless myriads of women in the neighbourhood of the Black Sea called Sauromatides who not only ride on horseback like men [805] but have enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally with the men. And I further affirm that if these things are possible nothing can be more absurd than the practice which prevails in our own country of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with one mind for thus the state instead of being a whole is reduced to a half¹ but has the same imposts to pay and the same toils to undergo and what can be a greater mistake for any legislator to make than this?

Cle Very true yet much of what has been asserted by us Stranger is contrary to the custom of states still in saying that the discourse should be allowed to proceed and that when the discussion is completed we should choose what seems best you spoke very properly and I now feel compunction for what I have said. Tell me then what you would next wish to say.

Ath I should wish to say Cleimias as I said before that if the possibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact then there might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as I have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of objection and failing this our exhortation will still hold good nor will any one deny that women ought to share as far as possible in education and in other ways with men. For consider—if women do not share in their whole life with men then they must have some other order of life.

Cle Certainly.

Ath And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? Shall we prefer that which is adopted by the Thracians and many other races who use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their herds and flocks and to minister to them like slaves?—Or shall we do as we and people in our part of the world do—getting together as the phrase is all our goods and chattels into one dwelling we entrust them to our women who are the stewards of them and who also preside over the shuttles and the whole art of spinning? [806] Or shall we take a middle course as in Lacedaemon Megillus—letting

Cf vi 781 Aristotle *Politics* i. 13 1.60 9-24

¹*Cf* 799

the girls share in gymnastic and music while the grown up women no longer employed in spinning wool are hard at work weaving the web of life which will be no cheap or mean employment and in the duty of serving and taking care of the household and bringing up children in which they will observe a sort of mean not participating in the toils of war and if there were any necessity that they should fight for their city and families unlike the Amazons they would be unable to take part in archery or any other skilled use of missiles nor could they after the example of the Goddess, carry shield or spear or stand up nobly for their country when it was being destroyed and strike terror into their enemies if only because they were seen in regular order? Living as they do they would never dare at all to imitate the Sauromatides who when compared with ordinary women would appear to be like men. Let him who will praise your legislators but I must say what I think. The legislator ought to be whole and perfect and not half a man only he ought not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life while he takes the utmost care of the male sex and leaves half of life only blest with happiness when he might have made the whole state happy.

Meg What shall we do Cleimias? Shall we allow a stranger to run down Sparta in this fashion?

Cle Yes for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let him go on until we have perfected the work of legislation.

Meg Very true.

Ath Then now I may proceed?

Cle By all means.

Ath What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation and who have entrusted the practice of the arts to others and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately who moreover have common tables in which the men are placed apart and near them are the common tables of their families of their daughters and mothers which day by day the officers male and female are to inspect—they shall see to the behaviour of the company and so dismiss them after which the presiding magistrate and his attendants shall honour with libations those Gods [807] to whom that day and night are dedicated and then go home? To men whose lives are thus ordered is there

you want me now to tell them plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong

Cle Yes, I do

Ath But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I am of opinion and if I am not mistaken there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning is dangerous to youth

Cle How would you advise the guardian of the law to act?

Ath In what respect?

Cle I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

Ath My good Cleinias I rather think that I am fortunate.

Cle How so?

Ath I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now and which, as I believe, have been inspired by Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have ever learnt or heard either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear. I cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law who is also the director of education can have. He cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these words and any which are of a like nature if he should happen to find them, either in poetry or prose, or if he come across unwritten discourses akin to ours, he should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. And first of all he shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by him but those whom he finds agreeing in his judgment he shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. [812] And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.

Cle I do not think. Stranger that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument but whether we are right or not in our whole conception I cannot be very certain.

Ath The truth Cleinias may be expected to become clearer when as we have often said we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws.

Cle Yes.

Ath And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us

Cle Certainly

Ath I think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre

Cle To what do you refer?

Ath We were saying if I remember rightly that the sixty year-old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation that is to say the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other in hymns and songs charming the souls of youth and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation.

Cle Very true

Ath And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre because its notes are pure the player who teaches and his pupil rendering note for note in unison but complexity and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another—also when they make concords and harmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined—or again when they make complex variations of rhythms which they adapt to the notes of the lyre—all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire a speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years for opposite principles are confusing and create a difficulty in learning and our young men should learn quickly and their mere necessary requirements are not few or trifling as will be shown in due course. Let the director of education attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them [813] they have been already described by us, and are the same which when consecrated and adapted to the different festivals we said were to benefit cities by affording them an innocent amusement.

Cle That again is true.

Cle 664 ff

Cle Republ. iii. 397

Cle 99.

sible the law ought to leave nothing to him but to explain everything that he may be an interpreter and tutor to others. About dances and music and choral strains I have already spoken both as to the character of the selection of them and the manner in which they are to be amended and consecrated. But we have not as yet spoken. O illustrious guardian of education of the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains which are written in prose although you have been informed what martial strains they are to learn and practise what relates in the first place to the learning of letters and secondly to the lyre, and also to calculation which as we were saying¹ is needful for them all to learn and any other things which are required with a view to war and the management of house and city and looking to the same object what is useful in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies—the stars and sun and moon and the various regulations about these matters which are necessary for the whole state—I am speaking of the arrangements of days in periods of months and of months in years which are to be observed in order that seasons and sacrifices and festivals may have their regular and natural order, and keep the city alive and awake the Gods receiving the honours due to them and men having a better understanding about them all these things. O my friend have not yet been sufficiently declared to you by the legislator. Attend then to what I am now going to say.—We were telling you in the first place that you were not sufficiently informed about letters, and the objection was to this effect—that you were never told whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply himself in detail to that sort of learning or not apply himself at all and the same remark holds good of the study of the lyre. But now we say that he ought to attend to them [810]. A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years the age of thirteen is the proper time for him to begin to handle the lyre and he may continue at this for another three years neither more nor less and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honours of which we shall hereafter speak. Hear however first of all what the young

ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and write but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these accomplishments in the given number of years they should let alone. And as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are not set to the lyre, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony—seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class—what will you do with them, O most excellent guardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.

Cle What troubles you Stranger? and why are you so perplexed in your mind?

Ath You naturally ask, Cleinias and to you and Megillus who are my partners in the work of legislation I must state the more difficult as well as the easier parts of the task.

Cle To what do you refer in this instance?

Ath I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths.

Cle Well and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?

Ath That is quite true and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to many others or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others and in company with them you bid me at whatever risk to proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer and not to faint.

Cle Certainly.

Ath And I do not faint I say indeed that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter trimeter and all sorts of measures—some who are serious others who aim only at raising a laugh—and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up in them and saturated with them some insist that they should be constantly hearing them read aloud [811] and always learning them so as to get by heart entire poems while others select choice passages and long speeches and make compendiums of them saying that these ought to be committed to memory if a man is to be made good and wise by experience and learning of many things. And

¹ Cf. v. 747.

Cf. viii. 828.

Cf. viii. 829.

you want me now to tell them plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong.

Cle Yes, I do.

Ath But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning is dangerous to youth.

Cle How would you advise the guardian of the law to act?

Ath In what respect?

Cle I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

Ath My good Cleitmas, I rather think that I am omniscient.

Cle How so?

Ath I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now and which, as I believe, have been inspired by Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have ever learnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear. I cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law who is also the director of education can have. He cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these words and any which are of a like nature, if he should happen to find them, either in poetry or prose, or if he come across unwritten discourses akin to ours, he should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, he shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by him, but those whom he finds agreeing in his judgment, he shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. [812] And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.

Cle I do not think, Stranger, that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument but whether we are right or not in our whole conception, I cannot be very certain.

Ath The truth, Cleitmas, may be expected to become clearer when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws.

Cle Yes.

Ath And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us.

Cle Certainly.

Ath I think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre.

Cle To what do you refer?

Ath We were saying, if I remember rightly that the sixty year-old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation, that is to say the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other in hymns and songs, charming the souls of youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation.

Cle Very true.

Ath And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre, because its notes are pure, the player who teaches and his pupil rendering note for note in unison but complexity and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another—also when they make *concord*s and *harmonies* in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined—or again, when they make complex variations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre—all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire a speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years for opposite principles are confusing and create a difficulty in learning and our young men should learn quickly and their mere necessary requirements are not few or trifling as will be shown in due course. Let the director of education attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them, [813] they have been already described by us, and are the same which, when consecrated and adapted to the different festivals, we said were to benefit citizens by affording them an innocent amusement.

Cle That, again, is true.

Cle u. 664, ff

Cle *Republic* iii. 397

Cle 799.

Ath Then let him who has been elected a director of music receive these rules from us as containing the very truth and may he prosper in his office! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules in addition to the preceding about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises—ought they not?

Cle Yes.

Ath Then the boys ought to have dancing masters and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them.

Cle Very good.

Ath Then once more let us summon him who has the chief concern in the business, the superintendent of youth [i.e. the director of education] he will have plenty to do if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic.

Cle But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?

Ath O my friend there will be no difficulty for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens male or female whom he desires and he will know whom he ought to choose and will be anxious not to make a mistake from a due sense of responsibility and from a consciousness of the importance of his office and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up then all things go swimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say nor do we say what will follow lest the regards of omens should take alarm about our infant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general for we include under gymnastics all military exercises such as archery and all hurling of weapons and the use of the light shield and all fighting with heavy arms and military evolutions and movements of armies and encampings and all that relates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public teachers receiving pay from the state and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state and also the girls and women, who are to know all these things. While they are yet girls they should have practised dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting—when grown up women [814] they should apply themselves to evolutions and tactics and the mode of grounding and taking up arms if for no other reason yet in case the

whole military force should have to leave the city and carry on operations of war outside, that those who will have to guard the young and the rest of the city may be equal to the task and on the other hand when enemies whether barbarian or Hellenic come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city which is far from being an impossibility great would be the disgrace to the state if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young as birds will against any creature however strong and die or undergo any danger but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines and bring upon human nature the reproach that of all animals man is the most cowardly!

Cle Such a want of education Stranger is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state as well as a great misfortune.

Ath Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters but that all citizens male and female alike shall attend to them?

Cle I quite agree.

Ath Of wrestling we have spoken in part but of what I should call the most important part we have not spoken and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean when word and action combine and not till then we shall explain clearly what has been said pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art and is to be pursued for the sake of this and not this for the sake of wrestling.

Cle Excellent.

Ath Enough of wrestling we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general called dancing and is of two kinds one of nobler figures imitating the honourable the other of the more ignoble figures imitating the mean and of both these there are two further subdivisions. Of the serious one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures [815] and may be truly called and is the dance of peace. The warrior dance is different from the peaceful one and may be rightly termed *Pyrrhic* this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving way or springing aside or rising up or falling down also

the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. And when the imitation is of bare bodies and souls, and the action is direct and muscular—namely, for the most part a straight movement to the limbs of the body—that, I say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right. In the dance of peace what we have to consider is whether a man bears himself naturally and gracefully and after the manner of men who duly conform to the law. But before proceeding, I must distinguish the dancing about which there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt. Which is the doubtful kind, and how are the two to be distinguished? There are dances of the Bacchic sort, both those in which, as they say, they imitate drunken men, and which are named after the *Nymphs*, and *Pan*, and *Silenuses*, and *Satyr*, and also those in which punctuations are made or myriads celebrated—such sort of dancing cannot be rightly defined as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as having any meaning, whatever and may I think, be most truly described as distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and not suited to a city at all. There let it lie; and so leaving it to us, we will proceed to the dances of war and peace, for which these we are undoubtedly concerned. Now the warlike muse, which belongs to dance the Gods and the sons of the Gods, is entirely associated with the consciousness of prosperity; this class may be subdivided into two lesser classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labour or danger into good, and has greater features, the other expressive of preservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less exciting. In all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater moves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again, if he be more orderly and has learned courage from discipline he moves less, if not; if he be a coward, and has no training, or self-control, he makes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he speaks, or sings, he is not altogether able to keep his body still, and so out of the combination of words in measures the whole art of dancing has arisen. And in these various kinds of imitation one man moves in an orderly manner in a disorderly manner and as the ancients may be observed to have given many names which correspond to nature and deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one

which they have given to the dances of men who in their times of prosperity are moderate in their pleasures—the giver of names, whoever he was, assigned to them a very true, and poetical, and rational name when he called them *Eumecleia*, or dances of order thus establishing two kinds of dances of the nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the *Pyrthia*, and the dance of peace which he called *Eumecleia*, or the dance of order giving to each their appropriate and becoming name. These things the legislator should indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should enquire into them and search them out, combining dancing with music, and assigning to the several sacramental feasts that which is suitable to them and when he has consecrated all of them in due order he shall for the future change nothing, whether of dance or song. Thenceforward the city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures, themselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and happily.

I have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and generous souls. But it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely persons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy and have a comic character in respect of style, song, and dance, and of the imitations which these afford. For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either but he can not carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place—he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate such things, but he should never take any serious interest in them himself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered taking pains to learn them and there should always be some element of novelty in the imitation. Let these then be laid down, both in law and in our discourse, as the regulations of laughable amusements which are generally called (*87*) comedy. And, if any of the serious poets, as they are termed, who write tragedy come to us and say—“O strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry—what is your will about these matters?”—how shall we answer the divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows. Cf. C. *ajlas* 358, ff.

Ath Then let him who has been elected a director of music receive these rules from us as containing the very truth and may he prosper in his office! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules in addition to the preceding about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises—ought they not?

Cle Yes.

Ath Then the boys ought to have dancing masters and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them.

Cle Very good.

Ath Then once more let us summon him who has the chief concern in the business, the superintendent of youth [i.e. the director of education] he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic.

Cle But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?

Ath O my friend there will be no difficulty for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens male or female whom he desires and he will know whom he ought to choose and will be anxious not to make a mistake from a due sense of responsibility and from a consciousness of the importance of his office and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up then all things go swimmingly but if not it is not meet to say nor do we say what will follow lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our infant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general for we include under gymnastics all military exercises such as archery and all hurling of weapons and the use of the light shield and all fighting with heavy arms and military evolutions and movements of armies and encampings and all that relates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public teachers receiving pay from the state and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state and also the girls and women who are to know all these things. While they are yet girls they should have practised dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting—when grown up women [814] they should apply themselves to evolutions and tactics and the mode of grounding and taking up arms if for no other reason yet in case the

whole military force should have to leave the city and carry on operations of war outside that those who will have to guard the young and the rest of the city may be equal to the task and on the other hand when enemies whether barbarian or Hellenic come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city which is far from being an impossibility great would be the disgrace to the state if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young as birds will against any creature however strong and die or undergo any danger but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines and bring upon human nature the reproach that of all animals man is the most cowardly!

Cle Such a want of education Stranger is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state as well as a great misfortune.

Ath Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters but that all citizens male and female alike shall attend to them?

Cle I quite agree.

Ath Of wrestling we have spoken in part but of what I should call the most important part we have not spoken and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean when word and action combine and not till then we shall explain clearly what has been said pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art and is to be pursued for the sake of this and not this for the sake of wrestling.

Cle Excellent.

Ath Enough of wrestling we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general called dancing and is of two kinds one of nobler figures imitating the honourable the other of the more ignoble figures imitating the mean and of both these there are two further subdivisions. Of the serious one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures [815] and may be truly called and is the dance of peace. The warrior dance is different from the peaceful one and may be rightly termed Pyrrhic this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving way or springing aside or rising up or falling down also

dren, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. They have to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes for a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons, and they arrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair to, either by lot or remain over and show how their turns come in natural order. Another mode of amusing them is to distribute vessels, sometimes of gold, brass, silver and the like, intermixed with one another sometimes of one metal only as I was saying they adapt to their amusement the numbers in common use, and in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements and movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a household they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide awake and again in measurements of things which have length, and breadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all these things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful.

Cle What kind of ignorance do you mean?

Ath I my dear Cleinias, I like yourself have late in life heard with amazement of our ignorance in these matters to me we appear to be more like pigs than men, and I am quite ashamed, not only of myself but of all Hellenes.

Cle About what? Say Stranger what you mean.

Ath I will not rather I will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me. You know I suppose, what length is?

Cle Certainly.

Ath And what breadth is?

Cle To be sure.

Ath And you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth?

Cle Of course.

Ath And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with themselves?

Cle Yes.

Ath That is to say length is naturally commensurable with length [320] and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?

Cle Undoubtedly.

Ath But if some things are commensurable and other wholly incommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what is your position in regard to them?

Cle Clearly far from good.

Cle bid 5.8.

1st Concerning length and breadth when compared with depth or breadth and length when compared with one another are not all the Hellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some way?

Cle Quite true.

Ath But if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet all of us regard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our compatriots and might we not say to them—O ye best of Hellenes, is not this one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them is disgraceful and of which to have a bare knowledge only is no great distinction?

Cle Certainly.

Ath And there are other things akin to this, in which there spring up other errors of the same family.

Cle What are they?

Ath The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. A man who is good for anything ought to be able, when he thinks to distinguish them and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's game of draughts.

Cle I dare say and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts.

Ath And these as I maintain Cleinias are the studies which our youth ought to learn for they are innocent and not difficult the learning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state. If any one is of another mind, let him say what he has to say.

Cle Certainly.

Ath Then if these studies are such as we maintain we will include them if not, they shall be excluded.

Cle I assuredly but may we not now Stranger prescribe these studies as necessary and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?

Ath They shall be regarded as pledges which may be hereafter redeemed and removed from our state if they do not please either us who give them or you who accept them.

Cle A fair condition.

Ath Next let us see whether we are or are not willing that the study of astronomy shall be proposed for our youth.

Cle Proceed.

Ath Here occurs a strange phenomenon which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated.

lows —Best of strangers we will say to them we also according to our ability are tragic poets and our tragedy is the best and noblest for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. You are poets and we are poets both makers of the same strains rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas which true law can alone perfect as our hope is. Do not then suppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in the agora or introduce the fair voices of your actors speaking above our own and permit you to harangue our women and children and the common people about our institutions in language other than our own, and very often the opposite of our own. For a state would be mad which gave you this licence until the magistrates had determined whether your poetry might be recited and was fit for publication or not. Wherefore O ye sons and scions of the softer Muses first of all show your songs to the magistrates and let them compare them with our own and if they are the same or better we will give you a chorus but if not then my friends we can not. Let these then be the customs ordained by law about all dances and the teaching of them and let matters relating to slaves be separated from those relating to masters if you do not object.

Cle We can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter thus.

Ath There still remain three studies suitable for freemen. Arithmetic is one of them the measurement of length surface and depth is the second and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars in relation to one another [818]. Not every one has need to toil through all these things in a strictly scientific manner but only a few and who they are to be we will hereafter indicate at the end which will be the proper place not to know what is necessary for mankind in general and what is the truth is disgraceful to every one and yet to enter into these matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for every one but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be set aside and probably he who made the proverb about God originally had this in view when he said that not even God himself can fight against necessity —he meant, if I am not mistaken divine necessity for as to the human necessities of which the many speak when they talk in this manner nothing can be

more ridiculous than such an application of the words.

Cle And what necessities of knowledge are there Stranger, which are divine and not human?

Ath I conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any knowledge at all can not be a God or demi god or hero to mankind or able to take any serious thought or charge of them. And very unlike a divine man would he be who is unable to count one two three, or to distinguish odd and even numbers or is unable to count at all or reckon night and day and who is totally unacquainted with the revolution of the sun and moon and the other stars. There would be great folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of knowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of knowledge but which these are and how many there are of them and when they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and what apart and the whole correlation of them must be rightly apprehended first and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of knowledge. For so necessity grounded in nature constrains us against which we say that no God contends or ever will contend.

Cle I think Stranger, that what you have now said is very true and agreeable to nature.

Ath Yes Cleimias that is so. But it is difficult for the legislator to begin with these studies at a more convenient time we will make regulations for them.

Cle You seem Stranger to be afraid of our habitual ignorance of the subject [819] there is no reason why that should prevent you from speaking out.

Ath I certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude but I am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort of knowledge and apply themselves badly. For entire ignorance is not so terrible or extreme an evil and is far from being the greatest of all too much cleverness and too much learning accompanied with an ill bringing up are far more fatal.

Cle True.

Ath All freemen I conceive, should learn as much of these branches of knowledge as every child in Egypt is taught when he learns the alphabet. In that country arithmetical games have been invented for the use of mere chil-

¹ Cf *Republic* iii 398 x 607

Cf xii 967

Cf *Republic* viii 522

⁴ Cf *ibid* 523 524 525 ff

Cf *ibid* 519.

who passes through life undisciplined and is obedient to the words of the legislator both when he is giving laws and when he assigns praise and blame. This is the truest word that can be spoken in praise of a citizen and the true legislator ought not only to write his laws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him honourable and dishonourable. And the perfect citizen ought to seek to strengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned by punishments. I will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning, and will be a sort of witness to my words. *Hunting* is of wide extent, and has a name under which many things are included, for there is a hunting of creatures in the water and of creatures in the air and there is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all kinds and not of wild beasts only. The hunting after man is also worthy of consideration: there is the hunting after him in war and there is often a hunting after him in the way of friendship which is praised and also blamed and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practised by robbers, and that of armies against armies. Now the legislator in laying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from naming these things, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign rules and penalties about all of them. What is he to do? He will have to praise and blame hunting with a view to the exercise and pursuits of youth. And, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently: neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his standard of action the praised and injunctions of the legislator rather than the punishments which he imposes by law. This being premised, there will follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting, the praise being assigned to that kind which will make the souls of young men better and the censure to that which has the opposite effect.

And now let us address young men in the form of a prayer for their welfare. O friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of fishing in the sea, or of angling, or of catching the creatures in the waters, ever take possession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by hook or by bait, which latter is very lazy contrivance and let not any desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters. And as to the desire of thieving in town or country may it never enter into your most passing thoughts nor let the insidi-

ous fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy of freemen, come into the head of any youth [829] There remains therefore for our athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals of which the one sort is called hunting by night, in which the hunters sleep in turn and are lazy: this is not to be commended any more than that which has intervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. Thus, only the best kind of hunting is allowed at all—that of quadrupeds which is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they get the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them and hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking them with their own hands. The praise and blame which is assigned to all these things has now been declared and let the law be as follows—Let no one hinder these who verily are sacred hunters from following the chase wherever and whithersoever they will but the hunter by night, who trusts to his nets and guns, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere. The fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on cultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted and any one who meets him may stop him. As to the hunter in waters, he may hunt anywhere except in harbours or sacred streams or marshes or pools, provided only that he do not pollute the water with poisonous juices. And now we may say that all our enactments about education are complete.

Cle. Very good.

BOOK VIII

[8.3] *Athenian Stranger* NEXT with the help of the Delphian oracle, we have to institute festivals and make laws about them, and to determine what sacrifices will be for the good of the city and to what Gods they shall be offered but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly regulated by us.

Cle. in a. The number—yes.

At. Then we will first determine the number and let the whole number be 365—one for every day—so that one magistrate at least will sacrifice daily to some God or demi-god on behalf of the city and the citizens, and their possessions. And the interpreters, and priests, and priestesses, and prophets shall meet, and in company with the guardians of the law ordain those things which the legislator of necessity

[821] *Cle* To what are you referring?

Ath Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God and the nature of the universe nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things and that such enquiries are impious whereas the very opposite is the truth

Cle What do you mean?

Ath Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical and at variance with the usual language of age But when any one has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to God he cannot abstain from expressing it

Cle Your words are reasonable enough but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars?

Ath My good friends at this hour all of us Hellenes tell lies if I may use such an expression about those great Gods the Sun and the Moon

Cle Lies of what nature?

Ath We say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same path and we call them planets or wanderers

Cle Very true Stranger and in the course of my life I have often myself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not moving in their accustomed course but wandering out of their path in all manner of ways and I have seen the sun and moon doing what we all know that they do

Ath Just so Megillus and Cleinias and I maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the Gods in heaven so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language and not to blaspheme about them

Cle There you are right if such a knowledge be only attainable and if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now and can be better instructed and learn to use better language then I quite agree with you that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly should be acquired by us And now do you try to explain to us your whole meaning and we on our part, will endeavour to understand you

Ath There is some difficulty in understanding my meaning but not a very great one nor will any great length of time be required And of this I am myself a proof for I did not know these things long ago nor in the days of my youth and yet I can explain them to you in a brief space of time whereas if they had been difficult I could certainly never have explained them all old as I am to old men like your selves

Cle True but what is this study which you describe as wonderful and fitting for youth to learn [822] but of which we are ignorant? Try and explain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can

Ath I will For O my good friends, that other doctrine about the wandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth but the very reverse of the truth Each of them moves in the same path—not in many paths but in one only which is circular and the varieties are only apparent Nor are we right in supposing that the swiftest of them is the slowest nor conversely that the slowest is the quickest And if what I say is true only just imagine that we had a similar notion about horses running at Olympia or about men who ran in the long course and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and the slowest as the swiftest and sang the praises of the vanquished as though he were the victor—in that case our praises would not be true nor very agreeable to the runners though they be but men and now to commit the same error about the Gods which would have been ludicrous and erroneous in the case of men—is not that ludicrous and erroneous?

Cle Worse than ludicrous I should say

Ath At all events the Gods cannot like us to be spreading a false report of them

Cle Most true if such is the fact

Ath And if we can show that such is really the fact then all these matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the avoidance of impiety but if we cannot they may be let alone and let this be our decision

Cle Very good

Ath Enough of laws relating to education and learning But hunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention For the legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond mere legislation There is something over and above law which lies in a region between admonition and law and has several times occurred to us in the course of discussion for example in the education of very young children there were things as we maintain which are not to be defined and to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity Now our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus delineated the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he is described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most but the higher form of praise is that which describes him as the good [823] citizen

we ever study the art of self-defence?

Cle The way which you mention, Stranger would be the only way.

Ath And shall the warriors of our city who are destined when occasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests and to fight for their lives, and their children, and their property and the whole city be worse prepared than boxers? And will the legislator because he is afraid that their practising with one another may appear to some ridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight will he not ordain that solders shall perform lesser exercises with our arms every day making dancing and all gymnastic tend to this end and also will he not require that they shall practise some gymnastic exercises, greater as well as lesser as often as every month and that they shall have contests one with another in every part of the country seizing upon posts and lying in ambush and imitating in every respect the reality of war fighting with boxing-gloves and hurling javelins, and using weapons somewhat dangerous and as nearly as possible like the true ones, in order that the sport may not be altogether without fear but may have terrors and to a certain degree show the man who has and who has not courage (831) and that the honour and dishonour which are assigned to them respectively may prepare the whole city for the true conflict of life? If any one dies in these mimic contests, the homicide is involuntary and we will make the slayer when he has been punished according to law to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men should die, others as good as they will be born but that if fear is dead then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior natures, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a few.

Cle We are quite agreed Stranger that we should legislate about such things, and that the whole state should practise them.

Ath And what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort hardly ever exist in states at least not to any extent worth speaking of? Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators?

Cle Perhaps.

Ath Certainly not, sweet Cleinias there are two causes, which are quite enough to account for the deficiency.

Cle What are they?

Ath One cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs men, and never for a moment allows them to think of anything but their own private possessions on this the soul of every

citizen hangs suspended and can attend to nothing but his daily gain mankind are ready to learn any branch of knowledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this end and they laugh at every other—that is one reason why a city will not be in earnest about such contests or any other good and honourable pursuit. But from an insatiable love of gold and silver every man will stoop to any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly in the hope of becoming rich and will make no objection to performing any action holy or unholy and utterly base, if only like a beast he have the power of eating and drinking all kinds of things, and procuring for himself in every sort of way the gratification of his lusts.

Cle True.

Ath Let this then be deemed one of the causes which prevent states from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other noble aim but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into merchants and captains of ships and servants and converts the valiant sort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, (832) and violent, tyrannical persons many of whom are not without ability but they are unfortunate.

Cle What do you mean?

Ath Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering?

Cle Then that is one cause, Stranger but you spoke of another.

Ath Thank you for reminding me.

Cle The insatiable lifelong love of wealth as you were saying is one cause which absorbs mankind and prevents them from rightly practising the arts of war—Granted and now tell me, what is the other?

Ath Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?

Cle No but we think that you are too severe upon the money loving temper of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar dislike.

Ath That is a very fair rebuke, Cleinias and I will now proceed to the second cause.

Cle Proceed.

Ath I say that governments are a cause—democracy of garchy tyranny concerning which I have often spoken in the previous discourse or rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects but they may be truly called

Cle Republic 1491 492.

Cle 1712 715.

omits and I may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take note of what is omitted. The law will say that there are twelve feasts dedicated to the twelve Gods, after whom the several tribes are named and that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month and appoint choruses and musical and gymnastic contests assigning them so as to suit the Gods and seasons of the year. And they shall have festivals for women distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's festivals and those which ought not. Further they shall not confuse the infernal deities and their rites with the Gods who are termed heavenly and their rites but shall separate them giving to Pluto his own in the twelfth month which is sacred to him according to the law. To such a deity warlike men should entertain no aversion but they should honour him as being always the best friend of man. For the connection of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them as I am ready to maintain quite seriously. Moreover those who would regulate these matters rightly should consider that our city among existing cities has no fellow either in respect of leisure or command of the necessities of life and that like an individual she ought to live happily [329]. And those who would live happily should in the first place do no wrong to one another and ought not themselves to be wronged by others to attain the first is not difficult but there is great difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. No man can be perfectly secure against wrong unless he has become perfectly good and cities are like individuals in this for a city if good has a life of peace but if evil a life of war with in and without. Wherefore the citizens ought to practise war—not in time of war but rather while they are at peace. And every city which has any sense should take the field at least for one day in every month and for more if the magistrates think fit having no regard to winter cold or summer heat and they should go out *en masse* including their wives and their children when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people or in separate portions when summoned by them and they should always provide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts and they should have tournaments imitating in as lively a manner as they can real battles. And they should distribute prizes of victory and valour to the competitors passing censures and encomiums on one another

or according to the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole life honouring him who seems to be the best and blaming him who is the opposite. And let poets celebrate the victors—not however every poet but only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of age, nor should he be one who although he may have musical and poetical gifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action but those who are themselves good and also honourable in the state creators of noble actions—let their poems be sung even though they be not very musical. And let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth and the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege and they alone shall be free to sing but the rest of the world shall not have this liberty. Nor shall any one dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyra and Orpheus, but only such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the Gods and such as are the works of good men in which praise or blame has been awarded and which have been deemed to fulfil their design fairly.

The regulations about war and about liberty of speech in poetry ought to apply equally to men and women. The legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind.—Who are my citizens for whom I have set in order the city? [330] Are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests and have they not innumerable rivals? To be sure will be the natural reply. Well but if we were training boxers or pancratiasts or any other sort of athletes would they never meet until the hour of contest arrived and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves previously by daily practice? Surely if we were boxers we should have been learning to fight for many days before and exercising ourselves in imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to use in the hour of conflict and in order that we might come as near to reality as possible instead of cestuses we should put on boxing gloves that the blows and the wards might be practised by us to the utmost of our power. And if there were a lack of competitors the ridicule of fools would not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practising at that. Or if we had no adversary at all animate or inanimate should we not venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves? In what other manner could

¹ Cf. vi 770 and *Republic* v 458

² Cf. *Cratylus* 403 *Republic* iii 386

Cf. *Republic* iii 403

would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in instituting contests which are not after the manner of our country. And therefore we give our prizes for single horses—for coats who have not yet cast their teeth, and for those who are intermediate, and for the full-grown horses themselves, and thus our equestrian games will accord with the nature of the country. Let them have conflict and rivalry in these matters in accordance with the law and let the colonels and generals of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed competitors in them. But we have nothing to say to the unarmed either in gymnastic exercises or in these contests. On the other hand, the Cretan bowman or javelin-man who fights in armour on horseback is useful, and therefore we may as

all place a competition of this sort among our amusements. Women are not to be forced to compete by laws and ordinances but if from previous training they have acquired the habit and are strong enough and like to take part, let them do so, girls as well as boys, and no blame to them.

Thus the competition in gymnastic and the mode of learning it have been described and we have spoken also of the tools of the contest, and of daily exercises under the superintendence of masters. Likewise what relates to music has been, for the most part, completed. But as to rhapsodes and the flute, and the contests of choruses which are to perform at feasts, all this shall be arranged when the months and days and years have been appointed for Gods and demigods, whether every third year or a summer every fifth year or in whatever way or manner the Gods may put into men's minds (§33) the distribution and order of them. At the same time, we may expect that the musical contests

will be celebrated in their turn by the command of the judges and the director of education and the guardians of the law meeting, to either for this purpose and themselves becoming legislators of the times and nature and conditions of the choral contests and of dancing in general. What they ought severally to be in language and song and in the admixture of harmony to rhythm and the dance has been ordered by the original legislator and his successor ought to follow him, making the games and sacrifices to correspond to fitting tunes, and appointing public festivals. It is not difficult to determine how these and the like matters may have a regular order nor again will the legislation of them do any great good or harm if it is so. This shall be another

matter of great importance and difficulty concerning which God should legislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from him an ordinance about it. But seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there appears to be a need of some bold man who specially honours plainness of speech, and will say outright what he thinks best for the city and citizens—ordinating what is good and convenient for the whole state amid the corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having no man his helper but himself standing alone and following reason only.

C. What is this, Stranger that you are saying? For we do not as yet understand your meaning.

S. Very likely I will endeavour to explain myself more clearly. When I came to the subject of education, I beheld young men and maidens holding friendly intercourse with one another. And there naturally arose in my mind a sort of apprehension—I could not help thinking how one is to deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and have nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile toils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their whole life are sacrifices and festivals and dances. How in such a state as this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and woman into perdition and from which reason (§36) assuming the functions of law commands them to abstain? The ordinances already made may possibly get the better of most of these desires the prohibition of excessive wealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and the whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them more so that the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the young and never to lose sight of them and these provisions do, as far as human means can effect anything exercise a regulating influence upon the desires in general. But how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities? How shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger? Truly, Clemeas, here is a difficulty. In many ways Crete and Lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who make peculiar laws but in the matter of love, as we are alone I must confess that they are quite against us. For if any one following nature should lay down the law which existed before the days of Laus, and denounce all these lusts as contrary to nature adducing the

states of discord in which while the govern-
ment is voluntary the subjects always obey
against their will and have to be coerced and
the ruler fears the subject and will not if he
can help, allow him to become either noble or
rich or strong or valiant or warlike at all.¹
These two are the chief causes of almost all evils,
and of the evils of which I have been speaking
they are notably the causes. But our state has
escaped both of them. For her citizens have the
greatest leisure and they are not subject to one
another and will I think be made by these
laws the reverse of lovers of money. Such a con-
stitution may be reasonably supposed to be the
only one existing which will accept the educa-
tion which we have described and the martial
pastimes which have been perfected according
to our idea.

Cle True.

Ath Then next we must remember about
all gymnastic contests, that only the warlike
sort of them are to be practised and to have
prizes of victory and those which are not mili-
tary are to be given up. The military sort had
better be completely described and established
by law; and first let us speak of running and
swiftness.

Cle Very good.

Ath Certainly the most military of all quali-
ties is general activity of body whether of foot
or hand. For escaping or for capturing an en-
emy [833] quickness of foot is required but
hand-to-hand conflict and combat need vigour
and strength.

Cle Very true.

Ath Neither of them can attain their great-
est efficiency without arms.

Cle How can they?

Ath Then our herald in accordance with the
prevailing practice will first summon the run-
ner—he will appear armed for to an unarmed
competitor we will not give a prize. And he
shall enter first who is to run the single course
bearing arms; next he who is to run the double
course; third he who is to run the horse-course
and fourthly he who is to run the long course.
The fifth whom we start shall be the first sent
forth in heavy armour and shall run a course
of sixty stadia to some temple of Ares—and we
will send forth another whom we will style the
more heavily armed to run over smoother
ground. There remains the archer and he shall
run in the full equipments of an archer a dis-
tance of 100 stadia over mountains and across
every sort of country to a temple of Apollo.

Cf Aristotle *Politics* v 11 1313 38 1314

and Artemis this shall be the order of the con-
test and we will wait for them until they re-
turn and will give a prize to the conqueror in
each.

Cle Very good.

Ath Let us suppose that there are three kinds
of contests—one of boys, another of beardless
youths and a third of men. For the youths we
will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds,
and for the boys at half of the entire course,
whether they contend as archers or as heavy-
armed. Touching the women let the girls who
are not grown up compete naked in the stadi-
um and the double course, and the horse-course
and the long course and let them run on the
race ground itself: those who are thirteen years
of age and upwards until their marriage shall
continue to share in contests if they are not
more than twenty, and shall be compelled to
run up to eighteen and they shall descend into
the arena in suitable dresses. Let these be the
regulations about contests in running both for
men and women.

Respecting contests of strength instead of
wrestling and similar contests of the heavier
sort, we will institute conflicts in armour of one
against one and two against two and so on up
to ten against ten. As to what a man ought not
to suffer or do and to what extent in order to
gain the victory—as in wrestling the masters
of the art have laid down what is fair and what
is not fair so in fighting in armour—we ought
to call in skilful persons who shall judge for
us and be our assessors in the work of legisla-
tion: they shall say who deserves to be victor in
combats of this sort and what he is not to do or
have done to him and in like manner what
rule determines who is defeated [834] and let
these ordinances apply to women until they are
married as well as to men. The panceration shall
have a counterpart in a combat of the light-
armed: they shall contend with bows and with
light shields and with javelins and in the throw-
ing of stones by slings and by hand and laws
shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes
given to him who best fulfils the ordinances of
the law.

Next in order we shall have to legislate about
the horse contests. Now we do not need many
horses for they cannot be of much use in a
country like Crete and hence we naturally do
not take great pains about the rearing of them
or about horse races. There is no one who keeps
a chariot among us and any rivalry in such
matters would be altogether out of place there.

Cf L 6 5

the penalty of his sin.

Me. You are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of opposition ever assails it, has a marvellous power.

Alc. Am I not also right in saying, that the legislator who wants to master any of the passions which master man may easily know how to subvert them. He will consecrate the tradition of their evil character among all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city—that will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make.

Me. Yet but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them.

Alc. A good objection but was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not intentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, (835) or sowing them in stony places, in which they will take no root; and that I would command them to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that which is sown is not likely to grow. Now if a law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents inter course of parents and children—such a law extending to other sensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of ten thousand blessings. For in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and madness of love, and from all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumerable other benefits would result if such a law could only be enforced. I can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scornful terms that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the world with his outcry. And therefore I said that I knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law which was very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no difficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way for as I was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. But matters have now come to such a pass that even then the desired result seems as if it could not be attained, just as the continuance of an entire meal in the practice of common meals is also deemed impossible. And although this latter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, and even in your cities the common meals of women would be regarded

as unnatural and impossible. I was thinking of the rebelliousness of the human heart when I said that the permanent establishment of these things is very difficult.

Me. Very true.

Alc. Shall I try and find some sort of persuasive argument which will prove to you that such enactments are possible, and not beyond human nature?

Alc. By all means.

Alc. Is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of love and to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is in a good condition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of training?

Me. He will be far more temperate when he is in training.

Alc. And have we not heard of Ierxus of Tarentum, who, with a view to the Olympic and other contests, (840) in his zeal for his art, and also because he was of a manly and temperate disposition, never had any connection with a woman or a youth during the whole time of his training? And the same is said of Crisus and Astylus and Dapompus and many others; and yet, Cimonas, they were far worse educated in their minds than your and my citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty.

Alc. No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the ancients of these athletes.

Alc. And had they the courage to abstain from what is ordinarily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and the like and had our young men be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory which is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this by tales and sayings and songs?

Alc. Of what victory are you speaking?

Alc. Of the victory of temperance, which if they win, they will live happily or if they are conquered, the reverse of happily. And, further may we not suppose that the fear of impurity will enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered?

Alc. I dare say.

Alc. And since we have reached this point in our legislation, and have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, I affirm that our ordinance should simply run in the following terms. Our citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in general who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age for procreation virgin and

animals as a proof that such unions were monstrous he might prove his point but he would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states Further they are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should always observe for we are always enquiring which of our enactments tends to virtue and which not And suppose we grant that these loves are accounted by law to be honourable or at least not disgraceful in what degree will they contribute to virtue? Will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance? Who will ever believe this?—or rather who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them? Will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman? And who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law? Certainly no one who had in his mind the image of true law How can we prove that what I am saying is true? [837] He who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of friendship and desire and of these so-called loves for they are of two kinds and out of the two arises a third kind having the same name and this similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity

Cle How is that?

Ath Dear is the like in virtue to the like and the equal to the equal dear also though unlike, is he who has abundance to him who is in want And when either of these friendships be comes excessive we term the excess love

Cle Very true

Ath The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse and has often no tie of communion but that which arises from likeness is gentle and has a tie of communion which lasts through life As to the mixed sort which is made up of them both there is first of all a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third love desires more over he is drawn different ways and is in doubt between the two principles the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of youth and the other forbidding him For the one is a lover of the body and hungers after beauty like ripe fruit and would fain satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter and looking rather than loving and with his soul desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner regards the satisfaction of

the bodily love as wantonness * he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom and wishes to live chaste ly with the chaste object of his affection Now the sort of love which is made up of the other two is that which we have described as the third Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved youth to be the best possible and the other two if possible we should hinder? What do you say friend Megillus?

Megillus I think Stranger that you are perfectly right in what you have been now saying

Ath I knew well my friend, that I should obtain your assent which I accept and therefore have no need to analyse your custom any further Cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some other time Enough of this and now let us proceed to the laws

[838] *Meg* Very good

Ath Upon reflection I see a way of imposing the law which in one respect is easy but, in another is of the utmost difficulty

Meg What do you mean?

Ath We are all aware that most men in spite of their lawless natures are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse with the fair and this is not at all against their will but entirely with their will

Meg When do you mean?

Ath When any one has a brother or sister who is fair and about a son or daughter the same unwritten law holds and is a most perfect safeguard, so that no open or secret connection ever takes place between them Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all in to the minds of most of them

Meg Very true

Ath Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?

Meg What word?

Ath The declaration that they are unholy hated of God and most infamous and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite but every one from his earliest childhood has heard men speaking in the same manner about them always and every where whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? When the poet introduces on the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus or a Macareus having secret intercourse with his sister he represents him when found out ready to kill himself as

Cf. Phaedrus 251

LAW VIII

which shall be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them be the law of Zeus, the god of boundaries. Let no one shift the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour or if he dwells at the extremity of the land, [843] of any stranger who is contentious with him, considering that this is truly to move the immovable, and everyone should be more willing to move the largest rock which is not a landmark, than the least stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between neighbours for Zeus the god of hundred, is the witness of the citizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger and when aroused, terrible are the wars which they stir up. He who obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobeying, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. For let no one willfully remove the boundaries of his neighbour's land and if any one does, let him who will inform the landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next place, many small injuries done by neighbours to one another through their multiplication may cause a weight of enmity and make neighbourhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any offence against his neighbour and especially of encroaching on his neighbour's land for any man may easily do harm, but not every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on his neighbour's land and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the damage, and to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured party. Of these and the like matters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the judges of them and assessors of the damage in the more important cases, as has been already said the whole number of them belonging to any one of the twelve divisions shall decide and in the lesser cases the commanders or again if any one pastures his cattle on his neighbour's land they shall see the injury and adjudge the penalty. And if any one, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms, and draws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage or if anyone sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbour's property he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. And

if in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and his neighbour's land he shall be punished in accordance with the enactments of many lawgivers which we may use not deeming it necessary that the great legislator of our state should [844] determine all the trifles which might be decided by any body for example husbandmen have had of old excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should propose to divert their course. He who likes may draw water from the fountain head of the common stream on to his own land if he do not cut off the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner and he may take the water in any direction which he pleases except through a house or temple or sepulchre but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the channel. And if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth which keeps in the rain from heaven and causes a deficiency in the supply of water let him dig down on his own land as far as the clay and if at this depth he finds no water let him obtain water from his neighbours, as much as is required for his servants drinking and if his neighbours, too, are limited in their supply let him have a fixed measure which shall be determined by the wardens of the country. Thus he shall receive each day and on these terms have a share of his neighbours' water. If there be heavy rain and one of those on the lower ground injures some tiller of the upper ground or some one who has a common wall by refusing to give them an outlet for water or again if some one living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on his lower neighbour and they cannot come to terms with one another let him who will call in a warden of the city if he be in the city or if he be in the country a warden of the country and let him obtain a decision determining what each of them is to do. And he who will not abide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper and pay a fine to the injured party equivalent to double the value of the injury because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates.

Now the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. The goddess of Autumn has two gracious gifts one, the joy of Dionysus which is not treasured up the other which nature intends to be stored. Let this be the law then concerning the fruits of autumn. He who tastes the common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs before the season of vintage which to accord with Arcturus, either on his own land or on that of others—let him pay

unmarried but when they have reached the proper time of life are coupled male and female and lovingly pair together and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence abiding firmly in their original compact—surely we will say to them you should be better than the animals. But if they are corrupted by the other Hellenes and the common practice of barbarians and they see with their eyes and hear with their ears of the so called free love everywhere prevailing among them and they themselves are not able to get the better of the temptation the guardians of the law exercising the functions of lawgivers shall devise a second law against them.

[841] *Cle* And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?

Ath Clearly Cleinias the one which would naturally follow.

Cle What is that?

Ath Our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with indulgence but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them into other parts of the body and this will happen if no immodesty be allowed in the practice of love. Then they will be ashamed of frequent intercourse and they will find pleasure if seldom enjoyed to be a less imperious mistress. They should not be found out doing anything of the sort. Concealment shall be honourable and sanctioned by custom and made law by unwritten prescription on the other hand to be detected shall be esteemed dishonourable but not to abstain wholly. In this way there will be a second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable involving a second notion of right. Three principles will comprehend all those corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves and who form but one class and will compel them not to transgress.

Cle What are they?

Ath The principle of piety the love of honour and the desire of beauty not in the body but in the soul. These are perhaps romantic aspirations but they are the noblest of aspirations, if they could only be realized in all states and God willing in the matter of love we may be able to enforce one of two things—either that no one shall venture to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots or in barren and unnatural lusts or at least we may abolish altogether the connection of men with men and as to women if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred

rites whether they be bought or acquired in any other way and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges and be deemed to be as he truly is, a stranger. Let this law then whether it is one, or ought rather to be called two be laid down respecting love in general and the intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires whether rightly or wrongly indulged.

[842] *Meg* I for my part Stranger would gladly receive this law. Cleinias shall speak for himself and tell you what in his opinion.

Cle I will Megillus when an opportunity offers at present I think that we had better allow the Stranger to proceed with his laws.

Meg Very good.

Ath We had got about as far as the establishment of the common tables which in most places would be difficult but in Crete no one would think of introducing any other custom. There might arise a question about the manner of them—whether they shall be such as they are here in Crete or such as they are in Lacedaemon—or is there a third kind which may be better than either of them? The answer to this question might be easily discovered but the discovery would do no great good for at present they are very well ordered.

Leaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of providing food. Now in cities the means of life are gained in many ways and from divers sources and in general from two sources whereas our city has only one. For most of the Hellenes obtain their food from sea and land but our citizens from land only. And this makes the task of the legislator less difficult—half as many laws will be enough and much less than half and they will be of a kind better suited to free men. For he has nothing to do with laws about shipowners and merchants and retailers and innkeepers and tax collectors and mines and money lending and compound interest and innumerable other things—bidding good bye to these he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and bee keepers and to the guardians and superintendents of their implements and he has already legislated for greater matters as for example respecting marriage and the procreation and nurture of children and for education and the establishment of offices—and now he must direct his laws to those who provide food and labour in preparing it.

Let us first of all then have a class of laws

Cf Aristotle *Politics* vii to 1350 3 10

be of persons two thousands or two and
 half or of tribes, one of men and
 women, since one can win a prize
 under his law, then be one the winner in
 the state—No one who is a man shall use as
 a creature who is to be a creature, he shall
 not surrender the man as a man but his
 own, under the reason that in surrendering
 many servants who are working for him, he is
 like a surrendered man himself, because more
 revenue will come to him from them than
 from his own art; [347] but in every man in
 the state have one art, though his living is not
 let the wardens of the city add to man's
 his law and a law common justice to any other
 art than the study of virtue, let them punish
 him with disgrace and money until they bring
 him back into his own right conduct and in any
 stranger process two arts, let them chastise him
 with blows and money penalties and expenses
 from the state, until they compel him to be one
 art and not many.

But as touching payments for hire, and con-
 tracts of work, or in case any one does wrong
 to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any
 other up to fifty drachmas, let the wardens of
 the city decide the case: but if a greater amount
 be involved, then let the public courts decide
 according to law. Let no one pay any duty ei-
 ther on the importation or exportation of goods;
 and as to frankincense and similar perfumes,
 used in the service of the Gods, which come
 from abroad, and purple and other dyes which
 are not produced in the country or the materi-
 als of any art which have to be imported, and
 which are not necessary—no one should import
 them nor again, should any one export any-
 thing which is wanted in the country. Of all
 these things let there be inspectors and superin-
 tendents, taken from the guardians of the law
 and they shall be the twelve next in order to the
 five seniors. Concerning arms, and all imple-
 ments which are required for military purposes,
 if there be need of introducing any art or plant,
 or metal, or chains of any kind, or animals for
 use in war let the commanders of the horse
 and the generals have authority over their im-
 portation and exportation: the city shall send
 them out and also receive them, and the guard-
 ians of the law shall make fit and proper laws
 about them. But let there be no retail trade
 for the sake of money making, either in these
 or any other articles, in the city or country
 at all.

With respect to food and the distribution of
 the produce of the country, the right and prop-
 er way seems to be nearly that which is the cus-
 tom of Greece: for all should be required to dis-
 tribute the fruits of the soil into twelve parts,
 and in this way consume them. Let the first por-
 tion of each (as for instance of wheat and
 barley) to which the rest of the fruits of the
 earth shall be added, [348] as well as the ani-
 mals which are for sale in each of the twelve dis-
 tricts) be divided in due proportion into
 three parts; one part for freemen, another for
 their servants, and a third for craftsmen and in
 general for strangers, whether sojourners who
 may be dwelling in the city and like other men
 must live, or those who come on some business
 which they have with the state, or with some
 individual. Let only this third part of all neces-
 saries be required to be sold, one of the other
 two-thirds no one shall be compelled to sell.
 And how will they be best distributed? In the
 next place, we see clearly that the distribution
 will be as equal as can possibly be, and in an-
 other point of view of unequals.

Cl. What do you mean?

Lk. I mean that the earth of necessary pro-
 duces and nourishes the various articles of food,
 sometimes better and sometimes worse.

Cl. Of course.

Lk. Such being the case, let no one of the
 three portions be greater than either of the oth-
 er two—neither that which is assigned to mas-
 ters or to slaves, nor again that of the stranger:
 but let the distribution to all be equal and alike,
 and let every citizen take his two portions and
 distribute them among slaves and freemen, be-
 having power to determine the quantity and
 quality. And what remains he shall distribute
 by measure and number among the animals
 who have to be sustained from the earth, among
 the whole number of them.

In the second place, our citizens should have
 separate houses duly ordered: and this will be
 the order proper for men like them. There
 shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of
 each twelfth portion, and in each hamlet they
 shall first set apart a market-place, and the tem-
 ples of the Gods, and of their attendant demigods
 and if there be any local deities of the
 Muses, or holy seats of other ancient deities,
 whose memory has been preserved, to these let
 them pay their ancient honours. But Hestia,
 and Zeus, and Athene will have temples every-
 where together with the God who presides in

Cl. Rep. li. in 397

Cl. Aristot. Pol. i. c. vi. 9, 1329 18-4.

Cl. Ibid. ii. 10 1-2 11 21

Cl. 738.

fifty drachmae which shall be sacred to Dionysus if he pluck them from his own land and if from his neighbour's land a mina and if from any others two-thirds of a mina. And he who would gather the choice grapes or the choice figs as they are now termed if he take them off his own land let him pluck them how and when he likes but if he take them from the ground of others without their leave let him in that case be always punished in accordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what he has not laid down¹ [845]. And if a slave touches any fruit of this sort without the consent of the owner of the land he shall be beaten with as many blows as there are grapes on the bunch or figs on the fig tree. Let a metic purchase the choice autumnal fruit and then if he pleases he may gather it but if a stranger is passing along the road and desires to eat let him take of the choice grapes for himself and a single follower without payment as a tribute of hospitality. The law however forbids strangers from sharing in the sort which is not used for eating and if any one whether he be master or slave takes of them in ignorance let the slave be beaten and the freeman dismissed with admonitions and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which are unfit for making raisins and wine or for laying by as dried figs. As to pears and apples and pomegranates and similar fruits there shall be no disgrace in taking them secretly but he who is caught if he be of less than thirty years of age shall be struck and beaten off but not wounded and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows. Of these fruits the stranger may partake just as he may of the fruits of autumn. And if an elder who is more than thirty years of age eat of them on the spot let him like the stranger be allowed to partake of all such fruits but he must carry away nothing. If however he will not obey the law let him run the risk of failing in the competition of virtue in case any one takes notice of his actions before the judges at the time.

Water is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens but is easily polluted. You cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air which are the other elements of nutrition in plants or divert them or steal them but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water which must therefore be protected by law. And let this be the law.—If any one intentionally pollutes the water of another whether the water of a spring, or collected in reservoirs either by

poisonous substances or by digging or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before the wardens of the city and claim in writing the value of the loss if the accused be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious substances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the cistern which contains the water in such manner as the laws of the interpreters² order the purification to be made by the offender in each case.

With respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil let a man if he pleases [846] carry his own fruits through any place in which he either does no harm to any one or himself gains three times as much as his neighbour loses. Now of these things the magistrates should be cognisant as of all other things in which a man intentionally does injury to another or to the property of another by fraud or force in the use which he makes of his own property. All these matters a man should lay before the magistrates and receive damages supposing the injury to be not more than three minae or if he have a charge against another which involves a larger amount let him bring his suit into the public courts and have the evil doer punished. But if any of the magistrates appear to adjudge the penalties which he imposes in an unjust spirit let him be liable to pay double to the injured party. Any one may bring the offences of magistrates in any particular case before the public courts. There are innumerable little matters relating to the modes of punishment and applications for suits and summonses and the witnesses to summonses—for example whether two witnesses should be required for a summons or how many—and all such details which cannot be omitted in legislation but are beneath the wisdom of an aged legislator. These lesser matters as they indeed are in comparison with the greater ones let a younger generation regulate by law after the patterns which have preceded and according to their own experience of the usefulness and necessity of such laws and when they are duly regulated let there be no alteration but let the citizens live in the observance of them.

Now of artisans let the regulations be as follows.—In the first place let no citizen or servant of a citizen be occupied in handicraft arts for he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation and hardly any human being is capa-

¹ Cf. xi 913

the council and assembly. And if he depart, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in the register kept by the magistrates.

BOOK IX

[853] NEXT to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of legislation will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not been described. Have in mentioned them severally under their usual names, we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each offence, and who are to be the judges of them.

Cleitias Very good.

Themistocles There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to do for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise someone who will be guilty of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for him by accusation and threaten and make laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter him and punish his acts under the idea that he will arise—this, as I was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. Yet seeing that we are not like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods, being according to the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine parents, but that we are only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitable blindness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a heart so hard that it cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the strength of the laws and for their sake, though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about the robbing of temples, in case any one should dare to commit such a crime. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection from their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties [854] And with a view to them especially and yet not without a prudent eye to the weakness of human nature generally I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar incurable or almost incurable criminals. Having already a seed that such enactments ought always to

have a short prelude, we may speak to the criminal whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words of admonition and exhortation—O sir we will say to him the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady nor yet a visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, an ever recurring curse—against this you must guard with all your might, and how you are to guard we will explain to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the wicked—fly and turn not back. and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well and good but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence.

Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over cry with a loud voice—He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a slave or stranger shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and hands and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and be improved for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who suffers either better or not so much worse as he would have been. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the gods, or his parents, or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that after receiving such an excellent education and training from youth upward he has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. His punishment shall be death [855] which to him will be the least of evils and his example will benefit others, if he perish ingloriously and be cast beyond the borders of the land. But let his children and family if they avoid the ways of their father have glory and let honourable mention be made of them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None

Cl. P. *tuoras* 3, 3, ff *Gorgias* 5 5
Cl. State m. 308.

each of the twelve districts.¹ And the first erection of houses shall be around these temples where the ground is highest in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner — They shall make thirteen divisions of the crafts men one of them they shall establish in the city and this again they shall subdivide into twelve lesser divisions among the twelve districts of the city, and the remainder shall be distributed in the country round about and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the wardens of the country shall superintend all these matters and see how many of them and which class of them each place requires [849] and fix them where they are likely to be least troublesome and most useful to the husband man. And the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city.

Now the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora. Their first care after the temples which are in the agora have been seen to should be to prevent any one from doing any wrong in dealings between man and man in the second place as being inspectors of temperance and violence they should chastise him who requires chastisement. Touching articles of sale they should first see whether the articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to strangers are sold to them as the law ordains. And let the law be as follows — On the first day of the month the persons in charge whoever they are whether strangers or slaves who have the charge on behalf of the citizens shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to them in the first place a twelfth portion of the corn — the stranger shall purchase corn for the whole month and other cereals on the first market day and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell and the other buy liquids sufficient to last during the whole month and on the twenty third day there shall be a sale of animals by those who are willing to sell to the people who want to buy and of implements and other things which husbandmen sell (such as skins and all kinds of clothing either woven or made of felt and other goods of the same sort) and which strangers are compelled to buy and purchase of others. As to the retail trade in these things whether of barley or wheat set apart for meal and flour or any other kind of food no one shall sell them to

neizens or their slaves nor shall any one buy of a citizen but let the stranger sell them in the market of strangers to artisans and their slaves, making an exchange of wine and food which is commonly called retail trade. And butchers shall offer for sale parts of dismembered animals to the strangers, and artisans, and their servants. Let any stranger who likes buy food from day to day wholesale from those who have the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as much as he pleases and when he pleases. As to other goods and implements which are likely to be wanted they shall sell them in the common market at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens of the market and city choosing according to their judgment shall determine at such places they shall exchange money for goods and goods for money neither party giving credit to the other² and he who gives credit must be satisfied whether he obtain his money or not, [850] for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. But whenever property has been bought or sold greater in quantity or value than is allowed by the law which has determined within what limits a man may increase and diminish his possessions let the excess be registered in the books of the guardians of the law or in case of diminution let there be an erasure made. And let the same rule be observed about the registration of the property of the metics. Any one who likes may come and be a metic on certain conditions a foreigner if he likes and is able to settle may dwell in the land, but he must practise an art and not abide more than twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself and he shall pay no sojourner's tax however small except good conduct nor any other tax for buying and selling. But when the twenty years have expired he shall take his property with him and depart. And if in the course of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any considerable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that he can persuade the council and assembly either to grant him delay in leaving the country or to allow him to remain for the whole of his life, let him go and persuade the city and whatever they assent to at his instance shall take effect. For the children of the metics being artisans and of fifteen years of age let the time of their sojourn commence after their fifteenth year and let them remain for twenty years and then go where they like but any of them who wishes to remain may do so if he can persuade

¹ Cf. v 745

Cf. xi 915.

LAWS IX

not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty against him to forgive him. But if a person be convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.

Cle What makes you say Stranger that a theft is all one, whether the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred or secular places—and these are not the only differences in thefts.—seeing then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entire ly different penalties?

1st Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impugned upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what indeed, had occurred to my mind already that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as I may say in passing.—Do you remember the image in which I likened the man for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient, and using the language almost of philosophy beginning at the beginning of the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh—he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue's end—Foolish fellow he would say you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him and he does not want to be made a doctor but to get well.

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1st Perhaps he would and he might remark upon us, that he who discourses about laws, as are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws that would be rather a telling observation.

Cle Very true.

1st But we are fortunate.

[853] *Cle* In what way?

1st Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or if we prefer what is most necessary—which shall we do

Cle At 931. At 941.

Cle —20

Cle There is something ridiculous, Stranger in our proposing such an alternative as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by the grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this at our leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.

1st Certainly in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.

Cle What is it?

1st There are many writings to be found in cities, and among them there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other persons.

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Cle Yes to them far above all others.

1st And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his opinion about the beautiful the good, and the just, and not to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?

Cle Certainly not.

1st And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtæus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and So on and others who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? [859] and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go

of them should have their goods confiscated to the state for the lots of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal

Touching the exaction of penalties when a man appears to have done anything which deserves a fine he shall pay the fine if he have anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him but more than that he shall not pay And to secure exactness let the guardians of the law refer to the registers and inform the judges of the precise truth in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money But if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty let him undergo a long and public imprisonment and be dishonoured unless some of his friends are willing to be surety for him and liberate him by assisting him to pay the fine No criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a single offence nor if he have fled the country but let the penalty be according to his deserts—death or bonds or blows, or degrading places of sitting or standing or removal to some temple on the borders of the land or let him pay fines as we said before In cases of death let the judges be the guardians of the law and a court selected by merit from the last year's magistrates But how the causes are to be brought in to court how the summonses are to be served and the like these things may be left to the younger generation of legislators to determine the manner of voting we must determine ourselves

Let the vote be given openly but before they come to the vote let the judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest in listening to such causes First of all the plaintiff shall make one speech and then the defendant shall make another and after the speeches have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties and proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been said and after the oldest has spoken the rest shall proceed in order to examine either party as to what he finds defective in the evidence whether of statement or omission and he who has nothing to ask shall hand over the examination to another And on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose all the judges shall set their seals and place the writings on the altar of Hestia [856] On the next day they shall meet again and in like manner put their questions and go through the cause and again set their seals upon the evidence and when they have three times done this and have had witnesses and evidence enough they

shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power and so they shall put an end to the suit

Next after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the dissolution of the state—Whoever by promoting a man to power enslaves the laws and subjects the city to factions using violence and stirring up sedition contrary to law him we will deem the greatest enemy of the whole state But he who takes no part in such proceedings and being one of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of the treason or having knowledge of it by reason of cowardice does not interfere on behalf of his country such an one we must consider nearly as bad Every man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates and bring the conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the government The judges of such cases shall be the same as of the robbers of temples and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same way and the vote of the majority condemn to death But let there be a general rule that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the children except in the case of some one whose father grandfather and great grandfather have successively undergone the penalty of death Such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions to the city and country of their ancestors retaining only and wholly their appointed lot And out of the citizens who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age they shall select ten whom their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are selected and him whom the God chooses they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed and may he have better fortune than his predecessors!

Clr. Very good

Ath. Once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges who are to give judgment and the manner of conducting suits against those who are tried on an accusation of treason [857] and as concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants—there shall be one law for all three for the traitor and the robber of temples and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state For a thief whether he steal much or little, let there be one law and one punishment for all alike in the first place let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted and if he have so much over and above the allotment—if he have

not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to forgive him. But if a person be convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.

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Cle Very true.

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Cle 21. 933 22. 941

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their ways and whether in discoursing of laws we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable—at any rate we will show our readiness to entertain such a view and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good and if God be gracious it will be good!

Cle Excellent! let us do as you say.

Ath Then we will now consider accurately as we proposed what relates to robbers of temples and all kinds of thefts and offences in general and we must not be annoyed if in the course of legislation we have enacted some things and have not made up our minds about some others for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us if you please consider these matters.

Cle By all means.

Ath Concerning all things honourable and just let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves and how far we are inconsistent and how far the many from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ agree and disagree among themselves.

Cle What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

Ath I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions are all fair and if a person were to maintain that just men even when they are deformed in body are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

Cle They would be quite right.

Ath Perhaps but let us consider further that if all things which are just are fair and honourable in the term all we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.

Cle And what is the inference?

Ath The inference is that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.

Cle Certainly.

Ath And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable [860] if the argument is consistently carried out?

Cle True.

Ath But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable and the term dishonourable is applied to justice will not the just and the honourable disagree?

Cle What do you mean?

Ath A thing not difficult to understand the

laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

Cle To what?

Ath We had enacted if I am not mistaken that the robber of temples and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we stopped short because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this be true are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

Cle Such appears to be the case.

Ath In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.

Cle Very true, Stranger.

Ath Then now Cleinias let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.

Cle Consistent in what?

Ath I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion but if I did not, let me now state—

Cle What?

Ath That all bad men are always involuntarily bad, and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

Cle What is it?

Ath That the unjust man may be bad but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will and yet that many do injustice willingly I do not agree with him. But then how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself if you Cleinias and you Megillus say to me—Well Stranger if all this be as you say how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—shall we legislate or not—what do you advise? Certainly we will. I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike [861] under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?

Cle Very good, Stranger and what shall we say in answer to these objections?

Ath That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us—

Cle Do what?

Ath Let us remember what has been well said by us already that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever two kinds of actions have been distinguished—the one, voluntary the other involuntary and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fully or unfairly inflicted.

Cle I agree with you, Stranger for one of two things is certain either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.

Ath Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable—not to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary I must endeavour to find some other distinction between them.

Cle Very true, Stranger there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.

Ath Reflect, then there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.

Cle Certainly

Ath I could not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds—one, voluntary and the other involuntary for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary. [863] And please to consider whether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say for I deny Cleinias and Me-

Cle A h e e i a h m e e e

gillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say that such a hurt whether great or small, is not an injury at all and on the other hand if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.

Cle Very good

Ath Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain) of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul and the cure of injustice will take the following direction.

Cle What direction?

Ath When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily or at any rate in a far less degree and he must in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just—this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, [863] inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.

Cle What you have said appears to me to be

their ways and whether in discoursing of laws we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable—at any rate we will show our readiness to entertain such a view and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good and if God be gracious it will be good!

Cle Excellent, let us do as you say.

Ath Then we will now consider accurately as we proposed what relates to robbers of temples and all kinds of thefts and offences in general, and we must not be annoyed if in the course of legislation we have enacted some things and have not made up our minds about some others for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us, if you please consider these matters.

Cle By all means.

Ath Concerning all things honourable and just let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ agree and disagree among themselves.

Cle What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

Ath I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice and just men and things and actions are all fair and if a person were to maintain that just men even when they are deformed in body are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

Cle They would be quite right.

Ath Perhaps but let us consider further that if all things which are just are fair and honourable in the term all we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.

Cle And what is the inference?

Ath The inference is that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.

Cle Certainly.

Ath And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable [860] if the argument is consistently carried out?

Cle True.

Ath But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable and the term dishonourable is applied to justice will not the just and the honourable disagree?

Cle What do you mean?

Ath A thing not difficult to understand the

laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

Cle To what?

Ath We had enacted if I am not mistaken that the robber of temples and he who was the enemy of law and order might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we stopped short because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are at once the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this be true are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

Cle Such appears to be the case.

Ath In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.

Cle Very true. Stranger.

Ath Then now Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.

Cle Consistent in what?

Ath I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion but if I did not let me now state—

Cle What?

Ath That all bad men are always involuntarily bad and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

Cle What is it?

Ath That the unjust man may be bad but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will and yet that many do injustice willingly I do not agree with him. But then how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself if you Cleinias and you Megillus say to me—Well Stranger if all this be as you say how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—shall we legislate or not—what do you advise? Certainly we will. I should reply Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike [861] under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?

very reasonable but will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice and the various complications of the voluntary and involuntary which enter into them?

Ath I will endeavour to do as you wish — Concerning the soul thus much would be generally said and allowed that one element in her nature is passion which may be described either as a state or a part of her and is hard to be striven against and contended with and by irrational force overturns many things

Cle Very true

Ath And pleasure is not the same with passion but has an opposite power working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things

Cle Quite true

Ath A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes Ignorance however may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts there is simple ignorance which is the source of lighter offences and double ignorance which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing This second kind of ignorance when possessed of power and strength will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes but when attended with weakness will only result in the errors of children and old men and these he will treat as errors and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws

Cle You are perfectly right.

Ath We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion and of another that he is inferior to them and this is true¹

Cle Certainly

Ath But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and another inferior to ignorance

Cle Very true

Ath We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite directions at the same time

Cle Yes often

Ath And now I can define to you clearly and without ambiguity what I mean by the just and unjust according to my notion of them — When anger and fear and pleasure

and pain and jealousies and desires, [864] tyrannize over the soul whether they do any harm or not—I call all this injustice. But when the opinion of the best in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man even if it be sometimes mistaken yet what is done in accordance therewith and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule and is best for the whole life of man is to be called just although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice Leaving the question of names about which we are not going to quarrel and having already delineated three sources of error we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory — One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear

Cle Quite right

Ath There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires and a third of hopes which aimed at true opinion about the best The latter being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions and for these five we will make laws of two kinds

Cle What are the two kinds?

Ath There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit or sometimes both with violence and deceit the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity

Cle Naturally

Ath And now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the Gods and concerning traitors, and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government A man may very likely commit some of these crimes either in a state of madness or when affected by disease or under the influence of extreme old age or in a fit of childish wantonness himself no better than a child And if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate and he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another but he shall be exempt from other penalties unless he have slain some one and have on his hands the stain of blood And in that case he shall go to another land and country and there dwell for a year and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law

¹ Cf Republic ii 430 *supra* i 626 ff

shall not come under the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have defiled of their brethren, or of their children. [509] And he who is disobedient shall be just liable to the law concerning impiety which relates to these matters. If any one is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the murdered person before dying freely forgives the murderer let him undergo the punishment which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide, and as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws—he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life, and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother undergo many deaths. How can he, whom, alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this—how can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father or his mother. But if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only defends himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger. Or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a stranger in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of homicide to another under the idea that his act was involuntary let the perpetrator of the deed undergo a punishment and remain in exile for a year according to law.

Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of every kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and covetousness, and jealousies.

Cle Very good.

1st Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various kinds. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the soul maddened by desire [80] and this is most commonly found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass of mankind. I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never to be satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the false praise of wealth which is bruted about both among Hellenes and barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should be spoken in all states—namely that riches are for the sake of the body as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence. This argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately and then there would be no murders in states requiring to be purged away by other murders. But now as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of the worst trials for voluntary homicide. A second cause is ambition this creates jealousies, which are troublesome companions, abate all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust fear which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them. Let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general and I must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by many and has been received by them from those who are learned in the mysteries. they say that such deeds will be punished in the world below and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will pay the natural penalty which is due to the sufferer and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit murder believes this, and is made by the mere prelude to dread such a penalty there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if he will not lis-

sion which may be justly said to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary [867] at the same time they are neither of them any thing more than a likeness or shadow of either. He who treasures up his anger and avenges himself not immediately and at the moment but with insidious design and after an interval is like the voluntary but he who does not treasure up his anger and takes vengeance on the instant and without malice prepense approaches to the involuntary and yet even he is not altogether involuntary but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary wherefore about homicides committed in hot blood there is a difficulty in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard them respectively as likenesses only of the voluntary and involuntary and to distinguish them accordingly as they are done with or without premeditation. And we should make the penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation and lighter for those who do not premeditate but smite upon the instant for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely this shall be the rule of our laws.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Let us proceed.—If any one slays a free man with his own hand and the deed be done in a moment of anger and without premeditation let the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide would have suffered and also undergo an exile of two years that he may learn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion yet with premeditation shall in other respects suffer as the former and to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years—his punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of their return shall be on this wise (and here the law has difficulty in determining exactly for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the law to be the worse may really be the less cruel and he who is judged the less cruel may be really the worse and may have executed the murder in a more savage manner whereas the other may have been gentler. But in general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of all these things the guardians of the law must take cognisance).—When a homicide of either kind has completed his term of exile the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land these during the interval shall have informed themselves of the

actions of the criminals and they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception [868] and the homicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned home any one of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed let him be an exile, and return no more or if he returns let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification but if he kills the slave of another in anger he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And if any homicide is disobedient to the law and without purification pollutes the agora or the games or the temples he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permuting him and the murderer with him and may compel the one to exact and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications and the accuser shall himself receive the fine in accordance with the law. If a slave in a fit of passion kills his master the kindred of the deceased man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they please and they will be pure or if he kills a freeman who is not his master the owner shall give up the slave to the relations of the deceased and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is a rare occurrence but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in a moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows or some other violence the slayer shall undergo the same purification as in other cases and be exiled during three years but when the exile returns the wife shall separate from the husband and the husband from the wife and they shall never afterwards beget children together or live under the same roof or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife or the wife her husband the slayer shall undergo the same purification and the term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has committed any such crime returns let him have no communication in sacred rites with his children neither let him sit at the same table with them and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister they shall undergo purification and exile as was the case with parents who killed their offspring they

be slain at some time or other by his children — if a mother he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages for where the blood of a family has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homestead soul which did the deed has given life for life [S. 3] and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some fatal ty to deprive his father or mother or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose for him the earthly law gives legislates as follows — There shall be the same proclamations about outdavy and there shall be the same surcues which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men as they say is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and irreparable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irreparable and intolerable shame but who from sloth or want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone and none shall be laid by their side they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their interment. And if a be it of burden or other an mal cause the death of anyone except in the case of anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder and the wardens of the country such and so many as the

kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them and let them cast it beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods — whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him [S. 74] or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border as has been said about the animals.

If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown and after a diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the previous cases, and the same interdiction on the murderer and having proceeded against him they shall proclaim in the agora by a herald, that he who has slain such and such a person and has been convicted of murder shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered, he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let this one law then be laid down by us about murder and let cases of this sort be so regarded.

And now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the murderer is rightly free from guilt — If a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal and he take and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator and be guiltless in the eye of the law or if a person kill another in warding off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong he shall assuredly be guiltless.

Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man having which he can and without which if he unfortunately be without them he cannot live and also concerning the punishments which are to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the nurture and education of the body we have spoken before and next in order we have to speak of deeds of violence voluntary and involuntary which men do to one another these we will now distinguish as far as we are able, according to their nature and number and determine what will be the suitable penalties of each and assign to them their proper place

ten let the following law be declared and registered against him [871]

Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges and he shall not pollute the temples or the agora or the harbours or any other place of meeting whether he is forbidden of men or not for the law which represents the whole state forbids him and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him And if a cousin or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side does not prosecute the homicide when he ought and have him proclaimed an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of men against him and in the second place he shall be hable to be prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead And he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lora-tion and any others which the God commands in cases of this kind Let him have proclamation made, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice according to the law Now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who these Gods are and what should be the true manner of instituting such trials with due regard to religion the guardians of the law aided by the interpreters and the prophets, and the God shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law The cause shall have the same judges¹ who are appointed to decide in the case of those who plunder temples Let him who is convicted be punished with death and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man for this would be shameless as well as unpious But if he fly and will not stand his trial let him fly for ever or if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man's country let any relation of the deceased or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him kill him with impunity or bind and deliver him to those among the judges of the case who are magistrates that they may put him to death And let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial

¹ Cf. 855.

But if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial

[872] If a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the death of another and is the author of the deed in intention and design and he continues to dwell in the city having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder let him be tried in the same way except in what relates to the sureties and also if he be found guilty his body after execution may have burial in his native land but in all other respects his case shall be as the former and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen or a citizen a stranger or a slave a slave there shall be no difference as touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance, except in the matter of sureties and these as has been said shall be required of the actual murderer only and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a freeman voluntarily either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the public executioner take him in the direction of the sepulchre, to a place whence he can see the tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive, let him put him to death And if any one kills a slave who has done no wrong because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder as he would have done if he had slain a citizen There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. If for example, there should be murders of kinsmen either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen or by their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often happen in ill regulated and ill-educated states and may perhaps occur even in a country where a man would not expect to find them we must repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable For the myth or saying or whatever we ought to call it, has been plainly set forth by priests of old they have pronounced that the justice which guards and avenges the blood of kindred follows the law of retaliation and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done He who has slain a father shall himself

intention to slay another who is not his enemy and whom the law does not permit him to slay and he wounds him, [§77] but is unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be punished—he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow and the other from an accursed fate and calamity—as a thank-offering to this deity and in order not to oppose his will—in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain in the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister and is found guilty death shall be the penalty. And if a husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo perpetual exile, if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the guardians shall take care of their property and have charge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a misfortune has no children, the kindred of the exiled man to the degree of sons of cousins, both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after taking counsel with the guardians of the law and the priests, shall appoint a son-in-law to be the head of the house, considering and reason that no house of all the 5043 belong to the inhabitants or to the whole family but is the public and private property of the state. Now the state should seek to have its houses as bold and happy as possible. And if one of its houses be unfortunate, and stained with impurity and the owner leave no posterity but dies unmarried, or married and childless, his offered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or against his fellow citizens, or which death is the penalty distinctly laid down in the law or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first

of all be purified and undergo expiation according to law and then let the kinsmen of the house as we were just now saying and the guardians of the law [§8, §3] meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest repute for virtue and also for good fortune in which there are a number of sons from that family let them take one and introduce him to the father and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake of the omen let him be called so, that he may be the continuor of their family the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites with better fortune than his father had and when they have made this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law and the offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when calamities such as these overtake him.

Now the boundaries of some things do not touch one another but there is a borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. And we were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and come in between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the amount of the injury if the wound be curable, or if incurable, four times the amount of the injury or if the wound be curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding another injures not only the sufferer but also the city and makes him incapable of defending his country against the enemy he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war or if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. The compensation for the injury whether to be twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. And if, in like manner a brother wounds a brother the parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to the parents, as is natural and if the estimate be disputed then the kinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot, they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And when similar charges of wounding are brought by

in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided as homicides were divided—into those which are involuntary and which are given in passion or from fear and those inflicted voluntarily and with premeditation. Concerning all this we must make some such proclamation as the following—*Man and must have laws and conform to them* [875] or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for human society or knowing always able and willing to do what is best. In the first place there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art or politics is concerned not with private but with public good (for public good binds together states but private only distracts them) and that both the public and private good as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first considered. In the second place although a person knows in the abstract that this is true yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible power he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state and the private good as secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason and will bring these to the front obscuring the juster and better and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth he would have no need of laws to rule over him: for there is no law or order which is above knowledge nor can mind without impiety be deemed the subject or slave of any man but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind true and free and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much and therefore we must choose law and order which are second best. These look at things as they exist for the most part only and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I have.

And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked in all such

cases—What did he wound or whom or how or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine all these things or not to determine any of them is alike impossible. There is one particular which they must determine in all cases—the question of fact. And then again [876] that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases but should himself decide about all of them small or great is next to impossible.

Cle. Then what is to be the inference?

Alc. The inference is that some things should be left to courts of law, others the legislator must decide for himself.

Cle. And what ought the legislator to decide and what ought he to leave to the courts of law?

Alc. I may reply that in a state in which the courts are bad and mute because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes clandestinely or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy as in a theatre clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator—I say that then there is a very serious evil which affects the whole state. Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts but where the necessity exists the legislator should only allow them to ordain the penalties for the small offences if the state for which he is legislating be of this character he must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good courts and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far more educated than ours would be able to determine, assigning to each offence what is due both to the perpetrator and to the sufferer. We believe those for whom we are legislating to be best able to judge and therefore to them the greater part may be left. At the same time as I have often said we should exhibit to the judges as we have done the outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an excellent practice which we observed before and which now that we are resuming the work of legislation may with advantage be repeated by us.

Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms—If anyone has a purpose and

Cf. v. 734, 12, 70

Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 3, 2, 1253, 29-33

* Cf. iii. 691, iv. 712, 713, 716

* Cf. *Statesman*—97

Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms with one another and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter for them the legislator legislates of necessity and in the hope that there may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father or mother or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath of the Gods also, [831] or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world below but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst that can happen to men far worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no prevention for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of mothers, or unpius hands lifted up against parents and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows:—If a man dare to strike his father or his mother or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any one who is at hand come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place in the games but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue, shall have praise, and if he do not come, blame. And if a slave come to the rescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue, let him receive one strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the agora if the occurrence take place in the agora or if some here in the city beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the city who is in residence shall punish him or if in the country then the commanders of the wardens of the country. If those who are near at the time be inhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or women, let them come to the rescue and denounce him as the unpius one and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the God of kindred and of an estors, according to law. And if any one is found guilty of assault

cf. -6a.

ing a parent, let him in the first place be forever banished from the city into the country and let him abstain from the temples and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city until he is purified for he should consider that he has become tainted by a curse. And if he disobey the law and pollutes the city and the temples contrary to law and one of the magistrates sees him and does not indict him, when he gives in his account this omission shall be a most serious charge.

[832] If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let any one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains and inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases but having punished him he must surrender him to his master according to law and not deprive him of his property. Let the law be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be released. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation to one another.

BOOK X

[833] AND now having spoken of assaults let us sum up all acts of violence under a single law which shall be as follows:—No one shall take or carry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he use anything which is his neighbour's without the consent of the owner for these are the offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are done against religion and especially great when in violation of public and holy rites, or of the partly-common rites in which tribes and phratries share [834] and in the second degree great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchres, and in the third degree (not to re-

children against their parents those who are more than sixty years of age having children of their own not adopted, shall be required to decide and if any one is convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die or suffer some other punishment either greater than death [879] or at any rate, not much less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law. If a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman the owner of the slave shall give him up to the wounded man who may do as he pleases with him and if he do not give him up he shall himself make good the injury. And if any one says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring together let him argue the point and if he is cast he shall pay for the wrong three times over but if he gains his case the freeman who conspired with the slave shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. And if any one unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. In such a case the judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of children suing their parents and they shall estimate the amount of the injury.

All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of violence and every man woman or child ought to consider that the elder has the precedence of the younger in honour both among the Gods and also among men who would live in security and happiness. Wherefore it is a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted by a younger in the city and it is reasonable that a young man when struck by an elder should lightly endure his anger laying up in store for himself a like honour when he is old. Let this be the law—Every one shall reverence his elder in word and deed he shall respect any one who is twenty years older than himself whether male or female regarding him or her as his father or mother and he shall abstain from laying hands on any one who is of an age to have been his father or his mother out of reverence to the Gods who preside over birth similarly he shall keep his hands from a stranger whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows either as the aggressor or in self defence. If he thinks that some stranger has struck him out of wantonness or insolence and ought to be punished he shall take him to the wardens of the city but let him not strike him that the stranger may

be kept far away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen and let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of Strangers and in case the stranger appears to have struck the citizen unjustly let them inflict upon him as many blows with the scourge as he has himself inflicted and quell his presumption. But if he be innocent they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him [880] and let them both go. If a person strikes another of the same age or somewhat older than himself who has no children whether he be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young man let the person struck defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands only. He who being more than forty years of age dares to fight with another whether he be the aggressor or in self defence shall be regarded as rude and ill mannered and slavish—this will be a disgraceful punishment and therefore suitable to him. The obedient nature will readily yield to such exhortations but the disobedient who heeds not the prelude shall have the law ready for him—if any man smite another who is older than himself either by twenty or by more years in the first place he who is at hand not being younger than the combatants nor their equal in age shall separate them or be disgraced according to law but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or still older relative. Further let him who dares to smite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said and if he be found guilty let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year or if the judges approve of a longer period their decision shall be final. But if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting and he who is found guilty in such a suit if he be a stranger but not resident, shall be imprisoned during a period of two years and a metic who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years unless the court assign him a longer term. And let him who was present in any of these cases and did not assist according to law be punished if he be of the highest class by paying a fine of a mina or if he be of the second class of fifty drachmas or if of the third class by a fine of thirty drachmas or if he be of the fourth class by a fine of twenty drachmas and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form the court in such cases.

¹ Cf. *Republic* v. 465

earth and stones only which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe.

Cle One such teacher O Stranger would be had enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse.

Alc Well, then what shall we say or do?—Shall we assume that some one is accusing us among unholy men, [887] who are trying to escape from the effect of our legislation and that they say of us—How dreadful that you should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! Shall we make a defence of our selves? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the law? For the discourse will certainly extend us great length, if we are to treat the impudently disposed as they desire, partly denigrating to them at some length the things of which they demand an explanation, partly making them afraid or dissatisfied, and then proceed to the requisite enactments.

Cle Yes, Stranger—but then how often have we repeated already that on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length for who is at our heels—as the saying goes, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men do. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest prelude of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry let us unreservedly consider the whole matter summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess.

Alc Seeing you thus in earnest, I would fain offer up a prayer that I may succeed—but I must proceed at once. Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument, I speak of those who will not believe the tales which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard them in the sacrificial prayers and seen sights accompanying them—sights and sounds delightful to children—and their parents during the sacrifices showing an intense earnestness on behalf of their children and of themselves, and with eager interest taking to the Gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced.

Cle *Apology* A. B. C. 19, ff. 11, 65-8.

of their existence who likewise see and hear the prostrations and invocations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians at the rising and setting of the sun and moon in all the vicissitudes of life, not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence and no suspicion of their non-existence when men knowing all these things, [888] despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the Gods? Yet the attempt must be made for it would be unseemly that one half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure and the other half in their indignation at such persons. Our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them and gently reason with him, smothering our anger—O my son, we will say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which you now hold. Wait awhile, and do not attempt to judge at present of the highest things and that is the highest of which you now think, nothing—to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance, and about which I cannot be deceived—You and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old. The two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many—the notion, I mean, that the Gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and the other notion that they do take heed of them but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. As to the opinion about the Gods which may some day become dear to you, I advise you go wait and consider if it be true or not ask of others, and also of all the legislator. In the meantime take care that you do not offend against the Gods. For the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.

Cle Our address, Stranger thus far is excellent.

peat the acts formerly mentioned) when insults are offered to parents the fourth kind of violence is when any one regardless of the authority of the rulers takes or carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them not having their consent and the fifth kind is when the violation of the civil rights of an individual demands reparation. There should be a common law embracing all these cases. For we have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege whether fraudulent or violent and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms—No one who in obedience to the laws believed that there were Gods ever intentionally did any unholy act or uttered any unlawful word but he who did must have supposed one of three things—either that they did not exist—which is the first possibility or secondly that if they did they took no care of man or thirdly that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their purpose by sacrifices and prayers.

Cleitias What shall we say or do to these persons?

Athenian Stranger My good friend let us first hear the jests which I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us.

Cle What jests?

Ath They will make some irreverent speech of this sort—O inhabitants of Athens and Sparta and Cnosus they will reply in that you speak truly for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods while others as you say are of opinion that they do not care about us and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim as you yourself allowed in the matter of laws that before you are hard upon us and threaten us you should argue with us and convince us—you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences and also that they are too good to be unrighteous or to be propitiated or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear such things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets and orators and prophets and priests and by innumerable others the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts but upon doing them and atoning for them. When law

givers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us and show us the existence of Gods if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer and who knows but that we shall hearken to you? If then our request is a fair one please to accept our challenge.

Cle But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?

[886] *Ath* How would you prove it?

Cle How? In the first place the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe and the fair order of the seasons and the division of them into years and months furnish proofs of their existence and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.

Ath I fear my sweet friend though I will not say that I much regard the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. For you do not understand the nature of their complaint and you fancy that they rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.

Cle Why Stranger what other reason is there?

Ath One which you who live in a different atmosphere would never guess.

Cle What is it?

Ath A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom.

Cle What do you mean?

Ath At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state as I am informed refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence I should not like to be severe upon them because they are ancient but looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents I cannot praise them or think that they are useful or at all true. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the Gods. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words when you and I argue for the existence of the Gods and produce the sun moon stars and earth claiming for them a divine being if we would listen to the afore said philosophers we should say that they are

like exist by nature, and no less than nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason as you appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree with you in thinking

Ath Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias but are not these things when spoken to a multitude hard to be understood not to mention that they take up a dismal length of time?

Cle Why Stranger shall we, whose patience failed not when drinking, or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of discoursing about the Gods, and about divine things? And the greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once written down [891] are always at rest they can be put to the test at any future time, and therefore if on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for apprehension about them because any man however dull can go over them and consider them again and again nor if they are tedious but useful is there any reason of religion as it seems to me, in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power

Megillus Stranger I like what Cleinias is saying.

Ath Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes for if impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say throughout the world, there would have been no need for any vindication of the existence of the Gods—but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself?

Meg There is no more proper champion of them

Ath Well then tell me, Cleinias—for I must ask you to be my partner—does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? These he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards and this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his meaning, but is what he really means

Cle Very true.

Ath Then, my Hea en we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators and I would have you examine their arguments with the utmost care for this impiety is a very serious matter they not only make a bad and mistaken use of argument, but they lead away the minds of others that is my opinion of them.

Cl. P. marcus 46

Cle You are right but I should like to know how this happens

Ath I fear that the argument may seem singular

Cle Do not hesitate Stranger I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation But if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that there are Gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way my good sir

Ath Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods.

[892] *Cle* Still I do not understand you.

Ath Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul especially in what relates to her origin they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body?

Cle Certainly

Ath Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them these will follow and will be under the government of art and mind

Cle But why is the word "nature" wrong?

Ath Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element and not fire or air then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body but not otherwise

Cle You are quite right.

Ath Shall we, then take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed?

Cle By all means

Ath Let us be on our guard lest this most deceptive argument with its youthful looks,

Ath Quite true, Megillus and Cleinias but I am afraid that we have unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine

Cle What doctrine do you mean?

Ath The wisest of all doctrines in the opinion of many

Cle I wish that you would speak plainer

Ath The doctrine that all things do become, have become and will become, some by nature some by art and some by chance

Cle Is not that true?

Ath Well philosophers are probably right at any rate we may as well follow in their track [88g] and examine what is the meaning of them and their disciples

Cle By all means

Ath They say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance the lesser of art which receiving from nature the greater and primal creations moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial

Cle How is that?

Ath I will explain my meaning still more clearly They say that fire and water and earth and air all exist by nature and chance and none of them by art and that as to the bodies which come next in order—earth, and sun and moon and stars—they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them—of hot with cold or of dry with moist or of soft with hard and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created and all that is in the heaven as well as animals and all plants and all the seasons come from these elements not by the action of mind as they say or of any God or from art but as I was saying by nature and chance only Art sprang up afterwards and out of these mortal and of mortal birth and produced in play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another such as music and painting create and their companion arts And there are other arts which have a serious purpose and these co operate with nature such for example as medicine and husbandry and gymnastic And they say that politics cooperate with nature but in a less degree and have more of art also that legislation is entirely a work of art and is based on assumptions which are not true

Cle How do you mean?

Ath In the first place my dear friend these people would say that the Gods exist not by nature but by art and by the laws of states, which are different in different places according to the agreement of those who make them and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature [89a] but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made—These my friends are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers which find a way into the minds of youth They are told by them that the highest right is might and in this way the young fall into impieties under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine and hence arise factions these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature that is to live in real dominion over others and not in legal subjection to them

Cle What a dreadful picture Stranger have you given and how great is the injury which is thus inflicted on young men to the ruin both of states and families!

Ath True Cleinias but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind proclaiming that if they will not say and think that the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended generally to the honourable the just and to all the highest things and to all that relates to virtue and vice) and if they will not make their actions conform to the copy which the law gives them then he who refuses to obey the law shall die or suffer stripes and bonds or privation of citizenship or in some cases be punished by loss of property and exile? Should he not rather when he is making laws for men at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?

Cle Why Stranger if such persuasion be at all possible then a legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading men he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion that there are Gods and of all those other truths which you were just now mentioning he ought to support the law and also art and acknowledge that both

Cf Gorgias 433

LAWS X

Cle Certainly

Ask And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most excellent?

Cle I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others.

Ask Very good, but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying?

Cle What are they?

Ask When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct.

Cle What was the error?

Ask According to the true order the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely enough termed the ninth by us.

Cle What do you mean?

Ask I mean this: when one thing changes another and that another of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other and that again other and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, [895] must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle?

Cle Very true, and I quite agree.

Ask Or to put the question in another way making answer to ourselves—If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?

Cle Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in themselves.

Ask Then we must say that self-motion be the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.

Cle Quite true.

Ask At this stage of the argument let us put a question.

Cle What question?

Ask If we were to see this power existing in any earthly watery or fiery substance, simple or compound—how should we describe it?

Cle You mean to ask whether we should call

it *Taurus* or

it *Phaenias* or

such a self-moving power life?

Ask I do.

Cle Certainly we should.

Ask And when we see soul in anything must we not do the same—must we not admit that this is life?

Cle We must.

Ask And now I beseech you, reflect,—you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things?

Cle What do you mean?

Ask I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name,—these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about any thing.

Cle How two?

Ask Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I mean in this way.

Cle How?

Ask Number like some other things is capable of being divided into equal parts when thus divided, number is named even, and the definition of the name "even" is "number divisible into two equal parts."

Cle True.

Ask I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition—in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak of the same thing calling even—the number which is divided into two equal parts.

Cle Quite true.

Ask And what is the definition of that which is named "soul"? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already [896] given—the motion which can move itself?

Cle You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?

Ask Yes and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of all change and motion in all things?

Cle Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the eldest of all things.

Ask And is not that motion which is produced in another by reason of another but

beguiling us old men, give us the slip and make a laughing stock of us. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater and fail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a rapid river, and I being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers take upon me the duty of making the attempt first by myself leaving you in safety on the bank. I am to examine whether the river is passable by older men like yourselves and if such appears to be the case then I shall invite you to follow and my experience will help to convey you across but if the river is impassable by you then there will have been no danger to any body but myself—would not that seem to be a very fair proposal? I mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be too much for you out of your depth and beyond your strength and I should be afraid that the stream of my questions might create in you who [893] are not in the habit of answering giddiness and confusion of mind and hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise. I think therefore that I had better first ask the questions and then answer them myself while you listen in safety in that way I can carry on the argument until I have completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body.

Cle. Excellent Stranger and I hope that you will do as you propose.

Ask. Come then and if ever we are to call upon the Gods let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows—Some one says to me O Stranger are all things at rest and nothing in motion or is the exact opposite of this true or are some things in motion and others at rest?—To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others at rest. And do not things which move move in a place and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a place? Certainly. And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one? You mean to say we shall rejoin that those things which rest at the centre move in one place, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to be at rest? Yes. And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which

might be thought an impossibility that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. Very true. And when you speak of bodies moving in many places you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another and sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon their axis and whenever they meet anything if it be stationary they are divided by it but if they get in the midst between bodies which are approaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions, they unite with them. I admit the truth of what you are saying. Also when they unite they grow and when they are divided they waste away—that is supposing the constitution of each to remain or if that fails then there is a second reason of their dissolution.

And when are all things created and how? [894] Clearly, they are created when the first principle receives increase and attains to the second dimension and from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this and after reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation only when it rests has it real existence but when passing into another state it is destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the exception my friends, of two?

Cle. Which are they?

Ask. Just the two with which our present enquiry is concerned.

Cle. Speak plainer.

Ask. I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?

Cle. Very true.

Ask. Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things but not to move itself—that is one kind and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things working in composition and decomposition by increase and diminution and generation and destruction—that is also one of the many kinds of motion.

Cle. Granted.

Ask. And we will assume that which moves other and is changed by other to be the ninth and that which changes itself and others and is co-incident with every action and every passion and is the true principle of change and motion in all that is—that we shall be inclined to call the tenth.

does no account to our immortality

Cle It does us great credit

1st And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one part, nor in order nor according to size or proportion, may be said to be akin to senseless and fort?

Cle That is most true

1st Then, after what has been said, there is no diversity in disorderly things, the same soul carries all things round, either the best sort or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven.

Cle And judging from what has been said, Stranger there would be imperty in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens.

1st You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now let me ask you another question.

Cle What are you going to ask?

1st If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?

Cle Certainly

1st Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all.

Cle Which will you take?

1st Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is circumscribed around them all, but is perceived by mind and therefore by mind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point.

Cle What is that?

1st If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong, in supposing one of three alternatives.

Cle What are they?

1st Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body like the soul which carries us about every way (899) or the soul proceeds herself with an external body of fire or air as some affirm, and violently propels body by body or thirdly she is without such a body but guides the sun by some extraordinary and wonderful power.

Cle Yes, certainly the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways.

1st And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the

sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from within or in this or that way ought by every man to be deemed a God?

Cle Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.

1st And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and months and seasons, must we not say in like manner that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence—and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?

Cle No one, Stranger would be such a madman.

1st And now Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.

Cle What terms?

1st Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly or if he be not able to say anything better then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods.—Let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are Gods.

Cle Certainly—quite enough, Stranger

1st Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs. To him we say—O thou best of men, in believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. But the tortures of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are celebrated both by poets and prose writers—these draw you aside from your natural piety (900) Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith—you have known or heard or been yourself an eye witness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by such criminal means from small beginnings attaining to sovereignty and the pinnacle of greatness and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your relatives and so from some

Cle *2nd* *2nd* 966, 967

Cle *Republic* ii. 364.

never has any self moving power at all being in truth the change of an inanimate body to be reckoned second or by any lower number which you may prefer?

Cle Exactly

Ath Then we are right and speak the most perfect and absolute truth when we say that the soul is prior to the body and that the body is second and comes afterwards and is born to obey the soul which is the ruler?

Cle Nothing can be more true

Ath Do you remember our old admission that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

Cle Certainly

Ath Then characters and manners and wishes and reasonings and true opinions and reflections and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies if the soul is prior to the body

Cle To be sure

Ath In the next place must we not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil base and honourable just and unjust and of all other opposites if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

Cle We must

Ath And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move however moving must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

Cle Of course

Ath One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you at any rate we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good and the other of evil

Cle Very true

Ath Yes very true the soul then directs all things in heaven and earth and sea by her movements and these are described by the terms—will [897] consideration attention deliberation opinion true and false joy and sorrow confidence fear hatred love and other primary motions akin to these which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances and guide all things to growth and decay to composition and decomposition and to the qualities which accompany them such as heat and cold heaviness and lightness hardness and softness blackness and whiteness bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses herself a goddess when truly receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their happiness but when she is the companion of folly she does the very contrary of all this Shall we assume so much or do we still entertain doubts?

Cle There is no room at all for doubt

Ath Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and earth and the whole world?—that it is a principle of wisdom and virtue or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that we make answer as follows—

Cle How would you answer?

Ath If my friend we say that the whole path and movement of heaven and of all that is therein is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws then as is plain we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path

Cle True

Ath But if the world moves wildly and irregularly then the evil soul guides it

Cle True again

Ath Of what nature is the movement of mind?—To this question it is not easy to give an intelligent answer and therefore I ought to assist you in framing one

Cle Very good

Ath Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the sun making ourselves darkness at midday—I mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes or know adequately the nature of mind—it will be safer to look at the image only

Cle What do you mean?

Ath Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles this I will bring to your recollection and will then make the answer on behalf of us all

Cle That will be excellent

Ath You will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion?

Cle I do

Ath And that of things in motion some were moving in one place [898] and others in more than one?

Cle Yes

Ath Of these two kinds of motion that which moves in one place must move about a centre like globes made in a lathe and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind

Cle What do you mean?

Ath In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner in and about the same and in relation to the same and according to one proportion and order and are like the motion of a globe we invented a fair image which

Cf Republic vii. 545

Ask Then the alternative which remains is that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, [902] they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters—what other alternative is there but the opposite of their knowing?

Cle There is none

Ask And O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care or that they know and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

Cle Impossible

Ask Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?

Cle That is not to be denied

Ask And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?

Cle Certainly

Ask And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small—in either case it would not be natural for the Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners to neglect us—There is also a further consideration

Cle What is it?

Ask Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty

Cle What do you mean?

Ask I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling and taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites

Cle Far more

Ask Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole—how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are lesser?

Cle Decidedly not well

Ask No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other such class if they neglected the small and regarded only the great—as the builders say the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser

Cle Of course not

Ask Let us not, then, deem God inferior to

Cle Timaeus 42

Cle Phaedo 62

human workmen who in proportion to their skill finish and perfect their works small as well as great [903] by one and the same art or that God, the wisest of beings who is both willing and able to take care is like a lazy good for nothing or a coward who turns his back upon labour and gives no thought to smaller and easier matters but to the greater only

Cle Never Stranger let us admit a supposition about the Gods which is both impious and false

Ask I think that we have now argued enough with him who delights to accuse the Gods of neglect

Cle Yes

Ask He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation

Cle What consolation will you offer him?

Ask Let us say to the youth—The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. Over these down to the least fraction of them ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own unhappy man which, however little, contributes to the whole and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed and that you are created for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you are ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the universe as far as the laws of the common creation admit. Now as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself or through the influence of another soul all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion

Cle In what way do you mean?

Ask In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods if any one were to form or fashion all things

want of reasoning power and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them you have come to believe that they exist indeed but have no thought or care of human things. Now that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety and that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure away the evil before it arrives we will add another argument to that originally addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias answer for the young man as you did before and if any impediment comes in our way I will take the word out of your mouths and carry you over the river as I did just now.

Cle Very good do as you say and we will help you as well as we can.

Ath There will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was present and heard what was said that they are perfectly good and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them.¹

Cle No doubt he heard that.

Ath Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to be temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?

Cle Certainly.

Ath Yes, and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?

Cle True.

Ath And the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable?

Cle To be sure.

Ath And the one like other meaner things is a human quality but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?

Cle That again is what everybody will admit.

Ath But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? What do you think?

Cle Decidedly not.

Ath They rank under the opposite class?

Cle Yes.

[901] *Ath* And their opposites therefore would fall under the opposite class?

Cle Yes.

Ath But are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good qualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones?

Cle And the comparison is a most just one.

¹ Cf. 809.

Ath Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which he himself hates?—he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be tolerated for a moment.

Cle Of course not. How could he have?

Ath Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect he who acts in this way whether he be God or man must act from one of two principles.

Cle What are they?

Ath Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole or if he knows that they are of consequence and he neglects them his neglect must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For surely when it is impossible for him to take care of all he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these things great or small which a God or some inferior being might be wanting in strength or capacity to manage?

Cle Certainly not.

Ath Now then let us examine the offenders who both alike confess that there are Gods but with a difference—the one saying that they may be appeased and the other that they have no care of small matters. There are three of us and two of them and we will say to them—In the first place you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge—do you admit this?

Cle Yes.

Ath And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?

Cle They will of course admit this also.

Ath And surely we three and they two—five in all—have acknowledged that they are good and perfect?

Cle Assuredly.

Ath But if they are such as we conceive them to be can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.

Cle Most true.

Ath Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever negligent for there is no cowardice in them.

Cle That is very true.

Ask Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, [902] they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters—what other alternative is there but the opposite of their knowing?

Cle There is none.

Ask And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

Cle Impossible.

Ask Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?

Cle That is not to be denied.

Ask And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?

Cle Certainly.

Ask And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small—in either case it would not be natural for the Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners, to neglect us.—There is also a further consideration.

Cle What is it?

Ask Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty.

Cle What do you mean?

Ask I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling and taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites.

Cle Far more.

Ask Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole—how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are lesser?

Cle Decidedly not well.

Ask No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great—as the bawlers say the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser.

Cle Of course not.

Ask Let us not, then, deem God ignorant.

Cle I mean 42.

Cle Phaedo 62.

human workmen, who in proportion to their skill finish and perfect their works small as well as great, [903] by one and the same art, or that God, the wisest of beings who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy good for nothing or a coward, who turns his back upon labour and gives no thought to smaller and easier matters, but in the greater only.

Cle Never Stranger let us admit a supposition about the Gods which is both impious and false.

Ask I think that we have now argued enough with him who delights to accuse the Gods of neglect.

Cle Yes.

Ask He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation.

Cle What consolation will you offer him?

Ask Let us say to the youth—The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. Over these, down to the least fraction of them ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you are ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the universe, as far as the laws of the common creation admit. Now as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.

Cle In what way do you mean?

Ask In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods. If any one were to form or fashion all things

without any regard to the whole—if for example he formed a living element of water out of fire instead of forming many things out of one or one out of many in regular order attaining to a first or [904] second or third birth¹ the transmutation would have been infinite but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task

Cle How so?

Alc I will explain —When the kings saw that our actions had life and that there was much virtue in them and much vice and that the soul and body although not like the Gods of popular opinion eternal yet having once come into existence were indestructible (for if either of them had been destroyed there would have been no generation of living beings) and when he observed that the good of the soul was ever by nature designed to profit men and the evil to harm them—he seeing all this contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole And he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room But the formation of qualities he left to the wills of individuals For every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul

Cle Yes that is probably true

Alc Then all things which have a soul change and possess in themselves a principle of change and in changing move according to law and to the order of destiny natures which have undergone a lesser change move less and on the earth's surface but those which have suffered more change and have become more criminal sink into the abyss that is to say into Hades and other places in the world below of which the very names terrify men and which they picture to themselves as in a dream both while alive and when released from the body And whenever the soul receives more of good or evil from her own energy and the strong influence of others—when she has communion with divine virtue and becomes divine she is carried into another and better place which is perfect in holiness but when she has communion with evil then she also changes the place of her life

This is the justice of the Gods who inhabit Olympus

O youth or young man who fancy that you are

¹ Cf *Timæus* 42. *Odyssey* xix 43

neglected by the Gods know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls or if better to the better and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like [905] may fitly suffer at the hands of like This is the justice of heaven which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained take good heed thereof for it will be sure to take heed of you If you say — I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth or I am high and will fly up to heaven you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty either here or in the world below or in some still more savage place whither you shall be conveyed This is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy and in their actions as in a mirror you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole And thinkest thou bold man that thou needest not to know this?—he who knows it not can never form any true idea of the happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational discourse respecting either If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods then will God help you but should you desire to hear more listen to what we say to the third opponent if you have any understanding whatsoever For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods and that they care for men —The other notion that they are appeased by the wicked and take gifts is what we must not concede to any one and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power

Cle Very good let us do as you say

Alc Well then by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me—if they are to be propitiated how are they to be propitiated? Who are they and what is their nature? Must they not be at least rulers who have to order unceasingly the whole heaven?

Cle True

Alc And to what earthly rulers can they be compared or who to them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they characters of contending pairs of steeds or pilots of vessels? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies or they might be likened to physicians providing against the

diseases which [906] make war upon the body or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons on the growth of plants or perhaps to shepherds of flocks For as we are known to see the world to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us which requires marvellous watchfulness and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, although some vestige of them may occasionally be discerned among mankind But upon this earth we know that there dwell souls possessing an immortal spirit, who may be compared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs or shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters for they in like manner as the voices of the wicked declare, prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity And this too, which is termed dishonesty is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence in years or seasons of the year and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice.

Cle. Qui est true

Alc. What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them? As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks Must not he who maintains that the Gods can be persuaded at give this?

Cle. Precisely so

Alc. And to which of the above mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that they are like pilots who are themselves turned away from their duty by libations of wine and the savour of fat, and at last overturn both ship and sailors?

Cle. As readily not

Alc. And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?

Cle. That would be a fearful image of the Gods.

Alc. Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds and no one would compare them to dogs who have

Cle. *Republ.* i. 3-5.

been silenced by wolves

Cle. A thing not to be spoken of

[907] Alc. And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests?

Cle. Yes the chiefest

Alc. And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?

Cle. Certainly not nor is such a notion to be endured and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious.

Alc. Then are the three assertions—that the Gods exist, and that they take care of men and that they can never be persuaded to do injustice, not sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?

Cle. You have our entire assent to your words

Alc. I have spoken with vehemence because I am zealous against evil men and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so I would not have the wicked think that, having the superiority in argument, they may do as they please and act according to their various imaginations about the Gods and their zeal has led me to speak too vehemently but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and to be their opposites, the prelude of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain

Cle. So let us hope and even if we have failed the style of our argument will not discredit the lawgiver

Alc. After the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that they must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. And to those who disobey let the law about impiety be as follows—If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed any one who happens to be present shall give information to the magistrates in aid of the law and let the magistrates who first receive the information bring him before the appointed court according to the law and if a magistrate, after receiving information refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws and if any one be cast the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety [908] and let all such criminals be imprisoned There shall be

three prisons in the state the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighbourhood of the agora for the safe keeping of the generality of offenders another is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal council² and is to be called the House of Reformation another to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country shall be called by some name expressive of retribution Now men fall into impiety from three causes which have been already mentioned and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety in all six which are worth distinguishing and should not all have the same punishment For he who does not believe in the Gods and yet has a righteous nature hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice and avoids unrighteous men and loves the righteous But they who besides believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate and have at the same time good memories and quick wits are worse although both of them are unbelievers much less injury is done by the one than by the other The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself if he be not punished But the other who holds the same opinions and is called a clever man, is full of stratagem and deceit—men of this class deal in prophecy and jugglery of all kinds and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the Sophists as they are termed with their ingenious devices There are many kinds of unbelievers but two only for whom legislation is required one the hypocritical sort whose crime is deserving of death many times over while the other needs only bonds and admonition In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more Assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding and not from malice or an evil nature be placed by the judge in the House of Reformation [909] and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens except with members of the nocturnal council and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of their souls health And when the time of their imprisonment has expired if any of them be of

sound mind let him be restored to sane company but if not and if he be condemned a second time let him be punished with death As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that there are no Gods but that they are negligent or to be propitiated but in contempt of mankind conjure the souls of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers and will utterly overthrow individuals and whole houses and states for the sake of money—let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the court to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre of the land and let no freeman ever approach him but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the guardians of the law from the hands of the public slaves and when he is dead let him be cast beyond the borders unburied and if any freeman assist in burying him, let him pay the penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a suit against him But if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens let the guardians of orphans take care of them just as they would of any other orphans from the day on which their father is convicted

In all these cases there should be one law which will make men in general less liable to transgress in word or deed and less foolish because they will not be allowed to practise religious rites contrary to law And let this be the simple form of the law—No man shall have sacred rites in a private house When he would sacrifice let him go to the temples and hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses who see to the sanctity of such things and let him pray himself and let any one who pleases join with him in prayer The reason of this is as follows—Gods and temples are not easily instituted and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty intellect And women especially and men too when they are sick or in danger or in any sort of difficulty or again on their receiving any good fortune [910] have a way of consecrating the occasion by vows sacrifices and promising shrines to Gods demigods and sons of Gods and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions and dreams or remember visions they find in altars and temples the remedies of them and will fill every house and village with them placing them in the open air or wherever they may have had such visions and with a view to all these cases we should obey the law The law has also re-

¹ Cf. *Lu* 921 961

gard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the secret performance of these actions—by raising temp^{ts} and by building altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly with sacrifices and prayers while they are really multiplying their crimes inflicting guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also upon those who permit them, and who are better men than they are and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their impiety which, in a certain sense, is deserved. Assuredly God will not blame the legislator who will enact the following law—No one shall possess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly authorized—supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not guilty of any other great and impious crime—shall be informed against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him to the guardians of the law and let them issue orders that he or she shall carry away their private rites to the public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they comply And if a person be proven guilty of impiety not merely from childish levity but such as grown-up men may be guilty of whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to any Gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure Whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish levity let the guardians of the law determine, before they bring the matter in court and prosecute the offender for impiety

BOOK XI

[13] In the next place dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated The principle of them is very simple—Thou shalt not, if thou canst help touch that which is mine, or remove it—least thin which belongs to me without my consent and may I be of a sound mind, and do to others as I would that they should do to me First, let us speak of treasure trove—As I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure which another has laid up for himself and his family he not being one of my ancestors, nor I fit, fit I should find, such a treasure And may I never have any dealings with those who are filled with d^{emons}, and who in an unworthy manner counsel me to take up the dishonest entrusted to the earth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if I take up the prize, as I should, if I

in justice and virtue of soul, if I abstain and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself for the possession of justice in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth And of many things it is well said—Move not the immovables, and this may be regarded as one of them And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says that such deeds prevent a man from having a family Now as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his without the consent of the depositor violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man—"Take not up that which was not laid down by thee"—of him, I say who despises these regulations, and takes up not small matter which he has not deposited but perhaps a great heap of treasure what he ought to suffer at the hands of the Court, God only knows but I would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city if the occurrence has taken place in the city or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their commanders. When information has been received the city shall send to Delphi, [914] and whatever the God answers about the money and the remover of the money that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle the informer if he be a freeman, shall have the honour of doing rightly and he who informs not, the dishonour of doing wrongly and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. Next in order shall follow a similar law which shall apply equally to matters great and small—If a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property whether intentionally or unintentionally let him who may come upon the left property suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law But if any one defies the law and takes the property home with him, let him, if the thing is of little worth, and the man who takes it a slave, be beaten with many stripes by him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. Or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and a despoiler of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of

the treasure which he has moved to the leaver And if some one accuses another of having any thing which belongs to him whether little or much and the other admits that he has this thing but denies that the property in dispute belongs to the other, if the property be registered with the magistrates according to law the claimant shall summon the possessor who shall bring it before the magistrates and when it is brought into court if it be registered in the public registers to which of the litigants it belonged let him take it and go his way Or if the property be registered as belonging to some one who is not present whoever will offer sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that he will give it up to him shall take it away as the representative of the other But if the property which is deposited be not registered with the magistrates let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the magistrates and if it be an animal which is deposited then he who loses the suit shall pay the magistrates for its keep and they shall determine the cause within three days

Any one who is of sound mind may arrest his own slave and do with him whatever he will of such things as are lawful and he may arrest the runaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his safe keeping And if any one takes away him who is being carried off as a slave intending to liberate him he who is carrying him off shall let him go but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties and if he give them and not without giving them he may take him away but if he take him away after any other manner he shall be deemed guilty of violence and being convicted shall pay as a penalty double the amount of the damages claimed to him who has been deprived of the slave [915] Any man may also carry off a freedman if he do not pay respect or sufficient respect to him who freed him Now the respect shall be that the freedman go three times in the month to the hearth of the person who freed him and offer to do whatever he ought so far as he can and he shall agree to make such a marriage as his former master approves He shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him liberty and what more he has shall belong to his master The freedman shall not remain in the state more than twenty years but like other foreigners² shall go away taking his entire property with him unless he has the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain. If a freedman or any

other stranger has a property greater than the census of the third class at the expiration of thirty days from the day on which this comes to pass he shall take that which is his and go his way, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by the magistrates And if any one disobeys this regulation and is brought into court and convicted he shall be punished with death and his property shall be confiscated Suits about these matters shall take place before the tribes unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid of the accusation either before their neighbours or before judges chosen by them If a man lay claim to any animal or any thing else which he declares to be his let the possessor refer to the seller or to some honest and trustworthy person who has given or in some legitimate way made over the property to him if he be a citizen or a metic sojourning in the city within thirty days or if the property have been delivered to him by a stranger with in five months of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice When goods are exchanged by selling and buying a man shall deliver them and receive the price of them at a fixed place in the agora and have done with the matter but he shall not buy or sell anywhere else nor give credit And if in any other manner or in any other place there be an exchange of one thing for another and the seller give credit to the man who buys from him he must do this on the understanding that the law gives no protection in cases of things sold not in accordance with these regulations³ Again as to contributions any man who likes may go about collecting contributions as a friend among friends but if any difference arises about the collection he is to act on the understanding that the law gives no protection in such cases [916] He who sells anything above the value of fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in the city for ten days and the purchaser shall be informed of the house of the seller with a view to the sort of charges which are apt to arise in such cases and the restitutions which the law allows And let legal restitution be on this wise — If a man sells a slave who is in a consumption or who has the disease of the stone or of strangury or epilepsy or some other tedious and incurable disorder of body or mind which is not discernible to the ordinary man if the purchaser be a physician or trainer he shall have no right of restitution nor shall there be any right of restitution if the seller has told the truth before

Cf. xi 952.

Cf. viii 849.

hand to the buyer. But if a skilled person sells to another who is not skilled, let the buyer appeal for restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy; and then the appeal may be made within a year. The cause shall be determined by such physicians as the parties may agree to choose; and the defendant, if he lose the suit, shall pay double the price at which he sold. If a private person sell to another private person, he shall have the right of restitution, and the decision shall be given as before, but the defendant, if he be cast, shall only pay back the price of the slave. If a person sells a homicide to another, and they both know of the fact, let there be no restitution in such a case; but if he do not know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever the buyer makes the discovery, and the decision shall rest with the youngest guardians of the law; and if the decision be that the seller was cognizant of the fact, he shall purify the house of the purchaser according to the law of the interpreters, and shall pay back three times the purchase money.

If a man exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for anything else, either with or without life, let him give and receive them genuine and unadulterated, in accordance with the law. And let us have a prelude about all this sort of roguery, like the preludes of our other laws. Every man should regard adulteration as of one and the same class with falsehood and deceit, concerning which the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places the practice may often be right. But they leave the occasion and the when and the where, undefined and unsettled; and from this want of definiteness in their language they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. No legislator ought not to leave the matter undetermined; he ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this be the rule prescribed:—No one shall call the Gods to witness when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dishonest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind to them. [977] And he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath and pays no heed to the Gods; and in the next degree, he who tells falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now better men are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the superiors of the young, wherefore also parents are the superiors of their offspring, and men of women and children and rulers of their subjects; for all men ought in reverence any one who is in possession of authority, and especially those who are in state offices. And this is

the reason why I have spoken of these matters. For every one who is guilty of adulteration in the agora tells a falsehood and deceives, and when he invokes the Gods according to the customs and cautions of the wardens of the agora, he does but swear without any respect for God or man. Certainly it is an excellent rule not lightly to defile the names of the Gods, after the fashion of men in general, who care little about piety and purity in their religious actions. But if a man will not conform to this rule, let the law be as follows:—He who sells anything in the agora shall not ask two prices for that which he sells; but he shall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away his goods, and on that day he shall not value them either at more or less, and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath taken about them. If a person disobey this command, any citizen who is present, not being less than thirty years of age, may with impunity chastise and beat the swearer; but if instead of obeying the laws he takes no heed, he shall be liable to the charge of having betrayed them. If a man sells any adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who knows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the magistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated goods; but if he be a citizen, and do not pursue the charge, he shall be called a rogue, and deemed to have robbed the Gods of the agora; or if he proves the charge, he shall dedicate the goods to the Gods of the agora. He who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition to losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes—a stripe for a drachma, according to the price of the goods; and the herald shall proclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain information from experienced persons about the rogueries and adulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought and ought not to do in each case, and let them inscribe their laws on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora, that they may be clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. [978] Enough has been said in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if anything seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the law, and write down the orders on and place on a column in the court of the wardens of the city the primary and secondary regulations which are laid down for them about their office.

After the practices of adulteration naturally follow the practices of retail trade. Concerning these we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in a city is not by nature intended to do any harm but quite the contrary for is not he a benefactor who reduces the inequalities and incommensurabilities of goods to equality and common measure? And this is what the power of money accomplishes and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. The hiring and the tavern-keeper and many other occupations some of them more and others less seemingly—alike have this object—they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions. Let us then endeavour to see what has brought retail trade into ill-odour, and wherein lies the dishonour and unseen 'mess of it in order that if not entirely we may yet partially cure the evil by legislation. To effect this is no easy matter and requires a great deal of virtue.

Cleimias What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger Dear *Cleimias* the class of men is small—they must have been rarely gifted by nature and trained by education—who, when assailed by wants and desires are able to hold out and observe moderation and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit. Wherefore all that relates to retail trade and merchandise and the keeping of taverns is denounced and numbered among dishonourable things. For if what I trust may never be and will not be we were to compel if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort or if in consequence of some fate or necessity the best women were compelled to follow similar callings then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are and if all such occupations were managed on incorrupt principles, they would be honoured as we honour a mother or a nurse. But now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys [919] for the sake of retail trade and receives strangers who are in need at the welcome resting place and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm or cool shade in the heat

and then instead of behaving to them as friends and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests treats them as enemies and captives who are at his mercy and will not release them until they have paid the most unjust abominable, and extortionate ransom—these are the sort of practices and foul evils they are which cast a reproach upon the succour of adversity. And the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this nature. There is an ancient saying which is also a true one—To fight against two opponents is a difficult thing as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in this case also the war is against two enemies—wealth and poverty—one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury while the other drives him by pain into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? In the first place they must have as few retail traders as possible and in the second place, they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state and in the third place they must devise some way where by the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.

After this preface let our law run as follows and may fortune favour us—No landowner among the *Magnetes* whose city the God is restoring and resettling—no one that is of the 500 families shall become a retail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily neither shall he be a merchant or do any service for private persons unless they equally serve him except for his father or his mother and their fathers and mothers and in general for his elders who are freemen and whom he serves as a freeman. Now it is difficult to determine accurately the things which are worthy or unworthy of a freeman but let those who have obtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong. He who in any way shares in the illiberality of retail trades may be indicted for dishonouring his race by any one who likes before those who have been judged to be the first in virtue and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father's house by an unworthy occupation [920] let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from that sort of thing and if he repeat the offence for two years and every time that he is convicted let the length of his imprisonment be doubled. This shall be the second law—He who engages in retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger. And a third law shall be—

¹ Cf. Aristotle *Politics* i. 9. 1. 56¹ 40-1257¹ 17

In order that the retail trader who dwells in our city may be as good or as little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember that they are not only guardians of those who may be easily watched and prevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well born and bred but still more should they have a watch over those who are of another sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to make men bad. And, therefore, in respect of the multitudinous occupations of retail trade, that is to say in respect of such of them as are allowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a state,—about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel with those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as we before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to this) and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts, after deducting expenses, will produce a moderate gain in the retail trades, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they find to be the right percentage of profit: this shall be seen to by the wardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city and by the wardens of the country. And so retail trade will benefit every one, and do the least possible injury to those in the state who practise it.

When a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in the courts of the tribes, for not having completed his agreement, if the parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or before their neighbours. The class of craftsmen who have furnished human life with the arts is dedicated to Hephaestus and Athens and there is a class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of defence, the vocaries of Athens and Athens to which duties they too are ably dedicated. All these continue through leaving the country and the people some of them are leaders in battle others make for hire equipments and weapons, and they ought not to desert in such matters, out of respect to the God who re their ancient works. If any craftsman through indolence omits to execute his work in a given time not esteeming the God who has made him the means of life, but considers too little that he is his own God and

will let him off easily in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the God, and in the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. He shall owe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has failed in performing and he shall begin again and execute them gratis in the given time. When a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the same chance which was given to the seller that he should not attempt to raise the price, but simply ask the value: thus the law enjoins also on the contractor for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work. Wherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose upon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a true thing and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have a right of action against the party who has wronged him. And if any one lets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the lawful agreement, disregarding Zeus the guardian of the city and Athens, who are the partners of the state, and overthrow the foundations of society for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the Gods maintain the common bonds of the state. And let him who having already received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the time agreed, pay double the price and if a year has elapsed although interest is not to be taken on loans, yet for every drachma which he owes to the contractor let him pay a monthly interest of an obol. Suits about these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes and by the way since we have mentioned craftsmen at all, we must not forget the other craft of war in which generals and tacticians are the craftsmen, who undertake voluntarily the work of our safety as other craftsmen undertake other public works—if they execute their work well the law will never tire of praising him who gives them those honours which are the just rewards of the soldier but if any one, having already received the benefit of any noble service in war does not make the due return of honour the law will blame him. Let this then be the law having an ingredient of praise, [922] not compelling but advising the great body of the citizens to honour the brave men who are the saviours of the whole state whether by their courage or by their military skill.—they should honour them, I say in the second place for the first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to those who are able above other men to honour the words of good legislators.

The greater part of the dealings between man

and man have been now regulated by us with the exception of those that relate to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians. These follow next in order and must be regulated in some way. But to arrive at them we must begin with the testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those who may have happened to die intestate. When I said Cleinias that we must regulate them I had in my mind the difficulty and perplexity in which all such matters are involved. You cannot leave them unregulated for individuals would make regulations at variance with one another and repugnant to the laws and habits of the living and to their own previous habits, if a person were simply allowed to make any will which he pleased and this were to take effect in whatever state he may have been at the end of his life for most of us lose our senses in a manner and feel crushed when we think that we are about to die.

Cle What do you mean Stranger?

Ath O Cleinias a man when he is about to die is an intractable creature and is apt to use language which causes a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the legislator.

Cle In what way?

Ath He wants to have the entire control of all his property and will use angry words.

Cle Such as what?

Ath O ye Gods he will say how monstrous that I am not allowed to give or not to give my own to whom I will—less to him who has been bad to me and more to him who has been good to me and whose badness and goodness have been tested by me in time of sickness or in old age and in every other sort of fortune!

Cle Well Stranger and may he not very fairly say so?

Ath In my opinion Cleinias the ancient legislators were too good natured and made laws without sufficient observation or consideration of human things.

Cle What do you mean?

Ath I mean my friend that they were afraid of the testator's reproaches and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be allowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he liked but you and I if I am not mistaken will have something better to say to our departing citizens [923].

Cle What?

Ath O my friends we will say to them hard is it for you who are creatures of a day to know what is yours—hard too is the Delphic oracle says to know yourselves at this hour. Now I

as the legislator regard you and your possessions not as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your whole family both past and future and yet more do I regard both family and possessions as belonging to the state wherefore if some one steals upon you with flattery when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old age and persuades you to dispose of your property in a way that is not for the best I will not, if I can help allow this but I will legislate with a view to the whole considering what is best both for the state and for the family esteeming as I ought the feelings of an individual at a lower rate and I hope that you will depart in peace and kindness towards us as you are going the way of all mankind and we will impartially take care of all your concerns not neglecting any of them if we can possibly help. Let this be our prelude and consolation to the living and dying Cleinias and let the law be as follows.

He who makes a disposition in a testament, if he be the father of a family shall first of all inscribe as his heir any one of his sons whom he may think fit and if he gives any of his children to be adopted by another citizen let the adoption be inscribed. And if he has a son remaining over and above who has not been adopted upon any lot and who may be expected to be sent out to a colony according to law to him his father may give as much as he pleases of the rest of his property with the exception of the paternal lot and the fixtures on the lot. And if there are other sons let him distribute among them what there is more than the lot in such portions as he pleases. And if one of the sons has already a house of his own he shall not give him of the money nor shall he give money to a daughter who has been betrothed but if she is not betrothed he may give her money. And if any of the sons or daughters shall be found to have another lot of land in the country which has accrued after the testament has been made they shall leave the lot which they have inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will. If the testator has no sons but only daughters let him choose the husband of any one of his daughters whom he pleases and leave and inscribe him as his son and heir. And if a man have lost his son when he was a child and before he could be reckoned among grown up men whether his own or an adopted son [924] let the testator make mention of the circumstance and inscribe whom he will to be his second son in hope of better fortune. If the testator has no children at all he may select

and give to any one whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which he has acquired but let him not be blamed if he gives all the rest to his adopted son, and makes a friend of him according to the law. If the sons of a man require guardians, and the father when he dies leaves a will appointing guardians, those who have been named by him, whether they are and whatever their number be, if they are able and willing to take charge of the children shall be recognized according to the provisions of the will. But if he dies and has made no will or a will in which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on the father's side and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the deceased, shall have the authority of guardians, whom the guardians of the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. And the fifteen eldest guardians of the law shall have the whole care and charge of the orphans, divided into threes according to seniority—a body of three for one year and then another body of three for the next year until the cycle of the five periods is complete and thus, as far as possible, is to continue always. If a man dies, having made no will at all, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians, they shall have in the protection which is afforded by these laws.

And if a man dying, by some unexpected fate leaves daughters behind him, let him pardon the legislators if when he gives them in marriage, he have a regard only to one out of three conditions—nearness of kin and the preservation of the lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally consider for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself, and a husband for his daughter with a view to his character and disposition—the father I say shall forgive the legislators if he disregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. Let the law about these matters where practicable be as follows.—If a man dies without making a will and leaves behind him daughters let his brother being the son of the same father or of the same mother having no lot, marry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. And if he has no brother but only a brother's son, in the manner let them marry if they be of a suitable age, and if there be not even a brother's son, but only the son of a sister let them do likewise and so in the fourth degree if there be only the testator's father's brother or in the fifth degree, his father's brother's son, or in sixth degree, the child of his father's lot. Let him be reckoned in the sixth degree as the son leaves daughters the rela-

tionship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters, and brothers and sisters children [925] and first the males shall come, and after them the females in the same family. The judge shall consider and determine the suitability or unsuitableness of age in marriage he shall make an inspection of the males naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. And if there be a lack of kinsmen in a family extending to grandchildren of a brother or to the grandchildren of a grandfather's children the maiden may choose with the consent of her guardians any one of the citizens who will marry and whom she wills, and he shall be the heir of the dead man and the husband of his daughter. Circumstances vary and there may sometimes be a still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state and if any maiden has no kindred living in the city and there is some one who has been sent out to a colony and she is disposed to make him the heir of her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred let him proceed to take the lot according to the regulation of the law but if he be not of her kindred she having no kinsmen within the city and he be chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by the guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died intestate. And if a man has no children, either male or female and dies without making a will, let the previous law in general hold and let a man and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house, and let the lot belong absolutely to them and let the heiress in the first degree be a sister and in a second degree a daughter of a brother and in the third, a daughter of a sister in the fourth degree the sister of a father and in the fifth degree the daughter of a father's brother and in a sixth degree of a father's sister and these shall dwell with their male kinsmen according to the degree of relationship and rights, as is enacted before. Now we must not conceal from ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there may sometimes be a hardship in the law giving commanding the kinsman of the dead man to marry his relation—he may be thought not to have considered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in the execution of such ordinances for there may be cases in which the parties refuse to obey and are ready to do anything rather than marry when there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who are bid den to marry or be married. Persons may fancy that the legislator never thought of this, but

they are mistaken wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator in that he having to take care of the common weal cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals [926] and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them

Cle And how Stranger can we act most fairly under the circumstances?

Alc There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them

Cle What do you mean?

Alc I mean to say that a case may occur in which the nephew having a rich father will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his uncle he will have a feeling of pride and he will wish to look higher And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity and he will be compelled to disobey the law if he is required for example to take a wife who is mad or has some other terrible malady of soul or body such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law —If any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage and asserts that the legislator if he were alive and present would not compel him to obey—that is to say would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage to do either—and some kinsman or guardian dispute this the reply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans male or female and to them let the disputants have recourse and by their aid determine any matters of the kind admitting their decision to be final But if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges and there have the points in dispute determined And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator which by a man of sense is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money

Thus will orphan children have a second birth After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education and after their second birth when they have lost their parents we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible In the first place we say that the guard-

ians of the law are lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers Moreover, they shall take charge of them year by year as of their own kindred, and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a sustable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans [927] And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs, about which there are many tales and traditions long indeed but true and seeing that they are so many and so ancient we must believe them and we must also believe the lawgivers who tell us that these things are true if they are not to be regarded as utter fools But if these things are really so in the first place men should have a fear of the Gods above who regard the loneliness of the orphans and in the second place of the souls of the departed who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children and are friendly to those who honour and unfriendly to those who dishonour them Men should also fear the souls of the living who are aged and high in honour wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous their descendants cherish them and solve happily old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of such duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind if he has any and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans seeking in every possible way to do them good for he is making a contribution to his own good and that of his children He who obeys the tale which precedes the law and does no wrong to an orphan will never experience the wrath of the legislator But he who is disobedient and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians if they did not possess examples of the manner in which children of freemen should be brought up in the bringing up of their own children and of the care of their property in the care of their own or if they had not just laws fairly stated

Cf 924

Cf ix. 865

about these very things—there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the one of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans. But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father though in regard to honour and dishonour and the atonement given to them, the two are not usually placed upon a level. [928] Wherefore, touching the legislation about orphans, the law speaks in various accents, both of persuasion and threatening, and such a threat as the following will be by no means out of place—He who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the guardians of the law to whom the superintendence of this guardian has been assigned, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child, and he shall be careful and diligent in the management of his possessions as he would be if they were his own, or even more careful and diligent. Let every one who has the care of an orphan observe this law. But any one who acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian of an orphan, may be fined by a magistrate, or if he be himself a magistrate, the guardian may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted, by exacting a fine of double the amount of that inflicted by the court. And if a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other citizen, to act negligently or dishonestly, let them bring him before the same court, and whatever damages are given against him, let him pay fourfold, and let him be bound to the orphan and half to him who procured the conviction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks that he has been ill-used by his guardians, let him within five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring them to trial and if any of them be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. And if a magistrate shall appear to have wronged the orphan by neglect, and he be convicted, let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect, besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from his office of guardian of the law and let the same appear another guardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room. Greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between fathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be of opinion that the legislator should enact that they

may if they wish, lawfully renounce their son by the proclamation of a herald in the face of the world, or of sons who think that they should be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of imbecility when they are disabled by disease or old age. These things only happen as a matter of fact, where the natures of men are utterly bad for where only half is bad, as, for example, if the father be not bad but the son be bad, or conversely no great calamity is the result of such an amount of hatred as this. In another state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease to be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws, [929] the disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country for no addition can be made even of a single family to the 5040 households and, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced not only by his father who is a single person, but by the whole family and what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as the following.—He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins, and in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the family and the son shall be allowed to address them in a similar manner and show that he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. And if the father persuades them, and obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive of the father and mother and the offender himself—I say if he obtains more than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the family of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his son, but not otherwise. And if any other citizen is willing to adopt the son who is put away no law shall hinder him for the characters of young men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. And if he has been put away and in a period of ten years no one is willing to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant population which is sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that he may be suitably provided for in the colony. And if disease or age or harshness of temper or all these together makes a man to be more out of his mind than the rest of the world are—but this is not observable, except to those who live with him—and he, being mar-

they are mistaken wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator in that he having to take care of the common weal cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals [926] and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them

Cle And how Stranger can we act most fairly under the circumstances?

Alth There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them

Cle What do you mean?

Alth I mean to say that a case may occur in which the nephew having a rich father will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his uncle he will have a feeling of pride and he will wish to look higher And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity and he will be compelled to disobey the law if he is required for example to take a wife who is mad or has some other terrible malady of soul or body such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law —If any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage and asserts that the legislator if he were alive and present would not compel him to obey—that is to say would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage to do either—and some kinsman or guardian dispute this the reply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans male or female and to them let the disputants have recourse and by their aid determine any matters of the kind admitting their decision to be final But if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges and there have the points in dispute determined And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator which by a man of sense is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money

Thus will orphan children have a second birth After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education and after their second birth when they have lost their parents we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible In the first place we say that the guard-

ians of the law are lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers More over they shall take charge of them year by year¹ as of their own kindred and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans [927] And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs about which there are many tales and traditions long indeed but true and seeing that they are so many and so ancient we must believe them and we must also believe the lawgivers who tell us that these things are true if they are not to be regarded as utter fables But if these things are really so in the first place men should have a fear of the Gods above who regard the loneliness of the orphans and in the second place of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children and are friendly to those who honour and unfriendly to those who dishonour them Men should also fear the souls of the living who are aged and high in honour wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them and solive happily old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of such duties and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind if he has any and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans seeking in every possible way to do them good for he is making a contribution to his own good and that of his children He who obeys the law which precedes the law and does no wrong to an orphan will never experience the wrath of the legislator But he who is disobedient and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians if they did not possess examples of the manner in which children of freemen should be brought up in the bringing up of their own children and of the care of their property in the care of their own or if they had not just laws fairly stated

Cf 9-4

Cf ix. 865

about these very things—there would have been reason in making laws for them under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans. But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father though in regard to honour and dishonour and the attention given to them the two are not usually placed upon a level [9 8] Wherefore, touching the legislation about orphans the law speaks in serious accents, both of persuasion and threatening and such a threat as the following will be by no means out of place—He who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the guardians of the law to whom the superintendence of this guardian has been assigned, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child and he shall be as careful and diligent in the management of his possessions as he would be if they were his own, or even more careful and diligent. Let every one who has the care of an orphan observe this law. But any one who acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian of the child, may be fined by a magistrate or if he be himself a magistrate, the guardian may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted by exacting a fine of double the amount of that inflicted by the court. And if a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other citizen to act negligently or dishonestly let them bring him before the same court, and whatever damages are given against him, let him pay fourfold and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured the conviction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks that he has been ill used by his guardians let him within five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring them to trial and if any of them be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. And if a magistrate shall appear to have wronged the orphan by neglect, and he be convicted let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay to the orphan and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect, besides paying the fine let him be deposed from his office of guardian of the law and let the state appoint another guardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room.

Greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between fathers and sons on the part of fathers who will be of opinion that the legislator should enact that they

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they are mistaken wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator in that he having to take care of the common weal cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals [926] and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them

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Alc I mean to say that a case may occur in which the nephew having a rich father will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his uncle he will have a feeling of pride and he will wish to look higher And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity and he will be compelled to disobey the law if he is required for example to take a wife who is mad or has some other terrible malady of soul or body such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law —If any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage and asserts that the legislator if he were alive and present would not compel him to obey—that is to say would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage to do either—and some kinsman or guardian dispute this the reply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans male or female and to them let the disputants have recourse and by their aid determine any matters of the kind admitting their decision to be final But if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges and there have the points in dispute determined And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator which by a man of sense is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money

Thus will orphan children have a second birth After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education and after their second birth when they have lost their parents we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible In the first place, we say that the guard-

ians of the law are lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers. Moreover they shall take charge of them year by year¹ as of their own kindred and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans [927] And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs about which there are many tales and traditions long indeed but true and seeing that they are so many and so ancient we must believe them and we must also believe the lawgivers who tell us that these things are true if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. But if these things are really so in the first place men should have a fear of the Gods above who regard the loneliness of the orphans and in the second place of the souls of the departed who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children and are friendly to those who honour and unfriendly to those who dishonour them Men should also fear the souls of the living who are aged and high in honour wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them and solve happily old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of such duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind if he has any and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans seeking in every possible way to do them good for he is making a contribution to his own good and that of his children He who obeys the tale which precedes the law and does no wrong to an orphan will never experience the wrath of the legislator But he who is disobedient and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians if they did not possess examples of the manner in which children of freemen should be brought up in the bringing up of their own children and of the care of their property in the care of their own or if they had not just laws fairly stated

him to be content to lose himself.

Of Courtesy

Law VI. We are taught, as I was saying, that we are to possess no more than which is necessary to the good, that is, a temper of moderation or of a cheerful contentment, when we have a due knowledge of the good of the God, and he is ready to answer our prayers for him, the good of an order of government, that is, the good of a happy state. For the state, when they are contented by us, join in our prayers, and when they are discontented, they will be ready to oppose us, but we must observe no doubt and therefore, as a man makes a right use of his power and government and other good relations, he will be happy which above all others will win him the favour of the God.

Of Excellence

Law. Every man of any understanding fears and respects the powers of parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. Now these things being thus ordered by nature, [932] good men think it a blessing from heaven if their parents live to old age and reach the utmost limit of human life, or if taken away before men, time they are deeply regretted by them, but to bad men parents are always a cause of terror. Wherefore let every man honour with every sort of lawful honour his own parents, according to what has now been said. But in this prelude be as careful as sound in the ears of any one, let the law now which may be rightly imposed in these terms.—If any one in this city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard and gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons and of his other offspring, or of himself—let him who experiences this sort of treatment either come himself, or send some one to inform the three eldest guardians of the law and three of the women who have the care of marriages and let them look to the matter and punish youthful evildoers with stripes and bonds if they are under thirty years of age, that is to say if they be men, or if they be women, let them undergo the same punishment up to forty years of age. But if when they are still more advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their parents, and do any hurt to any of them, let them be brought before a court in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be the judges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court determine what he ought to pay or suffer and any penalty may be imposed on him which a man can pay

or suffer. Is the person who has been wronged be unable to inform the magistrates, or any person who bears on his case concern, and if he do not, he shall be accused by him, and shall be liable to his punishment as a common-law suit, and if any one who likes, and if a slave informed, he shall receive freedom, and if he be a free man, or injured party, he shall be set free by the magistrates, or if he be a slave, to any other citizen, the public shall pay a price on his behalf to the owner, and let the magistrates take heed that no one wrongs him out of revenge, because he has given information.

Cases in which one man injures another by poison, and which prove fatal, have been already discussed, but about other cases in which a person intentionally and of malice harms another with meats, or drinks, or medicines, nothing has as yet been determined. For there are two kinds of poisons used among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished. There is the kind just now expressly mentioned, [933] which is used either by the use of other bodies according to a natural law, there is also another kind which persuades the more durable, class than they can do injury by sorceries, and incantations, and magic knots, as they are termed, and makes others believe that they above all persons are injured by the powers of the magician. Now it is not easy to know the nature of all these things, nor if a man do know can he readily persuade others to believe him. And when men are disturbed in their minds at the sight of wondrous images raised either at their doors, or in a place where three ways meet, or on the thresholds of parents, there is no use in trying to persuade them that they should despise all such things because they have no certain knowledge about them. But we must have a law in two parts, concerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt is made, and we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not to have recourse to such practices, by which they scare the multitude out of their wits, as if they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal the fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first place, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what he is doing: either as regards the body (unless he has a knowledge of medicine) or as regards his enchantments (unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner). Let the law then, run as follows about poisoning or witchcraft.—He who employs poison to do any injury, not fatal, to a man himself, or to his

ter of his property, in the ruin of the house and his son doubts and hesitates about indicting his father for insanity let the law in that case ordain that he shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell them of his father's misfortune and they shall duly look into the matter and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not And if they advise him to proceed they shall be both his witnesses and his advocates and if the father is cast he shall henceforth be incapable of ordering the least particular of his life let him be as a child dwelling in the house for the remainder of his days And if a man and his wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper ten of the guardians of the law who are impartial and ten of the women who regulate marriages¹ [930] shall look to the matter and if they are able to reconcile them they shall be formally reconciled but if their souls are too much tossed with passion they shall endeavour to find other partners Now they are not likely to have very gentle tempers and therefore we must endeavour to associate with them deeper and softer natures Those who have no children or only a few at the time of their separation should choose their new partners with a view to the procreation of children but those who have a sufficient number of children should separate and marry again in order that they may have some one to grow old with and that the pair may take care of one another in age If a woman dies leaving children male or female the law will advise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children without introducing into the house a step-mother But if he have no children then he shall be compelled to marry until he has begotten a sufficient number of sons to his family and to the state And if a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up But if she appears to be too young to live virtuously without a husband let her relations communicate with the women who superintend marriage and let both together do what they think best in these matters if there is a lack of children let the choice be made with a view to having them two children one of either sex, shall be deemed sufficient in the eye of the law When a child is admitted to be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them but there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to follow—in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave or with a freeman or freedman the offspring

shall always belong to the master of the female slave Again if a free woman have intercourse with a male slave the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave but if a child be born either of a slave by her master or of his mistress by a slave—and this be proven—the offspring of the woman and its father shall be sent away by the women who superintend marriage into another country and the guardians of the law shall send away the offspring of the man and its mother

Neither God nor a man who has understanding will ever advise any one to neglect his parents To a discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents a prelude such as the following about the service of the Gods will be a suitable introduction —There are ancient customs about the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds [931] some of the Gods we see with our eyes and we honour them of others we honour the images raising statues of them which we adore and though they are lifeless yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account Now if a man has a father or mother or their fathers or mothers treasured up in his house stricken in years let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are who are sitting at his hearth if only he knows how to show true service to them

Cle And what do you call the true mode of service?

1st I will tell you O my friend for such things are worth listening to

Cle Proceed

Ath Oedipus as tradition says when dishonoured by his sons invoked on them curses which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by the Gods and Auntyor in his wrath invoked curses on his son Phoenix and Theseus upon Hippolytus and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children whence it is clear that the Gods listen to the imprecations of parents for the curses of parents are as they ought to be mighty against their children as no others are And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonoured by his or her children are heard by the Gods in accordance with nature and that if a parent is honoured by them and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the Gods in his prayers to do them good he is not equally heard and that they do not minister to his request? If not they would be very unjust ministers of good and that we

¹ Cf. vi 784 ff vii 794.

And ridiculous if they attempt in a good natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing, or person though as we were saying not if he be angry and have a set purpose? We forbear earnest—that is unalterably fixed but we have still to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humour. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or likeness, either in anger or without anger. And if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the country or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the God who presides over the contests. [936] Those only

who have received permission shall be allowed to write verses at one another but they shall be without anger and in jest, in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let not the poet himself exhibit, or ever teach anybody else, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held disobedient to the laws.

Now he is not to be pitied who is hungry or who suffers any bodily pain but he who is temperate, or has some other virtue, or part of a virtue, and at the same time suffers from misfortune it would be an extraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were utterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably well-ordered city or government. Wherefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to such cases in the following terms—Let there be no beggars in our state and if anybody begs, seeking to pick up a livelihood by unavailing prayers let the wardens of the agora turn him out of the agora, and the wardens of the city out of the city and the wardens of the country send him out of any other parts of the land across the border in order that the land may be cleared of this sort of animal.

If a slave of either sex injure anything which is not his or her own, through inexperience, or some improper practice, and the person who suffers damage be not himself in part to blame, the master of the slave who has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction or give up

the slave who has done the injury. But if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the injurer with the view of obtaining the slave let him sue the person who says that he has been injured for malpractices. And if he gain a conviction let him receive double the value which the court fixes as the price of the slave and if he lose his suit let him make amends for the injury and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or horse, or dog or any other animal injure the property of a neighbour the owner shall in like manner pay for the injury.

If any man refuses to be a witness he who wants him shall summon him and he who is summoned shall come to the trial and if he knows and is willing to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does not know let him swear by the three divinities *Zeus*, and *Apollo* and *Themis*, that he does not and have no more to do with the cause. [937] And he who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner shall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. And if a person calls up as a witness any one who is acting as a judge, let him give his witness but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. A free woman may give her witness and plead if she be more than forty years of age, and may bring an action if she have no husband but if her husband be alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. A slave of either sex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead but only in cases of murder and they must produce sufficient sureties that they will certainly remain until the trial in case they should be charged with false witness. And either of the parties in a cause may bring an accusation of perjury against witnesses, touching their evidence in whole or in part, if he asserts that such evidence has been given but the accusation must be brought previous to the final decision of the cause. The magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness, and have them kept under the seal of both parties and produce them on the day when the trial for false witness takes place. If a man be twice convicted of false witness he shall not be required and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness and if he dare to witness after he has been convicted three times let any one who pleases in form against him sue the magistrates and let the magistrates hand him over to the court, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. And in any case in which the evidence is rightly found to be false, and yet to have given the

servants or any injury whether fatal or not, to his cattle or his bees if he be a physician and be convicted of poisoning shall be punished with death or if he be a private person, the court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. But he who seems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or enchantments or incantations or any of the like practices if he be a prophet or diviner let him die and if not being a prophet he be convicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay or suffer.

When a man does another any injury by theft or violence for the greater injury let him pay greater damages to the injured man, and less for the smaller injury but in all cases what ever the injury may have been, as much as will compensate the loss. And besides the compensation of the wrong let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his offence [934] he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another through the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter penalty but he who has injured another through his own folly when overcome by pleasure or pain in cowardly fear or lust, or envy or implacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. Not that he is punished because he did wrong for that which is done can never be undone but in order that in future times he and those who see him corrected, may utterly hate injustice or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing. Having an eye to all these things the law, like a good archer should aim at the right measure of punishment and in all cases at the deserved punishment. In the attainment of this the judge shall be a fellow worker with the legislator whenever the law leaves to him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay and the legislator, like a painter shall give a rough sketch of the cases in which the law is to be applied. This is what we must do Megillus and Cleinias in the best and fairest manner that we can saying what the punishments are to be of all actions of theft and violence and giving laws of such a kind as the Gods and sons of Gods would have us give.

If a man is mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations shall keep him at home in any way which they can, or if not let them pay a penalty—he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmae whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects and he of the second class shall pay four fifths of a mina and he of the third class three fifths and he of the fourth class two-

fifths. Now there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already mentioned and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament and are increased by bad education out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to occur in a well-ordered state. Let this, then be the law about abuse which shall relate to all cases—No one shall speak evil of another and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company but he shall abstain from evil speaking for out of the imprecations which men utter against one another [935] and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another and using foul names out of words light as air in very deed the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his anger which is an ungracious element of his nature and nursing, up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilized by education he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. And in such cases almost all men take to saying something ridiculous about their opponent and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether or lose the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one utter any taunting word at a temple or at the public sacrifices or at the games or in the agora or in a court of justice or in any public assembly. And let the magistrate who presides on these occasions chastise an offender and he shall be blameless but if he fails in doing so he shall not claim the prize of virtue for he is one who heeds not the laws and does not do what the legislator commands. And if in any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings whether he has begun the quarrel or is only retaliating let any elder who is present support the law and control with blows those who indulge in passion which is another great evil and if he do not let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say now that he who deals in reproaches against others cannot reproach them without attempting to ridicule them and this when done in a moment of anger is what we make matter of reproach against him. But then do we admit into our state the comic writers who are so fond of making man-

victory to him who wins the suit and more than half the witnesses are condemned the decision which was gained by these means shall be rescinded and there shall be a discussion and a decision as to whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not and in whichever way the decision may be given the previous suit shall be determined accordingly

There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble which has been the civilizer of humanity? How then can the advocate of justice be other than noble? And yet upon this profession which is presented to us under the fair name of art has come an evil reputation. In the first place we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause [938] whether just or unjust and that both the art, and the power of speech which is thereby imparted are at the service of him who is willing to pay for them. Now in our state this so-called art whether really an art or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence or if existing among us should listen to the request of the legislator and go away into another land and not speak contrary to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more but for those who disobey the voice of the law is as follows.—If any one thinks that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges and unseasonably litigate or advocate let any one who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy and let him be judged in the court of select judges and if he be convicted let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentiousness. And if he is supposed to act from contentiousness the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause and if he is supposed to act as he does from love of money in case he be a stranger he shall leave the country and never return under penalty of death but if he be a citizen he shall die because he is a lover of money in whatever manner gained and equally if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness he shall die

BOOK XII

[941] If a herald or an ambassador carry a false message from our city to any other or bring back a false message from the city to

which he is sent or be proved to have brought back whether from friends or enemies, in his capacity of herald or ambassador what they have never said let him be indicted for having violated contrary to the law the commands and duties imposed upon him by Hermes and Zeus and let there be a penalty fixed which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted

Theft is a mean and robbery a shameless thing and none of the sons of Zeus delight in fraud and violence or ever practised either. Wherefore let no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief of such things nor let him suppose when he thieves or is guilty of violence that he is doing nothing base but only what the Gods themselves do. For such tales are untrue and improbable and he who steals or robs contrary to the law is never either a God or the son of a God of this the legislator ought to be better informed than all the poets put together. Happy is he and may he be for ever happy who is persuaded and listens to our words but he who disobeys shall have to contend against the following law.—If a man steal anything belonging to the public whether that which he steals be much or little he shall have the same punishment. For he who steals a little steals with the same wish as he who steals much but with less power and he who takes up a greater amount not having deposited it is wholly unjust. Wherefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on the one than on the other because his theft is less but on the ground that the thief may possibly be in one case still curable and may in another case be incurable. If any one convicted in a court of law a stranger or a slave of a theft of public property let the court determine what punishment he shall suffer or what penalty he shall pay bearing in mind that he is probably not incurable. But the citizen who has been brought up as our citizens will have been if he be found guilty of robbing his country by fraud or violence whether he be caught in the act or not shall be punished with death for he is incurable.

[942] Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are required the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do any

Cf. *Republic* iii 358 391

This passage is not consistent with ix 857 where theft of public property is punished by imprisonment

Cf. *Thucydides* v 66.

this, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader even in the least things being under his guidance for example he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be always and in all things as far as possible in common and to either there neither is nor ever will be a better or better or more scientific precept than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to practise this habit of commanding, others, and of being commanded by others. Anarchy should have no part in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with a view to military exercise and agility and ease should be cultivated for the same object, and also endurance of the want of meats and drinks, and of winter cold and summer heat, and of hard couches and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the peculiar qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural growth of hair and soles. For these are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body whether they are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence; the one is the servant of the whole body and the other the master [943] in whom all the ruling senses are by nature set. Let the young man imagine that he hears in what has preceded the praises of the military life the law shall be as follows—He shall serve in war who is on the roll or is, pointed to some special service, and if any one is absent from cowardice, and without the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the military commanders for want of service when the army comes home and the soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy armed, and the cavalry and the other arms of the service shall form separate courts and they shall bring the heavy armed before the heavy armed, and the horsemen before the horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he who is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for any prize of valour or select another for not serving on an expedition, or be an accuser at all in any military matter.

Of. vi. 76.

Moreover the court shall further determine what punishment he shall suffer or what penalty he shall pay. When the suits for failure of service are completed the leaders of the several kinds of troops shall again hold an assembly and they shall adjudge the prizes of valour and he who likes shall give judgment in his own branch of the service saying nothing about any former expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm his statement, but speaking only of the present occasion. The crown of victory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at the temple of any war god whom he likes, adding an inscription for a testimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first, the second or the third prize. If any one goes on an expedition, and returns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not withdrawn the army he shall be indicted for desertion before the same persons who took cognisance of failure of service, and if he be found guilty the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. Now every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally if he can help for justice is truly said to be an honourable maiden and falsehood is naturally repugnant to honour and justice. A witness ought to be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms—he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary and not make that a reproach, or bring an action against some innocent person on that account. [944] To make the distinction may be difficult but still the law must attempt to define the different kinds in some way. Let me endeavour to explain my meaning by an ancient tale—If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons) the original arms, which the poet says were presented to Peleus by the Gods as a nuptial gift when he married Thetis, remaining in the hands of Hector then the base spirits of that day might have reproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away his arms. Again, there is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost their arms and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed by floods of water and there are numberless things of this kind which one might adduce by way of extenuation, and with the view of justifying a misfortune which is easily misrepresented. We must, therefore, endeavour

our to divide to the best of our power the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. And a distinction may be drawn in the use of terms of reproach. A man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield: he may be only the loser of his arms. For there is a great or rather absolute difference between him who is deprived of his arms by a sufficient force and him who voluntarily lets his shield go. Let the law then be as follows:—If a person having arms is overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself but lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death—in such a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done but the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned for the bad man ought always to be punished in the hope that he may be improved but not the unfortunate for there is no advantage in that. And what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defence? Tradition says that Caeneus the Thessalian was changed by a God from a woman into a man but the converse miracle cannot now be wrought or no punishment would be more proper than that the man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman.¹ This however is impossible and therefore let us make a law as nearly like this as we can—that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days but shall live for ever under the stigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms:—When a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers [945] and the officer who gives the coward any place shall suffer a penalty which the public examiner shall exact of him and if he be of the highest class he shall pay a thousand drachmae or if he be of the second class five minae or if he be of the third three minae or if he be of the fourth class one mina. And he who is found guilty of cowardice shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae if he be of the highest class and five minae if he be of the second class and three if he be of the third class and a mina like the preceding if he be of the fourth class.

What regulations will be proper about ex-

¹ Cf. *Timaeus* 90.

aminers, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot and for a year and some for a longer time and from selected persons? Of such magistrates who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them weighed down by the pressure of office or his own inability to support the dignity of his office be guilty of any crooked practice? It is by no means easy to find a magistrate who excels other magistrates in virtue but still we must endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. For the truth is that there are many elements of dissolution in a state as there are also in a ship, or in an animal they all have their cords and girders and sinews—one nature diffused in many places and called by many names and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the examiners are better than the magistrates and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way then by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting principle of all constitutions every power in the state is rent asunder from every other they no longer incline in the same direction but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one¹ and soon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the examiners ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating them which shall be as follows:—Every year after the summer solstice the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo and shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the manner following [946]—Each citizen shall select not himself but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best and who is not less than fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one half if they are an even number but if they are not an even number they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes and make them an even number and then leave the half which have the greater number of votes. And if two persons have an equal number of votes and thus increase the number beyond one half they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away with the excess and then including all the rest they shall again vote until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or

Cf. *Republic* iv 4.2.

two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third: these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the Magnesians, by the providence of the Gods, is again preserved, and presents to the Sun and to Apollo her three best men as first fruits, to be a common offering to them, according to the ancient law: as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy five years, in whom three shall afterwards be added yearly: and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them by every sort of test in which a freeman may be subjected: and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually and of others in company with his colleagues: and let him place a writing in the agora about each magistracy and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate does not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he be acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves: if however he be convicted and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once)—but any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over.

And now let us pass under review the examiners themselves: what will their examination be, [9.47] and how conduct it? During the life of these men, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue they shall have the first seat at all public assemblies and at all Hellenic sacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in which they take part. The chiefs of each sacred miss on shall be selected from them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel: they shall all be priests of Apollo and Helios and one of them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year shall be high priest and they shall write up his name in each year to be a measure of time as long as the city lasts and after their death they shall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner different from the other citizens. They shall be decked in a robe and of white, and there shall be

no crying or lamentation over them but a chorus of fifteen maidens, and another of boys, shall stand around the bier on either side hymning the praises of the departed priests in alternate responses, declaring their blessedness in song all day long: and at dawn a hundred of the youths who practise gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the bier to the sepulchre, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb of warriors—the cavalry with their horses, the heavy armed with their arms and the others in like manner. And boys near the bier and in front of it shall sing their national hymn and maidens shall follow behind and with them the women who have passed the age of child-bearing next, although they are interdicted from other burials, let priests and priestesses follow unless the Pythian oracle forbid them for this burial is free from pollution. The place of burial shall be an oblong vaulted chamber underground constructed of tufa, which will last for ever having stone couches placed side by side. And here they will lay the blessed person and cover the sepulchre with a circular mound of earth and plant a grove of trees around on every side but one and on that side the sepulchre shall be allowed to extend for ever and a new mound will not be required. Every year they shall have contests in music and gymnastics, and in horsemanship in honour of the dead. These are the honours which shall be given to those who at the examination are found blameless but if any of them trust to the scrutiny being over should after the judgment has been given manifest the wickedness of human nature let the law ordain that he who pleases shall indict him, [9.48] and let the cause be tried in the following manner. In the first place, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law and to them the surviving examiners shall be added as well as the court of select judges and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form—he shall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his office and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his office and of the burial and of the other honours given him. But if the prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if he be of the first class, pay twelve minae and eight if he be of the second class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he be of the fourth class.

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt

that there were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days because most men were the sons of Gods,¹ and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man but to the Gods only and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods and others imagine that they have no care of us and the opinion of most men and of the worst men is that in return for a small sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice for as the opinions of men about the Gods are changed the laws should also be changed—in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side—he who obtains leave to bring an action should write down the charges but should not add an oath and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing and not swear for it is a dreadful thing to know when many law suits are going on in a state that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law then be as follows—A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from a temple [949] so too the judge of dances and of all music and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests and any matters in which as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading nor to call down curses on himself and his race nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall ever be teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words and he who does otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at

issue. On the other hand strangers in their dealings with strangers shall as at present have power to give and receive oaths for they will not often grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land.

As to the imitation of private suits let the manner of deciding causes between all citizens be the same as in cases in which any freeman is disobedient to the state in minor matters of which the penalty is not stripes imprisonment, or death. But as regards attendance at choruses or processions or other shows and as regards public services whether the celebration of sacrifice in peace or the payment of contributions in war—in all these cases first comes the necessity of providing a remedy for the loss and by those who will not obey there shall be security given to the officers whom the city and the law empower to exact the sum due and if they forfeit their security let the goods which they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city but if they ought to pay a larger sum the several magistrates shall impose upon the disobedient a suitable penalty and bring them before the court, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

Now a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only and has no foreign trade must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. About these matters the legislator has to consider and he will begin by trying to persuade men as far as he can. The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers [950] When states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well-ordered the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other cities when any one either young or old desires to travel anywhere abroad at whatever time is of no consequence. On the other hand the refusal of states to receive others and for their own citizens never to go to other places is an utter impossibility and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilized it is a practice adopted by people who use harsh words such as xenodasia or banishment of strangers, and who have harsh and morose ways as men think. And to be thought or not to be thought well of

¹ Cf. *Timæus* 40.

by the rest of the world is no light matter for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good as they are removed from the nature of virtue in them so as. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments of the differences between the good and bad. And the generality of cities are quite right in ascribing us to value a good reputation in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this—that he who is really good (I am speaking of the man who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with but not without the reality of goodness. And our Cretean colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men and there is every reason to expect that if the reality answers to the idea, she will be one of the few well-ordered cities which the sun and the other Gods behold. Wherefore, in the matter of journeys to other countries and the reception of strangers we enact as follows.—In the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age and no one shall go in a private capacity but only in some public one as a herald, or on an embassy or on a sacred mission. Going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels of the class authorized by the state. To Apollo at Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to Isthmus, citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games there dedicated to the Gods and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace (§§1) procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that which is gained in war and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior to their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men and these no law shall hinder. For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized nor again can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only and without an intelligent understanding of them. And there always are in the world a few inspired in whose acquaintance is beyond price and who spring up quite

as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. These are they whom the citizens of a well-ordered city should be ever seeking out, going forth over sea and over land to find him who is incorruptible—that he may establish more firmly institutions in his own state which are good already and amend what is deficient for without this examination and enquiry a city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.

Cleitias How can we have an examination and also a good one?

Athenian Stranger In this way. In the first place, our spectator shall be of not less than fifty years of age he must be a man of reputation especially in war if he is to exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of the law but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer continue in his office of spectator. And when he has carried on his inspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he pleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who review the laws. This shall be a mixed body of young and old men who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun. They shall consist, in the first place, of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue and in the second place, of guardians of the laws the ten eldest being chosen the general superintendent of education shall also be a member as well the last appointed as those who have been released from the office and each of them shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he chooses, between the ages of thirty and forty. These shall be always holding conversation and discourse about the laws of their own city or about any specially (§§5-) good ones which they may hear to be existing elsewhere also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use and will throw light upon the examination or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. Any knowledge of this sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all diligence and if any one of those who have been invited appear to be unworthy the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. The rest of the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish themselves having an eye upon them, and especially honouring them if they succeed but dishonouring them above the rest if they turn out to be inferior. This is the assembly to which he who has visited the institutions of other men,

that there were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days because most men were the sons of Gods¹ and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man but to the Gods only and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points in dispute and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods and others imagine that they have no care of us and the opinion of most men and of the worst men is that in return for a small sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments: the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice for as the opinions of men about the Gods are changed the laws should also be changed—in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side—he who obtains leave to bring an action should write down the charges but should not add an oath and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing and not swear for it is a dreadful thing to know when many lawsuits are going on in a state that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law then be as follows—A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from a temple [949] so too the judge of dances and of all music and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests and any matters in which as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading nor to call down curses on himself and his race nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall ever be teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words and he who does otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at

Cf *Simaeus* 40.

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unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search he who is prevented shall go to law with him estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching and if the other be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master be absent from home, the duellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes to guard them during five days and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city and to make his search opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed and then together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city he shall seal them up again as they were before. There shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be disturbed. As to houses and lands there can be no dispute in this state of ours but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora and in the temples, and no one has put in a claim in them and some one says that he was looking for them during this time, and the possessor is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year the one having the goods and the other looking for them, the claim of the seeker shall not be allowed after the expiration of the year or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market or in the city but only in the country and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after or if he uses them in the city but within the house, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years or ten years if he has them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land there shall be no limit of time or prescription, but whenever the owner finds them he may claim them.

If any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial whether a principal party or his witnesses if the person prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another the suit shall be incomplete and invalid but if he who is prevented be a freeman besides the suit being incomplete [955] the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year and shall be prosecuted for kidnapping by any one who pleases. And if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present

at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judges, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing and if they are not able and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and in any case he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.

If any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend and enemy and if any one makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he, like the receiver of the exile shall undergo the penalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts and there ought to be no excusing or approving, the saying, "Men should receive gifts as the reward of good, but not of evil deeds" for to know which we are doing and to stand fast by our knowledge, is no easy matter. The safest course is to obey the law which says, "Do no service for a bribe, and let him who disobeys if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation for various reasons every man ought to have had his property valued and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country that in this way there may be two valuations and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables.

Touching offerings to the Gods a moderate man should observe moderation in what he offers. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all Gods wherefore let no man dedicate them a second time to the Gods. Gold and silver whether possessed by private persons or in temples, are in other cities provocative of envy [956] and ivory the product of a dead body is not a proper offering brass and iron again are instruments of

on his return home shall straightway go and if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture or if he have himself made any observations let him communicate his discoveries to the whole assembly. And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm and if he be much better let him be praised so much the more, and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours. But if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted pretending to be wise when he is not let him hold no communication with any one whether young or old and if he will hearken to the rulers then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual but if he will not let him die if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws. And if he deserve to be indicted and none of the magistrates indict him let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided.

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad and let him go abroad under these conditions. In the next place the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now there are four kinds of strangers of whom we must make some mention—the first is he who comes and stays throughout the summer: this class are like birds of passage taking wing in pursuit of commerce and flying over the sea to other cities while the season lasts he shall be received in market places and harbours and public buildings near the city but outside by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters and they shall take care that a stranger whoever he be duly receives justice but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation [953]. They shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary and this shall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the Muses such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons and the priests and ministers of the temples should see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a reasonable time let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came and then go away neither having suffered nor done any harm. The priests shall be their judges if any of them receive or do any wrong up to the sum

of fifty drachmae but if any greater charge be brought in such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora. The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land and is to be received with public honours. He is to be received only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot and the host by whom he is entertained in conjunction with the Prytanes shall have the sole charge of what concerns him. There is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators who come from another land to look at ours. In the first place such visits will be rare and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. Let such an one then go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich being one of them himself let him go for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them both learning from them and also teaching them and when he has seen and heard all he shall depart as a friend taking leave of friends and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. These are the customs according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other countries and should send forth her own citizens showing respect to Zeus the God of hospitality not for bidding strangers at meals and sacrifices as in the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile nor driving them away by savage proclamations.

When a man becomes surety let him give the security in a distinct form acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae [954]. The agent of a dishonest or untrustworthy seller shall himself be responsible both the agent and the principal shall be equally liable. If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another he shall enter naked or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he expects to find it there he shall then make his search and the other shall throw open his house and allow him to search things both sealed and

¹ Cf. xi 915

² Cf. Aristotle *Politics* viii. 6 1327 31 39.

unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching, and if the other be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master be absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes to guard them during five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city and so make his search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and then together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city he shall seal them up again as they were before. There shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be disturbed. As to houses and lands there can be no dispute in this state of ours; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora and in the temples, and no one has put in a claim to them, and some one says that he was looking for them during this time, and the possessor is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year the one having the goods and the other looking for them, the claim of the seeker shall not be allowed after the expiration of the year; or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market or in the city but only in the country, and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after; or if he uses them in the city but within the house, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he has them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land there shall be no limit of time or prescription, but when ever the owner finds them he may claim them.

If any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial, whether a principal party or his witnesses, if the person prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be incomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides the suit being incomplete, [955] the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year and shall be prosecuted for kidnapping by any one who pleases. And if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present

at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judges, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they are not able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases; and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and in any case he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.

If any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief; and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend and enemy; and if any one makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he, like the receiver of the exile, shall undergo the penalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding; and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to be no excusing or approving the saying, "Men should receive gifts as the reward of good but not of evil deeds," for to know which we are doing and to stand fast by our knowledge, is no easy matter. The safest course is to obey the law which says, "Do no service for a bribe," and let him who disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation, for various reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued, and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country; that in this way there may be two valuations, and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables.

Touching offerings to the Gods, a moderate man should observe moderation in what he offers. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all Gods; wherefore let no man dedicate them a second time to the Gods. Gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in temples, are in other cities provocative of envy [956] and ivory, the product of a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron again are instruments of

on his return home shall straightway go and if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture or if he have himself made any observations let him communicate his discoveries to the whole assembly And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm and if he be much better let him be praised so much the more and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours But if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted pretending to be wise when he is not let him hold no communication with any one whether young or old and if he will hearken to the rulers then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual but if he will not let him die if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws And if he deserve to be indicted and none of the magistrates indict him let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad and let him go abroad under these conditions In the next place the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit Now there are four kinds of strangers of whom we must make some mention—the first is he who comes and stays throughout the summer this class are like birds of passage taking wing in pursuit of commerce and flying over the sea to other cities while the season lasts he shall be received in market places and harbours and public buildings near the city but outside by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters and they shall take care that a stranger whoever he be duly receives justice but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation [953] They shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary and this shall be as little as possible The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the Muses such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons and the priests and ministers of the temples should see and attend to them But they should not remain more than a reasonable time let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came and then go away neither having suffered nor done any harm The priests shall be their judges if any of them receive or do any wrong up to the sum

of fifty drachmae but if any greater charge be brought in such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land and is to be received with public honours He is to be received only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot and the host by whom he is entertained in conjunction with the Prytanes shall have the sole charge of what concerns him There is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators who come from another land to look at ours In the first place such visits will be rare and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city Let such an one then go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich being one of them himself let him go for example to the house of the superintendent of education confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them both learning from them and also teaching them and when he has seen and heard all he shall depart as a friend taking leave of friends and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect These are the customs according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens showing respect to Zeus the God of hospitality not for bidding strangers at meals and sacrifices as is the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile nor driving them away by savage proclamations

When a man becomes surety let him give the security in a distinct form acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae [954] The agent of a dishonest or untrustworthy seller shall himself be responsible both the agent and the principal shall be equally liable If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another he shall enter naked or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he expects to find it there he shall then make his search and the other shall throw open his house and allow him to search things both sealed and

Cf 950

¹ Cf. xi 915

² Cf. Aristotle *Politics* vii. 6 13-7 31-39.

to the party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with the exception of necessities, and the assignment shall be made through the herald immediately after each session in the hearing of the judges and when the month arrives following the month in which the courts are sitting (unless the paper of the suit has been previously satisfied) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the winner the goods of the loser but if they find that he has not the means of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a denarius, the insolvent person shall not have any right of going in law with any other man and he have satisfied the debt of the winning party but other persons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. And if any one who is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority which condemned him let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their authority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law and if he be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole state and of the laws.

Thus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at length in due time he grows old under the protection of the laws, and his end comes in the order of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the Gods of the under world or of this, shall be decided by the interdicts with absolute authority. Their sepulchres are not to be in places which are fit for cultivation, and there shall be no monuments in such spots, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, their foster-parent, is naturally inclined to provide for them. And let not the dead be placed higher than would be the work of ten men completed in five days nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the dead included in four heroic lines. [959] Nor shall the laying out of the dead in the house continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a

trance only and him who is really dead and speaking generally the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulchre. Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to be our shades or images for the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods, before them to give an account—which is an inspiring hope to the good but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us and they also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. But the living—he should be helped by all his kindred that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world below. If this be true a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him, he should consider that the son, or brother or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own destiny and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. But the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness. Let the law then, be as follows.—The expenditure on the entire funeral of him who is of the highest class, shall not exceed five minae and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class, two minae and for him who is of the fourth class, one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood or manhood, or any other age. And at the end of all let there be some one guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend and let it be glory to him to manage with fairness and moderation what relates to the dead and a discredit to him if they are not well managed. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with custom but to the statesman who adopts custom as his law we must give way in certain particulars. It would be monstrous for

CL. Phaedo 63.

CL. 717 719.

war but of wood let a man bring what offerings he likes provided it be a single block, and in like manner of stone, to the public temples of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can execute in a month. White is a colour suitable to the Gods especially in woven works but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war. The most divine of gifts are birds and images and they should be such as one painter can execute in a single day. And let all other offerings follow a similar rule.

Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible the next thing will be to have justice done. The first of the courts shall consist of elected judges who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelvefold division of the land and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages: if the suit be not decided before the first judges the defendant, if he be defeated the second time shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time let him carry the suit before the select judges and if he be again defeated let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more and if defeated he shall pay a like sum but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision and will insist on proceeding to a third court then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and as I said before half as much again and the plaintiff if he lose shall pay half of the damages claimed. Now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the completion of the number of them and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates and the times at which the several causes should be heard and the youngs and delays and all the things that necessarily concern suits and the order of causes and the time in which answers have to be put in and parties are to appear—of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice.—All lesser and easier matters

which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one [957]. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way and the public and state courts and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them and bringing them to the test of experience until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined and then putting the final seal upon them and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse and the different notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in our own as compared with other states they have been partly mentioned already and another part of them will be mentioned hereafter as we draw near the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge shall justly look and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (*νοῦς*). And of all other words such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose whether written down or uttered in daily conversation whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them as is often the case—of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright procuring for the good the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad on the other hand a conversion from ignorance and intemperance and in general from all unrighteousness as far as their evil minds can be healed but to those whose web of life is in reality finished giving death which is the only remedy for souls in their condition as I may say truly again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise [958] from the whole city.

When the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall regulate their execution.—In the first place the judge shall assign

¹ Cf vi, 66 ix 853 ff

² Cf vi 811

ing me with them, may be truly called the salvation of all.

Cle Yes, Quite so.

Alk Yes, indeed but with what is that intent concerned which, mingling with the sea, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? In a ship, when the pilot and the sailors unite their perceptions with the pilot's mind, do they not save both themselves and their craft?

Cle Very true.

Alk We do not want many illustrations about seameners—What aim would the general of an army or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain a man?

Cle Very good.

[952] *Alk* Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war and do not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in the body?

Cle Certainly.

Alk And a physician who is ignorant about the body that is to say who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory or any others who are objects of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters.

Cle They cannot.

Alk And what would you say of the state? Is a person prone to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the first place, to be called a ruler at all and whether will he ever be able to preserve the of which he does not even know the aim?

Cle Impossible.

Alk And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some education, which, as I was saying, will tell us the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or constitution will lead us to that end. Any state which has no such constitution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.

Cle Very true.

Alk In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?

Cle I am not quite certain, Stranger but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.

Alk You understand me perfectly Cleinias and we must assume, as the argument implies,

that this council possesses all virtue and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing and on this to fix all our aims.

Cle Quite true.

[953] *Alk* Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that these legislators have such different aims nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom and some legislate with a view to two things at once—they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour and to which they would have all things look.

[953] *Cle* Then, Stranger our former assertion will hold, for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only and this, as we admitted was rightly said to be virtue.

Alk Yes.

Cle And we said that virtue was of four kinds?

Alk Quite true.

Cle And that mind was the leader of the four and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?

Alk You follow me capitally Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question—O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior as you declare yourself to be of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?

Cle We cannot, Stranger.

Alk Well but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found?

Cle For example, where?

Alk For example we were saying that there

example that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead but he may forbid cries of lamentation and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the house [960] also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets and the processions of mourners in the streets and may require that before daybreak they should be outside the city Let these, then be our laws relating to such matters and let him who obeys be free from penalty but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all with a fitting penalty Other modes of burial or again the denial of burial which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and parricides and the like, have been devised and are embodied in the preceding laws so that now our work of legislation is pretty nearly at an end but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or acquiring something or establishing something—the end will be attained and finally accomplished when we have provided for the perfect and lasting continuance of our institutions until then our creation is incomplete

Cle That is very good Stranger but I wish you would tell me more clearly what you mean

Ath O Cleinias many things of old time were well said and sung and the saying about the Fates was one of them

Cle What is it?

Ath The saying that Lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first of them and that Clotho or the spinster is the second of them and that Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them and that she is the preserver of the things which we have spoken and which have been compared in a figure to things woven by fire they both (i.e. Atropos and the fire) producing the quality of unchangeableness I am speaking of the things which in a state and government give not only health and salvation to the body but law, or rather preservation of the law in the soul and, if I am not mistaken this seems to be still wanting in our laws we have still to see how we can implant in them this irreversible nature

Cle It will be no small matter if we can only discover how such a nature can be implanted in anything

Ath But it certainly can be so much I clearly see

Cle Then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this quality to our laws for it is ridiculous after a great deal of labour has

Cf Republic x 620

been spent to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation

Megillus I approve of your suggestion and am quite of the same mind with you

Cle Very good And now what according to you is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws and how is it to be effected?

Ath Were we not saying that there must be in our city a council which was to be of this sort [961]—The ten oldest guardians of the law and all those who have obtained prizes of virtue were to meet in the same assembly and the council was also to include those who had visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use in the preservation of the laws and who having come safely home and having been tested in these same matters had proved themselves to be worthy to take part in the assembly—each of the members was to select some young man of not less than thirty years of age he himself judging in the first instance whether the young man was worthy by nature and education and then suggesting him to the others, and if he seemed to them also to be worthy they were to adopt him but if not the decision at which they arrived was to be kept a secret from the citizens at large and more especially from the rejected candidate The meeting of the council was to be held early in the morning when everybody was most at leisure from all other business whether public or private—was not something of this sort said by us before?

Cle True

Ath Then returning to the council I would say further that if we let it down to be the anchor of the state our city having everything which is suitable to her will preserve all that we wish to preserve

Cle What do you mean?

Ath Now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness

Cle Well said and I hope that you will fulfil your intention

Ath Know Cleinias that everything in all that it does has a natural saviour as of an animal the soul and the head are the chief savours

Cle Once more, what do you mean?

Ath The well being of those two is obviously the preservation of every living thing

Cle How is that?

Ath The soul besides other things contains mind and the head besides other things contains sight and hearing and the mind mingling with the noblest of the senses and becom

with them, may be truly called the salvation of all.

Cle Yes, *Quint* so.

Ath Yes, indeed; but with what is that most concerned which, mingling with the sea, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? In a ship when the pilot and the sailors unite their perceptions with the pilot's mind, do they not save both themselves and the craft?

Cle Very true.

Ath We do not want many illustrations of such matters.—What aim would the general of an army or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain it, *Quint*?

Cle Very good.

[962] *Ath* Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war and not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in the body?

Cle Certainly.

Ath And a physician who is ignorant about the body that is to say who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory or any others who are general of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters.

Cle They cannot.

Ath And what would you say of the state? Is a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the first place, to be called a ruler at all and further will he ever be able to preserve the state or even be able to know the aim?

Cle Impossible.

Ath And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some person, which, as I was saying, will tell us the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law of action will advise us to that end. Any state that has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.

Cle Very true.

Ath Is which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?

Cle I am not quite certain, *Stranger*; but I think I suppose that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.

Ath You cannot find me perfectly certain, and we must assume, as I have a general supposition,

that this council possesses all virtue and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing and on this to fix all our aims.

Cle Quite true.

Ath Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom and some legislate with a view to two things at once—they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour and to which they would have all things look.

[963] *Cle* Then, *Stranger* our former assertion will hold, for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only and thus, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.

Ath Yes.

Cle And we said that virtue was of four kinds?

Ath Quite true.

Cle And that mind was the leader of the four and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?

Ath You follow me especially, *Cleitarchus*, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question—O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior as you declare yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. Can you, *Megillus*, and you, *Cleitarchus*, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?

Cle We cannot, *Stranger*.

Ath Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found?

Cle For example, where?

Ath For example, we were saying that there

are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them each of them must be one

Cle Certainly

Ath And further all four of them we call one for we say that courage is virtue and that prudence is virtue and the same of the two others as if they were in reality not many but one that is virtue

Cle Quite so

Ath There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another and have received two names and so of the rest But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue

Cle How do you mean?

Ath I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers

Cle Once more what do you mean?

Ath As I me what is that one thing which I call virtue and then again speak of as two one part being courage and the other wisdom I will tell you how that occurs—One of them has to do with fear in this the beasts also participate and quite young children—I mean courage for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason But without reason there never has been or is or will be a wise and understanding soul it is of a different nature

Cle That is true

Ath I have now told you in what way the two are different and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same [964] Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discerned?

Cle I suppose not

Ath And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue and has won the palm of excellence than these very qualities of which we are now speaking—courage, temperance wisdom justice?

Cle How can there be anything greater?

Ath And ought not the interpreters, the

"*Cf. Laches* 196

teachers the lawgivers the guardians of the other citizens to excel the rest of mankind and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reprov'd what is the nature of virtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are no adequate in speech or action and have no adequate knowledge of virtue the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

Cle Wonder I no

Ath Well then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the herd and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?

Cle What Stranger is the drift of your comparison?

Ath Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state having their souls all full of eyes with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory and inform the elders of all that happens in the city [965] and those whom we compared to the mind because they have many wise thoughts—that is to say the old men—take counsel and making use of the younger men as their ministers and advising with them—in this way both together truly preserve the whole state—Shall this or some other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education?

Cle That they should be equal my good sir, is impossible

Ath Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any which has preceded

Cle Certainly

Ath And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?

Cle Very true

Ath Did we not say that the workman or guardian if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims,

but he should press onward to the one? thus he should know and knowing order all things with a view to it.

Cle True.

Ath And can any one have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things?

Cle Perhaps not.

Ath Not perhaps not, but certainly not, my good sir, is the right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man.

Cle I bow to your authority, Socrates, let us proceed in the way which you propose.

Ath Then, as would a fear we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perform in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four—the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this my friends, we will if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many or four or one? Certainly if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let this matter alone we will.

Cle We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers, I swear that we must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose.

[966] *Ath* What a little before you ask, and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.

Cle Certainly it ought to be if it can be.

Ath Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many or also how and in what way they are one?

Cle They must consider also in what sense they are one.

Ath And are they to consider only and to be unable to set forth what they think?

Cle Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.

Ath And may not the same be said of all

Cle Republic ii. 53^d

good things—that the true guardians of the law should know the truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature?

Cle Certainly.

Ath Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge—to know that they are and know how great is their power as far as in man lies. We do indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things.

Cle It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honourable should be put as far from him.

Ath Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?

Cle What are they?

Ath One is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned—that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man looks upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so godless who did not expect an effect opposite to that which the many imagine. [967] For they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless, because they see, as far as they can see things happening by necessity and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.

Cle But what is the fact?

Ath Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in those days men were wiser about them, and that which is now ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them—that if they had been things without soul and had no mind, they could never have

Cle x. 893.

Cle ibid. 896.

are four kinds of virtue and as there are four of them each of them must be one

Cle Certainly

Ath And further all four of them we call one for we say that courage is virtue and that prudence is virtue and the same of the two others as if they were in reality not many but one that is virtue.

Cle Quite so

Ath There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another and have received two names and so of the rest But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue

Cle How do you mean?

Ath I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers

Cle Once more, what do you mean?

Ath Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue and then again speak of as two one part being courage and the other wisdom I will tell you how that occurs—One of them has to do with fear in this the beasts also participate¹ and quite young children—I mean courage for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason But without reason there never has been or is or will be a wise and understanding soul it is of a different nature

Cle That is true

Ath I have now told you in what way the two are different and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same [964] Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned?

Cle I suppose not

Ath And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue and has won the palm of excellence than these very qualities of which we are now speaking—courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?

Cle How can there be anything greater?

Ath And ought not the interpreters, the

¹ Cf. *Laches* 196

teachers the lawgivers the guardians of the other citizens to excel the rest of mankind and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reprov'd what is the nature of virtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action and have no adequate knowledge of virtue the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

Cle Wonder! no

Ath Well then must we do as we said? Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the herd and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?

Cle What Stranger is the drift of your comparison?

Ath Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians who are chosen for their natural gifts placed in the head of the state having their souls all full of eyes with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory and inform the elders of all that happens in the city [965] and those whom we compared to the mind because they have many wise thoughts—that is to say the old men—take counsel and making use of the younger men as their ministers and advising with them—in this way both together truly preserve the whole state—Shall this or some other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education?

Cle That they should be equal my good sir, is impossible

Ath Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any which has preceded

Cle Certainly

Ath And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?

Cle Very true

Ath Did we not say that the workman or guardian if he be perfect in every respect ought not only to be able to see the many aims

dwelling in the citadel of the land might be come perfect guardians such as we have never seen in all our previous life by reason of the saving virtue which is in them

Meg Dear Cleinias after all that has been said, either we must detain the Stranger and

by supplications and in all manner of ways make him share in the foundation of the city or we must give up the undertaking

Cle Very true Megillus and you must join with me in detaining him

Meg I will

moved with numerical exactness so wonderful and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body once more overturned the world or rather I should say themselves for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared to be full of stones and earth and many other lifeless substances and to these they assigned the causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity and the poets took occasion to be abusive—comparing the philosophers to the dogs uttering vain howlings and talking other nonsense of the same sort. But now as I said the case is reversed.

Cle How so?

Ath No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know these two principles—that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born and is immortal and rules over all bodies moreover as I have now said several times he who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars and gone through the previous training and seen the connection of music with these things and harmonized them all with laws and institutions is not able to give a reason of such things as have a reason.* And he who is unable to acquire this in addition to the ordinary virtues of a [968] citizen can hardly be a good ruler of a whole state but he should be the subordinate of other rulers. Wherefore Cleinias and Megillus let us consider whether we may not add to all the other laws which we have discussed thus further one—that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates which has also shared in the whole scheme of education proposed by us shall be a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state. Shall we propose this?

Cle Certainly my good friend we will if the thing is in any degree possible.

Ath Let us make a common effort to gain such an object for I too will gladly share in the attempt. Of these matters I have had much experience and have often considered them and I dare say that I shall be able to find others who will also help.

Cle I agree Stranger that we should proceed along the road in which God is guiding us and how we can proceed rightly has now to be investigated and explained.

Ath O Megillus and Cleinias about these matters we cannot legislate further until the council is constituted when that is done, then we will determine what authority they shall have of their own but the explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given rightly in a long discourse.

Cle What do you mean and what new thing is this?

Ath In the first place a list would have to be made out of those who by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits are well fitted for the duty of a guardian. In the next place it will not be easy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore to write down the times at which and during which they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction would be a vain thing for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. And so these details although they could not be truly said to be secret might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand because when stated they would have no meaning.

Cle What then are we to do Stranger under these circumstances?

Ath As the proverb says the answer is no secret but open to all of us [969]—We must risk the whole on the chance of throwing as they say thrice six or thrice ace and I am willing to share with you the danger by stating and explaining to you my views about education and nurture which is the question coming to the surface again. The danger is not a slight or ordinary one and I would advise you Cleinias, in particular to see to the matter for if you order rightly the city of the Magnetes or whatever name God may give it you will obtain the greatest glory or at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the estimation of posterity. Dear companions, if this our divine assembly can only be established to them we will hand over the city none of the present company of legislators as I may call them would hesitate about that. And the state will be perfected and become a waking reality which a little while ago we attempted to create as a dream and in idea only mingling together reason and mind in one image in the hope that our citizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated and being educated and

* Cf Republic x 607

* Cf Republic vii 531 ff

Cf Republic ix 592.

rest of one or the friends of the party then in exile, at the time when they themselves were in exile and misfortune.

As I observed these incidents and the men engaged in public affairs, the law too and the reasons, the more closely I examined them and the farther I advanced in life, the more difficult it seemed to me to handle public affairs any more. [d] For it was not possible to be active in politics without friends and trustworthy supporters and to find these ready to my hand was not an easy matter since public affairs at Athens were not carried on in accordance with the manners and practices of our fathers nor was there any ready method by which I could make new friends. The laws too, written and unwritten, were being altered for the worse, and the evil was growing with startling rapidity. The result was that, though at first I had been full of a strong impulse towards political life, [e] as I looked at the course of affairs and in them being swept in all directions by contending currents, my head finally began to waver and, though I did not stop looking to see if there was any likelihood of improvement in these symptoms and in the general course of public life, [f] I postponed action till a suitable opportunity should arise. Finally it became clear to me with regard to all existing communities, that they were on and all misgoverned. For their laws have got into a state that is almost incurable, except by some extraordinary reform with good luck to support it. And I was forced to say when praying to the philosophy that it is by this that men are enabled to see what justice in public and private life really is. Therefore, I said, there will be no cessation of evils for the sons of men, [g] till either those who are pursuing a right and true philosophy receive sovereign power in all States, or those in power in the States by some dispensation of providence become true philosophers.

With these thoughts in my mind I came to Italy and Sicily on my first visit. My first impressions on arrival were those of strong disapproval—disapproval of the kind of life which was there called the life of happiness, stuffed full as it was with the banquets of the Italian Greeks and Syracusans, who ate to repletion twice every day and were never without a partner for the night, [h] and disapproval of the habits which this manner of life produces. For with these habits formed early in life, no man under heaven could possibly attain to wisdom—this man is not capable of such an extraordinary condition. Temperance also is

out of the quest on for such a man and the same applies to virtue generally. No city could remain in a state of tranquillity under any laws whatsoever when men think it right to squander all their property in extravagant excesses, [i] and consider it a duty to be idle in every thing, save except eating and drinking and the laborious prosecution of debauchery. It follows necessarily that the constitutions of such cities must be constantly changing tyrannies, oligarchies and democracies succeeding one another while those who hold the power cannot so much as endure the name of any form of government which maintains justice and equality of rights.

With a mind full of these thoughts, on the top of my previous convictions, [j] I crossed over to Syracuse—led there perhaps by chance—but it really looks as if some higher power was even then planning to lay a foundation for all that has now come to pass with regard to Dion and Syracuse—and for further troubles too. I fear unless you listen to the advice which is now for the second time offered by me. What do I mean by saying that my arrival in Sicily at that moment proved to be the foundation [k] on which all the sequel rests? I was brought into close intercourse with Dion who was then a young man, and explained to him my views as to the ideals at which men should aim, advising him to carry them out in practice. In doing this I seem to have been unaware that I was, in a fashion, without knowing it, contriving the overthrow of the tyranny which subsequently took place. For Dion, who rapidly assimilated my teaching as he did all forms of knowledge, listened to me with an eagerness which I had never seen equalled in any young man, [l] and resolved to live for the future in a better way than the majority of Italian and Sicilian Greeks, having set his affection on virtue in preference to pleasure and self-indulgence. The result was that until the death of Dionysos he lived in a way which rendered him somewhat unpopular among those whose manner of life was that which is usual in the courts of despots.

After that event he came to the conclusion that this conviction, [m] which he himself had gained under the influence of good teaching, was not likely to be confined to himself. Indeed, he saw it being actually implanted in other minds—not many perhaps, but certainly in some and he thought that, with the aid of the Gods Dionysos might perhaps become one of these, and that, if such a thing did come to pass,

The Seventh Letter

PLATO TO THE RELATIVES AND FRIENDS OF DION WELFARE

You write to me that I must consider your views the same as those of Dion [324a] and you urge me to aid your cause so far as I can in word and deed. My answer is that if you have the same opinion and desire as he had, I consent to aid your cause, but if not, I shall think more than once about it. Now what his purpose and desire was, I can inform you from no mere conjecture, but from positive knowledge. For when I made my first visit to Sicily, being then about forty years old, Dion was of the same age as Hipparinos is now, and the opinion which he then formed was that which he always retained [b]. I mean the belief that the Sicilians ought to be free and governed by the best laws. So it is no matter for surprise if some God should make Hipparinos adopt the same opinion as Dion about forms of government. But it is well worth while that you should all, old as well as young, hear the way in which this opinion was formed, and I will attempt to give you an account of it from the beginning. For the present is a suitable opportunity.

In my youth I went through the same experience as many other men. I fancied that if early in life I became my own master [c], I should at once embark on a political career. And I found myself confronted with the following occurrences in the public affairs of my own city. The existing constitution being generally condemned, a revolution took place, and fifty-one men came to the front as rulers of the revolutionary government, namely eleven in the city and ten in the Peiræus—each of these bodies being in charge of the market and municipal matters—while thirty were appointed rulers with full powers over public affairs as a whole [d]. Some of these were relatives and acquaintances of mine, and they at once invited me to share in their doings, as something to which I had a claim. The effect on me was not surprising in the case of a young man. I considered

that they would of course so manage the State as to bring men out of a bad way of life into a good one. So I watched them very closely to see what they would do.

And seeing as I did that in quite a short time they made the former government seem by comparison something precious as gold—for among other things they tried to send a friend of mine [e], the aged Socrates, whom I should scarcely scruple to describe as the most upright man of that day, with some other persons to carry off one of the citizens by force to [3-5a] execution, in order that whether he wished it or not, he might share the guilt of their conduct, but he would not obey them, risking all consequences in preference to becoming a partner in their iniquitous deeds—seeing all these things and others of the same kind on a considerable scale, I disapproved of their proceedings and withdrew from any connection with the abuses of the time.

Not long after that a revolution terminated the power of the thirty and the form of government as it then was. And once more, though with more hesitation, I began to be moved by the desire to take part in public and political affairs [b]. Well, even in the new government, unsettled as it was, events occurred which one would naturally view with disapproval, and it was not surprising that in a period of revolution excessive penalties were inflicted by some persons on political opponents, though those who had returned from exile at that time showed very considerable forbearance. But once more it happened that some of those in power brought my friend Socrates, whom I have mentioned to trial before a court of law [c], laying a most iniquitous charge against him, and one most inappropriate in his case, for it was on a charge of impiety that some of them prosecuted and others condemned and executed the very man who would not participate in the iniquitous ar-

had come upon me for faint heartedness and cowardice.

On my arrival to cut a long story short I found the court of Dionysios full of intrigues and of attempts to create in the [c] sovereign ill feeling against Dion I combated these as far as I could but with very little success and in the fourth month or thereabouts charging Dion with conspiracy to seize the throne, Dionysios put him on board a small boat and expelled him from Syracuse with ignominy All of us who were Dion's friends were afraid that he might take vengeance on one or other of us as an accomplice in Dion's conspiracy With regard to me, there was even a rumour current in Syracuse that I had been put to death by Dionysios as the cause of all that had occurred [d] Perceiving that we were all in this state of mind and apprehending that our fears might lead to some serious consequence, he now tried to win all of us over by kindness me in particular he encouraged, bidding me be of good cheer and entreating me on all grounds to remain For my flight from him was not likely to redound to his credit, but my staying might do so There fore, he made a great pretence of entreating me. And we know that the entreaties of sovereigns are mixed with compulsion. [e] So to secure his object he proceeded to render my departure impossible, bringing me into the acropolis and establishing me in quarters from which not a single ship's captain would have taken me away against the will of Dionysios, nor indeed with out a special messenger sent by him to order my removal Nor was there a single merchant or a single official in charge of points of departure from the country who would have allowed me to depart unaccompanied, and would not have promptly seized me and taken me back to Dionysios, especially since a statement had now been circulated contradicting the previous rumours and giving out that Dionysios was becoming extraordinarily [330a] attached to Plato. What were the facts about this attachment? I must tell the truth. As time went on, and as intercourse made him acquainted with my disposition and character he did become more and more attached to me, and wished me to praise him more than I praised Dion, and to look upon him as more specially my friend than Dion, and he was extraordinarily eager about this sort of thing But when confronted with the one way in which this might have been done, if it was to be done at all, [b] he shrank from coming into close and intimate relations with me as a pupil and listener to my discourses

on philosophy fearing the danger suggested by mischief makers, that he might be ensnared and so Dion would prove to have accomplished all his object. I endured all this patiently retaining the purpose with which I had come and the hope that he might come to desire the philosophic life. But his resistance prevailed against me

The time of my first visit to Sicily and my stay there was taken up with all these incidents [c] On a later occasion I left home and again came on an urgent summons from Dionysios But before giving the motives and particulars of my conduct then and showing how suitable and right it was I must first, in order that I may not treat as the main point what is only a side issue, give you my advice as to what your acts should be in the present position of affairs afterwards, to satisfy those who put the question why I came a second time, I will deal fully with the facts about my second visit what I have now to say is this.

He who advises a sick man whose manner of life is prejudicial to health, [d] is clearly bound first of all to change his patient's manner of life and if the patient is willing to obey him he may go on to give him other advice But if he is not willing I shall consider one who declines to advise such a patient to be a man and a physician, and one who gives in to him to be unmanly and unprofessional In the same way with regard to a State whether it be under a single ruler or more than one, if, while the government is being carried on methodically and in a right course, [e] it asks advice about any details of policy it is the part of a wise man to advise such people But when men are travelling altogether outside the path of right government and flatly refuse to move in the right path and start by giving notice to their adviser that he must leave the government alone and make no change in it under penalty of death—if such men [331a] should order their counsellors to pander to their wishes and desires and to advise them in what way their object may most readily and easily be once for all accomplished, I should consider as unmanly one who accepts the duty of giving such forms of advice, and one who refuses it to be a true man

Holding these views whenever anyone consults me about any of the weightiest matters affecting his own life as, for instance, the acquisition of property or the proper treatment of body or [b] mind if it seems to me that his daily life rests on any system, or if he seems likely to listen to advice about the things on

the result would be a life of unspeakable happiness both for himself and for the rest of the Syracusans. Further he thought it essential that I should come to Syracuse by all manner of means and with the utmost possible speed to be his partner in these plans [d] remembering in his own case how readily intercourse with me had produced in him a longing for the noblest and best life. And if it should produce a similar effect on Dionysios as his aim was that it should, he had great hope that without bloodshed, loss of life and those disastrous events which have now taken place he would be able to introduce the true life of happiness throughout the whole territory.

Holding these sound views Dion persuaded Dionysios to send for me: he also wrote himself entreating me to come by all manner of means and with the utmost possible speed [e] before certain other persons coming in contact with Dionysios should turn him aside into some way of life other than the best. What he said though perhaps it is rather long to repeat was as follows. What opportunities he said shall we wait for, greater than those now offered to us by Providence? [328a] And he described the Syracusan empire in Italy and Sicily his own influential position in it and the youth of Dionysios and how strongly his desire was directed towards philosophy and education. His own nephews and relatives he said, would be readily attracted towards the principles and manner of life described by me and would be most influential in attracting Dionysios in the same direction so that now if ever we should see the accomplishment of every hope that the same persons might actually become both philosophers and the rulers of great States [b]. These were the appeals addressed to me and much more to the same effect.

My own opinion so far as the young men were concerned and the probable line which their conduct would take, was full of apprehension—for young men are quick in forming desires which often take directions conflicting with one another. But I knew that the character of Dion's mind was naturally a stable one and had also the advantage of somewhat advanced years.

Therefore I pondered the matter and was in two minds as to whether I ought to listen to entreaties and go or how I ought to act and finally the scale turned in favour of the view that if ever anyone was to try to carry out in practice my ideas about [c] laws and constitutions now was the time for making the at-

tempt for if only I could fully convince one man I should have secured thereby the accomplishment of all good things.

With these views and thus nerved to the task, I sailed from home, not in the spirit which some imagined but principally through a feeling of shame with regard to myself lest I might some day appear to myself wholly and solely a mere man of words one who would never of his own will lay his hand to any act. Also there was reason to think that I should be betraying first and foremost my friendship and comradeship with Dion, [d] who in very truth was in a position of considerable danger. If therefore any thing should happen to him, or if he were banished by Dionysios and his other enemies and coming to us as exile addressed this question to me. Plato I have come to you as a fugitive, not for want of hoplites nor because I had no cavalry for defence against my enemies but for want of words and power of persuasion which I knew to be a special gift of yours enabling you to lead young men into the path of goodness and justice and to establish in every case relations of friendship and comradeship among them [e]. It is for the want of this assistance on your part that I have left Syracuse and am here now. And the disgrace attaching to your treatment of me is a small matter. But philosophy—whose praises you are always singing while you say she is held in dishonour by the rest of mankind—must we not say that philosophy along with me has now been betrayed so far as your action was concerned? [329a] Had I been living at Megara you would certainly have come to give me your aid towards the objects for which I asked it or you would have thought yourself the most contemptible of mankind. But as it is do you think that you will escape the reputation of cowardice by making excuses about the distance of the journey the length of the sea voyage and the amount of labour involved? Far from it. To reproaches of this kind what creditable reply could I have made? Surely none.

[b] I took my departure therefore, acting so far as a man can act, in obedience to reason and justice and for these reasons leaving my own occupations, which were certainly not discreditable ones to put myself under a tyranny which did not seem likely to harmonise with my teaching or with myself. By my departure I secured my own freedom from the displeasure of Zeus Xenios and made myself clear of any charge on the part of philosophy which would have been exposed to detraction if any disgrace

levins, a tribute for the barbarians. This was the language and these the exhortations given by us, the conspirators against Dionysios according to the charges circulated from various sources—charges which, prevailing as they did with Dionysios, caused the expulsion of Dion and reduced me to a state of apprehension. But when—to summarise great events which happened in no great time—Dion returned from the Peloponnese [b] and Athens, his advice to Dionysios took the form of action.

To proceed—when Dion had twice over delivered the city and restored it to the citizens, the Syracusans went through the same changes of feeling towards him as Dionysios had gone through, when Dion attempted first to educate him and train him to be a sovereign worthy of supreme power and, when that was done, to be his coadjutor in all the details of his career Dionysios listened to those who circulated slanders to the effect that Dion was aiming at the tyranny in all the steps which [c] he took at that time, his intention being that Dionysios, when his mind had fallen under the spell of culture, should neglect the government and leave it in his hands and that he should then appropriate it for himself and treacherously depose Dionysios. These slanders were victorious on that occasion: they were so once more when circulated among the Syracusans, winning a victory which took an extraordinary course and proved disgraceful to its authors. The story of what then took place is one which deserves careful attention on the part of those who are [d] in a position to deal with the present situation.

Lisias, an Athenian and friend of Dion, came as his ally to the court of Dionysios, in order that Lisias might create good will in place of a state of war in my conflict with the authors of these slanders I was worsted. When Dionysios tried to persuade me by offers of honours and wealth to attach myself to him, and with a view to this to a decent colour to Dion's expulsion to be a witness and friend on his side, he failed completely in his attempt. Later on, [e] when Dion returned from exile, he took with him from Athens two brothers, who had been his friends not from community in philosophic study but with the ordinary companionship common among most friends, which they form as the result of relations of hospitality and the intercourse which occurs when one man instructs the other in the mysteries. It was from this kind of intercourse and from services connected with his return that these two helpers in his restoration became his companions. Having come to

Sicily [33 a] when they perceived that Dion had been misrepresented to the Sicilian Greeks whom he had liberated as one that plotted to become monarch, they not only betrayed their companion and friend, but shared personally in the guilt of his murder standing by his murderers as supporters with weapons in their hands. The guilt and impiety of their conduct I neither excuse nor do I dwell upon it. For many others make it their business to harp upon it, [b] and will make it their business in the future. But I do take exception to the statement that, because they were Athenians, they have brought shame upon this city. For I say that he too is an Athenian who refused to betray this same Dion, when he had the offer of riches and many other honours. For his was no common or vulgar friendship but rested on community in liberal education, and this is the one thing in which a wise man will put his trust far more than in ties of personal and bodily kinship. So the two murderers of Dion were not of sufficient importance to be causes of disgrace [c] to this city as though they had been men of any note.

All this has been said with a view to counselling the friends and family of Dion. And in addition to this I give for the third time to you the same advice and counsel which I have given twice before to others—not to enslave Sicily nor any other State to despotism—this is my counsel—but to put it under the rule of laws—for the other course is better neither for the enslavers nor for the enslaved, [d] for themselves, their children's children and descendants: the attempt is in every way fraught with disaster. It is only small and mean natures that are bent upon securing such gains for themselves, natures that know nothing of goodness and justice, divine as well as human, in this life and in the next.

These are the lessons which I tried to teach, first to Dion, secondly to Dionysios, and now for the third time to you. Do you obey me, thinking of Zeus the Preserver the patron of third ventures, and looking at the lot of Dionysios and Dion, of whom the one who disobeyed me is living in dishonour [e] while he who obeyed me has died honourably. For the one thing which is wholly right and noble is to strive for that which is most honourable for a man's self and for his country and to face the consequences whatever they may be. For none of us can escape death, nor if a man could do so, would it, as the vulgar suppose, make him happy. For nothing evil or good, which is worth

which he consults me, I advise him with readiness, and do not content myself with giving him a merely perfunctory answer. But if a man does not consult me at all or evidently does not intend to follow my advice, I do not take the initiative in advising such a man, and will not use compulsion to him, even if he be my own son. I would advise a slave under such circumstances, and would use compulsion to him if he were unwilling. [c] To a father or mother I do not think that piety allows one to offer compulsion unless they are suffering from an attack of insanity and if they are following any regular habits of life which please them but do not please me, I would not offend them by offering useless advice nor would I flatter them or truckle to them, providing them with the means of satisfying desires which I myself would sooner die than cherish. The wise man should go through life with the same attitude of mind towards his country. If she should appear to him to be following a policy which is not a [d] good one he should say so provided that his words are not likely either to fall on deaf ears or to lead to the loss of his own life. But force against his native land he should not use in order to bring about a change of constitution, when it is not possible for the best constitution to be introduced without driving men into exile or putting them to death. He should keep quiet and offer up prayers for his own welfare and for that of his country.

These are the principles in accordance with which I should advise you as also, jointly with Dion. I advised Dionysios bidding him in the first place to live his daily life in a way that would make him as far as possible master of himself and able to [e] gain faithful friends and supporters in order that he might not have the same experience as his father. For his father having taken under his rule many great cities of Sicily which had been utterly destroyed by the barbarians was not able to found them afresh and to establish in them trustworthy governments carried on by his own supporters. [33a] either by men who had no ties of blood with him or by his brothers whom he had brought up when they were younger and had raised from humble station to high office and from poverty to immense wealth. Not one of these was he able to work upon by persuasion, instruction, services and ties of kindred so as to make him a partner in his rule and he showed himself inferior to Darius with a sevenfold inferiority. For Darius did not put his trust in brothers or in men whom he had

brought up, but only in his confederates in the overthrow of the Medes and Eunuch [b] and to these he assigned portions of his empire, seven in number each of them greater than all Sicily, and they were faithful to him and did not attack either him or one another. Thus he showed a pattern of what the good lawgiver and king ought to be for he drew up laws by which he has secured the Persian empire in safety down to the present time.

Again to give another instance, the Athenians took under their rule very many cities not founded by themselves, which had been hard hit by the barbarians but were still in existence, and maintained their rule over these for seventy years [c] because they had in each of them men whom they could trust. But Dionysios, who had gathered the whole of Sicily into a single city and was so clever that he trusted no one, only secured his own safety with great difficulty. For he was badly off for trustworthy friends and there is no surer criterion of virtue and vice than this whether a man is or is not destitute of such friends.

This then was the advice which Dion and I gave to Dionysios since, [d] owing to the bringing up which he had received from his father he had had no advantages in the way of education or of suitable lessons in the first place and in the second place that after starting in this way, he should make friends of others among his connections who were of the same age and were in sympathy with his pursuit of virtue but above all that he should be in harmony with himself for this it was of which he was remarkably in need. This we did not say in plain words for that would not have been safe but in covert language we maintained that every man in this way would save both himself and those whom he was leading [e] and if he did not follow this path he would do just the opposite of this. And after proceeding on the course which we described and making himself a wise and temperate man if he were then to found again the cities of Sicily which had been laid waste and bind them together by laws and constitutions so as to be loyal to him and to one another in their resistance to the attacks of the barbarians he would we told him [33a] make his father's empire not merely double what it was but many times greater. For if these things were done, his way would be clear to a more complete subjugation of the Carthaginians than that which befell them in Gelon's time whereas in our own day his father had followed the opposite course of

know that in times of civil strife there is no respite from trouble till the victors make an end of feeding their grudge by combats and banishments and executions, and of wreaking their vengeance on their enemies [337a] They should master themselves and enacting impartial laws, framed not to gratify themselves more than the conquered party should compel men to obey these by two retraining forces, respect and fear fear because they are the masters and can display superior force respect, because they rise superior to pleasures and are willing and able to be servants to the laws. There is no other way save this for terminating the troubles of a city that is [b] in a state of civil strife but a constant continuance of internal disorders, struggles, hatred and mutual distrust is the common lot of cities which are in that plight.

Therefore, those who have for the time being gained the upper hand when they desire to secure their position must by their own act and choice select from all Hellas men whom they have ascertained to be the best for the purpose. These must in the first place be men of mature years, who have children and wives at home, and, as far as possible, a long line of ancestors of good repute, and all must be possessed of sufficient property. For a city of ten thousand householders their numbers should be [c] fifty that is enough. These they must induce to come from their own homes by entreaties and the promise of the highest honours and having induced them to come they must entreat and command them to draw up laws after binding themselves by oath to show no partiality either to conquerors or to conquered but to give equal and common laws to the whole State.

When laws have been enacted what every thing then hinges on is this [d] If the conquerors show more obedience to the laws than the conquered the whole State will be full of security and happiness, and there will be an escape from all your troubles. But if they do not, then do not summon me or any other helper to aid you, just those who do not obey the counsel I now give you. For this course is akin to that which Dion and I attempted to carry out with our hearts set on the welfare of Syracuse. It is indeed a second best course. The first and best was that scheme of welfare to all mankind which we attempted to carry out with the co-operation of Dionysius but some chance, mightier than men, [e] brought it to nothing. Do you now with good fortune attending you and with Hecatas' help try to bring your efforts to a happier issue.

Let this be the end of my advice and injunction and of the narrative of my first visit to Dionysius. Whoever wishes may next hear of my second journey and voyage, and learn that it was a reasonable and suitable proceeding. My first period of residence in Sicily was occupied in the way which I related [338a] before giving my advice to the relatives and friends of Dion. After those events I persuaded Dionysius by such arguments as I could to let me go and we made an agreement as to what should be done when peace was made for at that time there was a state of war in Sicily. Dionysius said that, when he had put the affairs of his empire in a position of greater safety for himself he would send for Dion and me again and he desired that Dion should regard what had befallen him not as an exile, [b] but as a change of residence. I agreed to come again on these conditions.

When peace had been made, he began sending for me he requested that Dion should wait for another year but begged that I should by all means come. Dion now kept urging and entreating me to go. For persistent rumours came from Sicily that Dionysius was now once more possessed by an extraordinary desire for philosophy. For this reason Dion pressed me urgently not to decline his invitation. But though I was well aware that as regards philosophy such symptoms were not uncommon [c] in young men still it seemed to me safer at that time to part company altogether with Dion and Dionysius and I offended both of them by replying that I was an old man and that the steps now being taken were quite at variance with the previous agreement.

After this, it seems, Archytas came to the court of Dionysius. Before my departure I had brought him and his Tarentine [d] circle into friendly relations with Dionysius. There were some others in Syracuse who had received some instruction from Dion and others had learnt from these, getting their heads full of erroneous teaching on philosophical questions. These, it seems, were attempting to hold discussions with Dionysius on questions connected with such subjects, in the idea that he had been fully instructed in my views. Now he is not at all devoid of natural gifts for learning, and he has a great craving for honour and glory. What was said probably pleased him and he felt some shame when it became clear that he had not taken advantage of [e] my teaching during my visit. For these reasons he conceived a desire for more definite instruction, and his love of glory was an additional incentive to him. The

mentioning at all [335a] belongs to things soulless but good or evil will be the portion of every soul either while attached to the body or when separated from it

And we should in very truth always believe those ancient and sacred teachings, which declare that the soul is immortal that it has judges, and suffers the greatest penalties when it has been separated from the body. Therefore also we should consider it a lesser evil to suffer great wrongs and outrages than to do them. The covetous man, impoverished as he is in the soul turns a deaf ear to this teaching [b] or if he hears it he laughs it to scorn with fancied superiority and shamelessly snatches for himself from every source whatever his bestial fancy supposes will provide for him the means of eating or drinking or glutting himself with that slavish and gross pleasure which is falsely called after the goddess of love. He is blind and cannot see in those acts of plunder which are accompanied by impiety what heinous guilt is attached to each wrongful deed and that the offender must drag with him the burden of this impiety while he moves about on earth and when he has travelled beneath the earth on a journey which has every circumstance of shame and misery [c]

It was by urging these and other like truths that I convinced Dion and it is I who have the best right to be angered with his murderers in much the same way as I have with Dionysios. For both they and he have done the greatest injury to me and I might almost say to all mankind they by slaying the man that was willing to act righteously and he by refusing to act righteously during the whole of his rule [d] when he held supreme power in which rule if philosophy and power had really met together it would have sent forth a light to all men. Greeks and barbarians establishing fully for all the true belief that there can be no happiness either for the community or for the individual man unless he passes his life under the rule of righteousness with the guidance of wisdom either possessing these virtues in himself or living under the rule of godly men and having received a right training and education in morals [e] These were the aims which Dionysios injured and for me everything else is a trifling injury compared with this

The murderer of Dion has without knowing it done the same as Dionysios. For as regards Dion I know right well so far as it is possible for a man to say anything positively about other men that if he had got the supreme power he

would never have turned his mind to any other form of rule [336a] but that dealing first with Syracuse, his own native land when he had made an end of her slavery clothed her in bright apparel and given her the garb of freedom he would then by every means in his power have ordered aright the lives of his fellow-citizens by suitable and excellent laws and the thing next in order which he would have set his heart to accomplish was to found again all the States of Sicily and make them free from the barbarians driving out some and subduing others an easier task for him than it was for Hiero [b] If these things had been accomplished by a man who was just and brave and temperate and a philosopher the same belief with regard to virtue would have been established among the majority which if Dionysios had been won over would have been established, I might almost say among all mankind and would have given them salvation. But now some higher power or avenging fiend has fallen upon them inspiring them with lawlessness godlessness and acts of recklessness issuing from ignorance the seed from which all evils for all mankind take root and grow and will in future bear the bitterest harvest for those who brought them into being. This ignorance it was which in that second venture wrecked and ruined everything

[c] And now for good luck's sake let us on this third venture abstain from words of ill omen. But, nevertheless I advise you his friends to imitate in Dion his love for his country and his temperate habits of daily life and to try with better auspices to carry out his wishes—what these were you have heard from me in plain words. And whoever among you can not live the simple Dorian life according to the customs of your forefathers [d] but follows the manner of life of Dion's murderers and of the Sicilians do not invite this man to join you or expect him to do any loyal or salutary act but invite all others to the work of resetting all the States of Sicily and establishing equality under the laws summoning them from Sicily itself and from the whole Peloponnese—and have no fear even of Athens for there, also are men who excel all mankind in their devotion to virtue and in hatred of the reckless acts of those who shed the blood of friends

But if after all this is work for a future time, whereas immediate action is called for by the disorders of all sorts and [e] kinds which arise every day from your state of civil strife, every man to whom Providence has given even a moderate share of right intelligence ought to

temper but a mere surface colouring of opinions penetrating like sunburn only skin deep when they see how great the range of studies is, [e] how much labour is involved in it and how necessary to the pursuit it is to have an orderly regulation of the daily life, come to the conclusion that the thing is difficult and impossible for them, [341a] and are actually incapable of carrying out the course of study which some of them persuade themselves that they have sufficiently studied the whole matter and have no need of any further effort. This is the sure test and is the safest one to apply to those who live in luxury and are incapable of continuous effort: it ensures that such a man shall not throw the blame upon his teacher but on himself, because he cannot bring to the pursuit all the qualities necessary to it. Thus it came about that I said to Dionysios what I did say on that occasion.

I did not, however, give a complete exposition, nor did Dionysios ask for one. [b] For he professed to know many and those the most important, points and to have a sufficient hold of them through instruction given by others. I hear also that he has since written about what he heard from me, composing what professes to be his own handbook, very different so he says, from the doctrines which he heard from me but of its contents I know nothing. I know indeed that others have written on the same subjects but who they are, is more than they know themselves. Thus much, at least, I can say about all writers, [c] past or future, who say they know the things to which I devote myself whether by hearing the teaching of me or of others, or by their own discoveries—that according to my view it is not possible for them to have any real skill in the matter. There neither is nor ever will be a treasure of mine on the subject. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another. [d] and thereafter sustains itself. Yet thus much I know—that if the things were written or put into words it would be done best by me, and that, if they were written badly I should be the person most pained. Again if they had appeared to me to admit adequately of writing and exposition, what talk in life could I have performed nobler than this to raise what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature of things into the light of all [e] to see? But I do not think it a good thing for men

that there should be a disquisition as it is called on this topic—except for some few who are able with a little teaching to find it out for themselves. As for the rest, it would fill some of them quite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt and others with lofty and vain glorious expectations as though they had learnt something high and mighty.

[341a] On this point I intend to speak a little more at length for perhaps, when I have done so things will be clearer with regard to my present subject. There is an argument which holds good against them in who ventures to put anything whatever into writing on questions of this nature: it has often before been stated by me, and it seems suitable to the present occasion.

For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted: fourth there is the knowledge itself. [b] and as fifth we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists. The first is the name the second the definition the third the image and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing spoken of and its name is that very word which we have just uttered. The second thing belonging to it is its definition made up of names and verbal forms. For that which has the name round angular or circle, might be defined as that which has the distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal. [c] Third, comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe and broken up—none of which things can happen to the circle itself—to which the other things mentioned have reference for it is something of a different order from them. Fourth comes knowledge intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in words nor in bodily shapes but in souls—from which it is clear that it is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from the three things mentioned before. [d] Of these things intelligence comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth and the others are farther distant.

The same applies to straight as well as to circular form to colours to the good the beautiful the just, to all bodies whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature, to fire water and all such things, to every living being, to character in souls, and to all things done and suffered. For in the case of all these

real reasons why he had learnt nothing during my previous visit have just been set forth in the preceding narrative. Accordingly now that I was safe at home and had refused his second invitation as I just now related Dionysios seems to have felt all manner of anxiety lest certain people should suppose that I was unwilling to visit him again [339a] because I had formed a poor opinion of his natural gifts and character and because knowing as I did his manner of life I disapproved of it.

It is right for me to speak the truth and make no complaint if anyone after hearing the facts forms a poor opinion of my philosophy and thinks that the tyrant was in the right. Dionysios now invited me for the third time sending a trireme to ensure me comfort on the voyage. He sent also Archedemo—one of those who had spent some time with Archytes [b] and of whom he supposed that I had a higher opinion than of any of the Sicilian Greeks—and with him other men of repute in Sicily. These all brought the same report that Dionysios had made remarkable progress in philosophy. He also sent a very long letter knowing as he did my relations with Dion and Dion's eagerness also that I should take ship and go to Syracuse. The letter was framed in its opening sentences to meet all these conditions and the tenor of it was as follows [c]. Dionysios to Plato here followed the customary greeting and immediately after it he said: "If in compliance with our request you come now in the first place Dion's affairs will be dealt with in whatever way you yourself desire. I know that you will desire what is reasonable and I shall consent to it. But if not none of Dion's affairs will have results in accordance with your wishes with regard either to Dion himself or to other matters. This he said in these words [d]. The rest it would be tedious and inopportune to quote. Other letters arrived from Archytes and the Tarentines praising the philosophical studies of Dionysios and saying that, if I did not now come I should cause a complete rupture in their friendship with Dionysios which had been brought about by me and was of no small importance to their political interests."

When this invitation came to me at that time in such terms and those who had come from Sicily and Italy were trying to drag me thither while my friends at Athens were literally pushing me out with their urgent entreaties [e] it was the same old tale—that I must not betray Dion and my Tarentine friends and supporters. Also I myself had a lurking feeling that

there was nothing surprising in the fact that a young man quick to learn hearing talk of the great truths of philosophy should feel a craving for the higher life. I thought therefore that I must put the matter definitely to the test to see whether his desire was genuine or the reverse, and on no account leave such an impulse unaided nor make myself responsible for such a deep and real disgrace, [340a] if the reports brought by anyone were really true. So blindfolding myself with this reflection I set out, with many fears and with no very favourable anticipations, as was natural enough. However I went, and my action on this occasion at any rate was really a case of "the third to the Preserver" for I had the good fortune to return safely and for this I must, next to the God, thank Dionysios because, though many wished to make an end of me, he prevented them and paid some proper respect to my situation.

[b] On my arrival I thought that first I must put to the test the question whether Dionysios had really been kindled with the fire of philosophy or whether all the reports which had come to Athens were empty rumours. Now there is a way of putting such things to the test which is not to be despised and is well suited to monarchs especially to those who have got their heads full of erroneous teaching. Which immediately on my arrival I found to be very much the case with Dionysios. One should show such men what philosophy is in all its extent what the range of studies is by which it is approached [c] and how much labour it involves. For the man who has heard this, if he has the true philosophic spirit and that godlike temperament which makes him akin to philosophy and worthy of it thinks that he has been told of a marvellous road lying before him that he must forthwith press on with all his strength and that life is not worth living if he does anything else. After this he uses to the full his own powers and those of his guide in the path, and relaxes not his efforts till he has either reached the end of the whole course of study or gained such power that he is not incapable of directing his steps without the aid of a guide [d]. This is the spirit and these are the thoughts by which such a man guides his life carrying out his work whatever his occupation may be but throughout it all ever cleaving to philosophy and to such rules of diet in his daily life as will give him inward sobriety and therewith quickness in learning a good memory and reasoning power the kind of life which is opposed to this he consistently hates. Those who have not the true philosophic

gression will know well that, if Dionysios or some else, great or small, has written a treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things, he has, so I say, neither heard nor seen any sound teaching about the subject of a treatise; otherwise, he would have had the same reverence for it, which I have, and would not shrink from putting it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness. For he wrote it, not as an aid to memory—since there is no risk of forgetting it, [e] if a man's soul has once laid hold of it; for it is expressed in the shortest of sentences—but if he wrote it at all, it was from a mean craving for honour, either putting it forth as his own invention, or to figure as a man possessed of culture, of which he was not worthy if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it. [345a] If then Dionysios gained this culture from the one lesson which he had from me, we may perhaps grant him the possession of it, though how he acquired it—God wot, as the Theban says, for I gave him the teaching, which I have described, on that one occasion and never again.

The next point which requires to be made clear to anyone who wishes to discover how things really happened, is the reason why it came about that I did not continue my teaching in a second and third lesson and yet oftener. Does Dionysios, after a single lesson, [b] believe himself to know the matter and has he an accurate knowledge of it, either as having discovered it for himself or learnt it before from others, or does he believe my teaching to be worthless, or thirdly to be beyond his range and too great for him, and himself to be really unable to live as one who goes as his mind to wisdom and virtue? For if he thinks it worthless, he will have to contend with many who say the opposite, and who would be held in far higher respect as judges than Dionysios. If, on the other hand, he thinks he has discovered or learnt the things and that they are worth having, as part of a liberal education, how could he, unless he is an extraordinary person, [c] have so recklessly dishonoured the master who has led the way in these subjects. How he dishonoured him, I will now state.

Up to this time he had allowed Dion to remain in possession of his property and to receive the income from it. But not long after the foregoing events, as if he had entirely forgotten his letter to that effect, he no longer allowed Dion's trustees to send him remittances to the Peloponnese, on the pretence that the owner of the property was not Dion but Dion's son, his

own nephew [d] of whom he himself was legally the trustee. These were the actual facts which occurred up to the point which we have reached. They had opened my eyes as to the value of Dionysios' desire for philosophy and I had every right to complain, whether I wished to do so or not. Now by this time it was summer and the season for sea voyages, therefore I decided that I must not be vexed with Dionysios rather than with myself and those who had forced me to come for the third time into the [e] strait of Sicily,

*that once again I might
To sell Charybdis' measure back my course*

but must tell Dionysios that it was impossible for me to remain after this outrage had been put upon Dion. He tried to soothe me and begged me to remain, not thinking it desirable for himself that I should arrive post haste in person as the bearer of such tidings. When his entreaties produced no effect, he promised that he himself would provide me with transport. [346a] For my intention was to embark on one of the trading ships and sail away being indignant and thinking it my duty to face all dangers, in case I was prevented from going—since plainly and obviously I was doing no wrong, but was the party wronged.

Seeing me not at all inclined to stay, he devised the following scheme to make me stay during that sailing season. On the next day he came to me and made a plausible proposal.

Let us put an end," [b] he said, "to these constant quarrels between you and me about Dion and his affairs. For your sake I will do this for Dion. I require him to take his own property and reside in the Peloponnese, not as an exile, but on the understanding that it is open for him to migrate here, when this step has the joint approval of himself, me, and you his friends, and this shall be open to him on the understanding that he does not plot against me. You and your friends and Dion's friends here must be sureties for him in this, and he must give you security. Let the funds which he receives be deposited in the Peloponnese and at [c] Athens, with persons approved by you, and let Dion enjoy the income from them but have no power to take them out of deposit without the approval of you and your friends. For I have no great confidence in him, that, if he has this property at his disposal, he will act justly towards me, for it will be no small amount, but I have more confidence in you and your friends. See if this satisfies you and

no one [e] if he has not some how or other got hold of the four things first mentioned, can ever be completely a partaker of knowledge of the fifth. Further, on account of the weakness of language these (i.e. the four) attempt to show what each thing is like, [343a] not less than what each thing is. For this reason no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language especially not in language that is unchangeable which is true of that which is set down in written characters.

Again you must learn the point which comes next. Every circle of those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere it has contact with the straight. But the circle itself, we say, has nothing in it either smaller or greater of that which is its opposite. We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of them [b] and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being called straight and the straight things round so for those who make changes and call things by opposite names nothing will be less permanent (than a name). Again with regard to the definition if it is made up of names and verbal forms the same remark holds that there is no sufficiently durable permanence in it. And there is no end to the instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers but the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier that whereas there are two things that which has real being [c] and that which is only a quality when the soul is seeking to know not the quality but the essence each of the four presenting to the soul by word and in act that which it is not seeking (i.e. the quality) a thing open to refutation by the senses being merely the thing presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement or the act of showing fills one may say every man with puzzlement and perplexity.

Now in subjects in which by reason of our defective education, we have not been accustomed even to search for the truth but are satisfied with whatever images are presented to us we are not held up to ridicule by one another the questioned by questioners [d] who can pull to pieces and criticise the four things. But in subjects where we try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of us and makes the man who gives an exposition in speech or writing or in replies to questions appear to most of his hearers to know nothing of the things on

which he is attempting to write or speak for they are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or speaker which is proved to be at fault but the defective nature of each of the four instruments. The process however of dealing with all of these, [e] as the mind moves up and down to each in turn does after much effort give birth in a well-constituted mind to knowledge of that which is well constituted. But if a man is ill-constituted by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral character)—or it may have become so by deterioration—not even Lynceus could endow such men with the power [344a] of sight.

In one word the man who has no natural kinship with this matter cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it. Therefore, if men are not by nature and kinship allied to justice and all other things that are honourable though they may be good at learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds—or if they have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory—none of all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice [b]. For both must be learnt together and together also must be learnt by complete and long continued study as I said at the beginning the true and the false about all that has real being. After much effort as names definitions sights and other data of sense are brought into contact and friction one with another in the course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines forth understanding about every problem and an intelligence whose efforts reach the furthest limits of human powers [c]. Therefore every man of worth when dealing with matters of worth will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing. In one word then it may be known from this that if one sees written treatises composed by anyone either the laws of a lawgiver or in any other form whatever these are not for that man the things of most worth if he is a man of worth but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth [d] and committed to writing then surely not gods but men have themselves bereft him of his wits.

Anyone who has followed this discourse and

Plato he said I am trying to convince our friend Dionysios that, if I am able to bring Heracleides before us to defend himself on the charges which have been made against him, and if he decides that Heracleides must no longer live in Sicily he should be allowed (this is my point) to take his son and wife and sail to the Peloponnese and reside there, [d] taking no action there against Dionysios and enjoying the income of his property. I have already sent for him and will send for him again and if he comes in obedience either to my former message or to this one—well and good. But I beg and entreat Dionysios that, if anyone finds Heracleides either in the country or here, no harm shall come to him, [e] but that he may retire from the country till Dionysios comes to some other decision. Do you agree to this? he added addressing Dionysios. I agree," he replied, that even if he is found at your house, no harm shall be done to him beyond what has now been said.

On the following day Eurybios and Theodotes came to me in the evening both greatly disturbed. Theodotes said, Plato you were present yesterday during the promises made by Dionysios to me and to you about Heracleides?" Certainly I replied. Well," he continued, at this moment peltasts are scouring the country seeking to arrest Heracleides and he must be somewhere in this neighbourhood. [34a]

For Heaven's sake come with us to Dionysios." So we went and stood in the presence of Dionysios and those two stood shedding silent tears, while I said "These men are afraid that you may take strong measures with regard to Heracleides contrary to what was agreed yesterday. For it seems that he has returned and has been seen somewhere about here." On hearing this he blazed up and turned all colours as a man would in a rage. [b] Theodotes, falling before him in tears, took his hand and entreated him to do nothing of the sort. But I broke in and tried to encourage him, saying, Be of good cheer. Theodotes Dionysios will not have the heart to take any fresh step contrary to his promises of yesterday. Fixing his eye on me, and assuming his most autocratic air he said, "To you I promised nothing small or great." "By the gods, I said you did promise that forbearance for which our friend here now appeals. With these words I turned away and went out. After this he continued the hunt for Heracleides, [c] and Theodotes, sending messengers, urged Heracleides to take flight. Dionysios sent out Teisias and some peltasts with or-

ders to pursue him. But Heracleides, as it was said was just in time by a small fraction of a day in making his escape into Carthaginian territory.

After this Dionysios thought that his long cherished scheme not to restore Dion's property would give him a plausible excuse for hostility towards me and first of all he sent me out of the acropolis, [d] finding a pretext that the women were obliged to hold a sacrificial service for ten days in the garden in which I had my lodging. He therefore ordered me to stay outside in the house of Archedemos during this period. While I was there, Theodotes sent for me and made a great outpouring of indignation at these occurrences throwing the blame on Dionysios. Hearing that I had been to see Theodotes he regarded this as another excuse, [e] sister to the previous one, for quarrelling with me. Sending a messenger he enquired if I had really been conferring with Theodotes on his invitation. Certainly I replied. Well continued the messenger he ordered me to tell you that you are not acting at all well in preferring always Dion and Dion's friends to him. And he did not send for me to return to his house, as though it were now clear that Theodotes and Heracleides were my friends, and he my enemy. He also thought that I had no kind feelings towards him because the property of Dion was now entirely done for.

[35a] After this I resided outside the acropolis among the mercenaries. Various people then came to me, among them those of the ships crewed who came from Athens my own fellow citizens, and reported that I was evil spoken of among the peltasts, and that some of them were threatening to make an end of me if they could get hold of me. Accordingly I devised the following plan for my safety.

I sent to Archytas and my other friends in Taras, telling them the plight I was in. Finding some excuse for an embassy from their city [b] they sent a thirty-oared galley with Lamiscos, one of themselves who came and entreated Dionysios about me, saying that I wanted to go and that he should on no account stand in my way. He consented and allowed me to go giving me money for the journey. But for Dion's property I made no further request, nor was any of it restored.

I made my way to the Peloponnese to Olympia where I found Dion a spectator at the Games, and told him what had occurred. Callinus, Zeus to be his witness he at once urged me with my relatives and friends to make prepara-

on these conditions remain for the present year [d] and at the next season you shall depart taking the property with you I am quite sure that Dion will be grateful to you if you accomplish so much on his behalf

When I heard this proposal I was vexed but after reflection said I would let him know my view of it on the following day We agreed to that effect for the moment and afterwards when I was by myself I pondered the matter in much distress The first reflection that came up leading the way in my self-communing was this [e] Come suppose that Dionysios intends to do none of the things which he has mentioned but that, after my departure he writes a plausible letter to Dion, and orders several of his creatures to write to the same effect telling him of the proposal which he has now made to me, making out that he was willing to do what he proposed [347a] but that I refused and completely neglected Dion's interests Further suppose that he is not willing to allow my departure and without giving personal orders to any of the merchants makes it clear as he easily can to all that he does not wish me to sail will anyone consent to take me as a passenger when I leave the house of Dionysios?

For in addition to my other troubles I was lodging at that time in the garden which surrounds his house from which even the gate-keeper would have refused to let me go unless an order had been sent to him from Dionysios

Suppose however that I wait for the year I shall be able to write word of these things to Dion stating the position in which I am and the steps which I am trying to take And if Dionysios does any of the things which he says, [b] I shall have accomplished something that is not altogether to be sneered at for Dion's property is at a fair estimate perhaps not less than a hundred talents If however the prospect which I see looming in the future takes the course which may reasonably be expected I know not what I shall do with myself Still it is perhaps necessary to go on working for a year, and to attempt to prove by actual fact the machinations of Dionysios

Having come to this decision on the following day I said to Dionysios [c] I have decided to remain But I continued I must ask that you will not regard me as empowered to act for Dion but will along with me write a letter to him stating what has now been decided and enquire whether this course satisfies him If it does not and if he has other wishes and demands, he must write particulars of them as

soon as possible, and you must not as yet take any hasty step with regard to his interests

This was what was said and this was the agreement which was made almost in these words Well after this the trading ships took their departure, and it was no longer possible for me to take mine [d] when Dionysios if you please, addressed me with the remark that half the property must be regarded as belonging to Dion and half to his son Therefore, he said he would sell it, and when it was sold would give half to me to take away and would leave half on the spot for the son This course, he said was the most just This proposal was a blow to me and I thought it absurd to argue any longer with him however I said that we must wait for Dion's letter and then once more write to tell him of this new proposal [e] His next step was the brilliant one of selling the whole of Dion's property using his own discretion with regard to the manner and terms of the sale and the selection of the purchasers He spoke not a word to me about the matter from beginning to end and I followed his example and never talked to him again about Dion's affairs for I did not think that I could do any good by doing so This is the history so far of my efforts to come to the rescue of philosophy and of my friends

[348a] After this Dionysios and I went on with our daily life I with my eyes turned abroad like a bird yearning to fly from its perch and he always devising some new way of scaring me back and of keeping a tight hold on Dion's property However we gave out to all Sicily that we were friends Dionysios now deserting the policy of his father attempted to lower the pay of the older members of his body guard The soldiers were furious and assembling in great numbers declared that they would not submit [b] He attempted to use force to them shutting the gates of the acropolis but they charged straight for the walls yelling out an unintelligible and ferocious war cry Dionysios took fright and conceded all their demands and more to the peltasts then assembled

A rumour soon spread that Heracleides had been the cause of all the trouble Hearing this, Heracleides kept out of the way Dionysios was trying to get hold of him [c] and being unable to do so sent for Theodotes to come to him in his garden It happened that I was walking in the garden at the same time I neither know nor did I hear the rest of what passed between them, but what Theodotes said to Dionysios in my presence I know and remember

tions for taking vengeance [c] on Dionysios—our ground for action being the breach of faith to a guest—so he put it and regarded it while his own was his unjust expulsion and banishment. Hearing this, I told him that he might call my friends to his aid, if they wished to go.

But for myself I continued you and others in a way forced me to be the sharer of Dionysios table and hearth and his associate in the acts of religion. He probably believed the current slanders, that I was plotting with you against him and his despotic rule yet feelings of scruple prevailed with him [d] and he spared my life. Again I am hardly of the age for being comrade in arms to anyone also I stand as a neutral between you if ever you desire friendship and wish to benefit one another so long as you aim at injuring one another call others to your aid. This I said because I was disgusted with my misguided journeyings to Sicily and my ill fortune there. But they disobeyed me and would not listen to my attempts at reconciliation and so brought on their own heads all the evils which have since taken place [e]. For if Dionysios had restored to Dion his property or been reconciled with him on any terms none of these things would have happened so far as human foresight can foretell Dion would have easily been kept in check by my wishes and influence. But now rushing upon one another they have caused universal disaster.

[351a] Dion's aspiration however was the same that I should say my own or that of any other right minded man ought to be. With regard to his own power his friends and his country the ideal of such a man would be to win the greatest power and honour by rendering the greatest services. And this end is not attained if a man gets riches for himself his supporters and his country, by forming plots and getting together conspirators being all the while a poor creature not master of himself overcome by the cowardice which fears to fight against pleasures [b] nor is it attained if he goes on to kill the men of substance, whom he speaks of as the enemy and to plunder their possessions and invites his confederates and supporters to do the same, with the object that no one shall say that it is his fault if he complains of being poor. The same is true if anyone renders services of

this kind to the State and receives honours from her for distributing by decrees the property of the few among the many—or if being in charge of the affairs of a great State which rules over many small ones [c] he unjustly appropriates to his own State the possessions of the small ones. For neither a Dion nor any other man will, with his eyes open make his way by steps like these to a power which will be fraught with destruction to himself and his descendants for all time but he will advance towards constitutional government and the framing of the justest and best laws reaching these ends without executions and murders even on the smallest scale.

This course Dion actually followed thinking it preferable to suffer iniquitous deeds rather than to do them but while taking precautions against them he nevertheless when he had reached the climax of victory over his enemies [d] took a false step and fell a catastrophe not at all surprising. For a man of piety temperance and wisdom when dealing with the impious would not be entirely blind to the character of such men but it would perhaps not be surprising if he suffered the catastrophe that might befall a good ship's captain who would not be entirely unaware of the approach of a storm, but might be unaware of its extraordinary and startling violence and might therefore be overwhelmed by its force. The same thing caused Dion's downfall. For he was not unaware that his assailants were thoroughly bad men but he was unaware how high a pitch of infatuation and of general wickedness and greed they had reached [e]. This was the cause of his downfall which has involved Sicily in countless sorrows.

[352a] As to the steps which should be taken after the events which I have now related my advice has been given pretty fully and may be regarded as finished and if you ask my reasons for recounting the story of my second journey to Sicily it seemed to me essential that an account of it must be given because of the strange and paradoxical character of the incidents. If in this present account of them they appear to anyone more intelligible and seem to anyone to show sufficient grounds in view of the circumstances the present statement is adequate and not too lengthy.

